PEACEW RKS

MaPPInG conFLIcT TrenDs In PakIsTan

Saira Yamin

and Salma Malik

[ [
Cover map: XNR Productions

The views expressed in this report are those of 

the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 93. First published 2014.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-211-9

© 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace

About the Report

Over the past decade, Pakistan’s domestic security 

landscape has become increasingly volatile and complex. 

An examination of the incidence of violence during this 

period reveals a multiplicity of conflict actors, varying 

patterns of violence in different regions, and an unprecedented number of casualties. This report, sponsored 

by the United States Institute of Peace, maps recent 

conflict trends in Pakistan and explores the trajectory 

of violence in the provinces—namely, Punjab, Sindh, 

Khyber Paktunkhwa, and Balochistan—and the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas and Gilgit-Baltistan and draws 

from a variety of Pakistani and international sources to 

present as comprehensive a picture as possible. 

About the Authors

Saira Yamin, a conflict resolution scholar-practitioner 

and development worker, is associate professor at the 

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu. Her 

research focuses on peace and conflict; South Asia; and 

women, peace, and security. Salma Malik is assistant 

professor at the Department of Defense and Strategic 

Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. 

She specializes in the areas of war, arms control and 

disarmament, and South Asian affairs. The views 

expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. 

They do not represent those of any government or 

organization they are affiliated with or necessarily reflect 

the views of the United States Institute of Peace. 
PEACEWORKS • FEBRUARY 2014 • NO. 93

CONTENTS

Introduction ... 5

e External Environment: Regional and International Pressures ... 5

Domestic Conict Trends by Region ... 7

Conclusions and Recommendations ... 19

[During the past decade, violence has become endemic 

across many parts of Pakistan. The country’s own experience 

suggests that if the existing conditions persist, the country 

could face escalation of violence levels, widespread 

lawlessness, and potential fragmentation.]

3

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

Summary 

■ Over the past decade, Pakistan has experienced a signicant rise in violence in terms of 

frequency, scope, and magnitude. e origins and intensity of violence vary regionally and 

involve both long-standing conict actors and new groups.

■ Violence is most concentrated along the Afghan border in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas (FATA) and the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Other regions of 

Pakistan lying along the border with Afghanistan, including Balochistan and GilgitBaltistan, have also experienced a signicant escalation in violence. is escalation is in part 

a result of the nexus between sectarian militants and terrorist outts. 

■ In Sindh, most of the violence is concentrated in Karachi, which witnessed a tenfold 

increase in violence between 2006 and 2013. e security landscape there has become 

increasingly complex over the years with the addition of many types of actors, including 

sectarian militant groups, terrorist outts, political parties, and criminal gangs.

■ e scale, scope, and magnitude of violence in Balochistan, the largest province in Pakistan 

in terms of territory, remain unprecedented and unabated. Sectarian and terrorist activities 

targeting the Shia Hazara community have compounded the eects of a high-intensity 

conict between a secessionist insurgency and the military that has been under way in the 

province since 2006. Balochistan also provides safe haven to the Quetta Shura, a key 

Afghan Taliban group headed by Mullah Omar. 

■ For the past decade, Punjab has experienced the least violence of any province in Pakistan. 

However, the province is increasingly a breeding ground for terrorist and militant recruits 

engaged in violence in other regions. 

■ Given the diverse and broad spectrum of conicts aicting Pakistan, it is important to 

analyze and address each conict in its own context and plan for comprehensive state 

stabilization and peacebuilding processes entailing both short- and long-term measures.
Number of Attacks in Pakistan, by District, 2012
5

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

Introduction

Over the past decade, Pakistan’s domestic security landscape has become increasingly volatile and 

complex. An examination of the incidence of violence during this period reveals a multiplicity 

of conict actors, new and old (including armed state, nonstate, domestic, and transnational 

groups); varying patterns of violence in dierent regions, both high and low intensity in nature; 

and an unprecedented number of casualties. In some cases, the symptoms are the product of 

long-standing unresolved issues, while in others, new sources of conict have emerged to compound existing ones, exacerbating the scope and magnitude of violence.

Across Pakistan, the various types of organized political and extremist violence include but are 

not limited to terrorism, secessionist insurgency, interfaith and intrafaith extremist violence, sectarian strife, and ethnic turf wars. e strategic nexus and close coordination among various groups 

perpetuating the violence often make it dicult to draw a distinction between the typology of violence and the motivations guiding the groups’ behavior. e government’s response to the intense 

and chronic nature of these incidents has over the years ranged from apathy to reliance on shortterm security measures, including heavy-handed military operations to counter terrorism; alleged 

extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances involving the police and intelligence agencies; 

and external military intervention, primarily in the form of a U.S. Predator drone campaign under 

way since 2004, with the state’s tacit consent.1

 Eorts to meaningfully address underlying socioeconomic and political conditions contributing to the fragile environment have been negligible. 

Pakistan’s recent experience with extreme high-intensity levels of violence has been reported 

in a number of prominent empirical studies. e Uppsala Conict Data Program identies 

Pakistan as one of six countries that qualies to be in the category of “war,” having crossed the 

unfortunate gure of one thousand battle-related deaths in a year’s time.2 e Global Peace 

Index (GPI) positions Pakistan among the ten least peaceful countries in the world. It suggests 

that, since 2004, Pakistan has ranked among the top ve countries showing the fastest decline in 

peacefulness globally.3 Pakistan ranked 149 out of 162 countries in the 2012 GPI and slipped 

to 157 for the year 2013.4 It noted that Pakistan was among the worst performers in the South 

Asian subregion in terms of the number of conicts fought.5

is report maps the various manifestations of protracted political and extremist conict in 

Pakistan involving state, nonstate, and transnational actors; highlights the main zones of violence; 

identies key players; and oers a contextual description of conict dynamics. It examines various regions in Pakistan, including the provinces—namely, Punjab, Sindh, KP, and Balochistan—

FATA, and Gilgit-Baltistan (formerly known as the Northern Areas). e report does not, however, address organized political or extremist violence in Kashmir, territory disputed by Pakistan 

and India. Although Kashmir presents a protracted conict, one of the oldest on the agenda of 

the United Nations, and has been a perpetual battleground for a number of armed nonstate actors mentioned in this report, the issue is beyond the scope of this study due to its predominantly 

interstate nature. 

The External Environment: Regional and International Pressures

Although this report focuses primarily on Pakistan’s internal conicts, the country’s overall security situation is also shaped, both directly and indirectly, by relations with its neighbors and 

the role of the Great Powers, particularly the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union. It is 

therefore important to acknowledge this outer layer of complexity and the key external players 

inuencing security dynamics within Pakistan.

The Global Peace Index 

(GPI) positions Pakistan 

among the ten least 

peaceful countries in the 

world. It suggests that, 

since 2004, Pakistan has 

ranked among the top 

five countries showing 

the fastest decline in 

peacefulness globally.
6

PEACEWORKS 93

Pakistan’s history of warfare and outstanding territorial disputes with nuclear archrival and 

neighbor India have contributed to the country’s evolution as a security state, one where military 

security has been pursued at the cost of human security. us, the Pakistani state has historically ascribed a very low priority to socioeconomic development generally across the country, 

allocating a large proportion of its annual budget to compete in an arms race with India. e 

India-centric security posturing is also the driver of Pakistan’s nuclear program, estimated to 

cost the country about $800 million annually since 2011, approximately 10 percent of its annual 

conventional military expenditure.6

Pakistan and India have been engaged in full-scale war three times. e unresolved Kashmir 

dispute led to two of these wars (1948, 1965) and a low-intensity confrontation known as the 

Kargil War (1999). e two states have been perpetually engaged in border skirmishes across 

the disputed frontier in Kashmir since their independence from the British in 1947.7 e year 

2013 has seen violation of a cease-re agreement reached in 2003 and the highest levels of violence between the two neighbors in a decade.8

 Pakistan and India also engaged in full-edged 

warfare in 1971, leading to the secession of East Pakistan as the independent state of Bangladesh. Other outstanding political disputes between Pakistan and India include the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation water dispute, unresolved since 1998; the Sir Creek Boundary dispute 

over the undemarcated sixty-mile strip of water along the Rann of Kuch marshlands, unresolved 

since 1965; and the Siachin Glacier dispute, unresolved since 1984.9

While the Pakistani state has historically mismanaged the conict in Balochistan by neglecting to equitably share national resources toward the socioeconomic development of the 

province and attempting to suppress the insurgency with an iron st, neighboring India has 

been accused of adding fuel to the re by covertly supporting the secessionist movement in 

Balochistan.10 India, on the other hand, accuses Pakistani security agencies of supporting militant groups in Kashmir and providing safe haven to transnational terrorist groups active in 

India. e alleged roles of security agencies in both India and Pakistan in the aairs of the other 

call for signicantly greater condence building between the two countries. 

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have also been historically tenuous. e Durand Line 

marking the 1,500-mile international border between the two countries is not recognized by 

Afghanistan and remains a stumbling block in the way of a congenial regional environment. 

Moreover, successive Afghan governments have taken the position that the entire Pashtun belt 

in Pakistan should be under Afghan territorial control.11 e Pakistan government’s alleged 

support of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan also remains a core point of contention between the two states. Given the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency’s historical reliance on militant nonstate actors as proxies during the Soviet-Afghan war, it is quite 

possible that it would continue to engage them as a rewall against the threat of encirclement 

by a hostile India, adding to the complexity in the security equation. 

One of the most direct consequences of war and violence in Afghanistan has been the ow 

of refugees into Pakistan that began with the Soviet-Afghan war in 1979 and continues in the 

post-9/11 landscape.12 Pakistan has been home to the largest refugee community in the world 

for over three decades. At peak levels, approximately 5 million Afghan refugees lived in Pakistan.13 Although it is claimed that 3.5 million Afghan refugees have been repatriated to their 

home country with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) since March 2002, about 2.2 million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan.14 Afghan 

refugees who are often unable to nd means of employment remain vulnerable to crime as well 

as recruitment by militant groups. 

The Pakistani state has 

historically ascribed a very 

low priority to socioeconomic 

development generally across 

the country, allocating a 

large proportion of its annual 

budget to compete in an 

arms race with India. 
7

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

With protracted war conditions in Afghanistan and a supply of arms from dierent parts of 

the world, Pakistan also developed a weapons culture, now deeply entrenched in society. is became visible when Kalashnikov-toting men became a common sight in Pakistan’s northwestern 

regions soon after the Soviet-Afghan war broke out.15 All forms of small arms and ammunition 

have made their way into the country over the past three decades. e clearest and most adverse 

consequence of the unchecked arms trac has been an exponential rise in the culture of violence 

and terrorist incidence across Pakistani society. 

U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan—aimed at dismantling and disrupting international terrorist networks, including al-Qaeda and the Taliban—has also spilled over into Pakistan. It is most visible in the U.S. Predator drone campaign under way in FATA, the most violent 

region in the country. As noted elsewhere in this report, the civilian casualty rate from drone 

attacks remains disputed across various studies. According to the Washington, DC–based New 

America Foundation, between 2004 and 2010, the civilian casualty rate in the drone campaign 

was particularly high, at about 32 percent.16 e year 2010 was seen as the deadliest in terms 

of number of fatalities, which according to the same source stood at 849.17 e Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) reports 961 dead in drone strikes, an even higher number of 

casualties for the same year.18 Since 2010, however, there has been a decrease in the number of 

drone strikes and people killed. In all, from the launch of the drone campaign in 2004 till July 

2013, the New America Foundation reports between 2,044 to 3,377 people killed in 360 drone 

strikes, whereas PIPS reports 2,777 deaths in 342 drone strikes during the same period.19 e 

deployment of drones, though selected for their precision, has fueled recruitment in militant 

organizations and solidied the resistance against the state in the form of an increasingly strong 

Pakistani Taliban movement, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). e TTP often justies its 

attacks as a response to the U.S. Predator drone strikes, which occur with the Pakistan government’s tacit approval primarily in tribal areas. On another level, the legality of Predator drone 

strikes has been questioned by Phillip Alston, the United Nation’s special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, who argues that the use of Predator drones to carry out 

targeted killings lacks legal basis and may be in violation of international law. 20 Pakistani public 

opinion regarding this form of U.S. military engagement remains unfavorable, contributing to 

strong anti-U.S. sentiment.

