*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 2, 2006*

Decided August 2, 2006

Before

 Hon. RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

 Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

No. 06-1529

RONDELL C. RAY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MARK A. BEZY,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Terre Haute Division

No. 2:05-CV-228-LJM-WTL

Larry J. McKinney, 

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Federal inmate Rondell Ray claims in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 that

he is confined unlawfully because, he contends, the Bureau of Prisons lost

“jurisdiction” over him and could not regain custody after authorities in Wisconsin,

where Ray was serving a state sentence, released him prematurely to the BOP and

then took him back several weeks later after realizing their mistake. We affirm the

denial of Ray’s petition.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 06-1529 Page 2

Ray was serving a Wisconsin prison term in 1998 when federal authorities in

the Eastern District of Wisconsin charged him with a drug offense and took him

into custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Ray pleaded

guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base,

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and in January 1999 he was sentenced to 151 months in

prison. Twelve of those months were to be served concurrently with his Wisconsin

sentence. Within days of his sentencing Ray was returned to the custody of the

State of Wisconsin to resume service of his state sentence.

Almost a year later, on January 12, 2000, the Wisconsin Department of

Corrections erroneously released Ray into the custody of the BOP. Several weeks

later, after realizing that they had miscalculated the termination date of Ray’s state

sentence, Wisconsin authorities notified the BOP that his release was premature

and requested that he be returned to state custody to complete his state sentence. 

The BOP complied and returned Ray to state custody on March 6, 2000. Wisconsin

credited the entire period from January 12 through March 6 against his state

sentence, and eventually paroled him on May 27, 2003. Once again he was turned

over to the BOP. Because one year of his federal sentence had run concurrently

with the state sentence, Ray had 139 months left to serve on his 151-month

sentence as of May 27, 2003. His projected release date falls in June 2013.

Ray filed his § 2241 petition in September 2005. Although he claimed

explicitly that the BOP had “relinquished jurisdiction by releasing petitioner to the

Wisconsin Department of Corrections,” the government and the district court

construed Ray’s pro se petition as arguing that the BOP was compelled to credit

against his federal sentence the time he erroneously spent in BOP custody from

January 12 through March 6, 2000. In denying Ray’s petition, the district court

noted that by statute the BOP is precluded from giving credit for periods of

confinement that already have been applied toward another sentence. See 18

U.S.C. § 3585(b) (providing that no period of incarceration can be credited against a

federal sentence if it already has “been credited against another sentence”); United

States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining operation of § 3585(b)). 

Because it is undisputed that Wisconsin gave Ray full credit for the weeks in early

2000 when the state’s error resulted in his being housed in a BOP facility, the

district court concluded that Ray could not get credit towards his federal sentence

for the identical period of incarceration. To the extent that Ray meant to claim

entitlement to federal credit for that same period, we agree with the district court’s

analysis.

However, as we read both his petition and his brief on appeal, Ray principally

argues that the BOP lost “jurisdiction” over him for good when it sent him back to

Wisconsin authorities in March 2000. That contention is incorrect. As we

explained in Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994), there is a common-
No. 06-1529 Page 3

law rule that prohibits the BOP from “delay[ing] the expiration of the sentence

either by postponing the commencement of the sentence or by releasing the prisoner

for a time and then reimprisoning him.” But this does not mean that the BOP

cannot temporarily relinquish custody to state authorities, and the prisoner cannot

complain unless the shuttling between jurisdictions “resulted in postponing the date

at which the prisoner’s last sentence would expire.” Dunne, 14 F.3d at 337; see Cox

v. United States, 551 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1977). 

And that did not happen in Ray’s case. A federal sentence that is run

partially concurrent with an unexpired state sentence effectively will not commence

until the state sentence has concluded, though credit will be given against the

federal term for the concurrent period. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), (b); U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, BOP Program Statement No. 5880.28(3)(e)(1997) (providing that, if a

district court orders a federal sentence to run “concurrently with, the non-federal . .

. undischarged term of imprisonment, the prisoner shall be returned to the nonfederal jurisdiction until the prisoner is released (completes the undischarged term

of imprisonment) from the non-federal term”); Binford v. United States, 436 F.3d

1252, 1254-56 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that federal sentence commenced only

when petitioner had completed his state sentence and “was finally received into

federal custody for the purpose of serving his federal sentence”; federal sentence

had not commenced when, after conclusion of federal prosecution, petitioner spent

several weeks in BOP facility due to mistake of marshals service in delivering him

there instead of returning him to state on expired writ of habeas corpus ad

prosequendum). When Ray was delivered by mistake to the BOP in January 2000,

his Wisconsin sentence had not yet expired, and so neither did his federal sentence

finally commence. Ray, as a state prisoner, in effect spent several weeks in a BOP

facility as a “guest” of the federal government, see 18 U.S.C. § 5003; 28 C.F.R.

§ 0.95(g); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 482 (1981), but the state’s mistake did not

delay the end of Ray’s federal sentence, and thus he has no claim under § 2241. 

See Dunne, 14 F.3d at 337.

AFFIRMED.