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KAZAKHSTAN’S BID TO CHAIR THE OSCE: A 

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR A FOOLHARDY 

AMBITION? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 16, 2007 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 110–1–7] 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida, 

Chairman 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, 

Co-Chairman 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

VACANT, Department of State 

VACANT, Department of Defense 

VACANT, Department of Commerce 

(II) 

KAZAKHSTAN’S BID TO CHAIR THE OSCE: A 

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR A FOOLHARDY 

AMBITION? 

OCTOBER 16, 2007 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 1 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe ...................................... 27 

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Ranking Member, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe ................................. 3 

WITNESSES 

H.E. Erlan A. Idrissov, Ambassador of the Republic of 

Kazakhstan to the United States ........................................... 5 

David Merkel, Former Director for Central Asia, National 

Security Council ....................................................................... 7 

Robert Herman, Director of Programs, Freedom House .......... 10 

Yevgeniy Zhovtis, Director, Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights ........................................................... 13 

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Alcee L. Hastings ........................ 36 

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin .................... 38 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith ................. 40 

Prepared statement of H.E. Erlan A. Idrissov .......................... 42 

Prepared statement of David Merkel ........................................ 49 

Prepared statement of Robert Herman ..................................... 53 

(III) 

(1) 

KAZAKHSTAN’S BID TO CHAIR THE OSCE: A 

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR A FOOLHARDY 

AMBITION? 

October 16, 2007 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

[The hearing was held at 10 a.m. in room 210 of the Cannon 

House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, 

Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

presiding.] 

Commissioners present: Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Benjamin L. 

Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe; and Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Ranking Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: H.E. Erlan A. Idrissov, Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United States; David Merkel, Former 

Director for Central Asia, National Security Council; Robert Herman, Director of Programs, Freedom House; and Yevgeniy Zhovtis, 

Director, Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights. 

HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. HASTINGS. Ladies and gentlemen, the hearing will come to 

order. 

I like to start on time. My understanding is several of the Commissioners will come along. As a matter of fact, as I speak, the 

ranking Commissioner is coming in the room. 

But we’ll begin with our opening statements and then go to our 

witnesses. I want to welcome all of you to this Commission hearing, 

and obviously there is great interest in the subject of our inquiry 

with reference to Kazakhstan’s bid to chair the OSCE in 2009, and 

I consider it to be especially timely and important. 

I’m not at all surprised at the level of interest that has been 

demonstrated not just by the presence of those of you here but others that have continuously spoken about this matter. 

Much is at stake here. Indeed, one of the goals today is to illuminate just how much is at stake for Washington, for Kazakhstan, 

for Central Asia, for Russia, and for the OSCE which is known for 

its promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 

2 

The former Soviet republics joined the OSCE in 1992, thereby 

agreeing to implement all of its commitments on democratization 

and human rights. 

Kazakhstan, like most of the ex-Soviet states, has found this a 

difficult transition. Consequently, Kazakhstan’s candidacy has been 

controversial, ever since it was put forward in 2003. 

For Washington and for many other OSCE capitals, 

Kazakhstan’s bid crystallizes the competing imperatives of seeking 

to promote democracy while maintaining and strengthening ties 

with an energy-rich, moderate Islamic state eager to build good relations with the Western world. 

Washington has consistently said to Kazakhstan that the United 

States supports Astana’s ambition to chair the OSCE but insists on 

demonstrable progress on human rights. 

The question was actually supposed to be settled at last year’s 

OSCE ministerial. However, the participating States could not 

reach agreement about supporting Kazakhstan’s bid. 

It’s no secret that the American administration, citing the record 

of flawed elections, continuing human rights problems and the concentration of power in the executive branch, was among those 

OSCE capitals that did not back Astana’s candidacy. 

For that reason, the matter was essentially postponed last year 

in the hope that circumstances would change in the interim so as 

to make the decision in favor of Kazakhstan easier to make this 

year. 

The picture in the past year is a decidedly mixed one. President 

Nazarbayev received parliamentary sanction to remain in office for 

life, if he so chooses. 

Parliamentary elections in August, according to some accounts, 

did not meet OSCE standards and produced a one-party legislature. 

So while no official statement has been issued by the administration, and none may be forthcoming before November, the indications are that the United States remains reluctant to endorse 

Kazakhstan. 

Apparently, even some countries that formally supported 

Astana’s candidacy are rethinking their position. That’s where we 

stand today, with the November ministerial right around the corner. 

Some of you may have noted the absence from our panel of distinguished witnesses of any representatives of the U.S. Government. Let me assure you that it is not an oversight. 

I and other members of the Commission and other members who 

are not members of the Commission have been in discussions with 

high-level State Department officials about this matter for some 

time and felt that considering the delicate diplomacy involved, it 

would not be entirely helpful to ask the department to air its views 

in public here today. 

But that does not mean we cannot examine this complex issue 

with other non-U.S. Government experts. 

Hearing from proponents and opponents of Kazakhstan’s candidacy will help all of us reach a conclusion on that country’s suitability to head the OSCE and the ramifications for the United 

3 

States of a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ vote. To that end, we’ve very carefully selected our witnesses. 

And before identifying them and asking them to go forward, I’d 

like to recognize my good friend, the ranking member from New 

Jersey, Chris Smith, for any opening comments he may make. 

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, RANKING MEMBER, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I want to 

thank you for convening this very important hearing. I believe and 

have believed since 2003 that the Kazakhstan’s candidacy to chair 

the OSCE deserves the closest attention from policymakers. 

And as far as I know, this hearing is the first open discussion 

of this issue. It comes at just the right moment, given the impending OSCE ministerial in Madrid. So again, I want to thank you for 

convening this very timely and very important hearing. 

Let me say at the outset that I would, in principle, be happy to 

welcome Kazakhstan’s candidacy. 

It would, indeed, be healthy for the OSCE if Kazakhstan or any 

of the former Soviet republics were ready to chair the organization. 

It would signal important growth and maturity for the country in 

question as well as for the OSCE. 

But I fundamentally disagree with the official Kazakh perspective that chairing the OSCE is a right and not a privilege. 

On the contrary, the OSCE Chair-in-Office, for reasons symbolic 

and substantive, is too important to be merely a rotating position 

which any participating state can hold. 

I believe that the OSCE chairman must represent a nation that 

is in compliance with OSCE commitments. We cannot be content 

to have as the chair simply the most democratic of the OSCE’s 

most repressive states. 

Since 2003, the U.S. Government has been conveying memoranda to the Kazakh authorities detailing what reforms they must 

implement to gain Washington’s backing. 

I have referred to these documents myself in conversations with 

Kazakh legislators in meetings at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as well as with Kazakh officials visiting Washington, D.C. 

Unfortunately, Kazakhstan has not yet made the necessary reforms. The country’s constitution calls for a balance of power, but 

President Nazarbayev rules his country autocratically. 

The legislature and the courts provide no genuine checks and 

balances. Electronic media, though formally privatized, remain 

under strict state control. 

There are still some opposition parties that have not been registered, and Kazakh authorities carefully limit the freedom of assembly. 

Though many religions coexist in Kazakhstan, I’m deeply disturbed that Kazakh law insists on registering communities of faith. 

And I’m deeply concerned about the recent raid on Grace Presbyterian Church in Karaganda and problems faced by the Hare 

Krishna. 

4 

Mr. Chairman, all of this was the situation even before the 

events of this year, when parliament gave Mr. Nazarbayev the 

right to be president for life, a very disturbing trend in many parts 

of the world, before yet another election that the OSCE could not 

certify as free and fair, and before the emergence of a one-party 

parliament that surely would do President Nazarbayev’s bidding in 

all matters. 

Even before this year, I was unable in good conscience to support 

Kazakhstan’s candidacy for ’09. After the events of ’07, I certainly 

cannot. It is my understanding that U.S. diplomats have been urging the Kazakhs to think about 2011 instead. 

Putting off a Kazakh chairmanship 2 more years does not make 

it automatic. I will not be able to support a Kazakh bid any year 

until the country makes the substantive reforms. And that’s what 

we’re calling for. 

But if and when they make these reforms, Mr. Chairman, I’m 

sure both you and I will be the first to applaud and congratulate 

and encourage the Kazakhstan Government on its success and welcome its holding of this important position. 

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. It’s 

timely and hopefully sends a clear, non-ambiguous message about 

our concerns on this OSCE commission. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Commissioner Smith. 

I turn now to the witnesses, and our first witness will be the Ambassador from the country of Kazakhstan, Erlan Idrissov. 

Ambassador Idrissov comes to this post after a long and distinguished career, most recently as his country’s Ambassador to the 

United Kingdom, and previously he served as Kazakhstan’s foreign 

minister. 

It’s hard for me to imagine anyone who could better make the 

case for his country’s candidacy than the Ambassador, and I’m 

deeply indebted to him for agreeing to come. 

We also have with us a former U.S. Government official, Mr. 

David Merkel, who is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and was also a staff person on Capitol Hill, so there’s some 

opportunity for you young staffers yet. 

So he is intimately acquainted with the mechanics and drama of 

a congressional hearing, and most recently was the director for 

Central Asia at the National Security Council, where he was directly involved in deliberations about the issue under discussion. 

Additionally, we have with us some persons from the NGO community. On September 21st a coalition of U.S.-based organizations 

issued a public statement urging Washington not to support 

Kazakhstan for OSCE chair. 

We asked those participating organizations to select someone to 

represent them, and they chose Dr. Robert Herman, who is here 

with us today. He is the Director of Programs at Freedom House. 

And additionally, we have with us Mr. Yevgeniy Zhovtis, the Director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights 

and Rule of Law. Mr. Zhovtis has been one of the leading human 

rights activists in Kazakhstan for many years. 

And we are fortunate that he happens to be in Washington this 

week and that he could participate in this hearing. 

5 

There were many other witnesses we considered inviting, but we 

decided to keep the number small to allow more time for questions. 

Possibly we may return to this issue in another hearing at which 

other points of view could be expressed. 

Now, without objection, all of your statements and testimony will 

be entered into the record, and I’d ask you, as much as possible, 

to summarize your remarks and keep them as brief as possible so 

that we can put our questions and give you time to be able to answer them. 

I’d like to begin, if we may, with Ambassador Idrissov. 

Ambassador, you have the floor. 

H.E. ERLAN A. IDRISSOV, AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF 

KAZAKHSTAN TO THE UNITED STATES 

Amb. IDRISSOV. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me indulge that— 

express our full appreciation to you, to Co-Chairman Senator 

Cardin, to the Commissioners, to the members of the Helsinki 

Commission, for convening this hearing today. 

Let me take this opportunity also to greet and welcome, first of 

all, my countrymen. I can recognize Mr. Zhovtis here. I can recognize Madam Fokina here. 

And of course, my appreciation to Dr. Merkel and Dr. Herman 

for being with us today to testimony on this important issue. 

I have provided a detailed written testimony for your attention 

and consideration, and I believe that I have explained in detail our 

vision for ongoing political and economic growth in Kazakhstan and 

also our vision for our goals to chair the OSCE. 

Therefore, I wouldn’t dwell on that. I hope that everyone had the 

opportunity to familiarize with these points I raised in the testimony, and I will be absolutely happy to address them at the Q&A 

session. 

Let me focus on a number of points which already have been 

touched upon. I, of course, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your 

thoughtful remarks at the opening of this session, and I would like 

to thank Commissioner Smith for his comments and ideas. 

I would like to focus briefly on a number of common misconceptions which exist in the West about my country. We are frequently 

described as a dictatorship led by an autocratic ruler, and we very 

often are being criticized for being slow to promote democratic reforms in Kazakhstan. 

In fact, Kazakhstan is a country which is only 15 years old and 

which, in that short period of time, has achieved remarkable 

progress in transforming itself from a former Soviet republic into 

a new and increasingly successful Western-style democracy. 

We sometimes do not understand what slow means. If you take 

the U.K.’s example—I served there for 5 years as Ambassador, and 

I know it took them more than 700 years to arrive at the status 

of their society as they are today, with often violent interludes. 

In Kazakhstan, we have achieved a remarkable degree, extraordinary degree, of political freedom in just 15 years, without any violence at all. 

The reality which Western observers often forget is that democracy is not only about laws and institutions, it is fundamentally 

about custom, habit, and culture, supported by property rights, 

6 

backed by the rule of law, without which there can be no democracy at all. 

One cannot expect to create a parliament in 1 day and expect a 

democratic debate to occur in it the next day. 

Opposition and free media are responsible, as they are, in the society—cannot be established by—at the stroke of a pen. 

Establishing and nurturing an independent judiciary is an even 

greater challenge, as is tackling corruption at all levels. 

A common misconception in the West is that in Kazakhstan we 

are forcefully dragged down the path to democracy against our own 

will. This is not true. 

We have chosen to become a democracy because we believe it is 

the best way to run our society, ensure the prosperity of our people 

and guarantee the long-term security and prosperity of our state. 

We have our own plans for political and economic growth. We 

have an almost impeccable record of economic growth. 

The new plans for political reform have been meticulously developed and debated widely in our society and envisage an enhanced 

role of the parliament; nurturing of political parties and civil society institutions; building genuinely free media; efficient, fair and 

transparent judiciary system; and institutions supporting the rule 

of law. 

We want to develop and enhance the tradition and culture of 

good and efficient local governance. These are the plans. 

The culmination of that came in May 19 of this year, in 2007, 

when we have announced major constitutional reforms. I have provided full details for the constitutional reforms in our papers, and 

there are additional papers for the distribution outside this room. 

But I will say that the gist of the constitutional amendments is 

the gradual ceding of powers by the president to the legislature 

and a thoughtful move toward a parliamentary majority system. 

This is what we announced, and this is what we’ll do and absolutely confident that we will succeed in doing this, as we have been 

successful in promoting and implementing economic reforms. 

As far as the OSCE bid is concerned, we made very clear that 

we believe that we can bring value and we can bring new substance to the organization. We value our cooperation with the 

OSCE because we believe it is one of the strong proponents and 

facilitators of our ongoing political growth. 

We have a clear-cut vision for our chairmanship in the OSCE if 

we have the privilege to be elected as the Chairman of OSCE. We 

will focus on all three dimensions of the organization, because we 

believe they are interdependent. 

And we will work hard with our partners to promote further the 

values, the integrity and the standards of the OSCE throughout a 

bigger region which is going beyond the traditional territory of 

OSCE. 

In fact, everyone recognizes that the focus of attention is more 

toward our part of the world, and Central Asia is becoming a matter of importance in terms of coming years. 

Therefore, we believe that the United States, which is a strong 

proponent and promoter of democracy throughout the world, and 

freedom, should understand the gist of our bid, and we believe that 

7 

it is only in the interest of the United States to be a champion in 

supporting Kazakhstan’s bid to chair the organization. 

We are confident that we’ll do our job in full compliance and with 

full understanding of the values of the organization. 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude my brief remarks by telling you 

an old saying among Kazakhs. There is a Kazakh saying which 

says that a road of 10,000 steps is being traveled by making the 

first step. 

So we believe that a road to democracy is also a long road, an 

important road. The United States is making its 9,757th step on 

this road, and Kazakhstan is making its 16th step. 

But please be assured that we are on the same road. What we 

are trying to do is what your forefathers were trying to do more 

than 200 years ago. 

Actually, we, sitting in front of you, are a replica of your forefathers as they were trying to bring new values to the new society 

more than 200 years ago. 

But there is no traffic police on this road. Therefore, one should 

be self-disciplined, and wise and thoughtful in moving ahead along 

this path. 

We should definitely apply by ourselves and with the support of 

and vision of our partners wise and thoughtful speed limits, not to 

over-haste and bring damage to the delicate fabric of promoting 

new values in our society. 

We believe that we have remained faithful and loyal along this 

path, along these 15 years of our independence. We have shown 

our support to the values we share with the United States. 

On any imaginable tracks, whether it is global security, nonproliferation, a war on terrorism, economic reforms or democratization, we believe that we have every right to count on the reciprocity 

on the part of the United States. 

I thank you very much. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Ambassador, for your comments and for summarizing them. 

And for purposes of the audience participants, I believe the Ambassador’s full statement is available for your perusal as you see 

fit. 

I’d like to go now to Mr. David Merkel. 

I’ve already indicated some portions of your curriculum vitae, but 

you have the floor. 

DAVID MERKEL, FORMER DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL ASIA, 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

Mr. MERKEL. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Chairman Hastings, Congressman Smith. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. 

As you said, having worked on Capitol Hill, the Senate Foreign 

Relations and the House Policy Committee, I appreciate the importance of the Commission, and I think it’s really important that 

you’re taking on this issue today. 

I’d like to start my testimony with the indisputable fact that 

Kazakhstan has not held an election that the OSCE has found to 

meet international standards. 

8 

Despite this, I believe that it is in the interest of Kazakhstan, 

Central Asia, the United States, and the OSCE for them to be 

named as Chairman-in-Office in Madrid. 

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, I would talk to friends of 

mine in Central Asia and express to them the interest and importance the United States places on the region. 

They would politely listen, often over tea, and then would inform 

me that the United States is fickle and far away and that our interest would wane. And until September 11th, they were largely 

correct. 