Domestic Conflict Trends by Region

Research ndings suggest that Pakistan has generally experienced a signicant rise in violence 

levels during approximately the past decade. e causes of violence vary regionally and involve 

both old and new conict actors. e scope and intensity of violence also varies by region. Violence is most concentrated along the Afghan border in FATA and the province of KP. While 

FATA has historically been a zone of violence, KP was previously one of the most peaceful 

regions of Pakistan. Reports suggest that al-Qaeda- and Pakistani Taliban–led terrorist activity and Pakistan military operations have resulted in the highest number of violence-related 

fatalities. Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city and economic engine, is another critical ashpoint. e 

city, which has experienced chronic instability since the mid-1980s, has demonstrated a tenfold 

increase in violence between 2006 and 2013 and remains volatile. Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest 

province in terms of territory, has also experienced a dramatic increase in violence. Sectarian and 

terrorist activities have compounded high-intensity conict in the province involving an armed 

insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. e scale, scope, and magnitude of violence in 

the province is unprecedented and unabated. During the past decade, Punjab, Pakistan’s core 

The deployment of 

drones, though selected 

for their precision, has 

fueled recruitment in 

militant organizations and 

solidified the resistance 

against the state in the 

form of an increasingly 

strong Pakistani Taliban 

movement.
8

PEACEWORKS 93

province, has experienced the least violence among all regions. Previously high levels of sectarian violence have not shown a signicant propensity for reescalation. However, the intensity 

of terrorist attacks that have taken place in Punjab in the past decade has been dramatic and 

unprecedented, and the province provides a breeding ground for terrorist and militant recruits 

operating at national and transnational levels. 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas

e FATA region, Pakistan’s semiautonomous tribal frontier along the Afghan border, is the 

most volatile conict zone in Pakistan.21 A safe haven for local and transnational terrorist outts 

and a hotbed of terrorist activity in the post-9/11 landscape, FATA is often dubbed the most 

dangerous place on earth. e South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) suggests that FATA is currently the most violent region in South Asia.22 While FATA has been the most violent region 

for well over two decades, the incidence of violence in recent years has been unprecedented, 

both on a per capita basis and in absolute numbers.23 Statistics on current levels of violence 

(recorded between 2009 and 2013) reveal approximately 16,578 casualties involving civilians, security forces, and militants as a consequence of sectarian strife, terrorist-related activity, Pakistan 

military operations, and the U.S. Predator drone campaign.24 e Stimson Center reports that 

between 2002 and 2011 the FATA region experienced eighty-two mass casualty attacks resulting in 1,392 deaths, amounting to approximately 19 percent of the national total.25 ese gures 

suggest that FATA has the highest number of violent deaths in the country.26 e severity of 

violence is signicant given the region’s small population of approximately 3.2 million, around 

2.2 percent of Pakistan’s total. 27

Divided into seven administrative agencies—Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur, 

North Waziristan, and South Waziristan—FATA is often described as an ungoverned space. 

e tribal agencies are not governed by Pakistan’s constitution or legal codes, and law and order 

is instead maintained under a draconian legal framework in place since colonial rule. e federal 

government appoints political agents in each agency to supervise development, oversee the provision of services, and manage intertribal trade regulation.28 ese political agents hold sway in the 

tribal agencies by oering stipends to maliks, or tribal elders, a system widely perceived as unfavorable to human rights and development. e negligible pace of political and administrative reform 

in the region has led to an acute sense of alienation and disaection across FATA. For instance, 

the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), a centuries-old, highly controversial legal framework instituted by the British, remains in place despite former prime minister Yusuf Raza Gilani’s pledge 

to repeal it.29 Under this law, the residents of FATA do not have the rights to appeal detention, 

to legal representation, or to provide reasoned evidence in their defense. 

Some measures to reform the system were taken by the Gilani government, including eorts 

to bring FATA into the political mainstream through the extension of the Political Parties Act 

(2002) to the region in 2011, which permitted local political parties to conduct political activities 

and campaign for elections in the area, and the FATA Local Government Regulation of August 

2012 to establish an elected local council system to build civilian governance capacity.30 However, 

most of these proposed reforms remain at best cosmetic and vague. With the lack of a viable 

alternative to the FCR, the entire process appears to have failed to deliver, compounding the 

challenges of governance and political disarray. e possibility of people-centered development 

and meaningful reforms has been further undermined by the provision of sweeping arrest and 

detention powers to security forces through the regressive Regulation to Provide for Actions in 

Aid of Civil Power in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, passed in June 2011.31 

While FATA has been the 

most violent region for well 

over two decades, the 

incidence of violence in 

recent years has been 

unprecedented, both on 

a per capita basis and in 

absolute numbers.
9

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

Rise of Militancy and Terrorist Networks 

e ow of arms from Afghanistan to FATA is an important factor enabling militancy and terrorism in the region in recent years. It can be traced to the Soviet-Afghan war (1979–88), when 

the region became a convenient training ground, operational base, and safe haven for the mujahideen (religious warriors). e mujahideen included Afghans waging jihad (religious struggle) 

and thousands of volunteers who had poured in from around the world to ght against the Red 

Army. Over the years, many foreign ghters, particularly of Arab and Central Asian origin, were 

able to integrate in FATA by marrying local women and bringing gifts in the form of money for 

the local tribes.32 ey remained in the region after the retreat of the Soviet forces. During the 

Soviet-Afghan war, FATA was also used as the primary supply conduit for arms and aid from 

the CIA, Saudi Arabia, and the ISI to support the Afghan jihad. 

In tandem with these developments, then military ruler of Pakistan, General Zia ul-Haq, 

introduced his policy of Islamization, cultivating the unregulated institution of madrassas 

(religious seminaries) to win favor with the religious constituency and consolidate his rule. 

Many of these schools, particularly the orthodox Deobandi madrassas, ourished in the tribal 

belt and supplied graduates to the Afghan jihad.33 Years later, former mujahideen, primarily of Deobandi orientation, returned to Pakistan organized as the Taliban. Rasul Bakhsh 

Rais notes that the Taliban are the product of two decades of interstate and civil warfare in 

Afghanistan.34 Contrary to popular opinion, he argues, the Taliban are not a new entity; he 

refers to the most prominent commanders as “the veterans of the Mujahideen resistance.”35

Post-9/11, FATA served as an operational base of al-Qaeda and other aliated national 

and international terrorist organizations. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Country 

Reports on Terrorism 2012, the organization has the “ability to inspire, plot and launch regional 

and transnational attacks from its safe haven in Western Pakistan, despite its leadership losses.”36

Although the core of al-Qaeda is now believed to have been signicantly diminished, 37 it has 

over the years provided fertile grounds for the political and military organization of the TTP or 

Pakistani Taliban, allied with other local and transnational militant outts, relying extensively 

on these networks to pursue its strategic objectives.38 ough the precise number of terrorist 

actors aliated with transnational militant organizations is not known, at least fourteen such 

organizations are active in Pakistan.39 Of these, the TTP has emerged as one of the most 

prominent and potent groups. 

Originally established in 2007 as an umbrella outt commanded by Baitullah Mehsud, the 

TTP at its peak is alleged to have encompassed tens of thousands of militants ghting Pakistani, Afghan, and coalition forces.40 According to the Islamabad-based FATA Research Center, the TTP originally formed as an umbrella organization of 40 militant groups, but today it 

includes as many as 130 minor and major militant groups.41 Its founder, Mehsud, was widely 

believed to have been responsible for masterminding Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in December 2007, and in 2009, he was killed in a U.S. drone strike in a joint Pakistan-U.S. intelligence 

operation.42 His death resulted in the fracturing of the TTP into many splinter groups, as well 

as a relative loss in its organizational capability under his successor, Hakimullah Mehsud. On 

November 1, 2013, Hakimullah Mehsud was also killed by a U.S. drone strike in the outskirts 

of Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan. In the absence of a predesignated successor, the 

iron-sted Maulana Fazlullah was elected the new chief of the TTP. While Fazlullah proved 

himself to be a ruthless commander during his two-year rule of the Swat Valley (2007– 09), 

and in leading a number of signicant terrorist attacks in Pakistan, it is widely speculated that 

he may not be able to command widespread authority over the TTP because he lacks tribal afAlthough the core of 

al-Qaeda is now believed 

to have been significantly 

diminished, it has over 

the years provided fertile 

grounds for the political 

and military organization 

of the TTP.
10

PEACEWORKS 93

liation with the Mehsud and Waziri tribes, which form the core of the organization.43 He has 

been held responsible for organizing a number of terrorist attacks, including on both soft and 

high-prole targets, such as the killing of Asfandyar Amirzeb, the nazim (district administrator) of Swat and grandson of the Wali of Swat in December 2007; the attempted assassination 

of school girl activist Malala Yousafzai in October 2012; and the killing of Pakistani Major 

General Sanaullah Khan Niazi in September 2013.

Pakistan Military Operations 

Between 2001 and 2010, the Pakistani military has conducted a number of operations in FATA 

province along the Afghan border. By one assessment, Pakistani troop levels along its frontiers with Afghanistan have ranged roughly between 55,000 and 145,000 from 2001 to 2011.44

During 2011 and 2012, the Pakistan military carried out 144 and 107 operational attacks respectively against militants in various agencies of FATA.45 Despite these eorts, terrorist activity in FATA in particular and in Pakistan in general has not abated signicantly. 

e Pakistan military deployed between seventy thousand and eighty thousand troops in 

South and North Waziristan agencies in FATA in Operation Al Mizan between 2002 and 

2006 and Operation Zalzala in 2008.46 Operation Zalzala was targeted primarily at Mehsud’s 

network in South Waziristan. During the operation conducted in January 2008, the Pakistani 

military is reported to have attacked four thousand homes and displaced two hundred thousand 

locals.47 Another military oensive by the name of Operation Sher Dil was launched in Bajaur 

Agency between August 2008 and February 2009. It resulted in the killing of at least one thousand Taliban militants and the displacement of thousands of locals in the combat zones.48 e 

high-intensity confrontation between the military and Taliban militants and aliated groups in 

FATA in 2008 led to the deaths of 3,067 people.49

A key Pakistan military oensive to dismantle the Mehsud-led Taliban bases in South Waziristan, Operation Rah-e-Nijat, was conducted between 2009 and 2010 with some support 

from the U.S. military and the CIA primarily through coordinated drone strikes.50 During this 

operation, the Pakistan military deployed armor units with main battle tanks, infantry units 

equipped with heavy artillery and mortars, helicopter gunships, and xed-wing aircraft.51 In 

early June 2013, following the killing of TTP’s second-in-command, Qari Waliur Rehman, in 

a drone strike in North Waziristan Agency, the Pakistan military stepped up its military operations in various parts of FATA, scaling up targeted operations in North and South Waziristan 

agencies and carrying out major oensives in Khyber and Kurram agencies. 

