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S. HRG. 111–1180 

THREE MILE ISLAND—LOOKING BACK ON 

30 YEARS OF LESSONS LEARNED 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR 

AND NUCLEAR SAFETY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 24, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

BETTINA POIRIER, Staff Director 

RUTH VAN MARK, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

BARBARA BOXER, California (ex officio) 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma (ex officio) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

MARCH 24, 2009 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ................... 1 

Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana ............................ 4 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 6 

Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio ........................ 7 

WITNESSES 

Klein, Dale E., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ............................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 40 

Senator Vitter ............................................................................................ 44 

Jaczko, Gregory B., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ................ 47 

Response to an additional question from Senator Boxer .............................. 49 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 50 

Response to an additional question from Senator Vitter .............................. 51 

Lyons, Peter B., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ...................... 52 

Response to an additional question from Senator Boxer .............................. 54 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 56 

Senator Vitter ............................................................................................ 57 

Svinicki, Kristine L., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission .............. 59 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 60 

Response to an additional question from Senator Vitter .............................. 63 

Bradford, Peter A., Adjunct Professor, Institute for Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School ................................................................................. 77 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 80 

Response to an additional question from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 85 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 86 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Vitter ................................ 87 

Denton, Harold, former NRC employee ................................................................. 88 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 90 

Responses to an additional question from: 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 95 

Senator Vitter ............................................................................................ 95 

Thornburgh, Dick, of counsel, K&L Gates LLP; former Governor of Pennsylvania ...................................................................................................................... 98 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 100 

Fertel, Marvin S., President and Chief Executive Officer, Chief Nuclear Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute ............................................................................. 121 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 123 

Response to an additional question from Senator Inhofe ............................. 133 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Vitter ................................ 134 

(1) 

THREE MILE ISLAND—LOOKING BACK ON 

30 YEARS OF LESSONS LEARNED 

TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in room 

406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper, Inhofe, Voinovich, Vitter, and Merkley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Senator CARPER. Welcome everybody. My voice sounds fuzzy up 

here. How do I sound out there? OK, all right, good. I don’t feel 

fuzzy. I feel good. In fact, I have been looking forward to this hearing. We have a great lineup, two panels, and we are going to learn 

a lot. Welcome back, and maybe help us to look forward as well. 

We will be joined by Senator Vitter here in a little bit. We’re 

going to go ahead and start. He doesn’t want us to hold up, and 

so we will just go ahead and kick it off. 

I want to thank our staff, both Democrat and Republican, for 

your help in putting together today’s hearing. And we are just 

grateful for all of our witnesses to be here. 

Today’s hearing is focused, as you know, on 30 years of lessons 

learned since the Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident. Senators will have 5 minutes or so, for opening statements. Then I am 

going to recognize our first panel of witnesses, the Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners themselves, in living color, and you are all 

here and we are grateful that you are here. 

Chairman Klein, we will ask you to speak for maybe 5 minutes 

or so. We will ask each of your colleagues to try to limit your remarks to close to 3 minutes. And then we will go about our first 

round of questions. I think we just have one round of questions for 

each of these panels. 

And then we will invite our second panel of witnesses to come 

forward, and we will follow their testimony with one round of questions as well. 

We will probably finish up about dinner time tonight. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. No, we will finish up. We have a caucus lunch 

and it starts at about 12:30 or 12:45, so we will finish up in due 

course. 
2 

Thirty years ago, a nuclear accident occurred at the Three Mile 

Island nuclear power plant in Middletown, Pennsylvania that 

would shake America’s confidence in nuclear power. The accident 

was a cooling malfunction that caused a partial meltdown of the reactor core, releasing a small amount of radioactivity. The accident 

was determined to be caused by a combination of several things: 

equipment failure, and the inability of the plant’s operators to understand the reactor’s condition during the event. 

Unlike the Chernobyl disaster that occurred I think about 8 

years later, the Three Mile Island reactor vessel did not fail. The 

leaked radioactive gases were vented into the atmosphere through 

specially designed filters under operator control. 

No immediate deaths occurred, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimated that approximately one additional cancer in the 

area would result from the accident. Although any increases of the 

cancer death rate is unacceptable, I think we would all agree it 

could have been much worse. 

This accident had a profound impact on the public, on the nuclear industry, and on the NRC. Public confidence in nuclear power 

generation was, if not shattered, greatly damaged. The cleanup effort took nearly 14 years and some $1 billion to complete. 

Three Mile Island served as a wake-up call that we had become 

complacent on nuclear safety. After the accident, the NRC, Congress, and the nuclear industry took a long, hard look at what we 

needed to do to make this industry safer and to gain back, to regain the public trust. 

Under the direction of the NRC, the industry made sweeping 

changes. Today, our Nation’s 104 operating nuclear reactors maintain high levels of safety and reliability. Our plants have also become more efficient over the past 30 years. As a result, we have 

been able to almost double our generating capacity, I call it our operating capacity, since 1979. These changes have given the nuclear 

industry one of the best safety records, really, of any industry in 

the United States. 

Now, Americans realize that nuclear power can provide reliable 

energy and can do it without polluting. To reduce our Country’s dependence on fossil fuels, we need to do a number of things. We 

need to harness the winds off the shore of Delaware and other 

places along our coast. We need to harness the sun’s rays in Nevada and other places like that. We will need to capture the CO2

coming off of coal-fired plants in West Virginia and other place 

around the Country. And we are going to need to build plug-in cars 

in Detroit and other places around America, and drive them. 

We are also going to need, in the end, we are going to need if 

we are going to reduce the threat of climate change, our dependence on foreign oil, harmful emissions into our air, we are going to 

need nuclear power. But broad support for the nuclear industry 

will vanish if another nuclear accident occurs. Without a safe nuclear industry, there will be no nuclear industry. 

I like to tell the story, we have a pilot here, our colleague Jim 

Inhofe, who flies his plane, I think, all over the Country, maybe all 

over the world, but I like to, for the record, the plane, the plane. 

This is cool. 

[Laughter.] 
3 

Senator INHOFE. I also have pictures of my kids. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. And he’s got a bunch of them. You have one or 

two grandchildren, too, don’t you? But not as many as Jim 

Bunning. Jim Bunning has 37 or 38 grandchildren, he and his wife. 

I said to him, how do you remember all their names? And he says, 

if they’re with their parents, I can remember them. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. But we will look at your grandchildren pictures 

later, but thanks for sharing that airplane picture. 

I was a naval flight officer, 5 years of active duty, and 18 years 

reserve, mission commander. And our jobs were to hunt for Red October, track Soviet nuclear submarines in all the oceans of the 

world, try to catch the bad guys coming into South Vietnam to resupply the Viet Cong, in our airplanes. It was interesting, we did 

mining operations and all kinds of stuff with our planes. 

Our skippers, our commanding officers would always say to us, 

the most important thing you are doing today is not tracking Soviet 

nuclear subs. The most important thing you are doing is not surveillance of the oceans, it’s not a mining missions, it’s not trying 

to catch the bad guys slipping into South Vietnam or Cambodia. 

The most important thing you are doing today is to take off safely, 

to fly safely, to land safely. 

And we tried to create a culture of safety in my squadron. We 

tried to do it in every naval aviation squadron. And we need a culture of safety, as I have said once or twice before, including to some 

of you, we need a culture of safety in every single nuclear power 

plant that we have now and those that we are going to build. 

As the oversight Subcommittee on nuclear safety, it is our job to 

make certain that the NRC and everyone who works in a nuclear 

power plant knows that safety is our No. 1 priority. Only with a 

safety-focused nuclear industry can America reap the benefits of 

clean, safe nuclear power, not just now, but for a long time to come. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Thirty years ago, a nuclear accident occurred at the Three Mile Island nuclear 

power plant in Middletown, Pennsylvania that would shake America’s confidence in 

nuclear power. 

The accident was a cooling malfunction that caused a partial melt-down of the reactor core, releasing a small amount of radioactivity. 

The accident was determined to be caused by a combination of equipment failure 

and the inability of the plant operators to understand the reactor’s condition during 

the event. 

Unlike the Chernobyl disaster that occurred a few years later, the Three Mile Island’s reactor vessel did not fail. The leaked radioactive gases were vented into the 

atmosphere through specially designed filters under operator control. 

No immediate deaths occurred, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

estimated that approximately one additional cancer in the area would result from 

the accident. 

Although any increases in the cancer rate is unacceptable—I think we would all 

agree—it could have been much worse. 

But this accident had a profound impact on the public, the nuclear industry and 

the NRC. 

Public confidence in nuclear power generation was shattered. 

The clean-up effort took nearly 14 years and $1 billion. 

Three Mile Island served as a wake-up call that we had become complacent on 

nuclear safety. 
4 

After the accident, the NRC, Congress, and the nuclear industry took a hard look 

at what we needed to do to make this industry safe and gain back the public’s trust. 

Under the direction of the NRC, the industry made sweeping changes. 

Today the Nation’s 104 operating nuclear reactors maintain high levels of safety 

and reliability. 

Our plants have also become much more efficient over the past 30 years. As a 

result, we have been able to almost double our generation capacity since 1979. 

These changes have given the nuclear industry one of the best safety records of 

any industry in the United States. 

Now Americans realize that nuclear power can provide reliable energy, and can 

do it without polluting. 

Reducing our country’s dependence on fossil fuels—we will need to capture the 

winds off the shores of Delaware, the sun rays in Nevada, and the CO2 off the coal 

plants in West Virginia. We will need to plug-in our cars in Detroit. But we will 

also need nuclear power. 

We will need nuclear power to help us meet our clean air goals and our climate 

goals. 

But broad support for the nuclear industry will vanish if another nuclear accident 

occurs. 

Without a safe nuclear industry, there will be no nuclear industry. 

As the oversight committee on nuclear safety, it is our job to make certain that 

the NRC and everyone who works in a nuclear power plant knows safety is the No. 

1 priority. 

Only with a safety-focused nuclear industry can America reap the benefits of 

clean, safe nuclear power. 

Senator CARPER. And that ends my statement, and the ending of 

my statement coincides with the arrival of a couple of my colleagues. They wanted to wait until I finished. They have heard me 

give these statements before. But we have a new Ranking Member 

here, and it is David Vitter from Louisiana. 

Senator Vitter, would you like to proceed? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will specifically not 

say it was perfect timing on our part. The thought never crossed 

my mind. 

It is great to be with you and great to be a new partner with you 

on this Subcommittee. We had a very good initial discussion last 

week, a few days ago, which I really enjoyed, and look forward to 

this work. 

I will simply say that I appreciate this hearing because we do 

have the opportunity, an enormously positive opportunity, for a nuclear renaissance in our Country. We need to pursue that aggressively and effectively to meet all of our energy and related environmental goals. And obviously, we need to pursue that in a context 

of safety. That is not only the right way to do it. That is the only 

way it will effectively happen, is to have the proper confidence of 

the American people in that regard. 

We are very active in all these pursuits in Louisiana, and we will 

continue to be in this nuclear renaissance. I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses about this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

I’d first like to thank the Chairman, Senator Carper, for holding this hearing as 

an opportunity discuss what we have learned and to look forward and advance the 
5 

future of the nuclear power industry. I enjoyed our conversation last week and believe there is an excellent opportunity on this subcommittee to work in a bipartisan 

manner to get some good things done. And for that I want to thank you. 

Second, I’d like to thank all the witnesses here today to discuss everything we 

have learned over the last 30 years. We have a distinguished panel here today that 

includes current and past NRC commissioners, as well as a former Governor and 

the head of the foremost institute on nuclear energy and safety. Thanks to all of 

you for your time. 

The accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI–2) nuclear power plant near 

Middletown, Pennsylvania, on March 28, 1979, was the most serious in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history. 

Fortunately, the accident caused no injuries or deaths. In addition, experts concluded that the amount of radiation released into the atmosphere was too small to 

result in discernible direct health effects to the population in the vicinity of the 

plant. 

Several independent studies have also been conducted. Estimates are that the average dose to about 2 million people in the area was only about 1 millirem. To put 

this in context, exposure from a chest x-ray is about 6 millirem. In other words, a 

chest x-ray exposes you to about 6 times the amount of radiation people were exposed to during the most significant nuclear accident in U.S. history. 

However, the accident was still an accident and did more to hurt public opinion 

of nuclear power than it did to the environment. Fortunately, the increased scrutiny 

came with increased vigilance by the NRC and other organizations. 

An important positive impact of the accident was that it brought about sweeping 

changes involving emergency response planning, reactor operator training, human 

factors engineering, radiation protection, and many other areas of nuclear power 

plant operations. It also caused the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to tighten 

and heighten its regulatory oversight. Resultant changes in the nuclear power industry and at the NRC have had the ultimate effect of enhancing safety. 

Within 9 months of the accident, the industry had formed the Institute of Nuclear 

Power Operations (INPO), whose mission is to promote the highest levels of safety 

and reliability in the operation of nuclear power plants. 

To improve training, INPO in 1985 formed the National Academy for Nuclear 

Training. The academy reviews and accredits nuclear utilities’ training programs for 

all key positions at each plant. 

INPO has had a profound impact on the way nuclear plants are managed and operated. The proof is the steady improvement in plant performance in the nearly 30 

years since the accident at TMI. 

Today, the Nation’s 104 operating reactors maintain high levels of safety and reliability, as evidenced by the NRC’s reactor oversight program and performance indicators tracked by the World Association of Nuclear Operators. 

Finally, I believe it is also important to note that universities and students across 

this Country are very excited about the potential of nuclear energy. On August 14, 

2008, a U.S. News and World Report article was titled The New Hot Job: Nuclear 

Engineering. The article stated, ‘‘After decades of declining interest in the field, universities are scrambling to keep up with the newfound demand’’ and ‘‘Not only are 

the existing programs growing near capacity, but departments that shuttered years 

ago are finding new life.’’ 