But on that day, we learned that instability anywhere has a direct national security impact on the United States. This is not to 

say that there were not those who paid attention, including myself 

and members of this Commission’s staff, to Central Asia. 

Energy, security, liberty form the crux of our interest in Central 

Asia and Kazakhstan today. 

How can we best pursue our interests given that some of the 

neighbors who are very actively engaged—Russia, China, Iran—do 

not see democracy promotion as anything more than a destabilizing 

effort and have no interest in seeing Central Asian energy reach 

global markets other than through a reliance on them for its transportation? 

When I was at the National Security Council, the President 

spelled out our interests in his national security strategy of 2006. 

It said Central Asia is an enduring priority for our foreign policy. 

The five countries of Central Asia are distinct from one another, 

and our relations with each, while important, will differ. 

In the region as a whole, the elements of our larger strategy 

meet, and we must pursue these elements simultaneously: Promoting effective democracies and the expansion of free market reform, diversifying global sources of energy, and enhancing security 

and winning the war on terrorism. 

While the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 

ODIHR office report on the last parliamentary election concluded 

that it did not meet international standards, it did indicate that 

improvements were made over previous elections, including citing 

important improvements with the central election commission. 

I’ve observed many elections in Eurasia, including with ODIHR, 

and I find that they provide a valuable service to member countries. While I would not quibble with the conclusions reached by 

the OSCE, I do think it important to make a couple of points to 

you today. 

Kazakhstan is a country still in transition. If the Chairman-inOffice post needs to go to a country with an established tradition 

as a functioning democracy, this has never previously been spelled 

out and will have the undesired effect of creating two classes of 

OSCE members. 

Kazakhstan is a country that respects diversity, both religious 

and ethnic, and where the youth, by and large, are excited about 

their future in Kazakhstan. This stands in contrast to many of the 

countries in Central Asia. 

Also, despite the fact that the last Presidential and parliamentary elections were not judged by the OSCE to meet international 

standards, it is without question that that the election results reVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:35 Dec 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\101607.TXT HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
9 

flect the will of the people and that President Nazarbayev and 

Prime Minister Masimov have a clear and unequivocal mandate as 

their country’s legitimate leaders. 

One of the difficulties in Central Asia, in my view, is the lack of 

appropriate regional architecture. For European nations who found 

themselves on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain or those in the 

Baltics, there was the aspiration of NATO and European Union 

membership to attract them to a future of shared values and common security. 

In Central Asia, there are several multilateral organizations, but 

none that possess the same incentives for domestic reform and external reconciliation. 

In fact, for the most part, the organizations that today are 

viewed as more relevant in Central Asia, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, lack the same common values, do not include European 

or U.S. membership, and are dominated by Moscow or Beijing. 

This is why organizations such as the OSCE and the European 

Union need to be seen as more relevant in Central Asia. But if 

Kazakhstan, which is viewed by most as the country within Central Asia with the greatest international weight, is not acceptable 

to the OSCE, then the countries of the region may believe what 

they are told by Moscow, that they will never be accepted by Europe or the United States as anything more than the ‘‘stans.’’ 

Unfortunately, the vast majority of Central Asians do not see the 

OSCE—or Europe, for that matter—as very relevant to them. Most 

OSCE members do not have embassies in Central Asia. Only Germany of the E.U. has embassies in all five Central Asian capitals. 

And OSCE only comes up when a diplomat wanting to distance 

his country a little bit cites an OSCE report when criticizing the 

country’s democratic transition. 

The government, elite, and population are often unaware of what 

benefits membership provides them and their country’s future. This 

has to change. 

In my discussions, many in Vienna and Washington believe that 

the OSCE’s future is the South Caucasus and Central Asia. They 

see the need and opportunity for expanding stability and personal 

liberties to the millions of predominantly moderate Muslims in 

Central Asia. 

I do not believe that you can hold this view and be against 

Kazakhstan’s candidacy. If the OSCE were to reject Kazakhstan in 

Madrid, it would be sending a message that Europe and European 

values are not Central Asia’s future in a time when we need to be 

providing an example of what their future could be, provided they 

have additional options rather than a reliance on Moscow and Beijing. 

Only the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic oppose Kazakhstan’s bid. One argument put forward on why 

Kazakhstan should not be Chairman-in-Office is that they would be 

beholden to the Kremlin for the office and would therefore support 

Moscow’s efforts to weaken the organization. 

This could be plausible if Moscow were one of Astana’s only supporters but that does not hold up given the breadth of 

Kazakhstan’s support. 

10 

Another stated argument is that because Kazakhstan does not 

itself have a fully developed democratic tradition, it will not be able 

or willing to be critical of other countries. 

But this has always been the case. Countries have differed in 

how active they have been in their comments, which is why the 

independence of the OSCE’s ODIHR, which conducts the election 

observations, is so important. 

And another argument at times expressed about why 

Kazakhstan should not be Chairman has to do with the questions 

of the professionalism or depth of their foreign ministry. Can they 

do the job? 

Kazakhstan—without question, their foreign ministry can do the 

job. We’ve had examples such as the case in Norway where they 

relied on their foreign ministry to provide functions of the OSCE, 

and Bulgaria, where they relied more on the OSCE’s secretariat to 

carry out their agenda. 

And the troika, consisting of the previous, current, and future 

Chairman-in-Office, also ensures that this will not be an issue. 

This decision will be reached by consensus of the members this 

November in Madrid. If the United States blocks Kazakhstan’s bid, 

I am sure that one of the 53 countries will block whomever we 

would suggest as chairman for 2009. 

In my view, Kazakhstan will be successful in reaching their goal, 

and I would like them to see that they’ve done so with our support 

and not in spite of our opposition. 

The Ambassador’s already mentioned the accomplishments that 

President Nazarbayev and his government have made over the last 

15 years, so I will not repeat those. 

But finally, I’d like to point out that many opposition figures in 

Kazakhstan—in fact, to my knowledge, I think a majority, but I 

don’t think that can be judged—support the government’s OSCE 

goals. 

They do so for two main reasons. First, national pride. They 

would like to see their country on a larger stage taking a greater 

international role. 

And second, they believe that being Chairman-in-Office will place 

a greater spotlight on Kazakhstan and will help them in addressing issues they believe are important to them and Kazakhstan’s 

democratic future. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today. I appreciate your attention and look forward to your questions. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Merkel. 

We turn now to Dr. Robert Herman. 

Dr. Herman, you have the floor. 

ROBERT HERMAN, DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS, FREEDOM 

HOUSE 

Dr. HERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Representative Smith. I’m very grateful for the opportunity to testify 

today before this Commission on behalf of Freedom House on the 

important and timely issue of Kazakhstan’s bid to become Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in 2009. 

11 

The outcome of Kazakhstan’s bid will have significant consequences for OSCE and for the future of democracy and human 

rights across Europe and Eurasia and beyond. 

The oldest human rights organization in the United States, Freedom House is an independent, nonprofit organization committed to 

the expansion of freedom worldwide. 

For three and one-half decades, we have chronicled the state of 

political rights and civil liberties in every country in the world, including in Kazakhstan since it became an independent state. 

We have also worked closely with some of Kazakhstan’s leading 

human rights groups such as the Kazakhstan International Bureau 

for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, represented here today. 

Based on our extensive analysis and our on-the-ground experience, Freedom House believes strongly that the OSCE participating 

States should not make Kazakhstan Chairman-in-Office. 

That prominent position should be reserved for governments with 

exemplary records on democratic reform and on safeguarding 

human rights, governments demonstrably committed to the core 

principles and values of the OSCE. 

We at Freedom House look forward to the day when Kazakhstan 

becomes a fully democratic country and can assume the OSCE 

mantle of leadership. But that day has not yet come. 

A country that falls so far short of OSCE’s own standards should 

not be accorded the privilege of becoming Chairman-in-Office, especially at a time when the organization’s essential role in supporting 

democratic reform and human rights is under attack from within. 

There is no question that Kazakhstan is a country of consequence by virtue of its substantial oil and gas production and its 

location in an important geostrategic region. 

We recognize that Kazakhstan has instituted some minor political reforms and that the twin processes of state-building and 

democratic change are formidable undertakings. 

We are also mindful that the United States has multiple interests with respect to Kazakhstan, the advancement of democratic 

governance among them. 

But despite some tentative steps at political reform, 

Kazakhstan’s overall dismal performance across the full range of 

democracy and human rights norms should preclude it from becoming OSCE chair. 

The regime of President Nazarbayev systematically violates fundamental human rights and has configured the political system to 

prevent any serious political competition. There is no check on executive power. Both the parliament and the judiciary are subservient to central authority. 

Media freedom is severely curtailed, effectively denying citizens 

access to independent sources of information. Civil society, most notably human rights advocacy groups, faces formidable constraints 

on legitimate political activity. 

And low levels of government transparency and accountability 

have enabled corruption to flourish to the disproportionate benefit 

of the ruling elite. 

Kazakhstan has yet to hold a national election that meets international standards, with both widespread election day irregularities and a sharply tilted playing field. 

12 

In Freedom House’s three-tiered rating system, countries are categorized as free, partly free, and not free. Kazakhstan is firmly 

mired in the bottom tier and has been since 1995 when a new constitution gave unchecked powers to the President. 

Every single country that has served as OSCE Chairman-in-Office has been rated free by Freedom House. 

That the OSCE might be chaired by a country with such a poor 

record in democratic governance and human rights would be a sad 

irony, particularly in the view of the fact that Kazakhstan has 

joined with other CIS countries in sharply criticizing OSCE’s work 

in the key fields of election monitoring and promoting political and 

civil rights. 

The OSCE, which traces its proud history to the Helsinki Final 

Act, was pivotal in focusing international attention on the terrible 

state of human rights in the Eastern Bloc. And in giving rise to 

Helsinki watch groups, it contributed in a major way to bringing 

the cold war to a peaceful conclusion. 

More recently, the OSCE has been instrumental in supporting 

free and fair elections and pressing participating countries to uphold their commitments to respect human rights. 

In addition to giving hope to freedom’s advocates in Europe and 

Eurasia, OSCE also serves as a model for other regional organizations that have as part of their mandate the strengthening of 

democratic norms and human rights. 

The elevation to the Chair-in-Office post of a country so patently 

undeserving of that honor would severely undermine the credibility 

of this respected organization and send a dispiriting message to the 

courageous men and women struggling to advance the cause of 

human freedom in Kazakhstan and in other OSCE states. Such an 

outcome would also threaten OSCE’s proven effectiveness. 

We cannot expect a government that routinely flouts the OSCE’s 

own standards, whether on conducting free and fair elections or upholding human rights, to determinedly press participating States to 

live up to their human dimension commitments. 

The work of the OSCE in supporting human rights and democratic freedoms is too important to be placed in jeopardy by a 

Chair-in-Office that lacks a commitment to the organization’s core 

values and which has criticized various of its efforts to bolster 

democratic governance. 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by reiterating that Freedom 

House looks forward to the day when Kazakhstan achieves a level 

of democratic progress and respect for human rights commensurate 

with its aspirations to chair the OSCE and to be a significant actor 

on the international stage. 

That time has not yet come, but the prospect of serving as Chairman-in-Office at some point in the future, combined with other 

positive inducements, will hopefully inspire the government and 

empower pro-democracy advocates in Kazakhstan to work collaboratively to implement far-reaching political reforms. 

However, at the present moment, for all the reasons elaborated 

here, Freedom House urges the governments of the United States 

and our European allies to oppose Kazakhstan’s bid to become 

Chairman-in-Office for OSCE in 2009. 

Thank you, and I’ll look forward to your questions. 

13 

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. 

Mr. Zhovtis, you have the floor. 

YEVGENIY ZHOVTIS, DIRECTOR, KAZAKHSTAN 

INTERNATIONAL BUREAU FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 

Mr. ZHOVTIS. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the U.S. 

Congress and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak at these hearings. Eight 

years ago I already had a chance to speak here on the problems 

of democratic process, rule of law, human rights observance in 

Kazakhstan, problems which unfortunately are still in place. 

Very soon the U.S. Government will have to make a decision on 

its position regarding Kazakhstan’s 2009 OSCE chairmanship. 

The United States, the United Kingdom, and some other OSCE 

countries held a relatively clear position on this issue—that 

Kazakhstan authorities must first demonstrate their commitment 

to OSCE principles and values in human dimension and to this end 

undertake a number of specific, practical steps in democracy development, rule of law, and respect for human rights. 

A number of other OSCE states—for economic and geopolitical 

reasons—have advanced the notion that Kazakhstan ‘‘does not deserve but should get it’’. 

Throughout this debate, I had supported Kazakhstan’s 2009 

OSCE chairmanship despite the fact that I am a human rights defender, am committed to democratic convictions, and believe that 

the Government of Kazakhstan has a long way to go before it has 

fulfilled its human dimension obligations. 

Like some public activists, politicians, and diplomats, I believed 

that the chairmanship will bring Kazakhstan closer to the European and U.S. political arena. 

I hoped that the chairmanship would strengthen the call of our 

country’s democratic forces to European and U.S. politics and public opinion, since it is one thing when an OSCE participating State 

fails to fulfill its human dimension obligations, but it is another 

matter when the OSCE chair does so. 

I thought that it would be significantly more difficult for Western 

politicians to use the grossly inappropriate comparison between 

Kazakhstan on the one hand and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on 

the other, and to draw from this comparison positive conclusions 

about the situation for civil and political rights in Kazakhstan. 

I hoped that the OSCE chairmanship would strengthen the position of the progressive, liberal part of Kazakhstan’s elite, and 

would advance the government’s political and legal culture. 

I also believed that denying Kazakhstan the chairmanship would 

worsen the situation in the country, and would strengthen the position of ideologues of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the 

documents of which make no mention of democracy, rule of law, 

and respect for human rights; would strengthen the influence of 

China and especially Russia, that profess their own path to democracy, but which resemble a modernized version of Soviet 

authoritarianism. 

Nonetheless, my support for Kazakhstan’s chairmanship was not 

unconditional. I have always called on Kazakhstan’s authorities to 

14 

demonstrate in 2006–2007 political will to follow the letter and 

spirit of the OSCE’s founding Helsinki Agreements and to take concrete steps, including: 

• register opposition political parties, including Alga 

Peoples’s Party and Atameken; 

• release the most recent political prisoner A. Zhumabayev; 

• end politically motivated criminal cases against opposition 

leaders and activists and reexamine the verdicts against them; 

• provide opposition political parties and movements 

unhindered access to nationwide mass media, which they have 

essentially denied for the past 10 years; 

• enter into a civilized and constructive dialogue with opposition forces; 

• end persecution against the Krishna Consciousness Society 

and resolve the conflict with this religious community in a fair 

way; 

• bring into conformity with international standards legislation on elections, freedom of expression and media, and peaceful assembly and associations. 

This was a moderate list of steps that would have unambiguously 

shown that Kazakhstan’s leadership was committed to fulfilling its 

OSCE obligations, its readiness to advance democracy, rule of law, 

and human rights within the framework of the OSCE’s principles. 

Had there been at least some confirmation that Kazakhstan’s 

Government had chosen to advance democratic development in 

2008, then although the country does not fully conform to OSCE 

principles, there would have been grounds to believe that it was 

nonetheless moving in that direction and its chairmanship in 2009 

was a reasonable compromise, considering economic, security and 

geopolitical factors. 

However, for the past year and a half, Kazakhstan’s authorities 

have not yet met a single one of these criteria. 

Moreover, this summer’s amendments to the Constitution moved 

the country even further from the principles of constitutional democracy. Consequently, the August parliamentary in Kazakhstan 

failed, in the view of the OSCE mission, to meet OSCE standards— 

as had all prior elections—and resulted in a single-party parliament. 

Under these circumstances supporting OSCE Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in 2009 would transform this organization into European 

version of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, would completely rob human dimension principles of any value, and would 

serve as a poor example to other CIS states with authoritarian regimes. 

The ‘‘does not deserve but should get it’’ notion should be rejected 

and replaced with ‘‘not reject but postpone’’. Kazakhstan can count 

on the chairmanship in 2010, 2011, 2012; however, only if it demonstrates its commitment to OSCE human dimension principles 

and values not only through words but through concrete, practical 

steps in democratic development, rule of law, and human rights 

protection, including those steps outlined above. 

The same call was expressed in the Statement of Democratic 

Forces of Kazakhstan issued on 11th of October, 2007 and signed 

15 

by more than 40 leading democratic politicians and public figures 

in Kazakhstan. 

Thank you for your attention. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you all very much. 

I’d like for you each as panelists to give some thought to a dialogue after Representative Smith and I make some inquiry of you. 

And if you are of a mind to ask each other questions—I continue 

to look for a formula in the Commission that will allow for a different kind of debate and dialogue, and so at least give some 

thought to that. 

And I especially am appreciative of the Ambassador for agreeing 

to be on the same panel. Normally we start with one panelist and 

then someone else, but he agreed, and I appreciate that very much, 

his willingness to dialogue with all of us. 

Toward that end, in light of the fact that he has commitments, 

I’m going to defer any questions I have and turn now to my friend, 

Commissioner Smith, for any questions he may have. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that courtesy. And again, this is a very timely hearing. 