While the SATP noted a minor 4 percent decline in terrorist-related casualties from 3,034 

in 2011 to 2,901 in 2012, 2013 showed a signicant decline with only 84 casualties reported 

from January to April in the FATA.52 A more recent report by PIPS, spanning January to June, 

2013, suggests that 248 people, including civilians, law enforcers, and tribal elders, were killed in 

174 terrorist attacks, conrming a signicant decline in terrorist-related casualties.53

e GPI notes that heavy ghting between the Pakistan military and the Taliban during 2010, 

particularly in Kurram and Orakzai agencies, led more than two hundred thousand people to 

ee from their homes.54 Further, widespread devastation caused by the Pakistan military’s counterterrorism operations has contributed to a strong sense of alienation among the politically disenfranchised and economically disgruntled communities in FATA. e Internal Displacement 

Monitoring Centre reported at least 415,000 conict-displaced people from FATA as of December 31, 2012.55 An additional 131,000 people are reported to have ed from their homes since 

mid-March 2013.56

Widespread devastation 

caused by the Pakistan 

military’s counterterrorism 

operations has contributed 

to a strong sense of 

alienation among the 

politically disenfranchised 

and economically 

disgruntled communities 

in FATA.
11

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

U.S. Predator Drone Campaign

Since FATA has become the operational base of TTP and al-Qaeda in the post-9/11 landscape, 

it has become the target of the covert U.S. Predator drone campaign. Between 353 and 369 

drone strikes have been reported from 2004 to July 2013, mainly in FATA and KP.57 While 

only ten strikes were reportedly conducted between 2004 and 2007, the number has increased 

signicantly since 2008.58 Since 2008, 93 percent of all reported drone strikes have taken place 

in North and South Waziristan.59 Since the inception of the Predator drone campaign in 2004 

through mid-2013, the New America Foundation reports that drone strikes have killed an estimated 2,077–3,424 people, including between 1,620 and 2,783 suspected militants.60

Sectarian Violence

In 2007, FATA saw the highest levels of sectarian violence in the country, with two stints of 

continuous sectarian violence spanning twenty-four and twenty-six days in Khyber and Kurram 

agencies respectively, resulting in 1,663 fatalities (48 percent) out of a national total of 3,448.61

Khyber and Kurram remained most aected by sectarian violence in 2008 in FATA, but other 

agencies including Orakzai and South Waziristan were also impacted by sectarian clashes.62

General data on sectarian violence across the whole of FATA in 2008 are not available, but 

according to one report, Kurram, the worst-hit area, suered approximately 1,125 fatalities.63

Most of the clashes were between Shia and Sunni groups, but Mohmand agency experienced 

clashes between Sala and Deobandi Taliban groups.64 While Kurram has been troubled with 

sectarian violence since 1987, the Taliban presence in neighboring tribal agencies and their alleged support for Sunni groups is believed to have been a key factor in the exacerbation of sectarian clashes. Ironically, Sunni and Shia leaders are believed to have put an end to the sectarian 

warfare under pressure to come to terms by the militant Haqqani network.65 Sectarian violence 

declined signicantly between 2009 and 2011, with FATA recording a total of 366 casualties 

in forty-nine such clashes. 66 e de-escalation in violence levels was also partly the result of 

military operations, such as Operation Rah-e-Nijat, which as mentioned resulted in the killing 

of Baitullah Mehsud and the fracturing of the TTP. 

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 

Conditions in KP province, which borders and surrounds the FATA region, have deteriorated significantly in recent years. Between 1988 and 2005, KP was generally very stable, remarkably maintaining the lowest levels of violence in the country with 0.9 casualties recorded per year per one hundred 

thousand people compared with 3.3 casualties per year per one hundred thousand people in the rest 

of the country. 67 Recent evidence suggests that its landscape has become extremely volatile since 

2005, and it now ranks as the second most violent region after FATA.68 Between 2005 and 2012, KP 

recorded approximately 11,862 casualties involving civilians, security forces, and militants, primarily 

as a result of terrorist-related activity and Pakistan military operations.69 

On an encouraging note, SATP reports that the year 2012 witnessed a considerable decrease 

in terrorist-related fatalities in KP. ere were 656 fatalities in 147 incidents reported in 2012, 

compared to 1,206 fatalities in 242 incidents of terrorism in 2011.70 PIPS data show a considerably lower number of fatalities in 2011 in KP, with 820 killed, but it suggests that this gure 

was the highest in Pakistan in terrorism-related violence during this period.71 PIPS also notes 

that 1,684 people suered injuries in KP during the same year, another indicator of the violent 

impact of terrorist strikes.72 For the rst six months of 2013, the number of killed and injured 
12

PEACEWORKS 93

is estimated by PIPS at 548 and 1,212 respectively in 351 attacks.73 SATP data (from January 

to mid-August 2013) show 620 people killed in various incidents, including 100 terrorists, 124 

security personnel, and 396 civilians.74 Despite the decline in terrorist-related casualties, KP 

continues to suer at the hands of terrorist organizations. Many prominent political and religious gures and security personnel have been targeted and killed, including provincial minister 

Bashir Ahmed Bilour, Awami National Party (ANP) parliamentarian Alamzeb Khan, Peshawar Deputy Inspector General of Police Malik Saad, and Frontier Constabulary Commandant 

Sifwat Ghayur.75 Also of note are terrorist attacks on sensitive civil military installations, such as 

the Kamra Airbase and the Bacha Khan International Airport in Peshawar.76

Sectarian Violence

KP experienced peak levels of sectarian violence in 2009 and continues to suer such attacks today. 

Between 2006 and 2011, the provincial capital of Peshawar and the cities of Dera Ismail Khan (D. 

I. Khan) and Hangu remained the ashpoints of sectarian violence.77 In 2008 and 2009, levels of 

sectarian violence in KP were the highest in the country, with the highest numbers of attacks reported in D.I. Khan.78 e city experienced sixteen major attacks and sixty-three fatalities in 2008.79

e attacks have been attributed to the increasing strength of the banned Sunni Deobandi sectarian 

groups Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which mainly target the Shia community. 80

In 2009, a total of forty-seven sectarian attacks and seventy-two fatalities were reported in D.I. Khan, 

the highest number in a national total of 104 incidents involving sectarian violence. 81

While there has been a national increase in the level of sectarian violence,82 KP recorded a 

de-escalation of sectarian conict with fourteen sectarian attacks in 2010 and thirteen in 2011.83

SATP notes that both the TTP and TTP-linked sectarian outt LeJ were responsible for these 

attacks.84 In 2010 and 2011, other cities of KP, including Kohat, Mardan, Nowshera, Swat, and 

Swabi, have also experienced low levels (between one and two incidents) of sectarian attacks. 

is decline, according to Muhammad Amir Rana from PIPS, “has partly been attributed to 

Pakistan’s military operations, improved surveillance by law enforcement agencies and death 

of key militants in U.S. drone strikes in FATA.”85 But, Rana argues, stability in the province 

remains elusive owing to poor governance and weak political institutions. From 2012 through 

mid-2013, sectarian-related terrorist attacks and violence have been concentrated mainly in 

Peshawar, D. I. Khan, Hangu, Khyber, and Orakzai agencies. During this period, twenty sectarian attacks were reported. Sunni sectarian groups—including LeJ, Ahle Sunnat wal-Jamaat 

Pakistan (ASWJP), Sunni Tehrik, Jaishul Islam, and Jundullah—and Shia sectarian group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan were responsible for most of these attacks. TTP has also claimed 

responsibility for many attacks targeting members of the Shia community.86

Military Operations

e Pakistan military conducted two major military operations against the Taliban in the scenic 

Swat Valley, Malakand and Buner, known as Operations Rah-e-Haq and Rah-e-Raast, commencing at the end of 2007 and concluding in mid-2009. In 2008 alone, 2,944 people were 

killed as a result of these operations in the province.87 e operations are believed to have led to 

the displacement of up to 2.5 million people.88 e total number of civilian casualties during this 

period remains unknown.89 However, SATP reports that between 2005 and 2012, 11,862 lives 

have been lost in KP as a whole as a result of continuous engagement between security forces and 
13

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

militants.90 Correspondingly, the PIPS reports 13,180 killed and 16,523 injured between January 2005 and June 2013.91 e casualties reported include civilians, security forces, and militants.

Sindh

In the last decade, the third-highest number of fatalities in Pakistan has been reported in Sindh 

province.92 However, 93 percent of the fatalities are concentrated in the provincial capital of Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city and economic engine.93 While Karachi has been rife with violence since 

the mid-1980s, evidence suggests that the intensity of political violence in Karachi was signi-

cantly reduced between 1999 and 2005. Prior to 2005, Sindh ranked as the second most violent 

region after FATA in terms of casualties on per capita basis, although in terms of absolute numbers, the province has been a conict hotspot since the mid-1980s.94 Karachi’s initial experience 

with intense political violence involving ethnic clashes resulted in at least 9,000 fatalities between 

1985 and 1998.95 During this phase, the highest levels of violence were observed in the years 1994 

and 1995, which recorded 1,113 and 2,095 casualties, respectively.96

Karachi observed a tenfold rise in the scale of political acts of violence and related deaths 

between 2006 and 2011.97 e years 2012 and 2013 have demonstrated signicant escalation of 

violence with attacks of various nature involving civilians, criminal gangs, security forces, terrorists, and militants.98 e year 2013 has seen the worst violence levels in the history of Karachi 

with 2,700 people killed.99 Ethnic target killings, sectarian violence, terrorism, political riots, 

and demonstrations are frequent in the province.100

Ethnopolitical Turf Wars

With an ever-expanding metropolitan population of approximately eighteen million, Karachi 

is one of the world’s largest cities, and demographic changes have contributed signicantly to a 

sharp resurgence in ethno-sectarian violence in the past decade.101

e ethnic composition of the city has transformed since 1941, when Sindhis formed more than 

62 percent of the population and the Urdu-speaking Muhajir immigrant population from the territories of northern India represented a mere 6 percent.102 Pakistan’s last countrywide census was held 

in 1998, making it dicult to state exact population gures, but by one recent conservative estimate, 

Karachi is now approximately 43 percent Muhajir, 17 percent Pashtun, 11 percent Punjabi, 6 percent 

Sindhi, 5 percent Balochi, 3 percent Seraiki, and 2 percent Hazara or Gilgiti.103 Another high-end 

estimate of the Muhajir population in Karachi suggests that they now form well over 50 percent of 

the population, with Pashtuns representing about 22 percent of the city’s population.104

Regardless of the exact gures, Karachi is now believed to be home to the largest urban 

population of Pashtuns, surpassing predominantly Pashto-speaking cities, such as Peshawar and 

Quetta.105 Relations between the Muhajirs and the Pashtuns have been tenuous, as conict 

is driven by economic and political competition for greater control over land and resources. 

e Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reports that “much of the violence is aimed at 

changing the demographics of those constituencies where there is an unequal mixed ethnic 

population among a larger homogenous one.”106 Much of the ethnic violence in Karachi in 

recent years has involved turf wars between rival gangs backed by political parties, including the 

Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), 107 a political party founded to represent the interests of 

the Muhajir community, and the ANP, a Pashtun nationalist party. More recently, Baloch gangs 

allegedly associated with the Pakistan People’s Party have also been involved in clashes with the 

Much of the ethnic violence 

in Karachi in recent years 

has involved turf wars 

between rival gangs backed 

by political parties.
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PEACEWORKS 93

MQM. Additionally, Jamaat-e-Islami, a prominent religious political party, is seen as having 

some responsibility for the ethnic and political violence.108

e political turf battles in Karachi have resulted in target killings, kidnappings for ransom, 

and extortions; they are exacerbated further by a large presence of underworld gangs, some of 

which are allegedly supported by political parties, and those operating as independent criminals.109 Kidnappings and killings are so common that people are afraid to leave their homes and 

send their children to schools.110 Afghan and Pakistani Taliban groups are also consolidating in 

Karachi, engaging in criminal activity, recruiting and fundraising, and, in the case of the TTP, 

organizing attacks on security personnel and political or sectarian rivals.111

Sectarian Violence

On the sectarian front, most of the recent violence in Karachi has involved target killings between Sunnis and Shias. PIPS reports suggest that sectarian violence has been steadily on the 

rise in Sindh in recent years with most of the incidents concentrated in Karachi.112 Between 

2009 and 2011, 98 sectarian attacks resulting in 191 reported fatalities. Intrasectarian violence 

between the orthodox Deobandi Sunnis, such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and the 

relatively moderate Barelvi Sunnis, represented by the Sunni Tehreek, has also increased.113 A 

number of militant organizations are engaged in sectarian violence in Karachi. 

One of the most prominent outts active—not only in Karachi but elsewhere in Pakistan—is 

the SSP, the largest Deobandi sectarian organization in the country. Established in the 1980s, it 

was renamed Ahle Sunnat wal-Jamaat Pakistan (ASWJP) after it was banned by the government 

in 2002 and continues to operate openly under this banner today. e SSP’s militant aliate wing, 

the LeJ, has claimed responsibility for multiple sectarian attacks in Karachi and Balochistan and 

is believed to maintain links with al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. e LeJ have organized 

suicide bombings and attacked Western targets in Karachi and participated in insurgencies in 

Afghanistan and Kashmir.114

Other radical elements in Karachi include the Tehreek-e-Islami Lashkar-e-Muhammadi 

(TILM), formed by militants from banned Sunni outts Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and 

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM). TILM is capable of organizing high-intensity attacks with 

sophisticated weaponry and seeks to target non-Muslim and foreign NGOs.115 Shia militant 

organizations active in Karachi include the Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan, established in the 

1990s to counter and attack SSP/ASWJP and LeJ targets.116 e outt, now banned in Pakistan, is recognized by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization.

