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Opinion filed 9/10/08; NO. 5-07-0199 Modified Opinion on D enial of Rehearing filed 1 0/27/08. IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

__________________________________________________________________ _______ THE PEOPLE OF THE STA TE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circui t Court of Plaintiff-Appell ee, ) E ff in gh am C ou nt y. ) v. ) No. 03-CF-264 ) TOBBY J . S MITH, ) Ho nora ble ) SherriL. E. Tungate, De fend ant-A ppella nt. ) Judge, presi ding.

_____________ ____________________________________________________________ Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing PR ES IDIN G JU ST ICE ST EW AR T de livered the op inion o f the c ourt: On December 11, 200 3, th e d ef en da nt , T obb yJ. Smi th , w as ch ar ge d wi thtwo coun ts of first-d egr ee m urd er fo r the dea th o f R ona ld H ood

. On February22, 2005, purs uant to a fully negotiated ple a, the defendant pl ed guilt y t o the char ge of firs t-deg re e murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1( a)(2) (West 2004)) in ret urn for t he State dismis sing all t

he other pe nding matters againsthim, i ncluding a second charge of firs t-degr ee murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2004)) and the c har ges , i n t wo other ca ses, of domestic batte ry , aggravated battery , and aggravat ed batte rywith a fi re arm. At the ple a heari ng, the State s et out t he terms of t

he plea agree men t: the defen dant w ould plead guilty to the charge of first-degree mu rd er for an agreedsentence of 22 year s' imprisonment in the Department of Co rrection s with credit for ti me serve d, pur suan t to truth in s enten cing h e w ould serve 100 % of h is senten ce, he wo uld paythe cost s of the proceedi ngs in the murder case , he would submit to DNA testing, and h is bond would be d ist

rib utedfor fe es, fine s, and cost s. The St ate ex plaine d that in exchange for the guilty

plea, all t

he other c harges against the de fendant wou ld be dis missed. The

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defenda nt 's cou nsel ag reed w ith the S tate's desc ription o f the te rms o f the p lea ag reem ent. Neither the Stat e norde fense counselmentioned mandat orysupervi sed rel ease. The defe ndan t receiv ed the follow ing ad mo nishm ent fro m the cour t:

"THE CO UR T: Sta te say s in Count I I of the I ndictment filed D ecem ber 1 8th of 2003 that onDecember 6 of 2003 in Effingham County you committed the offense of first[- ]degree murder in that y ou, without lawful just ifi cati on, shot Ronald Hood with a handgun knowing such act creat ed a strong prob ability of de ath or g reat bo dily harm to Ronald Hood ther eby causing the death of Rona ld H ood in viol ation of [secti on 9-1(a) (2) of t

he CriminalCode of 1 961 (7 20 I LCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (W est 2004))]. Do you underst and what it is the State say s you di d? DEF END AN T: Yes. THE CO UR T: Fo r that sen tence , for tha t offe nse, you could be se ntenc ed to twen tyto si xty

year s in the Department of Correct ions. Y ou co uld b e fine d up to $25,000. You could b e subject to mandatory supervised rel ease of three years

. You 're not eligi ble for p rob ation

. Do you underst and what the poss ible pe nalty for the charge is? DE FE ND AN T: Y es." When the court imposed the sentence, it stated as foll ows: "THE COU RT: Mr. Smith, Iam then going t o find that y ou und erst an d the charge andpossibl e penalt ies, that t here is a factualba sis , th at t he pl ea is v ol un tar y, you under stand y our ri ghts t o tri al andthe othe r ri ghts I e xplaine d, that y ou give up those rig hts voluntari ly , and I' m going to accept your guilt y pl ea to Count I I of th e Indictm ent, December 18, 200 3, and per you r agree men t with th e State I'm go ing to
sen tenc e you on t hat C oun t II to 2 2 yea rs in t he D epa rtme nt o f C orre ction s." The court dismissed the other cha rges, entered a jud gmen t on his plea to first-deg ree murd er,