Let me just ask a couple of questions. And I appreciate all of 

your testimonies, and I’ve read them, and I think they’re very well 

formulated, and you’ve presented your views in the most persuasive way I think you could. 

But you know, when I read—Ambassador Idrissov, you know, 

you did say that you would respect—or your country as the Chairin-Office would respect all three baskets. 

And I’m not much of a gambler, especially when it comes to 

human rights and when it comes to democracy issues. You know, 

we’ve seen this before. 

When a country seeks a position, very often it claims that it will 

make amends after the fact rather than before. And we’re not talking about amends. We’re talking about substantive and systemic 

reform. 

Most recently with the U.N. Human Rights Council, a number of 

the countries that were now part of that Human Rights Council 

which was configured to replace the egregiously flawed Human 

Rights Commission, we have really gone out of the frying pan into 

the fire. 

There’s very little difference. It’s been a seamless transition of 

rogue states sitting in judgment and running interference and ensuring that the spotlight, as you, Mr. Merkel, pointed out, is not 

brought to bear upon their records. 

The PRC, China, jumps off the page as a country that runs interference, as do some of these other countries. 

And frankly, I have a very deep concern, with all due respect to 

Kazakhstan—very deep concern—given the signing of that letter 

in—or that joint statement in July ’04, where double standards 

were alleged, where the CIS—where the OSCE missions in CIS 

countries were criticized, that the ability to thwart, to dilute, and 

even run interference on fundamental human rights scrutiny would 

be a possible result, just like we saw with the Human Rights Council. 

16 

Remember how that was vaunted as being, you know, this great 

follow on? That hasn’t happened. It is a bitter disappointment, especially to the victims. 

So the question about the—you know, Mr. Merkel, if you could 

speak to that. I understand how the opposition folks in the country 

would say we want that, too. 

Really, they almost have to say that, even if there is a private 

thought that now is not the time. They have to say it just for their 

own viability. 

But the idea that things could even get worse as the OSCE loses 

its edge and becomes a blunt instrument rather than, you know, 

something that is much more refined concerns me. 

And so that would be the first. You know, we run that risk, like 

the Human Rights Council, that the spotlight becomes much dimmer. 

Second, and if I could specifically to you—and I appreciate the 

Chairman’s yielding to me—the Jehovah’s Witnesses—and this 

would be to you, Mr. Ambassador—will the Government of 

Kazakhstan investigate why the Atyrau region justice department 

has not granted registration to Jehovah’s Witnesses, despite four 

applications to register since ’01 and four official religious expert 

studies of the literature of Jehovah’s Witnesses? 

Second, on the Grace Presbyterian Church, which I mentioned in 

my opening comments—that raid—if you might want to speak to 

that issue. 

And third, on the Hare Krishna, we understand that some 26 

homes have been destroyed, 116 acres of the community’s land confiscated, and the OSCE Advisory Council on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief released a statement a year ago that these actions suggest 

that the Hare Krishnas were targeted on the basis of their religious affiliation and raises serious issues regarding the enjoyment 

of the freedom of religion and belief in your country. 

Three different denominations—sects, if you will—all having 

problems in what would clearly be seen from our point of view as 

being contrary to OSCE basic principles. 

So if on those questions we could get some answers. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Please, Ambassador? 

Amb. IDRISSOV. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I’d like to thank all the witnesses for their statements and points of views expressed, and I thank you for the invitation to have a dialogue. 

This was my—actually, when I received an invitation to sit separately as a witness, I was surprised, because it was always my intention and it was always our desire to keep a dialogue. 

This is our culture which we are building in our country, and I 

appreciate very much the views expressed here. Our life is life and 

views will not always be the same. Everyone has the right to express his view, and we believe that we have every right to express 

our view, and we will also hope that others will respect our view. 

So I heard a number of criticism before. Representative Smith, 

I will answer your question. I’d like to say that I will be absolutely 

happy to go into detail if time permits to answer each and every 

point of criticism. 

17 

And I simply cannot and will never take the views expressed 

here by our distinguished friends—for example, as the unreformed 

nature of our judiciary, subservient nature of our legislature, et 

cetera, et cetera. 

These are very strong remarks, and I want to strongly oppose 

these remarks and place this on the record. 

We are building a new society. We are building new institutions. 

We are not saying that we are ideal. We are on the growth. Therefore, we are going through our teething problems, and we believe 

that this should deserve full understanding and appreciation on the 

part of our friends and partners. 

I can address all the issues and give full details of my point of 

view on, for example, media access, constitutional reforms, the socalled issue of the lifetime presidency, Hare Krishna, registration 

of political parties. 

I believe that the information which has been provided here is 

wrong, and I am prepared to give full answers why it is wrong. 

Answering your question, Representative Smith, with regard to 

Jehovah, Presbyterian, and Hare Krishna, I unfortunately am not 

aware of the Jehovah’s Witnesses situation, but as in any country, 

there is an issue here. 

First of all, one should not question the integrity and legitimacy 

of our court rulings. Court and judiciary is a sacred cow which we 

try to build in our society. I am not saying that our courts are 

ideal. I am not saying that our judges are ideal. They are not. 

But we are trying to achieve—to go to that ideal. In doing so, it 

will be a mistake to put to question the integrity of any court ruling in Kazakhstan. There is a procedure, as in any country—there 

is a procedure for simple registration by any religious organization. 

If there is some disorder with this procedure, a respective organization will ask to perfect this order. 

With regard to particularly the Hare Krishna situation, I had the 

opportunity to explain in full detail to Chairman Hastings and 

other members here that it is basically a property issue. 

We are a society which builds a culture of respecting the property rights. Therefore, we believe that the whole issue is about 

property rights. We have set up an independent commission which 

comprises representative of other religious, Muslim, Christian, 

Buddhist. 

We have included members of the parliament into that commission. And we have included the members of the Krishna community itself. Mr. Govinda from Kazakhstan’s Krishna community, the 

chair of that group, is within that commission. 

And we have included NGOs like Helsinki Commission of 

Kazakhstan, Helsinki Committee of Kazakhstan, in that independent commission—for them to review the ruling of the court, of 

different courts at different levels. 

And they have reviewed the ruling of these courts, and they have 

agreed that this is a property violation situation. As simple as that. 

In Kazakhstan we have more than seven Krishna communities 

in different parts of the country, and none of them are facing any 

problems because none of them are having property disputes. 

Only the community in Almaty had the property dispute, and it 

is about a violation of property rights of other people. And the comVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:35 Dec 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\101607.TXT HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
18 

mission came up with a very simple decision, please do rectify 

things which are done wrongly in making the property rights 

through the necessary paperwork. 

And the ruling is the decision by the commission—please do 

choose what we have to offer to you, and there is a process of a 

selection. There is a discussion between the Krishna community 

and the authorities to find an amicable solution to this situation. 

It is not about targeting a particular religious group in 

Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has almost an impeccable record on promoting religious freedoms in Kazakhstan. 

We are the promoters of interfaith dialogue in our part of the 

world, and we have already convened two global congresses on this 

issue. 

Therefore, I strongly oppose the notion that it is the targeting of 

one particular religious group. It is about property rights. It is 

about a violation of property rights of one group of people by another group of people. 

And the independent commission came with a solution offering 

to find an amicable decision through dialogue and discussion. 

This would be my responses to the critical comments and answers—questions which have been asked here. And I once again 

stress the point that please do not try—I am not saying that we 

are ideal. 

My point is that we are a young emerging society. Therefore, we 

try to put the ambitious goals in front of us, before us, and we are 

absolutely sure that we will achieve them. 

We believe that there should be a recognition of the importance 

of these goals and ambitions. It is like bringing up a child. You see, 

if you always say to a child that he is wrong and bad, that child 

will have very few opportunities to grow as a full-fledged, responsible citizen. 

Therefore, every effort should be done to support and care those 

positive things which are emerging on the ground. We are a young 

society, but we are confident that we’ll develop into a fully fledged 

democratic liberal society. 

And as I said, one should not overestimate the importance of a 

time factor. One should not overestimate the importance of the 

emerging culture. It is about the generation changes. It is about 

the mentality changes. 

And these things do not happen overnight. They cannot be 

achieved at once. I thank you very much. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Follow-up? 

Mr. SMITH. Just would any other panelists like to speak to this, 

especially on the Krishna and the—and you didn’t really speak to 

the issue, with all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, to the Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, so perhaps you could get to that. 

But frankly, we want to treat Kazakhstan not as a child, but as 

an adult. And you know, adults don’t let adults commit human 

rights abuses. Friends don’t let friends commit human rights 

abuses. 

That’s what this is all about. It’s not about being critical. It’s 

about trying to speak truth to the power of your government so 

that corrective action for victims and disenfranchised people will 

occur. 

19 

That’s what this is all about. Mr. Hastings and I want nothing 

better—and other members of this Commission—to applaud 

Kazakhstan. That’s what this is all about. 

But when we get credible reports of ongoing mischief, if you 

will—you know, you said almost impeccable. It’s not about almost 

or anything. It’s about the victims. That’s what we care about, the 

victims—rule of law, accountability, transparency. 

Would any of the others want to speak to that? 

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Zhovtis? 

Mr. ZHOVTIS. Thank you a lot, because we have a dialogue. I 

want to respond to some key issues. 

No. 1, I agree with the Ambassador that we are a young democracy, but who are the young democracy? We should move from the 

younger to more adult. We should move forward. 

If you look at the Kazakhstan 1993, you will find out there are 

a lot of opposition political parties registered. You could find independent TV and radio, which we do not have now. 

You could find some kind of [inaudible] functions of parliament 

over the executive branch of power. You could find some roots of 

democracy in the early ’90s which we now didn’t have in place. 

And this is the problem. The problem is that the constitution and 

the laws are not becoming better, are not becoming more democratic. 

They’re becoming more authoritarian, more control function 

given to the executive branch of power, more involvement of special 

services for prosecutors’ offices, and so on, and so on, and so on. 

That the question of [inaudible] of development and the development of [inaudible] is not the question of—is not the problem of 

questioning the young democracy as such. 

What is concerns the Krishna community [inaudible] I was also 

the member of this commission, which was established under the 

committee on religious affairs of ministry of justice. 

I want to remind that it’s not the question of integrity of the justice. It’s a question of the OSCE standard for free and fair trials. 

And free and fair trials should be forward. 

That should be open, transparent procedure where everybody 

could provide its evidence and so on. It couldn’t be that the hearings were held without the defendants at all, as it happens in the 

supreme court of Kazakhstan. 

What about the commission? Unfortunately, the commission was 

established exactly several days before the religious forum, and it 

seems it was some kind of window dressing, because we never reviewed anything. 

There was only two technical meetings, and that’s all, and after 

that we have the decision of the commission where we are the 

members. I haven’t even seen any hearings, any discussion on the 

issues. It was only technical procedural things. 

Property rights—yes, of course, the property should be protected, 

and so on, and so on. But when you see the selective approach, 

when you see that the owners should mention their religious affiliation, and because of those who belong to the Krishna community—their houses are demolished, and those who do not belong, 

their houses were not demolished, in spite of [inaudible] that the 

same legal status was for everybody for all owners of this land. 

20 

Unfortunately, the legal situation was very complicated, of 

course, but there were opportunities to solve the problem in a fair 

and a good faith way. It was if the government wants to do so. 

The government didn’t do anything to solve the problem in a 

good faith. They hide themselves behind the court decisions which 

were made in an untransparent and unfair way. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Zhovtis, let me ask you another question, 

though. The Ambassador said that there are other Krishna communities that do not have property disputes that have ongoing opportunities to explore their religion. 

Is that true? 

Mr. ZHOVTIS. It’s relatively true, because there are seven very 

small communities which have no places for worship and have no 

property at all, that they have not faced any problems, and other— 

it is the center. It is the center of Krishna community in 

Kazakhstan. 

Mr. HASTINGS. I follow you. I follow you, but my point would be 

if the government was being totally intolerant, it would seem to me 

that the Krishnas would not have an opportunity to proceed at any 

place, and I’ve seen those, as have—— 

[Crosstalk.] 

Mr. ZHOVTIS. There was a selective approach, unfortunately. 

There was a selective approach. 

In this case, it was some kind of selective approach, and you 

could find out—very interesting—two things, that when you see in 

the TV how the high-rank official of the local executive branch said 

that the Krishna community—that even Indians deny the Krishna 

community. 

How you could measure that, what I said, it’s clear—— 

[Crosstalk.] 

Mr. HASTINGS. Well, I don’t want to get bogged down. We could 

be here forever about religion. 

And I consider it critical—Ambassador, by all means, I will hear 

you, sir. But I did want to try to carry us into some other directions 

as well. But go ahead, Ambassador. 

Amb. IDRISSOV. Yes, just a couple of facts. Again, I full respect 

what our friends express here, but I do not want to impose my 

opinion in whatever way. Simply a couple of facts. 

In this situation with Krishna, it was believed—and it was widely disseminated that the government or certain groups within the 

locality, with the support of local authorities, tried to take out the 

land from Krishnates for certain commercial needs, because the 

land is very expensive there. 

I can give you the fact that not all the houses of the Krishna 

have been taken away. Those who had proper paperwork for their 

property titles—they have been allowed to continue to own that 

property, so it is not that it is being [inaudible] on the massive 

scale because you are Krishna. It is a wrong picture, completely 

wrong picture. 

And second fact is that the land which has been retrieved is 

given for an orphanage. It’s not being turned into a highly valuable 

commercial property or whatever. It has been given for an orphanage. 

21 

And again, this fact proves that the rumors which were spread 

were baseless. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. With all due respect—— 

Mr. HASTINGS. Go right ahead, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Confiscated properties remains one of 

the most compelling issues as a holdover from the Nazi era, the 

Communist era. 

And to think that confiscated properties are occurring real-time, 

now, raises very serious questions, especially as Kazakhstan is 

seeking to be the Chair-in-Office. 

You know, there’s always a pretext. There’s always, you know, 

the excuse that papers—your papers were not in order. We hear 

that all the time. And whenever the commission gives an explanation like that, it’s very disturbing. 

I do think a few of the others wanted to answer. 

Mr. HASTINGS. I want to accelerate us to another posture, and I 

fully respect the dialogue that has been ongoing. 

But I’m curious, and I guess I put it to you, Dr. Herman. Some 

people maintain that allowing Kazakhstan to chair the OSCE will 

bring them into the fold—and Mr. Zhovtis earlier, before his ‘‘however,’’ had postured that that was his belief earlier, before subsequent changes that took place brought him on—rather than shutting them out, and by taking leadership in an institution dedicated 

to upholding basic human rights and democracy, Kazakhstan can’t 

help but be influenced by their Chairman-in-Office tenure if they 

were to have that opportunity. 

How would you respond to this argument? And while you are 

preparing your thoughts on it, you know, I was elected as the first 

American to be the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 

OSCE. 

And, Mr. Merkel, I just want to correct the misapprehension that 

a lot of times people say when election monitoring—you talked 

about your experiences—takes place—ODIHR is always mentioned, 

and rightly so. 

But the Parliamentary Assembly also conducts portions of those 

determinations, and I, for one, was the lead observer in the Kazakh 

elections previous to the more recent one, and while I made the 

declaration, that declaration was on behalf of ODIHR, NATO, the 

Council of Europe, and others. 

But I also had my personal witness, and I can tell you I’m from 

Florida, and I saw things in Kazakhstan that were substantially 

improvements over whatever that mess is we have in Florida. 

So when you look at it with another kind of lens, not suggesting 

by any stretch of the imagination that there were not problems, 

but, my goodness gracious, you know, we need to be mindful when 

we are highlighting these particular matters. 

And back to you, Dr. Herman. When I was elected as President 

of the Parliamentary Assembly, there was criticism from a lot of 

the countries, France being lead among them, that an American 

should not be the President of the Assembly, that I would bring all 

of whatever it is in America to Europe, and I wouldn’t be fair and 

objective and what have you. 

And I doubt very seriously now if any of the persons in the Parliamentary Assembly would argue that my 2-year tenure was not 

22 

tinged with complete objectivity on a variety of subjects that are 

just as controversial as this one, ranging all the way from something that the American Congress is considering, the ArmenianTurkish disputes, the Greek-Turkish disputes, the Russian-European disputes. 

And I balanced myself, taking myself to another level, in an effort to try to bring parties together and to fulfill the mandate of 

the OSCE. 

And I haven’t personally been persuaded why Kazakhstan can’t 

do the same thing. When you cite to me their human rights violations, I can cite to you in the State of Florida what I perceive to 

be a serious human rights violation. 

And I know we are free, and the highest of the free, of those. But 

last week, a terrible injustice took place in the State of Florida 

with reference to a kid that was killed in a juvenile detention facility. 

Now, I could go on and on and on. I don’t want to bring up Guantanamo. I’ve held hearings here about that. I don’t want to talk 

about Abu Ghraib. I don’t want to talk about Black discrimination 

and what have you. 

But when other countries look at us and then we may be the 

ones that hold up their opportunities to come inside the fold, I personally would rather be in a position of having Kazakhstan be influenced by their opportunities. 

And following with what Mr. Merkel said, having the troika, outgoing and incoming, person to work with, they couldn’t help but 

improve. And how do you respond to that, even in the area of 

human rights? 

