United States Institute of Peace • www.usip.org • Tel. 202.457.1700 • Fax. 202.429.6063

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

“Security sector reforms so far 

have been primarily designed to 

increase the security of the 

presidential incumbent, rather 

than the Yemeni citizens.”

March 21, 2013

The Security Sector in Yemen

No State, No Problem?

Summary

•	 A new survey by the Yemen Polling Center revealsthat the state’ssecurity establishment

remainsineffective in cities and largely absent in rural areas.

•	 Yemenis do not equate the presence of the state’ssecurity establishment with greater

personalsecurity, indicating a high degree of popular trust in traditional, tribalsecurity

arrangements.

•	 Yet, many Yemenis also understand the limits of the tribalsystem, advocating for a more

substantial role of the state as a security provider.

•	 Security sector reformsthroughout 2012 have been limited to President Abd Rabbuh Mansur

Hadi’srecruitment of new leadership personnel.

The Yemen Polling Center (YPC)—an independent think-tank in Sanaa—issued a report, on January 30, 2013, on the public perception of the Yemenisecurity sector.1

In a country-wide survey,

a questionnaire was distributed to 1,990 respondents, with an even number of male and female

respondents. The report allowsfor an interpretation that issomewhatsurprising. In a nutshell,

Yemenis perceive the state’ssecurity establishment as notoriously ineffective, if not virtually

absent. With ongoing civil warsin the North and South of the country,significant al-Qaida activism

in the Southern governorates, frequent assassinations ofsecurity personnel and politicians, and

the irregular kidnapping of foreigners, there is objectively no security at all in a country routinely

described as a failed state by Western observers. Yet, the majority of Yemenis, whether in urban or

in rural areas, do not necessarily feel insecure in an environment where public security arrangements are absent or dysfunctional.

Dysfunctional Security Service, But Safe

In theory, the domestic police force consists of the regular police, traffic police, firefighters,

passport authority, criminal investigation, the Najda Police (a special force employed for the

protection of government buildings and foreign embassies), and the Central Security Forces

(CSF, a large paramilitary unit employed as an anti-riot police, an anti-terrorist force, and for the

recruitment ofsecurity checks). Perhaps with the exception of the CSF, these police units are either

ineffective—wherever they exist—or entirely absent, in particular in the rural areas of the country.

Holger Albrecht

E-mail: Halbrecht@usip.org

Phone: 202.457.1700

PEACEBRIEF142
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

page 2 • PB 142 • March 21, 2013

The Security Sector in Yemen

Even prior to the Yemeni uprising of January 15, 2011,state capacity has been extremely limited in

the periphery of the country, but also in parts of the central highlands and bigger cities.

Yemenis are fully aware of the state’slack of capacity. The YPC survey revealsthat 14.6 percent of

all respondents perceive the police forces’engagement in their region as positive (13.9 percent as

negative), while 49.5 percent maintain that the police are not active at all. The YPC survey implies a

significant gap between urban and rural areas. In the major cities, the degree ofsecurity depends

heavily on the presence of the military (especially the Republican Guard and the Special Forces)

and more or less autonomous militias(tribal forces, the First Armored Division under the command

of Ali Mohsen, and other private armies),sidelining the police forcesreporting to the Ministry of

Interior. In the cities, 75.8 percent of the respondents knew of the existence of a police station, while

in the countryside 89.5 percent indicated the complete absence of police stations—and in one third

of governorates 100 percent of respondents maintained that there were no police stations at all.

Wherever police forces do exist, people remain unimpressed with their performance. When

asked who would offersecurity in the region where respondentsreside, 21.9 percent mentioned

the police—lessthan those resorting to tribalshaykhs(22.2 percent) and“the people themselves”

(41.1 percent). Concerning people’s confidence in the police 15.7 percent had“no confidence at

all”and 43.8 percent“little confidence.”Among the reasons cited for a no-confidence judgment,

corruption and favoritism are dominant, with 77.9 percent. According to the survey, the level of

corruption was“high”or“very high”in the governmental courtsystem (62 percent), the regular

police (60.1 percent), the traffic police (55.7 percent), the investigative police (39.9 percent), the

emergency police unit (38.9 percent), and the Central Security Forces(38.1 percent). The personal

experience of Yemenis with the police is devastating: Only 6.9 of respondents maintained that

police officersresponded in a positive way when assistance was needed. Overwhelming anecdotal

evidence suggeststhat Yemenisecurity and military forces are actively involved in criminal activities, in particularsmuggling.