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sentence d him to 22 y ears' incarc erati on in the Department of Co rr ectio ns wi thcr edi t f orti me served, asse ssed cou rt co sts, re qui red him to su bm it to D NA testin g, and s et out t he distribut ion of his bondfor fees, costs, and fines. W hen the co urt pronounced the sentence , it did not s tate that t

he defendant would be required to ser ve a ter m of mandatory

supervi sed relea se. The writt en s entencing judgm ent mad e no refe rence to a term of ma ndatory supervi sed rel ease. The defendantfile d no posttrialmotions or direct appeal. On February27, 2007, t he defendantfile d a pro se petition for r elie f from judgment under secti on 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2006)), alle ging that his constitutional right to due process and fundam ental fairness was violat ed because he had not been informed that
a 3-year mandat ory-supe rvised -release term w ould apply to th e 22- year priso n sen tence to which he pled gui lty . The defendant di d not chal lenge the vali dity of his pl ea, nor di d he seek the withdr awal of

his gui lty

plea. The defendantconceded that the st atutor

y mini mum for firs t-degr ee murder i s 20 ye ars' inca rce ration a nd th at sub tracting 3 years f rom his sentence wo uld tak e it belo w the stat utory minimum; ther efore, he request ed that his sent ence be re du ce d t o 2 0 ye ar s' im pr iso nm en t fo llo w ed by a period of 3 years' mandatory supervi sed relea se. On M arch 6 , 200 7, t he tr ial co urt, sua s pon te , order ed the defendant 's pe tition dis missed on the grounds that it was unti mely f iled and that it fai led to pl ead facts upon which reli ef coul d be g ranted . The defe ndan t filed a tim ely notice o f app eal alleg ing tha t, pursuant to People v. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d 177, 840 N.E.2d 658 (2005), his ful ly negotiated 22-y earprison senten ce mu st be mod ified to 20 years' imprisonm ent plus 3 years' mand atory supervi sed release , so that h is sente nce w ill appro xima te the sent ence to which he pl ed gu ilty. We find that the circuit court erred i n dismis sing t

he peti tion bas ed upon timel iness, in fai ling to recharacterize t

he petition as apostconvi ction pe tition, and in finding that t he peti tionwas wit hou t me rit. W e rev erse and rem and wit h di recti ons .

### 4 AN AL YS IS The defend ant a rgu es th at the trial c our t erre d in dism issin g, sua s pon te , his secti on 2- 1401 petiti on on timeliness grounds, because the pe tition alleg ed a v alid leg al claim for rel ief. A trial cou rt ma y, sua s pon te , dis miss a sec tion 2- 1401 petition when the pet iti oner' s cl ai m is w itho ut m erit. People v. Vincent , 226 I ll. 2d 1, 13, 87 1 N.E .2d 17, 26 (2 007). H owe ver, the two-y ear time period cont ained i n secti on 2 -1 401 is a statute of lim itation an d no t a juri sdict ional pre req uisite

. People v. Mall oy , 374 Il l. App. 3d 820, 823, 872 N.E.2d 140, 143 (2007). As a stat

ute of l imit ation, the Stat e must asse rt t he time period as an af firmat ive defense, and the tr ial co urt m ay no t, sua s pon te , dis miss the peti tion onthe basis of timeliness. Malloy , 374 Il l. App. 3d at 823, 872 N.E. 2d at 143. The defendant fi led his secti on 2-1401 petit ion fi ve days after the two-y ear time limit . In di smissi ng the defendant 's pe tition sua spon te , the trial court s tate d that t he peti tion was not

timel y fi led and that the defendant "f aile d to set fo rth any rea son for the la te filing u nder this sec tion." T he trial co urt erred in dismissing the defendant's section 2-1401 petiti on on the basis of timeliness. We also fi nd that t

he tri al court

erred i n fail ing to r echaract erize the defendan t's pr o
se pleading a s a postcon viction petition. It has long b een re cognized that a lack of l egal knowledge might cause a pro se prisone r to se lect the wro ng m ethod to collatera lly attack his convict ion. People ex rel . Palmer v. Twomey , 53 Il l. 2d 479, 484, 292 N. E.2d 379, 382 (1973). Prior to the adopt ion of the Post-Convic tion Hearing Act , a co nvicti on could be atta cked by writ of error , habeas corpus , and cora m n obis

. People v. Sl aughter , 39 Il l. 2d 278, 284, 235 N.E.2d566, 569 (1968) ; Il l. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq. (now 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (W est 2 006 )). This troubled the United States Supreme Court "because
no matter

which meth od a p risone r pursu ed, he appe ared a lways to be m et by a claim that he shou ld have pursued a different remedy." Slaughter , 39 Il l. 2d at 284, 235 N.E. 2d at 569 (citing Marino v. Ragen , 332 U .S. 561, 570 , 92 L. Ed . 170, 176, 68 S. Ct. 240, 24 5 (1947 )).