Dr. HERMAN. Thank you for your questions. Let me start by 

going to the point you mentioned about the deficiency in the United 

States, and I know that’s not the subject of the hearing, but it’s relevant here that no country is perfect. 

All democracies are in a path, a trajectory, of perfecting their institutions. 

What I would say to you, though, the difference is, in a country 

like the United States and many of the other established democracies, what you have is self-correcting mechanisms such that 

when there are problems, you have the institutions, including a 

free press, including a vibrant civil society. You have an independent court. 

All those things are checks on executive power and the balance 

of power, as we’ve talked about. And those are absent in transition 

countries, certainly in authoritarian countries, like Kazakhstan. 

So there is not the self-correcting mechanisms that we would see 

in the more established democracies. That’s one point. 

The second one is the historical record is filled with cases where 

letting in countries that don’t meet the standards—it is not a spur 

to further democratic reform. Lowering the bar has the impact of 

doing just that, of lowering the overall standards of the organization. 

Now, I should say to you that Freedom House—when we do our 

annual reports, Freedom in the World and other things, it is not 

just a naming and shaming exercise. 

23 

The reason we do those reports is exactly to do what you suggested before, engage those governments in a dialogue about how 

to move the democratic process forward. It’s pointing out some of 

the shortcomings, but it’s for the basis of a conversation. 

And more importantly, not a conversation just that Freedom 

House has with those governments, but that those governments 

should have with their own citizens. 

It would please us to no end to see human rights organizations 

like the one that Yevgeniy represents engaging with their government on a dialogue about what needs to happen to move that country forward. 

And as you heard, the democratic opposition, the leading human 

rights organizations, in Kazakhstan do not believe that bringing in 

Kazakhstan as the Chairman-in-Office at this time is going to be 

the answer, is going to be a spur to further democratic reforms. 

If you take the example, let’s say, of the European Union, in my 

experience that has been a very, very powerful incentive for governments to undertake reforms in order to bring them into conformity with the requirements of E.U. membership. 

Those countries didn’t get a free pass. They didn’t come in when 

they were at the very, very bottom. They only came in admitted to 

the E.U. after they had achieved certain levels or standards of that 

organization. 

I would say that that would also be the case with Kazakhstan. 

I am all for putting together a blueprint, a road map, of what 

Kazakhstan needs to do in order to get to the point that it will inspire the confidence of the other members. 

Mr. HASTINGS. I take your point, and I’m going to just cut you 

off so that others—— 

Dr. HERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTINGS [continuing]. including Representative Smith, 

could have something to say. 

And you know, I’m no rookie in all of this stuff. You talk about 

the other countries that came into the E.U. Romania came into the 

E.U. and I can sit here and cite to you countless problems that still 

exist there, including—I’m sitting here with the world’s leader on 

the subject of human trafficking, and I can tell you if Romania 

doesn’t have a serious problem, then I know of no country that 

does. 

So we can go back and forth in that regard, and I particularly 

enjoy the dialogue in that regard. 

Ambassador? 

And then, perhaps, Chris has something else. 

And I don’t want to overlook you at all, Mr. Merkel. I’ll come 

back to you. 

Amb. IDRISSOV. Thank you very much. Quickly, on the point Representative Smith raised about the confiscation, it is exactly about 

protecting property rights. It is not confiscation. It is about the protection of the property rights, which we build as a sacred cow in 

our society. 

Now, coming back to elections, you have touched upon the election process in Kazakhstan. May I respectfully remind all the participants today that we have had more than five elections over this 

short period of 15 years? 

24 

And a discussion of the election process as we have it here sometimes may create a picture that we are kind of—in a kind of a conflict with OSCE. On the contrary, we are very close partners with 

OSCE, particularly with ODIHR. 

If you look at the record of our partnership and the work with 

ODIHR, you will see that every election, every election, is being described as an improvement. 

This election—the report of the ODIHR mission says—the first 

line of the report says it is a work in progress. A lot has been done, 

and this election, as compared to the previous election, was much 

better in terms of the opposition parties’ status, in terms of the access to the media. 

And you will have full details of this, full account of this, in the 

report of OSCE. 

Mr. HASTINGS. But, Ambassador, in the intervening time, the 

sanction that the parliament allowed in order that the President 

would be President for life—you said in your remarks earlier that 

you would address that subject and dispel the myth of the presidency for life. 

I’d like to hear that. 

Amb. IDRISSOV. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is absolutely correct that it is not true. It is not a lifetime presidency. 

What the parliament did—it is a set of 40 amendments to the Constitution. 

One amendment was to fix two terms for the President, reducing 

the term from 7 years to 5 years. So each and every President in 

the future will have two five-term periods for the Presidency. 

In recognition of the unique set of circumstances this time, the 

parliament has voted for the right to this President, first President 

of the country, to run for the third time, if he chooses so. 

And he will not stand unopposed. This was not a Presidential decree. This was an independent decision by the M.P.s, by the elected 

members of the parliament, to give the exceptional right to the current President to run for the third time. 

If there will be—and he will run against other candidates which 

emerge by the year 2012 when we expect next election, so—and if 

he chooses. This is an opportunity for the society to encourage the 

growth of political leaders in the country by including political parties in the country. 

Mr. HASTINGS. So you’re saying he didn’t reach his decision on 

the constitutional amendment that allows him to be president for 

life along with the admonition that he gave to President Putin that 

President Putin ignore constitutional restrictions and Western criticism and simply remain in office. 

And I quote President Nazarbayev, who you know that I’ve had 

the pleasure of sitting and talking with. I quote him. He said to 

Putin to remain in office ‘‘as long as the country needs you.’’ 

Now, then, that didn’t factor in President Nazarbayev’s decisions 

with reference to what the members of parliament did, allowing 

that he succeed himself for the—— 

[Crosstalk.] 

Amb. IDRISSOV. No. This is, on the contrary, a concept of a safety 

valve. If the situation will have a danger of going into difficult situVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:35 Dec 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\101607.TXT HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
25 

ation, then he would have the exceptional right to run for the third 

time, to run, not unopposed. 

And this was not his decision. This was an independent decision 

by the elected members of the parliament, which he couldn’t overrun, because by constitution a president cannot overrun the ruling 

by the parliament. 

That was as simple as that. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Merkel, you have not had an opportunity to 

get in this with us. Go ahead. 

Mr. MERKEL. I wanted to touch on Congressman Smith’s dim 

light question, which—I noted that you addressed a dim light question to me. I think Russia is actively working to dim the light of 

the OSCE. 

In the name of reform, they are trying to make the organization 

weaker. But in the case of Central Asia, I don’t think that 

Kazakhstan would participate in this effort, and I don’t think the 

comparison is right for them to be chairman would naturally dim 

the light. 

Also, with a just heart toward Central Asia, there were three organizations that were invited to observe the elections in 

Kazakhstan—OSCE/ODIHR, the Commonwealth of Independent 

States, and the first election observation by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 

I think at a certain point, with the number of elections that 

Kazakhstan has had, with the number of elections that have taken 

place in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the OSCE providing 

recommendations, we have to also look not just why these countries 

aren’t improving at a more accelerated pace, but why the OSCE 

and others of us are not more effective in encouraging progress. 

We can keep the OSCE under glass and make sure that nothing 

happens to it, or, in my view, we can make it a more effective instrument in the regions that many believe are their raison d’etre 

heading into the future. 

And I think that this is a pivotal point in time that if the organization—although 53 members of the organization don’t feel this 

way, but if the United States, the U.K., Czech Republic refuse 

Kazakhstan’s bid, then I fear that the organization will be even 

less effective in trying to influence progress in this region. 

And finally, I have great admiration—not just sitting here; I 

have great admiration always for the two of you in your pursuit of 

human rights. I’ve worked in Congress long enough to know that 

you’re both champions of this. 

I do kind of understand why Kazakhstan chafes a little bit in 

hearing of important issues when they’re doing so many other 

things well. They need to hear about them. 

But when Bobby, who comes from a great organization himself— 

I’ve known him for many years—and does great things, talks about 

that we need positive incentives to get their progress, positive inducements, I’m reminded of all we did to bring NATO members 

into the fold. 

And that was a point in time when many of the issues from the 

Holocaust were resolved. And we put money toward it. We provided 

them the opportunity to sit at a table that meant great things. It 

meant more stability for future economic progress. It was a stepVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:35 Dec 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\101607.TXT HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
26 

ping stone toward E.U. membership, which is very different from 

OSCE membership. 

And I don’t see that same effort. And if you’re sitting in one of 

the Central Asian capitals, I think what you hear is conditionality, 

not a road map of how we can work together to make sure that 

you’re successful. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Did we pass out the questionnaires? And anyone 

in the audience that may have received them, would you bring 

them up so that we—oh, they haven’t been passed out? We’ll pass 

them out, and maybe we’ll get one or two questions from someone 

in the audience. 

I’ve been trying, Chris, really, to lessen the podium and bring the 

audience into these matters. 

I want to followup on Mr. Merkel’s point and ask you again, Dr. 

Herman—I understand and have great respect, as you know, for 

Freedom House’s activities, scoring, methodologies. I don’t come to 

quarrel. 

But on something of this magnitude, if you relegate yourself to 

just your niche, which largely is in the field of human rights, then 

you would not score Kazakhstan favorably in that area, and I accept how you come to your conclusion. 

But what do you do with the close cooperation that Kazakhstan 

has with the United States of America in nonproliferation and 

counterterrorism? And do they not have an opportunity to get 

scored a little bit favorably on matters of that magnitude? 

Senator, how are you? 

Yes? 

Dr. HERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that’s obviously for you and 

for the State Department and other members of the administration 

to judge. 

I made the point in my comments that we recognize that the 

U.S. Government has multiple interests with respect to 

Kazakhstan and that the promotion of democracy and human 

rights being just one of them. 

I worked in the State Department on the policy planning staff, 

so I know some of the debates that take place internally with the 

administration. 

What I can say and what President Bush has said is that we’ve 

learned the lesson that when you ignore democracy and human 

rights, you do so at your peril. And if you’re looking at long-term 

stability in Central Asia and elsewhere, if you’re looking at reliable 

allies, look to how those governments treat their own people. 

At a minimum, it seems to me, that should be a standard that 

we should demand of any country that would be Chair-in-Office of 

the OSCE. 

I do not see how you can expect a Chair-in-Office that has not 

lived up to its commitments as a participating State—that when 

they’re catapulted to the Chair-in-Office that they’re suddenly 

going to develop the political will to undertake the kind of systemic 

reforms that Representative Smith was talking about. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Right. Well, you could kind of get ready for 

Kyrgyzstan at some point in the future. I’ve been speaking with 

their good offices and have been told that they intend to make a 

bid, and it will be interesting to see how that plays out. 

27 

And at the very same time, I think it important that we score 

the positives that countries produce in Central Asia, and I also 

think that we take into consideration a variety of positives and the 

negatives, and take into consideration those things that not only 

promote human rights and democracy but also that support and 

promote security. 

And in this particular instance, looking long range, I think we 

have some critical decisions that need to be made before November, 

and there is talk out there in the realm of Kazakhstan putting off 

until the year 2011. 

But I was wondering what other countries would come forward. 

What consequences might obtain by virtue of Kazakhstan not being 

permitted to be Chair-in-Office? 

And don’t drop the dime on the United States. There are some 

other countries that feel pro and con about this matter as well. And 

I just am grateful that we have an opportunity to air it. 

And I believe the Ambassador and his country will feel good 

about the fact that there is a robust discussion ongoing here in the 

United States as well as in the Congress. 

We’ve been joined by Senator Cardin, and I know he has a full 

statement that will be submitted for the record. 

But if there is anything that you would like to add at this time, 

Senator, we’ll leave the floor to you. 

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Ambassador, it’s a pleasure to have you before our committee. We thank you very much. Kazakhstan is an extremely important country in OSCE as well as in our foreign policy considerations. 

So from both the point of view of OSCE and the United States, 

it’s a real pleasure to have you before our committee. 

And I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, my statement being made part 

of the record. 

I must say I am conflicted here, because I think it’s important 

that we look at the next plateau of leadership within OSCE, that 

we have a more effective organization in dealing with the important agenda that OSCE brings to all of its member states, including human rights advancements, including the economic and environmental and security dimensions. 

And I think it’s important that we figure out ways that we can 

better understand the challenges that each of our states face. I personally do not expect to see overnight change that would be, in my 

view, consistent with the OSCE commitments. 

But I am concerned about the lack of political progress within 

Kazakhstan, and it’s something that is troubling to me, and ones 

in which we need to have a better understanding before moving 

forward on supporting a leadership change within OSCE. 

So I look forward to reviewing your testimony today and the exchanges that have taken place with the members of the commission. But I just really want you to know I’m open. I’m open for suggestions, because I do think that OSCE has been compromised in 

the last couple years. 

28 

The relationship with the Russian Federation has caused severe 

concerns about the effectiveness of OSCE. So I do think we have 

to reach out and figure out ways to be more inclusive within OSCE. 

I would also hope we would look at changes within the mechanism. The relationship between the capitals and Vienna needs to 

be reviewed, because it’s causing a bureaucratic problem in dealing 

with a lot of these issues. 

The consensus requirements, I think, need to be reviewed also. 

And I think these are all issues that we need to explore as to 

whether the Chair-in-Office will be aggressive in seeking those 

types of reforms needed within OSCE. 

So yes, I am concerned about Kazakhstan’s records on fundamental issues that are important for a country that seeks to have 

the Chair-in-Office. But I am also concerned about the commitments made toward reform within OSCE. 

And we’ll be very much looking at those types of conversations 

during the next—I hope immediately, I mean, because time is running out on making decisions here, so that we can make an informed decision here. 

And I’m not sure it’s a yes or no issue, because there is a timing 

issue, whether it’s this year or next year or the following year. I 

think these are all issues that we need to talk about in a very open 

way as to when is the best time for the types of transitions within 

OSCE. 

So I very much appreciate this hearing. I think it’s extremely important. And I can tell you that the committee I serve on in the 

Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee, is very much interested 

in what’s taking place here in this committee today. 

And very much appreciate the openness, Mr. Ambassador, of 

your participating in this meeting. I think it’s extremely valuable—— 

Mr. HASTINGS. Yes. 

Mr. CARDIN [continuing]. to the process, and I thank you very 

much for your attendance here today. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Senator. 

Gentlemen, I’d ask you all to stand alert. 

And, Ambassador, you’re going to have an opportunity. But add 

some of these questions to the thought that you have there, if you 

could just put a pin in it right for a moment. 

These are questions from the audience, and I’m trying to establish a tradition where the tremendous experts and feelings of others, other than those of you who are experts and those of us who 

are pretenders, get to talk, and the audience doesn’t have an opportunity. 

So here are some questions, and some of them are rather pointed. Kazakhstan’s actions toward the OSCE are important. The 

country blocked the OSCE budget several years ago and brought it 

to a—and I couldn’t make out the word, but seems like near closure, I guess, is what the scrivener is saying. President Nazarbayev 

has threatened to withdraw from OSCE over 15 years. Why do we 

want to reward this democratic child with a reward it has not 

earned? 

And what is the—next question. What is the state of the dialogue 

between the Kazakh Government and civil society? 

29 

And again for you, Ambassador Idrissov, why has Kazakhstan 

joined Russia in promoting reforms of ODIHR’s election observation 

role which would compromise the independence of ODIHR? 

And would Kazakhstan be opposed to a 2011 bid? Why does it 

have to be in 2009? 

And, Mr. Merkel, I don’t know—I’m putting the question. I’m not 

seeking this answer unless you choose. On whose behalf is Mr. 

Merkel testifying? Who is he employed by today in giving his testimony? 

And for Mr. Zhovtis, why has Kazakhstan moved away from its 

generally good record of tolerance and human rights of 10 years 

ago? And how would a Kazakhstan chairmanship affect the work 

of ODIHR, OSCE? 

Ambassador, I’ll start with you, or start with someone else if you 

want to collect your thoughts. Yes, sir. 

Amb. IDRISSOV. Thank you very much. First of all, let me express 

my full appreciation to Senator Cardin and for his kind words. 

And I would like to, first of all, address the questions which have 

been asked for me, and then I want to make a point of—a general 

observation. 

On the budget, budgetary issues in any multilateral organization 

is a complex issue. Therefore, if something happened 5 years ago, 

it was not the intention, I’m sure, of Kazakhstan to block—maybe 

there was a point of clarification of budgetary spendings, et cetera, 

et cetera. 

And once again, this shows that we are quite responsible and 

sober in our membership in the organization. 

As far as the quote, would-be quote, of President Nazarbayev 

saying that we will withdraw from the organization, I didn’t see 

that quote, but I think that this quote has been taken out of context and should not be commented as such. 

But Kazakhstan and its leader always confirmed their full appreciation and respect to organization and our openness and willingness to develop this [inaudible] further. 

The dialogue with the civil society is ongoing. I will take you 

back to Kazakhstan 15 years ago when the notion of an NGO was 

absolutely unfamiliar to anyone in Kazakhstan. Now in 

Kazakhstan we have more than 5,000 NGOs. This will tell you 

what kind of a dialogue we are developing with civil society. 

And actually, the government is putting together a number of 

practical efforts in terms of programs and budgeting these programs to develop this meaningful dialogue further. 

We believe that the civil society is an important part of our 

growth. We believe that civil society is an important backbone of 

our society. Therefore we want to encourage the further meaningful 

and quality growth of the civil society, and we are in dialogue with 

them. 

On ODIHR, we have an excellent—I started to address this 

issue. We have an excellent relation with ODIHR. We are in a permanent dialogue. And we simply take this dialogue as a friendly 

and fair dialogue. 

ODIHR is not ideal, as Kazakhstan is not ideal either. We believe that there are points of perfection for both of us. Therefore, 

we engage ourselves in this meaningful dialogue. 

30 

We believe that we have full right to point to the areas of criticism as we believe to ODIHR, and we full respect the right of 

ODIHR to point at the areas of criticism as they believe. 

Therefore, we are in a permanent dialogue, and it is not that we 

want to undermine ODIHR. On the contrary, we want to enhance 

the integrity and the future of ODIHR. 

We believe that this organization is very important, and we will 

be supporting ODIHR in our future chairmanship if we have the 

privilege to be elected. 

Why 2009? Because 2003 and the beginning of 2000, of the 21st 

century, actually brought enormous progress in Kazakhstan’s economic and political growth. 

Our philosophy was to concentrate on economic growth and stability. We believe that this is the basis to usher in meaningful, important political reforms, which we are trying to do now. 

Actually, the constitutional reforms are the first step of our 

major focused work on political reforming of the country. This is 

just a first step. And the election which we had is the first step. 

It’s not the final destination. 

We understand that the final destination is far ahead of us, and 

we quite understand that for Western standards, this one-party 

parliament which we have after the election is something which is 

strange. We understand this completely. 

But I draw attention of distinguished members here to the words 

of the president when he said immediately after the election that 

he was sorry that not all the parties were able to make it to the 

parliament. 

But he said that all ideas which have been voiced by the opposition parties—they will be taken full on board on the constructive 

basis. And he stressed that all the voters who supported opposition 

parties will be heard and their interests will never be ignored. 

And this is not the last election. We believe that we’ll have many 

more elections. And this was simply a point when opposition parties were weaker. 

And Mr. Zhovtis will agree with me that the whole point is that 

our President is enjoying a lot of popularity in the country and the 

vote which we had last August was a fair vote, because electors in 

Kazakhstan that had the opportunity to make a free choice, as they 

have in the previous Presidential elections, when strong opposition 

leaders were given the right to stand for elections. 

There were no restrictions on opposition leaders. There were no 

restrictions on opposition parties, et cetera, et cetera. We are a 

growing society, and we now started—and we are making major 

announcement to the world: Look, we have built economic muscles. 

Now, we strong enough to think more meaningfully about protecting ourselves politically. 

This is the message we are sending to the rest of the world and 

to our partners like the United States. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CARDIN. Could I just, Mr. Ambassador, followup one issue 

that you did not cover? 

And that is Russia has put forward a proposal in OSCE election 

monitoring which is viewed as a Russian proposal to significantly 

weaken the traditional role of OSCE in monitoring elections, someVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:35 Dec 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\101607.TXT HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
31 

thing that our delegation, our Commission, has taken very much 

as a priority to strengthen, not weaken, the election monitoring 

procedures. 

We think we understand the motivation of the Russian Federation, and it’s something that we will have to deal with. We were 

disappointed to see that your country co-sponsored that. 

And I thought that appeared to be an accommodation to the Russian Federation which is—one of the things we’re looking for is the 

independence of your country in leadership within OSCE. 

And I wanted to give you an opportunity to respond as to the cosponsorship of that resolution. 

Amb. IDRISSOV. Yes, with regard to the co-sponsorship, I explained the rationale behind our co-sponsorship. As I said, we want 

to be a responsible chairman of the organization. 

And we believe that there is room within the organization to further perfect itself. ODIHR is a very important, indispensable instrument within the OSCE. We fully recognize that. 

But we believe that since the practice of election is diverse within the space of organization, therefore we believe that ODIHR, 

through its engaged dialogue with all the membership of OSCE, 

can further perfect its performance in terms of monitoring the election. 

We fully understand that this is a very important element of 

OSCE activity and ODIHR. Therefore, by sponsoring this—co-sponsoring this resolution, we voiced our recognition of the need to work 

further with ODIHR to make it better, to improve the function of 

ODIHR in monitoring the elections. That’s it. 

Mr. CARDIN. I would suggest that that would be perhaps perceived more favorably if it was an independent initiative by your 

country. 

But joining the Russian Federation, which has had such a difficult record of late with election monitoring issues, puts you with 

a country that is just not credible in its belief that it’s trying to 

strengthen ODIHR. 

Amb. IDRISSOV. Mr. Senator, quite respectfully, I have the experience in working in multilateral organizations, and sometimes resolutions are being sponsored and co-sponsored, as it is the practice 

in OSCE, in the United Nations, et cetera, et cetera. 

But I will tell you that we have made our opinion heard independently on improvements of different elements and different institutions within ODIHR—within OSCE. 

So the fact of co-sponsoring the resolution where the main sponsor was Russia is not the fact that we are going to play in the 

hands of anyone. We will be playing in the hands of interest of 

Kazakhstan and in the interest of the organization itself. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Zhovtis, a question was put directly to you. 

Do you remember the question? 

Mr. ZHOVTIS. Yes, of course. I think what happened 10 years ago 

when the constitution signed in ’95 was adopted—it was the shift 

in the policy from liberal democratic past to more authoritarian. 

It was explained that it is because of the need to develop the 

economy, to make privatization process more or less controlled, and 

so on and so on. 

32 

But it was a very clear turn around, because a lot of things happened during that time, and oppositional political parties practically disappeared from the political arena, independent media, especially electronic—I mean TV and radio—practically disappeared 

from the Kazakhstan political scene. 

And I disagree with Mr. Ambassador—I agree that Mr. 

Nazarbayev and Party Nur Otan, of course, gathered much more 

public support. But to some extent, it’s the result of some narrowing political space for others. 

You could find some leaders of political opposition which were arrested and put in prison, and some are in exile, and it was politically motivated travel in spite of the fact that, of course, Mr. Ambassador could refer to the, quote, decisions. 

It was the lack of access to nationwide media, nationwide mass 

media, and if you have no access to nationwide mass media, you 

could not bring your programs, your platforms, to the voters. 

You have the problems with the registration. The country with 

a 15 million population needs 50,000 signatures to create and register political party. 

And it’s practically—very complicated procedure of registration, 

and some political parties are still denied registration. 

There are a lot of constraints in the process which leads to certain results, because no matter how we are conducting and technically make better the election as such. 

And one thing I want also to mention—when we’re talking about 

stability, we should keep in mind that at this point in Kazakhstan 

it is personal stability, stability based on one person, which is the 

center of the political system. 

It is not institutional stability, and it’s a very big risk that if this 

personal stability will disappear and will be not replaced by an institutional stability, by—institutions of the constitutional democratic state, it will be at risk. 

And the last question was about what happens if Kazakhstan 

will chair OSCE. I have some questions which I could not answer 

myself. 

When Kazakhstan came out with this bid for OSCE chairmanship, the democratic forces, human rights organizations, international community came out with this moderate list of some practical steps to show its commitment to the OSCE obligation. 

Why did Kazakhstan not do these? It was very few—registration 

of political parties, improvement of the legislation on peaceful assembly and so on. Why it has not happened during this 1.5 years? 

Thus, I could not say how the Government of Kazakhstan will do 

it the best, if it will receive this high position. It’s very unclear, because during this 1.5 years—and I’m already repeating—it was unclear why we had these elections which fell far short from international standards. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. 

Dr. Herman and Mr. Merkel, if each of you would take a minute, 

and then I’m going to read two more questions and allow the Ambassador to take and have the last word. 

So if I could just hold you to a minute, I would appreciate it. 

Dr. HERMAN. Let me just make one point, which is that the Ambassador had said, and we quite agree, that the question becomes 

33 

how to move the country forward. And I think what we’ve heard 

today is that the preconditions for doing that don’t now exist in 

Kazakhstan. 

So yes, we need a dialogue with Kazakhstan. Yes, we need to 

incentivize how we would put in place democratic reforms. But as 

you just heard from Yevgeniy Zhovtis, those conditions don’t now 

exist in Kazakhstan. 

So the basic building blocks to get to the point at which 

Kazakhstan could meet its OSCE—the OSCE standards and its 

other commitments under international obligations, whether it’s a 

free press, whether it’s a level playing field for the political opposition—because those things don’t now exist, I have very little confidence that Kazakhstan is on a trajectory of profound political 

change. 

In fact, I think what we’re seeing and what we’ve heard is that 

they’ve really gone backward, and I think that we’ve seen those initial years after 1991, after independence, where some of those conditions did exist on the ground, it did seem like Kazakhstan was 

on a trajectory to move more in that direction. 

Now that process has been short-circuited. 

Mr. MERKEL. I was asked on whose behalf I’m here today, and 

I feel quite Kissinger-esque, where after being involved with the 

opening of China because of the appreciation of the importance of 

China, when you speak about China afterwards people would think 

that it must be because he has business interests in China. 

When I was at the White House, I was very fortunate to be involved in the strengthening of our strategic partnership, President 

Nazarbayev and President Bush had the opportunity to meet—and 

a joint statement providing a direction for our future relations. 

When I was asked to speak here, I thought the Commission quite 

appropriately asked me if I had business interests involved. I do 

not. I have no business interest with Kazakhstan or with companies that are involved with Kazakhstan. 

I think that this is important because it’s important to the 

United States of America. And I would just—want to touch on one 

topic that Senator Cardin mentioned, which is the independence of 

Kazakhstan. 

Kazakhstan pursues a multivector foreign policy. They want to 

have good relationships in their neighborhood. They want to have 

good relationships with major powers. Our interest is not to wean 

Kazakhstan away from Russia. History, diaspora, education, culture would make that unsuccessful. 

Our goal should be to preserve our access and influence in the 

region and provide more options for the countries in the region, 

where they don’t always have to look to Russia or China, but there 

is a good path toward Europe and European values. 

And that should be our goal, to where they can cut better deals 

on a lot of different issues because they have more options. 

Mr. HASTINGS. You cite something that I think is not highlighted 

here among us policymakers, and that is the multivectoring that 

Kazakhstan does. 

More specifically, if they were to be the Chair-in-Office, their 

interface with the Shanghai group would be of immense importance. 

34 

But I don’t think a lot of policymakers even know that the 

Shanghai group is of substantial import—not those of us, and 

maybe many in this room. I’m talking about folk that just simply 

are not mindful of ongoing events. 

I have another belief as well. For example, when I first went to 

Kazakhstan, I had an opportunity to meet with all of the officials 

and Mr. Zhovtis, with opposition persons. As a matter of fact, I had 

a whole day of discussions with members of the opposition. 

And my second visit I had an opportunity to meet with President 

Nazarbayev. And it was after Hurricane Wilma, and I had traveled 

with President Bush to Florida to review the damage there on Air 

Force One. 

And President Bush was mindful that I was going to meet with 

President Nazarbayev, so he gave me a message, not anything secret, but a message to carry to President Nazarbayev. 

And I told President Nazarbayev I was going from there to Uzbekistan, and so he gave me a message to give to President 

Karimov, and I’m saying to myself, ‘‘Who am I, the Presidential 

courier here for these people?’’ 

But the point that I wish to make is Kazakhstan’s relationship 

with other Central Asian countries is of critical import with reference to the future. 

And OSCE’s future in large measure must contemplate the Central Asian countries in a manner that I believe that Kazakhstan 

could help in developing stronger missions and allowing discussions 

with those countries, including the new opportunities in 

Turkmenistan, and I cited earlier to Kyrgyzstan. 

All of these countries have a different approach to matters than 

the Western approach, and the sooner we begin to understand that, 

the better off we’re going to be. 

Ambassador, there were two other questions, and I’ll just read 

them, because I do ask our participants that come to hear these 

hearings to do this little bit. But you don’t have to respond to them 

right now. Maybe you can give me something and I’ll put it on our 

Web site. 

It said could you elaborate or comment on recent Kazakhstan’s 

joining the U.N. conventions protocols on human rights and/or convention against torture. Kazakhstan signed it in September ’07. 

And then the other one I think we’ve answered. If the prospect 

of OSCE chairmanship has not induced Kazakhstan to make 

progress so far, why would actual chairmanship induce it to do so? 

I think we have had some discussion on that. 

We have 2 or 3 more minutes, and I’ll let the Ambassador have 

the last word. 

But if I may, I would like to announce for those present that we 

will hold a hearing of the Helsinki Commission on Thursday, this 

coming Thursday, October 18th, at 9:30 in room B–318 of the Rayburn House Office Building. 

And the hearing is going to focus on the challenges facing today’s 

Europe and the ability of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to meet those challenges, which include unresolved conflicts and obstacles to democratic development in a region stretching across North America and Europe into the 

Caucasus and Central Asia. 

35 

And our witness at that hearing will be the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and chairman of the committee on foreign affairs 

and the Swedish parliament there, Riksdag, my successor in the organization, Go ̈ran Lennmarker—is going to be our witness, and I 

encourage people to attend that hearing. 

I would also make mention of the fact that the Parliamentary Assembly’s annual meeting is in Astana in July of next year and it 

poses some interesting developments between now and that time. 

Ambassador, perhaps, sir—you’ve been very gracious with your 

time, and as Senator Cardin said, and Representative Smith, we 

deeply appreciate your participation. 

I hope it has been enlightening for you in the sense that, as I 

said earlier, a robust dialogue is in progress. 

You, sir. 

Amb. IDRISSOV. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is our 

policy—we believe that dialogue is always enlightening. Therefore, 

we like being engaged in a dialogue. 

I would like to make my final statements. I may once again put 

on record that we respectfully disagree with those who want to create a picture that there are no building blocks in Kazakhstan for 

further growth. 

The situation in early ’90s was when Kazakhstan just came out 

of the shackles of the Soviet Union and there was nothing on the 

ground there. We have concentrated our efforts to build the economic building blocks, to grow the country further. 

This is what we have achieved now, and this is what we are now 

announcing, that we are now focusing our efforts on political maturing of the society and our institutions. 

I do not agree when somebody said that there is no progress. 

There is a lot of progress, and this is being widely recognized by 

many external observers of Kazakhstan. 

And I may also make a final point, Mr. Chairman. We believe 

that the bid for Kazakhstan, which we announced in 2003—when 

we started to feel our economic muscles to grow, we believe that 

our bid has created a lot of opportunities. 

We believe that this is an opportunity for ourselves. This is an 

opportunity for our part of the world. And this is the opportunity 

for the organization. 

We all grow. Therefore, we want that this situation becomes an 

opportunity—a situation when we use this opportunity. And we, of 

course, do not want to see the situation when it is a missed opportunity. 

We invite everyone to look deeply into what’s going on, and we 

believe that we should take the opportunity which is being offered 

by life to us. 

We call on all our partners, particularly the United States, which 

is a strong and longtime partner of independent Kazakhstan, to 

look at as the golden opportunity to grow for everyone involved in 

this process. 

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

36 

A P P E N D I C E S 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome to this Helsinki Commission 

hearing. I see by the number of people and the presence of media 

from all over the world that the subject of our inquiry today— 

Kazakhstan’s bid to chair the OSCE in 2009—is especially timely 

and important. 

I am frankly not surprised at the level of interest. Much is at 

stake here. Indeed, one of my goals today is to illuminate just how 

much is at stake—for Washington, for Kazakhstan, for Central 

Asia, for Russia and for the OSCE, a security organization known 

for its promotion of democracy, human rights and rule of law. 

The former Soviet republics joined the OSCE in 1992, thereby 

agreeing to implement all of its commitments on democratization 

and human rights. Kazakhstan, like most of the ex-Soviet states, 

has found this a difficult transition. 

Consequently, Kazakhstan’s candidacy has been controversial 

ever since it was put forward in 2003. For Washington, and for 

many other OSCE capitals, Kazakhstan’s bid crystallizes the competing imperatives of seeking to promote democracy while maintaining and strengthening ties with an energy-rich, moderate Islamic state, eager to build good relations with the Western world. 

Washington has consistently told Kazakhstan that the U.S. supports Astana’s ambition to chair the OSCE but insists on demonstrable progress on human rights. 

This question was actually supposed to be settled at last year’s 

OSCE Ministerial. However, the participating states could not 

reach agreement about supporting Kazakhstan. It is no secret that 

Washington, citing the record of flawed elections, continuing 

human rights problems and the concentration of power in the executive branch, was among those OSCE capitals that did not back 

Astana’s candidacy. 

For that reason, the matter was essentially postponed last year, 

in the hope that circumstances would change in the interim so as 

to make the decision in favor of Kazakhstan easier to make this 

year. 

It would appear, however, that such is not the case. In 2007, 

President Nazarbaev received parliamentary sanction to remain in 

office for life, if he so chooses. 

Parliamentary elections in August did not meet OSCE standards, 

and produced a one-party legislature, with no opposition representation. 

So while no official statement has been issued by Washington, 

and none may be forthcoming before November, the indications are 

that the U.S. remains reluctant to endorse Kazakhstan. Apparently, even some countries that formerly supported Astana’s candidacy have begun to rethink their position. That is where we 

stand today, with the November Ministerial right around the corner. 

37 

Some of you may have noted the absence from our panel of distinguished witnesses of any representatives of the U.S. Government. Let me assure you that is not an oversight. I have been in 

discussions with high-level State Department officials about this 

matter for some time and felt that considering the delicate diplomacy involved, it would not be entirely helpful to ask the Department to air its views in public here today. 

But that does not mean we cannot examine this complex issue 

with other, non-U.S. Government experts. Hearing from proponents 

and opponents of Kazakhstan’s candidacy will help all of us reach 

a conclusion on that country’s suitability to head the OSCE and the 

ramifications for the United States of a Yes or No vote. 

To that end, we have very carefully selected our witnesses. Leading the charge for Kazakhstan is that country’s Ambassador, Erlan 

Idrissov. He comes to this post after a long and distinguished career, which included a stint as Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister. It 

is hard to imagine anyone who could better make the case for his 

country’s candidacy. 

Also on the ‘‘pro’’ side is a former U.S. Government official. David 

Merkel, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce, used to 

work on the Hill, so he is intimately acquainted with the mechanics and drama of a Congressional hearing. Most recently, he was 

the Director for Central Asia at the National Security Council, 

where he was directly involved in deliberations about the issue 

under discussion. 

Arguing against Kazakhstan’s OSCE ambitions are prominent 

human rights advocates, from the United States and Kazakhstan. 

On September 21, a coalition of U.S.-based organizations issued a 

public statement urging Washington not to support Kazakhstan for 

OSCE chair. We asked those participating organizations to select 

someone to represent them and they chose Dr. Robert Herman, Director of Programs at Freedom House. 

Joining him in the ‘‘No’’ column is Yevgeniy Zhovtis, the Director 

of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and 

Rule of Law. Mr. Zhovtis has been one of the leading human rights 

activists in Kazakhstan for many years. We are fortunate that he 

happens to be in Washington this week, at the invitation of the 

U.S. Committee on International Religious Freedom. 

There were many other witnesses we considered inviting but we 

decided to keep the number small, to allow more time for questions. Possibly, we may return to this issue in another hearing, at 

which other points of view could be expressed. 

Without objection, all the witnesses’ prepared testimony will be 

entered into the record. I ask them to summarize their remarks 

and keep them as brief as possible to allow more time for questions. 

38 

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding this hearing. 

Those of us who are closely involved in the OSCE know well that 

the November Ministerial, where important decisions have to be 

made, is bearing down on us. This hearing will help us clarify our 

thinking about Kazakhstan’s aspirations to chair the OSCE. 

The Helsinki Commission has been deeply engaged in discussions 

about this issue ever since Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to the OSCE 

first claimed the mantle of the organization’s leadership in 2003. 

The Commission has been in discreet contact with the White House 

and the State Department, as well as with senior Kazakh officials. 

Today, in thinking about the merits of Kazakhstan’s case, one 

must consider whether the country in the last 15 years has made 

sufficient progress in developing rule of law, institutionalizing political pluralism and observing OSCE commitments, to head an organization best known for its human rights profile. All of us are familiar with the assessments of human rights organizations on that 

score. 

Even Kazakh officials concede they have a long way to go. But 

they maintain they have made impressive progress, certainly sufficient to head the OSCE and promise even more and faster gains 

if they become chair-in-office. For example, Ambassador Idrissov 

assured me recently that the constitutional amendments adopted 

this spring will strengthen the legislative branch and promote the 

rise of a multi-party system in Kazakhstan. 

But I frankly find myself stuck on the fact that President 

Nazarbaev can now be president for life, if he so desires. There is 

little reason to think he will not. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s parliament is now composed only of members of President Nazarbaev’s 

ruling party. These facts give me serious pause and raise grave 

doubts about President Nazarbaev’s intentions and the prospects of 

Kazakh democracy. 

Apart from domestic policies, I recall President Nazarbaev’s support for his counterpart in Uzbekistan when Islam Karimov 

oversaw the bloody massacre at Andijon. More recently, the 

Kazakhs have co-sponsored a disturbing Russian proposal on OSCE 

election monitoring, also backed by Alexander Lukashenka of 

Belarus. We understand that a similarly restrictive paper on NGOs 

and civil society will be issued any day now, in an attempt to muzzle human rights activists and exclude them from future OSCE 

human dimension meetings. Such actions are very revealing and 

not reassuring at all. 

But are these the only proper and appropriate metrics for considering the issue? Should we only be thinking about whether 

Kazakhstan—or any other country—is in substantial fulfillment of 

its OSCE human rights commitments to be a serious contender for 

OSCE chairman? Or, should we also give thought to geo-strategic 

and economic ramifications? 

For example, if we don’t support Kazakhstan’s candidacy, will we 

push the country closer towards Russia and China and those members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which not only do 

not value human rights but see the entire issue as a wedge to divide Central Asian states from Western influence and institutional 

39 

integration? Would we risk losing out on energy deals and pipeline 

routes that would benefit Western consumers? 

Or, as Kazakhstan’s representatives have frequently asserted, is 

the OSCE chairmanship a ‘‘right’’ and not a ‘‘privilege?’’ Privileges, 

by definition, must be earned and imply special status; rights are 

inherent and are usually taken for granted. 

Perhaps the most important and troubling question for me is 

whether giving the OSCE chairmanship to Kazakhstan this year 

for 2009 will help democratize the country, as advocates claim, or 

will simply reward bad behavior, as opponents fear. 

These are issues Members of Congress confront in dealing with 

many countries. What singles out the Kazakhstan case is that at 

stake is the leadership of—not just membership in—the OSCE. 

These are not simple or obvious matters. For that reason, I am 

particularly interested in hearing what our witnesses have to say. 

40 

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, RANKING MEMBER, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. Chairman, I’m pleased to be participating in this important 

hearing. I have believed since 2003 that the question of 

Kazakhstan’s candidacy to chair the OSCE deserves the closest attention from policymakers. As far as I know, this hearing is the 

first open discussion of the issue. It comes at just the right moment, given the impending OSCE Ministerial in Madrid. 

Let me say at the outset I would in principle be happy to welcome Kazakhstan’s candidacy. It would indeed be very healthy for 

the OSCE if Kazakhstan, or any of the other former Soviet republics, were ready to chair the organization. It would signal important growth and maturity for the country in question, as well as 

for the OSCE. 

But I fundamentally disagree with the official Kazakh perspective that chairing the OSCE is a right, not a privilege. On the contrary, the OSCE Chair-in-Office, for reasons symbolic and substantive, is too important to be merely a rotating position, which 

any participating state can hold. I believe that the OSCE Chairman must be in compliance with OSCE commitments. We cannot 

be content to have as the Chair simply the most democratic of the 

OSCE’s most repressive states. 

Since 2003, the U.S. Government has been conveying memoranda to Kazakh authorities detailing what reforms they must implement to gain Washington’s backing. I have referred to these documents myself in conversations with Kazakh legislators at meetings of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. 

Unfortunately, Kazakhstan has not made the necessary reforms. 

The country’s constitution calls for a balance of powers, but President Nazarbaev rules his country autocratically. The legislature 

and courts provide no genuine checks and balances. Electronic 

media, though formally privatized, remain under strict state control. There are still some opposition parties that have not been registered and Kazakh authorities carefully limit the freedom of assembly. Though many religions coexist in Kazakhstan, I am disturbed that Kazakh law insists on registering communities of faith. 

I am deeply concerned about the recent raid on Grace Presbyterian 

Church in Karaganda and problems faced by the Hare Krishna. 

Mr. Chairman, all this was the situation even before the events 

of this year, when parliament gave Mr. Nazarbaev the right to be 

president for life; before yet another election that OSCE could not 

certify as free and fair—and before the emergence of a one-party 

parliament that surely will do President Nazarbaev’s bidding in all 

matters. 

Even before this year I was unable, in good conscience, to support Kazakhstan’s candidacy for 2009. After the events of 2007, I 

certainly cannot. It is my understanding that U.S. diplomats have 

been urging Astana to think about 2011 instead. I hope that 

Astana will back away from insisting on 2009 in favor of that more 

realistic option. 

Putting off a Kazakh chairmanship two more years does not 

make it automatic for Kazakhstan. I will not be able to support a 

Kazakh bid any year until the country makes substantive reforms. 

41 

But if and when they make these reforms, Mr. Chairman, I will 

be the first to applaud and congratulate Kazakhstan on its success 

and welcome its holding this important position. 

In the meantime, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

42 

H.E. ERLAN A. IDRISSOV, AMBASSADOR OF KAZAKHSTAN TO 

THE UNITED STATES 

Distinguished Members of the U.S. Congress and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), 

My name is Erlan Idrissov and I am Kazakhstan’s Ambassador 

to the United States. I appreciate this opportunity to comment on 

the possibility of Kazakhstan being selected to chair the OSCE in 

year 2009. 

On behalf of my government, I wish to convey our appreciation 

to the new co-chairmen, Senator Ben Cardin and Representative 

Alcee Hastings, and other members of the Helsinki Commission for 

their strong leadership in promoting democratization and the fundamental freedoms of all the participating states consistent with 

the Human Dimension of the OSCE. 

Today’s hearing is timely given the upcoming ministerial conference in Madrid next month, which will determine the OSCE 

chairmanship for 2009. At the ministerial conference in Brussels 

held in December 2006, all member countries confirmed the legitimacy of Kazakhstan’s bid and unanimously decided to continue 

consultations in order to make a final decision in Madrid next 

month. 

Securing the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009 is a high priority of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. As Ambassador of Kazakhstan 

to the United States, my testimony will cover Kazakhstan’s 

progress over the past 15 years, its commitment to political and 

election reforms, a positive relationships in the world community, 

measures it has taken to address some criticisms of other member 

nations, and its vision for making OSCE a progressive and viable 

organization in the twenty first century. 

To begin, it is helpful to present a brief history of Kazakhstan’s 

notable developments since the breakup of the Soviet Union. 

Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country in the world with a population of 15 million, and a literacy rate of 99 percent. As of 2006, 

GDP is growing at a rate of 9 percent. Of the former Soviet Union 

countries, Kazakhstan’s economy has demonstrated the most impressive growth. 

Over the last 15 years, Kazakhstan has fostered positive relationships not only with its immediate neighbors, but also with the 

United States, and countries of the European Union and Asia. 

Kazakhstan’s unique geopolitical position and impressive reform 

record through the post-Soviet years makes it a model country in 

the region and allows it to serve as a stabilizing force, particularly 

among the Central Asian countries, Russia, and China. The U.S. 

was the first country to recognize Kazakhstanian independence and 

establish diplomatic relations following the breakup of the Soviet 

Union. In fact, the U.S. Embassy opened in Kazakhstan in January 

1992, less than one month after it attained independence. 

Since that time, the U.S.—Kazakhstan relationship has been 

strengthened by close cooperation in many areas that have proved 

important to both our countries. 

43 

CURRENT REFORMS—PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY

In May 2007, President Nazarbayev announced a series of significant political reforms designed to further develop a genuine democracy and civil society. Among his proposals were judicial reform; reduction of the presidential term from seven to five years, 

increasing the powers of Parliament so that the government would 

be accountable to it; introducing proportional representation to 

elect members of the Majilis (Lower House); and establishing a 

party-based parliamentary system. 

The President’s announcement was greeted positively in the 

United States and Europe, yet the Western media reporting has 

been narrowly focused on an amendment added by the Majilis to 

grant President Nazarbayev the right to stand for a third term in 

2012. The comprehensive reform package, adopted by the Majilis, 

was never fully and fairly reported, thus it is not surprising that 

negative perceptions exist and have become the source of recurring 

criticism in recent months. The reality is that Kazakhstan is moving in the right direction and is emerging as a model for other 

countries in the region. 

Our democratic achievements were recently noted by Germany, 

France and Italy to explain why they support the Kazakhstan bid 

for 2009. These reforms have included a multiparty parliamentary 

system; reform of the justice system and humanization of the penal 

system; freedom of religion and respect for minority rights, tolerance towards refugees, recent decrease in trafficking in human 

beings; a moratorium on the death penalty; a system for monitoring human rights (Presidential Commission on Human Rights, 

human rights ombudsman, National Commission on Issues of Democratization and Civil Society); and ratification of important 

international treaties and conventions, such as the International 

Pact on Civil and Political Rights (November 2005). 

The U.S. government considers Kazakhstan to be of vital importance as a stabilizing force in the region. It also plays a very important geopolitical role to the EU, sitting strategically between Russia and China. The Bush Administration has encouraged 

Kazakhstan’s leadership on energy development in the region to 

help diversify energy sources. This piece of Realpolitik is becoming 

an urgent matter for energy dependent nations in Europe and elsewhere. 

Kazakhstan has also made a notable contribution to world peace 

by its early efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons, signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1993, and its leadership in the region and beyond in promoting efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons 

internationally. 

Kazakhstan voluntarily renounced the use of nuclear weapons 

immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union, and has 

since called on all states seeking nuclear weapons to abide by their 

NPT commitments and follow the example set by Kazakhstan. 

Among its related initiatives, Kazakhstan hosted the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in June 2007. It is a member of 

NATO’s Partnership for Peace, IAEA, and participates in the 

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. 

44 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that this hearing is devoted to the 

OSCE chairmanship, of which Kazakhstan is the leading nation to 

assume this position for 2009, and now would like to comment on 

matters relevant to the U. S. consideration and ultimate decision 

on who to support for the chairmanship position. • Economic and Market Reforms. Under President Nazarbayev’s 

leadership, Kazakhstan’s has made impressive strides in implementing economic and market reforms and has become a model in 

the region. Our financial institutions have been privatized and indeed Kazakhstan is preparing to become the financial center for 

Central Asia. A public announcement is scheduled to be made here 

in Washington on October 21. 

Kazakhstan promotes a transparent investment climate, having 

implemented comprehensive tax reform and a privatization program. As proof of these strides toward economic liberalization, U.S. 

exports to Kazakhstan in 2005 grew over 70 per cent, reaching 

$540 million. In addition, the U.S. and Kazakhstan have worked 

together on technical assistance programs to promote good governance and fight corruption, including judicial reform, judicial ethics, 

drafting legislation to conform with WTO requirements, training of 

parliamentarians on ethical issues related to conflicts of interest, 

programs to support development of free media, seminars hosted by 

corruption experts, and support for a local chapter of Transparency 

International. Many Kazakhstanian companies are pursuing IPO’s 

and joined the London Stock Exchange and plan to join the New 

York Stock Exchange. • Democratization and Electoral Reforms. Kazakhstan’s commitment to advancing democratic and political reforms has been publically assured by President Nazarbayev and conveyed to your Secretary of State by our Foreign Minister Tazhin when they met on 

May 9, 2007. While the August elections, the first after the reform 

package was enacted, did provide an extraordinarily favorable vote 

for the President’s party, the fact remains that the election system 

was significantly reformed, media coverage, including debates, extended to opposition parties, and the election system was deemed 

fair and efficient by most international observers, including the 

OSCE, which called the August 18, 2007 elections ‘‘a welcome 

progress’’. 

To this end, electoral legislation has been improved, the system 

of local government is being reformed, the legislation on mass 

media is being liberalized, a program for the development of civil 

society is being implemented, and there is a hard fought campaign 

against corruption under way. 

• Proven Leadership in International Organizations. Fourth, 

Kazakhstan is also prepared for the OSCE chairmanship in terms 

of our technical capacity to run and chair a large international organization. We are building an ad hoc group of experienced diplomats for the practical implementation of Kazakhstan’s OSCE 

chairmanship. Furthermore, Kazakhstan already has the experience of managing other multilateral bodies: the CIS, the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization, the Economic Cooperation Organization, 

and the Eurasian Economic Community. Kazakhstan has itself initiated the launch of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence 

Building Measures in Asia, which has been successfully chaired by 

45 

our country for more than 15 years. In 2006, Kazakhstan effectively presided over the Third Conference on Review of the CFE 

Treaty. We have held the OSCE Conference on Tolerance, which 

was singled out by the OSCE and the EU leadership for its efficient organization. 

• Promotion of Diversity and Religious Freedom. President 

Nazarbayev’s personal commitment to religious freedom is renowned internationally, particularly among religious leaders of all 

faiths. Every three years he presides over the Congress of World 

and Traditional Religions in Astana where hundreds of religious 

leaders participate in a two day session. The next session of the 

Congress will be in September, 2009. 

Kazakhstan is one of few Muslim countries with a unit (engaged 

in the dangerous activity of de-mining) in Iraq alongside U.S. forces 

for years now. It is also a predominantly Muslin country that enjoys excellent relations with Israel and that actively promotes religious tolerance, especially within its Jewish community. We recognize that Americas cherish this freedom above all and trust that 

it well be a consideration when the State Department weighs its 

decision on the OSCE chairmanship. 

OSCE AND CENTRAL ASIA

As members of the Helsinki Commission can appreciate, former 

Soviet Republics have been challenged in breaking away from the 

past and charting a new and uncertain course to the future. The 

experiences have been varied, to be sure, but at least in Central 

Asia, Kazakhstan has been the leader in advancing both economic 

and democratic reforms. 

The OSCE is the one organization that has been established to 

guide participating states in a manner that will help build institutions and a value system that are inherent in the three Dimensions 

mandated by the Helsinki Final Act (HFA). Eastern European 

countries have made great strides in embracing democracy and 

market economies, while other countries in the former Soviet Republic have mixed reviews, yet it is in Central Asia that the challenge is the greatest at the moment. 

That is why we believe that Kazakhstan can play a crucial role 

as chairman of OSCE. Kazakhstan will be in the forefront of building the organization’s legitimacy and will serve to encourage others 

in Central Asia to work toward democracy. It will also encourage 

Kazakhstan to move forward with meaningful reforms and the rule 

of law, paving the way for other countries in the region. It is in this 

spirit that so many of the 55 member states have already announced their support of Kazakhstan’s candidacy. 

Not selecting Kazakhstan to head the OSCE will be a missed opportunity and could possibly undermine the incentives that are essential if other CIS countries are to follow Kazakhstan’s lead. With 

difficult times ahead already (reform discussion, mandate extension 

for the OSCE Centre in Tashkent, to name just two controversial 

issues), it cannot be in our interest to add another line of division. 

46 

KAZAKHSTAN’S OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP GOALS

1. Kazakhstan, as the chairman of the OSCE, would conduct a 

principled independent policy based solely on the interests of the 

Organization. We do not intend to become a promoter of interests 

of any other state or a group of states. Below I will outline 

Kazakhstan’s specific priorities. 

2. Human dimension will be one of the top priorities for 

Kazakhstan. We will also work hard to fight terrorism, nuclear proliferation, human trafficking, narcotics and weapons smuggling— 

all dangers threatening the security and democratic equilibrium of 

OSCE Member States. 

3. Kazakhstan welcomed the OSCE Observer Mission (and other 

international election observer missions) to its August 18 parliamentary election, and values the advice it and others provided 

on the need for procedural and other improvements. 

4. Kazakhstan is committed to a course that is consistent with 

the traditions and principles of the OSCE. Kazakhstan has benefited from the organization’s core principles, and has developed a 

clear understanding of the strengths and usefulness of the various 

OSCE institutions and their practices. Kazakhstan’s advance 

through political reforms has taken a unique path—a path determined by the culture and history of the Kazakhstanian people. It 

is that culture and history that will anchor Kazakhstan’s independent vision for and leadership of the OSCE. 

5. Kazakhstan enthusiastically supported the establishment of 

the three CiO Personal Representatives on religious tolerance, for 

Anti-Semitism, for Muslims and for Christians and Other Religions. While there is room for introducing greater effectiveness and 

accountability into the work of these Personal Representatives, 

they represent a critically important set of the principles on which 

the OSCE was founded: freedom of religion and religious tolerance. 

Kazakhstan’s record in promoting these principles within 

Kazakhstan and internationally is exemplary. Indeed it has on two 

occasions hosted the Congress on World and Traditional Religions, 

bringing together religious leaders of all faiths from around the 

world, to promote religious freedom. Kazakhstan strongly supports 

the extension of the mandates of these representatives for the term 

of the next CiO, and will do so should Kazakhstan be granted the 

opportunity to lead this organization in 2009. 

6. Kazakhstan is proud to promote its highly successful experience with economic reform as a model in the OSCE. Its liberalized 

market economy is producing a vibrant commercial sector and now 

boasts a banking sector that could become a regional and international banking center, patterned on those in Dubai and Singapore. 

7. Kazakhstan is an active member of the group of 31 Landlocked 

Developing Countries, a UN group that established a relationship 

with the OSCE under the Belgian chairmanship. Kazakhstan intends to promote several issues of importance to both organizations 

should it be selected to chair the OSCE, using as a framework the 

Landlocked Developing Countries’ Almaty Plan of Action adopted 

at its last conference. 

47 

8. An issue of increasing importance to OSCE’s member territory 

is that of Eurasian continental transit and transport corridors. 

Kazakhstan contends that OSCE support for their development 

will underpin efforts to liberalize economies and to enhance market 

access for countries’ produce and production. Second, climate 

change issues are more severe in landlocked countries. Kazakhstan 

announced several initiatives at the September 2007 UN Conference on Climate Change, including establishment of a Eurasia 

Water Center and a Solar Center for Renewable Resources and 

Sources of Energy. 

9. The environment is also an area in which Kazakhstan excels 

and plans to lead the OSCE to continue its programs. Kazakhstan 

is already well known for its work to clean up the nuclear testing 

sites of the Soviet era and to work to overcome the environmental 

disaster perpetrated on the Aral Sea with imaginative and aggressive programs that are resulting in the return of the fishing industry to part of that inland sea. Further, Kazakhstan endorses the 

Spanish chairmanship’s priorities on rational and effective water 

management and its fight against land degradation and soil contamination. 

10. Kazakhstan has now reached the level of a middle income 

country. It now ranks as an emerging donor state. Kazakhstan remains prepared to continue to co-finance non-budgeted OSCE 

projects, as it does now for the Kyrgyz Republic. 

11. It is Kazakhstan’s belief that continued work in this dimension serves to support the goals of the human dimension. 

Kazakhstan takes the strong view that poor economic conditions 

make a bad partner for democracy. 

12. As noted previously, Kazakhstan is a champion of nuclear 

non-proliferation, and has been since it renounced the world’s 

fourth largest stockpile of nuclear warheads at the breakup of the 

Soviet Union. With 500 nuclear tests having been conducted on its 

territory, Kazakhstan knows only too well the dangers of nuclear 

testing and proliferation. It is among the states most adamant that 

nuclear materials not fall into the hands of non-state actors and 

plans to lead initiatives in the OSCE’s Security Dimension aimed 

at solidifying export control regimes. 

13. Kazakhstan noted in speech at the Special Meeting of the 

OSCE’s Permanent Council that the build-up of the organization’s 

effectiveness in the architecture of Eurasian security is a goal for 

Kazakhstan. There is no doubt that regional stability and the fight 

against international terrorism are goals that are shared by among 

all OSCE Member States. Kazakhstan will work with Member 

States to further these goals. 

14. Afghanistan is an OSCE Partner State that lies next door to 

the Central Asian Member States. Its close proximity warrants 

extra attention from the OSCE. Thus, Kazakhstan will support extending the work of the OSCE Field Missions to Afghanistan where 

border security, border management, police training and assistance 

for the 2009 elections could be useful. The scourge of narcotics trafficking makes enhancement of border control capabilities even 

more urgent. 

15. Kazakhstan also believes that activities in the security dimension serve to support continued progress in the human dimenVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:35 Dec 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\101607.TXT HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
48 

sion—the dimension where it will focus its energetic efforts. It is 

appropriate to lend the prestige of the OSCE to address any emerging conditions of uneven stability in this region. Kazakhstan 

pledges to lead this effort effectively should it become CiO. 

To conclude, Kazakhstan is among the countries in the OSCE 

that are now making gradual progress in economic, political, social 

and military reforms. This progress has succeeded while keeping 

the social and economic fabric of the country intact, allowing 

Kazakhstan to emerge as a financial center and leader in market 

reforms in the region. 

Kazakhstan assures the Member States that Kazakhstan’s leadership and commitment to OSCE ideals has prepared it to lead the 

organization and to participate in a positive, collaborative way in 

the OSCE. 

It is our belief that the Member States are prepared to take this 

wise and bold step and elect a state as CiO that is in the process 

of implementing the principles of the OSCE, so that it can use this 

expression of trust to continue its movement toward fulfilling the 

full set of OSCE goals—and lead other countries along the reform 

path. Doing so certainly strengthens this important regional organization and gives encouragement to all countries that are still 

working hard—that their efforts are appreciated and recognized. 

Kazakhstan highly values broad cooperation with the OSCE and 

its institutions and views it as an important tool and facilitator for 

the country’s ongoing economic and political growth. The support 

for Kazakhstan’s 2009 chairmanship bid will further encourage this 

growth and provide many more new opportunities for cooperation 

to jointly promote shared values and OSCE standards throughout 

our region. 

Thank you very much. 

49 

DAVID A. MERKEL, FORMER DIRECTOR FOR EUROPE AND 

EURASIA, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

I would like to thank Chairman Hastings, Co-Chairman Cardin 

and the members of the Commission for this opportunity to meet 

with you today. Having previously worked as Senior Professional 

Staff for Europe and Eurasia with the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, I am well aware of the importance of this Commission 

and applaud you for examining Kazakhstan’s bid to be Chairmanin-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) today. 

I would like to start my testimony with the indisputable fact that 

Kazakhstan has not held an election that the OSCE has found to 

meet international standards. Despite this, I believe that it is in 

the interest of Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the United States of 

America and the OSCE for Kazakhstan to be named as Chairmanin-Office for 2009 at the 15th OSCE Ministerial this November 29- 

30th in Madrid. 

BACKGROUND

After the break up of the Soviet Union I would talk with friends 

of mine from Central Asia and express to them the interest and importance that the United States places in the region. They would 

politely listen and then inform me that the U.S. was fickle and far 

away and that our interest would wane, and until September 11, 

2001 they were largely correct. But on that day we learned that instability anywhere could have a direct national security impact on 

the United States. This is not to say that there were not those in 

the U.S., including myself and members of this Commission’s staff, 

who did pay attention to Central Asia. The first wave of interest 

was from those looking to assist former Soviet Republics, including 

those in Central Asia, in their transition to a free market economy 

with a multi-party democracy. Later, greater focus was placed on 

exploiting hydrocarbons in the Caspian Basin and after 9/11 security and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan took 

a more prominent role. 

Energy, Security, and Liberty still form the crux of our interest 

in Central Asia and Kazakhstan today. How can we best pursue 

our interests of diversifying global sources of energy, enhancing 

ours and the regions security and cooperation in the war on terrorism and promote economic and political reform. Additionally, 

how can we do this in a region where some of the neighbors who 

are very actively engaged (Russia, China and Iran) do not see democracy promotion as anything more than a destabilizing effort 

and have no interest in seeing Central Asian Energy reach global 

markets other than through a reliance on them for its transportation. 

While I was on the National Security Council staff at the White 

House, the President spelled out our interests in his National Security Strategy of 2006. 

‘‘Central Asia is an enduring priority for our foreign policy. The 

five countries of Central Asia are distinct from one another and our 

relations with each, while important, will differ. In the region as 

a whole, the elements of our larger strategy meet, and we must 

50 

pursue those elements simultaneously; promoting effective democracies and the expansion of free-market reforms, diversifying global 

sources of energy, and enhancing security and winning the War on 

Terror.’’ 

KAZAKHSTAN

While the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 

Rights (ODIHR) report on the last Parliamentary Elections concluded that the elections did not meet international standards, it 

did indicate that improvements were made over previous elections 

including citing important improvements with the Central Election 

Commission (CEC). I have observed many elections in Eurasia with 

the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and with the OSCE and believe that the 

OSCE–ODIHR provides a valuable service to member countries. 

While I would not quibble with the conclusions reached by the 

OSCE, I do think it important to make a couple of points to you 

today. 

Kazakhstan is a country still in transition. If the Chairman-inOffice post needs to go to a country with an established tradition 

as a functioning democracy, this has never previously been spelled 

out and will have the undesired affect of creating two classes of 

OSCE members. Kazakhstan is a country that respects diversity, 

both religious and ethnic, and where its youth by and large are excited about their future in Kazakhstan. This stands in contrast to 

many of the other countries in Central Asia. Also, despite the fact 

that the December 4, 2005 Presidential and the recent Parliamentary election did not meet international standards as judged by the 

OSCE–ODIHR, it is without question that the election results reflect the will of the people. President Nazarbayev and Karim 

Massimov, as the first Prime Minister approved by the Parliament, 

have a clear and unequivocal mandate as the countries legitimate 

leaders. 

REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE

One of the difficulties in Central Asia is the lack of appropriate 

regional architecture. For European nations who found themselves 

on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain or those in the Baltic, there 

was the aspiration of NATO and European Union membership to 

attract them to a future of shared values and common security. In 

Central Asia there are several multilateral organizations but none 

that possess the same incentives for domestic reform and external 

reconciliation that membership in NATO and the EU provided to 

the countries of Central Europe. In fact, for the most part the organizations that today are viewed as more relevant for the Central 

Asian Republics are dominated by Moscow or Beijing. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which both sent election observers to the 

last election in Kazakhstan, do not include European or U.S. membership and do not promote the same common values. 

This is why organizations such as the OSCE and the European 

Union need to be seen as more relevant in Central Asia. But if 

Kazakhstan, which is viewed by most as the country in Central 

51 

Asia with the greatest international weight, is not acceptable to the 

OSCE, then the countries of the region may believe what they are 

told by Moscow and Beijing, which is that they will never be accepted by Europe or the United States and are seen only as ‘‘the 

Stans.’’ 

IMPORTANT FOR THE OSCE 

Unfortunately, the vast majority in Central Asia do not see the 

OSCE or Europe for that matter as very relevant to them. Most 

OSCE members do not have Embassies in Central Asia. In fact, 

Germany is the only EU member with Embassies in all five of the 

Central Asian capitals. The OSCE only comes up in diplomatic dialogue when a diplomat cites an OSCE report when criticizing a 

country’s democratic transition. The Government, elite and population are often unaware of what benefits membership provides 

them and their country’s future. This has to be changed. Many in 

Vienna and in Washington believe that the OSCE’s future is the 

South Caucasus and Central Asia. They see the need and opportunity of expanding stability and personal liberties to the millions 

of primarily moderate Muslims in Central Asia. I do not believe 

that you can hold this view and be against Kazakhstan’s candidacy. 

If the OSCE were to reject Kazakhstan in Madrid it would be sending a message that Europe and European values are not Central 

Asia’s future at the time when we need to be providing an example 

of what their future could be provided they have additional options 

rather than a reliance on Moscow and Beijing. 

MOVING FORWARD

The OSCE has 56 members. Only 3: the United States, the 

United Kingdom and the Czech Republic oppose Kazakhstan’s bid. 

This means that allies such as Germany, Romania, Georgia and 50 

others support Kazakhstan’s ambitions. One argument put forward 

on why Kazakhstan should not be Chairman-in-Office is that they 

would be beholden to the Kremlin for the office and would therefore support Moscow’s efforts to weaken the organization. This 

would be plausible if Moscow were one of Astana’s only supporters 

but it does not hold up given the breadth of Kazakhstan’s support 

which includes support from countries with their own difficulties 

with Russia. Another stated argument is that because Kazakhstan 

does not itself have a fully developed democratic tradition, it will 

be unable or unwilling to be critical of other countries. But this has 

always been the case. Countries have differed on how active they 

have been in their comments on election procedures which is why 

the independence of the Office for Democratic Institutions and 

Human Rights (ODIHR) who conduct the election observation is so 

important. Another argument at times expressed on why 

Kazakhstan should not be Chairman has to do with questions of 

the professionalism and depth of their foreign ministry—can they 

do the job? Without question Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry is up 

to the task but as we have seen with recent Chairman-in-Office 

some, as was the case with Norway, utilize their foreign ministry 

to advance their goals while in office. While others, as was the case 

with Bulgaria, rely more on the OSCE Secretariat to carry on the 

52 

functions of Chairman-in-Office. The Troika consisting of the previous, current and future Chairman-in-Office also ensures this will 

not be an issue. 

This decision will be reached by consensus of the members this 

November in Madrid. 53 member states have already expressed 

their support and if the United States blocks Kazakhstan, I am 

sure that one of these countries will block whomever we would suggest as Chairman for 2009. In my view Kazakhstan will be successful in reaching their goal and I would like them to see that they 

have done so with the assistance of the United States and not in 

spite of our opposition. I believe that our support is the right decision to best advance our goals in Central Asia and the right decision in the spirit of consultation with our allies. 

In just 15 years, President Nazarbayev has ensured the independence and stability of Kazakhstan’s boarders. This despite the 

fact that at independence, a minority of the population were ethnic 

Kazakhs and a majority ethnic Russian. He demonstrated leadership and wisdom in his decision to make Kazakhstan the first 

country after the break up of the Soviet Union to voluntarily relinquish what was the fourth largest nuclear arsenal. He has created 

an economic engine that is bringing an increased quality of life, 

better education and health services to more and more 

Kazakhstani citizens. Kazakhstan is an exporter of stability in a 

region that is still too unstable. Despite the fact that many would 

like to see an acceleration of the pace of democratic reform, the 

government is moving in the right direction and has the support 

of a large majority of the population. 

Finally, to my knowledge, a majority of the major opposition figures in Kazakhstan support the government’s OSCE goals. They do 

so for two main reasons. First, national pride, they would like to 

see their country on a larger stage, taking on a greater role in the 

international community and second, they believe that being Chairman-in-Office will place a greater spotlight on Kazakhstan and 

help them in addressing issues they believe are important to them 

and Kazakhstan’s democratic future. 

I appreciate this opportunity, thank you for your attention and 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

53 

ROBERT HERMAN, DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS, FREEDOM 

HOUSE 

Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by thanking you for the opportunity 

to testify today on behalf of Freedom House on the important issue 

of Kazakhstan’s bid to become Chairman-in-Office (CiO) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Freedom House recognizes that Kazakhstan is a country of consequence, a major energy exporter that has long cooperated with 

the United States on security issues, including the removal of the 

nuclear weapons and materials it inherited from the USSR. Freedom House also recognizes that Kazakhstan has made some 

progress in the area of human rights and democratic reform during 

the past few years as the government has simultaneously pursued 

its bid to head the OSCE. On October 1, we issued a statement on 

Kazakhstan’s recent signing of optional protocols to international 

conventions on civil and political rights and on combating torture, 

which followed a long advocacy campaign by a number of dedicated 

Kazakhstani human rights organizations. The statement called the 

Kazakhstani action an encouraging first step, while also noting 

that the onus is now on the Government of Kazakhstan to implement these protocols. 

It is our hope that one day Kazakhstan will develop into a fully 

democratic country. Unfortunately, that has not yet happened. As 

chronicled by Freedom House in its annual global survey of political rights and civil liberties, Freedom in the World, Kazakhstan is 

a solidly authoritarian country that has none of the fundamental 

features of a democratic society such as free and fair elections, opposition political parties able to compete for power, an independent 

judiciary, robust civil society, free press, and safeguarding of basic 

human rights. Kazakhstan falls far short of meeting its OSCE commitments in these regards. For these reasons, Freedom House believes strongly that the United States and other OSCE participating states must oppose Kazakhstan’s bid to chair the OSCE in 

2009. 

The OSCE played a historic role in the fall of the Iron Curtain 

and the peaceful end of the Cold War. Since then, it has continued 

to play a significant role, particularly in promoting human rights 

and democratic reform in Europe and Eurasia. Today, however, the 

OSCE finds itself under attack, including from the governments of 

some participating states that seek to prevent the organization 

from shining a spotlight on their failure to respect their citizens’ 

basic civil and political rights. If these governments succeed it will 

be a severe blow to the universal desire for freedom and damage 

efforts to create a Europe democratic, whole and free. To settle for 

a Chairman-in-Office—such as today’s Kazakhstan—that falls so 

far short of international norms in terms of respect for its own citizens’ basic rights and that flouts OSCE standards, would profoundly weaken the organization’s work in support of democratic 

governance across the region. 

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OSCE 

The OSCE traces its heritage to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 

and the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

54 

Europe. The Soviets thought the Final Act a major victory, in that 

it included the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of 

states. In their minds this enshrined their long cherished position 

that the post-war map of Europe was final. What they failed to understand was the transformative potential of the Third Basket on 

human rights. After agreeing to the Final Act, the Soviet Union 

could no longer claim that Western efforts in support of human 

rights in the USSR and the countries of the Warsaw Pact constituted an illegitimate interference in those countries’ internal affairs. This paved the way for the CSCE review conferences of the 

1980s and early 1990s and the formation of Helsinki Commissions 

in Prague and Moscow (and solidarity groups in the West), which 

labored heroically to hold their governments accountable for the 

commitments they made under the human rights basket. The inspired work and dedication of many people involved in this process, 

including Freedom House Chairman Emeritus Ambassador Max 

Kampelman, who headed the U.S. delegation to the review conferences, focused international attention on the human rights situation in the USSR and Eastern Europe and helped spur the collapse of communism. Over the years, the CSCE/OSCE also contributed to peace and security, particularly in the area of controlling 

conventional armed forces in Europe. 

A strong OSCE, one capable of carrying out its mandates in the 

security, economic and human dimensions, is still very much in the 

interest of the United States and our European allies. The OSCE 

was pivotal in exposing as fraudulent the initial results of the 2004 

Ukrainian presidential election, and in negotiating the agreement 

that paved the way for a new election that truly reflected the will 

of the people. It has done admirable work in the Balkans and the 

Caucasus trying to resolve conflicts and assisting in post-conflict 

reconstruction. The OSCE also provides a valuable forum for discussing pressing issues such as anti-Semitism and other forms of 

discrimination. To ordinary citizens across Europe and Eurasia, 

OSCE has been instrumental in strengthening democratic practices 

and safeguarding human rights. It is also viewed as a model for regional organizations elsewhere around the world that have as part 

of their mandate the advancement of democracy and human rights. 

RECENT ATTACKS ON THE OSCE’S ROLE IN SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

For many years now, a number of OSCE participating states— 

Kazakhstan among them—have expressed their displeasure with 

and attempted to impede the organization’s core work. For example, these countries opposed the establishment of large OSCE field 

missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo that served to constrain Serbian ambitions and they criticized the closing of OSCE 

field missions in Estonia and Latvia, claiming those countries were 

not meeting OSCE standards for treatment of their national minorities. But the main reason for these governments’ attacks on the 

OSCE is their unease over the organization’s efforts to strengthen 

democratic governance and in particular its role in monitoring elections and promoting advances in human rights in their countries. 

In July 2004, the leaders of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—again, including 

55 

Kazakhstan—issued a statement sharply critical of the OSCE. This 

statement claimed, in part, that the OSCE had ‘‘been unable to 

adapt itself to the demands of a changing world’’ and that it pursued ‘‘double standards,’’ devoting too much attention to human 

rights and democracy in the countries of the CIS and the Balkans, 

while ignoring problems elsewhere in the OSCE region. The statement pointedly attacked the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), arguing that its election monitoring was ‘‘frequently politicized and does not take into account 

the specific features of individual countries.’’ The joint statement 

charged that OSCE field missions in the CIS were ‘‘ineffective’’ and 

that instead of fulfilling their mandate ‘‘to provide assistance to the 

government of the host state,’’ they concentrated ‘‘exclusively’’ on 

the human rights situation and criticized their hosts’ domestic political situation in an ‘‘unwarranted’’ manner. 

In April 2005, a meeting was convened in Vienna to air the concerns of those participating states that were displeased with the 

OSCE’s work. A senior member of one delegation put these countries’ case bluntly when he told the press that: ‘‘Unfortunately, the 

institution of international monitoring [of elections] today is changing from an instrument assisting countries in implementing the 

principles of democracy into an instrument of legitimizing political 

decisions which concern the state of international relations with a 

given country. We see in this a departure from the goal of ensuring 

the citizens’ rights to participate in the electoral process. Instead, 

the emphasis is being placed on the political participation [by other 

countries] in the internal affairs [of the monitored state].’’ In other 

words, the leaders of these countries are concerned that, as was the 

case in Ukraine, OSCE exposure of fraudulent elections could lead 

to the kind of ‘‘color revolutions’’ they fear. 

Considering this criticism, it is instructive to look at the track 

records of OSCE and CIS teams that have monitored elections in 

CIS member states. OSCE monitors have frequently documented 

serious shortcomings and judged that many of these elections fell 

far short of international standards. The only time CIS monitors 

found an election in the region did not meet international standards was after President Yushchenko’s victory in the re-run of 

Ukraine’s presidential election in 2004. In distinct contrast, the 

then-head of the OSCE Monitoring Mission stated: ‘‘The people of 

this great country made a great step forward to free and fair elections by electing the next president of Ukraine.’’ This episode underscores that OSCE’s crucial role as an independent election monitor is under threat from several participating states, which are 

also members of the CIS. These governments are seeking to require 

that the OSCE Permanent Council (PC) approve all ODIHR election monitoring reports. As all decisions at the PC are achieved 

through consensus, this would give each participating state the 

ability to veto ODIHR’s assessment of elections in that country. 

KAZAKHSTAN IS NOT READY TO BE CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE

If OSCE’s credibility and effectiveness in support of democracy 

and human rights is to be maintained in the face of concerted efforts to weaken the organization, it is essential that the Chairmanship be held by a country that fully meets and is demonstrably 

56 

committed to OSCE standards in the sphere of political and civil 

rights. The Chairman-in-Office is key to setting the course for the 

organization over the year, beginning with the incoming CiO’s annual speech setting out the country’s priorities for its chairmanship 

and ending with the annual Ministerial Meeting, which the CiO organizes and hosts. In between, the Chairman’s representative in 

Vienna—his or her country’s Ambassador to the OSCE—organizes 

and chairs the weekly meetings of the Permanent Council. The CiO 

also makes key personnel appointments. As Freedom House Executive Director, Jennifer Windsor, and her colleagues from the International League for Human Rights, Global Rights, Human Rights 

First, the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human 

Rights, Human Rights Watch, Minnesota Advocates for Human 

Rights and Physicians for Human Rights wrote in their September 

21, 2007 letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, ‘‘Due to the 

Kazakhstan government’s poor record on democracy, we believe 

that its chairmanship will be a disaster for the OSCE’s ability to 

be a guarantor of human rights among its member states and that 

the U.S. should therefore continue to oppose it.’’ Freedom House 

describes Kazakhstan as ‘‘Not Free’’ in its annual survey of political 

rights and civil liberties, Freedom in the World. Never in the history of the OSCE has a ‘‘Not Free’’ or even a ‘‘Partly Free’’ country 

served in this capacity. 

When Kazakhstani State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev made his 

country’s case for the Chairmanship before the Permanent Council 

in Vienna on September 20, he noted that the OSCE’s preliminary 

analysis of parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan on August 18, 

2007 states that this year’s elections ‘‘reflected welcome progress in 

the pre-election process and during the conduct of the vote.’’ He 

also stated that, ‘‘Seven political parties were battling for the electorate’s votes. These parties presented their programmes for the 

development of the State and, most importantly, had absolutely 

equal opportunities to conduct their electoral campaign.’’ Mr. 

Saudabayev further claimed that local authorities did not use what 

he himself described as their ‘‘notorious administrative resources’’ 

to affect the outcome of the elections. 

Both of these assertions run counter to the facts of what took 

place during the campaign and on election day. In fact, the elections were heavily manipulated, resulting in the ruling Nur-Otan 

party winning every single seat in the parliament. While emphasizing that the OSCE’s preliminary analysis indicated that these 

elections were a step forward, Mr. Saudabayev conveniently forgot 

to mention the next phrase in the report’s opening sentence, namely that ‘‘a number of OSCE commitments and Council of Europe 

standards were not met.’’ In her intervention before the OSCE Permanent Council on September 6, U.S. Ambassador Julie Finley 

stated that the U.S. Government agreed with the OSCE monitors 

in negatively assessing ‘‘the transparency of the vote count in over 

40 percent of the polling stations visited; preferential treatment of 

the ruling Nur Otan party by authorities and government-controlled media; and restrictive legal provisions that limited the right 

to seek public office, established a high vote percentage threshold 

for representation in the Mazhilis, and provided for parties to 

57 

choose which candidates would become members of parliament only 

after the election.’’ 

In its statement on the elections, Reporters Without Borders 

noted that: ‘‘There were many cases of pressure, self-censorship, 

violations of electoral legislation and bias in favour of the ruling 

party (now the only one in parliament) at the opposition’s expense.’’ 

The statement continues, ‘‘A country where press freedom stops 

whenever the authority of the president and his party is challenged 

is not fit to head an organization such as the OSCE that defends 

democratic values. Despite this year’s electoral reforms, the way 

the election was held has reinforced our fear that they were just 

window-dressing designed to win the support of the western countries.’’ 

The flawed parliamentary election this past August is merely the 

latest example of a long-standing pattern of national elections that 

have failed to meet accepted international standards. Indeed, 

Kazakhstan has never had an election judged to be up to international standards by impartial monitors. Few if any of the essential pre-conditions for such an election are in place. In addition to 

the demonstrated lack of political will on the part of the government, severe limits on and harassment of political opponents and 

a lack of independent media and robust civil society have precluded 

the possibility of elections that meet international standards. 

But the electoral arena is by no means the only area where 

Kazakhstan still falls far short of international norms. Another 

major deficiency in the field of political rights was the promulgation of a constitutional amendment this spring that allows President Nazarbayev to be re-elected indefinitely. In our annual report 

Freedom in the World 2007, we also noted that: 

Political violence established a disturbing presence in 

Kazakhstan in 2005–2006. In December 2005, the authorities ruled 

the death of opposition leader Zamanbek Nurkadilov a suicide, 

even though he was found dead in his home with two gunshot 

wounds to the chest and one to the head. In February 2006, 

Altynbek Sarsenbayev, a leading member of For a Just 

Kazakhstan, was found shot to death along with his bodyguard and 

driver. The subsequent investigation pointed to the involvement of 

state security officers in the killing, but left many questions unanswered. The trial, which was marred by claims that confessions 

had been coerced, culminated in the sentencing of Yerzhan 

Utembayev, former head of the Senate administration, to a 20-year 

prison term for organizing the murder. Prosecutors said Utembayev 

had been acting on a personal grudge, but conflicting theories implicating higher government officials were aired by trial witnesses 

and the opposition. 

The report also noted that while the constitution provides for 

freedom of the press, the government has repeatedly harassed or 

shut down independent media outlets through measures including 

politicized lawsuits and confiscations of newspapers. Despite constitutional guarantees, the government imposes restrictions on 

freedom of association and assembly, while the judiciary is subservient to the executive branch. There are also issues in the area of 

respect for religious freedom. Just this summer, Kazakhstani authorities demolished two dozen homes of Hare Krishna believers. 

58 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me stress that Freedom House 

fully understands Kazakhstan’s strategic importance as a major oil 

and gas producing nation located in an important geo-strategic region. Freedom House recognizes that Kazakhstan has made slight 

progress in the area of civil and political rights, including the recent signing of optional protocols to international conventions on 

civil and political rights and combating torture. But these are only 

initial steps and they do not offset the enormous body of evidence 

that Kazakhstan is failing to uphold the principles and values of 

the OSCE and therefore should not be entrusted with the responsibility or have the privilege of serving as Chairman in Office. 

Freedom House joins the many Kazakhstanis who are working 

towards this goal in hoping that the country may one day evolve 

into a democratic state. Together with pro-reform citizens in 

Kazakhstan and beyond, we would welcome that historic development. But given Kazakhstan’s poor record on democratic reform 

and respect for human rights, it is not reasonable to expect that 

the country will be able to institute the requisite reforms in the 

near term. In addition to placing at risk the credibility and effectiveness of the OSCE, elevating Kazakhstan to Chairman-in-Office 

would both remove a powerful incentive to undertake democratic 

reforms and send a crushing message to the courageous men and 

women struggling to advance the cause of human freedom in their 

respective OSCE states and across the world. OSCE is too important an institution to put its leadership in the hands of a country 

that does not live up to the organization’s own standards. Freedom 

House respectfully urges the governments of the United States and 

our European allies not to support Kazakhstan’s bid to become 

Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in 2009. 

Attachment—Letter to Secretary of State Rice 

September 21, 2007. 

Hon. Condoleezza Rice, 

Secretary of State, 

U.S. Department of State, 

Washington, DC 20520 

DEAR SECRETARY RICE: We understand that a U.S. decision to 

concur in the selection of Kazakhstan to preside over the Organization for Security and Cooperation during the 2009 term is imminent. Due to the Kazakhstani government’s poor record on democracy, we believe that its chairmanship will be a disaster for the 

OSCE’s ability to be a guarantor of human rights among its member states and that the U.S. should therefore continue to oppose it. 

Kazakhstan’s anti-democratic record is well-documented. 

Kazakhstan has yet to hold a national election that meets OSCE 

standards. President Nazarbayev’s sweeping victory in the December 2005 presidential election came against a backdrop of government pressure on the country’s civil society and political opposition, 

charges of electoral fraud, and a highly critical report by poll monitors from the OSCE. The brutal February 2006 murder of opposition leader Altynbek Sarsenbayev highlighted the country’s disturbing tendency toward political violence. President Nazarbayev’s 

welcoming of the single-party parliament that resulted from the 

59 

August elections as ‘‘a wonderful opportunity to speed up our country’s economic and political modernization’’ speaks volumes to his 

respect for institutions promoting pluralism. 

Over the years, the OSCE has established a respected track 

record of credibility in election monitoring and human rights defense. In fact, it is one of the few remaining serious intergovernmental bodies that advocates for democracy and human rights. A 

Kazakhstan chairmanship would irreparably damage the OSCE’s 

legitimacy and ability to defend those working on the front lines for 

democratic change. 

In 2005, President Bush said that ‘‘one day this untamed fire of 

freedom will reach the darkest corners of our world.’’ Kazakhstan 

is one such dark corner that remains. Rewarding Kazakhstan with 

the OSCE chairmanship will only serve to assure a solidly undemocratic government that democratic credentials do not matter, while 

sending a stark message to human rights defenders around the 

world. At this crucial time, the countries of Europe cannot afford 

to ignore the defense of liberty and human rights, nor can the U.S. 

We strongly urge that the United States government reconsider 

this tacit endorsement of Kazakhstan’s bid. 

Sincerely, 

ROBERT ARSENAULT, President, International League for Human Rights. 

MR. SALIH BOOKER, 

Executive Director, Global Rights. 

MS. MAUREEN BYRNES, 

Executive Director, Human Rights First. 

MS. FELICE D. GAER, 

Director, Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of 

Human Rights. 

MR. TOM MALINOWSKI, 

Washington Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch. 

ROBIN PHILLIPS, 

Executive Director, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights. 

LEN RUBENSTEIN, 

President, Physicians for Human Rights. 

MS. JENNIFER WINDSOR, 

Executive Director, Freedom House. 

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