Perhapsthe mostsurprising result of the YPC survey isthat the absence and inefficiency of

the state’ssecurity arrangements does not result in the people’s perception of a general lack of

personalsafety. 44.7 percent of respondentsthroughout the country feel“alwayssafe,”while 27.7

percent feel“mostly safe.”On the question asto which actors would have a detrimental impact on

the security situation, 50.3 percent responded with“no one.”Nearly 37 percent answered“nothing”

when asked about the greatest threat to personalsecurity. For personal protection, 28 percent of

respondents admitted that they would rely on their own weapons—notsurprising in a country

with the second-highest density ofsmall arms worldwide. Nearly 60 percent, however,said that

they would not rely on any personal means ofself-protection, which correlate with the equally

high number of people who did not identify any particular threat to their personalsafety. Only 10.3

percent of respondents maintained that they have become the victim in a crime during the past

two years. Among those 74.3 percent reported to the police but 83.9 percent were dissatisfied with

the help they received.

Yemenis’perception of the security situation obviously does not correspond with the Western

perception of a failed state. In the Northern governorate of Saada, the center of the Huthi rebellion

against the central government that led to six military conflictssince 2004, close to 80 percent of

respondents evaluated their personalsecurity situation as either“good”or“very good.”In a ranking

of 21 governorates, Saada occupiesthe forth place even though—or perhaps because—the

region has completely slipped out ofstate control: 100 percent of respondentsindicated that there

was not a single police station in the Saada governorate. Even in the Southern province of Abyan,

the hot-bed of al-Qaida activism in Yemen, around 60 percent of respondents assessthe security

situation as“good”or“very good”—more than in the cities of Sanaa and Aden.
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

page 3 • PB 142 • March 21, 2013

The Security Sector in Yemen

Toward an Effective State Security Sector

The YPC survey, in conjunction with frequent assassinations ofsecurity and government personnel

throughout 2012, revealsthat police and security forcesremain inefficient in the urban centers of

the country, and they are almost entirely absent in the rural areas. A comparison between center

and periphery impliesthat the complete absence ofstatistsecurity forces does not necessarily

increase the people’sinsecurity. People also do not feel more unsafe in those regionsthatslipped

away from government control,such asin the Zaydi North (Saada governorate) or in the Southern

governorate of Abyan, the center of al-Qaida activism. Neither doesthe YPC data indicate a

significant difference between North and South in security perceptions. But it is apparent in the

data that people do not feel more unsafe when the state is absent.

The reason for this phenomenon isthat people throughout Yemen perceive tribalsocial

structures as a largely efficient provider of personalsecurity. The unwritten rules of tribalsociety

(qabyala) envelope mechanisms of informal litigation and strengthen the role of tribal elders

(shaykhs) and local committeesfor conflict resolution and prevention. People feelsafe whenever

the traditionalsocial fabrics of Yemenisociety remain intact, despite serious conflictsthat may

arise between their community and the central government. A forthcoming USIP report by Erica

Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsari maintainsthat tribalsocial mechanisms have been weakened in

the Northern governorate of Marib,2an observation that is confirmed by the perception of its

citizens: While YPC data on Marib indicates a substantial (compared to other governorates) feeling

of insecurity, the neighboring Saada province does not, despite the protracted Huthi rebellion.

People living in the cities of the country perceive a lack of personalsecurity irrespective of the

presence of police, military, and the state’sintelligence apparatus. Thisisin part due to the erosion

of traditionalsocietalstructuresin the bigger cities, but also because the popular uprising and

ensuing armed elite conflict in 2011 led to a deterioration of the security situation in Sanaa, Aden,

and Taizz. When asked about the development over the past year, respondentsindicated significant improvement in those governorates precisely because it isin those cities where the end of the

armed conflictsin November 2011 wasfelt the most.

While the YPC survey revealssubstantial insightsinto the importance of the traditionalsocial

fabrics, there is an understanding among many Yemenis—perhaps also admitted by many of those

who feel generally safe—that a greater presence of the state’ssecurity establishment would be

desirable: 63.5 percent of all respondentssaid that they would feel“more secure”with a stronger

police presence, whereas only 29.4 percent would feel“more secure”with a greater role of tribal

leaders. Despite the general understanding thatstate security arrangements are inefficient, 44.8

percent of respondentsstill believe thatsecurity should remain entirely in the hands of the state. In

any case, most Yemenisshare an understanding thatsecurity sector reforms and a strengthening

of the police force are eminent.

Security for Whom?