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A st atut orypos tc onv ic ti on r emedyth atlate r b ecame the P ost -Co nvicti on Hearing Act was enactedin re spo nse . Slaughter , 39 Il l. 2d at 284, 235 N.E. 2d at 569; I ll. Rev. Stat . 1949, ch. 38, p ars. 8 26- 832
. Consiste nt with the int ent of the Post-Convic tion Hearing Act (the Act ) to pr ovide a comprehensive postconvi ction procedure and t o end the merry -go-round of collateralatta cks
on convictions b y pri son ers, the s upre me c ourt h eld tha t the circu it court sh ould evalu ate whethera pro se petition, ho weve r label ed or inar tfully worded, alle ged a viol ation of the pe titi on er 's right s cognizabl e underthe A ct. Palmer , 53 Il l. 2d at 484, 292 N.E.2d at 382. The court was also urged to r ead pro se petitions more l iberal ly than formalpleadi ngs prepar ed bycou nse l. People v. Sm ith , 268 Il l. App. 3d 574, 580, 645 N.E.2d 313, 318 (1994). Under this analy sis, if the petit ion a llege d a violation cogni zable under the Act, the court

was instructed

to tre at it as a pos tconv iction p etition, allo win g the a ppo intme nt of c oun sel to prop erly frame the i ssues and t o facil itat e the adj udicat ion in one pr oc ee di ng w ith fin ali ty. Palmer , 53 I ll. 2d at 48 3-8 4, 29 2 N .E.2 d at 3 82. In 1997, ho wev er, the Act was amended by Public Act 89- 609, which added subsection (d) to se ction 122 -1. P ub. A ct 89 -60 9, §5 , eff

. Jan uar y 1, 1997 (1997 Il l. Laws 2674) (amending 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994) ). That subsect ion prov ides th at a trial court reviewing a petition wh ich do es no t state that it i s fil ed under the Act "need not e valuat e the petition to det ermine whether it coul d otherwis e have statedsome grounds for r elie f under" the Ac t. 725 IL CS 5/12 2-1(d ) (W est 20 06). W hile the supre me c ourt h as stated in a fo otno te that under the s tatut e a tri al court is "under

no obligation" t o rechara cteri ze a pro se clai m as a postcon viction petition, it also stated that a trial court "m ay" do so. People v. She lls trom , 216 Ill. 2d 45, 53 n.1, 833 N.E.2d 863, 868 n.1 (2005 ). Ill inois courts have since c onsiste ntly reviewed, on an abus e-of- discre tion stan dard , the de cisio ns of tri al cou rts wh ether to rechara cteri ze pro se plea din gs a s po stco nvi ction petit ion s. E.g. , Peopl e v. Starks , 365 I ll.

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App. 3d 592, 597, 850 N. E.2d 206, 212 (2006) ("[T]he t rialcourt di d not abuse i ts di scret ion in implie dly cons truing d efen dant's 'mo ti on for a ne w trial' as a petition under the Act"); People v. Holliday , 369 Il l. App. 3d 678, 682, 867 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (2 007) (T he trial court did not abuse i ts di scret ion by fail ing to recharacteri ze the defendant's habeas corpus petition
as a postconvi ction pe tition). Implicit in a t rialcou rt's sua sponte dism issal an d failu re to rechara cter ize a pro se petition is an ex ercise o f its discr etion, w hich is r eview able b y this
cour t. Thus, we beli eve that a tri al court 's e xpress or impli ed decisi on not to r echaract erize
a pro se petit ion ma y be re view ed u nde r an abu se-o f-d iscre tion stan dar d. A pro se defe ndan t is not n ecess arily maste r of h is clai m, and the cour t may ove rri de his choice of pr ocedural vehicl e by which to seek rel ief. People v. Pearson , 216 Il l. 2d 58, 66, 833 N.E.2d 827, 831 ( 2005). Where a pro se defendant fi les a pl eading al leging a depri vation of a consti tuti onal ri ght cogniz able under the Act, the trial c ourt may rechara cteri ze it as a postconvi ctionpetition, and the pet iti on may be re charact erize d even if it i s clearly

label ed as a not her type o f ple adin g. Shells trom , 216 Il l. 2d at 51, 833 N.E.2d at 867. A pleading i s not det ermined by the la bel appl ied to it by

the defend ant, bu t b y its content and cha racte r. People v. Harp er , 345 Il l. App. 3d 276, 284, 802 N.E.2d 362, 369 (2003). Recharacte rizi ng a peti tion pr otect s a pro se litigant fro m the poss ible ha rsh res ult aris ing from his l ack of legalknowledge in sel ecti ng a method to at tack hi s conviction when his claim cou ld m ore app rop riate ly be d ealt w ith as a po stco nvi ction petit ion