As well, Louisiana State University, which of course is in my home State, advertises that ‘‘at the present time, demand for nuclear engineers and health physicists 

exceeds the supply, so that graduates in these areas have excellent prospects for obtaining well paid jobs in some phase of the nuclear field.’’ 

Indeed, these are very exciting times for an industry that is quite capable of providing high-paying jobs to American workers as well as providing consistent and reliable energy for decades. Thank you for your time and I look forward to questions. 

Senator CARPER. Welcome aboard. We are delighted to have you 

as my seatmate here. 

Senator Inhofe chaired this Subcommittee for a number of years, 

and he began chairing the Subcommittee at a time that I don’t 

know that Congress was providing especially good oversight over 

the nuclear industry. That changed under his leadership, and he 

continues to have a strong interest in this, and I am delighted that 

he is with us today. 

Senator Inhofe. 
6 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I appreciate that, Senator Carper. It is 

true, too. I recall, we were just talking back here trying to remember just when it was I became Chairman of this Subcommittee. I 

think it was 13 years ago. And at that time, there had not been 

an oversight hearing in years. And you know, the interesting thing 

was that the NRC was very anxious to start having oversight hearings. So we had oversight hearings, and then we kind of put down 

goals and deadlines, and we got some things really started at that 

time, I believe. 

And of course, at that time it was just 17 or 18 years after Three 

Mile Island. Our concern was always, you know, did we really 

learn something from that. And you point out very well, although 

for different reasons than I would have, nuclear energy in the future, it is going to have to be there. We cannot run this machine 

called America without the nuclear component. 

And it seems to me that it shouldn’t take as long as it does take 

to get new applications working. I hope that we are going to be 

able to improve that. 

Studying the past is useful in so far as it guides improvement 

for the future, and I am glad that you are having this hearing because it is one that is certainly necessary now. No one should be 

pleased that the accident did happen, but I am very pleased that 

the Commission and industry have spent the last 30 years improving the safety of our existing plants and preparing to build new reactors. 

So I think that we have done a good job. I think you are certainly 

carrying this leadership on, Senator Carper, and it is something 

that, I can’t think of anything more important that is happening 

in America today in terms of our future capability to run this machine than to be talking about nuclear energy. 

I would like also to hear in the opening statements from all of 

you how we can improve the timeframe that it takes to get these 

applications handled and perhaps something that we will be able 

to do to reach our goals a little quicker than we otherwise would. 

I appreciate your having this hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

The accident at Three Mile Island was a culmination of several mistakes. As with 

any mistake, there are lessons to be learned. Critics of the nuclear industry frequently point to it and say neither the industry nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have learned anything from it and plants are just as risky today as Three 

Mile Island was then. Mr. Chairman, I strongly disagree. 

My first observation is that this accident validated the defense-in-depth concept 

which is the basis for nuclear safety. In spite of equipment malfunctions, design 

flaws, and human errors, radiation exposure to the public was within regulatory 

limits and was proven to have produced no discernable health effects. 

My second observation is that 30 years have passed and we haven’t had another 

accident like this one, which partially melted a nuclear reactor core. That doesn’t 

mean that the industry and the Commission can sit back and relax—they can’t. It 

is our responsibility in this Committee to ensure that they do NOT become complacent. 

However, studying the past is useful insofar as it guides improvement for the future. I’m glad that Chairman Carper has chosen to focus this hearing on the con-
7 

structive ways that the Commission and the industry have addressed those shortcomings rather than simply Monday-morning-quarterbacking a 30-year-old event. 

Even though there were no discernable health effects, the Three Mile Island accident was a transformational event. Many analyses of this accident were done, cataloging the various equipment malfunctions, design flaws, human errors, and poor 

communication. The analyses formed the basis for the NRC to impose many new 

regulatory requirements and for the industry to establish a more coordinated effort 

to improve safety and performance. The most important lesson is the need for both 

the industry and the regulator to be vigilant about improving the safety of nuclear 

energy. As Senator Carper is fond of saying, ‘‘If it isn’t perfect, make it better.’’ 

This vigilance is very evident in the effort to license new plants. The NRC has 

indicated to this Committee that it will spend approximately 5 years reviewing new 

reactor designs before granting certifications. While I’m not thrilled with how long 

that process takes, the current process will be more predictable and is clearly an 

improvement over how new plant licensing was conducted in the ’70s and ’80s. Modern technology has also yielded great improvements in plant equipment reliability 

and control rooms that reduce the potential for human error. 

No one should be pleased that the accident happened. But I AM very pleased that 

the Commission and the industry have spent the last 30 years improving the safety 

of our existing plants and preparing to build new reactors that are even safer. This 

vigilance will ensure that our Country will continue to benefit from clean and reliable nuclear energy for years to come. This is the true legacy of Three Mile Island. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Inhofe, thanks very much, thanks for 

your leadership and your continued strong participation. 

Another former Chair of this Subcommittee has bailed on me and 

gone over to be the Ranking Republican on, what is it, the Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee, George Voinovich of 

Ohio, but it has been great working with Senator Voinovich on 

these issues and a bunch of others. 

Senator Voinovich, you are recognized. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman and 

Ranking Member Vitter. 

I want to welcome Senator Vitter to this Subcommittee. I served 

on it for 8 years, either in the chairmanship or Ranking Member, 

and Brother Carper and I have had some fun together. 

Mr. Chairman, I take great pride in the fact that this Committee 

has helped transform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission into one 

of the best and most respected regulatory agencies in the world. We 

worked very hard placing the right people on the Commission, providing the Commission with the resources and tools necessary to do 

its job, and holding them accountable for the results. 

We have held more than 20 hearings involving the NRC in the 

past 8 years. A good number of those hearings were related to the 

Davis-Besse incident in 2002, and we took the NRC to task as it 

was initially reluctant to address the issue of safety culture. So it 

is no accident that we have seen dramatic improvements in both 

the safety records and reliability of the 104 operating reactors 

today, compared to 2002. 

And I would like to take this opportunity to thanks and recognize 

each member of the Commission for the outstanding job that you 

do day to day. Being a regulator often is a thankless job, whether 

it is the NRC, FAA, FDA, or the Federal Reserve Board. It seems 

as though the only time people care about what you do is when 

something goes wrong, and it is almost always to criticize what you 

did or didn’t do. And you should be very, very proud of your record. 
8 

Indeed, a regulator’s job is a complex and difficult one. It is like 

a high wire balancing act. You can’t be too far to the left or too far 

to the right. It has to be just right. The Fed has to keep the interest rates just right, otherwise it will result in either recession or 

inflation. Similarly, the NRC has to be vigilant at all times to keep 

its regulatory threshold just right. It should be tight enough to prevent complacency, both within the agency and the industry it regulates, but not overly restrictive to a point of stifling the growth of 

nuclear power in this Country at a time when it is most needed. 

I think today’s hearing provides us with an opportunity to reflect 

upon the past, present and future of the industry. Clearly, the nuclear power industry has come a long way since the 1960s and 

1970s. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979, however unfortunate, provided an experience through which both the industry and 

the NRC were humbled, and have matured into stronger, safer entities. 

There were many lessons learned from TMI, as we will hear from 

the witnesses today. But one that resonates with me the most as 

a policymaker is something that Admiral Rickover said, ‘‘Nuclear 

power is not to be feared, but to be respected.’’ 

I recently met with Mr. Andre Lacoste, the Chairman of the 

French Nuclear Regulatory Agency, and he said something very interesting. He said that many European countries that adopted a 

policy of phasing out nuclear power following Chernobyl in 1986, 

countries like Italy, Sweden, UK, and perhaps even Germany, are 

now re-embracing nuclear power. 

I was at the German Marshall Fund this last week and heard 

again that they are really thinking about really getting back into 

nuclear power. He thought there were two main reasons for this. 

One is the recognition that the newly adopted carbon reduction 

mandate cannot be achieved through energy efficiency and renewables alone. And the other is the recognition of the improved safety 

records and reliability of nuclear power plants, and maybe the jobs 

that are created in the nuclear power industry that nobody is talking about. They are tremendous jobs. In fact, in my opinion, we 

have had more jobs created in this Country in the area of nuclear 

power than we have in windmills and solar. 

And for the benefit of my colleagues on this Committee, I would 

like to share with you a portion of a speech given by British Prime 

Minister Gordon Brown last week. The speech is entitled, Nuclear 

Energy and Proliferation. And I quote Brown’s speech. He said, 

‘‘Because whether you like it or not, we will not meet the challenges of climate change without far wider use of civil nuclear 

power. Given the scale of global emissions reductions required and 

the like cost, no cost-effective low carbon technology must be off 

limits.’’ 

And the International Energy Agency estimates that we must 

build 32 nuclear reactors globally every year, every year, if we are 

going to meet the emissions standards that they have laid out for 

2050. 

So he goes on to say, ‘‘So however we look at it, we will not secure the supply of sustainable energy on which the future of our 

planet depends without a role for civil nuclear power.’’ 
9 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is exactly the message that you 

and I have tried to convey to the Senate during the climate change 

debate last year. We conducted four roundtables in the last Congress to identify solutions to making the nuclear renaissance a reality in this Country. And I hope we continue this effort during this 

Congress through the formation of a Senate Caucus on Nuclear Energy. We have to do that if we are to continue to have this nuclear 

renaissance that I think is so necessary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Voinovich, thank you so much. 

Our first panel of witnesses, I think you folks have been here 

once or twice before. It is good to see you again. We are grateful 

for your service and grateful for your preparation and participation 

today. 

Chairman Dale Klein will speak first, and be followed by each of 

his three colleagues, Mr. Greg Jaczko, Peter Lyons, and Kristine 

Svinicki. 

It is great to see all of you. Thank you for being here. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF DALE E. KLEIN, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR 

REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Vitter, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me and my fellow 

Commissioners to appear before you today to discuss the lessons 

learned from the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant 30 years 

ago. 

My written testimony provides some historical background on the 

accident, addresses the NRC’s response, and outlines some of the 

regulatory improvements that have been implemented, and mentions one ongoing challenge. 

In my brief summary, let me just say that the NRC has come a 

long way in 30 years. We have an excellent team of highly competent staff who are very focused on the agency’s mission. In fact, 

I should draw your attention to the results of the Office of Personnel Management’s human capital survey of 2008 which was reported in The Washington Post on March 13. The NRC ranked first 

in leadership and knowledge management; second in results-oriented performance culture; first in talent management; and just for 

the sake of completeness, let me also mention, first in job satisfaction. 

On the matter of Three Mile Island, let me assure you that the 

Commission has not forgotten about the accident that occurred 

there. Last week, we distributed to all Members of the Committee 

a recent paper by NRC’s historian, Three Mile Island After 30 

Years, which was developed as part of an effort to ensure that current and future NRC employees learn from what happened. 

In addition, the agency will hold a seminar tomorrow for NRC 

employees to explain what happened and what lessons the agency 

learned. A number of our presenters, including former Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh and former NRC Director for 

the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Harold Denton, are participating at this hearing during the second panel of witnesses. 
10 

One of the most important changes that has occurred over the 

last 30 years is an intensive focus on what we call a strong safety 

culture, both in industry and internally within the NRC. The agency’s wide-ranging safety improvements include personnel training, 

internal processes and procedures, infrastructure and planning, 

technological upgrades, oversight and risk assessment methodologies, and safety culture expectations. 

The results of these efforts by the NRC and by industry are evident in the handout which shows in quantifiable terms the significant improvements in safety at nuclear power plants that have 

been achieved. And these are shown on two posters to my right and 

to my left. 

In addition to safety improvements, the agency has also implemented a variety of enhancements in the area of security, especially since 9/11. In recent years, the NRC has required increased 

patrols, stronger and more capable security forces, additional physical barriers, enhanced emergency preparedness and response 

plans, and many other heightened security measures. 

With all this, however, the NRC still faces one ongoing challenge, 

which is something that confronts every industry and every regulator that is concerned with safety. I am referring to the danger of 

complacency. Guarding against complacency must involve a rigorous and conscientious commitment to maintaining high standards of safety and security. That effort includes remembering the 

past, learning from where we have been, and ensuring that past 

mistakes are not repeated. 

This hearing contributes to all of these goals, and I appreciate 

the Committee’s interest in understanding the lessons that have 

been learned and implemented at the NRC. 

To answer Senator Inhofe’s question about efficiency, I should 

point out, and we can talk more of this, we are looking at Lean Six 

Sigma to make sure that we can be more efficient with no compromise on safety, and we can talk more about that as we go forward. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my 

opening statement. Thank you for having me and my colleagues 

today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein follows:] 
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Senator CARPER. Chairman Klein, thank you for your testimony. 

Thank you for your leadership at the NRC as well. 

Commissioner Jaczko. Welcome, thank you. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. JACZKO, COMMISSIONER, 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. JACZKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank you 

for having us here today to discuss the lessons of the accident at 

Three Mile Island. 

I would like to focus on what I see as the larger lesson learned 

from this event, which, as the Chairman indicated, is the danger 

of complacency. Three Mile Island and Davis-Besse, which happened decades later, happened in large part because of complacency. There was a fundamental belief at the time of these accidents that they could not occur. The challenge that remembering 

Three Mile Island raises for us is the need to continue to work to 

minimize risks, never rest on success, and always be on the lookout 

for new information and for the unexpected. 

We did learn important lessons from Three Mile Island, and I 

would like to briefly mention three areas where tremendous 

progress has been achieved. Those would be in the areas of performance assessment, emergency preparedness, and enforcement. 

After the accident at Three Mile Island, we developed methods 

of measuring the performance of operating reactors and making 

our assessments accessible to the public. We first developed the 

Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance and now have the 

Reactor Oversight Process, which was an improvement on the original systematic assessment of licensee performance. 

The ROP was developed to look objectively at licensee safety performance across three broad areas: reactor safety, radiation safety, 

and protection of the nuclear power plant. While I think the ROP 

is a very strong program for oversight, we must remember not to 

get complacent, but rather to look for opportunities to further improve how we assess plant performance, and in particular to continue to look at new ways to measure performance to ensure that 

we are truly getting an understanding of what safety is at any particular facility. 

