(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 06–11206. Argued November 10, 2008—Decided January 13, 2009 

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatory

prison term on a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm who has 

three prior convictions for committing certain drug crimes or “a violent felony,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1), defined as a crime punishable by

more than one year’s imprisonment that, inter alia, “involves conduct 

that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,”

§924(e)(2)(B)(ii). At petitioner Chambers’ sentencing for being a felon

in possession of a firearm, the Government sought ACCA’s 15-year

mandatory prison term. Chambers disputed one of his prior convictions—failing to report for weekend confinement—as falling outside

the ACCA definition of “violent felony.” The District Court treated 

the failure to report as a form of what the relevant state statute calls 

“escape from [a] penal institution,” and held that it qualified as a

“violent felony” under ACCA. The Seventh Circuit agreed. 

Held: Illinois’ crime of failure to report for penal confinement falls outside the scope of ACCA’s “violent felony” definition. Pp. 3–8. 

(a) For purposes of ACCA’s definitions, it is the generic crime that

counts, not how the crime was committed on a particular occasion. 

Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 602. This categorical approach requires courts to choose the right category, and sometimes 

the choice is not obvious. The nature of the behavior that likely underlies a statutory phrase matters in this respect. The state statute 

at issue places together in a single section several different kinds of

behavior, which, as relevant here, may be categorized either as failure to report for detention or as escape from custody. Failure to report is a separate crime from escape. Its underlying behavior differs

from the more aggressive behavior underlying escape, and it is listed

separately in the statute’s title and body and is of a different felony 
2 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

class than escape. At the same time, the statutory phrases setting

forth the various kinds of failure to report describe roughly similar

forms of behavior, thus constituting a single category. Consequently, 

for ACCA purposes, the statute contains at least two separate crimes,

escape and failure to report. Pp. 3–5.

(b) The “failure to report” crime does not satisfy ACCA’s “violent

felony” definition. Although it is punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year, it satisfies none of the other parts of the definition.

Most critically, it does not “involv[e] conduct that presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another.” Conceptually speaking,

the crime amounts to a form of inaction, and there is no reason to believe that an offender who fails to report is otherwise doing something that poses a serious potential risk of physical injury. The Government’s argument that a failure to report reveals the offender’s

special, strong aversion to penal custody—pointing to 3 state and

federal cases over 30 years in which individuals shot at officers attempting to recapture them—is unconvincing. Even assuming the 

relevance of violence that may occur long after an offender fails to report, the offender’s aversion to penal custody is beside the point. The 

question is whether such an offender is significantly more likely than 

others to attack or resist an apprehender, thereby producing a serious risk of physical injury. Here a United States Sentencing Commission report, showing no violence in 160 federal failure-to-report

cases over 2 recent years, helps provide a negative answer. The three 

reported cases to which the Government points do not show the contrary. Simple multiplication (2 years versus 30 years; federal alone

versus federal-plus-state) suggests that they show only a statistically

insignificant risk of physical violence. And the Government provides

no other empirical information. Pp. 5–8. 

473 F. 3d 724, reversed and remanded. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., 

joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which 

THOMAS, JJ., joined. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–11206 

DEONDERY CHAMBERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED 

STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[January 13, 2009] 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The question before us is whether a “failure to report”

for penal confinement is a “‘violent felony’” within the

terms of the Armed Career Criminal Act. 18 U. S. C. 

§924(e). We hold that it is not. 

I 

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-

year mandatory prison term on an individual convicted of 

being a felon in possession of a firearm if that individual 

has “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a

serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions 

different from one another.” §924(e)(1). ACCA defines a 

“violent felony” as a “crime punishable by imprisonment 

for a term exceeding one year” that also either 

“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of

another; or 

“(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use 

of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-
2 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

other.” §924(e)(2)(B). 

Clause (ii), ACCA’s so-called residual clause, is at issue 

here. 

II 

The petitioner, Deondery Chambers, pleaded guilty to a

charge of being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm. §922(g). At sentencing the Government asked the

District Court to apply ACCA’s 15-year mandatory prison 

term because, in its view, three of Chambers’ prior convictions qualified as an ACCA “serious drug offense” or “violent felony.” Chambers conceded that two of his prior 

convictions, namely a 1998 conviction for robbery and 

aggravated battery and a 1999 drug crime conviction, fell

within ACCA’s definitions. But he disputed the Government’s claim as to a third conviction. That third conviction arose out of Chambers’ sentence for his 1998 robbery 

and battery offense. The sentence required Chambers to

report to a local prison for 11 weekends of incarceration. 