. Shells trom , 216 Ill. 2d at 52 , 833 N.E .2d a t 86 7. The trial court does not, however, have unl imit ed discr etion to constr ue a pleadi ng as
a pos tcon victi on p etitio n. People v. Hel gesen , 347 I ll. App. 3d 672, 677, 807 N. E.2d 718, 723 (2004). When determining whet h er a rec harac terization is app ropria te, the co urt sho uld
c onsider whether the filing was also cogni zable i n the form i n which the defendant fi led it

. People v. Pearson , 345 Ill. A pp. 3 d 19 1, 19 9, 802 N .E.2d 386 , 393 (200 3), aff' d on other

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grounds , 216 Ill . 2d 58, 833 N. E.2d 827 (2 00 5) . A dd itio na lly, when a court re charact erize s
as a post co nvicti on petition a pro se pleadi ng that t he peti tioner

has label ed as a dif

ferent acti on cognizabl e under Il linoi s law, t he court must

take the foll owing acti on: "(1 ) notify th e pro se litigant t hat the court intends t o rechara cteri ze the pleadi ng, (2) warn the litigant that t his re charact erization means t hat any subsequent postconvi ctionpetition will be subject to the r estr icti ons on success ive post convict ion petiti ons, and (3) pr ovide the litigant an opportuni ty to withdr aw the p leading or t o amend it so that it co ntains a ll the claim s app ropria te to a postconvi ction pe tition that the lit igant believes he or she has." Shells trom , 216 Il l. 2d at 57, 833 N.E. 2d at 870. "[ A] tri al court 's de cisi on rega rding r echaract erization i s address ed to it s sound discr etionand will be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." H olli day , 369 I ll. App. 3d at 6 82, 86 7 N .E.2d at 102 0. W hile th e Act does not req uire a tria l court to rechara cteri ze a peti tion t hat fai ls t o specify

that it is file d underthe Act, "bythe st rongest of implications, the court also may do so." Starks , 365 Il l. App. 3d at 597, 850 N.E. 2d at 212. The tri al court

acts pr operly

when it rec haract erize s a pro se petition fil ed under a di fferent labelas a p ostco nvictio n petitio n w hen th at con struction is the on lylogica l const ructi on that
wo uld pre serv e the cou rt's juris dicti on. Starks , 365 Il l. App. 3d at 597, 850 N.E.2dat 21 2. The Act prov ides that, if a defendant did not fi le a di rect a ppeal, he may fi le a postconvi ctionpetit io n no late r t hanth re e y ear s f

ro m th e date of t

he c onv ic ti on. 725 ILCS 5/122-1( c) (West 2 004). In the in stant case, t he defendant fi led his petition for r elie f from jud gment (to modify

his sent ence) a l ittle more than two years aft er his date of convict ion

. The defendant' s peti tion was not timel y fi led as a secti on 2 -140 1 petitio n, but it w as time ly file d as a post convict ion petition. His peti tion al leged the deprivation of a consti tuti onal right. Because this pro se petition is the on lyposttrialmotion file d by t he defendant and be cause the only logica l cons truction that w ould preser ve the co urt's jurisdic tion ov er this p etition w as to

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rechara cteri ze it as a postconvi ction pe tition, t he tri al cour t abus ed its discre tion in failing to rechara cteri ze it. The tri al court 's j udgment should t he refore be reversed and this cause remanded with directions t hat the court recharact erize the defendant's pro se petiti on as a postconvi ction petit ion and provide him with the appr opriat e notif icat ion, warning, and opportuni ty

to withdr aw or amend the plea ding. On remand, t

he tri al court wil l be required to det ermine th e m er its of th e d ef en da nt 's petit ion

. Since the tri al court has previous ly found the pet iti on to be without merit, we find it necessar

y t o discuss the subst ance of the defendant 's pe tition. In do ing so , we n ote tha t both par ties h ave fully b rief

ed th e issu e in th is ap pea l. To be en titled to po stcon viction relief, the defe ndan t mus t show that h e suffere d a subs tanti a l deprivation of his consti tuti onal ri ghts i n the proce eding that produced t he chall enged sen tenc e. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 183, 840 N.E .2d at 6 63. "The scope of the postc onv iction p rocee ding is limited to con stitutiona l matter s that ha ve no t been , and c ould not have been, previously adjudi cated." Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 183, 840 N.E. 2d at 663. Because a plea barg ain depri ves a defendant of l ibert y and ot her const itutionally pr otect ed interest s, a defendant who shows that he enter ed his pl ea in re lianc e on the t erms of the plea bar gain ma y hav e a d ue p roc ess r igh t to en for ce th e term s of the a gre em ent. Wh itfield , 217 Ill. 2d at 18 9, 84 0 N .E.2 d at 6 66. T he def endan t argues that the ad mon ishments h e received c oncerning mand atory supervi sed release we re no t suff icient to inform him t