Another area that I think has shown dramatic improvements directly from the aftermath of Three Mile Island is in the area of 

emergency preparedness. Following the accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission now works closely with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, with licensees, and with State and local officials from around the Country to better prepare and respond to any 

kind of incident at a nuclear facility. 

These programs and the partnerships between all levels of government built the foundation upon which all hazards preparedness 

work is done in this Country. And when the Commission talks 

about these issues with members of the public, we are often told 

by people who live in the communities that have nuclear power 

plants that their emergency preparedness initiatives are better 

than any other community because of the preparedness activities 

that they do with the nuclear power plant. 

Finally, I would like to turn to one area which I think was a very 

important change that came out of the Three Mile Island incident, 
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and that was in the area of enforcement. Substantial changes were 

made in the NRC’s enforcement authority, and I think this continues to be an important change in an important area as we continue to execute our mission of being an effective regulator. 

I would just like to close with a comment and a quote from one 

of the reports that was issued following the Three Mile Island accident. This is from the Rogovin report, which was a study that was 

commissioned by the NRC following the Three Mile Island incident. 

And it stated, ‘‘Before March 28, 1979, an attitude of complacency 

pervaded both the industry and the NRC, an attitude that the engineer-designed safeguards built into today’s plants were more than 

adequate, that an accident like that at Three Mile Island would not 

occur, and in the particular jargon of the industry, that such an accident was not a credible event.’’ I think that the danger of complacency is as true for us today as it was in 1979, and true in the 

sense that those are the lessons and the things we need to keep 

our focus on as regulators. 

And briefly, then, if I could just add in response to Senator 

Inhofe’s question, I think an area where we can improve the process for new reactor applications and one which I think the industry 

has made some comments to the agency about, is in trying to better prioritize the applications that we review, rather than the approach right now where we review all applications that come in 

based on when they come in. Perhaps we could take our resources 

and focus first on those applications that are most likely to be completed in the near term, and focus our work there to complete 

those, and then on the other applicants at a subsequent time. 

Thank you. 

[Mr. Jaczko’s answers to questions for the record follow:] 
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Senator CARPER. Mr. Jaczko, thanks so much for that testimony. 

Is it Dr. Lyons? It is, isn’t it? 

Mr. LYONS. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. Yes, Dr. Lyons. 

Is it Dr. Klein? It’s not Dr. Jaczko, is it? All right. Dr. Svinicki? 

All right. One mere mortal among all these doctors. That’s good. 

Senator INHOFE. Is it Dr. Carper? 

Senator CARPER. No, I don’t think so. I don’t think so. 

All right. We have plenty of doctors here. 

Dr. Lyons, you are on. Thanks for joining us. 

STATEMENT OF PETER B. LYONS, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR 

REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. LYONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to 

all of you for holding today’s hearing to discuss the 30 years of experience in applying the lessons learned from TMI. These vital lessons, fundamental to safe reactor operation, must never be forgotten if we are to maintain the hard-earned confidence of the American public and the safety of the Nation’s nuclear power plants. 

I support Chairman Klein’s testimony and I would like to offer 

just a few additional comments. 

Evaluating events and learning from them is a simple concept, 

but an enormous challenge. Until I studied the TMI event, I had 

not realized that virtually the same situation occurred at the 

Davis-Besse plant in September 1977. Then, the operators correctly 

diagnosed the problem. Unfortunately, information from that occurrence was never shared with TMI. If it had been and if the TMI 

response had duplicated the operator response at Davis-Besse, the 

Nation would not have experienced TMI. 

I visited TMI and discussed the event with Mr. Ed Frederick, 

who was a controller and operator during that accident. Prior to 

that visit, I believed that a simple explanation of operator error 

largely covered the event. But by hearing his explanation of the actions he took that evening, it became clear to me that the design 

of the control room and the instrumentation available to him dramatically limited his ability to comprehend the situation. 

After TMI, far more attention was given to the interface between 

operators and the reactor. Today’s operators have a clear understanding of key plant parameters. After TMI, the operational experience program was strengthened, and the industry and the NRC 

thought that we had a solid program. Nevertheless, in March 2002, 

the cavity in the reactor vessel head at the Davis-Besse nuclear 

plant was discovered. Although this was a near miss and not an 

actual event, the magnitude of the cavity and the potential significance of that event again sent shock waves through NRC and industry. 

That corrosion also had precursors, such that the industry and 

the NRC, which were aware of this area of concern, should have 

been even more alert to the potential for that type of problem. 

Much like the event at TMI, Davis-Besse once again suggested that 

the NRC and industry failed to adequately use operational experience. 

Today, our operational experience program is a strong, solid contributor to reactor safety. Through discussions with operators at 
53 

our plants, I am assured that the reports generated by our program 

are viewed as very important and taken very seriously. It is my 

hope and expectation that no future event will be partially ascribed 

to a failed opportunity to learn from our experiences. 

We have come a long ways from TMI. Safety at our nuclear 

plants has improved dramatically because of TMI and other NRC 

and industry initiatives. But the recent Davis-Besse incident shows 

that we must remain ever vigilant that the TMI lessons are never 

forgotten. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Mr. Lyon’s answers to questions for the record follow:] 
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Senator CARPER. Thank you so much, Dr. Lyons. 

Commissioner Svinicki, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF KRISTINE L. SVINICKI, COMMISSIONER, 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Ms. SVINICKI. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member 

Vitter, Senator Inhofe and Senator Voinovich, for the opportunity 

to appear before you at today’s hearing. 

I support Chairman Klein’s testimony as well, and add my voice 

to those of my colleagues in supporting the commemoration of this 

significant event in our Nation’s nuclear history. Today’s hearing 

and the seminar to be held tomorrow for all employees at the NRC 

are important opportunities for the community of nuclear safety 

professionals to pause, reflect on this historic event, and remain 

vigilant against technical complacency or overconfidence. 

Since I am one of the NRC employees who was not involved in 

the nuclear profession at the time of the Three Mile Island event, 

in preparation for this hearing I have studied a number of the written histories and other critical reviews. The President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island is mentioned in Chairman Klein’s written testimony. In developing its final report to 

President Carter on the event, that Commission took more than 

150 formal depositions and interviewed an even larger group of individuals. At public hearings, it took testimony and collected documentary material that it estimated filled about 300 linear feet of 

shelf space. 

In analyzing all this detail, however, their strongest conclusions 

were sometimes startlingly simple. Among their conclusions was 

the following statement, which I would like to conclude by quoting 

briefly from their report. It is as follows: ‘‘In the testimony we received, one word occurred over and over again. That word is mind 

set. At one of our public hearings, the director of NRC’s Division 

of System Safety used that word five times in a span of 10 minutes. 

‘‘The most serious mind set is the preoccupation of everyone with 

the safety of equipment, resulting in the downplaying of the importance of the human element in nuclear power generation. We are 

tempted to say that while an enormous effort was expended to assure that safety-related equipment functioned as well as possible, 

and that there was backup equipment in depth, what the NRC and 

the industry have failed to recognize sufficiently is that the human 

beings who manage and operate the plants constitute an important 

safety system.’’ 

Chairman Carper, in my work at the NRC over the past year, 

I have found an organization of dedicated safety professionals who 

are ever mindful of this important fact, and who are committed to 

its enduring lessons. 

I thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[Ms. Svinicki’s answers to questions for the record follow:] 
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Senator CARPER. Commissioner Svinicki, thank you very much 

for your testimony and for your service. 

I would just say, before I ask a question, just an observation. 

This is a busy time for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This 

is a very busy time. You have 104 nuclear power plants that require your close supervision. A number of those plants are in the 

relicensing process to be relicensed to operate for another 20 years. 

I believe there are either 16 or 17 applications to build maybe 26 

or 27 new nuclear power plants. And you have a number of companies that have designed state-of-the-art nuclear power plants and 

have presented them to you for your review, to determine whether 

or not they are worth going forward with. I mean, that is a lot. 

That is a lot. 

You have a great agency. It is well known and regarded as one 

of the best places for people in the Federal Government, and probably in any place in this Country. I think you can be justifiably 

proud of that. 

Chairman Klein, in your testimony you warn against the dangers 

of complacency when it comes to nuclear safety. I have said as 

much. Others here have said as much. Other Commissioners have 

repeated this theme to us. This is not a time to rest on our laurels. 

Great progress has been made since that day almost 30 years ago, 

but obviously we have to guard against complacency, and frankly, 

we can do better. 

You say that overconfidence was a factor in the Three Mile Island accident and in the more recent Davis-Besse episode. How are 

you ensuring, you are you, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners of the 

NRC, how are you ensuring that your new generation of employees, 

folks who weren’t around, at least not with NRC, 30 years ago, but 

many of which are new, how do you ensure that they too guard 

against complacency, particularly when it comes to safe operations? 

Mr. KLEIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have a large program that 

reminds people about their self-responsibility and their importance. 

We do that every time we give our speeches. We do it in training. 

We do it in our knowledge management catch-up program. And so 

we demonstrate by our actions that we believe what we say and 

that they should always be vigilant. 

We also have a rotation program where people are able to rotate 

within the agency. That challenges them so they don’t get locked 

into one mind set, as Commissioner Svinicki had indicated. So 

what we try to do is continuously reinforce the importance not only 

to our employees, but also to the licensees, that every individual 

has the authority they need to carry out their assigned tasks, and 

we monitor and maintain and check that. 

Senator CARPER. OK. You may have said this, but I want to ask 

specifically, how are you bridging the education gap between the 

older generation at the NRC and the newer generation of employees? 

Mr. KLEIN. A lot of our individuals who have retired still want 

to work, they just don’t want to work the 80 hours a week that 

sometimes it seems like they do. So they come back and they are 

training this next generation. And we basically have an entire 

cadre of people that are making sure that we keep our best practices and our best techniques available. 
65 

Senator CARPER. Good. I understand that the NRC is again looking at new license applications, similar to the time up to Three 

Mile Island. I think there were a lot of applications in at that time 

as well. But how is the NRC making sure that we don’t take our 

eye off of our current fleet of 104 nuclear power plants, while preparing for what we hope and expect will be a new fleet in the years 

to come? 

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the ways that we did 

that was fundamentally in our structure. We created an Office of 

New Reactors, separate from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, so that individuals in the one division understand very clearly 

their role is to monitor and maintain those 104 plants that are running today. That is their full-time responsibility, so they don’t get 

distracted with the new reactors that are underway. 

So we created two divisions, one which looks at the new reactors; 

one which looks at the existing fleet. 

Senator CARPER. And do you feel, two questions, do you feel that 

the new license process is effective? Do you think you have enough 

resources, employees to meet all these jobs that you are asked to 

take care of? 

Mr. KLEIN. Well, Senator Carper, I appreciate yours and the 

Committee’s support on giving us the finances we need to make our 

decisions to protect the American people, to ensure that these 

plants are safe and secure. And I believe that we do have a work 

force that is adequate to carry out that mission. We work at it very 

hard. In 2007, for example, we hired 441 people, for a net gain of 

219. Sixty percent, six zero, were women and minorities. And so we 

have a very aggressive recruiting campaign. We have gotten very 

talented individuals, and I believe we have the resources that are 

necessary for us to do our job. 

Senator CARPER. All right. And a question for Commissioner 

Jaczko, and then I will yield to Senator Vitter. 

But let me go back to the issue of transparency and 

miscommunication that were problems during the Three Mile Island accident, and just ask, how has the NRC improved, made improvements in those areas? And what do you think we could do better? What do you think the NRC could do better? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think some of the areas where we have made 

real improvements in transparency in particular, as I mentioned in 

my initial statement, is in the area of emergency preparedness. We 

have much more clearly defined plans for the plants. We exercise 

those plants in a significant way, with the local communities, so 

that provides a much better avenue for communication. Because 

one of the areas of tremendous challenges for information flow during the accident was what exactly the response needed to be to deal 

with the evacuation, and who needed to be evacuated, and in what 

time. 

So I think there have been a lot of improvements made in that 

area in particular, where we have established better processes and 

better exercise those processes now so that begins to share information. 

We just fundamentally live in a much different world now, where 

information flow is much easier than it used to be, with the Internet, with outreach to individuals. We have a much, I think, more 
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transparent program. I guess I would just finally add that the new 

oversight program that we have is also much more geared toward 

transparency and geared toward providing more information to the 

public about what the status is of any particular power plant or 

any particular facility that we regulate. 

So I think those are some of the specific areas where we have 

made real progress in the area of transparency. 

I think one area that we can make improvements on, and it was 

an item that was addressed, I believe, in the Kemeny Commission 

report, and that is to continue to improve on our ability to communicate in plain English, I guess is the phrase we like to use, where 

we are communicating complex technical information in a way that 

the public can understand without necessarily having a background 

in nuclear engineering or nuclear science. 

So that’s an area where I think we could continue to improve, 

and that probably means more training and continuing to train our 

individuals, not just in their technical expertise, but in how to communicate that to an audience that’s not technically educated. 

So I think those are some areas where we have done well and 

where we can work on getting a little bit better. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thanks for those responses. 

I think I have consumed 7 minutes. Let’s just say each of our colleagues have 7 minutes. 

Senator Vitter, you are up next. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is to anyone who cares to answer. Could you give any specific examples since Three Mile Island, not so much Three Mile Island, but since then, of how operating experience has improved 

plant operations today, including your guidelines for that? 

Mr. KLEIN. Senator Vitter, I think there are a lot of examples 

that we have that can demonstrate that. I think one of those is the 

sharing of information. It is much more openness between the industry and among the industry. I think the creation of the Institute 

of Nuclear Power Operations has helped to share good practices 

and good techniques, and also bad practices and bad techniques, so 

those are not repeated. 