He failed to report for weekend confinement on four occasions, and was later convicted of the crime of “fail[ing] to 

report to a penal institution.” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, 

§5/31–6(a) (West Supp. 2008). 

The District Court treated the “failure to report” as a

form of what the relevant Illinois statute calls “escape 

from [a] penal institution,” ibid., and held that the crime 

qualified as a “violent felony” under ACCA. The Court of 

Appeals agreed. 473 F. 3d 724 (CA7 2007). In light of 

disagreement among the Circuits as to whether failure to

report for imprisonment falls within the scope of ACCA’s

definition of “violent felony,” we granted certiorari. Compare United States v. Winn, 364 F. 3d 7, 12 (CA1 2004)

(failure to report is a “violent felony”), with United States 

v. Piccolo, 441 F. 3d 1084, 1088 (CA9 2006) (failure to

report is not a “violent felony”). 
Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

III 

We initially consider the classification of the crime. In 

ordinary speech, words such as “crime” and “felony” can 

refer not only to a generic set of acts, say, burglary in 

general, but also to a specific act committed on a particular occasion, say the burglary that the defendant engaged 

in last month. We have made clear, however, that, for 

purposes of ACCA’s definitions, it is the generic sense of 

the word “felony” that counts. Taylor v. United States, 495 

U. S. 575, 602 (1990); see also Shepard v. United States, 

544 U. S. 13, 16–17 (2005). The statute’s defining language, read naturally, uses “felony” to refer to a crime as

generally committed. And by so construing the statute,

one avoids the practical difficulty of trying to ascertain at

sentencing, perhaps from a paper record mentioning only

a guilty plea, whether the present defendant’s prior crime,

as committed on a particular occasion, did or did not involve violent behavior. See id., at 20–21. Thus, to determine, for example, whether attempted burglary is a “violent felony,” we have had to examine, not the unsuccessful 

burglary the defendant attempted on a particular occasion, but the generic crime of attempted burglary. James 

v. United States, 550 U. S. 192, 204–206 (2007). 

This categorical approach requires courts to choose the 

right category. And sometimes the choice is not obvious. 

The nature of the behavior that likely underlies a statutory phrase matters in this respect. Where Massachusetts, for example, placed within a single, separately

numbered statutory section (entitled “Breaking and entering at night,” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 266, §16 (West

2008)) burglary of a “building, ship, vessel or vehicle,” this 

Court found that the behavior underlying, say, breaking

into a building, differs so significantly from the behavior 

underlying, say, breaking into a vehicle, that for ACCA 

purposes a sentencing court must treat the two as different crimes. See Shepard, supra, at 16–17; see also Taylor, 
4 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

supra, at 598. 

The Illinois statute now before us, like the Massachusetts statute, places together in a single numbered statutory section several different kinds of behavior. It separately describes those behaviors as (1) escape from a penal

institution, (2) escape from the custody of an employee of a 

penal institution, (3) failing to report to a penal institution, (4) failing to report for periodic imprisonment, (5) 

failing to return from furlough, (6) failing to return from

work and day release, and (7) failing to abide by the terms 

of home confinement. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §5/31–6(a); 

see Appendix A, infra. We know from the state-court 

information in the record that Chambers pleaded guilty to 

“knowingly fail[ing] to report” for periodic imprisonment 

“to the Jefferson County Jail, a penal institution.” App.

68; see Shepard, supra, at 25 (sentencing court may look, 

for example, to charging document, plea agreement, jury

instructions, or transcript of plea colloquy to determine

crime at issue). But we must decide whether for ACCA 

purposes a failure to report counts as a separate crime. 

Unlike the lower courts, we believe that a failure to 

report (as described in the statutory provision’s third, 

fourth, fifth, and sixth phrases) is a separate crime, different from escape (the subject matter of the statute’s first

and second phrases), and from the potentially less serious

failure to abide by the terms of home confinement (the

subject of the final phrase). The behavior that likely 

underlies a failure to report would seem less likely to

involve a risk of physical harm than the less passive, more 

aggressive behavior underlying an escape from custody.

See Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip 

op., at 7). Moreover, the statute itself not only lists escape

and failure to report separately (in its title and its body) 

but also places the behaviors in two different felony

classes (Class Two and Class Three) of different degrees of 

seriousness. See Appendix A, infra. 
Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

At the same time, we believe the statutory phrases 

setting forth various kinds of failure to report (or to return) describe roughly similar forms of behavior. Each is 

characterized by a failure to present oneself for detention

on a specified occasion. All amount to variations on a 

single theme. For that reason we consider them as together constituting a single category. Cf. James, supra, at 

207–209 (determining that where separately listed behaviors pose a similar degree of risk, sentencing courts may

consider all listed behaviors as a single crime). We consequently treat the statute for ACCA purposes as containing 

at least two separate crimes, namely escape from custody 

on the one hand, and a failure to report on the other.

Failure to abide by home confinement terms—potentially

the least serious of the offenses—is not at issue here. 

IV 

We now must consider whether the “failure to report”

crime satisfies ACCA’s “violent felony” definition. It 

clearly satisfies the first part of that definition, for it is a

“crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B). But it satisfies none 

of the other parts. It does not have “as an element the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another.” §924(e)(2)(B)(i). It does 

not consist of “burglary, arson, or extortion,” or “involv[e] 

use of explosives.” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). And, more critically 

for present purposes, it does not “‘involve conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.’” See Begay, 553 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2–4); 

id., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (treating serious risk of physical injury to another

as critical definitional factor); id., at ___ (slip op., at 2) 

(ALITO, J., dissenting) (same).

Conceptually speaking, the crime amounts to a form of 

inaction, a far cry from the “purposeful, ‘violent,’ and 
6 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

‘aggressive’ conduct” potentially at issue when an offender 

uses explosives against property, commits arson, burgles a 

dwelling or residence, or engages in certain forms of extortion. Cf. id., at ___ (slip op., at 7). While an offender who 

fails to report must of course be doing something at the 

relevant time, there is no reason to believe that the something poses a serious potential risk of physical injury. Cf. 

James, 550 U. S., at 203–204. To the contrary, an individual who fails to report would seem unlikely, not likely,

to call attention to his whereabouts by simultaneously

engaging in additional violent and unlawful conduct.

The Government argues that a failure to report reveals

the offender’s special, strong aversion to penal custody. 

And it points to three cases arising over a period of 30 

years in which reported opinions indicate that individuals

shot at officers attempting to recapture them. See United 

States v. Eaglin, 571 F. 2d 1069, 1072 (CA9 1977); State v. 

Johnson, 245 S. W. 3d 288, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); State 

v. Jones, 96 Wash. App. 369, 371–372, 979 P. 2d 898, 899 

(1999). But even if we assume for argument’s sake the

relevance of violence that may occur long after an offender

fails to report, we are not convinced by the Government’s 

argument. The offender’s aversion to penal custody, even 

if special, is beside the point. The question is whether 

such an offender is significantly more likely than others to

attack, or physically to resist, an apprehender, thereby 

producing a “serious potential risk of physical injury.” 

§924(e)(2)(B)(ii). And here a United States Sentencing

Commission report helps provide a conclusive, negative 

answer. See Report on Federal Escape Offenses in Fiscal 

Years 2006 and 2007, p. 6 (Nov. 2008) (hereinafter Commission’s Report), reprinted in part in Appendix B, infra. 

See also 473 F. 3d, at 727 (Posner, J.) (urging that such 

research be done).

The Commission’s Report identifies every federal case in 

2006 or 2007 in which a federal sentencing court applied 
Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

the Sentencing Guideline, “Escape, Instigating or Assisting Escape,” 1 United States Sentencing Commission,

Guidelines Manual §2P1.1 (Nov. 2008), and in which 

sufficient detail was provided, say, in the presentence

report, about the circumstances of the crime to permit

analysis. The analysis included calculation of the likelihood that violence would accompany commission of the

escape or the offender’s later apprehension. 

Of 414 such cases, 160 involved a failure to report either 

for incarceration (42) or for custody after having been 

temporarily released (118). Commission’s Report 7; see 

also Appendix B, infra. Of these 160 cases, none at all 

involved violence—not during commission of the offense 

itself, not during the offender’s later apprehension—

although in 5 instances (3.1%) the offenders were armed. 

Ibid. The upshot is that the study strongly supports the 

intuitive belief that failure to report does not involve a 

serious potential risk of physical injury.

The three reported cases to which the Government

points do not show the contrary. The Sentencing Commission culled its 160 instances from a set of federal sentences 

imposed over a period of 2 years. The Government apparently culled its three examples from a set of state and 

federal sentences imposed over a period of 30 years. Compare Eaglin, supra (CA9 1977) with Johnson, supra (Mo.

Ct. App. 2008). Given the larger set, the presence of three 

instances of violence is consistent with the Commission’s 

data. Simple multiplication (2 years versus 30 years; 

federal alone versus federal-plus-state) suggests that they 

show only a small risk of physical violence (less than one 

in several thousand). And the Government provides no

other empirical information.

For these reasons we conclude that the crime here at 

issue falls outside the scope of ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The judgment of the Court 

of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for pro-
8 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

ceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
Opinion of the Court 

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 9 

Appendix A to opinion of the Court 

APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF THE COURT 

“Escape; failure to report to a penal institution or to report 

for periodic imprisonment. 

“A person convicted of a felony, adjudicated a 

delinquent minor for the commission of a felony 

offense under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, or 

charged with the commission of a felony who 

intentionally escapes from any penal institution or 

from the custody of an employee of that institution 

commits a Class 2 felony; however, a person convicted 

of a felony or adjudicated a delinquent minor for the

commission of a felony offense under the Juvenile

Court Act of 1987 who knowingly fails to report to a

penal institution or to report for periodic

imprisonment at any time or knowingly fails to return 

from furlough or from work and day release or who

knowingly fails to abide by the terms of home 

confinement is guilty of a Class 3 felony.” Ill. Comp.

Stat., ch. 720, §5/31–6(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
Opinion of the Court 

10 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES 

Appendix B to opinion of the Court 

APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF THE COURT 

Report on Federal Escape Offenses in Fiscal Years 2006

and 2007, p. 7, fig. 1 (Nov. 2008).* 

Leaving

Secure 

Custody 

Leaving

Law 

Enforcement 

Custody 

Leaving

Nonsecure 

Custody 

Failing to

Report 

Failing to

Return 

Number 

of Cases 

64 13 177 42 118 

Force 10 

(15.6%) 

1 (7.7%) 3 (1.7%) 0 

(0.0%) 

0 

(0.0%) 

Dangerous 

Weapon 

20 

(31.3%) 

1 (7.7%) 4 (2.3%) 3 

(7.1%) 

2 

(1.7%) 

Injury 7 

(10.9%) 

2 

(15.4%) 

3 (1.7%) 0 

(0.0%) 

0 

(0.0%) 

—————— 

*Cases can fall into more than one category. For example, one case 

could involve both force and injury. Such a case would be represented 

in the table for force and also for injury. Therefore, the reader should 

not aggregate the numbers in any column. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 1 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–11206 

DEONDERY CHAMBERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED 

STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[January 13, 2009] 

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

concurring in the judgment. 

As I have previously explained, I believe that the

Court’s approach in Begay, like its approach in this case,

“cannot be reconciled with the statutory text.” Begay v. 

United States, 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 1) 

(dissenting opinion). I nonetheless recognize that “stare 

decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has ‘special 

force,’” John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 

U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 8), and I am sympathetic 

to the majority’s efforts to provide a workable interpretation of the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal 

Act (ACCA), while retaining the “categorical approach”

that we adopted in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 

602 (1990). In light of Taylor and Begay, I agree that this

case should be remanded for resentencing. I write separately, however, to emphasize that only Congress can

rescue the federal courts from the mire into which ACCA’s 

draftsmanship and Taylor’s “categorical approach” have 

pushed us.

In 1986, when Congress enacted ACCA’s residual

clause, 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), few could have foreseen the difficulties that lay ahead.1 Only four months 

—————— 

1Congress originally enacted ACCA in 1984. See §1802, 93 Stat. 
2 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

before Congress framed the residual clause, this Court

upheld a state sentencing provision that imposed a mandatory minimum sentence where the judge found by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly 

possessed a firearm during the commission of certain 

felonies (including robbery). See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79 (1986). Legislating against the background of McMillan, Congress may have assumed that 

ACCA’s residual clause would similarly require federal 

sentencing judges to determine whether the particular

facts of a particular case triggered a mandatory minimum 

sentence. 

