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94–106 PDF 2015

COUNTERING VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: THE 

URGENT THREAT OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND 

HOME-GROWN TERROR 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 11, 2015 

Serial No. 114–2 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES

Mr. Francis X. Taylor, Under Secretary, Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

Mr. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

Mr. Michael B. Steinbach, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigations, U.S. Department of Justice: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

(1) 

COUNTERING VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: THE URGENT THREAT OF FOREIGN 

FIGHTERS AND HOME-GROWN TERROR 

Wednesday, February 11, 2015 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul [Chairman 

of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, Smith, Rogers, Duncan, Perry, 

Clawson, Katko, Hurd, Carter, Walker, Loudermilk, McSally, 

Ratcliffe, Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin, Higgins, Richmond, 

Keating, Payne, Vela, Watson Coleman, Rice, and Torres. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Committee on Homeland Security will 

come to order. The committee is meeting today to hear testimony 

on violent Islamist extremism and the threat of foreign fighters 

and home-grown terror. I now recognize myself for an opening 

statement. 

Today, at the first hearing of the House Committee on Homeland 

Security in the 114th Congress, I would like to take a moment of 

silence to remember all those who lost their lives at the hands of 

ISIS, especially Americans James Foley, Steven Sotloff, and most 

recently, Kayla Mueller. 

These victims are the reason why we are here today. We must 

keep these barbaric terrorists out of the homeland to protect the 

American people. This hearing will also assess the urgent and 

growing threat of terrorist recruiting and inspiring Americans. We 

need to accurately define the threat, and that is violent Islamist extremism, and recognize that it is spreading like wildfire around the 

globe. 

These fanatics want nothing less than destruction of our way of 

life, and now their ability to match words with deeds is growing at 

an astonishing rate. In recent years, their safe havens have proliferated and their ranks have swelled. 

In many ways, we are no longer talking about terrorist groups. 

We are talking about terrorist armies. ISIS now controls a territory 

the size of Belgium, governs millions of people, draws on billions 

of dollars in revenue and commands tens of thousands of foot soldiers. 

They are brutal. Their latest act of barbarism was on full display 

with a horrific murder of a Jordanian pilot. This evolving Islamic 

terrorist landscape has given rise to the dual threats of foreign 
2 

fighters returning to the United States and home-grown terrorism. 

The recent terror attack in Paris and other attacks and plots in 

Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and 

here in the United States are proof that the threat has surged and 

that the enemy is dead-set on attacking the West. 

This map behind me shows a wide-spread surge in ISIS-linked 

terrorist plots over the last year alone. As Mr. Rasmussen notes in 

his testimony, more than 20,000 fighters from over 90 countries 

have made their way to the battlefield to join al-Qaeda, ISIS, and 

other extremist groups, making this the largest convergence of 

Islamist terrorists in world history. 

That number continues to grow despite months of air strikes. Up 

to 5,000 of these fighters are Westerners, many of whom are able 

to travel into the United States without obtaining a visa. And more 

than 150 American citizens have attempted to or succeeded in getting to the battlefield, and we know that some of them have already returned to our shores. You can see this flow depicted in the 

graphic behind me. 

But extremists do not need to travel overseas in order to become 

a threat to our homeland. Through Hollywood-like propaganda videos and social media and through that means, Islamist terror 

groups are inciting their followers and potential recruits to wage 

war at home. 

Both ISIS, and Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

have called for Westerners, including Americans, to wage individual jihad in their home countries, and it is working. ISIS social 

media also gives step-by-step instructions on how to get to the fight 

and how to return. 

Following the attacks in Paris last month, our European partners have been busy uncovering new terrorist cells and disrupting 

imminent plots. Also, just recently here at home, the FBI arrested 

an Ohio-based ISIS sympathizer who was intending to attack the 

United States Capitol with pipe bombs. 

I am worried about our ability to combat this threat abroad, but 

also here at home. I wrote to the President recently and raised concerns that we still have no lead agency in charge of countering domestic radicalization and no line item for it in the budgets of key 

departments and agencies. 

I am also concerned that the few programs we do have in place 

are far too small to confront a threat that has grown so quickly. 

Today, I hope to hear how the administration assesses the danger posed by foreign fighters, particularly Westerners, and the 

threat of home-grown terrorism here in the United States. More 

importantly, I hope we will hear about how the administration is 

responding and how it plans to ramp up its response to those challenges. 

This morning, I would like to welcome all of our witnesses, but 

especially Mr. Rasmussen with the National Counterterrorism Center, in his first appearance before Congress after being confirmed 

as director, and we look forward to his testimony. 

As part of our committee’s focus on this critical National security 

issue, the Ranking Member and myself are establishing a task 

force on combating terrorist and foreign fighter travel. The 6-month 

task force will review U.S. Government efforts, focusing on DHS, 
3 

to disrupt terrorist travel into our country and to combat the foreign fighter threat. It will ultimately provide recommendations to 

the committee on how we can improve U.S. security against these 

dangers. 

I must say I am very disappointed that the State Department 

chose not to send a witness here today. The threats we are discussing are serious, and the State Department plays a key role in 

combating them. 

I recently sent a letter to the White House expressing my concerns over the Department’s desire to resettle tens of thousands of 

Syrian refugees here in the United States. I am worried that ISIS 

could exploit this effort in order to deploy operatives to America via 

a Federally-funded jihadi pipeline. 

Before closing, I would like to again reiterate what I said at our 

organizational meeting last month. Mr. Thompson, we look forward 

to working with you to accomplish our shared goal of protecting the 

homeland. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

FEBRUARY 11, 2015 

Today, at the first hearing of the House Committee on Homeland Security in the 

114th Congress, I’d like to take a moment of silence to remember all those who lost 

their lives at the hands of ISIS, especially Americans James Foley, Steven Sotloff 

and, most recently, Kayla Mueller. 

The victims are the reason why we are here today. We must keep those barbaric 

terrorists out of the homeland to protect the American people. This hearing will also 

assess the urgent and growing threat of terrorists recruiting and inspiring Americans. 

We need to accurately define the threat—violent Islamist extremism—and recognize it is spreading like wildfire around the globe. These fanatics want nothing less 

than destruction of our way of life, and now their ability to match words with deeds 

is growing at an astonishing rate. In recent years, their safe havens have proliferated and their ranks have swelled. 

In many ways, we are no longer talking about terrorist groups. We are talking 

about terrorist armies. ISIS now controls a territory the size of Belgium, governs 

millions of people, draws on billions of dollars in revenue, and commands tens of 

thousands of foot soldiers. And they are brutal—their latest act of barbarism was 

on full display with the horrific murder of the Jordanian pilot. 

This evolving Islamist terror landscape has given rise to the ‘‘dual threats’’ of foreign fighter returnees and home-grown terrorism. The recent terror attack in Paris, 

and other attacks and plots in Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, 

Canada, and here in the United States are proof that the threat has surged and 

that the enemy is dead-set on attacking the West. 

As Mr. Rasmussen notes in his testimony, more than 20,000 fighters from over 

90 countries have made their way to the battlefield to join al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other 

extremist groups—making this the largest convergence of Islamist terrorists in 

world history. That number continues to grow despite months of air strikes. Up to 

5,000 of these fighters are Westerners, many of whom are able to travel into the 

United States without obtaining a visa. More than 150 American citizens have attempted to or succeeded in getting to the battlefield—and we know some have already returned to our shores. 

But extremists do not need to travel overseas in order to become a threat to our 

homeland. Through Hollywood-like propaganda videos and social media, Islamist 

terror groups are inciting their followers and potential recruits to wage war at 

home. Both ISIS and Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have called 

for Westerners—including Americans—to ‘‘wage individual jihad’’ in their home 

countries—and it’s working. ISIS social media also gives step-by-step instructions on 

how to get to the fight and how to return. 

Following the attacks in Paris last month, our European partners have been busy 

uncovering new terrorist cells and disrupting imminent plots. Also, just recently 
4 

here at home, the FBI arrested an Ohio-based ISIS sympathizer who was intending 

to attack the U.S. Capitol with pipe bombs. 

I am worried about our ability to combat this threat abroad, but also here at 

home. I wrote to the President recently and raised concerns that we still have no 

lead agency in charge of countering domestic radicalization and no line item for it 

in the budgets of key departments and agencies. I am also concerned that the few 

programs we do have in place are far too small to confront a threat that has grown 

so quickly. 

Today, I hope to hear how the administration assesses the danger posed by foreign fighters, particularly Westerners, and the threat of home-grown terrorism here 

in the United States. More importantly, I hope we will hear about how the administration is responding—and plans to ramp up its response—to these challenges. 

This morning I would like to welcome all of our witnesses but especially Mr. Rasmussen. It is his first appearance before Congress after being confirmed as the Director of the NCTC, and we look forward to his testimony. 

As part of our committee’s focus on this critical National security issue, the Ranking Member and myself are establishing a Task Force on Combatting Terrorist and 

Foreign Fighter Travel. The 6-month task force will review U.S. Government efforts—focusing on DHS—to disrupt terrorist travel into our country and to combat 

the foreign fighter threat. It will ultimately provide recommendations to the committee on how we can improve U.S. security against these dangers. 

I am very disappointed that the State Department chose not to send a witness 

here today. The threats we are discussing are serious, and the State Department 

plays a key role in combating them. I recently sent a letter to the White House expressing my concerns over the Department’s desire to resettle tens of thousands of 

Syrian refugees in the United States. I am worried ISIS could exploit this effort in 

order to deploy operatives to America via a Federally-funded jihadi pipeline. 
5 

Chairman MCCAUL. With that, the Chairman now recognizes the 

Ranking Member. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your comments, 

as well as for holding today’s hearing. 

I would like to also welcome Director Rasmussen for his first appearance before this committee as the director of the National 

Counterterrorism Center. As well, I would also thank the rest of 

the panel for testifying about the Federal Government’s effort to 

identify and deter foreign fighters and the Government’s efforts to 

counter violent extremism. 

I would like to express my condolences at the beginning to the 

family of the 26-year-old Kayla Mueller, an American aid worker 

who was taken hostage by the Islamic State of Iraq. U.S. officials 

have confirmed she was killed by the terrorist group. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Mueller’s death and other recent terrorist attacks across 

the world over the past few months have magnified the nature of 

the evolving threat from the terrorist groups and state actors. The 

heinous actions by ISIL, including the beheading of a Japanese 

journalist and the terrorist group’s burning of a Jordanian pilot 

further illustrates the abhorrent nature of this terrorist group. 

Last month, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated 

that the radical ideology of ISIL is causing other terrorist groups 

to rebrand themselves and emulate ISIL. 

Top U.S. officials have made public statements that foreign fighters linked to ISIL may pose a direct threat to this country. Moreover, those inspired by the ideology of ISIL, al-Qaeda, and other 

groups are of concern. 

As we look to these threats, we cannot take a myopic view. Each 

attack from terrorist groups have reemphasized the global reach of 
6 

terrorist activity. For instance, there was a crippling cyber attack 

in November on Sony Pictures Entertainment Network. In December, in Sydney, Australia, we witnessed a terrorist attack on a cafe, 

where at the end of a 16-hour stand-off, two innocent people lay 

dead. 

Then in January in Paris, there was a series of execution-style 

murders of 12 members Charlie Hebdo’s creative team. Al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula has taken credit for this attack. 

This serves as a reminder that the terrorist threats we face are 

evolving quickly. This committee’s responsibility is to hold hearings 

and receive Classified information that lets us know the nature of 

the threats and how the Federal Government is dealing with the 

threat. 

In spite of this, Mr. Chairman, the Republican majority continues to play political games with funding the Department of 

Homeland Security. Mr. Chairman, I, too, feel that it is meaningless to have a strategy if the ends are not paired with the means 

to achieve them. It is my hope that you will make the point to your 

colleagues and leadership who are holding the funding for a key 

agency and the Federal Government that Americans look to to detect, deter, and respond to a terrorist hostage situation. 

Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security is operating under the threat of a shutdown, and it is only funded by a 

continuing resolution for the next 17 days. It is important that my 

Republican colleagues act responsibly, stop playing politics, and 

pass a clean DHS funding bill. Without a fully-funded Department 

of Homeland Security, some of our key methods of identifying terrorists and preventing terrorist travel will be at risk. 

Are we really ready to stand before the American people, those 

who trust and value that we recognize their needs, and declare for 

the sake of partisanship we are going to make our Nation more 

vulnerable by not funding DHS? 

Mr. Chairman, I hope not. We have significant challenges before 

us. You have outlined in your testimony those challenges, but if we 

don’t have a fully-funded Department, one that can’t operate on 

continuing resolution, we put this country, its people, at risk. So 

whatever it takes for us to deal with this threat, first of all, we 

have a Department that has the resources to address the threat. 

So I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. But I also 

look forward to an effort where we can get the Department of 

Homeland Security treated like every other department of Government, having a budget that carries us until the end of the fiscal 

year. 

With that, I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

FEBRUARY 11, 2015 

I would like to welcome Director Rasmussen to his first appearance before this 

committee as the director of the National Counterterrorism Center. I also thank the 

rest of the panel for testifying about the Federal Government’s efforts to identify 

and deter foreign fighters and the Government’s efforts to counter violent extremism. I would like to express my condolences to the family of 26-year-old Kayla 

Mueller, an American aid worker who was taken hostage by the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant. U.S. officials have confirmed she was killed by the terrorist 
7 

group. Kayla Mueller’s death and other recent terrorist attacks across the world 

over the past few months have magnified the nature of the evolving threat from terrorist groups and state actors. 

The heinous actions by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), including 

the beheading of a Japanese journalist and the terrorist group’s burning of a Jordanian pilot, further illustrate the abhorrent nature of this terrorist group. Last 

month, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that the radical ideology 

of ISIL is causing other terrorist groups to rebrand themselves and emulate ISIL. 

Top U.S. officials have made public statements that foreign fighters linked to ISIL 

may pose a direct threat to this country. 

Moreover, those inspired by the ideology of ISIL, al-Qaeda, and other groups are 

of concern. As we look at these threats, we cannot take a myopic view. Each attack 

from terrorist groups have reemphasized the global reach of terrorist activity. 

For instance, there was the crippling cyber attack in November on Sony Pictures 

Entertainment’s network. In December, in Sydney, Australia, we witnessed a terrorist attack on a cafe where, at the end of a 16-hour stand-off, two innocent people 

laid dead. Then, in January, in Paris, there was a series of execution-style murders 

of 12 members of Charlie Hebdo’s creative team. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

has taken credit for this attack. 

This serves as a reminder that the terrorist threats we face are evolving quickly. 

This committee’s responsibility is to hold hearings and receive Classified information that lets us know the nature of the threat and how the Federal Government 

is dealing with the threat. 

In spite of this, the Republican Majority continues to play political games with 

funding the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Chairman, I, too, feel that it is 

meaningless to have a strategy if the ends are not paired with the means to achieve 

them. It is my hope that you will make that point to your colleagues and leadership 

who are holding the funding for the key agency of the Federal Government that 

Americans look to detect, deter, and respond to terrorism hostage. Unfortunately, 

the Department of Homeland Security is operating under the threat of a shut-down 

and is only funded by a continuing resolution for the next 17 days. 

It is important that my Republican colleagues act responsibly, stop playing politics, and pass a clean DHS funding bill. Without a fully-funded Department of 

Homeland Security, some of our key methods of identifying terrorists and preventing terrorist travel will be at risk. Are we really ready to stand before the 

American people—those who trust and value that we recognize their needs—and declare for the sake of partisanship, we are going to make our Nation more vulnerable 

by not funding DHS? 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank the Ranking Member. Other Members are reminded that statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

FEBRUARY 11, 2015 

Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson thank you for holding this 

morning’s hearing on ‘‘Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat 

of Foreign Fighters and Home-Grown Terror.’’ 

I offer the family and friends of Kayla Mueller my condolences and thoughts and 

prayers during this difficult time. 

She is the latest United States citizen to have been killed while being held 

against their will by ISIS/ISIL. 

I welcome and thank today’s witnesses, the Honorable Francis X. Taylor, under 

secretary for intelligence and analysis U.S. Department of Homeland Secretary; the 

Honorable Nicholas J. Rasmussen, director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and Mr. Michael B. Steinbach, assistant 

director, Counterterrorism Division with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

The work of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to protect our Nation 

and its people from radical terrorists and terrorism is critical to homeland security. 

The topic of today’s hearing is relevant to the reality of a new global terrorism 

threats posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/the Islamic State 

(IS)/the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 

On February 14, 2014, the testimony of James Clapper, the director of intelligence, before the Senate Armed Services Committee estimated that ‘‘somewhere 
8 

between 75,000 to possibly 115,00 insurgents were organized into 1,500 groups comprised numbers of persons associated with the ISIS/ISIL terrorism network.’’ 

In 2014, the Bipartisan Policy Center reported that more than 10,000 foreign 

fighters have gone to Syria where they have access to training, weapons, and hardened terrorist fighters. 

The threat is no longer isolated to the region that borders Syria, Iraq, and Turkey, but can be found in nations far from the area of conflict. 

In January Belgium police conducted pre-emptive raids against terrorist suspects 

who were said to have recently returned from fighting with terrorists in the war 

in Syria. 

Belgium police reported that the suspects opened fire on police using militarystyle weapons. 

The attraction by some in the United States to joining the ISIS/ISIL is evident 

by the FBI arrest of U.S. citizens and residents on charges of providing material 

support to terrorist groups and using certain weapons in connection with the conflict 

in Syria. 

In 2014, a 20-year-old U.S. citizen and resident of California allegedly traveled 

to the Canadian border intending to travel to Syria to join ISIL. In March this 

young man was charged with attempting to provide material support to a foreign 

terrorist group after he agreed to ‘‘connect’’ an undercover FBI agent to ISIL. 

Many of the Members of the Homeland Security Committee are concerned about 

terrorist travel especially those holding United States or European passports because they can gain ease of access to our shores. 

I know that the Department of Homeland Security’s job is to identify foreign fighters who may seek to enter the United States and prevent them from traveling to 

this country or ensuring another appropriate Government response. 

I have introduced H.R. 48, the ‘‘No Fly for Foreign Fighters Act,’’ which requires 

the director of the Terrorist Screening Center to review the Terrorist Screening 

Database and the terrorist watch list to determine if an individual boarding a U.S.- 

bound or domestic flight poses a terrorist threat or is suspected of being a member 

of a foreign terrorist organization. 

It is my believe that the Department of Homeland Security must be able to do 

its job and that Congress not providing full funding for the agency for fiscal year 

2015 is a hindrance to the agency’s mission and our obligations to do all that we 

can be protect the American public. 

Protection of Federal buildings, as well as the workforce and citizens who access 

them, are also hampered by a failure to provide full-year funding to DHS. 

In the wake of high-profile attacks in Paris, Secretary Johnson directed the Federal Protective Services to step up security operations. Without full year funding, 

those efforts could be hampered. 

Because of budget uncertainty the Department of Homeland Security cannot complete a much-needed $90 million investment in new and upgraded remote and mobile video surveillance systems in the Rio Grande Valley. 

These systems are necessary to provide the Border Patrol with increased situational awareness, early detection of border incursions, enhanced identification and 

classification of threats, and the tracking of suspect materials. 

Additionally, the Border Patrol needs Mobile Video Surveillance Systems for day 

and night surveillance. Moreover, the Department cannot carry out the additional 

16,526 flight hours along the Southwest Border to detect illegal border crossings. 

For this reason, I ask my colleagues on the committee to join me in asking the 

leadership of the House to pass a budget to fully fund the Department of Homeland 

Security for fiscal year 2015—not doing so may make the Nation more vulnerable 

at a time we should be at our highest level of preparedness. 

I thank today’s witnesses and look forward to their testimony. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I am pleased to have three distinguished 

witnesses before us today to discuss this important topic. First, the 

honorable Francis Taylor became the under secretary for intelligence and analysis at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

in April 2014. He has held a variety of senior-level positions over 

his 35-year career in Government service. Most recently, Under 

Secretary Taylor served as the assistant secretary of state for diplomatic security and director of foreign missions. Thank you, sir, for 

being here today. 
9 

Next we have the honorable Nicholas Rasmussen, sworn in as director of the National Counterterrorism Center in December 2014. 

He previously served as NCTC’s deputy director since June 2012. 

Prior to returning to NCTC, he served with the National Security 

Council staff as special assistant to the President and senior director for counterterrorism. Thank you, sir. 

Last but not least, Michael Steinbach, appointed as the assistant 

director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division by Director Comey 

in July 2014. He joined the FBI in 1995, held a variety of positions 

at FBI headquarters in the field and overseas during his 10-year 

career with the bureau, most recently served as deputy assistant 

director of the Counterterrorism Division. 

The witnesses’ full statements will appear in the record. The 

Chairman now recognizes Under Secretary Taylor for his opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF FRANCIS X. TAYLOR, UNDER SECRETARY, INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. TAYLOR. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, 

and distinguished Members of the committee, I am pleased to be 

here today with my colleagues from the FBI and NCTC to discuss 

the foreign fighter threat and our current efforts to disrupt terrorist travel. 

I would be remiss if I did not highlight one of the biggest threats 

to the security of our homeland, the lack of funding for the Department of Homeland Security. 

Given the myriad of threats facing the homeland, it is imperative 

that Congress pass a full-year DHS appropriations bill for 2015. As 

long as the Department operates under a CR, there are a whole series of activities vital to homeland security and public safety that 

the Department just cannot do. The men and women of DHS need 

a partner in Congress to fund their efforts. Time is running out, 

and I urge Congress to pass a full-year appropriations bill for this 

Department as soon as possible. 

The foreign fighter threat continues to be a security threat to the 

United States and our allies. Events in Australia, Canada, and 

most recently in France and Belgium underscore that the foreign 

fighter threat is no longer a problem restricted to foreign conflict 

zones, such as northern Syria and western Iraq. 

At present, we are unaware of any specific, credible, or imminent 

threat to the homeland. However, recent events have demonstrated 

the need for increased vigilance, both at home and abroad. That 

said, the foreign fighter threat is constantly evolving as well as developing new tactics in recruitment that we have not previously 

seen before. 

The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, commonly referred to as 

ISIL, exhibits a very sophisticated propaganda capability. ISIL’s 

use of multi-media content has enhanced the appeal of its terrorist 

organization. This propaganda encourages supporters to carry out 

attacks, and such attacks could be conducted without specific direction from ISIL with little or no warning. 

To address this very threat, counter violence extremism in the 

homeland, and to guard against the domestic lone offender, Sec-
10 

retary Johnson has directed the DHS to build on our partnerships 

with our State, local, and local law enforcement partners in ways 

that enhance its community relationships and builds resilience to 

violent extremism. 

The Secretary recently appointed a CVE coordinator to oversee 

the various CVE programs and efforts across our Department. Additionally, since September 2014, Secretary Johnson has personally 

participated in direct engagement efforts with critical stakeholders 

in Chicago, Columbus, Ohio, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and Boston 

to discuss how DHS can best support local efforts to counter violent 

extremism and address the foreign terrorist fighters. 

DHS CVE efforts are designed to share information with communities and local officials, to raise vigilance on behavioral indicators 

that may link to radicalization to violence. The DHS program also 

focuses on empowering communities and local law enforcement to 

develop intervention and prevention efforts at the local level. 

The White House plans to host a CVE summit on February 18, 

2015. It will focus on both domestic and international CVE efforts. 

Prior to the summit, DHS will host an event for domestic stakeholders on February 17 at the White House, while a second affiliated event, specifically for international partners, will be hosted by 

the Department of State on February 19. 

Let me now turn to the specific efforts DHS is undertaking to 

identify, address, and minimize the foreign fighter threat to the 

United States and to our allies. Beginning in July 2014, DHS required enhanced screening at selected overseas airports with direct 

flights to the United States. Weeks later, DHS added additional 

airports to this list with the United Kingdom and other countries 

following similar enhancements to their required aviation security 

operations. 

TSA, as directed by Secretary Johnson is also conducting an immediate short-term review to determine if additional security 

screening measures are necessary at both domestic, and overseas, 

last-point-of-departure airports. DHS is also exploring the possibility of expanding PRE—pre-clearance operation at foreign airports with flights to the United States. 

Currently, CBP has pre-clearance operations at 15 airports in six 

countries, and, where appropriate, CBP intends to enter into negotiations to expand air pre-clearance operations at new locations. 

The Department continues to work closely with our European partners through the U.S.-E.U. Passenger Name Records Agreement to 

transfer passenger name records information to DHS by airlines 

that are subject to the E.U. data protection laws. 

In addition, DHS uses close partnerships with countries in the 

Visa Waiver program and the five-country ministerial to improve 

respective abilities to identify illicit travel. Just this past November, the Secretary increased the data fields that are collected from 

Visa Waiver countries where visas are not required for entry into 

the United States, and to provide additional passport data, contact 

information, and other potential names or aliases in the travel application submitted under the electronic system for travel authorization before they can travel to the United States. 

DHS is increasing efforts to track those who enter and leave 

Syria and may later seek to travel to the United States without a 
11 

State Department-issued visa. The terrorist threat is dynamic, and 

those who operate individually as a part of terrorist organizations 

will continue to challenge our security measures and our safety. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to end my statement there, and I 

look forward to the questions from the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANCIS X. TAYLOR

FEBRUARY 11, 2015 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today—along 

with my colleagues from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the Department of State (DOS)—to discuss 

the foreign fighter threat and current efforts to disrupt terrorist travel. 

For some time, the U.S. Government, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has been concerned that terrorist groups operating in permissive environments present a significant security threat to the United States and to our allies. 

Events in Australia, Canada, and, most recently, in France and Belgium underscore 

that the foreign fighter threat is no longer a problem restricted to foreign conflict 

zones such as those in northern Syria or western Iraq. The Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant (ISIL) and other like-minded terrorist organizations have been effective in recruiting fighters from Western countries, as well as recruiting individuals 

for violent action at home for those who cannot travel to conflict zones. The threat 

is real, it continues to evolve, and it is a present danger to everyone across the 

globe. It includes people radicalized to violence overseas, or potentially here in the 

United States. 

At present, we are unaware of any specific, credible, imminent threat to the homeland; however, recent events have demonstrated the need for increased vigilance 

both at home and abroad. We recognize that the threat environment is ever-evolving 

and becoming increasingly complex and decentralized. For that reason, DHS is continuing to encourage an informed and aware public, as promoted by the ‘‘See something, say something’’ campaign, as well as our more specific bulletins. We must recognize protecting the homeland is a shared responsibility. 

In my testimony today, I will discuss the foreign fighter threat and highlight specific efforts DHS is undertaking to identify, address, and minimize the foreign fighter threat to the United States and to our allies. 

FOREIGN FIGHTER THREAT

While much of today’s hearing will focus on terrorist threats from Syria and Iraq, 

it is important to emphasize that the terrorist threat is fluid and not constrained 

to one group, race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or geographic location. Many 

terrorist groups continue to pose a risk to our security and safety. 

Core al-Qaeda (AQ), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and AQ’s affiliates and adherents remain a major concern for DHS. Despite the deaths of many 

of AQ’s senior leaders, the group maintains the intent, and in some cases, the capability to facilitate and conduct attacks against U.S. citizens and facilities. The group 

has also demonstrated that it is capable of adjusting its tactics, techniques, and procedures for targeting the West. 

Events in recent weeks have also made it clear why DHS and others in the 

counterterrorism and law enforcement communities are concerned about the threats 

posed by terrorists operating out of Syria and Iraq. In addition to hard-core alQaeda loyalists, a number of those involved in terrorist operations within Syria and 

Iraq are affiliated with ISIL. ISIL operates as if it were a military organization and 

aspires to overthrow governments in the region and eventually beyond. Their experience and successes on the battlefields in Syria and Iraq have armed this group with 

advanced capabilities that most terrorist groups do not have. 

ISIL has also publicly threatened ‘‘direct confrontation’’ with the United States, 

which is consistent with the group’s media releases during the past several years 

that have alluded to attacking the United States. Through their sophisticated messaging capability, which includes the dissemination of high-quality media content on 

multiple on-line platforms, ISIL has been able to quickly reach a global audience 

and encourage acts of violence, as well as inspire U.S. citizens to travel to Syria to 

join in the conflict. 
12 

The on-going conflict in Syria has emerged as a draw for more than 19,000 foreign 

fighters. We are aware of a number of U.S. Persons who have traveled or attempted 

to travel to Syria. More than 150 U.S. Persons and at least 3,400 Westerners have 

traveled or attempted to travel to Syria to participate in the conflict. We have also 

noted that veteran al-Qaeda fighters have travelled from Pakistan to Syria to take 

advantage of the permissive operating environment and easy access to foreign fighters. We remain concerned about the threat of foreign fighters from the United 

States or elsewhere who may go to Syria and Iraq, become more radicalized to violence, and return to the United States or their home country and conduct attacks 

on their own or in concert with others. Furthermore, we also are concerned that 

U.S. Persons who join violent extremist groups in Syria could gain combat skills, 

violent extremist connections, and possibly become persuaded to conduct organized 

or ‘‘lone-wolf’’ style attacks that target U.S. and Western interests. We also have become increasingly aware of the possibility that Syria could emerge as a base of operations for al-Qaeda’s international agenda, which could include attacks against the 

homeland. 

DHS RESPONSE TO THE FOREIGN FIGHTER THREAT

Aviation Security 

Terrorist organizations like AQAP continue to pose a serious threat to international civil aviation. As we have seen in AQAP’s three attempted aviation attacks 

against the homeland—the airliner plot of December 2009, an attempted attack 

against U.S.-bound cargo planes in October 2010, and an airliner plot in May 

2012—terrorist groups have shown a significant and growing sophistication in terms 

of bomb design and construction, operational skill, and innovation. In the past 3 

years terrorists have become increasingly interested in circumventing airport security screening through the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) concealed in 

cargo, commercial electronics, physical areas of one’s body, in shoes or clothing, and 

in cosmetics and liquids. 

To address the terrorist threat to aviation, DHS continues to evaluate, modify, 

and enhance aviation security measures. For example, beginning in July 2014, DHS 

required enhanced screening at select overseas airports with direct flights to the 

United States. Weeks later, DHS added additional airports to the list, with the 

United Kingdom and other countries following with similar enhancements to their 

required aviation security operations. Following recent world events, in January 

2015, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) took steps to enhance the 

number of random searches of passengers and carry-on luggage boarding aircraft at 

U.S. airports. TSA, as directed by Secretary Johnson, is also conducting an immediate, short-term review to determine if additional security measures are necessary 

at both domestic and overseas last-point-of-departure airports. DHS will continue to 

evaluate the implementation of aviation security measures with air carriers and foreign airports to determine if more is necessary, and will make the appropriate aviation security adjustments without unduly burdening the traveling public. 

In the long term, DHS is exploring the possibility of expanding pre-clearance operations at foreign airports with flights to the United States. This initiative provides 

for customs, immigration, and agriculture inspections of international air passengers and their goods by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials before the individual boards the plane for travel to the United States. Currently, CBP 

has pre-clearance operations at 15 airports and in 6 countries and, if appropriate, 

intends to enter into negotiations in order to expand air pre-clearance operations to 

new locations. 

Information Sharing 

Information sharing with our domestic and foreign partners is vital in identifying 

developing threats both here and abroad. DHS is committed to continuing our efforts, along with our colleagues in the intelligence community, to partner with European governments and other key counterterrorism allies to share information about 

terrorist threats. 

Since its inception, DHS has sought to broaden and deepen international liaison 

efforts to improve its ability to share information with key foreign allies. DHS has 

worked closely with the European Union through the U.S.-E.U. Passenger Name 

Records Agreement to facilitate the transfer of Passenger Name Records information 

to DHS by airlines that are subject to E.U. data protection laws. This agreement 

provides the highest standard of security and privacy protection. In addition, DHS 

has used its close partnerships with the countries in the Visa Waiver program and 

the Five Country Conference to improve our respective abilities to identify illicit 

travel. The Preventing and Combating Serious Crime Agreement that DHS and 40 
13 

foreign partners have signed provides each signatory with reciprocal access to fingerprint repositories for the purposes of combating crime and terrorism. With the 

Five Country Conference, which includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 

United Kingdom, we have also concluded immigration information-sharing agreements that reduce the likelihood that a person applying for asylum or a visa in any 

of the five countries who has an illicit past could hide that history. DHS also engages with foreign partners to share analytic and targeting methodology, chiefly by 

conducting analytic exchanges, to enhance the ability of DHS and foreign allies to 

identify individuals and travel routes, and prevent travel to foreign conflict zones. 

DHS is working with our interagency partners to inform our State, local, Tribal, 

and territorial (SLTT) partners of recent events and threats. Following the Paris attacks, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) prepared two Intelligence Notes 

and worked with the FBI to prepare and issue Joint Information Bulletins (JIBs); 

DHS shared both items Nationally with fusion centers. 

I&A continues to provide our State and local law enforcement partners with information about observable behavioral indicators of U.S. Persons planning or attempting travel to Syria. I&A has produced tailored assessments on the motivations of 

U.S. travelers, their travel patterns, the role social media is playing in 

radicalization to violence, and the ways in which U.S. Persons are providing material support to Syria-based violent extremist groups. Additionally, I&A has 

partnered with the FBI to produce JIBs and other products for State and local law 

enforcement on the trends and observable behaviors in individuals seeking to travel 

to Syria. 

Tracking Foreign Fighters 

DHS is increasing efforts to track those who enter and leave Syria and may later 

seek to travel to the United States without a State Department-issued visa under 

the Visa Waiver program (VWP). Working with the intelligence community, DHS is 

aware that a number of foreign fighters in Syria have come from various VWP countries. 

In response, this fall, DHS strengthened the security of the VWP through enhancements to the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). Those 

changes went into effect on November 3, 2014. ESTA adds a significant layer of security to the VWP by enabling CBP to conduct security vetting of prospective VWP 

travelers to determine if they pose a law enforcement or security risk before they 

board aircraft destined for the United States. DHS determined that additional data 

will improve the Department’s ability to screen prospective VWP travelers and more 

accurately and effectively identify those who pose a security risk to the United 

States. These improvements provide an additional layer of enduring security for the 

VWP and facilitate visa-free travel to the United States. 

Because we view advance passenger screening as a critical element to an effective 

National counterterrorism capability, we have explained to many partner nations 

how they can compare airline manifests and reservation data against terrorist 

watch lists and other intelligence about terrorist travel. This is an area where the 

United States has developed a capability significantly more advanced than most 

other nations, both in identifying illicit travel and in protecting the privacy and civil 

liberties of all travelers, and we have worked to share this know-how in order to 

prevent terrorists from traveling the globe in anonymity. Developing this capability 

is also consistent with the new obligations introduced through U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 2178, introduced last year by President Obama. 

DHS is also working with partner nations in Europe, the Middle East, and North 

Africa to increase our information sharing to track Syrian foreign fighters. These 

efforts allow the United States greater visibility on potential threats to the homeland, while similarly enhancing our partners’ ability to track and prevent terrorist 

travel. The importance of this issue was highlighted by the United Nations Security 

Council’s adoption of Resolution 2178 in September 2014, which provided new momentum for European and other governments to use air passenger screening technology and enhance information sharing through multi-lateral and bi-lateral channels. 

Countering Violent Extremism 

Home-grown violent extremists (HVEs) represent a persistent and often unpredictable threat based on their close familiarity with the United States and their 

ability to act with little or no warning as lone offenders or in small decentralized 

cells. Over the past few years we have seen self-mobilizing, independently operating 

HVEs plot to bomb high-profile targets, such as the Federal Reserve Bank in New 

York, the U.S. Capitol, and commercial establishments in downtown Chicago, 

Tampa, and Oakland. All these plots were disrupted. 
14 

To address the need to counter violent extremism (CVE) in the homeland and to 

guard against the domestic ‘‘lone wolf’’—someone who did not train at a terrorist 

camp or join the ranks of a terrorist organization overseas, but is inspired here at 

home by a group’s social media, literature, or violent extremist ideology—Secretary 

Johnson has directed DHS to build on our partnerships with State and local law 

enforcement in a way that enhances community relationships and builds resilience 

to violent extremist recruitment. DHS now has a senior executive whose sole responsibility is coordinating and improving the Department’s CVE efforts. 

DHS’s approach emphasizes the strength of local communities and the premise 

that well-informed and well-equipped families, communities, and front-line personnel represent the best defense against violent extremism. Over the past 8 

months, DHS has participated in a National Security Council (NSC)-coordinated 

interagency effort to work with Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis/St. Paul to facilitate and support the development of locally-based, and -driven, violent extremism 

prevention and intervention pilot frameworks. Additionally, since September 2014, 

Secretary Johnson has personally participated in direct engagement efforts with 

critical stakeholders in Chicago, Columbus, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and most recently, Boston, to hear how DHS can best support local efforts to counter violent 

extremism and address foreign terrorist fighters. 

DHS CVE efforts, in partnership with NCTC, also include the development of the 

Community Awareness Briefing (CAB), which is designed to share Unclassified information with stakeholders regarding the threat of violent extremism, as well as 

help communities and law enforcement develop the necessary understanding of alQaeda, al-Shabaab, ISIL, and related affiliates’ recruitment tactics as well as explore ways to address these threats at the local level. The CAB draws a parallel 

between the similar recruitment targets of all types of violent extremism. For example, the CAB uses the case study on the attack at a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, WI 

to illustrate potential for violence from all types of violent extremists, including but 

not limited to violent white supremacists, violent eco-terrorists, violent Neo-Nazis, 

criminal gangs (such as MS–13), and international terrorist groups. Due to the increased number of Western-based fighters traveling to foreign war conflicts, such as 

Syria and Somalia, the CAB now includes information relating to the foreign terrorist fighter recruitment narrative by al-Shabaab and ISIL. 

Beyond our borders, DHS collaborates with partner countries (such as the United 

Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Spain, and France) to develop best practices in community engagement endeavors that effectively counter 

violent extremism. Following the Paris attacks, DHS worked with some of these 

countries and the Department of State to link members of civil society and community stakeholders in respective countries so that they could coordinate and build 

grass-roots responses to the attacks in Paris. 

DHS is also working closely with the NSC staff, the Department of State, the Department of Justice including the FBI, and NCTC to plan the February 18–19, 2015, 

CVE Summit which will bring together key stakeholders from National and local 

governments around the world as well as the private sector, civil society, and community leaders to develop an action agenda address violent extremism in all its 

forms. Furthermore, DHS is working with the Department of State on the Global 

Counterterrorism Forum Workshop, which will be held on February 23 and 24 in 

Washington, DC and will build on the CVE Summit. This workshop will focus on 

ways in which communities and governments can develop specific programs and efforts to address the issue of foreign terrorist fighters. France, Canada, Australia, 

and others will address the recent attacks they have faced and solutions they are 

developing to deal with this threat. 

CONCLUSION

The terrorist threat is dynamic, as those who operate individually or as part of 

a terrorist organization will continue to challenge our security measures and our 

safety. DHS will continue to work with our international counterparts and our colleagues within the FBI, NCTC, Department of State, and the intelligence community, to identify potential threats to our security, both at home and abroad. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank the Secretary. Excuse me. The 

Chairman now recognizes Director Rasmussen for his opening 

statement. 
15 

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson and Members of the committee. I really do appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the threat posed 

by foreign fighters and home-grown terror and our efforts as a Government to counter it. 

As Frank Taylor said, I am also pleased to join my colleagues 

and close partners from Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We work closely and cooperatively every day 

as a part of a true community of counterterrorism professionals, 

and I am really grateful for that partnership that we share. 

This morning, I will briefly describe the threat we face from foreign fighters, highlight the role that extremist use of social media 

has played in that process, and conclude with efforts NCTC and 

our partners across the Federal Government are taking to counter 

that threat. I will begin with the foreign fighter picture. 

As you know, one of the most pressing concerns for the intelligence community is the on-going flow of foreign fighters to Syria, 

and importantly, the threat they could pose upon return to their 

home country of home origin. The battlefields in Iraq and Syria 

clearly provide foreign fighters with combat experience, with training in weapons and explosives, and with access to terror networks 

that may be ultimately planning targets—attacks which target the 

West. 

The rate of foreign fighter travel that we have seen in recent 

years is unprecedented. It exceeds the rate of travel and travelers 

who went to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia, other 

prominent conflict zones, but it exceeds the rate of travel to those 

conflict zones that we have seen at any point in the last 20 years. 

The United States and our allies are increasingly concerned with 

the more than 20,000 foreign fighters we assess have traveled to 

Syria from over 90 different countries of origin. We assess that at 

least 3,400 of these fighters are from Western countries, and that 

number includes also over 150 U.S. persons who have either traveled to the conflict zone, or attempted to do so. That is something 

we can speak about in more detail later in the session. 

I want to be cautious here about that because it is very difficult 

to be precise with these numbers, because they come from a wide 

variety of sources that vary in quality. I would rather focus on the 

trend lines, which are clear, and which are concerning. 

In addition to the foreign fighters who have already traveled, it 

is clear that the number of those seeking to go to Iraq and Syria 

is going up. Furthermore, the majority of those who are getting 

there, getting to the conflict zone right now, are fighting, or looking 

to fight for ISIL on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq. 

It is also a complicating factor that the individuals drawn to 

fight in foreign conflict zones do not fit any one stereotype or profile. They come from various backgrounds, which highlights the 

need for comprehensive messaging strategies and early engagement with a variety of communities in order to dissuade vulnerable 

individuals from trying to travel to conflict zones. The volume and 
16 

diversity of recruits flowing to and from the conflict makes disruption particularly challenging. 

There is no single pipeline for foreign fighter travel into and out 

of Syria. Violent extremists take different routes, including land, 

air, and sea. Most routes do involve transit through Turkey because of its geographic proximity to the Syrian border areas where 

most of these groups operate. 

Now this sense of shared threat has prompted even closer cooperation across U.S. Federal agencies, and importantly, with our 

international partners, particularly in Europe. This is resulting in 

the development of stricter counterterrorism laws overseas, increased efforts at border security among our European partners, 

and importantly, more willingness to share threat information 

among partner nations. 

While these good efforts are under way and are making progress, 

significant work remains, particularly in ensuring that our foreign 

partners are able and willing to identify and stop foreign fighters 

when they transit their borders, both to prevent those fighters from 

entering, and then to stop fighters from leaving their home countries to travel abroad. 

Now, I will turn quickly to the use of social media by extremists, 

and especially by ISIL, and the way in which this group uses social 

media to attract a diverse set of aspiring foreign fighters. 

Now, the Chairman and the Ranking Member both mentioned in 

their opening remarks the brutal behavior that we have seen of 

ISIL in recent weeks. The world witnessed the brutal burning of 

a Jordanian pilot held hostage by the group, and we have seen the 

cruel beheadings of U.S. and Japanese hostages. 

ISIL’s media capabilities are robust and effective. Moreover, their 

ability to generate timely propaganda continues to grow. I would 

argue that ISIL has proven far more adept than core al-Qaeda ever 

was, or more adept than any of—core—of al-Qaeda’s affiliate 

groups, more adept at using these new social media tools to reach 

a broader audience. 

Just since January 1 of this year, more than 250 official ISIL 

products have been published on-line, and the group has shown the 

capacity to use these products to speak to a full spectrum of potential audiences. Local Sunni Arab populations inside Iraq and Syria, 

who they are trying to co-opt and exercise dominion over, individuals in coalition countries, and even populations around the world, 

including English-speaking audiences here and across the globe. 

As you would expect, ISIL uses the most popular of social media 

platforms to disseminate this messaging. YouTube, Facebook, Twitter. They know how to ensure that once their media releases are 

posted, that they reach far and wide almost instantaneously with 

reposting, and regeneration of follow-on links and translations into 

an ever-growing number of additional languages. 

Now, in terms of content, we have all seen that it includes these 

horrible, horrific images in which hostages have been murdered or 

ISIL’s adversaries on the battlefield have been executed in summary fashion. But we have also seen social media images of a bucolic family-friendly welcoming light under ISIL’s rule in their selfdeclared caliphate as ISIL tries to paint a picture to entice 

disenfranchised individuals seeking ideological, religious, or per-
17 

sonal fulfillment, and not just a battlefield or a martyrdom experience. 

ISIL also generates releases that cater to a younger population 

very familiar with popular culture. These releases often reference 

Western branding, including popular video games, in an attempt to 

appeal to thrill seekers and youth looking for fulfillment. 

Now, the threat we face is not just from foreign fighters or terrorist groups including ISIL and al-Qaeda. Individuals inspired by 

these and other groups, or simply by violent, extremist propaganda 

can be motivated to action, and, as Frank said, that can come with 

little or no warning. 

Many of these so-called home-grown violent extremists are lone 

actors who can potentially operate undetected and who can plan 

and execute a simple attack without providing us warning. As a 

community, we closely monitor violent extremist activity, including 

when that activity appears and occurs in the United States, and we 

are looking for signs that last year’s attacks in Canada and elsewhere may embolden other HBEs to conduct additional attacks. 

We believe ISIL’s rhetoric may have played a role in these attacks, particularly in target selection in terms of targeting Government officials or military personnel. We are working with our partners across multiple disciplines in the community to increase our 

knowledge of foreign fighters and to counter extremism. 

NCTC has taken a broad center-wide effort to track foreign fighters traveling to Syria. We work in the first instance to resolve the 

specific identities of these potential fighters to uncover any potential derogatory information that we have in intelligence community 

holdings. 

We are also working closely with foreign partners to combat 

threats emanating from Syria. We are looking hard to develop investigative leads for our partner agencies to pursue, including identifying foreign fighters entering Syria, who may have potential access or connections to individuals in the homeland so that they can 

be watch-listed. 

The growing number of individuals going abroad as foreign fighters only emphasizes the importance of prevention. Any hope of enduring security or defeating organizations like ISIL rests in our 

ability to diminish their appeal and to dissuade individuals from 

joining them in the first place. To this end, we continue to refine 

and expand the preventive side of terrorism and counterterrorism. 

We have seen a steady proliferation of more pro-active and more 

engaged community awareness efforts across the United States 

with the goal of giving communities information and tools they 

need to identify extremism in their midst, and to do something 

about it before it manifests in violence. 

My organization, NCTC, in direct and daily collaboration with 

DHS, the Justice Department, and FBI, has led the creation of 

CVE tools to build community resilience across the country. In 

working closely with these partners, we are doing this work all 

across the country, and I would like to point to just one quick example. 

You will recall the case last year in which three young teenage 

girls allegedly attempted to travel from Denver to Syria by way of 

Frankfurt, Germany, where their travel was disrupted by law en-
18 

forcement. Now, in the aftermath of that incident, we, working together with DHS—DHS, FBI, and the Department of Justice—sent 

our officers on multiple occasions to meet and talk to the greater 

Denver community to raise awareness among community and law 

enforcement partners about the terrorist recruitment threat. 

We developed a briefing, working with our partners, that is now 

tailored to address the specific effort to identify and recruit foreign 

fighters for Syria and Iraq. We have received a very strong demand 

signal for more such outreach from communities like Denver, and 

we continue to try to expand our toolkit of CVE-related tools. 

With our DHS colleagues, we have created and we regularly deliver a community resilience exercise program, a table-top exercise 

that brings together law enforcement with community leaders to 

run through a hypothetical scenario and talk about response. 

We realize we can’t institutionalize a prevention approach without scaling up these efforts, and that goes to something you said 

in your opening statement, Chairman McCaul. So we are working 

as a community to try to create more programs to train individuals 

on CVE tools to ensure that communities across the country are 

able to lead CVE approaches locally in their own communities. This 

approach syncs up nicely with the efforts of the White House, 

NCTC, DHS, DOJ, and FBI to facilitate the local development and 

implementation of intervention frameworks in cities all across the 

country. 

I will stop there, Mr. Chairman—— 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN [continuing]. Mr. Ranking Member. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rasmussen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN

FEBRUARY 11, 2015 

Thank you Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the 

committee. I appreciate this opportunity to be here today to discuss the threat posed 

by foreign fighters and home-grown terror, and our efforts to counter it. I’m pleased 

to join my colleagues and close partners from the Department of Homeland Security 

and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

FOREIGN FIGHTERS

One of the most pressing concerns for the intelligence community is the on-going 

flow of foreign fighters to Syria and the threat they could pose upon return to their 

home countries. The battlefields in Iraq and Syria provide foreign fighters with combat experience, weapons and explosives training, and access to terrorist networks 

that may be planning attacks which target the West. 

This shared threat has prompted even closer cooperation across U.S. Federal 

agencies and with our international partners, particularly in Europe. We are seeing 

increased international focus on this problem which is resulting in stricter counterterrorism laws overseas, increased border security efforts, and more willingness to 

share threat information among partner nations. 

The United States and our allies are increasingly concerned with the more than 

20,000 foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria from over 90 different countries. 

We assess at least 3,400 of these fighters are from Western countries including over 

150 U.S. persons who have either traveled to the conflict zone, or attempted to do 

so. It’s very difficult to be precise with these numbers because they come from a 

variety of sources that vary in quality. But the trend lines are clear and concerning. 

The rate of foreign fighter travel to Syria is unprecedented. It exceeds the rate of 

travelers who went to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any 

point in the last 20 years. 
19 

In addition to the foreign fighters who have already traveled, the number of those 

seeking to go to Syria and Iraq are going up. Furthermore, the majority of those 

getting there right now are fighting for ISIL on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq. 

Individuals drawn to fight in foreign conflict zones do not fit any one stereotype. 

Recruits come from various backgrounds, highlighting the need for comprehensive 

messaging and early engagement with a variety of communities to dissuade vulnerable individuals from traveling. Extremist use of social media, especially by ISIL, 

is attracting a diverse set of aspiring foreign fighters and serving as a platform for 

relaying travel advice, including facilitation information, meeting locations, and 

even regional hotel accommodations. 

ISIL’S USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Last week, the world witnessed the brutal burning of Jordanian pilot Lieutenant 

Muath al-Kaseasbeh. As that propaganda video demonstrated, ISIL’s media capabilities are robust and effective. Moreover, their ability to generate timely new propaganda continues to grow. Since January 1 of this year, more than 250 official ISIL 

products have been published on-line. The group has shown the capacity to use 

these products to speak to the full spectrum of potential audiences: Local Sunni 

Arab populations whom they are trying to co-opt and exercise dominion over, coalition countries, and populations around the world—including English-speaking audiences here and across the globe. 

As you would expect, ISIL uses the most popular social media platforms to disseminate this messaging—YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. They know how to ensure that once their media releases are posted, that they reach wide and far almost 

instantaneously, with re-posting and generation of follow-on links and translations 

into additional languages. 

In terms of content, we’ve all seen that it includes those horrible images in which 

hostages have been murdered or ISIL’s adversaries on the battlefield have been executed. 

But we’ve also seen the social media images of a bucolic, family-friendly, welcoming life under ISIL’s rule in their self-declared caliphate, as ISIL tries to paint 

a picture to entice disenfranchised individuals seeking ideological, religious, and 

personal fulfillment, not just a battlefield or martyrdom experience. 

ISIL also generates releases that cater to a younger population more familiar with 

popular culture. These releases often reference Western brands—including popular 

video games—to appeal to thrill seekers and youth looking for fulfillment. They 

have also coined pithy ‘‘memes’’ such as, ‘‘YODO: You Only Die Once. Why not make 

it martyrdom?’’ 

ISIL supporters have also enhanced the group’s presence on the internet, expressing their alliance in various languages—in countries from Belgium to the Philippines—in their ‘‘We are ISIL’’ campaign. 

In short, ISIL has proven far more adept than core al-Qaeda—or any of al-Qaeda’s 

affiliates—at using new media tools to reach a broader audience. 

FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL

How do we disrupt travel by foreign fighters to conflict zones, Syria in particular? 

The volume and diversity of recruits flowing to and from the conflict areas make 

disruption especially challenging. There is no single pipeline for foreign fighter travel into and out of Syria. Violent extremists take different routes, including land, air, 

and sea. Most routes involve transit through Turkey because of its geographic proximity to the Syrian border areas where violent extremist groups operate. Turkey has 

signed visa-free travel agreements with more than 69 governments, which limit the 

requirement for traveler screening. No visas are required for most E.U. citizens, 

some of whom are also able to travel on identity cards. Many would-be fighters simply take direct or indirect commercial flights to Turkish airports. Some European 

fighters also travel overland via the Balkans. Violent extremists from the Caucasus 

transit Iran, Russia, or Georgia en route to Turkey. Other extremists, including 

those from Europe or North Africa, use maritime routes by boarding cruise ships 

or ferries to Turkey before crossing into Syria. 

Recently, Turkey has stepped up its efforts to deny entry to potential foreign 

fighters based on information provided by the fighters’ countries of origin. The 

‘‘Turkish Banned from Entry List’’ now reportedly includes 10,000 individuals. 

In response to the recent attacks in Paris and arrests in several European countries of violent extremists planning terrorist attacks, we see an increased political 

willingness among our foreign partners to review and enhance border controls and 

institute stronger watchlisting and information-sharing arrangements. In fact, tomorrow, the European Union is holding a summit on foreign fighter issues, and we 
20 

hope to see additional border security and information-sharing initiatives as a result 

of this meeting. Additionally, the summit will most likely address counterterrorism 

legal mechanisms in the European Union and a discussion of terrorist use of the 

internet, all worthwhile and meaningful steps to greater cooperation in Europe. 

Our partners in North Africa and Asia are also passing new counterterrorism 

laws and identifying other means to identify, interdict, and prosecute foreign fighters and those who support them. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and 

the UAE have all recently enacted legislation or regulations to address the foreign 

fighter issue. 

While good efforts are underway, significant work remains, particularly in ensuring that our foreign partners are able and willing to identify and stop foreign fighters at their borders—both to prevent fighters from entering and to stop fighters 

from leaving their home countries to travel abroad. These efforts must include a 

range of measures, including screening visa applicants; using Passenger Name 

Records or other data to identify potential foreign fighters; applying increased 

screening measures at points of departure; and a willingness to share information 

through INTERPOL, the United Nations, and bilateral relationships. 

NCTC EFFORTS TO ADDRESS FOREIGN FIGHTER THREAT

NCTC is undertaking a broad Center-wide effort to track foreign fighters traveling to Syria, working closely with our intelligence community partners. We work 

to resolve the identities of potential fighters to uncover possible derogatory information in NCTC holdings. Additionally, the U.S. Government continues to work closely 

with foreign partners to combat threats emanating from Syria. 

As part of this effort, NCTC aggregates information on known or suspected terrorists traveling to Syria in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). 

TIDE is the U.S. Government’s central repository for terrorist identity intelligence. 

It is also an analytic tool, and this effort has created a valuable forum for identifying, tracking, and sharing information with law enforcement, counterterrorism, 

screening, and watchlisting communities on known or suspected terrorists. 

Our metrics-based tracking and assessment of these terrorist identities has directly helped resolve inconclusive identities, enhance TIDE records, and upgrade 

watch list statuses on several hundred known or suspected terrorists. 

NCTC’s Pursuit Group—which develops investigative leads for our partner agencies to pursue—is working to identify foreign fighters entering Syria who have potential access or connections to the homeland, so they can be watchlisted. This analysis leverages NCTC’s unique accesses: A wider range of IC and law enforcement 

information than any other agency through our own counterterrorism data holdings 

as well as natively through embedded officers from ten other agencies. 

HOME-GROWN VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The threat we face is not just from foreign fighters or terrorist groups including 

ISIL and al-Qaeda. Individuals inspired by those and other groups, or simply by violent extremist propaganda, can be motivated to action, with little to no warning. 

Many of these so-called home-grown violent extremists (HVEs) are lone actors, who 

can potentially operate undetected and plan and execute a simple attack. 

We closely monitor violent extremist activity, including when such activity occurs 

in the United States, for signs that last year’s attacks in Canada and New York 

may embolden other HVEs to conduct additional attacks. ISIL’s rhetoric may have 

played a role in those attacks, particularly in target selection. 

More broadly, we believe the HVE threat will remain at its current level resulting 

in fewer than 10 uncoordinated and unsophisticated plots annually from a pool of 

up to a few hundred individuals, most of whom are known to the IC and law enforcement. 

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE)

The growing number of individuals going abroad as foreign fighters to Syria only 

emphasizes the importance of prevention. Any hope of enduring security against terrorism or defeating organizations like ISIL rests in our ability to diminish the appeal of terrorism and dissuade individuals from joining them in the first place. 

To this end, we continue to refine and expand the preventive side of counterterrorism. We have seen a steady proliferation of more proactive and engaged community awareness efforts across the United States, with the goal of giving communities 

the information and the tools they need to identify extremism in their midst and 

do something about it before it manifests itself in violence. NCTC, in direct collaboration with DHS, DOJ, and FBI, has led the creation of CVE tools to build community resilience across the country. 
21 

Working closely with these partners, NCTC is engaged in this work all across the 

country, and I will point to just one example. 

You will recall the case last year in which three young teenage girls allegedly attempted to travel from Denver to Syria by way of Frankfurt, Germany, where their 

travel was disrupted. 

In the aftermath of that incident, we, in concert with DOJ, DHS, and FBI, sent 

our officers on multiple occasions to meet with the greater Denver community and 

to raise awareness among community and law enforcement audiences about the terrorist recruitment threat. The briefing, developed with our partners, is now tailored 

to address the specific issue of foreign fighter recruitment in Syria and Iraq. We and 

our partner agencies have received a strong demand signal for more such outreach. 

This isn’t a law enforcement-oriented effort that might be perceived as intimidating. Rather, it’s an effort to share information about how members of our communities are being targeted and recruited to join terrorists overseas. Seen in that 

light, we’ve had a remarkably positive reaction from the communities with whom 

we have engaged. 

We continue to expand our CVE tools. With our DHS colleagues, we have created 

and regularly deliver the Community Resilience Exercise program, a table-top exercise that brings together local law enforcement with community leadership in a city 

to run through a hypothetical scenario featuring a possible violent extremist or foreign fighter. We were pleased that House Homeland staff was able to attend a recent exercise in Minneapolis. 

We realize we cannot institutionalize a prevention approach without scaling up 

these efforts. Our agency is creating programs to train individuals on CVE tools to 

ensure that communities across the country are able to lead on CVE approaches locally. This approach syncs with the efforts of the White House, NCTC, DHS, DOJ, 

and FBI to facilitate the local development and implementation of prevention and 

intervention frameworks in cities across the country. 

CONCLUSION

Confronting the threat of foreign fighters and working with resolve to prevent another terrorist attack remains the counterterrorism community’s overriding mission. 

NCTC recently celebrated its 10th year in service to the Nation, and we remain focused on continuing to enhance our ability to counter the terrorist threat in the 

years ahead. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this morning. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

Chairman MCCAUL. We just have many Members here to ask 

questions, and there will be plenty of time to talk about that, but 

we appreciate you being here today. Thank you, Director. 

Chairman now recognizes Assistant Director Steinbach for his 

opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL B. STEINBACH, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. STEINBACH. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking 

Member Thompson, Members of the committee. Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the dynamic 

threat of foreign fighters traveling in support of the Islamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant, commonly known as ISIL, and the continued threat to the United States posed by home-grown violent extremists. 

These threats remain among the highest priorities for the FBI 

and the intelligence community as a whole. However, it is a blending of the home-grown violent extremism with foreign fighter ideology which is today’s latest adaptation of the threat. 

Conflicts in Syria and Iraq are currently the most attractive 

overseas theaters for Western-based extremists who want to engage in violence. We estimate upwards of 150 Americans have trav-
22 

eled or attempted to travel to Syria to join extremist groups. While 

this number is small in comparison to the number of European 

travelers, we must also consider the influence groups like ISIL 

have on individuals located in the United States who are inspired 

to commit acts of violence. It is this influence which I refer to as 

the blended threat. 

ISIL has proven ruthless in its campaign, in its violent campaign 

to rule, and has become yet the latest terror group attracting likeminded Western extremists. Yet from a homeland perspective, it is 

ISIL’s wide-spread reach through the internet and social media 

which is the most concerning, as ISIL has proven dangerously competent like no other group before it at employing such tools in furtherance of its nefarious strategy. 

ISIL uses high-quality traditional media platforms, as well as a 

multitude of social media campaigns to propagate its extremist 

ideas. Like al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations, ISIL 

has effectively used the internet to communicate, to both radicalize 

and recruit. Unlike other groups, ISIL has gone one step further 

and demonstrates an effectiveness to spot and assess potential recruits. 

Social media in particular has provided ISIL with the technical 

platform for wide-spread recruitment, operational direction, and 

consequently has helped bridge the gap between foreign fighters 

and home-grown extremists. As a communication tool the internet 

remains a critical mode for terror groups to exploit. 

One recent example just occurred this past week. A group of five 

individuals was arrested for knowingly and willingly conspiring 

and attempting to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organizations active in Syria and Iraq. 

Much of their conspiracy occurred via the internet. 

Following on other groups’ doctrines, ISIL, too, has advocated for 

lone-wolf attacks. Last month, ISIL released a video via social 

media reiterating the group’s encouragement of lone-wolf offender 

attacks in Western countries, specifically advocating for attacks 

against soldiers, law enforcement, and intelligence members. 

Several incidents have occurred in the United States and Europe 

over the past few months which indicate this call to arms has resonated amongst ISIL, supporters and sympathizers. In one case, an 

Ohio-based man was arrested in January after he obtained a weapon and stated his intent to conduct an attack on the U.S. Capitol 

in Washington, DC, as was mentioned here earlier. Using a Twitter 

account, the individual posted statements, video, and other content 

indicating his support for ISIL, and he planned his attack based on 

his voiced support. 

Likewise, recent events in Australia, Canada, France, and the 

United Kingdom reflect the power of this radicalized message and 

reemphasize our need to remain vigilant in the homeland, since 

these small-scale attacks are just as feasible within the United 

States. 

We should also understand community and world events, as 

viewed through the eyes of the committed individual, may trigger 

action. As we have seen with highly-publicized events such as the 

attack on military personnel at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier 

in Canada and the hostage situation at the cafe in Australia, these 
23 

acts of terror will attract media attention—international media attention and may inspire copy-cat attacks. 

ISIL, however, is not the only high-profile terrorist organization 

of concern. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, poses an ongoing threat to the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. AQAP’s 

on-line magazine, Inspire, advocates for lone wolves to conduct attacks against the homeland and Western targets by utilizing simple and inexpensive tactics and methods. On December 24, 2014, 

AQAP released the 13th edition of the magazine, which provides 

instructions for building and deploying an IED. 

Lastly, social media has allowed groups such as ISIL to use the 

internet even more effectively at spotting and assessing potential 

recruits. With the wide-spread horizontal distribution of social 

media, terrorists can identify sympathetic individuals of all ages in 

the United States, spot, assess, recruit, and radicalize either to 

travel or conduct a homeland attack. 

The foreign terrorist now has direct access into the United States 

like never before. As a result, it is imperative that the FBI and all 

law enforcement organizations understand the latest communication tools and are equipped to identify and prevent terror attacks 

in the homeland. 

We live in a technologically-driven society, and just as private industry has adapted to modern forms of communication, so have the 

terrorists. Unfortunately, changing forms of communication on the 

internet and through social media are quickly outpacing laws and 

technology designed to allow for the lawful intercept of communication content. This real and growing gap the FBI refers to as ‘‘going 

dark’’ must be urgently addressed as the risks associated with 

going dark are grave both in traditional criminal matters, as well 

as National security matters. 

We must continue to build partnerships and work with internet 

providers and social media companies to ensure appropriate, lawful 

collection is possible. Most companies are not required by statute 

to development lawful intercept capabilities for law enforcement. 

As a result, services are developed and deployed without any ability for law enforcement to collect. The FBI, in partnership with the 

Department of Homeland Security, is utilizing all investigative 

techniques and methods to combat the threat these individuals 

pose to the United States. In conjunction with our domestic and 

foreign partners, we rigorously collect and analyze intelligence as 

it pertains to on-going threats posed by ISIL, AQAP, and other foreign terrorist organizations. 

In partnership with our many Federal, State, and local agencies 

assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the country, 

we remain vigilant to ensure the safety of the American public. Be 

assured the FBI continues to pursue increased efficiencies and information-sharing processes to stay ahead of the threat to the 

homeland. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and committee 

Members, I thank you for this opportunity to testify concerning the 

foreign fighter threat and home-grown violent extremist threat 

posed to the homeland. I am happy to answer any questions at this 

time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Steinbach follows:] 
24 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL B. STEINBACH

FEBRUARY 11, 2015 

Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of 

the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 

the dynamic threat of foreign fighters traveling in support of the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the rising threat to the United States from homegrown violent extremism. This threat remains one of the biggest priorities not only 

for the FBI but for the intelligence community (IC) as a whole and our foreign partners. Conflicts in Syria and Iraq are currently the most attractive overseas theater for 

Western-based extremists who want to engage in violence. We estimate upwards of 

150 Americans have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria to join extremist 

groups. However, once in Syria, it is very difficult to discern what happens there. 

This lack of clarity remains troubling to the IC. 

ISIL has proven to be relentless and continues to terrorize individuals in Syria 

and Iraq, including Westerners. We are concerned about the possibility of homegrown extremists becoming radicalized by information available on the internet. 

ISIL utilizes high-quality, traditional media platforms, as well as wide-spread social 

media campaigns, to propagate its extremist ideas. The group’s ability to produce 

visually appealing messaging coupled with the rampant use of social media by ISIL 

supporters exhibits the diverse propaganda capabilities. Combined, these tactics result in sophisticated propaganda which may continue to inspire individuals in the 

homeland to travel to fight overseas. Recent propaganda releases include multiple 

issues of English language publications, including a complete English magazine. 

Several videos of ISIL-held hostages and videos sensationalizing ISIL members have 

also been released. 

The threat to American interests overseas is most acute in Iraq, but extends 

throughout the Middle East region and to the West. There is little doubt that ISIL 

views the United States and the West as a strategic enemy. A year ago, the leader 

of ISIL warned the United States will soon be in direct conflict with the group. In 

January 2015, ISIL released a video via social media networking sites reiterating 

the group’s encouragement of lone-offender attacks in Western countries; specifically 

advocating for attacks against soldiers, patrons, law enforcement, and intelligence 

members. Several incidents have occurred in the United States and Europe over the 

last few months that indicate this ‘‘call to arms’’ has resonated among ISIL supporters and sympathizers. 

Our Western partners in Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom 

(UK) have recently disrupted plotting and, unfortunately, had security officers attacked by individuals linked to ISIL or other forms of violent extremism. A French 

national who took hostages in Paris and shot and killed a policewoman in early January, claimed he was an ISIL supporter. In December 2014, another French national entered a police station in France and began stabbing police officers before 

being killed by police in a violent extremism attack. Two separate attacks in Canada 

in October 2014 targeted Canadian soldiers. Additionally, in September and October, the U.K. and Australian authorities separately thwarted attacks targeting local 

law enforcement. In each scenario, the apprehended individuals had suspected ties 

to ISIL. 

The FBI remains concerned the recent calls by ISIL and its supporters on violent 

extremist web forums, and the recent events in Europe could continue to motivate 

home-grown extremists to conduct attacks in the homeland. On-line supporters of 

ISIL have used various social media platforms to call for retaliation against the 

United States in the homeland. In one case, an Ohio-based man was arrested in 

January after he obtained a weapon and stated his intent to conduct an attack on 

the U.S. Capitol in Washington, DC. Using a Twitter account, the individual posted 

statements, videos, and other content indicating support for ISIL, and he planned 

his attack based on this voiced support. 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to pose one of the greatest 

threats to the United States. AQAP’s on-line English magazine Inspire advocates for 

lone wolves to conduct attacks against the homeland and Western targets by utilizing simple and inexpensive tactics and methods. The most recent edition of Inspire was released via social media sites in December 2014. As with the previous 

editions, the magazine promotes the need for lone wolves to carry out small arms 

attacks and provides specific, detailed ‘‘how-to’’ instructions for constructing a successful bomb. 

Historically, AQAP has been focused on large-scale transportation and aviation 

plotting. However, last month’s shooting at a satirical magazine’s office in Paris 
25 

demonstrates the sophisticated ability of individuals inspired or directed by AQAP 

to conduct coordinated attacks by combining small arms and explosive devices. The 

attackers demonstrated extensive preparation and maintained a level of discipline 

throughout the attack. This assault shows a new wave of extremism; a blending of 

home-grown violent extremism and an association with a foreign terrorist organization. 

Soon after the attacks in Paris, authorities in Belgium conducted a raid against 

several individuals who were allegedly planning an attack against police personnel. 

These individuals purportedly had ties to ISIL and allegedly had some connections 

to the Paris attackers. Our European partners remain on heightened alert and continue to take the steps necessary to mitigate imminent threats. 

The recent events in Europe re-emphasize our need to remain vigilant in the 

homeland as these small-scale attacks are feasible within the United States. Individuals inspired by foreign terrorist groups could be covertly arming themselves 

with expertise and tools to carry out an attack in the homeland. Community and 

world events may trigger one of these individuals to act. We remain concerned these 

types of events, which were widely broadcasted in the media, could inspire ‘‘copycat’’ attacks. Additionally, as we saw after ISIL posted videos depicting beheadings 

of hostages, we continue to see intelligence advocating plots which include public or 

videotaped beheadings. 

The FBI, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, is utilizing 

all investigative techniques and methods to combat the threat these individuals may 

pose to the United States. In conjunction with our domestic and foreign partners, 

we are rigorously collecting and analyzing intelligence information as it pertains to 

the on-going threat posed by ISIL, AQAP, and other foreign terrorist organizations. 

In each of the FBI’s 56 Field Offices, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces remain vigilant to ensure the safety of the American public. Given the global impact of the 

Syria and Iraq conflicts, regular engagement with our domestic and foreign partners 

concerning foreign fighters is critical. 

The FBI continues to pursue increased information sharing, efforts to combat 

radicalization, and exchanges regarding community outreach programs and policing 

strategies. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and committee Members, I thank 

you for this opportunity to testify concerning the threat foreign fighters and homegrown extremists pose to the homeland. I am happy to answer any questions you 

might have. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Director. Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

You know, the American people have seen Americans, the American journalists, beheaded by the executioner, ISIS executioner. It 

was a wake-up call for the United States, Kayla Mueller, who was 

just recently executed, and the Jordanian pilot, in one of the most 

horrific videos I have ever seen, and a very sophisticated Hollywood 

movie production style, lit on flames. They are barbarians, and I 

think the barbarians are at the gate. 

We want to keep them outside the gate of the United States. I 

am concerned that some have already returned. So my first question is—we know there are 50,000 ISIS strong. We know that foreign fighters have gone from 15,000 to 20,000. We know that 5,000 

of these foreign fighters have Western passports that could get 

them entrance into the United States. As Director Rasmussen mentioned, there are hundreds of Americans who have traveled to the 

region to fight with ISIS. We know that some of them have returned, and that is a Classified number. 

But my first question is, for those who have returned to the 

United States, what assurance can you give the American people— 

what confidence do we have, first that we know all the people who 

have joined the fight and returned? What are we doing about it to 

ensure that they do not attack here in the United States? Director 

Rasmussen. 
26 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I will start, but I will ask Mike Steinbach to 

pitch in on the bureau’s efforts here. 

In talking about the numbers, Mr. Chairman, you are right to 

raise questions about our overall level of confidence in numbers. As 

I tried to say in my remarks, we know what we know, but that 

comes from a wide variety of sources, and we have always assessed 

that there is likely more information out there that we have not 

yet been able to collect either from our foreign partners or from 

other intelligence means, and that it is possible that there are 

greater numbers of foreign fighters, and potentially even greater 

numbers of individuals from Western countries and the United 

States who have traveled to the conflict zones. 

I will let Mike speak to the question of what we can say about 

individuals who have traveled to the conflict zone and come back, 

but it is obviously the highest-possible priority for the intelligence 

community to track their movements. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Mr. Steinbach. 

Mr. STEINBACH. So certainly, I would not be truthful if I told you 

that we knew about all the returnees. We—like Nick said, we know 

what we know. There is a number that we don’t know about. 

The ones we know about, the numbers of foreign fighters that 

have returned from Syria, from the conflict zone, every single one 

of those is a predicated FBI investigation run on the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Regardless of the intelligence or the information 

that we started with, we go to build the case to disrupt, whether 

that disruption is in the form of deportation or whether that disruption is in the form of prosecution. 

Every single one of those known foreign fighters is an FBI investigation, and we seek to determine the root cause of their travel, 

what they did in Syria, and then ultimately, if it was in support 

of a foreign terrorist organization such as ISIL, we look for prosecution or some other disruption. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Well, in my briefings in having served as a 

Federal prosecutor, as well, I certainly understand that. I want to 

commend the FBI for its efforts in this very difficult task to monitor. You are right, you don’t know what you don’t know. I don’t 

think our human intelligence on the ground in Syria is sufficient 

to properly identify these individuals, and hopefully, the administration will move forward to do that. 

General Taylor, in regards to travel. At Homeland Security, there 

is a lot of it is about travel, keeping people off airplanes, whether 

it be al-Nusra, Khorasan Group, AQAP with bombs or these foreign 

fighters in Syria with ISIS off airplanes. There has been some concern that our European partners have not been fully cooperative. 

A good example is the brothers in the Paris attacks, went to 

Yemen, were on a No-Fly list. We share that information with 

them. I don’t know what they are doing with that. I am concerned 

about Turkey in terms of their cooperation because, let’s face it, 

these foreign fighters are like a highway going through in and out 

of Turkey, as demonstrated by the female terrorist in the grocery 

store who left Paris, went to Istanbul and into Turkey. 

What are we doing to ramp up these efforts with our European 

partners and with Turkey? 
27 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Certainly, as you indicate, one of our major on-going concerns is a foreign terrorist fighter on an airline coming to the United States from a last-point-ofdeparture airport. As I indicated in my remarks, we have taken action since July to ramp up security of our aircraft at those locations 

around Europe and in the Middle East and elsewhere, where we 

assess there is a potential for those individuals to try to exploit airplane travel to get to the United States. 

In addition, the Secretary has directed additional requirements 

under the ESTA, the Visa Waiver program, to strengthen the 

amount of data that we have to assess against our community 

records within both DHS and within the intelligence community, so 

we can spot and assess—spot individuals who may be involved in 

nefarious activity. 

I would say that we are all concerned that we only know what 

we know. Ramping up our work with our European partners and 

other partners around the world has certainly increased since the 

attacks in Paris. I was just in London last week with the Five 

Country Ministerial. There is a clear understanding that sharing 

of information on these individuals across all of our five country 

partners is critical to the ability to detect. 

We now have, and I would ask Nick to speak a little bit to it, 

within NCTC the capacity to begin to track these individuals that 

we are getting data on from across the world. That gives us a better confidence that if someone were to try to circumvent our security systems, we would at least be able to know who they were and 

what they were trying to accomplish. 

That is not a perfect system yet, we continue to add to it today. 

I just saw a report this morning, so it continues to grow, but the 

cooperation with our European partners has been significantly enhanced in the course of the last 6 months. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Well, I think since Paris it has been enhanced. I know it is—if State Department was here they could answer the coordination and cooperation with these databases. No-fly 

list, terrorist watch list, we have had a difficult time having them 

recognize that in Europe, Canada with some privacy concerns as 

well, and I hope that we can work that out so that we have a free 

exchange of intelligence and information to keep these terrorists off 

airplanes, stop the travel, and stop them from coming into the 

United States. 

My time is just about expired, but one last question. The state 

is not here to answer this, but I am very concerned and I sent a 

letter to Susan Rice about these refugees, both in Syria and Turkey. I have been over there and I have seen them. Yes, most of 

them are women and children, but there are male actors that concern me. 

I think this would be a huge mistake if we bring in these 

refugess into the United States that could potentially be 

radicalized. Then we got a—we are not only trying to keep these 

guys, the foreign fighters, out, but under this would be a Federallysanctioned welcome party, if you will, to potential terrorists in the 

United States. 

Can the three of you, and I know this is a very maybe awkward 

question to ask you, but all three of you, do you agree with that 
28 

policy that we should bring in these Syrian refugees into the 

United States? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I am not in a position to agree with the policy, 

that is really under the offices of the Secretary of State and his response—— 

Chairman MCCAUL. But do you think that would pose a threat 

or danger to Americans? 

Mr. TAYLOR. We are concerned about any group of people coming 

to the United States who may be coming to the United States for 

nefarious purposes. Therefore, under our CIS responsibilities, want 

to make sure that if we are asked to vet individuals from any part 

of the world to come to the United States, that we have applied the 

most rigorous screening that is available within the U.S. Government. 

I think we have learned that lesson in the past, and so any 

tasking we are given from a Departmental point of view with our 

intelligence community partners will be as thorough as we can 

make it to make sure—— 

Chairman MCCAUL. My time is—I mean, very succinctly, Director Rasmussen, Mr. Steinbach, would that bring in Syrian refugees 

pose a greater risk to Americans? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I mean, it is clearly a population of concern and, 

as Under Secretary Taylor said, what we want to be able to do is 

apply the full weight of U.S. intelligence community holdings to the 

vetting and screening process so that we can unearth any information that we may have in our holdings that gives us concern about 

particular individuals. 

Thank you. The Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Well, you said we don’t know what we don’t 

know. 

Mr. Steinbach. 

Mr. STEINBACH. Yes, I am concerned. We will have to take a look 

at those lists and go through all of the intelligence holdings and be 

very careful to try and identify connections to foreign terrorist 

groups. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Following on the Chairman’s questioning, is it our procedure for 

anyone coming to this country that we provide a thorough vetting 

of that individual, or those individuals, before they are allowed to 

come? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Is that your understanding, Mr. Rasmussen? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes—National Counterterrorism Center as a information center provides the information that allows the screening 

agencies to decide—make the decisions on entry or exit. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Steinbach. 

Mr. STEINBACH. You have to have information to vet, so the concern in Syria is that we don’t have systems in places on the ground 

to collect the information to vet. That would be the concern is we 

would be vetting—databases don’t hold the information on those individuals, and that is the concern. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 
29 

This is to General Taylor and to you, Director Steinbach. The 

Business Executives for National Security recently released a report finding that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies 

are currently operating without an enterprise-wide concept at the 

Federal level. This inhibits the Federal Government’s ability to 

conduct domestic intelligence activities in support of counterterrorism. This is a concern given the fact that there could be potential home-grown violent extremists here in the United States. 

Do you agree with that assumption? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I have had a conversation with the BENS leadership. We don’t agree with that assumption. We believe the enterprise partnership that we have with the FBI is as strong and as 

effective as it can be today, especially adding the information that 

is available through the NCTC. 

So, no, we do not agree. Things can be better. We work at making it better every day, but the lack of an enterprise approach I 

don’t think is a fair assessment of where we are today. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Director Steinbach. 

That BENS strategy piece is outdated. It was a good attempt, 

but they looked at information that was 4 or 5 years old, so no, I 

don’t agree. Updated information, had they looked at what is going 

on now, they would have likely come to a different conclusion. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Have you shared that with the business executives? 

Mr. STEINBACH. Yes, we have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

General Taylor, you have outlined in quite detail what the impact of not being funded after February 27 would be. We are talking about the threat to foreign fighters and home-grown terror. 

Can you, in short order, indicate to this committee what kinds 

of impact without money the Department would be faced? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Certainly, sir. Certainly, sir, and not a total list, but 

for example, nearly $2.6 billion in funding for new grants, including $103 billion in homeland security grants and $680 million in 

foreign fighters assistance grants cannot be approved—disseminated under the current continuing resolution. 

One hundred ninety million dollars in new upgrades for remote 

and mobile—video surveillance along the Rio Grande Valley to enhance our detection capability there. One hundred forty-two million 

dollars in Secret Service protective activities as we are get into the 

election cycle. So, there is a long list of things that we are precluded from doing and investing in without a full funding bill from 

the Congress. 

Mr. THOMPSON. One of the things that a lot of us are confronted 

with as well as our constituents, is we all have Federal buildings 

in our communities. After the situation in Paris, the Secretary ordered an enhanced effort at those Federally-protected facilities. 

Would the lack of money for the Department create a security risk 

at some of those buildings? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I can’t speak spec—we are continuing to enhance our security efforts at facilities across the country, Federal 

facilities that we are charged with protecting. Specifics on whether 

or not FPS would be able to continue that, I would have to take 

that as a question and get back to you. 
30 

Mr. THOMPSON. Please, I think we need to hear since we have 

quite a few of those facilities. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chairman recognizes the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield my time to my 

colleague from Texas, Mr. Hurd. 

Mr. HURD. I would like to thank the gentleman from Texas and 

you here today. I appreciate you all coming here. 

I know the difficulty of the task that you all are charged with 

having spent 9 years as an undercover officer in the CIA, chasing 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban and places like that—organizations like 

that. I know the difficulty and—I know that the people in your— 

the men and women in your organizations are operating as if it is 

September 12, 2001. Please, when you go back to your organizations, thank them for all of their hard work on behalf of us. 

When I was in Pakistan, Afghanistan, you know, the bad guys 

would push their message through night letters. At night, they 

would drop letters on people’s doorsteps. Now, they have social 

media, and all three of you will have highlighted that in your testimony and in the documents that you submitted. 

My question is—is what efforts—who is coordinating the effort to 

counter that ideology on social media and these other elements? 

You know, 20 percent of any counter-insurgency is cutting off the 

head of the snake, 80 percent is addressing the underlying concerns. 

Who is leading that? What are you guys doing in each one of 

your agencies to counter that? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I will start, and certainly welcome help from my 

partners up here. 

In terms of the counter-ISIL strategy that the President has laid 

out for our effort to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL, State Department has the lead for working with our international partners 

and the overseas environment to counter violent extremism, and to 

create a counter-narrative and a counter-messaging effort. I would 

certainly defer to them to kind-of describe the whole range of activities which have included a number of overseas summit meetings and other gatherings designed to coordinate, particularly inside the region, inside the Middle East to make sure that our partners in the coalition are doing their part to counter the narrative. 

Here at home, we have, as I described in my testimony, I think 

a very effective partnership among the four agencies and departments with responsibility for countering violent extremism. DHS, 

the FBI, the Department of Justice, and NCTC. As I said, we work 

together almost seamlessly on a range of difference CVE initiatives, 

leveraging the capabilities that each of our departments have. 

I say that because it is the law enforcement community that has 

the reach into local law enforcement. So FBI has that advantage. 

Homeland Security has the reach into a network of community organizations and other Homeland Security-oriented populations in 

our major metropolitan areas that gives them reach into. NCTC 

tries to provide analytic support and, you know, content generation 

to help us with this effort at outreach in the domestic environment. 
31 

So, it really is—I rarely would say this—we are seamless as we 

could, I think, almost possibly be in terms of our work together. 

The question is, as I mentioned to the Chairman earlier, is scale. 

Are we doing enough of it? Do we have enough reach into all of the 

parts of the country where this is a potential problem? I would not 

argue to you that we are there yet on that score. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. The President’s CVE summit will give us a 

chance to kind-of give that an important boost. 

Mr. STEINBACH. Yes, just one note on context. So, you know, part 

of is—a part of this message has to be pushed down at the local 

level, just like parents have to watch their children on the internet 

and on social media for pedophiles and financial criminals. We 

have to have that same message. You have to have interaction. If 

you look at the case in Denver that was highlighted, you look at 

other cases, we see a lack of understanding by parents and guardians to what is going on, and that tool needs to be monitored. It 

is a powerful tool and it provides quite a bit of reach. So, that is 

a part of it at the local level. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you. Next question is two parts. 

Again, when I was, you know, in the intelligence community and 

operating an alias, I would frequently travel to a lot of countries, 

and I never ended up going to that end destination. I would go 

somewhere else driving because it was a lot easier. So, you know, 

the concept of broken travel. 

What are you all doing in order to monitor the broken travel of 

folks that may end up going to Syria, but don’t go directly there, 

drive in? The other issue is, what new intelligence capabilities do 

we need in Syria in order for you all better do your job back here? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Let me speak first, sir, to the nature of how we 

monitor broken travel. It is a concern. People can book a flight to 

an end-destination, and stop at an end-point and go other places. 

We understand that phenomenon. 

We are able to use our travel data to better spot those instances 

when they occur. As I mentioned earlier, taking that information 

and bouncing it against the other holdings within the community 

to better understand the phenomenon. It is not perfect yet. It continues to refine, but it is an issue that we now understand how 

that works and use our travel security tools to monitor it most effectively. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Sir, you raise a very good point about the challenge of collecting intelligence in Syria right now. Without going 

into too much detail in an open session, it is a tremendously challenging collection environment for all of our intelligence agencies 

because we are not present on the ground there in a traditional 

way. We don’t have the footprint on the ground that we would have 

in many places around the world with a diplomatic, military, and 

intelligence presence. 

So, we are forced to be more creative, more innovative, more entrepreneurial in trying to close that gap. 

We can talk about that more in closed session, but it—all of the 

intelligence agencies have prioritized this at the absolute top of our 

priority list in terms of devoting resources, energy, and effort to do 

so. I would not argue, though, that we have closed the gap on 
32 

where we need to be in terms of our understanding with granularity what is going on on the ground in Syria. 

In many cases, the information we have about foreign fighters 

traveling into the conflict zone stops when they get there, and we 

don’t have as much insight, or nearly enough insight, into what actually happens when they are on the ground in Syria. That is a gap 

we are trying to close. 

Mr. HURD. I think they covered it sufficiently. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, is recognized. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

our witnesses for your testimony today. 

I would like to turn to the discussion that we have been involved 

with this morning about tracking those individuals who have been 

in the conflict zone in Iraq or Syria fighting with ISIS who have 

U.S. or Western passports. 

It is my understanding that we have, you know, somewhat our 

arms around being able to track those with U.S. passports, but as 

we have alluded to this morning, we are talking about maybe on 

the hundreds, or a hundred or so persons with U.S. passports. 

But it could be in the thousands for people with Western passports that are fighting in Syria, many of whom with ISIS, and yet 

those individuals that could travel potentially then back to European countries and could come to the United States, particularly 

those from Visa Waiver countries—and what I am hearing, what 

I have heard in past testimony—that it is very difficult perhaps to 

track those individuals particularly because there are certain governments particularly in the European Union that are reluctant to 

share threat information on their citizens due to privacy concerns. 

I was just in Munich this past weekend at the Munich Security 

Conference, met with Britain’s—their Secretary of Defense, and he 

confirmed that that is a concern not so much for the United Kingdom because their privacy laws are different, and so that kind of 

information sharing is not—restricted from Great Britain, but more 

an issue with continental European countries. 

So has this been the experience of NCTC? What are we doing to 

close that gap? Because that is a significant blind spot for us. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. In talking about sharing of information, particularly from our European partners, I think it is maybe useful to 

think of it happening in two different ways. One is kind-of structured, routinized sharing of travel information of the sort that 

Under Secretary Taylor mentioned before. We certainly want that 

kind of sharing from our European partners because it would help 

us with the screening that we are talking about. 

But the other kind of sharing that I think is worth mentioning, 

and where we have seen, I would say, a fairly dramatic improvement with our European partners over the last couple of years, is 

intelligence service to intelligence service sharing on individuals of 

specific terrorism concern. 

We have been on a bit of an evangelical effort over the past few 

years to try to engage our European partners on this, and I would 

argue that a couple of years ago, we were in the position of explaining, Gee, this is a terrible threat, we need to work together on it. 
33 

We are well past that now. Any European capital you go to or 

any European partner you engage with jumps into that conversation right away and is quite open in sharing what they know, including often about their own citizens. What that allows us to do 

is potentially populate our TIDE, our Terrorist Identities Datamart 

Environment, with information about specific individuals that can 

aid our screening process. 

So I don’t want to paint an entirely dire picture of our European 

partners’ work in this area because I would argue that in intelligence channels, it has been almost unprecedentedly a good news 

story. Much room for improvement, and Europe is not a monolith, 

and so certainly, across the continent, there are areas where we 

could get better, more cooperative sharing arrangements. 

But I did want to distinguish between the two types of sharing 

because there is a kind of bulk data-sharing discussion that is 

sometimes more difficult for our European partners. Then there is 

more granular, specific sharing about known individuals on whom 

we have intelligence reporting where I think they are often quite 

responsive. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. But what I want to get to is the question, should 

we be insisting or trying to work with NATO partners, our European partners, to change their privacy laws, or can Congress play 

a role in helping to ease these privacy concerns? For example, do 

you believe that the judicial redress announced last week as part 

of the PPD–28 review would help alleviate these challenges? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I would say that the privacy concerns in Europe 

are significant, and not just in this area of sharing terrorism information, but in all aspects of how private information is shared for 

business, for Government and elsewhere. 

The Chairman referred to it earlier. There are now new laws in 

several countries, particularly in the five I’s about enhancing that 

sharing. There is a discussion at the European Union this week 

about EUPNR, which we are encouraged by and hope that the European parliament will move forward to pass a European-wide PNR 

requirement that allows for that data to be collected across Europe 

and shared across the European Union. 

We think that will be a big step, but we also think if that doesn’t 

work, then we can work bilaterally with individual countries to 

share data. The important thing for us is using every tool in our 

toolkit to get the information shared between us and our partners, 

and back and forth. There is not one set of processes that are going 

to do that, but we are going to use every tool in the toolkit to make 

sure those relationships work and work effectively. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I would just add one thing, though, to your 

point, Mr. Langevin, on engaging European legislatures or parliaments. I mean, I think anything we can collectively do to send 

the message that if information is shared with us, we use it for the 

purposes that we have asked for it, and we handle it responsibly 

and in accordance with the terms on which it was given to us. If 

that can provide reassurance to European partners and increase 

the flow of information, then all to the good. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. I appreciate your answer. I just would say 

I still think this is—until we get this seamless, and we are getting 
34 

all the information that we need, it is a blind spot. I think it is a 

problem and I think we need to work on this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 

Duncan, is recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for a very timely hearing. I would ask that we schedule a Classified hearing, briefing 

with some of these intelligence community to get a little different 

intake—input. 

Chairman MCCAUL. That is a good idea. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes. Thank you. So Director Rasmussen, alQaeda—they are still alive and well, right? They are still a threat 

to freedom, global freedom? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, sir. They certainly pose a significant terrorist threat. 

Mr. DUNCAN. In fact, I would say that al-Qaeda, ISIS, al-Qaeda 

in all of its elements, AQAP, AQ MINA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, 

Abu Sayyaf—all these terrorist groups are still active, right? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So we shouldn’t take our eye off the ball with just 

focusing on ISIS and think of this globally and not get hung up on 

the 50 shades of terrorism, talk about terrorism about terrorism, 

that these groups are a threat all over the globe. 

So let me lay out a scenario that actually happened. I led a 

CODEL back in late May to Europe. Right before we arrived in 

Brussels, a foreign fighter had traveled to Syria about a year, I believe, maybe 18 months, radicalized, came back through Turkey, 

through Germany into Brussels, shot up a Jewish museum, killed 

three people. A fourth one was wounded. I don’t know if that person died or not or remember that. 

That was right before we arrived. It was very—it was very real 

to the Belgians. It was very real to the French because this foreign 

fighter fled out of Belgium through France and was captured in 

Marseilles, trying to catch a boat or a plane to North Africa. Had 

he gotten out of Europe into North Africa, he would have disappeared. 

This was a foreign fighter that took advantage of the Schengen 

region, the open borders in Europe. From what I remember from 

talking with the folks in Europe at that time is that Germany had 

information about this individual who had traveled through Germany but failed to share in a timely manner with either the Belgium or the French authorities. 

So I am concerned—(A), Mr. Chairman, you brought up the point 

of Visa Waiver. I am concerned with the whole Schengen open travel, open border region and visa waiver and the ability of foreign 

fighters to flow to this country. I am also concerned about the open 

borders and the ability to of foreign fighters to get back to Europe, 

travel to Marseilles or to the south of France, and hop over from 

Portugal or Spain into North Africa and disappear, or maybe rejoin 

the fight with Boko Haram or al-Shabaab, or travel back to the 

Middle East and continue these evil acts. 

So in a post-Snowden environment, where I believe the reason 

Germany was slow to inform the French or the Belgians was be-
35 

cause of intelligence sharing and what was being revealed at the 

time about the United States spying on Chancellor Merkel. 

So in the post-Snowden environment, let me ask you, are we 

communicating with our allies in the region, our global allies in 

this war on terror? How do you see that communication being hampered in the post-Snowden era? Either one. I would rather—let’s 

talk to Mr. Taylor first. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I think our communication is robust with our 

allies across the world on this particular issue. It is not perfect. 

Certainly, the challenges within the Schengen zone in terms of free 

travel once an individual gets into Schengen and is able to move 

is understood by the European Union. Hence the discussions about 

PNR and other sorts of data exchanged between the Schengen zone 

countries to better remedy that particular circumstance that you 

describe. 

It is not perfect yet, but I think they recognize the security deficit that is created—cross-border movement that is allowed within 

the Schengen zone at this point in time and are looking at ways 

in which they can remedy that. But I would tell you that the bilateral and multilateral engagement on this issue of foreign fighters 

and sharing of data is daily and consistent and robust. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Rasmussen, in 41 seconds. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. You are right to point to an overlay or an overhang from the period of disclosures that included the Snowden disclosures. But I would argue that since that period, we have seen 

an increased sense of shared threat among our European partners 

precisely because of the attacks like the Brussels attack and certainly what we saw in Paris and in Belgium again recently. So 

that, I would argue, there is a bit of a pendulum swing to this process that is for the moment trending in a direction of more sharing 

and willingness to share information. 

But again, I would argue with intelligence channels, that is not 

an immediate thing that just happened in the last 2 weeks since 

Paris. I think we have—that has been a pretty consistent refrain 

over the past couple of years. The politics of this issue are very difficult for some of our European partners, but as professional intelligence organizations working with each other, I would argue a lot 

goes on that we can be comfortable is useful to us. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes. I thank the gentleman. My time is expired. 

But communication is key in this realm, and I think you have acknowledged that. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the lenience, and I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank the gentleman for his insight, as always. 

Gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just on two aspects of this. One is the nature of terrorist attacks 

has changed profoundly. Al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has relied traditionally on complex plots involving explosions in airliners. Now, in September 2014, an ISIS leader told 

would-be recruits not to bother coming to Iraq or Syria but to 

launch attacks in their home countries. ISIS has called for attacks 

on soft targets in the West by any means available, including using 

a car to drive at pedestrians. 
36 

The other issue is technology. As Mr. Steinbach had said, technology moves faster than legislation, a lot faster. You characterize 

the FBI as labeling this, you know, ‘‘going dark.’’ It is increasingly 

difficult to monitor the communications within terrorist networks. 

The proliferation of often encrypted, covert, coded information to 

prevent unauthorized use, from Skype to gaming forums to other 

new technology, has made surveillance tremendously technologically demanding, and in some cases, virtually impossible. 

Moreover, Apple’s latest mobile operating system came with a default encryption, and Google’s Android is soon to follow. In these 

systems, companies do not have access to their customers’ passwords, and thus can’t capture their messages. 

Now from a customer standpoint, from a consumer standpoint, 

you know, that is a very good thing. But those who are malicious— 

those—the malignancy of terror—it takes away a major tool that 

law enforcement uses to thwart terrorist activity in its planning 

stages. 

So, could you comment on that and what it is, if anything, we 

can be doing? You know, there was a time where publicly-owned 

telephone companies were all too willing to cooperate with law enforcement agencies for wiretaps and those kinds of things. That is 

no longer the case, and this poses a major, major challenge to 

Western law enforcement officials. 

Mr. STEINBACH. Sir, I agree with you, the threat—first of all, is 

diffused, it is evolving, and so I think sometimes we focus too much 

on the other end versus the threat. Whether it is a complex attack, 

a coordinated attack such as Paris, or a more simple use of a vehicle as we saw in Jerusalem. 

We need to focus on the threat and the commonality in many of 

these threat streams is the internet, is social media. I think it 

needs to start with an education. I think there is probably a little 

bit of a backlash from Snowden, but there is also the TV version 

of it, what they think is doable and how simple it is. In the reality 

of lawful intercept, there is a very structured process in place that 

is reviewed by judicial, either on the criminal side or in FISAC— 

in the court. 

So, I think there needs to be an education piece that we are not 

looking to snoop where we shouldn’t be allowed to snoop, but we 

have to have the lawful ability to intercept. Whether you are talking about a on-going criminal matter, a dangerous criminal matter, 

or you are talking about a terrorist communicating over the—either 

overseas or within the United States. 

So, I think it needs to start with a public message for all of us 

to explain exactly what it is. Then we need to go back and provide 

legislative tools, much like there were with Kahlea, that apply to 

not just a small number of telecommunication providers, but apply 

to the majority of those providers who serve as communication 

platforms. I think that is an issue that needs to be resolved and 

head-on immediately. 

I know from the FBI’s perspective, we are engaging with the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police, the major city sheriffs 

and the chiefs, the USIC and others to explain our position and to 

show them very much that we are not crying wolf. This is a problem and in a closed session we can show you the numbers of how 
37 

we are going dark. But it is a grave concern, and your point is 

right on. Without that lawful tool, we risk an attack. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, and thank you for raising that 

important issue. I think it is going to provide a mode of communication for not only criminals, but potential terrorists to communicate without any ability of us to intercept that. So, with that the 

Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Taylor, a man named, a jihadist as I would characterize him, 

named Abdul Sabah from Florida was allowed back into the country and wandered around here for about 6 months in between visits 

to Syria. Now, he eventually met his demise on his own hand as 

a suicide bomber in Syria, but as far as I know, we didn’t even 

know. The United States didn’t even know that he made two previous trips. So, this individual is obviously somebody that we would 

be interested in and poses a threat to our security. 

How did we—how did your agency—what did we miss? How did 

we miss it? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sorry, you are correct that this individual who later 

committed a suicide attack in Syria did return to the United States 

from Syria without our knowledge, and I think without—was not 

under an FBI investigation. It was only after his suicide attack 

that we learned of his activity. 

I think that incident really reinforced our understanding of the 

need to have better intelligence on what was going on in Syria. 

Mr. PERRY. I agree with you, I am just—how did we miss him? 

What has changed, what have you done in your agency to make 

sure that that doesn’t happen again? 

How did we miss him? What has changed? 

Mr. TAYLOR. What has changed is our better understanding of 

how these people move, where they move, working with our foreign 

partners in terms of sharing intelligence, understanding the intelligence that is coming out and the communications patterns that 

are going on that perhaps weren’t as robust. 

Mr. PERRY. Are there any concrete steps that you can describe 

right now that you have changed based on missing him and to 

make sure it doesn’t happen again? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I think I would share that with the FBI in terms 

of what the FBI has done in addition to what DHS has done. In 

terms of—— 

Mr. PERRY. What have you done? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, we have extensively changed our methodology 

for tracking travel across the world, to the United States and out 

of the United States to these sorts of locations. In working with our 

intelligence partners across the world to better identify the linkages between potential Americans and others—— 

Mr. PERRY. With all due respect, in the interest of time, is that 

information Classified? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Can we set up an off-site that I can get that 

information from you? I appreciate it. Thank you. 

Moving on, I am just curious to get an understanding of how you 

characterize this threat. By what name does your agencies refer to 
38 

what I describe as a global jihadi movement? That is what I described it as. What—you are talking about foreign fighters, but the 

larger picture, I am just trying to get a mind’s eye into your view 

of it from an agency perspective. 

How do you describe this threat? 

Mr. TAYLOR. We describe it as radical extremism. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Mr. Rasmussen. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Global extremists. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Mr. Steinbach. 

Mr. STEINBACH. Sir, I don’t care what you call it. It is a threat 

to U.S. citizens here and abroad, so it is people trying to conduct 

violent attacks, whether you call it global extremism, al-Qaeda, 

AQAP, it is a threat. I am not going to—I don’t care about labeling. 

I worry about their intent. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, I appreciate that, sir, and I agree with you, but 

you can’t fix a problem if you refuse, or unwilling, or unable to 

label it, and I think it is more than just global extremism. 

There is a particular global extremism, and that is why I characterize it as jihadi. The fact that none of you want to say—you 

know, characterize it that concerns me because that is not identifying the problem. 

But, moving on, yet again in the interest of time. The UAE, 

Saudi Arabia and Egypt considered the Muslim Brotherhood as a 

terrorist organization. I am wondering, in the interest of pursuing 

foreign fighters, if—that comes into your consideration, 

radicalization and how it is perpetrated in this country. 

Do you look at those organizations, or that particular organization, or another one for that matter—CAIR, those folks wander 

around this country with impunity and—may or may not be involved in radicalization based on the fact that some nations have 

considered them a terrorist organization. Does that work into your 

calculation into determining radicalization? Do you have any 

knowledge of radicalization or participation by any of the—either 

of those two organizations? 

Mr. STEINBACH. Sir—— 

Mr. PERRY. And Muslim Brotherhood. 

Mr. STEINBACH. If you are asking me if I consider the Muslim 

Brotherhood a concern, I do. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

Mr. STEINBACH. If you look at the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, what it stood for, where it began, absolutely. There is, at 

the core, there are concerns about their ideology and their 

radicalization. 

Mr. PERRY. All right, and so do you do investigations? Have any 

investigations led you to those organizations at all, regarding 

radicalization of America? 

Mr. STEINBACH. Absolutely, There are historical investigations 

that at the root, the individual was radicalized by Muslim Brotherhood entities. We don’t focus on the group. The individual has to 

have an intent, and that is where we focus the effort. 

Where is the radicalization come from is important for us, but it 

is not where I can hang my hat, and it is certainly not what I can 

build a case on. 

Mr. PERRY. Appreciate it. Mr. Chairman, I yield. 
39 

Chairman MCCAUL. Just to the gentleman’s point, I—in deference to these individuals, in their reports they refer to it as 

Sunni extremism. I believe it is radical Islamist extremism that is 

the enemy. It is important to define that, it defies me why the administration won’t call it that, but I will support these three witnesses, who, in their reporting, call—I think called threat what it 

is. 

Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Taylor, thank 

you for your service. 

I want to go back to your very first remarks that you began this 

hearing with. You were talking about your concerns with the budget in homeland security. You know, there is a dangerous game of 

chicken that is going on right now, where in reaction to the President’s immigration efforts, the reaction has been to threaten withholding of the very funding that protects our homeland security. 

Now, I don’t think in the minds of the public they think there 

will be an absolute cutting of—out those funds, because that would 

be so radical a reaction. I don’t think they think that is feasible. 

However, my point is, the reaction of going from these stop-gap 

budgets, continuing resolutions from month to month, backwards 

and forwards, that presents real limits on what you can do itself. 

So, I want you to focus on the fact that, forget about for a second 

the threat of just the cutting off of those funds. Right now the way 

you are functioning is a threat to your ability to deal with our security. 

Could you talk to that important point, I believe? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Certainly, sir. Secretary Johnson has spoken to that 

point, and as we have spoken during our testimony today that the 

threat that we face is evolving and changing. He needs the flexibility to adjust tactics and techniques as this threat evolves under 

the current issues. With the continuing resolution he does not have 

that flexibility. 

I would add one other thing. Before this committee, and before 

the authorizing committees, or the intelligence committees, as I 

came on board, one of the major issues discussed was the issue of 

morale. We have 220,000 employees in our Department who every 

day come to work to try to secure this country. It sends a terrible 

signal, in my view, to them and their responsibility when the Congress has not fully funded the effort that they are charged with accomplishing. 

So, not only from an ability to react to the changing nature of 

the threat, we have a challenge in our Department in ensuring our 

people understand that we support them and that they are going 

to get—— 

Mr. KEATING. I thank you for that. I just don’t want it lost as 

we are talking about all these things today that we should be 

doing, that you are limited right now and able—you are limited in 

being able to address those things because of this stop-gap or continuing resolution approach that just keeps going on. 

Along those lines, one of the programs that I am interested in, 

particularly that Director Rasmussen talked about in general, was 

a program with Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Boston. Some of the 
40 

UASI money is going to fund that, and it is joint with homeland 

and with the Justice Department in general. It is the effort dealing 

with the National strategy on empowering local partners to prevent 

violent extremism. 

To me, that is a critical point going forward, too. I see it right 

in my own home State in Boston, in our ability to deal with that. 

Director, could you comment on that, and any other witnesses? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Sure, and the three cities that you mentioned, 

sir, are pilot cities in an effort to try to test and—and see if we 

can—what we are doing in an effort to counter violent extremism 

in our—in our communities here in the United States is, in fact, 

a workable solution, working with State and local partners, and is 

therefore something scalable and we can use it across a larger 

number of cities. 

The three pilot cities are going to be featured at the upcoming 

CVE summit that the White House is convening in just a couple 

weeks. There will be an obvious opportunity there to show other 

communities the benefits of participating in an effort to pull all of 

the different tools of a community together, not just the Federal 

tools as Director Steinbach said. This largely has to be a locallyled initiative, but enabled and with content help generated by the 

Government. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes, this committee has done much work, particularly in light of the Boston Marathon bombing, in showing the multiplier effect of dealing with our local, and State, and county resources and assets in there. So, that is why it is important. 

Very quickly, one other point with the Passenger Name Record 

information. I mean, it spent 2013 in the European parliament that 

that has languished. It is great to hear a corporation with the 

United States and our allies is going great, but they are not talking 

to each other. Without that, we have a problem. 

Can you see any changes, or recommend any changes, should 

this stalemate continue with the Visa Waiver program? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, you mean the stalemate within the—— 

Mr. KEATING. Within the European Union and parliament in 

dealing with this. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Of course our Visa Waiver program agreements are 

with individual countries. 

Mr. KEATING. Right. 

Mr. TAYLOR. We are looking to strengthen within that bilateral 

relationship the exchange of information under the Visa Waiver 

program. So, we would love to see the European parliament come 

through and decide to do this across Europe, but that will not dissuade us from engaging bilaterally on the information exchanges 

that we think we need to—— 

Mr. KEATING. I agree with you, but I wanted to hear your comments in that regard, because there has been some discussion on 

changing that. But I think really we compromise our security in 

doing that. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Let me just add, the gentleman mentioned 

Boston. We have the Watertown police, as you know, in town to receive the Presidential Medal of Valor for Public Safety. I can’t 
41 

think of a organization more deserving than the Watertown police 

and the heroic efforts on that fateful day. 

With that, the Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from 

Florida, Mr. Clawson. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Thank you for coming, you all, today. I also pass 

along my best to the folks that work with y’all. They got a real 

tough job. Democracy is messy on Capitol Hill, and so the circumstances are difficult. So my full respect and appreciation for 

what y’all do. 

When I think about terrorists coming out of a dangerous part of 

the world like this and what is going on over there, I always think 

to Turkey. Honorable Mr. Rasmussen, you mentioned it, I think, 

earlier in your comments. On the one hand, Turkey has a proud 

history, a secular history. They got how many thousands of terrorists go to the Aegean Sea every year, manufacturing product going 

out of Ismir back to Europe, and a member of NATO. 

So you would think, on the one hand, these folks ought to be motivated to get things under control here with respect to the highway of tourists. On the other hand, I read about hostage exchanges 

with ISIL. There has been a long history, as you know, of problems 

with the Kurds. Also, it almost feels like there is ambivalence with 

respect to the violence on the border—I mean, on the border, with 

a war going on. 

It doesn’t feel to me like we can solve this problem over there, 

and therefore, over here without pinning down where Turkey really 

is. I don’t know where they are. If we can’t get an ally who is a 

member of NATO to help us in the region, I am not sure what we 

could expect from anybody else. 

So I—you know, I am befuddled on where this is going and how 

we could ever have success without Turkey, and I am really interested in what you have to say about that. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Well, I think you are absolutely right, sir, that 

success in the counter-ISIL campaign or any effort we are engaged 

in to try to stem the flow of foreign fighters into and out of the conflict zone requires a functioning, effective partnership with the 

Turks across the whole range of issues—intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy, all of that. 

It is also true, though, that Turkey will always look at its interests through the prism of their own sense of self-interest, and how 

they prioritize particular requests that we make for cooperation 

doesn’t always align with our prioritization. That is just a simple 

fact. 

We have a complicated on-going discussion with the Turks, all of 

the Turkish government elements, about the specific ways in which 

Turkey can contribute to the coalition. I wish my State Department 

partners were here today to kind-of talk you through all of the different ways in which they are doing that, but it is a—truly a mixed 

story. There are areas where we receive profoundly effective cooperation from our Turkish partners and it is tremendously useful, 

and yet from our perspective, we think there is more to the relationship that we could get more that we need from the relationship 

to effectively address our concerns. 

Mr. CLAWSON. How do we take the next step, or is that purely 

a State Department issue at this point? 
42 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, certainly, State Department has the lead, but 

our Department has been engaged with the Turks on very specific 

border security and other discussions to try to push forward more 

cooperation in that regard, and that is continuing. The Turks will 

be here for the CVE summit. Those engagements will continue. But 

as Director Rasmussen mentioned, it is a challenge at this point. 

But we see lights of cooperation beginning to flow in ways that we, 

I think, will want to explore going forward with them. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Well, we will push this in Foreign Affairs Committee, as well, because it seems that if we speak about a broad 

coalition to take on global terrorism and we don’t have a fully committed Turkey on one bookend, and the other bookend is Syria, for 

God’s sakes, you know, what are we really doing here? 

So I appreciate y’all’s comments, and I think until you get full 

cooperation from the Turks, this is going to be a real uphill battle, 

in my view. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank the gentleman on this important 

point. Our NATO ally Turkey could be a real help with the situation. I think we need to put pressure towards that end. 

Gentlelady from New York, Miss Rice, is recognized. 

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So I am not sure who can answer this, or all of you or one of 

you. Can you expand on the enhancements that are—have been 

made or are planning—or are going to be made on the ESTA system for the Visa Waiver countries to better secure, obviously, our 

Nation’s homeland? To what extent—or where do you get the funding to ensure that whatever enhancements need to be made can be 

paid for? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, ma’am. In October, we added six additional 

data elements that were required for all—and I don’t have the specific ones, I can get them to you—that would broaden the data elements that have to been filled in in an ESTA application that 

comes to us before the travel is accomplished. 

That has allowed us to do more thorough screenings against our 

databases of those people who would come in from Visa Waiver 

countries. We are considering additional adjustments both bilaterally and across our entire program that are now being discussed 

in our Department to continue to strengthen the security of the 

Visa Waiver program and not to give us better confidence, more 

confidence here on the Hill and elsewhere that the security of that 

program is as effective as it can be. 

Miss RICE. In terms of oversight, how is that we ensure that 

every country that is part of the Visa Waiver program is actually 

keeping up with the standards that we need in order for us to get 

the information that we need? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, we do biannual reviews on the ground in those 

countries, of every Visa Waiver country. One of the things we are 

discussing is whether we should do that annually, as opposed to biannually. There are other things that we are discussing to 

strengthen our confidence that what we believe is happening in 

those countries is indeed happening. There will be more to come on 

that in the future as those deliberations continue. 

Miss RICE. Okay. Thank you. 
43 

I yield back, Mr. Speaker. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, from Georgia, Mr. Loudermilk, is recognized. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To the witnesses here today, I appreciate you being here. I don’t 

know that when in my lifetime, I have been more concerned about 

the internal security of America, not just from our safety and security, but our economic security and on several fronts for different 

reasons. 

One of the things that I know that has been spoken about here 

and at other times is the threat of ISIS as not only being what I 

understand the most well-funded, the best organized terrorist organization possibly in the history, but also their ability to effectively 

use the internet and social media. 

There is one thing to use social media, but those of us engaged 

in politics, we spend a lot of time studying the effective use of social media. How do you come up and stand out amongst billions of 

users across the world? It appears that ISIS is doing a very good 

job. They are effectively marketing to our youth, which is specially 

concerning to me, especially those that are vulnerable, those are— 

feel disenfranchised and even using video games, as you have mentioned. 

So what are we doing—are we working with internet providers, 

social media providers to help combat the use of the internet and 

social media to spread their radical Islamic idealism that I think 

is a threat to the future? Are we working with those companies, 

and are they participating? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I will start, but I will certainly ask Mike to take 

this on, too, because the bureau is having quite a bit of direct engagement with these providers. 

Partnership with these technology companies on whose platforms 

this propaganda is riding is a central part of any strategy to 

counter what is going on. The President’s CVE summit will have 

a private-sector component to it for precisely that reason, to make 

these companies partners with us. 

This partnership has a number of elements. It is in part exposing 

them to the information about what is happening on platforms that 

they control so they understand it. If they can understand when 

terms of service violations are taking place that they should intervene and take steps to block certain content. 

But it is also to—again, to deepen a partnership and make sure 

that they understand that we need to be partners with them in 

going at this more systemically, not simply in response to a single 

video or a single YouTube posting or something, but actually to 

think about what kind of relationship between the Federal Government, law enforcement, and these companies makes sense if we are 

going to tackle this phenomenon that is creating a serious homeland security vulnerability. 

Mr. STEINBACH. So I will just add, sir, that, you know, social 

media, when you look at the volume and numbers of companies, it 

is hundreds of companies. So we do have direct engagement with 

those companies that are U.S.-based, but when you look at the totality of what the terrorist groups are using, many of these are 
44 

small social media companies that reside offshore, who flaunt their 

lack of cooperation with law enforcement. So that is the problem. 

There is a—you can go to Twitter or many other companies, but 

there is just a large number out there that, unfortunately, it is difficult to get our arms around. So there needs to be thought towards, how do we affect the totality of the social media platforms 

that are out there? 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Well, obviously, the dominant players in social 

media are American companies. Have they been receptive to work 

with you? Have you found them to be cooperative? 

Mr. STEINBACH. So we have had on-going continual dialogue. I 

think we have a team there now on the West Coast talking to the 

companies. I would say they understand our viewpoint. I don’t 

think those companies and the individuals who work in those companies want to see bad things happen. They balance the right to 

privacy versus their diligence and the requirement to keep people 

safe. 

But it is a volume thing. So it is not—they try to follow the 

terms of agreement, and certainly, if they see individuals violating 

those terms, those service agreement contracts, they shut them 

down. But when you are talking with that volume, it is a challenge 

for them. So I would say they understand our problem. We continue to work with them to get them to develop process technology 

to help us out. But that is just one part of it. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. Thank you. I only have a few seconds 

left, but just wanted to say that when I was in the military, one 

of the things that we got to was the basic ideology behind an 

enemy. That is how you formed a strategy for a long-term defeat. 

My concern is that we are not properly identifying this as radical 

Islamic extremists to have a long-term fight, a strategy against the 

ideology. Typically, on the battlefield, most soldiers have a survival 

instinct that we know that when it comes down to it, they do want 

to live. In this case, this ideology is that death is a reward. 

So I would just emphasize the importance, as Ronald Reagan understood, understanding the ideology of extremism. If we are going 

to—if we don’t, we will find ourselves responding instead of having 

a long-term strategy. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. STEINBACH. Really quickly, sir? Can I make a comment to 

that really quickly? 

Chairman MCCAUL. Please. 

Mr. STEINBACH. So I think it is important to note that the subject-matter experts, whether you are talking about organized crime 

or terrorism, they are subject-matter experts. They—we spend a lot 

of time training towards, we hire towards subject-matter experts to 

understand. You have to be a subject-matter expert to engage in 

this fight. We have robust training programs that talk about the 

ideology, that talk about the background and the culture, the history of the radicalization and history of terrorism. So those programs, those training programs are in place, and they are very important for my folks, and I am sure the other agencies, to work the 

threat. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank the gentleman. 
45 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentlemen from New Jersey, 

Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Ranking Member. 

You know, a lot of this discussion today and over the past month 

or so has been very interesting to me. Here we are, a committee 

with the responsibility of making sure that the homeland remains 

safe. But yet and still—everyone talks about making sure that that 

happens, but there are a group in the Congress that are willing to 

play politics with this country’s security. 

You know, politics is part of what we do, but to pick Homeland 

Security in order to make your point is dangerous. I travel from my 

district in New Jersey, the 10th Congressional district, which takes 

in Newark, New Jersey, a tier-one target. Prudential Insurance 

Company was targeted several years ago, about a decade ago, for 

an attack. 

If you go to Jersey City in my district, where I went on September 12 and saw the smoldering building from across the river— 

we cannot play games with the funding for this Department because of a policy that you don’t agree with in the Executive branch. 

It makes no sense. 

With that—oh, and let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I had come 

down from my district on the train Monday night, and in the train 

station there were DHS police officers, and I went over and spoke 

to them and thanked them for their service and the things they are 

doing for this country. They asked me to send a message back to 

Congress, and it was please give us the resources and the funding 

we need to do this job. Do not cut our legs from under us. 

So, we can’t continue saying we appreciate their service and 

work, but yet we will not give them the resources that they need 

to do the job. So, Under Secretary Taylor, you mentioned that not 

fully funding the Department of Homeland Security would have a 

crippling effect on domestic security. 

Could you please explain how if the Department of Homeland Security is not provided with the full-year funding, efforts to prevent 

foreign fighters and their travel would be affected, since that seems 

to be a great concern on the other side, how not funding the Department will impact that ability? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I think the point the Secretary has made and 

I have tried to make here today is that working under the CR limits our flexibility in investing in the threats as they evolve over 

time, and our grant funding, and our ability to respond—to add 

money to the Secret Service for additional protection, and those 

sorts of issues. 

So, I can’t speak specifically to a specific foreign fighter aspect, 

but in the day and age that we work and live from a security perspective, the Secretary believes very strongly that in order to protect the homeland, we need the flexibility to invest in the new 

threats as they are evolving. Under the current system, he doesn’t 

have that flexibility to direct his forces to execute in that manner. 

Mr. PAYNE. New funding for new programs? 

Mr. TAYLOR. New funding for programs, funding for continuing 

grants, funding—— 
46 

Mr. PAYNE. Two-point-six—two-point-six billion dollars in grant 

funding from what I am reading here. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PAYNE. You know, it just baffles me how we can almost, like, 

talk out of both sides of our mouths and say that we want to make 

sure that the homeland is safe, but because of an issue you have 

with the Executive branch, we are going to play games and say, 

well, you know, maybe we won’t fund the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko 

is recognized. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Steinbach, earlier you testified that the FBI did not have a 

process in place to vet and conduct background checks for Syrian 

refugees. What tools or capabilities would the FBI need to be able 

to conduct these checks? 

Mr. STEINBACH. Sir, I didn’t say we didn’t have a process in 

place, I said that there was a lack of databases. So, we learned our 

lessons with the Iraqi refugee population. We put in place a USICwide background and vetting process that we found to be effective. 

The difference is, in Iraq, we were there on the ground collecting, 

so we had databases to use. The concern is in Syria, the lack of our 

footprint on the ground in Syria, that the databases won’t have the 

information we need. So, it is not that we have a lack of process, 

it is there is a lack of information. 

Mr. KATKO. Is there ways that you could suggest we go about 

trying to get this information? 

Mr. STEINBACH. I just don’t think you can go and get it. You are 

talking about a country that is a failed state, that is—does not 

have any infrastructure so to speak, so you—all of the data sets, 

the police, the intel services that normally you would go and seek 

that information don’t exist. 

Mr. KATKO. That obviously raises a grave concern as to being 

able to do proper background checks of the individuals coming into 

the country. 

Mr. STEINBACH. Yes. 

Mr. KATKO. Okay. All right, now, Mr. Taylor, thank you for your 

testimony as well. As a Member of the—as the Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Transportation Security I look forward to working with DHS and TSA on a regular basis moving forward to the 

mutual benefit of everyone. 

A couple quick questions from your written submission, and it 

just—these real points of clarification for me so I can better understand the foreign fighter issue. 

One of the things that you mention was that the Secretary Johnson has ordered—or is conducting an immediate short-term review 

to determine if additional security measures are necessary at both 

domestic and overseas last-point-of-departures. 

What is the status of that review right now and when are we 

going to be able to get some information out on that? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The schedule to brief the Secretary is this week by 

TSA. The idea behind this—the thing Secretary Johnson has 

charged us all with is thinking outside of the box. 
47 

Mr. KATKO. I like that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. We apply security directives, we see the effect of 

those security directives every week when we have our counterterrorism meeting. His last question is: Are we thinking out of the 

box, and what else could we be doing to be more effective? That is 

what he has charged TSA to give him some ideas back that he will 

decide in terms of how those things might be better implemented 

to—across both domestically and internationally. 

Mr. KATKO. Okay. So, that is a short-term, and—of course you 

will report to us at the appropriate time any suggestions—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KATKO [continuing]. That might be helpful. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Absolutely. 

Mr. KATKO. We appreciate that. You also noted that in the long 

term, you are exploring the possibility of expanding to pre-clearance operations. 

Could you explain this a little bit more in detail why that would 

be beneficial? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, simply put in a football analogy, we would 

rather play defense on their one-yard line than on our one-yard 

line, and right now, without pre-clearance, the clearance happens 

here in the United States and not at the overseas airport. 

So, the extent to which we have pre-clearance agreements with 

governments across the country, we can put Homeland Security 

personnel in those airports, conduct the screening using our databases at their 1-yard line, and be more effective, we think, in preventing people from getting on airplanes, coming to our country. 

Rather than finding them here and having to send them back. 

Mr. KATKO. Okay. Thank you for that. 

Last, with respect to tracking the foreign fighters, there was a 

reference in your written report to enhancing or enabling of CBP 

to conduct security vetting of respective VWP travelers to determine if they have low—law enforcement security risk. 

When you say enabling CBP, what do you mean by that? Is it 

something mandatory? 

Mr. TAYLOR. We are really speaking to the expanding of ESTA 

and our ESTA data requirements, as one of the earlier Members 

asked, we have expanded that by six. We are looking at whether 

or not we should expand it even further so that we have better 

data upon which to vet against our databases. 

Mr. KATKO. All right, so when you are—the term I was kind of 

hung up, maybe I am being my former prosecutor a little bit too 

much here, enabling the CBP to conduct security vetting. 

I mean, I use the seed word enabling. Does that mean it is optional for them to do that, or is it—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. No, no, sir. It expands your capacity to do it with 

more data elements. 

Mr. KATKO. It is part of the total mix of things they do when 

they screen someone? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KATKO. Okay. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I would add, sir, that every person that comes to the 

United States on an aircraft or ship is vetted against our holdings. 

There is no one that comes here that doesn’t get that kind of 
48 

screening. It is the—whether it is a visa screening or an ESTA 

screening, that may be a bit different in terms of whether an interview is conducted and that sort of thing, but everyone gets 

screened against the databases that are available to our country. 

Mr. KATKO. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson 

Coleman is recognized. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank 

you Mr. Thompson. Gentlemen, I am sorry I wasn’t here for the beginning of your testimony, but I spent my last night reading it, and 

I found it fascinating. 

So, I want you to know that I am very appreciative of what each 

of your agencies is doing and attempting to do and identifying in 

terms of keeping us safe here. How you have expanded your interactions, and your information sharing, and your methodologies, and 

your creativity with other—places, including foreign countries so 

that we can all be safe. 

That is very important to me. I am particularly struck by Homeland Security and I want to associate myself with Mr. Keating and 

Mr. Paine’s remarks about our responsibility to ensure that as you 

are the protector of the homeland, that you have the resources necessary to be flexible, to be responsive, to be proactive, to do what 

you need to do to keep me safe without engaging in the political 

wranglings of whether or not we should be holding the President’s 

foot to the fire on something that he did because Congress couldn’t 

see fit to do. 

But nonetheless, my question is more narrowed, and I think it 

is similar to Mr. Loudermilk’s questioning. I am concerned about 

growing our terrorists here, taking who we think are everyday 

young people, having them exposed to the way these radical organizations use the social media and any other recruitment resources, 

and how—what is it that we can do to sort of cut it off at the pass? 

What is it that we should be doing in terms of accessing young 

students, vulnerable college students? Are there resources that we 

should be putting in educating and counteracting some of this negative propaganda, this ideology-spewing that is taking place with— 

how do we help our communities and our families see signs? 

Are there any commonalities of the characteristics of people that 

we have seen that seem to be most vulnerable that are homegrown, that seem most vulnerable to this radicalization? Can you 

share with me where you think our greatest threat is in terms of 

the security? 

Is it on the Southern Border of the United States and Mexico? 

Is it some other borders that we are talking about? For someone 

like me, I consider myself Spongebob. I want to soak up as much 

information as I can get. I need to have a better understanding of 

those questions, and whoever is able to answer any part of it, I 

would be greatly appreciative. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I will start, but any one of us can add pieces 

to this, ma’am. 

You are absolutely right that the focus of—one of the focuses of 

our effort at the Federal level is to try to empower local communities to develop their own engagement or intervention strategies, 

because that is what it takes. There is not going to be a Federally- 
49 

led intervention in a particular family, or community, or social setting that is going to be the tipper that turns someone off from 

radicalization. It is that local community, the families, schools, 

churches, mosques, they are the ones who recognize behavioral 

changes at a point when behavior can be still addressed and potentially not end up at the worst-case scenario of a person actually 

having traveled overseas. 

So the precisely the kind of information you are asking for is 

what we are trying to share in a series of community awareness 

briefings that give people, parents, schools, teachers the tools to 

say hey, this is what is happening, and now I have to do something 

about it. 

Now the ‘‘do something about it’’ part is still very much has to 

be a community decision or a local decision. But the other frustrating piece, and it gets to the last part of your question, is that 

there isn’t a single place you can say, ah, we need to be worried 

about it here but not here. 

Unlike some of our other previous foreign fighter flow episodes, 

like during the period when a large number of Americans were 

going to Somalia to participate in the fighting in east Africa, there 

you had a relatively defined set of communities where we had great 

concern because of the Somali-American population and their particular vulnerability to recruitment there. 

Here, and I am sure Mike would echo this, we do not have a profile or a pattern that says, ah, in these communities yes, but in 

these communities we are okay. So what we are having to do is, 

we talked about it with Chairman earlier, is just scale up these efforts because the ISIL, the Iraq grounded propaganda is having a 

reach far beyond ethnicity. It is not Iraqi Americans or Syrian 

Americans, it is—it isn’t—it can’t be narrowed in that way, and 

that is a challenge and it is frustrating to us. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ma’am, I would add, and certainly associate myself 

with all of the comments that Nick has been made, we believe one 

of the empowering organizations is our fusion centers and training 

of our State and local police officers who are the first responders, 

who are going to be the first level of defense, if you will, in spotting 

some of this behavior in addition to what happens within the community awareness area. 

So, it is a combination of empowering the community in terms 

of what to look for and having our police officers better understand 

this phenomenon and what they may see on the street on a dayto-day basis in their encounters with citizens. Community policing 

officers who are involved in day-to-day activities within communities across our country also need to have that kind of an understanding. 

I think, Assistant Director Steinbach mentioned it, it is almost 

like the D.A.R.E. program, where you go to get to the basics of everybody understanding what the issue is and filling the knowledge 

base so that people when they see it, that is where, ‘‘See something, Say something’’ can really make a difference in identifying 

these sorts of issues before they become bigger problems. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, gentlelady. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Chairman. 
50 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter is 

recognized. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, gentlemen 

for being here and thank you for what you do to protect our homeland. We appreciate it very much. 

Let me ask you—you know, this is the kind of report that you 

read through and you are concerned about everything, and not one 

thing more so than the other. But one of the things that struck me 

was about the foreign fighter travel. I just want to know what we 

can do to better control that. From what I understand, we are not 

using all of our resources. I don’t know that the administration has 

even identified a lead agency to combat this. Is that true? 

Mr. STEINBACH. No, I would say that is not true. So foreign fighter travel, travel to a conflict zone in support of foreign terrorist organization, is against the law. So the FBI has the lead on that. 

The question is: When you look at the broken travel, as Mr. 

Hurd brought up earlier, when you look at the ways to—legitimate 

citizens traveling abroad is not something that we choose to curtail. 

So if you take travel to destinations like Europe, where you can 

then take—Schengen—down to Turkey. 

So it is more about identifying the multitude of ways that these 

individuals in the United States are committed to travel using good 

investigative processes. Are they going up to Canada? Are they 

going down to Mexico? How are they getting to—how are they 

using lawful process, lawful ways to get to these locations? 

So it is not a function of not having the tools. It is—you know, 

they are—they have just as much creativity as we do and they 

have got a lot of support. So they reach out on social media, on 

platforms, talk to people who have done it and made it, and then 

follow the travel routes. 

So we have got to stay on top of that and use tripwires, the intelligence community, the 17,000 State and local and travel law enforcement agencies to develop an understanding of what the landscape is. 

Mr. CARTER. So the message I am getting from you here today 

is that you feel like we have got that under control, or doing the 

best we can? 

Mr. STEINBACH. We don’t have it under control. Absolutely, we 

are doing the best we can. If I were to say that we had it under 

control, then I would say I know of every single individual traveling. I don’t. I don’t know every person there and I don’t know everyone coming back. So it is not even close to being under control. 

It continues to be a challenge. We have to creatively, as Frank 

said, think outside the box to figure out how to combat this. We 

spend a lot of time figuring this out, looking this over, trying to develop processes and databases, automated searches to work this 

problem. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. Let me switch here to a quick—and let’s talk 

about the Visa Waiver program. As I understand it, there are certain people who are eligible for this and it is good for 90 days and 

it expires in 90 days? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Actually, sir, the period of the ESTA approval can 

be upwards of 3 years, depending on the country. So once an ESTA 
51 

is submitted, then the period that that ESTA is valid can be between 1 and 3 years. 

Mr. CARTER. But those countries that we are most concerned 

with, it is up to 90 days, generally? 

Mr. TAYLOR. In terms of? 

Mr. CARTER. In terms of the waiver. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Right now, we have a Visa Waiver with 28 countries 

across the country—across the world. In each of those cases, we 

have a bilateral relationship with those countries about how we exchange data and for what purposes. More broadly, other countries 

have to get visas through the State Department for the purposes 

of traveling to—— 

Mr. CARTER. Okay, well, let me ask you this: What happens 

when it expires? Do we have someone who checks up on these people to make sure that they are not still here? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Oh, absolutely. That is the job of our Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement. Part of being in the Visa Waiver program is the requirement that your visa overstays be somewhere in 

the less than 1 percent level. So we are pretty confident in the 

countries that we have Visa Waiver programs with that the level 

of this type of activity by their citizens in our country is minimal, 

compared to the level of activity that may be evident in other countries, where visa overstays are a bigger issue. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. Well, as I can imagine it, you have got a tickler file set up, and if somebody exceeds that 90 days and they 

haven’t left—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Absolutely. 

Mr. CARTER [continuing]. Then you go looking for them? 

Mr. TAYLOR. We have processes to try to make sure that those 

people who are in this country for longer then their visa period are 

tracked down and escorted away. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remaining time. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank the gentlemen. 

Chairman recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson 

Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the Chairman—let me thank 

the Chairman and the Ranking Member for this very important 

hearing. Let me state to the witnesses I was delayed because we 

were holding a crime subcommittee in Judiciary, of which I am the 

Ranking Member. 

This is an extremely important hearing, and it is issued in the 

backdrop of several worthy comments. The President has now released his AUMF, which is a singular notice to the Congress of the 

importance of addressing the question of ISIS and the potential of 

the United States engaging in some form of military action to be 

able to secure this Nation. 

I indicated in remarks earlier today on the floor that the Department of Homeland Security provides a domestic armor, a National 

armor of security. That is the responsibility of that. For many of 

us on this committee, we have had the privilege of serving since 

the horrendous and heinous act of 9/11. 

Often, I make the comment, certainly not proudly, that I was on 

or at Ground Zero during the moments of the extended time of 

looking for remains. It will always be a potent and striking mo-
52 

ment in my life, and I take seriously the responsibilities of this 

committee. 

For that reason, I believe it is crucial that we do not hold hostage 

this Department. We have actually 7 days to make amends on the 

funding of the Department of the Homeland Security, and I remind 

my colleagues that the issue of unaccompanied children or the 

President’s Executive Actions do not pose the kind of heinous 

threat that we are talking about today. 

I frankly think this is an important discussion, and many frontline DHS employees will be, in essence, hindered from their work 

without the full funding of this committee. 

I ask you Mr. Taylor, just a simple question, that in the midst 

of your jurisdiction and employees that you have under your jurisdiction, without funding for this Department, will some of them not 

be paid or some of them have to be furloughed, or some issue may 

come up regarding their service? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ma’am, we are in the process of reviewing the procedures for an orderly shut-down of the Department. I can’t say specifically the number of people, since I—people who work for me are 

primarily in the National security arena and are exempt from this. 

But there will be an impact in terms of people who are not directly 

involved in National security. 

Also, I would reinforce a comment I made earlier. There are 

going to be people who are working but not paid. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That is the point that I made. You didn’t hear 

me say that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. This is a morale challenge in a Department that is 

morale-challenged going forward. So—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But the main point is, is that you are in the 

process of having that as a responsibility, which is surveying your 

Department and determining what will happen without the funding. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That is taking your attention away from important security issues of securing the Nation, which I assume— 

that is a statement that I believe is accurate. Is that not accurate? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am not personally involved, but our Departmental 

management folks are working—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But that is staff persons dealing with those 

issues—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. That would not ordinarily be 

dealing with them at this time. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me offer and pursue my questioning to 

make this point. I do want to offer sympathy. We have come to our 

attention that three members of a Muslim family were murdered 

in Chapel Hill. These were students at the University of North 

Carolina Chapel Hill. We understand the culprit was arrested and 

charged with first-degree murder and had some issues dealing with 

religious questions. One of the individuals was, in fact, speaking 

against the murder of people, meaning one of the Muslim students 

was speaking against that. 
53 

Let me go straight to the gentleman from the FBI and ask the 

question regarding cyber and the internet and soliciting and what 

counter, in terms of ideology, can be best used to fight this. We can 

fight with arms. We can fight with intelligence. But are there other 

ways of stopping or getting in the way of the solicitation of our 

young people? 

Mr. STEINBACH. Absolutely, ma’am. I think there are a variety of 

ways, both methods we can talk about in open session, as well information we can talk about behind closed doors in a Classified setting. 

I think it starts to go back—we have to understand the path to 

radicalization and mobilization. It starts with intellectual curiosity 

at some point, and there are lots of community-based efforts that 

can be made to turn people away. 

Once an individual gets to the point where he or she has an intent to conduct an attack, then it turns into an enforcement or a 

disruption piece. All along that spectrum, all the way through disruption, there are efforts that can be made both from a counterradicalization narrative, both from a disruptive and an intervention 

perspective—and it is a multi-pronged approach that involves the 

State Department and the counter-messaging piece. It involves a 

community-based counter-radicalization piece. Of course, it involves 

the use of tripwires and disruption to prevent acts of terrorism. So 

it is a wide-spread approach that we have to utilize all of those. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well let me just say that I hope that this committee, that we have overlapping jurisdiction, will ramp up the dollars that will intervene in that radical heinous ideology. 

I consider ISIS barbaric. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, I 

do want to offer my deepest sympathy to the family of Kayla 

Mueller, who was in the truest sense a great American, who wanted to do nothing more than to help people who were in need. To 

be targeted by the heinous violence of ISIS—this committee’s hearing is important. 

The violence in this committee—excuse me, in this—not in this 

committee, in this Nation that warranted and brought about the 

death of three Muslim students or individuals in North Carolina— 

none of this should be tolerated. However we can disrupt and interrupt this, I think it requires all of our resources, working together 

in bipartisan, funding the DHS, to be able to make a difference. 

I, for one, would like to be engaged in the writing of the legislation and/or to find out more in an instructive manner, how do we 

stop the radicalization of our young people for something as heinous as what ISIS represents. 

My final word, Mr. Chairman, is to thank King Abdullah and 

Jordan for their committed work, along with our allies, on this effort. My sympathy to them for the losses that they have experienced throughout the Mideast and throughout Europe. 

With that, I yield back my time. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Gentlelady’s time has experienced. The 

gentlelady from Arizona, Ms. McSally, is recognized. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here and—try and look at you while I am 

talking here with my colleague in the way. 
54 

So I appreciate your work that you have been doing. I was 26 

years in the military and worked especially, Director Rasmussen, 

with your organization, and my last assignment at U.S. Africa 

Command running current operations there to include our counterterrorism operations. 

I am aware you all have been dealing with the foreign fighter 

issue long before a lot of people are now paying attention to it. But 

we were watching it even back then, 2007 to 2010, where we had 

foreign fighters flowing from many places but into areas for alShabaab training camps and AQAP and AQIM, North Africa, any 

of these ungoverned spaces, as you know. 

I will say as someone in the military, it caused great frustration 

as much as what we have been talking about today is mostly on 

the defense, to your terminology. But in order to address this, it 

needs to be a comprehensive whole-of-Government approach, for 

sure. But I sure would prefer to be on the offense primarily, and 

that includes going after these people that have, you know, decided 

to become enemy combatants in a generational struggle against us, 

as well as going after the core ideology. 

So at the Unclassified level—I mean, you know this. We watched 

thousands of foreign fighters graduate from these training camps 

because, quite frankly, we didn’t have the political will to do anything about it on the offense at the time, not thinking it was within 

our interest or it wasn’t a threat to our country. God knows where 

those thousands of jihadists who graduated from these training 

camps all over Africa—where they are now. I mean, who knows 

where they are today? 

But we just watched them. We let them go. We did nothing about 

it. Where we had tremendous opportunity to do some things, we 

just didn’t do it. So we have been focusing on the foreign fighter 

problem with ISIS, but I do want you to comment on your perspective of the foreign fighter problem in other ungoverned areas that 

we can’t forget about, to include many of them in Africa. I would 

just like your perspectives on what we are seeing through there. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you. As I talked about in my testimony, 

the thing that is an order of magnitude different about the foreign 

fighter phenomenon in this current conflict is the scale. But you 

are absolutely right. This is not a phenomenon that was invented 

yesterday. Individuals interested in flowing to conflict zones to participate in conflict there is something we have been watching 

through a series of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. 

The kind of unifying theme in these areas is lack of governance, 

and so we are left, in a sense, sitting on the outside, trying to intervene using all of the tools available, but no one tool itself being 

adequate to the task of reaching into North Africa, whether that 

is a Mali or a Libya or a Somalia, and reaching in and being able 

to affect the dynamic that those foreign fighters are moving into, 

is a challenge that we do not have our arms completely around yet. 

We are particularly challenged in some of these areas because of 

an intelligence deficit, where our ability to collect intelligence that 

gives us a really, really good picture of who the individuals of 

greatest concern are. As you know, that is where we try to spend 

most of our effort, is trying to determine who those individuals are 

that actually are engaged in plotting against our interests because 
55 

there is obviously a huge population of individuals who are there 

to participate in localized,conflict so we can’t devote all of our resources to understanding that picture. 

I guess the last thing I would say is that particularly concerning 

about the ISIL phenomenon is that ISIL has now decided it needs 

to move beyond Syria and Iraq. So you have extremist organizations in North Africa, Algeria, in Egypt, in Libya, who now have 

raised the flag of ISIL and claimed affiliate status. 

Again, that creates a sense of momentum and competition among 

extremist jihadist groups that ultimately adds to our threat concerns, doesn’t subtract. Even though you like to see your enemies 

fighting amongst each other, but actually, it is creating competition 

against each—amongst each other as they try to one-up each other 

in efforts to go after us. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. The next question—I have just 

a little bit of time here left—is—I know you talked about some 

community engagement, but you know, this is an Islamic extremist 

problem. So what in particular is the engagement with the Muslim 

community in America, the Muslim leaders? Where are you seeing 

that there are obstacles to having them admit that this is a problem of an extremist portion of their religion, and they need to get 

on board in order to stop it? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ma’am, I would say that within the Muslim communities around our country, they are concerned, as are all Americans, about this kind of behavior among people within their community, and they want to address it. They want to understand it 

better and to have the tools to address it. 

I have noted—I have been out with the Secretary on a couple of 

these. There are concerns about discrimination on the part of those 

communities and how they are are treated in certain other ways, 

but there is no lack of commitment in those communities to get at 

extremism among their children, among people in those communities, because they see that as inconsistent with their responsibilities of being Americans and living the American dream in our 

country. 

So I have noted—I don’t think we have noted a major lack of effort among those communities to recognize this phenomenon and 

how it impacts those communities and not wanting the tools to 

help them address them proactively. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Chairman recognizes the gentlelady from 

California, Mrs. Torres. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to 

the panel for giving you my back, but unfortunate circumstances 

of seating arrangements—I would like to go back to the question 

that was asked by Ranking Member Thompson for you, Under Secretary Taylor. Without a full year funding bill, the Department of 

Homeland Security cannot award, it was my understanding, $2.6 

million, correct? Billion dollars. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Billion. 

Mrs. TORRES. Billion in grant funding, much of which goes to 

State and local departments. Having served both at the local level 

as a council member/mayor, and having served as a State senator 
56 

in the State of California, you know, these agencies are just beginning to recover from this great recession that we have had. They 

certainly do not have the funding to back-bill what we do not send 

to them, and they are dependent on this funding in order to help 

protect our communities. 

So what do you think is the risk assessment as it relates to these 

agencies not being able to pick up the phone and have someone on 

the other side answer to get feedback on a potential threat risk? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ma’am, I can’t speak to the specific risk. What I can 

speak to is the fact that grant funding and our investment in State 

and local community engagement efforts is a linchpin for how we 

have structured our country to do homeland security. 

We believe everyone needs to be in the game. Everyone needs to 

be empowered to understand what the risk is, what the tactics, 

techniques, and procedures are that they should be looking for and 

to share that information with the FBI, with the IC so that we can 

engage before the act happens. So the extent to which these grants 

make those agencies less effective in meeting that responsibility 

presents a risk for us. 

Mrs. TORRES. Would you consider that a low-risk, a high-risk, in 

the—as it relates to not just the agencies, but—I am sorry, not just 

as it relates to the local agencies, but the inability of the FBI or 

the inability of other departments to be able to coordinate and communicate with these agencies? 

Mr. TAYLOR. As I said, ma’am, we have built our homeland security enterprise based on a State, local, Federal model, and any capability that is taken away from that in some way diminishes our 

capacity to address the risks that we are concerned with in our 

country. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you. I yield my time back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chairman recognizes the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Ratcliffe. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I have very much enjoyed and appreciated your testimony today. As a former terrorism prosecutor and as a former 

United States attorney, I have had the good fortune to work with 

each of your agencies before on a number of occasions, and I very 

much look forward to the opportunity to do so again as a Member 

of this committee. 

Mr. Steinbach, I would like to start with you. Your boss, director 

of the FBI Jim Comey recently expressed concern about technology 

companies using encryption methods on mobile devices, specifically 

in response to an Apple representative’s statement that it would no 

longer be possible to unlock encrypted iPhones and iPads. Director 

Comey drew an analogy to child kidnappers, and he said, ‘‘The notion that someone would market a closet that could never been 

opened, even if it involves a case involving a child kidnapper and 

a court order, to me, that does not make any sense.’’ 

As a former terrorism prosecutor, I share Director Comey’s concern and can certainly see how the inability to access encrypted devices would hamper terrorism investigations. So my question is: 

What is the FBI’s plan to deal with this? Have you engaged the 

technology industry to address these concerns? 
57 

Mr. STEINBACH. First of all, sir, I am certainly not going to argue 

with Director Comey, so he is, of course, right. It is a concern. I 

think, quite frankly, it is irresponsible for companies to build products, have software updates that allow for no lawful capability to 

unlock their devices. 

So to make the argument that it is on the cloud and so you don’t 

need to have access to the device itself is disingenuous because, as 

we know, not all of the information is on the cloud. We have to 

have the ability, whether we are talking about gangsters or organized crime or terrorists, with lawful abilities, court orders to look 

into and take content, store communications, whether it is a child 

pedophile, whether it is somebody involved in narcotics trade or 

somebody trying to conduct a terrorist act. We have to have that 

ability. 

So we have put this message out. I know that the director and 

his staff have gone out and relayed this message on numerous occasions. We have pushed it out. We have had interaction with the 

State, local, and Federal levels of law enforcement, as well as had 

direct contact with those companies and tried to explain to them 

through use of examples that this is a dangerous precedent to go 

down, to not have the ability at any means—whether it is an ongoing kidnapping or some other event, not to have the ability to get 

in there and look at that content or that stored communication. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Terrific. Thanks very much. I am going to throw 

this question out to anyone on the panel that wants to take it. 

There are numerous reports out there that Ask.fm is one of the 

common recruitment channels through which a number of American foreign fighters have formed close relations with ISIS recruiters. We talked today about the teenage girls from Denver. Since 

Ask.fm is operating out of Latvia, I would like to know whether 

there has been any interaction between the State Department and/ 

or law enforcement with the Latvian government regarding this? 

Mr. STEINBACH. So I can’t speak to specific interaction between 

the State Department and the Latvian government. I will tell you 

that Ask.fm is but one of many social media companies that we 

have seen in our intelligence collection efforts USIC-wide that is 

being used. It is just one. There are many other platforms that reside overseas that, again, like I said earlier, have shown an unwillingness to work with either our government or the host governments. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Terrific. Last question. I apologize if this has 

been covered earlier. I have been in and out of other hearings 

today. But when ISIS-specific material is posted on Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, YouTube, what are the existing lines of communication between law enforcement and those entities to either provide 

notice or to facilitate the removal of that material? 

Mr. STEINBACH. So the companies themselves have terms of service agreements that in many cases, violence, criminal acts, violate 

those terms of service agreements, and as I understand, they have 

got automated processes, once they see that, to take those down. 

We are not looking at it from a terms of service agreement, of 

course. We are looking at it from the threat. So when we identify 

a communication, a radicalization node or some other piece that is 

being used, we look to, quite frankly, exploit that node and do that 
58 

through lawful means, whether it is collecting the information to 

see what they are communicating about or to look at on-going communications. 

So we have an overlapping, I guess, mission when compared to 

some of these companies, but at the end of the day, the result 

should be the same. We want to stop the communication through 

various social media and internet platforms. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Terrific. My time is expired. Again, I appreciate 

all of you being here. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. We thank the witnesses for being here 

today. This is a very important topic to our National security. I 

want to thank all three of you for your service to the American people to keep Americans safe. I want to thank also the rank and file 

within the Department of Homeland Security, NCTC, and the FBI 

for the job that they do day in and day out without much recognition. But they are truly the patriots of this country. Just on behalf 

of this committee, we want to say thank you. 

The hearing record will be open for 10 days for additional questioning. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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