Balochistan

Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province in terms of its geographic size, comprising about 42 percent of the national territory. It ranks as the fourth most violent region over the past decade.117 e 

province has experienced a signicant escalation in violence levels since 2002–03.118 PIPS reports 

the loss of 4,320 lives between September 11, 2001, and June 30, 2013, as a result of dierent types 

of political and extremist violence.119 Another report by the SATP estimates 3,679 fatalities in 

Balochistan between January 2004 and January 2013 alone.120 Insurgency and counterinsurgency 

operations, sectarian strife, and the presence of local and transnational terrorist outts in the province have contributed to an increasingly complex and deteriorating security landscape. An examination of Balochistan’s security environment preceding the wave of escalating social and political 

unrest in the province during the past decade reveals that the security landscape has changed 

radically in the province. High-intensity conict between security forces and nationalist groups 
15

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

has contributed to an internal displacement crisis in the province, with at least 140,000 persons 

aected; these include members of the Bugti tribe, Punjabi settlers, and Shias. 121

Insurgency

Balochistan has had a troubled relationship with the federal government since its controversial 

accession to Pakistan in March 1948.122 Despite an abundance of natural resources, Balochistan 

remains the least developed part of Pakistan. e federal government owes billions of Pakistani 

rupees to Balochistan in natural gas revenue arrears, compounding the trust decit.123 In 2004, 

under the interim setup of Prime Minister Shujaat Hussain, a thirty-eight-member committee 

was formed to make recommendations addressing Balochistan’s grievances and its relationship with the center.124 Based on the ndings of this committee, subsequent reconciliation 

committees, and provincial devolution plans proposed during the 2008 elections, the former 

government of Prime Minister Gilani announced the “Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan” (Initiation of Rights and Privileges for Balochistan) package in November 2009.125 e package 

spelled out the government’s determination to correct the wrongs of history by conferring the 

political, economic, and cultural rights of the province. Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan was 

designed as a comprehensive process providing for, among other measures, constitutional reforms for increased provincial autonomy and local government control; a restructuring of the 

revenue-sharing formulas of the National Finance Commission Award, shifting from previous 

population-based formulas that had left Balochistan with a small share of national resources; 

increased educational quotas and employment programs; and the release of political workers 

and investigation into missing persons cases and the death of Baloch nationalist leader Nawab 

Akbar Bugti in 2006.126

Recent reports suggest that the provincial share of the national budget has more than doubled and that the center has also started a process of paying back natural gas revenue arrears to 

the province under the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package. 127 However, the perception 

of exploitation of resources, widespread poverty, chronic underdevelopment, and disproportionate underrepresentation of the Baloch people in state institutions continue to challenge the 

relations between the central government and the province. e province has seen ve armed 

revolts since Pakistan’s inception in 1948, 1954, 1966, and 1977. e roots of a fth ongoing 

insurgency were sown in 2002, when Pakistan military set up cantonments in the resource-rich 

Kohlu and Sui districts of Balochistan, exacerbating antistate resentment.128 2005, prominent 

Baloch nationalist leaders Nawab Akbar Bugti and Mir Balach Marri issued a fteen-point 

list of demands to the federal government calling for greater autonomy and control over the 

province’s resources, protection for the Baloch populace, and an end to building of military 

bases.129 In August 2006, Bugti’s death in a military crackdown ordered by former president 

Pervez Musharraf triggered a sharp spike in violence widely regarded as fueling the conditions 

for the current insurgency. 

e Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is the most prominent militant separatist group 

in the province. It is headed by Harbyar Marri, who currently resides in London and is highly 

inuential in Quetta, Bolan, Kech, Khuzdar, and Kohlu districts in Balochistan. e BLA is 

also allegedly active in Karachi and bordering parts of South Punjab, where it is believed to be 

involved in criminal activities such as abduction, extortion, and armed robbery.130 Another inuential militant organization is the Baloch Republican Army, led by Brahamdagh Bugti, whose 

membership is mostly drawn from the Bugti tribe. In 2012 alone, the group carried out 121 terrorist attacks in Dera Bugti, Naseerabad, Dera Murad Jamali, Barkhan, and Loralai districts. 131

The roots of a fifth 

ongoing insurgency were 

sown in 2002, when 

Pakistan military set 

up cantonments in the 

resource-rich Kohlu and 

Sui districts of Balochistan, 

exacerbating antistate 

resentment.
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PEACEWORKS 93

Lashkar-e-Balochistan, led by Javed Mengal, is an emerging insurgent group concentrated in the Khuzdar, Panjgur, Gwadar, and Turbat areas of Balochistan. e organization 

has expanded its terrorist operations in Punjab and Karachi. It is suspected to have been involved in terrorist attacks on the Chinese consulate in Karachi in July 2012 and a blast at the 

Lahore Railway Station in August 2012. e Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), another 

active insurgent group, is led by Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch. It operates across Balochistan but 

is primarily focused in the southern coastal Makran belt. e United Baloch Army, led by 

Mureed Baloch, is a splinter group of the BLF, which is known for attacking settlers from 

Punjab and Pakhtun areas. On June 15, 2013, the ocial residency—and historic landmark—

of Pakistan’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was attacked, torched, and razed to 

the ground; the BLA claimed responsibility.132 Besides these organizations, many other actors—such as the TTP, Tehreek-e-Taliban Balochistan, and progovernment groups such as 

the Baloch Musallah Difa’a Tanzeem, led by Shaq Mengal—have played a role in the fractured security landscape of the province.133

PIPS reports that most violence in Balochistan is generated by the insurgency. According to the think tank, between September 2001 and June 2013, 2,430 people were killed and 

4,692 injured in 3,694 attacks by nationalist insurgents.134 PIPS has also documented twentysix operational attacks by security forces during the same period leading to ninety killed and 

fty-two injured.135

Fatalities reported in Balochistan, however, do not account for the increasing number of 

enforced disappearances, people who are frequently found dead.136 e victims are mostly from 

the ethnic Baloch and Brahui communities.137 e enforced disappearances are allegedly a 

dynamic of the ongoing confrontation between various Baloch insurgent groups—as they demand autonomy, greater political rights, and control over their resources and the security forces 

—and the Pakistani government. In 2012, Pakistan’s then minister of interior, Rehman Malik, 

acknowledged that 2,390 people had been reported missing in the province while also questioning the credibility of the reports led on behalf of the suspected victims.138 International human 

rights organizations have linked the enforced disappearances to alleged extrajudicial killings by 

members of the Pakistani security services.139 Members of insurgent groups are also allegedly 

killed in target attacks by security forces.140 Punjabis and Urdu-speaking settlers in the province, 

particularly professionals, such as doctors, engineers, and teachers, have been killed in targeted 

attacks by insurgent outts who regard them as usurping local resources.

Sectarian Conflict 

Hazara Shia immigrants from neighboring Afghanistan have borne the brunt of sectarian 

violence in Balochistan province. Most of the world’s eight to ten million Hazaras live in Afghanistan; facing persecution there, they have sought safety through emigration for well over 

a century, including to neighboring Pakistan. Approximately 25,000 Hazaras are believed to 

have emigrated to Pakistan over the past decade, where the current Hazara population is now 

estimated at around 600,000.141 

Within Pakistan, the Hazara community has come under increased attack in recent years. 

e LeJ and SSP Deobandi Sunni sectarian groups claim most of the attacks against the 

Hazara Shias;142 these militant organizations often mobilize their manpower based in Punjab, 

Sindh, and KP against targets in Balochistan.143 A report by the provincial home department 

in Balochistan estimates that more than 450 Shias and Hazaras were killed in the province in 

over 110 sectarian attacks between 2008 and 2011 alone.144 is is likely a low-end estimate. 
17

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

In 2012, more than one hundred Hazaras were killed in the province, mostly in the provincial 

capital of Quetta and the Mastung district.145 A single mass sectarian attack on January 10, 

2013, claimed more than one hundred Hazara Shia lives in the capital city Quetta; these losses 

were further compounded by another brutal suicide bombing in a vegetable market on February 16, 2013, that claimed another eighty-four lives.146 e trends in sectarian violence appear 

to be consistent over the years, showing a propensity to increase rather than decline. From 

January 2012 to June 2013, 311 Shia community members have been killed and another 558 

have been injured in sixty-one attacks.147

Terrorist Organizations

A number of transnational and local terrorist outts have been active in Balochistan during 

the past decade. Among them, al-Qaeda, the Quetta Shura Taliban, and Tehreek-e-Taliban 

Balochistan are prominent.148 Operations by these groups in the province have further exacerbated existing separatist conict conditions. Chaman, a city bordering Afghanistan, and 

the provincial capital Quetta appear to have the greatest Taliban presence.149 e province 

has been noted as the location of the highest number of attacks against NATO supply trucks 

bound for Afghanistan, with 158 attacks on NATO trucks reported between 2008 and June 

2013.150 SATP has also noted the arrests of several al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban militants in 

the province since 2009.151

Punjab

By virtue of its economic strength and large population size, Punjab is considered the core province of Pakistan. Evidence suggests that it is currently the least violent of all provinces in the 

country.152 Although the total number of violence-related deaths is much lower in relative terms 

compared with other regions in Pakistan, the absolute numbers of violence-related deaths are 

indicative of signicant instability in the province. As Jacob Shapiro and Saad Gulzar note, “e 

average death toll per militant attack in Punjab has increased by more than 1000% since 2005, 

and that for terrorist attacks has more than doubled.”153 is dramatic increase in casualties is 

attributed to the deadly nature of terrorist attacks in the province. e assessment points toward 

an unprecedented rise in terrorist-related activity in Punjab.154 While the incidence of political 

riots and demonstrations did not increase signicantly between 1988 and 2010 in the province, 

the number of casualties associated with such incidents more than doubled.155

Militant and Terrorist Organizations and Operations

Punjab is home to a number of extremist militant organizations, particularly those based in the 

province’s south.156 Over the years, the country has experienced a large number of attacks organized by these groups on their own and in collaboration with local and transnational networks. 

According to the SATP, between 2006 and 2012, a total of 1,495 people were reported killed in 

Punjab as a result of terrorist-related activity.157 e rst six months of 2013 claimed seven lives 

and twenty injured in fteen such attacks.158 Many of these groups are also active beyond Pakistan’s borders; prominent Punjabi militant outts such as HuM, JeM, and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba 

(LeT) have been responsible for cross-border attacks in the Indian-held Kashmiri territory.159

e Pakistan government’s alleged reliance on these groups as proxies in its protracted dispute 

with India has long been a source of deep mistrust between the nuclear archrivals.160 e involvement of these groups in the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 
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PEACEWORKS 93

led to a tense military stando in 2002, when India and Pakistan were widely believed to be on 

the brink of nuclear war. Likewise, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 resulted in India’s 

suspension of a composite dialogue process under way between the two neighbors. 

Increasingly Punjab province is also being watched as a supply line of money and new recruits for locally focused terrorist groups. e TTP have been actively recruiting in the province 

directly and through their alliances with various militant organizations. According to Pakistani 

intelligence reports, they are known to be openly raising funds in the province.161 While a 2010 

report published by the Brookings Institution suggests that there are approximately two thousand Punjabi militant group members aliated with the TTP, more recent accounts suggest 

that the number is probably much higher and growing.162

Sectarian Violence

Sectarian violence in Pakistan has strong roots in Punjab. e district of Jhang emerged as the 

epicenter of sectarian violence directed against Shias in the late 1980s and 1990s. e SSP—

now known as the ASWJP—was founded in the district along with the LeJ and subsequently 

“institutionalized the politics of sectarian violence in 1985.”163 SSP militancy targeting the 

Shia community went unchecked by the state for many years. Some measures were taken by 

former prime minister Nawaz Sharif to deter the SSP, resulting in an assassination attempt 

against him.164 e SSP’s ongoing inuence across Pakistan, and the activities of the LeJ, has 

been a major factor in spreading anti-Shia violence to other parts of Punjab and Pakistan.165

A report by the Jinnah Institute suggests that within a period of two years (September 

2010–12), Punjab experienced sixty-seven incidents of extremist violence, including thirty-

ve interfaith attacks, twenty-eight sectarian attack, and three attacks on religious shrines, 

among others.166 ese attacks led to the loss of 106 lives and 528 injured. Punjab showed a 

signicantly higher number of incidents of sectarian violence during the 1990s than during 

the past decade.167 PIPS data on incidents of sectarian violence in Punjab between September 

11, 2001, and June 30, 2013, document thirty-two attacks that resulted in 242 dead and 560 

injured. ese attacks peaked in 2010, with twelve attacks claiming 111 lives and 222 casualties,168 and have since declined, with only ve attacks reported in the year 2011, three in 2012, 

and only one as of July 1, 2013.169 Data suggest that while sectarian violence has abated in 

Punjab in recent years, it could potentially are up at any time given the presence of militant 

organizations presently focusing on other regions in Pakistan. 

