Initial Decision Release No. 1375

Administrative Proceeding

File No. 3-17693

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

In the Matter of

Sean P. Finn and

M. Dwyer LLC

Initial Decision of Default

May 8, 2019

Appearance: Hemma R. Lomax for the Division of Enforcement,

Securities and Exchange Commission

Before: James E. Grimes, Administrative Law Judge

I grant the Division of Enforcement’s motion for summary disposition 

and entry of sanctions. Respondents Sean P. Finn and M. Dwyer LLC are

barred from associating with a broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal 

securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized 

statistical rating organization and from participating in an offering of penny 

stock.

Procedural Background

The Securities and Exchange Commission initiated this proceeding in 

November 2016, when it issued an order instituting proceedings (OIP) under 

Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 This proceeding is a 

follow-on proceeding based on a permanent injunction entered against Finn 

and Dwyer by the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.

2

 

1 OIP ¶ I; see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b).

2 See SEC v. Malom Grp. AG, No. 2:13-cv-2280 (D. Nev.) (the civil case); 

OIP ¶ II.B.2.
2

This proceeding was previously assigned to a different administrative 

law judge, who issued an initial decision in April 2017.

3 In June 2018, the 

Commission stayed all pending cases.4 In August 2018, the Commission 

allowed the stay to lapse, vacated any prior opinion it had issued in pending 

cases, and remanded all cases pending before it for reassignment, with 

instructions for the newly assigned administrative law judge to give no

weight to or otherwise presume the correctness of any prior opinions, orders, 

or rulings issued in the matter.

5 The Commission’s remand order included 

this case among a list of remanded cases.6 Following the Commission’s 

August order, this proceeding was reassigned to me.7

After reassignment, I determined that Respondents were served with the 

OIP in January 2017.

8 Because they had not answered the OIP or otherwise 

participated in this proceeding, I ordered them to show cause why they 

should not be found in default.9

The Division filed a timely motion for summary disposition and 

sanctions. Respondents have not filed an answer, a response to the order to 

show cause, or an opposition to the Division’s motion.

Findings of Fact

The findings and conclusions in this initial decision are based on the 

record and on facts officially noticed under Commission Rule of Practice 323, 

 

3 Finn, Initial Decision Release No. 1126, 2017 WL 1425434 (ALJ Apr. 21, 

2017).

4 Pending Admin. Proc., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 10510, 2018 

WL 3193858 (June 21, 2018).

5 Pending Admin. Proc., Securities Act Release No. 10536, 2018 WL 

4003609, at *1 (Aug. 22, 2018).

6 Id. at Ex. A.

7 Pending Admin. Proc., Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 5955, 2018 SEC 

LEXIS 2264, at *2–3 (ALJ Sept. 12, 2018).

8 Finn, Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 6292, 2018 SEC LEXIS 3149, at 

*1 (ALJ Nov. 5, 2018).

9 Id. at *1–2.
3

17 C.F.R. § 201.323.10 Because they failed to answer the OIP or otherwise 

participate in this proceeding, Respondents are in default.11 As a result of 

Respondents’ default, I have accepted as true the factual allegations in the 

OIP.12 In making the findings below, I have applied preponderance of the 

evidence as the standard of proof.13 

From April 2010 through September 2011, which is the relevant time 

period charged in the Commission’s injunctive complaint, Finn was Dwyer’s 

sole owner, officer, and employee.

14 During that time, Finn and Dwyer acted 

as unregistered brokers.15

Respondents participated in a fraudulent scheme in which at least 14 

investors lost millions of dollars. Finn introduced investors either to Malom 

Group AG,16 an entity based in Switzerland, or M.Y. Consultants.17 Although 

 

10 I take official notice of the docket in the civil case and the orders the 

court has issued. Finn and several other defendants were indicted in 2013 

and charged in a 24-count indictment with securities fraud, wire fraud, and 

conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud. See United States v. Brandel, 

No. 2:13-cr-439 (D. Nev.) (the criminal case), ECF No. 1. I also take notice of 

the docket, orders, and filings in the criminal case. 

Finn was extradited from Canada in 2018 and ordered detained pending 

trial. See id., ECF No. 390. Finn’s criminal trial is currently scheduled to 

begin in mid-July. See id., ECF No. 407, at 5. 

11 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155(a), .220(f); Pending Admin. Proc., 2018 WL 

4003609, at *1.

12 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155(a), .220(f). 

13 See John Francis D’Acquisto, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release 

No. 1696, 1998 WL 34300389, at *2 (Jan. 21, 1998).

14 OIP ¶¶ II.A.1, II.B.3. 

15 OIP ¶ II.A.1; see Lomax Decl., Ex. 25 (certification that neither 

Respondent was registered with the Commission or associated with a 

Commission-registered broker-dealer).

16 Malom is an acronym for “make a lot of money.” Civil Case, ECF No. 1 at 

1.