So I think communication is an area that we have really improved on. The success rate, as seen by these two charts, demonstrates that we cannot become complacent, but the trends are 

positive. 

Senator VITTER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Vitter, as the Chairman said, there could be 

a number of examples, but if I can give you just two. 

One would be an issue that occurred several years ago in cracking of dissimilar welds at the Wolf Creek Plant. That has led to a 

concerted effort that the NRC has carried out with industry to 

evaluate any potential for such cracks at other plants. That would 

be one example of how operational experience is being used directly 

to improve safety today. 

If I could give you one other example, which is sort of a cross between operational experience, as well as addressing questions on 

complacency. There is now in the lobby of the NRC a model of the 

Davis-Besse cavity, the corrosion cavity that occurred in the vessel 

head. It is not only a constant reminder to our staff of the need 
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to avoid complacency, but also an aid in operational experience of 

the importance of being ever conscious of the concern for corrosion. 

So those would be two examples. 

Senator VITTER. Great. Thank you very much. 

Again, this is to each of you, and I would love each of you to give 

at least a brief response. A lot of folks have suggested, broadly 

speaking, that in the U.S. we should have more standardization 

within our nuclear industry of design and operation. What would 

your comment be on that with regard to both safety improvements 

and efficiency improvements, particularly in getting new plants online? 

Mr. KLEIN. Senator Vitter, I think all of us have commented at 

one time or another that standardization is very important. When 

I talk to the industry, and I talk about standardization, I want the 

walls to even be painted the same colors. And we really do need 

to standardize. It would make our job as a regulator easier, and it 

would make lessons learned easier for the industry. And the industry is moving in that direction. We have several different vendors, 

but within each vendor we expect standardization. 

Mr. JACZKO. If I could add, and I certainly agree with the comments of the Chairman. I would perhaps just expand that a little 

bit by saying that I think standardization is certainly an enhancement for efficiency, and ultimately in the end can allow us to deal 

with generic issues, generic safety issues that may arise, in a more 

straightforward manner, because we don’t have to tailor the solution to 104 unique plants, which is what we find ourselves in with 

the situation today with several generic issues that we are wrestling with, that the solutions are so unique and so specific to each 

plant that it consumes a tremendous amount of resources to have 

to analyze those individually. So there is, I think, an enhancement, 

certainly from the safety perspective. 

I think the biggest challenge is how we actually achieve that. We 

don’t impose standardization as a safety requirement. We encourage it, and we encourage it very strongly right now because if the 

designs that we are reviewing are not truly standardized, we simply won’t have the resources to review all the applications that we 

have in a timely manner. So that has been a good incentive from 

the licensing review perspective to get standardization. 

The challenge will be if plants are licensed and then built, how 

we maintain standardization among different utilities that may all 

have a similar design. That is not a requirement that we have, as 

I said, from a safety perspective, so that is where it will be much 

more incumbent upon the industry to police that initiative themselves, to ensure that plants that were licensed the same are operated and ultimately modified in the same way as we go forward, 

so that we don’t branch out and modify them in unique ways in the 

future. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LYONS. I certainly agree with the comments made by each 

of my colleagues. Standardization is very, very important. It is important not only to the regulator, but also to industry. We can be 

more efficient. We can better assess safety issues across the fleet. 

I concur with Commissioner Jaczko that the main way that we can 

encourage standardization is when we tell industry that if you 
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standardize, we can be far more efficient and effective in our reviews of your application. That is the main tool we have toward 

standardization, and maintaining standardization, as my colleague 

said, is also vital. 

Thank you. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Senator, I know you don’t have much time for 

questions if you get four answers to each, but I agree with my colleagues. Clearly, standardization holds the potential of a lot of increases in efficiency. The timeframes for review that Senator 

Inhofe was talking about, more standardization allows us as a regulator to capture the efficiencies in those reviews. And also as 

Commissioner Jaczko said, it has an enduring benefit as new reactors would be added to the current fleet. Standardization would 

continue to provide efficiencies for us. 

Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Let me end with this follow up question. Given 

all of your answers, shouldn’t we or you or both of us consider actually mandating more standardization than we do at present? 

Mr. KLEIN. Well, Senator Vitter, I think the industry has the 

message. I think we as regulators have the message. In the United 

States, we support the concept of free enterprise. It was easier for 

France to standardize when they had one vendor and one utility. 

We have multiple vendors and multiple utilities. And so, I think 

the way we will encourage standardization, as opposed to mandate 

it, is by the review process. If someone comes in with a non-standard design, it will take us a very long time to look at it. 

Senator VITTER. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Good questions. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first of all kind of go back a little ways. I am one of the 

few who actually remembers Three Mile Island and all the hysteria 

and the public clamor that came out of that thing. Would you, 

Chairman Klein, describe to us any public health impacts that resulted from that accident 30 years ago? 

Mr. KLEIN. Well, Senator Inhofe, I think the concern that people 

typically have is concern about cancer. And there is no data that 

shows there has been any negative impact of cancer from that accident. 

Senator INHOFE. Is there any data that shows that there was any 

resultant public health impairment as a result of that accident? 

Mr. KLEIN. No evidence of that, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. You know, I think that’s significant, because 

you talk to most people and they don’t realize that. They assume 

that. And yet, I would have to say, and I think that each of you 

in the Commission would agree that because of that incident 30 

years ago, that did retard our efforts to move forward with nuclear 

energy. And I wonder, any thoughts about where we would be 

today if that had not happened? 

Mr. KLEIN. You know, that’s a difficult question. One could speculate about that, but as you indicated, I think Three Mile Island 

should have shown that the safety systems were fairly robust, and 

that there were no negative health impacts. But certainly the public confidence was shaken, but that also occurred at the same time 
69 

that we were undergoing a transition into reduced baseload demand of electricity. So there were, after Three Mile Island, there 

were a lot of coal-fired plants that were canceled as well due to the 

lower baseload demand. 

But my guess is that had Three Mile Island not occurred, we 

would likely have had more reactors today than we have. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, and we didn’t anticipate back at that time 

30 years ago that we would be having the energy problems that we 

have today. I mean, here we are with 20 percent of our energy coming from nuclear and some of the Western European countries, 

France, I believe is 80 percent. 

I have never heard anyone talk in any of these hearings about 

the performance of whatever the counterpart is called in one of 

these other countries like France. Are they going through about the 

same things that we are right now, even though they are way in 

advance of us? Are they as concerned with safety? Are they concerned with the same concerns that you folks have? How do you 

compare us to them? 

Mr. KLEIN. I think, Senator, if you look at the performance of the 

plants, in general our plants perform better than a lot of countries. 

I believe that as the regulatory body, we are still viewed as the 

world’s best regulator. We have more people, a lot more technical 

details. But we also have things we can learn from other countries, 

and so we share. 

We have a very large international program where we try to 

share information among various regulators. And I know that 

Andre Lacoste, the head of the French regulator, is also going 

through and trying to beef up their regulatory capabilities. 

But I think for most countries, they are similar. I think our job 

as a regulator in an international arena is to share best practices 

worldwide because, as we learn, even though we have no reactors 

like Chernobyl in the United States, there was still a lot of uncertainty and apprehension from Chernobyl. So we need to be 

proactive in the international community. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Lyons. 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Inhofe, France certainly has a very strong 

safety regulator, a very effective one. But I think it is interesting 

to note that within the last, I would say, 2 years there have been 

legislative changes within France that have moved their regulatory 

system much closer to ours, in that their regulator now has a substantially greater degree of independence, and basically is now an 

independent regulator, as we are, and in addition has mandates for 

transparency and public information. 

If I were to look across the world, I think that two important 

trends would mirror what has happened in France, that more countries are recognizing the importance of an independent regulator, 

of strong public input, and public information as we have. In addition, a quest that I would say that we have been on in many of 

our international discussions, is to encourage more countries to 

look at both safety and security as two integrated functions, two 

very important integrated functions. Many countries handle these 

completely separately. 

Senator INHOFE. You know, I hesitate even getting into the thing 

on the 5 years that it takes the NRC, as indicated to this Com-
70 

mittee, that it takes about 5 years reviewing new reactor designs 

before granting certifications, because safety is the most important 

thing. I understand that. 

Commissioner Jaczko, you said when I was saying, you know, if 

there is a way that we could reduce that 5 years down, move a little bit faster, you talked about prioritizing applications. I would 

like to ask each of you in my time remaining of any ideas you 

might have that might shorten that 5-year period of time and 

maintain the same level of safety that we enjoy today. 

I will start with you, Commissioner Svinicki. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Senator, one of the practices that Chairman Klein 

brought from the Pentagon was referred to as Lean Six Sigma, 

which is a process whereby our staff has gone through and looked 

at all of the procedural steps for reviewing these applications. The 

Commission has received some suggestions from the staff of how to 

better coordinate their internal work and the coordination that 

needs to occur between offices. So they are looking at it, Senator, 

if they could take some months off of that process. The Commission 

has received some recommendations that we are looking at now. 

Senator INHOFE. Good, good. 

Mr. Lyons. 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Inhofe, at least one suggestion I would make 

would be the hope that industry in the future could follow more directly the path that we anticipated when Part 52 was created. We 

anticipated that a site would go first for an early site permit, that 

they would be using a certified design, and only then would be 

going for the construction and operating license. I believe it is correct that no licensee, no applicant right now is following that exact 

path. There certainly are other areas where we can look for efficiency, but having that process followed would help us. 

Senator INHOFE. I see. 

Commissioner Jaczko. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, as I talked about, I think the area of 

prioritization, as Commissioner Svinicki mentioned, the staff has 

talked about areas where we could improve our review a little bit, 

but we are talking about months perhaps. And the biggest challenge that I see right now is really getting the design reviews completed. And for most of the designs that we have right now, there 

are some challenges in getting those reviews completed. 

So once we can have that completed, the licensing review will be 

a much more straightforward process. But right now, there are 

challenges, I think, with getting the design review complete. And 

as I said, I think our focus would be better on taking a few, maybe 

a smaller number of those designs and a smaller number of licensees or applicants, focusing on getting those through the process 

once, demonstrate how it will work effectively, and then turn to the 

other applications. 

Senator INHOFE. So we would effectively be getting them online 

faster by doing that, but not as many of them. 

Mr. JACZKO. Not as many. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. 

Chairman Klein, any last comments on that? 

Mr. KLEIN. Well I think, Senator Inhofe, on the design certifications, those are fairly unique. One thing I have learned is that 
71 

a good application takes less time than an incomplete one. And so 

it is a two way street, I think. I think industry needs to give high 

quality applications and we need to be responsive in the review of 

that application. 

I think on the license applications, once we go through a few of 

those and we practice the Lean Six Sigma activities, I think we will 

become more efficient with no compromise on safety. 

Senator INHOFE. Good. 

Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. You are welcome. Thank you. 

Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I didn’t 

say a few words on the Davis-Besse incident, because that facility 

is located in the State of Ohio. I was Chairman of the Subcommittee when that occurred, and as I said in my opening remarks, we took the NRC to task, as well as First Energy. We devoted three oversight hearings to follow up on the NRC’s corrective 

actions stemming from the GAO and inspector general reports. 

We also met with Nils Diaz, the NRC chair at the time, and Ed 

McGaffigan privately on a quarterly basis to get updates. It took 

a little while and some pushing, but I was pleased to see NRC formally incorporating safety culture into its inspection and regulatory oversight process. 

As you all know, we are trying to launch the nuclear renaissance 

in this country. We need to get into it for reducing, providing baseload energy. We need it also to meet the emissions caps that we 

will be seeing probably with new legislation being passed to deal 

with climate and global warming. And also it is an area of large 

job creation. 

But I still run into people out there that are saying, well, what 

about safety? What about the security of these plants? Aren’t they, 

you know, vulnerable right now to terrorist attack? That is one 

thing. Then you hear another story out there about all this nuclear 

waste that is all over the United States being held in dry and wet 

storage, and how safe is that stuff? 

And also, if something would happen, you know, what kind of insurance do they have? They have no idea about Price Anderson and 

the way the insurance if something would happen. All of the insurance carried by all of the 104 would be used to deal with a situation. 

And I still think, and it is a complaint I have, is that you are 

not doing a good enough job getting information out there in the 

country. There is still a lot of stuff that is floating around, and 

these same people that are out there, you know, talking about this 

are the ones that are standing in the way of our moving forward 

right here in Congress in some areas that we should be going forward with. 

I would be interested in your commenting on these. 

Mr. KLEIN. Well, Senator Voinovich, I believe that as an agency, 

we can be more proactive on education. We have to walk that fine 

line, as Senator Carper indicated. We have to remember we are the 

regulator, and not a promoter. 

I would like to see the Department of Energy be more proactive 

in their roles and responsibilities. The area of communication, 
72 

though, is one in which I believe the NRC can do better. I think 

we would like to modernize our Web sites so that we become the 

site of first choice if someone has a question. 

As Commissioner Jaczko indicated, we do need to train our individuals to communicate clearly and succinctly. As I oftentimes say, 

I am an engineer, so if you ask an engineer what time it is, they 

will tell you how to build a watch. 

So I believe we can do a better job on communication and we are 

working on it. 

Senator VOINOVICH. How about the whole issue of the nuclear 

waste that we are generating, and the fact that we continue to 

have it located in dry and wet storage, and people are concerned 

about that all over the Country? What do we say to them about 

that? How long can that last? 

Mr. KLEIN. Dry cask storage is safe. We license those facilities. 

We currently have made a determination that we can safely secure 

and store that material onsite for as long as 100 years. But as a 

Nation, it would be good to come forward with a long-term waste 

solution. 

For us, as a regulator, we make sure that the dry cask storage 

is done safely, properly and securely. As you know, we have the application before us for the Yucca Mountain site. We by law are required to look at that application and we will do that in a very effective manner, depending on the resources that we have available. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So what you are saying to me and saying to 

the public is that the current way of holding that waste at the facilities around the Country is safe. And second of all, that there is 

some extended life in terms of it being stored in that fashion. Because most people today believe Yucca ain’t going to happen, and 

so there is a concern about that. And some of us are considering 

doing something as an alternative to that. 