Gilgit-Baltistan

Gilgit-Baltistan, formerly known as the Northern Areas of Pakistan, is also a conict hotspot, 

although the level of violence is signicantly lower than other zones of violence due to low 

population density. e region lies in a strategic location along KP’s north and to the west of 

the disputed Jammu and Kashmir territory; it also shares borders with China and Afghanistan. Gilgit-Baltistan is the only majority-Shia region in an otherwise predominantly Sunni 

Muslim country and has been a ashpoint of sectarian violence over the past two decades in 

particular. Prior to the 1970s, the Gilgit-Baltistan area was generally peaceful.170 e abrogation of the State Subject Rule by former prime minister Zulqar Ali Bhutto, a policy prohibiting nonlocals from acquiring land and other assets, was the initial trigger that exacerbated the 

politics of ethnic and sectarian identity in the region during the 1970s.171 Although sectarian 

tensions between Sunnis and Shias have been on the rise since 1973, they did not escalate to 

armed conict until May 1988, when a Shia insurgency demanding wider rights for the people 
19

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

broke out. 172 Izhar Hunzai notes that a combination of factors have compounded the problem 

and contributed to local violence. ese factors include General Zia’s Sunni-oriented policies 

of Islamization through the 1980s, the ideological contagion of the Afghan jihad during the 

decadelong Soviet-Afghan war, the associated spillover of religious extremism in other parts of 

Pakistan, and demographic engineering by the state.173 Other sources conrm that the denial 

of political representation in the national government and policies favoring Sunni migration in 

Gilgit-Baltistan have aggrieved the local communities and upset the traditional demographic 

balance.174

Sectarian Violence

From 1988 to March 2011, 122 sectarian murder cases were registered in the jurisdiction of 

Gilgit police.175 According to police records, since 1988, a total of 229 people have been reported 

killed as a result of sectarian clashes—of those killed, 125 were Shias and 96 Sunnis.176 Victims 

also included seven members of the Ismaili and one member of the Noor Bakhsi minority sects 

in the district.177 PIPS data recorded between September 11, 2001, and June 30, 2013, suggest 

that sectarian groups in Gilgit-Baltistan organized fty-seven terrorist attacks and six sectarian 

clashes.178 e year 2012 was a particularly deadly one for Gilgit-Baltistan, claiming eighty lives 

as a result of sectarian violence.179 On the night of June 23, 2013, eight foreign mountaineers— 

ve Ukrainians, three Chinese, and a Russian—were killed at their base camp while trekking 

the Nanga Parbat Mountain. e nighttime raid was among the worst attacks on foreigners in 

Pakistan in a decade. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Janud-e-Hafza faction of 

the TTP, which, according to its spokesperson, was intended to “avenge the May 29th killing of 

Waliur Rehman” in a drone strike.180

Key sectarian militant groups in Gilgit-Baltistan include the anti-Shia ASWJP and the 

pro-Shia Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqha-e-Jaria, both active since General Zia’s rule.181 e Shia 

group Sipah-Muhammadi Pakistan is also active in the region.182 e nexus between sectarian outts and local and transnational jihadist groups is an important factor contributing to 

violence in the area. Hunzai notes that the region’s proximity to Taliban and al-Qaeda strongholds makes it vulnerable to their inuence.183 In the same vein, a report by the Pakistan 

Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency notes that the inuence of the Taliban has contributed signicantly to preexisting sectarian schisms, exacerbating the security 

environment.184 e TTP have also claimed responsibility for their engagement in anti-Shia 

attacks.185 Likewise, al-Qaeda is known to have colluded with the LeJ to target the Shia community in many cities around Pakistan, including Gilgit.186

Conclusions and Recommendations

Since partition from India and independence from British colonial rule in 1947, Pakistan has 

navigated a checkered military and civilian political trajectory whereby the economic growth 

and political development process has been interrupted time and again by competing political 

and military interests. Even when democratically elected civilian leaders have been at the helm 

of political power, key state institutions and policies appear to have been predominantly under 

the control of the military. Enabling the military’s intervention in aairs of government, civilian 

regimes in Pakistan have often leaned toward the institution as an instrument for short-term 

solutions to deep-seated social and political problems and unrest. Long-term people-centered 

approaches promoting socioeconomic development, equitable and just provision of human 

rights, and conict resolution processes to address genuine grievances of disaected communi-
20

PEACEWORKS 93

ties have generally been overlooked. Government by successive military and civilian regimes has 

traditionally served the interests of the ruling rather than the ruled. 

Corruption levels and the ineptitude of various democratically elected governments in Pakistan have over the years served to undermine the credibility of the democratic process itself. 

e military by virtue of its capacity to enforce a relatively greater semblance of law and order 

in the country was, for a long time, the most highly respected institution of the state. In Pakistan’s recent history, however—particularly since retired general Pervez Musharraf ’s nine-yearlong rule (1999–2008)—there has been a dramatic reduction in the society’s appetite for the 

militarization of politics and government. In a demonstration of this shift toward democratic 

consciousness across Pakistani society, the most recent elections held in May 2013 were the rst 

occasion in the country’s political history that an elected government, having completed a full 

ve-year term uninterrupted by a military coup d’etat, handed over power to a new government 

also elected by popular vote. Regrettably, however, military dictatorships and civilian authoritarianism throughout Pakistan’s history have undermined the development of robust state institutions upholding the social contract, the principle that government exists to serve the interests of 

society rather than those of the state and the ruling elites. 

e state’s unwillingness or inability to adequately provide public goods and services and 

justice and security, coupled with poor socioeconomic development, have extensively undermined its legitimacy, most evident in the zones of violence identied in this report. Pervasive 

insecurity; ungoverned spaces; parallel legal systems; the erosion of the social contract; the acute 

perception of relative deprivation; and ethnic, religious, and sectarian fragmentation are among 

some of the factors challenging the state’s writ, thereby sowing the seeds of political and extremist violence and perpetuating protracted conict. e state’s own security-centered posturing 

continues to spur confrontations with various groups across the country, exacerbating the perception of alienation and victimization in many regions aected by violence. 

Data suggest that during the past decade violence has become endemic across many parts 

of Pakistan. e country’s own experience suggests that if the existing conditions persist, the 

country could face escalation of violence levels, widespread lawlessness, and potential fragmentation. ere is a dire need for a robust eort at good governance and people-centered policy 

reform where socioeconomic development is accorded high priority to mitigate the perception 

of alienation and marginalization among various groups. Appropriate institutional responses 

by the state, particularly in the conict-aected regions identied in this report, are critical and 

necessary to transform the volatile environment.

Given the diverse and broad spectrum of conicts aicting Pakistan, it is important to 

analyze and address each conict in its own context and plan for comprehensive state stabilization and peacebuilding processes entailing both short- and long-term measures. While providing a comprehensive framework for conict resolution and transformation in Pakistan’s various 

zones of violence is beyond the scope of this study, the authors recommend prioritizing policy 

intervention in those regions most aected by violence. ese regions include FATA and KP, 

Karachi, and Balochistan.

FATA and KP

For several decades, FATA and KP have been adversely aected by the spillover of conict in 

neighboring Afghanistan. e conict contagion, including the ow of illicit arms, narcotics, 

and nonstate actors, has been compounded by homegrown elements. Over the years, many 

militant outts have germinated as a consequence of Pakistan’s support for the Afghan jihad 

The state’s security-centered 

posturing continues to spur 

confrontations, exacerbating 

the perception of alienation 

and victimization in many 

regions affected by violence.
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MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

of the 1980s. is is most evident in FATA and KP (as elsewhere) in the presence of transnational outts and their nexus with indigenous militant groups. e clearest example of this is 

the unprecedented phenomenon of al-Qaeda- and Pakistani Taliban-led terrorism in FATA 

and KP, the most violence-prone regions over the past decade. To curb the illegal passage of 

nonstate actors, Pakistan’s newly elected government, headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, 

should ensure eective control and surveillance of its porous borders using technologies such 

as biometrics. Border patrols should be enhanced through electronic measures and equipment. 

e government should also discourage private funding by international actors, state parties, 

and donors to individual organizations supporting networks of madrassas in FATA and KP as 

in the rest of the country.

e culture of appeasement, support, and protection rendered to extremist elements by political actors as well as vested interest groups and agencies must be curtailed through a sustained 

eort. e government should especially be mindful that when peace accords with militants 

have neglected to address the critical issues of de-weaponization and demobilization, they often 

result in emboldening nonstate outts, with FATA and KP witnessing an associated rise in 

militancy and lawlessness. e organization of private militia and citizen armies, in particular, 

should be discontinued. Creating “aman lashkars” (peace militias) or jihadi groups as a proxy for 

the state, whether they operate within or across borders is counterproductive, often resulting 

in arming and training groups that may otherwise not engage in the spectrum of political and 

extremist violence.

FATA requires a comprehensive political and economic development strategy to engender lasting stability. is strategy calls for graduated policy interventions to transform existing 

political and legal structures. Robust short- and long-term development plans must be put in 

place for improving the economic conditions of the local communities and for integrating local 

communities with the socioeconomic mainstream of the country. Measures announced by former prime minister Gilani to abolish the Frontier Crimes Regulation were a welcome rst step. 

Yet the delay in its implementation is widely perceived in FATA as the government’s apathy 

toward the fundamental human rights of the people.187 Constitutional measures to eectively 

integrate FATA with the mainstream political system through the abolition of its special (yet 

unfavorable) status and the swift implementation and monitoring of legal reforms to support 

the socioeconomic development process are imperative.188

In areas aected by militancy, the government should aim for a greater balance in political, 

economic, and military interventions. Military operations should aim to minimize the extent 

of collateral damage. Swift reconstruction and rehabilitation of communities aected by counterterrorism campaigns, including through the provision of speedy and cost-eective access to 

justice, could reduce the margin for exploitation by nonstate actors and would help build the 

government’s credibility.

Karachi (Sindh)

Karachi presents another very critical zone of violence with strong implications for Pakistan’s 

overall stability, especially given its economic signicance for the country. Demographic pressures, a high crime rate, sectarian strife, and terrorist activity have turned the city into a boiling 

cauldron. e nexus between extremists, militants, terrorists, and criminals is very strong in the 

provincial metropolis. Analysis of the incidence of violence suggests that the underlying political 

and economic causes of the city’s troubles range from intense demographic pressures to poor 

delivery of public services, from competition for greater control of its political and economic 

In areas affected by 

militancy, the government 

should aim for a greater 

balance in political, 

economic, and military 

interventions.
22

PEACEWORKS 93

resources to the lack of a policy to address deep-seated sectarian and ethnic strife. e city has a 

strong propensity for volatility and forms a microcosm of sectarian and ethnic schisms evident 

in various parts of the country. 

Huma Yusuf aptly notes that “the key to Karachi’s stability is a representative power-sharing 

agreement among the major political parties that reect the city’s evolving demographics.”189

Going forward, the capacity of the government to respond to the increasing demands of urban 

management through greater investments in public infrastructure and the provision of security 

to Karachi’s citizenry are of utmost importance. Security sector reform responsive to the needs 

of the people through more eective, ecient, and legitimate mechanisms for law enforcement 

and the provision of justice should be a policy priority for the provincial and federal government. 

Security sector reform should reect greater transparency in procedures and accountability and 

also encourage local participation in the review process. Unemployed youth are especially vulnerable to recruitment by nonstate militant actors and also partly responsible for Karachi’s high 

crime rate. Creating meaningful employment opportunities for the city’s large youth bulge, often a feature of megacities and, in this case, reective of Karachi’s realities, is equally critical for 

engendering a sustainable social order.190

Balochistan

e insurgency in Balochistan has emerged as a signicant destabilizing factor for Pakistan. 

e ongoing armed insurgency—the fth one since the country’s inception in 1947—is a clear 

manifestation of the government’s mismanagement of its relations with the province and the 

acute sense of alienation pervasive in Balochistan. Insecurity in the province is further exacerbated by the inux of Afghan Taliban and terrorist operations by local Taliban and sectarian outts.191 Trends in violence suggest an increasingly deteriorating environment with grave 

implications for Pakistan’s cohesion. A comprehensive plan to integrate the Baloch population 

into the political and economic mainstream through institutional restructuring is imperative. 

e Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package, if implemented in letter and spirit, could go a 

long way toward infusing trust and building condence between the center and the province. 