17 Lomax Decl., Ex. 8 at 2, Ex. 24A at 123; see Lomax Decl., Ex. 16 

(describing Finn as a broker), Ex. 17; see also Simpson Decl., Ex. 3 (reflecting 

payments received in relation to specified investors).
4

Finn’s pitch to investors took a variety of forms, it typically involved 

hallmarks of fraud: purportedly riskless investment with guaranteed, quick, 

and highly unlikely returns.18 Many investors were lured into placing large 

sums—between $250,000 and $550,000—in a supposedly secure escrow 

account, “always under your control,” that would enable investors to access 

fantastic returns.19 Portraying itself as a serious financial player—“at this 

time we do have a $10M minimum”—Dwyer’s website described the sizeable 

funds to be placed in escrow as “modest.”20 But the promise of fantastic 

returns would turn out to be false and investors would eventually lose funds 

placed in escrow—which was the point of the scheme.

Other investors were solicited to provide $5.5 million in return for $11 

million to be earned in one day.21 Investors were purportedly allowed to “reenter the program as many time[s] as they want.”22

Investors were usually told that their investments were protected by a 

certificate of deposit or proof that Malom had large deposits “at a recognized 

and respected financial institution.”23 But because the scheme would fall 

apart if investors contacted the financial institutions that were supposedly 

protecting their risk-free investments, Finn took steps to dissuade investors 

from investigating potential problems. In an e-mail in September 2010, he 

told an investor that “[a]ny unscheduled calls or communications to the bank 

 

18 See Lomax Decl., Ex. 3, Ex. 10; see also Lomax Decl., Ex. 6 (Dwyer 

website).

19 See Lomax Decl., Ex. 2, Ex. 5 at 121629; see also Lomax Decl., Ex. 6, Ex. 

12, Ex. 13 at 409, 412; Simpson Decl., Ex. 4.

20 See Lomax Decl., Ex. 6.

21 See Lomax Decl., Ex. 7A, Ex. 9.

22 Lomax Decl., Ex. 7A; see Lomax Decl., Ex. 9.

23 Lomax Decl., Ex. 1 at 29 ($100 million in cash and cash equivalents “at a 

recognized and respected financial institution”), Ex. 3 at 7766 (certificate of 

deposit), 7769 (“Certificate of Deposit guaranteed by an A rated insurance 

company that will completely guarantee the return of your cash”), Ex. 5 at 

121629 (“Our money is at UBS and Credit Suisse”), Ex. 6 (Dwyer website 

claiming that “[o]ur money is at UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and 

HSBC”), Ex. 12 at 42 (“we are prepared to segregate $55M at Deutsche Bank, 

Frankfurt, Main Branch for your investment opportunity”), Ex. 13 at 410 

(“cash and cash equivalents” of at least $54 million “at a recognized and 

respected financial institution”).
5

will result in a cease and desist. Those calls have to be scheduled.”24 A few 

months later, he told principals with investor LGB9 Enterprises that 

“communications with the bank” had to go through Joseph Micelli, an alleged

co-conspirator affiliated with Malom, and that “unscheduled communications 

with the bank could kill the transaction.”25

The same day Finn warned LGB9 not to investigate, Anthony Brandel 

from M.Y. Consultants directed the escrow agent to disperse approximately 

$300,000.26 LGB9 soon demanded its money back and Martin U. Schlaepfer, 

identified as a member of Malom’s board, responded with a lengthy e-mail in 

which he said LGB9’s demands were “extreme and outrageous” and “intended 

to cause ... emotional distress.”27 A representative of LGB9 responded that it 

was preparing to file suit.28

 

24 Lomax Decl., Ex. 19.

25 Lomax Decl., Ex. 18 at 640. Micelli was a defendant in both the civil case 

and the criminal case. See Criminal Case, ECF. No. 1; Civil Case, ECF No. 1. 

He pleaded guilty in the criminal case in November 2015 to conspiracy to 

commit wire and securities fraud. Id., ECF No. 187. Micelli was later 

sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $5.65 million in 

restitution. Id., ECF No. 262. In the civil case, the district court granted 

injunctive relief in September 2014, and found Micelli jointly and severally 

liable to pay disgorgement and interest in excess of $11.3 million and 

imposed a civil penalty of nearly $900,000. Civil Case, ECF No. 38. 

26 Simpson Decl., Ex. 4.

27 Lomax Decl., Ex. 16 at 581. Brandel and Schlaepfer were charged in 

Finn’s indictment and were also co-defendants in the civil case. See Criminal 

Case, ECF. No. 1; Civil Case, ECF No. 1. Brandel was convicted in December 

2015 of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud, nine counts of wire 

fraud, and eight counts of securities fraud. Criminal Case, ECF No. 215. He 

was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay nearly $6.4 

million in restitution. