This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 28,325 9 MATTHEW BENJAMIN ALDERETE, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY 12 John W. Pope, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 18 Nancy Hewitt, Assistan t Appellate Defender 19 Santa Fe, NM 20 for Appellant 21 MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 VIGIL, Judge. 232 On June 27, 2008, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review our 1 memorandum opinion filed here in on May 15, 2008, and further ordered that the 2 matter be held in abeyance in the Supreme Court pending its disposition of State v. 3 Maddox , No. 30,526. On August 3, 2009, the Supreme Court filed its Order of 4 Remand directing us to further consid er our May 15, 2008 memorandum opinion “in 5 light of[ ] State of New Mexico v. Maddox , [2008-NMSC-062, 145 N.M. 242, 195 P.3d 6 1254] and[ ] State of New Mexico v. Garza , [2009-NMSC-038, 146 N.M. 499, 212 7 P.3d 387].” We now hold that Garzacompels us to affirm the district court order 8 denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for a violation of his righ t to a speedy trial. 9 We therefore affirm Defendant’s convictions. 10 A more detailed summary of the factual and procedural history of this case can 11 be found in our prior Memorandum Opinion. State v. Alderete , No. 28,325, slip op. 12 (N.M. Ct. App. May 15, 2008, cert. granted , 2008-NMCERT-006, 144 N.M. 381, 188 13 P.3d 105. For purposes of this decision, we note the following facts. 14 Defendant appealed to this Court fo llowing a conditional plea of guilty under 15 which he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss for a speedy 16 trial violation. We reversed, conc luding that under our existing precedent, 17 Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. 183 We first concluded that this is a simple case. Under Salandre v. State , 111 1 N.M. 422, 428, 806 P.2d 562, 568 (1991), a nine-month delay was considered 2 presumptively prejudicial for a simple cas e. Since the delay between Defendant’s 3 indictment on November 16, 2006, and hi s conditional guilty plea on September 25, 4 2007, amounted to ten months and eight days , it was presumptively prejudicial. The 5 delay therefore triggered further analysis of Defendant’s speedy trial claim under the 6 Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 (1972), factors: “‘Length of delay, the reason for the 7 delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.’” See 8 Zurla v. State , 109 N.M. 640, 642, 789 P.2d 588, 590 (1990) (quoting Barker , 407 9 U.S. at 530). 10 We concluded that the le ngth of delay, one month and eight days beyond the 11 nine-month threshold, weighed slightly in De fendant’s favor. We also determined that 12 the reason for the delay, the State’s moti on for an extension to negotiate a plea 13 arrangement, weighed against the State based upon our opinion in State v. Maddox , 14 2007-NMCA-102, 142 N.M . 400, 166 P.3d 461, rev’d by 2008-NMSC-062, 145 N.M. 15 242, 195 P.3d 1254. The third factor, Defendant’s assertion of the right, weighed in 16 Defendant’s favor because he made a sp eedy trial demand, he opposed the State’s 17 petition for an extension, and he filed a motion to dismiss based on the violation of his 18 right to a speedy trial. Finally, we determined that the fourth factor of undue prejudice 194 did not weigh in Defendant’s favor. We therefore held, “Because three of the four 1 speedy trial factors weigh in Defendant’s favor, we conclude that the State has not 2 rebutted the presumption of prejudice established by the delay in this case.” Alderete , 3 No. 28,325, slip op. at 10. 4 In Garza , the Supreme Court reviewed our state’s speedy trial jurisprudence 5 and “abolish[ed] the presumption that a de fendant’s right to a speedy trial has been 6 violated based solely on the threshold de termination that the length of delay is 7 ‘presumptively prejudicial.’” 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 1. As a result, a “presumptively 8 prejudicial” length of delay does not esta blish a presumption of a speedy trial 9 violation, but rather triggers further inquiry into the Barker factors. Garza , 2009- 10 NMSC-038, ¶ 21. Additionally, without a showing of particularized prejudice by a 11 defendant, a successful speedy trial violation requires that “the le ngth of delay and the 12 reasons for the delay weigh heavily in [the ] defendant’s favor and [that the] defendant 13 has asserted his right and not acquiesced to the delay.” Id. ¶ 39. The Court also 14 extended the amount of time necessary be fore a delay becomes “presumptively 15 prejudicial.” Id. ¶ 47. The threshold delay for a simple case is now one year. Id. ¶ 16 48. This new guideline applie s “to speedy trial motions to dismiss initiated on or after 17 August 13, 2007.” Id. ¶ 50. 185 Applying Garzato Defendant’s case, we are compelled to revisit our holding. 1 Defendant filed his motion to dismiss on September 17, 2007, which subjects his 2 speedy trial claim to the new one-yearpresumption for simple cases. See id. ¶ 48. 3 Further, there is no indication that there was any possibility of prejudice to 4 Defendant’s defense that would require incr eased speed in bringing the case to trial. 5 See id. ¶ 49 (“Where [the] possibility [of prejudice to the defendant’s defense] is 6 realized and the defendant suffers actual prejudice as a result of delay, these 7 guidelines will not preclude the defendant from bringing a motion for a speedy trial 8 violation though the delay may beless than one year.”). In fact, we previously held 9 that Defendant did not show actual prejudice as a result of the delay. Consequently, 10 further analysis of the Barker factors in light of Maddox is not required. 11 For the reasons stated in this opinion, weaffirm the district court order denying 12 Defendant’s motion to dismiss for a violati on of his right to a speedy trial and affirm 13 Defendant’s convictions. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15
16 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 17 WE CONCUR: 18

19 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge 206 1 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 2