So you are telling me and telling the public that the waste that 

is out there today being stored in dry storage is safe, and that we 

can continue to do this for some time in the future without being 

concerned about it? 

Mr. KLEIN. Yes. 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, if I could add, the NRC did a study about 

dry cask storage several years ago, and that study found that the 

risks from any of the spent fuel, particularly in dry cask storage, 

was about a million times less than the risk from the power plant 

itself. So what you often find is communities that are very accepting of the power plant, may have concerns about the waste. And 

in fact, I think the waste, we have shown through our analysis, is 

much, much, much less of a risk. 

So I think that is a message that we can communicate. I think 

the licensees themselves can do a better job communicating that 

message as well in the communities that do have facilities, about 

really what the areas of focus from our perspective really should 

be from a safety standpoint. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And also security. 

Mr. JACZKO. And security as well. 

Senator VOINOVICH. In terms of, you know, terrorist attack, you 

hear that. Oh my goodness, if something happens there that, you 

know, we will have calamity. 
73 

Do you want to comment on that, the security aspect of this? We 

are talking about safety and security. 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has 

one of the most longstanding programs in security. It goes back to 

the 1970s, our ideas of how we deal with facilities and deal with 

security. And I think the agency was in a very good position, in 

particular, following September 11 because we had a well established program, that we were able to quickly make changes, make 

modifications to deal with that new issue. 

We have a very rigorous program right now where we do exercises at facilities on an ongoing basis to test their security programs. We have put in place new requirements for the existing 

fleet of reactors to ensure that they can mitigate the effects of any 

kind of 9/11 type incident. And we put in place very strong requirements for new reactors to ensure that they will be able to deal with 

some of the 9/11 type incidents and things that could happen in the 

future. 

So I think we have a very robust program in security. We are 

continuing to make that better. We are continuing to improve our 

communication in our work with other members of the Federal 

family, including the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, 

to ensure that we have security covered from all the different angles, whether it is from the facility itself, whether it is from responding to an event at a facility, or developing the emergency preparedness and training and interface that is necessary to successfully deal with an incident. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Senator, if I could just draw together your last two 

questions on communications and security. I would like to add that 

one of the unfortunate outgrowths of the enhanced security at reactors post-9/11 is that so many had to close their visitors centers 

and their information centers. As I visit reactor sites now, I often 

notice that along the roadside, the entrance to the plant, they have 

large signage for a visitors center with a big placard across it that 

says now closed to the public. 

I am heartened that some of the new reactor applicants are considering how they are able to site some sort of public information 

center that they can put far enough away from the reactor at new 

sites so that they could once again be communicating with the public. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Mr. LYONS. If I could just suggest, Senator, that one way of perhaps reinforcing in the public’s mind the safety and security of dry 

cask storage, and this would be something that industry could do, 

would be to make some of those casks available for public inspection. 

I think anyone who has had the opportunity to view those casks, 

to simply stand beside them, realizes the number of tons of concrete and steel that are in those things. I think they would develop 

a very healthy respect for both the safety and security of dry cask 

storage. 

But I also agree with your point and I personally hope that the 

Congress would be looking toward development of a long-term 
74 

spent fuel policy that would give the American public a clear view 

of where we would be going far into the future. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Voinovich introduced me to the concept 

of roundtables, as opposed to committee hearings, several years 

ago. And I like them a lot, and we are going to hold a roundtable 

in Cambridge, Massachusetts on Monday morning, May 18, and invite some very smart people up there to come and share with us 

what they know about spent fuel. 

We talk about it as nuclear waste, but actually I understand 

there is a fair amount of energy still unrealized and unextracted 

from this spent fuel. So we are going to find out their ideas, hear 

a little bit about what is going on in other places around the world, 

and tape the brains of some very, very bright people, and also have 

an opportunity to bring in maybe a person or two to talk with us 

about clean coal and sequestration of CO2. 

The responsibility of this Subcommittee is dual in purpose. One 

is clean air, and the other is nuclear safety, and they are related, 

but we want to make sure we have an opportunity while we are 

there that morning, and my hope is that Senator Vitter and Senator Voinovich and others on the Subcommittee, Senator Merkley, 

can join us for that time. 

All right. Speaking of Senator Merkley, he has joined us here, 

and we are delighted you are here. He is not a new Member anymore. He is an old veteran, and we are happy he is here, and welcome to our hearing. 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you for your testimony. I will just have a couple of 

quick questions. One is, I believe that there are some facilities that 

still have nuclear rods stored in pools, whether they are in dry 

cask. But if you could just kind of characterize, if you could, the 

amount of storage that is still done, wet storage if you will, and 

does that pose greater risks, and is there a strategy for moving to 

a dry cask system? 

Mr. KLEIN. All nuclear power plants use wet pools. In fact, we 

require the ability to offload the entire core of a reactor, if need be, 

into the adjacent spent fuel pool that is in water. 

So every commercial reactor that is running has a wet pool. They 

typically want to utilize that one first, and then they only go to dry 

casks once that wet pool is filled. Both are safe. 

Senator MERKLEY. And why is it they want to utilize the wet 

pool first? 

Mr. KLEIN. It was a part of the initial design. That was the initial concept. It also has decay heat removal, so you will remove the 

decay heat from the spent fuel for several months before you would 

ever consider putting it into dry casks for decay heat removal. 

Senator MERKLEY. I had the experience a few years ago of being 

up at Hanford, and walking on the metal grating on top of a pool. 

And it is a strange feeling, with the nuclear rods down at the bottom. And I asked the question, well, what happens if an earthquake comes through here and this water is lost? And the answer 

was just summarized as, well, that would be bad. 

But could you kind of give us a better sense of kind of the safety 

issues related to the wet pool storage? 
75 

Mr. KLEIN. Well, Senator, as you might expect, all of those facilities have to meet earthquake requirements. They typically are robust. There are very thick walls. Some have liners. And so in the 

event that there could be a crack in that pool that water would 

leak out, and again these are very thick pools, several feet of concrete, it is important that the plant has the ability to quickly add 

water. 

Senator MERKLEY. Turning to another safety issue, in terms of 

the dry cask above-ground storage, are there issues there related 

to potential terrorist actions? What happens if a dry cask is blown 

up in terms of radioactivity in nearby areas? Is there a terrorist 

risk? How do we address it? 

Mr. KLEIN. Well, Senator, we have analyzed the terrorist risk on 

those dry casks. You know, there are a lot of factors that go into 

that, much of which we can’t say publicly, but we have analyzed 

a lot of what if scenarios, what kinds of attacks, and how they 

might occur. These are very robust canisters, and so we believe 

that from all of our analyses that it is a minimal risk. 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Senator Merkley. Thanks for joining 

us. 

Let me just conclude as this first panel wraps up, with a couple 

of thoughts. One point I made earlier, folks at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are busy these days, very busy. You are always 

busy, but especially these days, saying grace over the safe operation of 104 active nuclear power plants; relicensing probably I 

think a couple dozen of them right now; reviewing the applications 

for I think 26 or 27 new nuclear power plants which could be built 

in the years to come; and examining carefully, closely the new designs for nuclear reactors that are being presented to you. And you 

are doing it all at once. 

And trying to provide a good working environment for people, 

and providing diversity in your work force. That is a lot. That is 

a lot to do well. It is a lot to manage. And we are counting on you 

to continue to do that work and to do it well. It is important. Our 

Nation needs safe nuclear energy as much now as we ever have. 

I have been reminded several times in this economic calamity 

that we are going through in the last year or so, especially the last 

several months, of the words of Franklin Roosevelt, who said to the 

American people a long time ago, ‘‘We have nothing to fear but fear 

itself.’’ 

We have, oh gosh, earthquakes to fear. We have terrorist attacks, 

I suppose, to fear. We have most I think to fear complacency, complacency. If we think that, oh, we have come a long way, we 

haven’t had an accident, a major incident for all, lo, those many 

years. We have done a much better job in terms of raising the operating capacity to realize more nearly the full capacity of the generation of electricity by these nuclear reactors. We have come a 

long ways in the last 10 or 20 years. 

Here is what we have to fear. We have to fear complacency. To 

sit back and rest on our laurels, that would be the worst thing that 

could happen. This is a time to remain vigilant. Several of you 

have used that word, vigilant. And this is indeed a time to remain 

vigilant. And if we do, then the future for nuclear energy in this 
76 

Country, along with it the prospect of cleaner air, the prospect of 

less dependence on fossil fuels, the prospect of maybe even smaller 

trade deficits is actually enhanced. 

So all that would be great news for our Country, which right now 

needs some great news. 

All right. That is it for this panel. Again, our thanks to each of 

you for your service, for being with us today. We will provide probably for the record some additional questions. We will ask that you 

respond to those promptly. 

Thank you so much. 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you for your support. 

Senator CARPER. You are quite welcome. 

Gentlemen, welcome, one and all. We are delighted that you are 

here. We are very much looking forward to your testimony. It is 

great to see some of you for the first time, and to be able to welcome others back. Thank you for joining us today. 

Just a real short review of your bios, and we will start with Hon. 

Peter Bradford. Mr. Bradford was an NRC Commissioner during 

the Three Mile Island accident, served at the age of, what, 12, I 

think he told me? He was 12 years old at the time. Today, he is 

an Adjunct Professor from the Institute for Energy and the Environment at the Vermont Law School. Welcome. 

Is it Dr. Bradford? Yes, it is. Thank you. 

He is a former Chair of the New York and Maine Utility Commissions and has advised many States on utility restructuring 

issues and he is also on the board of the Union of Concerned Scientists. I think in reading Governor Thornburgh’s testimony, I 

think he alluded to calling on the Union of Concerned Scientists to 

help out during the time that that was most helpful. 

Mr. Harold Denton, it is great to see you, sir. I read all about 

you in Governor Thornburgh’s testimony and the kind of role, the 

key role that you played all those years ago, 30 years ago. And I 

understand you were onsite directing NRC’s staff activities and 

served as the Federal Government’s spokesperson for the Three 

Mile Island accident. You were also the first, in the first group of 

Americans allowed to visit the Chernobyl site. And after retiring 

from the NRC, you consulted on other nuclear safety matters and 

retired and currently live in Knoxville, Tennessee, where my wife 

went to graduate school. 

Welcome. We are glad you are here. 

Governor Dick Thornburgh, Governor Thornburgh was Governor 

of Pennsylvania for, what was it, 72 days or so before this incident? 

George, can you imagine that? Senator Voinovich, a former Governor like you imagine being Governor of Ohio or Governor of my 

State of Delaware and having something like this dropped on you 

72 days into your first term. That would be quite an experience. 

But not only, I call guys like you and Senator Voinovich and me 

recovering Governors, but not only are you a recovering Governor, 

but you had a public career spanning some 25 years, including Attorney General for not one, but two Presidents, and currently of 

counsel to the national law firm of Kirkpatrick and Lockhart here 

in Washington, DC. 

Thanks for joining us. 
77 

Finally, Dr. Marvin Fertel. Mr. Fertel is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute, with 35 years of experience consulting for electric utilities. 

We are delighted that you are all here. We would ask you, I have 

read your testimony, wonderful testimony. We would ask you to try 

to limit your comments to about 5 minutes. 

Mr. Bradford, I think, has to leave around 12:30. We have a Caucus luncheon that starts just after that, so we will try to get us out 

the door close to that time. But Mr. Bradford, if you need to leave 

right at 12:30 and we are not quite done, feel free to slip out. But 

you go first, and we are just delighted that you are all here. Thank 

you so much for coming. 

STATEMENT OF PETER A. BRADFORD, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, 

INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 

VERMONT LAW SCHOOL 

Mr. BRADFORD. Thank you very much, Senator Carper. I apologize to you and my fellow panelists for the scheduling constraint. 

The consolation I can offer Governor Thornburgh is that I am inconveniencing him less this morning than I did on the morning we 

were on opposite ends of the phone line between Washington and 

Harrisburg 30 years ago. 

I appreciate the opportunity to reflect on the lessons of Three 

Mile Island. With all of the interest in new nuclear power reactors 

in the U.S., as well in extending the licensed lives and increasing 

the output of the existing plants, getting the lessons right is crucial, just as important as not learning the wrong lessons. 

The principal conclusion of the Kemeny Commission was, ‘‘After 

many years of operation of nuclear plants, with no evidence that 

any member of the general public has been hurt, the belief that nuclear power plants are sufficiently safe grew into a conviction. This 

attitude must be changed to one that says nuclear power is by its 

very nature potentially dangerous, and therefore one must continually question whether the safeguards already in place are sufficient to prevent major accidents.’’ 

The Kemeny Commission also found, ‘‘That the NRC is so preoccupied with the licensing of plants that it has not given primary 

consideration to safety issues.’’ 

Occasional mishaps in the 1980s and 1990s notwithstanding, the 

NRC and the industry made many significant improvements after 

the accident at Three Mile Island. Then at the Davis-Besse Plant 

in Ohio in 2002, complacency and excessive concern for the finances of the power plant owner very nearly cost them all the 

ground that they had gained. 

Davis-Besse had received the NRC’s highest safety ratings 

throughout 2001, even as boric acid was eating away the reactor 

vessel head. Only a three-eighths of an inch thick steel liner performing a function for which it was not designed avoided a hole in 

the pressure vessel, an event not analyzed in NRC licensing because it was considered impossible. 

Among the lessons of Three Mile Island is that nuclear power is 

least safe when complacency and pressure to expedite are highest. 

A key corollary to this lesson is the importance of congressional 
78 

oversight, emphasizing that safety must be the NRC’s highest priority. 

Of course, this goal is always stated verbally, but at times the 

message has been mixed. Senator Pete Domenici wrote that he 

changed the NRC’s priorities in a 1998 meeting with the NRC 

Chair in which he threatened to cut the agency’s budget by onethird if the NRC did not modify its adversarial attitude toward the 

industry. 