hat he wou ld be subjec t to mand atory supervi sed release in add ition to th e 22- year pris on sentence t o which he agreed. He cites Wh itfield in support

of his ar gument that

the addi tion of

th e t er m o f mandatory supervi sed release consti tutes an unfair breach of the plea agreement and violates his due process rights, and the fact s in Wh itfield are strikin gly similar to those in this case . In Wh itfield , the defendantpled guilty pu rsuan t to a ne gotiate d plea agree men t that pro vided a spe cific

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sentence of 25 year s' imprisonment in the Department of Corrections. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 190, 840 N.E.2d at667. The tr ial c ourt r atif ied the agreement and f aile d to admonish t

he defendantthat a

mandatory -supervi sed-re lease t erm would be added to the negot iate d 25-y ear sentence
. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 190, 840 N.E.2d at 667. Additional ly , the writt en order of sentence and commitment made no reference to the three-year mandatory-supervised-release term req uire d by la w. Wh itfield , 217 Ill . 2d at 180 n.1, 840 N. E.2d at 661 n. 1. The defendant did not file a pos tjudgm ent m otion to with draw his plea, and he neverdirectly app ealed his convict ion or se nten ce. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 180, 840 N.E. 2d at 661. While in pr ison, the defendantlearne d he would be subject to a m andatory-superv ised-release term in add ition to his 25-year pri son sente nce. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 180, 840 N.E. 2d at 661. He then fil ed
a pro se section 2-14 01 "M otion for R elief F rom Judg men t" (sectio n 2-1 401 mo tio n)

. Wh itfield , 217 Ill. 2d at 180-81, 840 N.E.2d at 661-62. The State moved to dismiss the section 2-1401 motionon th e gro und s that it w as no t timely filed , and in doin g so it acknowledged that the trial c ourt coul d treat the de fendant's secti on 2-1401 motion as a postconvi ction petition, but it argued that t he tr ial co urt w as u nde r no obl igati on t o do so. Wh itfield , 217 I ll. 2d at181, 840 N. E.2d

at662. Th e defe ndant asked t he court to treat

his sec tion 2- 1401 motion as a pos tcon victi on p etitio n. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 181, 840 N.E. 2d at 662. The tri al
cou rt dis mis sed the d efe nda nt's se ction 2-1 401 mo tion

. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 181, 840 N.E.2d at662 . O n appeal t he defendant argued that he did not r eceive t

he benefit

of the barg ain he m ade w ith th e S tat e w he n h e p led gu ilty. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 184, 840 N.E. 2d at 663. He did not

chall enge the va lid ity o f his p lea an d did not se ek its w ithdraw al. Wh itfield , 217 Ill . 2dat 187, 840 N.E.2d at665. The defendant argued that he knowingly and volu ntarily pled g uilty in exc han ge for th e pr om ise o f a 2 5-yea r sen tenc e. Wh itfield , 217 I ll. 2d a t 18 7, 84 0 N .E.2 d at 6 65. The Illi nois Supreme Co urt, t reating the defendant' s pleading as a postconvi ction

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petitio n, rule d that, under thes e circ umstances, adding the stat utori ly requir ed three -y ear mandatory-supervised-r elease term to t he defendant' s negoti ated sent ence w as a unil atera l modification andbreach of the p lea a gre em ent. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 190, 840 N.E. 2d at 667. The court held as follows:

"[T]here is no su bstan tial com plianc e w ith Ru le 402 [(17 7 Ill. 2d R. 402)] and due process i s viol ated when a defendant pleads gui lty

in exchange fo r a s pecif ic sentence and the tr ial co urt fails to adv ise th e de fen dan t, p r ior t o accepti ng his pl ea, that a mandatory [-]supe rvise d[-]r elease term willbe added to that sentence
. In these circumstances, addit ion of the [mandatory -supervi sed-re lease] term to t he agree d-upo n sentence violates due p rocess bec ause the sen tence imp osed is m ore onerous than the
one defendant agr eed to at the time of the pl ea he aring. Under these circumstances, the additi on of the [mandat orysupervi sed rel ease] cons tit utes anunfair breach of t he pleaagree men t." (Em phas is add ed.) Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 195, 840 N.E. 2d at 669. The defen dant al so rel ies on People v. Company , 376 Il l. App. 3d 846, 876 N.E.2d 1055 (2007), in support of his ar gument. I n Company , the defendant ent ered into a full y negotiatedplea agr eement whereby he was to rece ive a spec ific senten ce of 15 ye a rs' incarc e rati on in th e D epa rtme nt o f C orre ction s. Company , 376 Il l. App. 3d at 850, 876 N.E.2d at 1058. The tri al court admoni s hed the defendant that, if convi cted at