Increased engagement of local stakeholders in policymaking and implementation would bolster 

eorts at good governance. Law enforcement by civilian agencies through adequate mobilization of resources respectful of the Baloch sociocultural landscape and a reassessment of current 

military engagement in the province are important in this regard.

e role of intelligence agencies in diusing insecurity in Balochistan, as elsewhere in the 

country, is an important concern. Extrajudicial disappearances and killings must come to an 

end. Intelligence agencies must be reformed to ensure that they operate within the bounds 

of law, such that they are perceived as eective and ecient and conform with human rights 

conventions and laws. ere is a strong need for increased accountability and transparency in 

their code of conduct for inuencing Pakistan’s interests and building greater credibility for the 

Pakistani state locally and internationally. While in practical terms it would be a challenge for 

intelligence agencies to maintain transparency in their operations, parliamentary and judicial 

oversight could provide a mechanism for enhancing and ensuring the professionalism and effectiveness of intelligence services in responding to Pakistan’s security dilemmas, both internal 

and external. 
23

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

Notes

1. See, for example, Mark Mazetti, “A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood,” New York Times, April 6, 

2013, available at www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-inpakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Also see Nic Robertson and Greg Botelho, “Ex-Pakistani President 

Musharraf Admits Secret Deal with U.S. on Drone Strikes,” CNN, April 12, 2013, www.cnn.

com/2013/04/11/world/asia/pakistan-musharraf-drones.

2. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Armed Conflicts 2011,” www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/125/125674_

armedconflicts_2011.pdf. 

3. Institute for Economics and Peace, New Dimensions of Peace—Society, Economy, and the Media, Global Peace 

Index, 2011 Discussion Paper (Sydney, Australia: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2011), 34, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/2011-GPI-Discussion-Paper.pdf; also cited Institute for 

Economics and Peace, Peace, Wealth and Human Potential, Global Peace Index, 2010 Discussion Paper 

(Sydney, Australia: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2010), 23, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/2010-GPI-Discussion-Paper.pdf.

4. Institute for Economics and Peace, Measuring the State of Global Peace, Global Peace Index 2013 (Sydney, 

Australia: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2013), 6, www.visionofhumanity.org/pdf/gpi/2013_Global_

Peace_Index_Report.pdf. 

5. Ibid., 14.

6. Zia Mian, Status of Pakistan’s Nuclear Modernization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2012), 55, www.

princeton.edu/sgs/faculty-staff/zia-mian/Pakistan-nuclear-modernization-2012.pdf.

7. Jeremy Page, “India and Pakistan Hold First Kashmir Peace Talks since Mumbai Attack,” Times Online, 

February 25, 2010; www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/article2611988.ece, and Samina Ahmed, 

“Avoiding an India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation: Workshop Report,” Pugwash Online, March 2003, 

www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/sa/march2003/pakistan2003-workshop-report.htm.

8. Tim Craig, “Concerns Grow in Pakistan and India Over Border Violence,” Washington Post, November 23, 

2013. www.washingtonpost.com/world/concerns-grow-in-pakistan-and-india-over-border-violence/2013/1

1/23/633519fc-4d15-11e3-bf60-c1ca136ae14a_story.html.

9. Bharat Bhushan, “Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachin: Competitive Methodologies,” South Asia Journal (January–

March 2005), Ashutosh Misra, “The Sir Creek Boundary Dispute: A Victim of India Pakistan Linkage 

Politics,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (Winter 2000–2001), www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/publications/full/bsb8-4_misra.pdf; Rashid Ahmad Khan, “Sir Creek: The Origin and Development of the 

Dispute Between Pakistan and India,” IPRI Journal (Summer 2007), http://ipripak.org/journal/summer2007/articles.pdf; and Brigadier Asad Hakeem and Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, Demilitarization of the 

Siachin Conflict Zone: Concepts for Implementation and Monitoring (Sandia Report, 2007), www.cmc.sandia.

gov/cmc-papers/sand20075670.pdf.

10. For commentary on the Pakistani narrative concerning the role of Indian consulates along its borders with 

Afghanistan in fueling the Balochistan insurgency, see William Dalrymple, A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and India (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, June 2013), www.brookings.edu/research/

essays/2013/deadly-triangle-afghanistan-pakistan-india-c. Also see Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard 

Country (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 8.

11. For the origins and development of the Durand Line dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan, see Shuja 

Nawaz, FATA—A Most Dangerous Place (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

January 2009). 

12. See the UNHCR for Pakistan website, http://un.org.pk/unhcr/about.htm, and UNHCR, “2008 Global 

Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons,” June 16, 2009, 

www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.pdf, 9.

13. Islamabad Policy Research Institute, “Fact Files: Afghan Refugees,” http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff21.shtml.

14. Umer Farooq, “Home Is Where the Documents Say: Afghan Refugees Repatriation Deadline Likely to Get 

Further Extension,” Express Tribune, June 4, 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/558410/

home-is-where-the-documents-say-afghan-refugees-repatriation-deadline-likely-to-get-further-extension/.

15. “In-Depth: Guns Out of Control: The Continuing Threat of Small Arms,” IRIN News, May 2006, 

www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=34290&Country=Yes. 

16. “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis,” New America Foundation, http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis (accessed on August 5, 2013). Also see Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of 

the Drone. An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” New America Foundation, 

February 24, 2010, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf, p.3.

17. “Analysis: The Drone War in Pakistan,” New America Foundation, http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/

pakistan/analysis (accessed on December 24, 2013).

18. For a database compilation by PIPS, see “Drone Attacks (2004–2013),” http://san-pips.com/app/database/

download.php?f=3.pdf (accessed on August 5, 2013).
24

PEACEWORKS 93

19. Ibid. 

20. “Alston Says Drone Attacks on Pakistan-Afghanistan Border May Violate International Law,” NYU Law,

October 30, 2009, www.law.nyu.edu/news/ALSTON_UN_GENERALASSEMBLY (accessed January 

14, 2010). See also Ben Emmerson’s interim report to the UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special 

Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While 

Countering Terrorism,” UN doc. A/68/389, September 18, 2013, www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/

uploads/2013/10/Emmerson-Report.pdf.

21. SATP, “Pakistan Assessment 2013,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/index.htm. Also see 

Institute for Economics and Peace, “2011 Methodology, Results & Findings,” Global Peace Index (Sydney, 

Australia: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2011), http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/

uploads/2011/09/2011-GPI-Results-Report-Final.pdf (accessed January 11, 2013). 

22. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, “Blind Spot in FATA,” South Asia Intelligence Review 10, no. 27 (January 9, 2012), 

www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair10/10_27.htm.

23. FATA has been the most violent region of Pakistan since before 2005. The number of casualties as a result 

of political violence, although low in absolute numbers, remained the highest in the country in terms of per 

capita basis. See Jacob Shapiro and Saad Gulzar, “Political Violence in Pakistan: Myths vs. Realities,” 

International Growth Centre, March 29, 2012, www.princeton.edu/~jns/papers/political_violence_policy_

brief_120329.pdf (accessed February 23, 2013). The study draws from a database of 28,000 incidents of 

political violence reported in major newspaper from 1988 to 2010. Also see SATP, “Pakistan Assessment 

2013.” 

24. For data compiled from 2009 until January 6, 2013, see SATP, “FATA Assessment 2013,” www.satp.org/

satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/index.html (accessed August 5, 2013). 

25. Michael Krepon and Nate Cohn, eds., Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences (Washington, 

DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, September 2011), 76, www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/

Crises_Complete.pdf. 

26. SATP, “FATA Assessment.” 

27. See FATA’s official website, FATA, “Population Demography,” http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=92 (accessed on August 5, 2013). These figures, which are based on 

the annual growth rate percentage between 1981 and 1998, correspond with Pakistan’s Population Census 

Organization, www.census.gov.pk/ProvinceRegion.htm. 

28. See FATA’s official website, http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Ite

mid=84.

29. Asim Yasin, “Gilani Unveils Coalition Govt Agenda,” News, March 30, 2008, www.thenews.com.pk/

TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=13823&Cat=13&dt=3/30/2008.

30. For detailed text of the FATA, Local Government Regulation 2012, see FATA, “FATA Local Government 

Regulations 2012,” http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=166&Itemid=154. 

Also see Joshua T. White and Shuja A. Malik, “Governance Reforms in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: The Long 

Road to Nowhere,” PeaceBrief no. 135 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, October 15, 

2012), www.usip.org/files/resources/PB-135.pdf; and Naveed A Shinwari, Understanding FATA 2011: 

Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, vol. 5 

(Islamabad: Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme, February 29, 2012), www.understandingfata.org/uf-volume-v/Understanding_FATA_Vol-V-11.pdf. 

31. Gazette of Pakistan, “Regulation to Provide for Actions in Aid of Civil Power in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas (FATA),” Acts, Ordinances, President’s Orders and Regulations, Government of Pakistan, 

States and Frontier Regions Division, Islamabad, June 27, 2011. 

32. Ibid.

33. Murtaza Haider, “Madrassa Graduates and Labour Market Mismatches,” Dawn, October 14, 2011, http://

dawn.com/2011/10/14/madrassa-graduates-and-labour-market-mismatches/. 

34. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “Conflict in Afghanistan: Ethnicity Religion and Neighbors,” Ethnic Studies Report 17, 

no. 1. (January 1999), 3, www.ices.lk/publications/esr/articles_jan99/Afghanistan-%20Rais,ESR,Jan%20

1999.pdf. 

35. Ibid.

36. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2012,” May 2013, www.state.gov/documents/

organization/210204.pdf, 5.

37. The Obama administration believes that post–Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda has been severely diminished 

and is “on the run.” See “WH Insists ‘Core’ Al-Qaeda Is Weakened as Pakistan Tries to Stop Terrorist 

Prison Breaks,” CNSnews.com, August 7, 2013, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/wh-insists-core-al-qaedaweakened-pakistan-tries-stop-terrorist-prison-breaks. 

38. Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Centinel 1, no. 2 (January 2008), www.ctc.

usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss2.pdf (accessed January 21, 2013). 

39. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2012.”
25

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

40. Imtiaz Ali, “Commander of the Faithful: Meet the Man Who Is Islamabad and Washington’s New Public 

Enemy No. 1,” Foreign Policy, July 9, 2009, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/09/pakistans_bin_laden. 

Ali mentions that Mehsud carried a 50 million rupee (about $615,300) bounty on his head from Pakistan and a 

$5 million one from the United States. Mehsud’s force structure was diverse, including approximately twelve 

thousand local fighters, many belonging to his own Mehsud tribe, and close to four thousand foreign fighters, 

predominantly Arabs and Central Asians seasoned in the Afghan jihad of the 1980s.

41. Intikhab Amir, “TTP Fractures into More than 100 Groups,” Central Asia Online, December 20, 2011, 

http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/pakistan/main/2011/12/20/feature-01. 

42. “TTP Finally Admits Baitullah Killed in US Strike,” Dawn, August 29, 2009, http://archives.dawn.com/

archives/151507 (accessed March 18, 2013).

43. See, for example, Zulfiqar Ali, “The Dynamics of Militancy after Fazlullah’s Surprise Pick,” Dawn, November 

9, 2013, http://dawn.com/news/1055174/dynamics-of-militancy-after-fazlullahs-surprise-pick. Also see Fahd 

Humayun, “A Game of Thrones in Waziristan: The Return of Fazlullah,” Jinnah Institute, 2013, http://jinnahinstitute.org/ssi-publications/773-a-game-of-thrones-in-waziristan-the-return-of-fazlullah

44. General Athar Abbas, Inter Services Public Relations, Pakistan, “Pak Army’s Contributions,” unclassified 

briefing slides, March 16, 2010, in Michael O’Hanlon, Ian Livingston, and Heather Messera, “States of 

Conflict: An Update,” New York Times, September 12, 2010; also see the White House’s unclassified report, 

“Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan,” March 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/

UNCLASS%20Report%20on%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf. 

45. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Reports 2012,” 31; PIPS, “Pakistan Security Reports 2011,” 2. 