If, when the NRC regulates seriously, it is hammered for delay 

or indifference to cost, as the NRC was in the weeks before the 

Three Mile Island accident, that message will have an impact. Today’s hearing can be a very useful antidote to the dangers that lie 

on that road. 

Finally, avoiding the wrong lessons is as crucial as learning the 

right ones. An oft-repeated Three Mile Island story line goes something like this. ‘‘The most important lessons is that the safety systems worked as intended. Interveners exploited the accident to tie 

up nuclear reactors in interminable and costly hearings. These 

problems have largely been solved. If Congress will further streamline the licensing process and shift financial risk from investors to 

taxpayers, nuclear construction can resume its rightful place in furthering national energy goals’’. 

But this story line is a harmful fantasy, inviting the wasting of 

a lot of money and effort in solving problems that nuclear power 

never had, while repeating the cycle that caused Forbes Magazine 

to proclaim in 1985 that the failure of the U.S. nuclear power program ranks as ‘‘ the largest managerial disaster in business history’’. 

When TMI is seen together with the fire at Browns Ferry 4 years 

earlier, and with other expensive mishaps such as fuel cladding 

failures, emergency core cooling system shortcomings, seismic design retrofits, and absence of offsite emergency plans, a clear picture emerges of a technology pushed far ahead of its operating experience. 

In 1968, the largest nuclear plant in operation was half the size 

of the smallest plant under construction. This was as if the airline 

industry had gone from Kitty Hawk to jumbo jets in 15 years. In 

1972, the Atomic Energy Commission forecast that the Country 

would need 1,000 nuclear power reactors by the year 2000. This 

would have required the regulators to issue a license every week 

for the next 28 years, a pace that could not possibly have been sustained. In hindsight, trouble and disappointment were inevitable. 

The nuclear regulatory problem culminating in the accident at 

Three Mile Island was not that the United States had licensed too 

few nuclear plants too slowly. The Country had in fact licensed too 

many reactors too quickly. That is why within a decade of the TMI 

accident, we had a landscape dotted with nine figure cost overruns. 

Every State in a crescent from Mississippi to Washington, and in 

a line across the northern tier from Illinois to Maine, was touched 

by at least one event involving the waste of more than $100 million. 

NRC hearings did not close Three Mile Island. NRC hearings 

had nothing to do with the quality assurance breakdowns at Diablo 

Canyon and Zimmer. NRC hearings did not cause the diesel gener-
79 

ator building at Midland to sink into the soil, or the tenfold cost 

overruns at the never-operated Shoreham Nuclear Plant in New 

York. 

Indeed, study after study made clear that NRC hearings have little to do with nuclear power’s real problems. The reasons for nuclear power’s inability to compete in U.S. power markets are beyond the scope of this hearing. But they have not been fixed by 

measures that assume that they were caused by Three Mile Island 

or by an overly cautious regulatory process. Indeed, they have not 

been fixed at all. 

Again, my thanks to the Subcommittee for the chance to expand 

on some of real and some wrong lessons of Three Mile Island. Undertakings such as this hearing as the way for the U.S. to learn 

history, rather than repeat it. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bradford follows:] 
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Senator CARPER. Dr. Bradford, thanks very much for those comments and for your presence here today. 

Mr. Denton, welcome. Glad to see you. Thank you for joining us. 

STATEMENT OF HAROLD DENTON, FORMER NRC EMPLOYEE 

Mr. DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

Committee. I am glad to have this opportunity to meet with you. 

On Friday morning following the accident, Chairman Hendrie requested I go to the site and take charge of the NRC response. I 

would be President Carter’s contact and work closely with Governor Thornburgh. A few hours later, the White House sent a helicopter to take me and Members and our staff to the site. On arrival, I asked the utility to inform us in advance of any changes 

they made in the status of the plant so that we could review them, 

and we began around the clock coverage of all the operations at the 

plant. 

Within a few days, we had over 100 NRC people at the site. The 

President asked during that time to be kept fully informed and had 

specific times that he wanted to be called in the morning and 

night. In addition, he indicated that all the resources of the Federal 

Government would be made available to bring the situation to a 

safe conclusion. I briefed Governor Thornburgh each evening and 

as events required, and he and I held press conferences nightly for 

many days there. 

I had never met President Carter or Governor Thornburgh before, but they appreciated the gravity of the situation. They were 

personally involved every day, and it was just remarkable cooperation that occurred during that whole crisis, between the Federal 

Government and State government. 

For example, I hadn’t signed any paperwork through those 

weeks. I did not approve or request any formal assistance that required paperwork. The military provided logistical support. They 

brought in plane loads of equipment from around the Country and 

people. The Department of Energy did environmental surveillance 

around the plant with all their capability. 

We were not an operational agency. We were a paperwork review 

agency, so we had very little capability, operational capability. So 

someone found phones available for the fire service, so they served 

as our phones for communicating within our staff members. I 

stayed there for 3 weeks. The event was hectic and challenging and 

at times surreal. 

We were not sure and did not understand the full consequences 

of that accident for a long time afterwards. We originally knew that 

there had been a severe accident. That was inferred from measurements made outside the containment. When the core was finally 

accessible and people were able to look inside the core, the examination showed a drastically different appearance than most people 

thought. 

The uppermost fuel assemblies were completely destroyed, and 

research showed that about 45 percent of the core had melted. The 

critical phase of the accident was actually over Wednesday morning 

in looking at this accident in retrospect. Operators turned off redundant emergency core cooling systems, although the reactor was 

losing water continuously through a failed valve. No core damage 
89 

would have resulted if the emergency pumps, which were started 

automatically had been left running, instead of being shut off. 

About 100 minutes into the accident, the water level dropped 

below the top of the core and the fuel began to overheat. As the 

water level continued to drop, more and more of the central core 

melted and flowed downward and solidified when it reached the 

bottom of the reactor vessel. 

Approximately 4 hours later, nearly 20 tons of molten core material had reached the bottom of the reactor vessel. The circular area 

at the bottom of the reactor vessel experienced extremely high temperatures for about 30 minutes before cooling. 

At 16 hours into the accident, the operators managed to re-start 

pumps and provided a way of getting water back into the core and 

providing subsequent cooling. A robust reactor containment structure proved valuable during this accident. The offsite radiological 

consequences were minimal. 

The history of containments is kind of interesting to me. The 

first containment was in use proposed back in 1947 by a blue ribbon committee of the Atomic Energy Commission. Since that time, 

containment structures have always been a safety feature of commercial reactors. 

During the TMI accident, the total amount of iodine released, 

which is a particularly hazardous material, was about one million 

times less than that released as a result of the uncontained 

Chernobyl accident in the Ukraine. Also, we found that as a result 

of studies after the accident that the possibility of the penetration 

of the containment basemat by a molten core, commonly referred 

to as the China Syndrome, which had not been studied since prior 

to the accident, is very unlikely to have penetrated the containment basemat even if the hot core had reached the basemat. 

A second topic that was subject to a lot of review at the time was 

the possibility of a hydrogen explosion within the containment. 

There had been a hydrogen explosion in the containment, but that 

led people to start thinking about could there be a hydrogen explosion within the reactor vessel. Calculations had been done, but they 

had neglected a reported factor that indicated that oxygen would 

recombine with the hydrogen in the water essentially as soon as it 

was generated, so there never was a chance for a hydrogen explosion in the reactor. 

As you mentioned before, the accident was comprehensively examined by a number of investigations, including the President’s 

Commission. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Denton, you are a little bit over 6 minutes. 

I am going to ask you to try to wrap it up here very shortly if you 

can, please. 

Mr. DENTON. All right. 

My conclusion is that the safety of power plants today is better 

than ever as a result of all the lessons learned. Federal and State 

preparations for emergency planning are better than ever, coping 

with new standard designs, and coping with the fact that the nuclear technology doesn’t really exist in the U.S. today as it did back 

in those days, there will be continuing challenges for the NRC 

Commission. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Denton follows:] 
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Senator CARPER. Thanks. Your entire statement will be made 

part of the record. When we add new questions, I am going to come 

back and ask you to kind of go back and revisit that last part of 

your testimony for us, if you would. Thanks so much. 

Governor, General Thornburgh, we are delighted that you are 

here. I don’t know how many people have been both a Governor 

and Attorney General for two Presidents, but not too many. So it 

is a real honor for us that you are here. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DICK THORNBURGH, OF COUNSEL, K&L 

GATES LLP, FORMER GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. THORNBURGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 

Subcommittee. My full written statement attempts to recount on a 

day by day, hour by hour basis the events of March 28, 1979, and 

the days immediately following, from my vantage point as a newly 

minted Governor of Pennsylvania. 

Senator CARPER. I think we all found it just very interesting. All 

the testimony is very good, but it was just riveting the way you 

documented it. So it was very interesting. 

Mr. THORNBURGH. Thank you. 

The statement addresses a couple of things that I want to emphasize about the emergency management side. One is the constant frustration that existed concerning the inability to acquire reliable information about what was transpiring at the damaged reactor, and the difficulty in communicating between various centers 

of activity. 

Remember, this was an era before we had cell phones, the Internet, BlackBerrys, video conferencing and the like. Land lines, 

which were the exclusive way to communicate, were frequently 

jammed, even the so-called hot line which had been established between the White House and President Carter and myself. 

Reliable information concerning potential threats to health and 

environment were equally hard to come by. Experts proliferated, 

but most of them were of little use. They either exaggerated the 

safety or exaggerated the threat of the situation. 

I would be remiss if I didn’t pay particular tribute to Harold 

Denton, who proved to be the real hero of this episode. He had an 

ability to translate nuclear jargon into plain English. He had a 

calm demeanor that built confidence and credibility, and he served 

as an effective antidote to the coincidental opening of the movie 

The China Syndrome in the Harrisburg area just prior to the accident. Talk about surreal events. That had to be one at the top of 

the list. 

We have seen 30 years pass since the time of the event, and I 

want to offer some brief observations on the future of nuclear 

power in light of present day circumstances. 

Energy independence is a byword today. A familiar litany has developed about the need to rely more on alternate sources of energy, 

but most people acknowledge that the prospects of substantial and 

timely relief from hydro, wind, solar, biomass, et cetera, is highly 

unlikely. 

As a result, there is a growing and renewed interest in nuclear 

energy, which is now supplying in many countries around the 

world more than the majority of their energy needs. 
99 

There is more and more interest in all non-carbon producing 

sources, such as nuclear, even among some environmentalists who 

are traditional opponents of nuclear energy. Concerns about global 

warming have made strange bedfellows indeed. 

The predictions of a comeback for nuclear power must be tempered, however, by major concerns that exist, and I will refer to 

those briefly. Nuclear technology, as has been referred to today, 

has become increasingly complex and demanding, and more expensive, and we have to rely more and more on foreign component 

manufacturers. Even the pioneer in this area, Westinghouse Electric in my State of Pennsylvania is now owned by Toshiba. 

The costs of construction are going to go up, increased financing costs, the $18.5 billion loan guarantee program authorized in 2005 

has been underfunded and understaffed, and now must compete 

with other priority needs. 

The safety record that has been referred to this morning, and it 

is certainly improved since pre-1979 times. Emergency management capabilities at the State and local level, while they have no 

doubt been upgraded, have not been tested, and with the passage 

of time no doubt have not been the high priority that they were in 

the immediate aftermath of TMI. 

I think the most important and sizable barrier to a vigorous development of nuclear power in the U.S. is the inability thus far to 

solve the problem of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. President 

Obama’s scuttling of the Yucca Mountain site is only the most recent setback in the effort to tackle this vexing challenge. 

Surely, this has to be a high priority in the expenditure of Federal research and development funds, even to the point of committing to a Manhattan Project type undertaking, to call upon our 

technological expertise to remove a significant barrier to helping to 

solve our energy problems and contribute to a better quality of life 

for all of our citizens. 

Thirty years after the Nation’s most serious nuclear accident, we 

have yet to address many of these key issues in a systematic way, 

and I compliment you, Mr. Chairman, and your Members, in calling this hearing to spotlight some of these issues. 

If we continue on our present path, we threaten to deprive ourselves of a potential green source of much-needed electric power. 

Many thanks. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornburgh follows:] 
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Senator CARPER. Governor, thank you so much. 

Mr. Fertel, Marvin Fertel, welcome. We are happy that you are 

here. Thanks. 

STATEMENT OF MARVIN S. FERTEL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER, NUCLEAR 

ENERGY INSTITUTE 

Mr. FERTEL. Chairman Carper and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for holding this hearing today. 

As you know, this month marks the 30th anniversary of the accident at Three Mile Island. Since then, the nuclear energy industry 

and the Federal Government have dramatically increased safety 

and reactor operating standards and developed a safety culture 

that we believe is demonstrably among the best in American industry and worldwide. 

The accident at Three Mile Island has had profound and lasting 

effects on virtually every aspect of nuclear power plant safety and 

operations. Lessons learned from the accident are permanently ingrained in the nuclear industry’s training, procedures, regulations, 

and culture. 

The Kemeny Commission, which has been referred to earlier, recommended two things that we took very seriously. First, ‘‘that the 

nuclear power industry should establish a program that specifies 

appropriate safety standards, including those for management, 

quality assurance, and operating procedures and practices, and 

that conducts independent evaluations.’’ And second, ‘‘that there 

must be a systematic gathering, review and analysis of operating 

experience at all nuclear plants, coupled with an industry-wide 

international communications network to facilitate rapid flow of information to affected parties.’’ 

The industry took those recommendations and formed the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 9 months after the accident, and 

charged it with promoting the highest levels of safety and reliability in the operation of our plants. 

The institute drives operational excellence, open communications, 

and continuous improvements among all U.S. nuclear plant operators. All U.S. energy companies that own and operate nuclear 

plants are members of INPO and they are driven by INPO to continuously strive for excellence in reactor operation. 

INPO has had a profound impact on the way nuclear plants are 

managed and operated. The proof, we believe, is in the steady improvement in plant performance over the last three decades since 

the accident. To improve training, INPO in 1985 formed the National Academy for Nuclear Training to focus and unify industry efforts to continuously improve training and qualification programs 

and to promote professionalism of nuclear plant personnel. The 

academy reviews nuclear utilities training programs for key positions at each plant. 

Since TMI, the industry also introduced the use of plant-specific 

reactor control room simulators at every site. In 1979, there were 

only four simulators for the use of all nuclear plant operators. The 

number of operating crews was expanded, and each crew spends a 

week in training in the plant-specific simulator every 6 weeks. 
122 

INPO also provides a unique form of self-regulation and recognition that the nuclear industry’s standard is excellence. INPO teams 

conduct onsite 2 week inspections at each plant once every 2 years 

to assess the knowledge and performance of plant personnel, the 

condition of systems and equipment, the quality of programs and 

procedures, and the effectiveness of plant management. Each year, 

INPO conducts meetings with all of the industry chief executive officers, in which both the good and poor performance is openly discussed, providing accountability for plant performance at the highest level of management. 

INPO also reviews significant events at nuclear plants and communicates lessons learned and best practices throughout the industry. INPO provides assistance with specific technical and management issues in areas related to plant operations and support. 

And as mentioned by the Governor, although emergency preparedness procedures had been in place prior to the TMI accident, 

it was clear from the event that additional action was required. As 

a result, the industry developed comprehensive emergency preparedness and response programs in cooperation with Federal, 

State and local leaders, and additional requirements were imposed 

by NRC and FEMA. 

The TMI–2 accident caused no injuries to workers or the public, 

but there was emotional distress as a result of the event and related evacuation of residents near the plant. A dozen epidemiological studies conducted since 1981 have found no discernible direct 

health effects in the population in the vicinity of the facility, and 

these studies are all summarized in my written testimony. 

Since TMI, one of the nuclear industry’s tenets is to never, and 

this is a term you have heard from everybody so far today, become 

complacent in our vigilance for safe operations of nuclear facilities. 

To prevent complacency, the industry is taking proactive actions to 

identify and resolve any emerging issues promptly and effectively, 

and to communicate operating experience broadly across the industry. 

The goal is to identify equipment or human performance problems well in advance of any significant impact on plant operations. 

Mr. Chairman, to conclude I would want to assure this Committee that the accident at Three Mile Island has had profound 

and lasting effects on virtually every aspect of nuclear power plant 

safety and operation. Today, the industry is more efficient, more 

productive, more professional and above all, more committed to 

safety. We continue to share operating experience and lessons 

learned because we will not allow history to repeat itself. 

Safety is and will continue to be our highest priority. The safety 

of our reactors today is evident in the world class performance of 

the facilities, and the exemplary worker safety record across our industry. 

Thank you for this hearing, and thank you for your interest in 

our industry. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fertel follows:] 
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Senator CARPER. Mr. Fertel, thank you for joining us today and 

for your testimony again today. 

Dr. Bradford, I would just ask my colleagues to direct their first 

questions to you, and then we will come back and ask questions of 

our other three guests. 

The question, the first question I would like to ask of you, if I 

could, I am reminded, I think it was Harry Truman who used to 

say, ‘‘The only thing that is new in the world is the history we 

never learned or have forgotten.’’ And I like to think of Three Mile 

Island in the context of lessons that we learned, lessons that we 

didn’t learn, and maybe lessons that we learned, but we have forgotten. 

Let me just ask you, thinking back, taking that approach of lessons learned, lessons never learned, and maybe lessons learned, 

but forgotten, just kind of tell us what you think in those three 

broad categories. 

Mr. BRADFORD. Well, I probably can’t do much with the learned 

but forgotten category because I have forgotten it. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BRADFORD. But in the context of the push for a nuclear renaissance, it does seem to me that one lesson that at least has faded 

from the forefront is the difficulty of maintaining a strong, clear 

focus on safety at a time when the rest of the Government seems 

entirely focused on licensing additional plants. That was very much 

the concern at the time of the accident at Three Mile Island. The 

pace of new applications had fallen off, review times had gotten 

longer. And many of the congressional hearings and much of the 

media’s focus was why can’t we get this process started up again. 

And in some ways, that pressure did contribute, I think, to the 

combination of complacency and haste that led to the accident. 

So my concern today in a context in which the industry is seeking your support for all of, essentially financing all of the plants 

that they see in the pipeline, is similar to the concern that Commissioner Jaczko echoed, or articulated well in the last panel, that 

there really is a need to prioritize, to pay attention to the pace at 

which the NRC can license and the taxpayer can afford to build the 

new plants. It may be different from the pace that the industry 

would like to move forward at. 

And that the setting of limits based on what the process can handle, rather than what the industry would like might make a significant contribution to safety. So maybe that one lesson, in a way, answers all three of your questions. It seems to me to have been an 

important lesson at the time of Three Mile Island, and there is a 

danger of its being overlooked and forgotten in the climate that exists today. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

One last question from me, and then I will yield to Senator 

Voinovich. 

I think you expressed concerns in your comments, or at least in 

your testimony, about the streamlining of the license process. What 

are your views on the current new and renewal license process? 

And do you feel public input is adequate on those? 

Mr. BRADFORD. I am glad you asked that question, Senator. In 

the context of your discussion with the previous panel on commu-
137 

nication, I was running through in my mind all the areas in which 

I agreed that communication has improved. 

But there is one respect in which I think communication has regressed, and that is that the public has far less access to the licensing process today, not just because of the one step process. In many 

ways, that change is constructive. But the NRC has also adopted 

a number of rule changes that drastically curtail the ability of people participating in their process, first to raise contentions effectively, and second, to pursue them. 

Attorneys can no longer cross examine directly in many situations. They have to submit questions through a panel chair. And 

that’s really an area of the Kemeny Commission and the NRC’s 

own Special Inquiry Group Report that has just been ignored in the 

years that went by. 

The Kemeny Commission recommended that the NRC create an 

Office of Special Counsel to represent the public in its hearings. 

The Rogovin Group actually went further and recommended intervener funding. None of that has happened. In fact, the NRC hearing process in some ways has become almost a show trial in terms 

of the public’s ability to be heard effectively. 

So I think the reforms in the direction of one-step licensing posed 

difficulties, but they also offer benefits. The exclusionary regulations that the NRC has adopted seem to me to be a mistake, an 

unfortunate one. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. One of the things that we try to concentrate 

on during the last number of years is human capital. And I have 

found because of my experience on the management side of government that so often regulatory agencies aren’t able to do the job that 

you would like them to do because they don’t have the resources 

to get the job done. 

I would be interested, Mr. Denton, in your reaction to what Mr. 

Bradford said earlier, and that is that there was a movement in 

the Country of having too many, too fast, that by 2000, 1,000. I 

don’t know who predicted that, but that was pretty ambitious. 

And then contrast that today with the situation where the Nuclear Regulatory Agency is probably the only Federal agency that 

has been able to replace the retirees that they have had, and in addition to that bring on new people to take care of the challenge of 

the new licenses that are coming before it. 

Mr. Fertel, you are watching this, too, and I might be interested 

in your comment in regard to that because the impression that you 

have, Mr. Bradford, is that they are not able to get the job done. 

I have to tell you that Senator Carper and I have worked very, 

very hard to create an environment there where they can replace 

their people. We have given them flexibilities that other agencies 

don’t have. They are No. 1 in the Federal Government in terms of 

job satisfaction with their people. We have reached out to MIT, 

even Ohio State in Ohio, Cincinnati, to get the schools back on 

track in terms of producing the people that we are going to need 

for this renaissance that we hope takes place. 

So I would just throw that up, a jump ball, and give you all a 

chance to comment on it. 
138 

Senator CARPER. Dr. Bradford, feel free to go first if you would 

like. 

Mr. BRADFORD. My concern is less with resources directly, because I agree that you have been very supportive of the NRC with 

regard to getting people for processing additional licenses. The concern is, that I have is more that when the Commission comes before various congressional committees and if the message is constantly one of are you meeting the licensing deadlines, are you 

avoiding delays, how can we squeeze a few more months out of the 

process, and they are never asked about the resolution of generic 

safety issues, and never asked to put—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. But you see, that is not the case, Mr. Bradford. Have you followed the numerous hearings that we have had? 

Twenty of them over the last number of years. That is not the case. 

Mr. BRADFORD. No, sir. I have only been here this morning. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I think it would have been good for 

you to maybe check in to see what has happened during the last 

8 years. 

Mr. BRADFORD. Well, you know, if you have put the same emphasis on getting a schedule for the generic issues, getting them on a 

track, being sure that the resources are available, that is terrific. 

And if all the other committees that they come before have done 

the same thing, that is terrific, too. 

But if that isn’t the balanced communication that they are getting, then there is the possibility, indeed the likelihood, that in trying to be responsive to the Congress, people will be shifted into the 

areas that the Congress is most concerned about. 

It happened certainly at times in the 1970s. That is the era that 

I am familiar with. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Can I ask you something? Do you believe 

that we should go forward with a nuclear renaissance? Do you believe that nuclear energy is something that we should increase in 

this Country in terms of baseload generation? Do you believe that 

nuclear power is something that is available to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions? 

You know, or are you just, I mean, where do you stand on that? 

Mr. BRADFORD. You know, I spent 20 years in positions of responsibility for the power supply to two States, and by the end of 

that time, my effort was devoted to creating processes that made 

the wisest economic choice essentially through the kinds of competitive market processes that we use in every other area, with the 

investors responsible for taking the risks and the customers responsible for paying off the costs once the plants are serving them. 

When those processes were put in place, nuclear power never bid. 

The investors would not take those risks. I would be glad to see 

nuclear power be part of a climate change solution package when 

it reaches the point in time that it is able to compete effectively in 

those power supply markets. And those markets have made sure 

that more than half of the customers in the U.S. in the regions that 

have gone to power supply markets, have had adequate electric 

supply for the 25 years now that we have been relying on them. 

But nuclear power can’t play in those markets. And it troubles 

me greatly to see the Congress asked to pick this one technology 

and favor it heavily in financial terms. 
139 

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you know something, that nuclear power 

has, in terms of, if you look at solar and wind power and see where 

the money that we have spent during the last several years is 

going, that is where the money is going. 

I think the only thing that the industry is concerned about is the 

issue of loan guarantees that would be necessary to go forward, 

and of course a little bit more important today because of the fact 

that the financial markets are in such bad shape. 

But if you look at where we have spent money, it is amazing. 

You know, if I were somebody out there today, I would invest in 

solar and wind power because of the subsidies that are coming out 

of the Federal Government in that regard. 

Mr. BRADFORD. When it comes to government support, they have 

a long way to go to catch up with nuclear. 

Senator CARPER. I am going to have to interrupt here. I will call 

on Senator Voinovich here in just a moment, but I want to yield 

to Senator Merkley for any questions you have of Dr. Bradford, and 

then he will be free to leave. 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

Professor, I thank you for your service as a Commissioner and 

the other work you have done. I find it very interesting to see the 

story, the history of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, and essentially 

a leaky nozzle eroded the carbon steel, multiple inches of carbon 

steel over a series of 4 years, and then there was a football-sized 

hole in that, and the inner lining, stainless steel lining, was deformed by the pressure of the vessel into that hole. 

And the role of the NRC in this was multiple. First, they had 

been requested to require inspections of these nozzles because they 

had been known to leak. After 4 years of debating that, they decided not to require those inspections. 

Then fast forward to 2001, they did take much stronger action 

and require plants to inspect those nozzles. The Davis-Besse Plant 

was one of two plants they decided not to do that, and resist that 

requirement. And the NRC did relent at that point and decided it 

would be safe to wait until the plant inspection in 2002. They decided that, no, it should really be done, and ordered the plant shut 

down for emergency inspection, but the plant resisted and then 

they went back to the position of waiting until the safety inspection. It is when they had that February inspection they discovered 

this football-sized hole. 

Does kind of this story give us any sense of insight into the role 

of the Commissioners, the pressure they are under to keep plants 

operating? And do we have an adequate system in place to be able 

to address the real safety risk? Because I think this is believed by 

all to have been a substantial safety risk. Do we have a system 

now? Have we learned from that enough to restructure the way 

NRC operates in order to have them be able to stand up and really 

ensure that inspections take place, even when it involves shutdowns and costs and so forth? Have we figured out that balance? 

Or is there more we need to do? 

Mr. BRADFORD. I wish you had asked that question of the previous panel, of course, because I am not there today and can’t—— 

Senator MERKLEY. But they are in the middle of it, whereas you 

get the objective experience to—— 
140 

Mr. BRADFORD. It is, you know, it is clear certainly that the licensee made its concerns known at the Commission level, and that 

would probably happen today, too. 

On the other hand, I assume the Commissioners with the benefit 

of what happened at Davis-Besse would almost certainly push back 

perhaps more than occurred at that time. 

At the end of the day, the public’s greatest safeguard in this area 

lies in the process of the appointment of Commissioners, the questions and decisions you make in confirming Commissioners, and 

the practices and procedures the Commissioners themselves put 

into place to protect the staff’s technical judgments from any political or financial intrusions. 

The protection that the public will get in these kinds of situations will be just as good as the standards that you insist on in confirming and that the President insists on in making the appointments. 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. I think you have summarized that 

it remains an inherent challenge. We have to protect the integrity 

of the staff judgments and try to insulate the Commission from political or economic pressures that might overrule the safety judgments of the technical staff. Is that a fair way to summarize your 

point? 

Mr. BRADFORD. It is. Yes. 

Senator MERKLEY. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. BRADFORD. I think there is perhaps some encouragement to 

be had in the study that Chairman Klein cited regarding the high 

staff morale in the agency, because that is not suggestive of a place 

where the staff feels beaten down at the moment in its ability to 

raise concerns. At least that is my hope that that is what that 

study is suggesting. 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Senator Merkley. 