a tri al, he
wo uld be su bject to a term of m anda tory supe rvised release but tha t und er the p lea ag reem ent, instead of the po ssib le sent ences avai lable upon convict ion, he would recei ve the agr eed sentence of 15 year s' imprisonment, with no menti on of mandatory supervi sed rel ease. Company , 376 Ill . App. 3d at 850, 876 N.E.2d at

1058. The written sent enci ng agreemen t fail ed to include a ma nda tory-su per vise d-re leas e term
. Company , 376 Il l. App. 3d at 850, 876 N.E.2d at 1058. The cour t foun d that th e defenda nt did not ente r his pl ea with ful l knowledge of the conseque nces because "the admonis hment li nked [mandatory supervi sed relea se] t o the

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de fe nd an t's poss ible sen tence if he were to be found gui lty at a trialand not to a

sentence for his crime i n general or to t he sentenc e that

was being imposed as a resul t of his g uilty ple a." Company , 376 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 8 52, 8 76 N .E.2 d at 1 060
. The State argues tha t People v. H olt , 372 Ill. App. 3d 650, 867 N.E.2d 1192 (2 007), is factu ally more simil ar to t he inst ant case than Whitfi eld or Company . In Ho lt , the defendant entere d into an ope n plea agr eement in which the S tate agreed t o recommend a sentenc e. Ho lt , 372 Ill. App . 3d at 6 51, 867 N.E.2d at 1193- 94. The tr ial c ourt admonis hed the defend ant as follow s: "If youare sent

to pri son, t

here [i s] a per iod of mandator y supe rvise d release of one -three years." (Emph asis omitted.) Ho lt , 372 Il l. App. 3d at 651, 867 N.E. 2d at 119 3. The S tate ' s r eci tati on o f the p le a ag re ement ma d e n o r ef er en ce to a m an da to rysupervised-release term, nor did the sentenci ng order include a mandatory-supervised-r elease term
. Ho lt , 372 Ill . App. 3d at 651, 867 N.E.2d at

1194. The court di sti nguished Wh itfield
on the ground t

hat the tri al court 's f

ailur e to men tion a mand atory-supervised-release term during the entirety of the pl ea proceedi ngs left the defendant

unaware of the cons equences of his plea, whereas in Ho lt , the defendant w as awa re that the man datory-supervised-release term
wo uld atta ch to any prison s entence, so the fai lure t o rest ate the requ irementdu ring t he recit ationof the plea agreement did not violate his due process rights. Ho lt , 372 Il l. App. 3d at 653 , 8 67 N. E.2 d at

119 5. Addi ti ona lly , t

he c ourt n ot ed t

hat th e ca se di ffe re d fr om Wh itfield in that it inv olv ed a n op en p lea a s op pos ed to a fu lly neg otiat ed p lea. Ho lt , 372 Il l. App. 3d at 653 , 867 N .E.2d at 119 5. Th e cou rt held that w here th e State only promises to recommend
a certa in sent ence and the total s entence t he defendant r eceives , inc luding mand atory supervi sed relea se, i s less than the maximum sentence aut h or ize d b y law , th e tr ial co ur t's failure to properly

admonish the de fendantof the mandator y- supervi sed-re lease t erm does not violate the defendant 's c onsti tuti onal ri ghts andhe recei ves the bene fit of his bar gain. Ho lt , 372 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 6 53- 54, 8 67 N .E.2 d at 1 195
. The State al so argues that People v.