But history took a different track. In Taylor, the Court 

held that ACCA requires “the sentencing court to look only 

to the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes 

falling within certain categories, and not to the facts 

underlying the prior convictions.” 495 U. S., at 600. Thus, 

we held that sentencing judges should apply a “categorical

approach” to determine whether an underlying state

offense meets the “generic” definition of burglary that this

Court—not Congress—created. Id., at 598. The Court 

justified its decision with a 10-page discussion of ACCA’s

purpose and legislative history, id., at 581–590; see also 

id., at 603 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring

in judgment) (criticizing the Court’s approach), and explained that its conclusion was necessary to undo “an

inadvertent casualty [in ACCA’s] complex drafting process,” id., at 589–590. 

ACCA’s clarity has been the true inadvertent casualty. 

—————— 

2185, 18 U. S. C. App. §1202(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. II) (repealed in

1986 by Firearms Owner’s Protection Act, §104(b), 100 Stat. 459). That 

statute, however, applied a mandatory sentencing enhancement to only 

two predicate felonies—robbery and burglary—which the statute 

expressly defined. 18 U. S. C. App. §§1202(c)(8)–(9) (1982 ed., Supp. II). 

Congress did not add the undefined “otherwise clause” until 1986. See 

Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, §1402, 100 Stat. 3207–39. 
Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 3 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

After almost two decades with Taylor’s “categorical approach,” only one thing is clear: ACCA’s residual clause is 

nearly impossible to apply consistently. Indeed, the “categorical approach” to predicate offenses has created numerous splits among the lower federal courts,2 the resolution 

of which could occupy this Court for years. What is worse 

is that each new application of the residual clause seems

to lead us further and further away from the statutory 

text. Today’s decision, for example, turns on little more

than a statistical analysis of a research report prepared by 

the United States Sentencing Commission. Ante, at 6–7; 

10 (App. B).

At this point, the only tenable, long-term solution is for 

—————— 

2For example, the lower courts have split over whether it is a “violent

felony” under ACCA’s residual clause to commit rape, compare United 

States v. Sawyers, 409 F. 3d 732 (CA6 2005) (statutory rape not categorically violent), with United States v. Williams, 120 F. 3d 575 (CA5

1997) (inducement of minor to commit sodomy violent), and United 

States v. Thomas, 231 Fed. Appx. 765 (CA9 2007) (all rape violent);

retaliate against a government officer, compare United States v. Montgomery, 402 F. 3d 482 (CA5 2005) (not violent), with Sawyers, supra 

(violent); attempt or conspire to commit burglary, compare United 

States v. Fell, 511 F. 3d 1035 (CA10 2007) (even after James v. United 

States, 550 U. S. 192 (2007), and even where statute requires an overt

act, conspiracy to commit burglary not violent), with United States v. 

Moore, 108 F. 3d 878 (CA8 1997) (attempted burglary violent if statute

requires proof of overt act); carry a concealed weapon, compare United 

States v. Whitfield, 907 F. 2d 798 (CA8 1990) (not violent), with United 

States v. Hall, 77 F. 3d 398 (CA11 1996) (violent); and possess a sawedoff shotgun as a felon, compare United States v. Amos, 501 F. 3d 524 

(CA6 2007) (not violent), with United States v. Bishop, 453 F. 3d 30 

(CA1 2006) (violent). Compare also United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 

501 F. 3d 1208 (CA10 2007) (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle not a 

“violent felony” under 18 U. S. C. §16(b), which closely resembles

ACCA’s residual clause), with United States v. Reliford, 471 F. 3d 913 

(CA8 2006) (automobile tampering violent under ACCA’s residual 

clause), and United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F. 3d 217 (CA5 

1999) (per curiam) (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle a “violent 

felony” under §16(b)). 
4 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

Congress to formulate a specific list of expressly defined 

crimes that are deemed to be worthy of ACCA’s sentencing

enhancement. That is the approach that Congress took in 

1984, when it applied ACCA to two enumerated and expressly defined felonies. See n. 1, supra. And that approach is the only way to right ACCA’s ship.