On December 19, 2012, President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi issued a presidential decree aimed

at reforming the military establishment and security sector. On firstsight, the taken measures

look promising. The decree called for Restructuring Committeesto be formed in the ministries

of Interior and Defense. The major challenge for reforming the Yemeni armed forces will be to

dissolve the autonomous militias and special military units and strengthen the chain-of-command

and corporate loyalty among soldiers and officers. Concerning the security forcesthat report to the

Ministry of Interior, one sub-committee of the Restructuring Committee wastasked with collecting

intelligence on existing resources acrossthe country, while anothersub-committee will be respon-
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

page 4 • PB 142 • March 21, 2013

The Security Sector in Yemen

sible for legal revisions and training. One core proposal wasthe decentralization of the command

structure, making the 21 governors directly responsible for regular police forces and the CSF. Other

major challengesinclude combating widespread corruption (identified in the YPC report as one of

the most eminent obstaclesfor an efficientsecurity force); the integration of parallelsecurity units

in the military but also in the police forces(most importantly the two intelligence apparatuses, the

Political Security Office and the National Security Bureau); and the professionalization of the police.

One year after the election of Hadi asthe new president, concrete reform measures were

largely focused on replacing top personnel with his own men. Like Hadi, the new minister of

defense, Mohammed Nasr Ahmed, isfrom the Southern province of Abyan and a close aide of

the president. Minister of Interior Abdel Qader al-Qahtan representsthe Islah Party in an obvious

attempt at consolidating a political alliance against the former president’sloyalistsin the General

People’s Congress(GPC). In the CSF, former Saleh loyalist Fadl al-Qawsi wasreplaced with the

formersecurity head in Taizz, Abed Rabbo al-Maqdashi. The new head of the National Security

Bureau is Ali al-Ahmadi from the Southern province of Shabwa. Throughout 2012, President Hadi

hasreplaced numerous army commanders, governors, and security officers. An informed observer

estimatesthat up to 80 percent of the new appointments are recruited from the South.3While it is

too early to fully assessthe results of the reform measures, those decisions point at the preference

of the new president to consolidate his position in the existing security establishment vis-à-vis

powerful political rivals,such as Ali Mohsen or the former president’sson, Ahmed Ali Saleh, rather

than embarking on substantialstructural reforms. Security sector reformsso far have been primarily designed to increase the security of the presidential incumbent, rather than the Yemeni citizens.

Recommendations

The results of the YPC trigger an imminent question: are security sector reforms necessary at all?

The answer is: yes. When asked in the survey, many people may have ignored the very realsecurity

challenges associated with a tribalsociety that defies penetration of a central government. Many

respondents may not have implied a questionnaire focusing on personalsecurity with tribal

conflicts. Yet, many respondents also believe in the limited capacities of tribalsecurity arrangementsfor maintaining peace and order. With traditionalsocieties eroding in the modern nationstate era,security sector reformsin Yemen should have a high priority. Yet, they will certainly have

to be accompanied by an awareness campaign, in particular in those regions where trust in tribal

arrangementsremainssolid. The YPS data offerssignificant insightsinto a mapping of Yemen

according to the need ofsuch an awareness campaign. The state’ssecurity sectorshall not replace,

but rather complement local and tribal arrangements. Successful reforms will include the recruitment of personnel from among the regions where staff is on duty as well asthe decentralization

of command structures. Civilian security forces will have to be strengthened to the detriment of

military units and private armies. Meaningful reforms will reach beyond the mere replacement of

top officialsin the security apparatus and include substantial measures of organizational restructuring. In order to support the professionalization ofsecurity forces,salaries will have to be raised

significantly to curb endemic corruption. Throughout medium-term developments, there will be

substantial needsfor budgetary assistance by the international donor community.

Endnotes

1. Yemen Polling Center. Public Perceptions of the Security Sector and Police Work in Yemen.

Major Survey Findings. (Sanaa: YPC, 2013). The survey is part of a larger EU-funded YPC-project
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, D.C. 20037

page 5 • PB 142 • March 21, 2013

The Security Sector in Yemen

implemented and supervised by Hafez Albukari (President of YPC) and Marie-Christine Heinze

(University of Bonn, Germany).

2. Erica Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsari.“Waiting for Change. The Impact of Transition on Local

Justice and Security in Yemen.”(Washington, DC: USIP, forthcoming 2013).

3. Interview with Yemeni military officer who asked to remain anonymous, Sanaa, January 15,

2013.

About This Brief

This Peace Brief is based on the 

author’s three-week research 

mission to Yemen in January 

2013. Holger Albrecht is assistant 

professor of political science at the 

American University in Cairo and 

Jennings Randolph senior fellow 

(2012-2013). His main research 

focus is on political opposition 

in the authoritarian regimes, 

transition to democracy, and 

civil-military relations in the Middle 

East and North Africa.