### 12

Borst , 372 Ill. A pp. 3 d 331, 86 7 N.E .2d 1181 (2007), is app licable to the instant case. In Borst , the trial c ourt admonis hed the defendant about the maximum possible sentence s for the crimes to w hich he w as e nter ing a fu lly neg otiat ed p lea. Borst , 372 Il l. App. 3d at 332-33, 867 N .E .2d at 1 18 2- 83 . In do in g s o, t he co ur t ad vi se d t he de fe nd an t o f th e m an da to rysupervised-release term s ea ch o ffe nse carr ied. Borst , 372 Il l. App. 3d at 332, 867 N.E. 2d at 1182. The tri al court

did not ment ion a mandat ory -supervi sed-re lease t erm in the oral recit ationof the pl ea ag reement, nor did the wri tten s entenci ng order i nclude a t erm of mand atory supervi sed rel ease. Borst , 372 Ill. App. 3d at 33 3, 867 N .E.2d at 118 3. The co urt held that Wh itfield

did not apply because, whil e the trialcourt coul d ha ve ma de its adm onish men ts clear er , the def end ant was info rme d that

mand at ory -s upe rv is ed- re le as e t erms applie d, and thus, his constitutional right t o due process and fundamental fair ness was not vio lated

. Borst , 372 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 3 34, 8 67 N .E.2 d at 1 184
. The defendant bear s the burden of est ablis hing that the ci rcumstance s exist ing at t he ti me of the ple a heari ng, when judged by object ive st andards, just ify his mis taken i mpression that his sentence did not inclu de a ma nda tory-su per vise d-re leas e term
. People v. Ja rrett , 372 Ill. App. 3d 344, 352, 867 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 ( 2007). The onl y admonition the de fend a nt recei ved about mandator y supe rvise d relea se occurr ed when the trial court inform ed him that, for the offense of firs t-degr ee murder, he could be sentence d to 2 0 to 60 y ears i n the Departmentof Correct ions, he could be fined up t o $25,000, and h e could be su bject to 3 years'mandatory

supervi sed rel ease. The t rialcourt neve r li nked the mandator y- supervi sedrelease term to the de fendant' s plea. When the tri al court accepted t

he plea and i mposed the sentence , it s pecifi call y menti oned the 22 years' incarcerati on, court costs, DNA test ing, and disburs ement of bond monies, but it did not ment ion a te rm of mandatory supervi sed relea se. Because the defendant

negotiated a sent ence at t he low end of the sentencing range, the failure to affirmat ively

inform the defendant t

hat mandator

y supe rvise d relea se rem a ined as a pa rt

### 13

of his sen tence could have led him to belie ve that the mandatory -supervi sed-re lease t erm had also be en ne go tia ted aw ay. If an ordi nary person i n the ci rcumstance s of the ac cuse d w ould underst and the admonishment s given by the trial court as conveying the inf ormation r equired byRu le 40 2, th en th ere h as b een sub stan tial co mp lianc e. People v. Sut herland , 128 Il l. App. 3d 415 , 419 , 470 N.E .2d 1210, 1214 (1984). We believe that an ordinary person i n the de fe nd an t's circumst ances would not unde rstand the trial co ur t's admonishment t o mean that
a term of mandator

y supe rvise d relea se would be added to any priso n sen tence , but w ould underst and the a dm oni shm ent a s a w arn ing abo ut th e po ssib le pe nalti es. Judged by obj ecti ve standards, the circ um stance s exis ting at t he tim e o f th e p lea he ar in g j us tif y th e d ef en da nt 's belie f tha t his s ente nce did not inclu de a ma nda tory-su per vise d-re leas e term
. The State argues that the defendant hadbeen re peatedl y i nformed that he would be subject to a thre e-year m anda tory-supe rvised -release term a t hearin gs prio r to the ple a heari ng and that, theref

ore, he c ould not cl aim that he was unaware that

a mandatory -supervi sedrelease period wo uld fo llow his relea se fro m th e Depa rtment of Correcti ons or that the mandatory-supervised-r elease term wa s so me thin g he cou ld b arg ain a wa y. Ad mo niti ons given at prior

proceedi ngs cannot be r elie d upon to remedy the la ck of proper admoni tions at the subsequent

plea hea ring

. People v. Bl ankley , 319 Il l. App. 3d 996, 1007, 747 N.E.2d 16, 25 (2001). To satis fy t

he consti tuti onal requirement of subs tanti al compliance wit h Rule 402, the adm onition s mu st be m ade a t the tim e the pl ea is t ak en. Blankley , 319 Il l. App. 3d at 1007, 747 N.E.2d at 2 5. E ve n i f th e d ef en da nt ha s s om e g en er al k no w led ge ab ou t m an da to rysupe rvised -release terms , that is insu fficien t to estab lish that h e und erstoo d the te rms o f his plea agr eem ent a t the t ime he p led g uilty. Wh itfield , 217 Il l. 2d at 200, 840 N.E. 2d at 672. "[ D] ue process r equires that it be evi dent from the record t hat a defendant 's pl ea o f guilty is entered with fullknowledge o f the consequences." Wh itfield , 217 I ll. 2d at 200, 840 N.E.2d at672. W he n a tria l co ur t fa ils to pr op er ly ad m on ish a d ef en da nt th at a m an da to ry-