46. Daud Khattak, “Evaluating Pakistan’s Offensives in Swat and FATA,” CTC Sentinel 4, no. 10 (October 2011): 

9–11, www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/evaluating-pakistan’s-offensives-in-swat-and-fata (accessed January 23, 2013). 

Also see Zahid Ali Khan, “Military Operations in FATA and PATA: Implications for Pakistan,” Strategic 

Studies (Winter 2011/Spring 2012): 132, www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1339999992_58398784.pdf.

47. Zulfiqar Ali, “Over 4,000 Houses Destroyed in Waziristan Operation: Report,” Dawn, November 8, 2008, 

http://archives.dawn.com/archives/158129 (accessed March 10, 2013).

48. Khattak, “Evaluating Pakistan’s Offensives.” 

49. “Pakistan (FATA and Northwest),” Latest Annual Update 2012, IISS Armed Conflict Database (accessed 

March 23, 2013)

50. Mark Mazzetti and Souad Mekhennet, “Qaeda Planner in Pakistan Killed by Drone,” New York Times, 

December 11, 2009. Also see Amanda Hodge, “Pakistan Allowing CIA to Use Airbase for Drone Strikes,” 

Australian, February 19, 2009; and Chris Allbritton, “Pakistan Army Chief Sought More Drone Coverage 

in ‘08: Wikileaks,” Reuters, May 20, 2011. 

51. Khan, “Military Operations in FATA and PATA,” 135–36.

52. SATP, “FATA Assessment–2013,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/index.html (accessed May 1, 2013). Note: The year 2013 statistics are for the first week of 

January 2013 only. 

53. PIPS, “FATA: Targets of the Terrorists, January 1st to June 30th, 2013,” (accessed August 4, 2013). 

54. Institute for Economics and Peace, “Executive Summary,” Global Peace Index (Sydney, Australia: Institute 

for Economics and Peace, 2011). 

55. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), “Pakistan: Displacement Caused by Conflict and 

Natural Disasters, Achievements and Challenges,” Norwegian Refugee Council, January 10, 2012, www.

internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/969C18AC44833F43C1257981002D731

0/$file/pakistan-overview-jan2012.pdf. See also Moeed Yusuf, “The War on Terror, US Drones, and the 

Pak-US Relationship,” South Asia Journal (Summer 2009).

56. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), “North-West Pakistan: Massive New Displacement 

and Falling Returns Require Rights-Based Response,” Norwegian Refugee Council, June 12, 2013, www.

internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/5CD59AE0A97C3676C1257B880038E6

07/$file/pakistan-overview-12jun2013.pdf. 

57. Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004–2013,” The Long 

War Journal, www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php. Also see “Analysis: The Drone War in 

Pakistan,” New America Foundation, http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis (accessed on 

December 24, 2013).

58. Roggio and Mayer, “Charting the Data for US Airstrikes.”

59. Ibid. 

60. New America Foundation, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (accessed December 24, 2013). For a 

discussion of conflicting reports on civilians killed in drone strikes, see Meg Braun, “Counting Civilian 

Casualties in CIA’s Drone War,” Foreign Policy, November 2, 2012, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/

posts/2012/11/02/counting_civilian_casualties_in_cia_s_drone_war (accessed December 24, 2013).. 

61. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Report 2007,” January 7, 2008, 24–25, http://san-pips.com/app/database/download.php?f=7.pdf. 
26

PEACEWORKS 93

62. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Report 2008,” January 19, 2009, 14, http://san-pips.com/app/database/download.

php?f=8.pdf. 

63. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2008 Human Rights Report: 

Pakistan,” 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/

sca/119139.htm (accessed: February 25, 2013)

64. Ibid.

65. For more on the role of the Haqqani Network in brokering peace between sectarian groups, see Daud 

Khattak, “A Haqqani-Brokered Peace in Kurram Agency?” Foreign Policy, February 16, 2011, http://afpak.

foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/16/a_haqqani_brokered_peace_in_kurram_agency.

66. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Reports 2009,” January 2010, 22; PIPS, “Pakistan Security Report 2010,” January 

2011, 14; and PIPS, “Pakistan Security Report 2011,” January 2012, 17. 

67. Shapiro and Gulzar, “Political Violence in Pakistan.”

68. Ibid. Also see SATP, “Pakistan Assessment 2013.” 

69. SATP, “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assessment–2013,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, www.satp.org/satporgtp/

countries/pakistan/nwfp/index.html. Data is through February 12, 2012.

70. Ibid.

71. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Report 2011.”

72. Ibid.

73. PIPS, “Casualty Figures for KP Province from January 1st to June 30th, 2013,” http://san-pips.com/app/

database/submit_reports.php?category=cas_report (accessed: August 4, 2013). 

74. SATP, “Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2013,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, www.satp.org/satporgtp/

countries/pakistan/database/fatilities_regionwise2013.htm (accessed August 6, 2013). 

75. Nader Buneri, “12,456 Killed in Five Years of Terror Attacks in KPK, Fata,” Nation, March 18, 2013, www.

nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/18-Mar-2013/12-456-killed-infive-years-of-terror-attacks-in-kpk-fata (accessed March 26, 2013). 

76. Ibid.

77. See PIPS, “Pakistan Security Reports 2006,” 24; PIPS, “Pakistan Security Reports 2007,” 24; PIPS, 

“Pakistan Security Reports 2008,” 13; PIPS, “Pakistan Security Reports 2009,” 21; PIPS, “Pakistan 

Security Reports 2010,” 17; and PIPS, “Pakistan Security Reports 2011,” 17. 

78. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Report 2008,” 13; PIPS, “Pakistan Security Reports 2009,” 22. 

79. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Report 2008.”

80. Alastair Lawson, “Pakistan’s Evolving Sectarian Schism,” BBC News South Asia, October 4, 2011, www.

bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12278919 (accessed February 24, 2013). Also see SATP, “Khyber 

Pakhtunkhwa Assessment–2013,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/nwfp/index.html.

81. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Report 2009,” 22.

82. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Reports 2012,” 6.

83. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Report 2010,” 17; “Pakistan Security Report 2011,” 17; PIPS, “KP Overall 

Distribution of Attacks, January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013,” http://san-pips.com/app/database/submit_

reports.php?category=distribution_attacks (accessed August 6, 2013).

84. SATP, “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assessment-2013.” 

85. Muhammad Amir Rana, “Pakistan: Under Attack from Within,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2011, http://

afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/10/analysing_pakistans_internal_security_situation.

86. PIPS “Pakistan Security Reports 2012,” 24–25.

87. IISS Armed Conflict Database, http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/Mainpages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.

asp?ConflictID=218&YearID=1329 (accessed March 26, 2013).

88. Daud Khan Khattak, “The Battle for Pakistan: Swat Valley,” New America Foundation, April 19, 2010, 

http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/publications/policy/the_battle_for_pakistan_swat_valley.

89. “Pakistani Military Claims Taliban Casualties Climbing,” CNN, May 9, 2009, www.cnn.com/2009/

WORLD/asiapcf/05/09/pakistan.swat.taliban.fighting/index.html.

90. SATP, “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assessment-2013.”

91. PIPS, “KP: Casualties’ Chart January 2005 to June 30, 2013,” http://san-pips.com/app/database/submit_

reports.php?category=cas_report (accessed August 4, 2013). 

92. SATP, “Pakistan Assessment-2013.” 

93. Ibid. 

94. Shapiro and Gulzar, “Political Violence in Pakistan.”

95. Yunas Samad, “Islamic Militancy and Violence in Pakistan,” in The Deadly Embrace: Religion, Politics and 

Violence in India and Pakistan, 1947–2002, ed. Ian Talbot (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 115.

96. Ibid., 166–67. 
27

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

97. Haris Gazdar, “Karachi’s Violence: Duality and Negotiation,” Collective for Social Science Research, 

September 23, 2011, www.researchcollective.org/Documents/Karachi_Violence_Duality_and_Negotiation.

pdf, 2.

98. PIPS, “Karachi: Overall Distribution of Attacks between January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013,” http://san-pips.

com/app/database/submit_reports.php?category=distribution_attacks (accessed August 6, 2013). 

99. Faraz Khan and Gibran Ashraf, “Karachi 2013: The Deadliest Year of All,” Express Tribune, January 6, 

2014, http://tribune.com.pk/story/653889/karachi-2013-the-deadliest-year-of-all/; Huma Yusuf, “Conflict 

Dynamics in Karachi”, Peaceworks no. 82 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012), 6, 

www.usip.org/files/resources/PW82.pdf (accessed April 19, 2013).

100. Moonis Ahmar, “Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi Crisis,” Asian Survey 36, no. 10 

(1996): 1031–48.

101. “Karachi the Gateway to Pakistan,” from the now-defunct website of the City District Government Karachi, 

www.karachicity.gov.pk (accessed April 3, 2013).

102. Imtiaz Ali, “Karachi’s Ethnic Composition Undergoing Radical Change,” News, November 1, 2011, www.

thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=75494&Cat=4 (accessed January 26, 2013).

103. Mohammad Nafees, “Karachi: The State of Crimes,” Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), 

March 2012, http://crss.pk/downloads/Reports/Research-Reports/Karachi%20Violence%20Report.pdf, 

p.4 (accessed March 24, 2013).

104. Zia ur Rehman, “No Space for Pashtuns?,” Friday Times, September 2–8, 2011, www.thefridaytimes.com/

beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20110902&page=4 (accessed January 26, 2013).

105. Ibid.

106. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), “Karachi: Unholy Alliances for Mayhem,” July 22, 2011, 

30–31.

107. Zia ur Rehman, “Lyari’s Baloch Community Rethinks Support for PPP,” Friday Times, April 13–19, 2012, 

www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20120413&page=6 (accessed January 18, 2013).

108. PIPS, “Profiling the Violence in Karachi,” July–September 2009, 6, http://san-pips.com/download.

php?f=161.pdf (accessed January 18, 2013).

109. CRSS, “Karachi Seething under Violence and Terror,” 5.

110. HRCP, “Karachi: Unholy Alliances for Mayhem,” 30.

111. PIPS, “Profiling the Violence in Karachi,” 16; also see Declan Walsh and Zia ur Rehman, “Taliban Spread 

Terror in Karachi as the New Gang in Town,” New York Times, March 28, 2013, www.nytimes.

com/2013/03/29/world/asia/taliban-extending-reach-across-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all. 

112. PIPS, “Pakistan Security Reports 2009,” 22; “Pakistan Security Reports 2010,” 17; and “Pakistan Security 

Reports 2011,” 17. 

113. Yusuf, “Conflict Dynamics in Karachi”, 17. 

114. PIPS, “Profiling the Violence in Karachi,” 10.

115. Ibid., 12–13

116. Ibid., 10–16.

117. SATP, “Pakistan Assessment 2013.” 

118. Shapiro and Gulzar, “Political Violence in Pakistan,” 2. 

119. PIPS, “Balochistan Overall Distribution of Militant and Terrorist Attacks from September 11, 2001 to June 

30, 2013,” http://san-pips.com/app/database/submit_reports.php?category=viol_dis (accessed August 6, 

2013).

120. SATP, “Balochistan Assessment–2013,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/index.

html (accessed August 6, 2013).

121. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Pakistan: Displacement in Balochistan,” www.internaldisplacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/B7A20DA4D8F9D1C2C125778C007E

EA48?OpenDocument (accessed January 11, 2013).

122. Yaqoob Khan Bangash, “Recalling Baloch History,” Express Tribune, June 14, 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/

story/188798/recalling-baloch-history/. 

123. PIPS, “Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan: Assessing Strategic Policy Options for Peace and Security,” 

Conflict and Peace Studies 3, no. 4 (2012): 28.

124. Noor ul Haq and Nargis Zahra, eds., Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan, IPRI Factfile no. 118 (Islamabad: 

Islamabad Policy Research Institute, January 2010), 2, http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff118.pdf. 

125. For detailed text, see “Aghaz-i-Huqooq-i-Balochistan,” www.achievements.gov.pk/AHBalochistan.aspx 

(accessed May 6, 2013).

126. Haq and Zahra, Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan, 60–68. 
28

PEACEWORKS 93

127. Muhammad Suhaib, “Aghaz-e-Huqooq: Balochistan’s Financial Share More than Doubles to Rs.114b,” 

Express Tribune, February 13, 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/506574/aghaaz-e-huqooq-balochistansfinancial-share-more-than-doubles-to-rs114b/.