And then Dr. Bradford, it is 12:30. Thank you so much for joining us. 

Mr. BRADFORD. Thank you very much. Again, my apologies to the 

Committee. 

Senator CARPER. We are glad that you could come, and thank 

you very much for your input. 

A question, if I could, for Governor Thornburgh, and perhaps for 

Harold Denton as well. 

Governor, how important was it looking back 30 years, how important was Harold Denton’s ability to communicate complicated 

technical information to the lay public, to ordinary people during 

an event of this nature? 

Mr. THORNBURGH. It was crucial. It was crucial because this was 

a technology not known to the general public or to those of us in 

public office. The so-called experts were beleaguering us with conflicting advice, and we really, I told President Carter, I said send 

us one good person who could provide us with reliable information 

upon which we could make judgments with regard to emergency 

management. 

And without embarrassing him, I have to say that when Harold 

showed up, it was clear that he filled the bill. 
141 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Denton, how did you feel when you were 

tapped for this assignment? It is not every day that a President 

calls and says, Harold, I have a job for you. 

Mr. DENTON. Well, I was shell-shocked probably at getting this 

assignment. When I went up, I thought that perhaps the White 

House would have a staff member up there and I would report to 

that person, and then this person would report to Governor 

Thornburgh. But I found out the moment I landed at the site the 

word had come in to us somehow that I was to call the White 

House, and I remember turning to my secretary, who had gone up 

with us, and I said, call the White House. And she replied, well, 

how do I do that? And I said, I don’t know, Doris, that is your problem. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DENTON. And I must have been under a lot of stress to snap 

at her like that, but she did get the White House, and the fact that 

the President was so willing to commit the resources of the Federal 

Government and so concerned about our relations with Governor 

Thornburgh and others, I felt pretty confident at the time that we 

would make every effort to bring things to a safe conclusion, and 

that is what we did. 

And there was just unparalleled cooperation among all the Federal agencies. I had never participated in any of the training for 

public affairs or public speaking sort of thing, but I did hold a 

press conference every day, and I think that was part of the secret 

that I came away with from that is that you need both technical 

people, subject matter specialist I will say, and elected officials to 

properly talk to the public. 

Technical people don’t really communicate well. They are not 

elected. They don’t necessarily understand the local context. The 

Governor brought that aspect to the communication process. Without that, people would probably still be evacuating. 

Senator CARPER. The two of you made a good team. 

Let me ask both Governor Thornburgh and you, Mr. Denton, do 

you believe that the NRC has gone some way toward rectifying 

their communications problems? Doing a better job at it now or 

not? 

Mr. DENTON. You mean in operation of reactors or in licensing 

reactors? 

Senator CARPER. Just being able to communicate their work, 

their role, their concerns, their efforts to focus on safety. Some of 

these issues are pretty technical. Most people in the Country aren’t 

all that good at understanding some of that stuff. I struggle with 

it as well. 

Mr. DENTON. I don’t think there has been a real advance in that 

area. I have wondered at times if Commission meetings held out 

in the region of the plant might be, you know, one way to do that. 

Not all meetings have to happen in Washington, for example. 

We would hold staff meetings in regional areas when there were 

problems, but usually the Commission didn’t feel willing to move 

Commission decisionmaking out to a region. 

We have also been very uneasy about appearing to take sides on 

these arguments about should the plant be licensed or not, except 

through formal mechanisms. So a lot of people who are unhappy 
142 

with Commission decisions never get a chance to see their decision 

challenged, so to speak, outside of a courtroom. 

Senator CARPER. One last question for Governor Thornburgh, 

and perhaps for you, Mr. Denton. But do you feel that the States 

are better prepared? Do you think they have more of the tools that 

they need to meet an accident of this nature today, than maybe 30 

years ago? 

Mr. THORNBURGH. That is still an item of concern to me. Thirty 

years have gone by, really a whole generation has grown up without having fresh in their memory the experiences of Three Mile Island. I think one would hope that those lessons have been learned. 

I did a lot of yapping about it when I was a Governor. We spent 

a lot of time focusing on emergency management issues. 

But it really bears substantial repeating, because the first lesson 

that I set forth in my written statement was expect the unexpected. And I think sometimes we are not as good at that as we 

would like to be. 

I would just add one thing to Harold Denton’s observations. Mercifully, I haven’t since 1979 had occasion to deal with the NRC in 

an emergency situation. But I don’t think there is any question but 

what at the very least that got their attention. 

I think that one of the things that both Harold Denton and I 

agreed upon in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island incident was 

you can’t manage this kind of an emergency situation away from 

the site. And most of the problems that evolved during this experience resulted from a failure to observe that. 

And I think his observations about getting the Commission and 

its staff out among the folks is good for any government agency, 

and I would second that motion as well. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Mr. FERTEL. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Just very briefly. My time has expired and I 

want to go to Governor Voinovich. Just very, very briefly. Go 

ahead, very briefly. Thank you. 

Mr. FERTEL. OK. The only thing I would add to what the Governor just said to your question is that there are exercises around 

every site every 2 years, which has gone on very, very rigorously. 

Where I think there has been significant improvement, not only in 

analytical tools like dose assessments and communication things 

and siren systems, is in relationships among the site people who 

interface on drills and everything else with the local and State people. 

Where I actually think what we do around our sites is negative 

training goes a little bit the other way. You heard the Governor 

and you heard Harold talk about how long this event took to 

evolve, and how it went. Well, when we do an exercise, we get to 

a general emergency as severe, if not much more severe, than what 

happened at Three Mile Island in a half a day. 

And we are conditioning people in decisionmaking in the State 

and local government to think that this happens that fast, and it 

doesn’t. So I think we have improved a lot, but we may be doing 

negative training in certain respects. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thanks for that comment. 

Governor Voinovich. Senator Voinovich. 
143 

Senator VOINOVICH. I am thinking about the security at these facilities. Several years ago, someone asked if we were going to have 

a terrorist attack or something in Cleveland, where would you go? 

And Davis-Besse is about 20 minutes from my house, and I said 

I am going to Davis-Besse. It is just amazing what they are doing 

out there. I have even said I visited other Federal facilities in the 

United States, and the security just is really not up to what it 

should be, and I said, why don’t you get in a car or fly a plane and 

get out and see how we are securing our nuclear facilities around 

the Country. 

I think it is important for everyone to understand that not only 

has this Committee, Subcommittee, had 20 hearings in 8 years. 

That is two and a half a year. But I can tell you that Senator Carper and I have met, and I personally have met with Nils Diaz and 

now with Dale Klein, who I believe is really doing an outstanding 

job, in my office. I think sometimes people think that the oversight 

that is getting done by Congress is done at these hearings. And 

yes, they are very important, but it is that special time that a Senator spends with the people that run the agency and the Commissioners that make a difference. 

Senator Carper, since he has taken over the chairmanship, has 

also had these groups of people together, and getting their input. 

We are going to be going up to MIT to get their slant on things. 

So I think it is real important that people understand that we 

are pretty sincere about what we are doing, and I think it is important. Maybe Mr. Fertel you could comment on the fastidiousness 

now that we have at the NRC since Davis-Besse. There is no question that they weren’t getting the job done. There were lessons 

learned there. The industry wasn’t doing the job. And they weren’t 

doing the job. 

But I think there is, and I would like to share with you some of 

the things that they have done since then to really demonstrate 

that if there is anything that looks like it’s not where it should be, 

they just shut them down. It is a very interesting difference of the 

way they are handling it. 

Plus one other thing, and that is INPO, your organization, that 

I think the people that run these places understand today that 

they really have to be on their toes. I have had some people tell 

me that this peer pressure is enormous in terms of getting them 

to do the things that they should be doing. 

So Mr. Fertel, would you like to comment on that? 

Mr. FERTEL. I had the distinct pleasure of sitting here before you 

after Davis-Besse and saying how it was a failure not only on the 

company’s part, and the NRC’s part to some degree, but also on 

INPO’s part from an industry standpoint. And INPO has dramatically modified its assessment process, with safety culture being a 

core portion of it now. 

In every INPO evaluation, safety culture is considered and in addition the plants do self-assessments on safety culture biannually. 

So from an industry standpoint, to some degree Davis-Besse had a 

real ground-breaking change for us, just like TMI did 30 years ago 

for operational safety. 

At the NRC, they did a very significant lessons learned. As you 

said, Senator Voinovich, they now look at safety culture as part of 
144 

their reactor oversight process, which they didn’t before. They are 

looking at improving how they do that, and they have implemented, I think, on the order of 18 to 20 different lessons learned 

that came out of the Davis-Besse experience. 

So we have seen a dramatic change within our own industry in 

how we look at it. And NRC has implemented a pretty dramatic 

change within their own oversight the way they look at it. So it has 

had a big impact. 

Senator CARPER. All right. 

Senator Merkley, the last word here. 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Governor Thornburgh, in your testimony, you noted that the 

added cost and increased scrutiny by regulatory authorities since 

the accident, together with decreasing costs from competing 

sources, have added up to an uncertain future for the industry. 

I am assuming you are describing a situation in which the process of responding to the risk of human error, the risk of natural 

catastrophe, the risk of terrorist attack have driven up costs, while 

some other non-carbon sources, we have new innovations that are 

reducing the cost of solar, wind, or so forth. 

When you see these things through the picture of a non-subsidized competition, if you will, is there a clear hierarchy in terms 

of the most cost-effective strategies to produce carbon dioxide-free 

electricity? 

Mr. THORNBURGH. It would take a wiser man than me to answer 

that question, I think. It’s not an area that I feel comfortable in. 

I think the point that is made here is that given the enormous concern about safety and the experience of the Three Mile Island accident, the regulatory overburden is bound to be greater for the nuclear industry than for other competing sources of energy. 

Now, how that breaks down quantitatively and what kind of a 

box score you come up with in making that comparison, I am really 

not qualified to say. But I think it is without doubt that that regulatory overburden varies directly with the amount of public concern 

over safety and threat to the environment, both of which have underscored a lot of the opposition to nuclear power over the years. 

Senator MERKLEY. Mr. Fertel, did you want to? 

Mr. FERTEL. Yes, I mean, what I would say in response to your 

question, Senator, is that right now our 104 plants are basically 

the lowest cost electricity in our Country outside of hydro. So with 

the burden of the regulation, which is appropriate in most cases, 

both security and safety, we are still after hydro the least expensive cost to consumers. 

With regard to new plants, our capital costs are certainly higher 

than others, but we think the electricity will be competitive. With 

regard to Peter’s comments about subsidies, the loan guarantee 

program that we are in, we pay for. So it is not a subsidy. We actually pay the government money for a loan guarantee that we would 

get, just like you would pay the bank money for a loan that you 

would get. So I am not quite sure where the subsidy comes in. 

Senator MERKLEY. Could I follow up on that point? 

Senator CARPER. Sure. Go ahead. 

Senator MERKLEY. So my understanding was that there is a cap 

on liability of $10 billion, with the estimate of a single major inci-
145 

dent being perhaps up to $300 billion, and that the private cost of 

providing that kind of insurance is so high that essentially investors would not invest if the government didn’t provide that cap. 

Is that the subsidy you are referring to? 

Mr. FERTEL. No, that may be something Peter refers to, and he’s 

totally wrong. To just be straight about it, Price Anderson, which 

is a law that Congress enacted and has renewed I think five times, 

doesn’t cap our liability. It imposes a liability. There is no other industry in the world, chemical industry, nuclear industry, elsewhere, anywhere, that has a $10 billion liability for an accident 

that might happen. 

The most severe accident that we have ever had is Three Mile 

Island, and basically Price Anderson ended up paying out money 

to people around there on the order of about $100 million. So we 

have a liability of $10 billion, which is a pooled liability for our industry, no taxpayer money. There is insurance for the first primary 

coverage of $300 million, but you have a pooled liability. It’s not 

that you can’t purchase liability insurance. But if you look at 64 

sites with $10 billion at each site, it is $640 billion worth of third 

party liability, which I believe is much greater than all of the third 

party liability insurance in the country though I honestly have 

never been able to get an answer from the insurance companies on 

what the capacity is. 

But I don’t think there is that much liability capacity in the 

country to try and do it. So we would argue, we have the best liability program in the world, that other countries try to copy, as 

opposed to a subsidy. 

Senator MERKLEY. I will just look forward to following up with 

you, because my understanding was that you are required to buy 

insurance, but at the same time the law caps your exposure to $10 

billion. So we can follow up and get more information. 

Mr. FERTEL. Sure. What Price Anderson does is it requires us to 

buy $300 million, whatever is in the market at the time, and that’s 

what everybody has. And then it requires, escalating with inflation, 

each site, if I have an accident at my site and I have to basically 

go into bankruptcy, all the other plants have to pay the rest of the 

liability up to $10 billion. If we ever got to $10 billion, and keep in mind we have had no 

accident that gets you anywhere near it, if you ever got there, the 

way the law is written, Congress would then decide whether or not 

the industry should continue to pay more, or Congress would intervene and decide that, no, the industry shouldn’t, but it would be 

a decision by the Congress. 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Well, gentlemen, this has been an enlightening 

morning and early afternoon. I want to really thank you for joining 

us today. 

Governor Thornburgh and Mr. Denton, it is just really heartening for me and I think to all of us to see the two of you sitting 

together side by side, arm in arm, still trying to help get us 

through some tough, challenging times. 

Mr. THORNBURGH. A mutual admiration society. 

Senator CARPER. Oh, it’s a good one there. 

Mr. THORNBURGH. We saved each other’s necks. 
146 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. And you saved some other people’s necks as 

well. 

I want to conclude just by saying that we may have some follow 

up questions that we will submit in writing, and if you could respond in a timely manner, we would very much appreciate that. 

With that having been said, to my colleagues and to our staff 

who worked on this hearing today, thank you all. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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