### 14

supervised-release term w ill attach to his pri son sente nce, t he defendantneed not d emo nstrate
a reasonabl e probabil ity that, but for t

he lack of

specifi c admonishment, he would nothave pled gui lty. Wh itfield , 217 Ill. 2d at 20 1, 84 0 N .E.2 d at 6 73. In Wh itfield , the supreme court plainly hel d that a

defendant pl eading gui lty to a specifi ed term of i mprisonmentpursu ant to a plea b argain must be advis ed prior to accepting his plea th at a term of m andatory supervi sed rel ease will be added to t he defendant' s sente nce. Wh itfield , 217 Ill. 2d at 195 , 840 N .E.2d at 669 . Accord ingly, we do no t believe that any mere mentionof the phra se "mandator y supe rvise d relea se" duri ng a p lea hea ring is su fficien t to sati sfythe constitutional r equirement s explained in Wh itfield

. Contra People v. Holborow , 382 Ill. App . 3d 852, 86 1-62, 892 N.E.2d 1, 8-9 (200 8). In order t o comply wit h Wh itfield , the court must

advise t he defendant t

hat a mandator

y- supervi sed-re lease t erm will be added to his sentence, an d that advisem ent must o ccur prior t o accepting his plea. As in Wh itfield

and Company , in th is c as e th e d ef en da nt 's pleadi ng suffici ently alle ges that the trial c ourt fai led to a dvise t he defendant, prior

to accepting his plea, that a three- year mandatory-supervised-r elease term w ould be added to the se ntenc e that w as the s ubjec t of his pleaag re em en t. W he n t he tria l co ur t's failure to pro perly adm onish a defenda nt resu lts in him recei ving a more onero us sen tence than th e one he w as told h e w ould receiv e, his consti tuti onal right

to due proce ss and fundamenta l fai rness has been viol ated. When a de fe nd an t's consti tuti onal ri ghts have bee n violat ed due to improper admoniti ons regardi ng the additi on of a mandatory -supervi sed-re lease t erm to his fully negotiatedsentence , the plea promise must be enforc ed or the de fendantmu st be allow ed to wit hdr aw his p lea. Wh itfield , 217 Ill. 2d at 20 2, 84 0 N .E.2 d at 6 73.

CONCLUS ION A cc or di ng ly, we revers e the ju dgm ent of the E ffing ham Co unty circu it c ourt and

### 15

remand with dir ecti on s thatthe circuit court recharacteri ze the defendant's peti tion as a postconvi ction pe tition and conduct further proceedi ngs not i nconsist ent with t his opi nion.
Reversed; cause remanded w ith directions.

GO LD EN HE RSH and W EX STT EN , JJ., concur.NO. 5-07-0199 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

___________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STA TE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circui t Court of Plaintiff-Appell ee, ) E ff in gh am C ou nt y. ) v. ) No. 03-CF-264 ) TOBBY J . S MITH, ) Ho nora ble ) SherriL. E. Tungate, De fend ant-A ppella nt. ) Judge, presi ding.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion Fi led: September 10, 2008 Modifie d Opinion o n Denialof Rehear ing Fi led: October 27, 2008

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justice s : Honorable B ruce D. Stewart, P.J.

Honorable Richar d P. Goldenhers h, J. , and Ho nor able Jam es M . W exs tten, J ., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys Daniel M. Kirwan, DeputyDefender, Edwin J. Anderson, Assi stant Defe nder, Office for of

the S tate A ppella te De fend er, Fifth Judic ial Distric t, 117 N orth Ten th Stree t, Suite Appell ant 300, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys Charles Zal ar, Speci al Prose cutor, Office of the St ate' s Attorne ys Appel late for Prosecut or, 725 Sout h Second Street , Spri ngfiel d, IL 62704; Norbert J. Goetten, Appellee D ire cto r, S tep he n E . N or ris , D ep ut y D ire cto r, K en dr a S . P ete rso n, S taff A tto rn ey,

Office of the St ate' s Attorne ys Appel late Prosecut or, 730 E. Ill inois Highway 15, Su ite 2, P .O. B ox 2 249 , M t. Ve rno n, IL 628 64; Ho n. E d D eters , Sta te's A ttorn ey, Effingham CountyCourthouse, 120 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor, Effingham, IL 62401

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