128. Sajjad Ashraf, “Pakistan 2012: A Country Gambling with Its Future,” Nation (Thailand), November 6, 

2012, www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Pakistan-2012-a-country-gambling-with-its-future-30193699.

html (accessed January 11, 2013).

129. Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network (AITPN), “Balochistan: Jackboot Justice in Tribal 

Heartland,” January 27, 2007, 2, www.aitpn.org/Issues/II-01-07-Balochis.pdf (accessed May 3, 2013). 

130. PIPS, “Pakistan Annual Security Report 2012.” 

131. Ibid., 12.

132. Reuters, “BLA Claims Attack on Jinnah Residency in Ziarat,” Express Tribune, June 15, 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/563531/one-official-killed-in-attack-on-quaid-e-azam-residency-in-balochistan/. 

133. Ibid., 15.

134. PIPS, “Balochistan District Wise Overall Distribution of Militant and Terrorist Attacks from September 

11, 2001 to June 30, 2013,” http://san-pips.com/app/database/submit_reports.php?category=viol_dis 

(accessed August 06, 2013).

135. Ibid.

136. HRCP, “Blinkered Slide into Chaos,” June 2011.

137. CRSS, “Balochistan’s Maze of Violence,” February 17, 2012, 6. 

138. “Missing Persons Issue Being Played Up to Malign Pakistan: Rehman Malik,” Express Tribune, August 4, 

2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/417571/missing-persons-issue-being-played-up-to-malign-pakistan

-rehman-malik/. 

139. HRCP, “Blinkered Slide into Chaos”; see also Amnesty International, Denying the Undeniable: Enforced 

Disappearances in Pakistan (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2008), www.amnesty.org/en/

library/asset/ASA33/018/2008/en/0de43038-57dd-11dd-be62-3f7ba2157024/asa330182008eng.pdf. 

140. CRSS, “Balochistan Maze of Violence,” 6.

141. Zofeen Ebrahim, “A Hundred Killed, A Community Cornered,” Inter Press Service News Agency, January 

14, 2013, www.ipsnews.net/2013/01/a-hundred-killed-a-community-cornered/.

142. Mahvish Ahmad, “What’s Behind the Attacks on Shiites in Pakistan?,” Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 

2013, www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2013/0701/What-s-behind-the-attacks-onShiites-in-Pakistan/Why-are-they-targeting-Shiites.

143. Ayesha Siddiqa, “Analysis: Violence against Hazaras in Balochistan,” Express Tribune, January 14, 2013, 

http://tribune.com.pk/story/493645/analysis-violence-against-hazaras-in-balochistan/. 

144. Zahid Gishkori, “Over 400 Killed in Balochistan Sectarian Violence: Report,” Express Tribune, July 1, 2012, 

http://tribune.com.pk/story/401826/over-400-killed-in-balochistan-sectarian-violence-report/. 

145. Declan Walsh, “Pakistan Reels With Violence against Shiites,” New York Times, December 3, 2012, www.

nytimes.com/2012/12/04/world/asia/pakistans-hazara-shiites-under-siege.html?pagewanted=all.

146. “Hazara Shias Bury Victims Four Days after Deadly Quetta Bombings,” Dawn, January 14, 2013, http://

dawn.com/2013/01/14/sit-in-3/. 

147. PIPS, “Balochistan: Targets of the Terrorists, January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013,” http://san-pips.com/app/

database/submit_reports.php?category=vic_targets (accessed August 6, 2013). 

148. PIPS, “Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan,” 70–75.

149. Ibid., 73.

150. SATP, “Balochistan Assessment–2013.” 

151. SATP, “NATO Related Attacks in Pakistan,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/

natoattack.htm. 

152. Shapiro and Gulzar, “Political Violence in Pakistan.”

153. Ibid., 5.

154. See also SATP “Punjab Assessment–2013,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/punjab/index.

html, which reports 1,495 casualties in the province between 2005 and 2012 (accessed May 30, 2013).

155. Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2009), 7

156. See, for example, Zeeshan Haider, “Factbox: Militant Groups in Pakistan’s Punjab Province,” Reuters, October 15, 

2009, www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/15/us-pakistan-militants-factbox-sb-idUSTRE59E0XI20091015.

157. SATP, “Punjab Assessment—2013.”

158. PIPS, “Punjab Overall Distribution of Attacks January 1 to June 30, 2013,” http://san-pips.com/app/database/submit_reports.php?category=distribution_attacks (accessed August 6, 2013). 

159. See, for example, Jamal Afridi, “Kashmir Militant Extremists,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 9, 2009, 

www.cfr.org/kashmir/kashmir-militant-extremists/p9135.
29

MAPPING CONFLICT TRENDS IN PAKISTAN

160. Ibid.

161. See, for example, Shehzad Malik, “Taliban ‘Openly Raising Funds’ in Pakistani Punjab,” BBC, June 23, 

2010, www.bbc.co.uk/news/10387670.

162. Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’ Hanlon, “Pakistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and 

Security,” Brookings Institution, November 29, 2011, 5, www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/

pakistan%20index/index.pdf. Also see Shehzad H. Qazi, “An Extended Profile of the Pakistani Taliban,” 

Policy Brief no. 44, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, August 2011, www.ispu.org/pdfs/

ISPU%20Policy%20Brief%20Extended%20Profile%20of%20Pakistani%20Taliban.pdf.

163. Zaidi, Extremism Watch 2011, 19.

164. Ibid., 20.

165. “Pak Shia Killing: LeJ Claims Responsibility for Quetta Massacre,” Daily Messenger, February 17, 2013, http://

dailymessenger.com.pk/pakistan/2013/02/17/pak-shia-killing-lej-claims-responsibility-for-quetta-massacre/. 

166. Salman Zaidi, “Conflict Trends: Presenting the Data,” in Extremism Watch: Mapping Conflict Trends in 

Pakistan 2010–2011 (Jinnah Institute, 2011), 8. Also see Salman Zaidi, “Conflict Trends,” in Extremism 

Watch: Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan 2011¬2012, (Jinnah Institute, 2012), 7.

167. Shapiro and Gulzar, “Political Violence in Pakistan,” 5–9.

168. PIPS, “Punjab: District Wise Overall Distribution of Militant and Terrorist Attacks from September 11, 

2001 to June 30, 2013,” http://san-pips.com/app/database/submit_reports.php?category=distribution_

attacks (accessed August 6, 2013). 

169. Muhammad Amir Rana, “Lahore Under Siege Punjab: A New Battlefield,” Friday Times, July 9–15, 2010. 

Also see PIPS, “Punjab District Wise Overall Distribution of Militant and Terrorist Attacks.” 

170. International Crisis Group (ICG), “Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas,” Crisis Group Asia Report no. 

131, April 2, 2007, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/131_discord_in_

pakistan_s_northern_areas.pdf. 

171. Priyanka Singh, “Gilgit Baltistan: Neither ‘In’ Pakistan Nor ‘Of’ It?” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 

Comment, March 6, 2012, www.idsa.in/idsacomments/GilgitBaltistanNeitherinPakistanNorofit_

psingh_060212. 

172. Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT). “Sectarian Conflict in GilgitBaltistan,” PILDAT background paper, May 2011, www.pildat.org/publications/publication/Conflict_

Management/GB-SectarianConflit-BackgroundPaperEng-May2011.pdf.

173. Izhar Hunzai, “Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan”, Special Report no. 321 (Washington, DC: United 

States Institute of Peace, January 2013), www.usip.org/files/resources/SR321.pdf. 

174. “Sectarian Conflict and Its Aftermath in Jhang and Gilgit, Pakistan,” Policy Brief No. 09-2011, Religions 

and Development Research Programme, University of Birmingham; also see ICG, “Discord in Pakistan’s 

Northern Areas.”

175. Data collected by Iftikhar Ali at Gilgit Police Headquarters on January 1, 2013, on behalf of the authors.

176. Ibid. 

177. Ibid. 

178. PIPS, “Gilgit Baltistan (NA) District Wise Overall Distribution of Militant and Terrorist Attacks, 

September 11, 2001 to June 30, 2013,” http://san-pips.com/app/database/submit_reports.

php?category=distribution_attacks (accessed August 5, 2013).

179. Shabbir Mir, “In G-B, SMS Banned after Propagation of ‘Blasphemous Content,’” Express Tribune, January 

3, 2013.

180. Agencies and Zahir Shah Sherazi, “Gunmen Kill Nine Foreign Tourists and Their Guide in Nanga 

Parbat,” Dawn, June 24, 2013, http://beta.dawn.com/news/1020142/gunmen-kill-nine-foreign-touristsand-their-guide-in-nanga-parbat (accessed August 6, 2013). 

181. PILDAT, “Sectarian Conflict in Gilgit-Baltistan,” 15. Also see Seema Shekhawat, “Sectarianism in GilgitBaltistan,” SATP, 4, www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume20/Article%204.pdf. 

182. Shekhawat, “Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan,” 4.

183. Hunzai, “Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan.”

184. PILDAT, “Sectarian Conflict in Balochistan,” 19.

185. Ajit Kumar Singh, “Sectarian Offensive in Gilgit Baltistan,” South Asian Outlook, September 2012, www.

southasianoutlook.net/index.php/issue/2012/september-2012/285-pakistan-sectarian-offensive-in-gilgitbaltistan (accessed February 20, 2013). 

186. PILDAT, “Sectarian Conflict in Balochistan,” 19.

187. See, for example, “Delay in FATA Reforms Execution Irks Bajaur Leaders,” Nation, December 23, 2012, 

www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/23-Dec-2012/

delay-in-fata-reforms-execution-irks-bajaur-leaders.
30

PEACEWORKS 93

188. For details on various laws, see “President Lauded for Bringing Fata into Mainstream,” Nation, September 

25, 2012, www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/25-Sep-2012/

president-lauded-for-bringing-fata-into-mainstream.

189. Yusuf, “Conflict Dynamics,” 3. 

190. Ibid., 32.

191. See, for example, Huma Yusuf, Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat? (Norwegian 

Peacbuilding Resource Centre, July 2012), 6, www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/appli

cation/949e7f9b2db9f947c95656e5b54e389e.pdf. Also see “Escalation: Links between Violent Sectarian 

Groups and the Pakistani Taliban Are Growing,” Economist, December 1, 2012, www.economist.com/

news/21567422-links-between-violent-sectarian-groups-and-pakistani-taliban-are-growing-escalation; 

and Riaz Khan, “Pakistan Army Post Attack: Suicide Bombing in Serai Naurang Kills 23, Taliban Takes 

Credit,” Huffington Post, February 2, 2013, www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/02/pakistan-army-postattack-suicide-bombing-taliban_n_2606043.html.


 5

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Chairman of the Board: Steven J. Hadley

Vice Chairman: George E. Moose

Acting President: Kristin Lord

Chief Financial Officer: Michael Graham

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington,

D.C.• George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The 

George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former 

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under 

George W. Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph Eldridge, University 

Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. 

Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram 

U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, Nev. • 

Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International 

Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John A. Lancaster, 

Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, 

Potsdam, N.Y. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, Va. • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense 

• Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National 

Defense University • Kristin Lord, Acting President, United States 

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
2 Looking for Justice United States Institute of Peace • 2301 Constitution ave., nw • Washington, DC 20037 • usip.org 

Over the past decade, violence has become endemic 

across many parts of Pakistan. This report examines the 

trajectory of violence in six of the most troubled regions 

and makes recommendations for more effective government responses in each. The authors conclude that, if 

existing socioeconomic conditions persist and the state 

continues to fail to deliver public services, justice, and 

security, the country could face a further escalation of 

violence and widespread lawlessness.

Related Links 

■ Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy edited by I. 

William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (USIP Press, 2011)

■ Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan by 

Stephen Tankel (Peaceworks, September 2013)

■ Regional Politics and the Prospects for Stability in Afghanistan by Sunil 

Dasgupta (Peaceworks, April 2013)

■ Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism by Amil Khan (Special Report, 

March 2013)

■ Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan by Izhar Hunzai (Special Report, 

January 2013)

■ Conflict Dynamics in Karachi by Huma Yusuf (Peaceworks, October 2012)

■ Fixing Pakistan’s Civil-Military Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation by 

Moeed Yusuf (Peace Brief, May 2012)

Peaceworks • FEBRUARY 2014 • no. 93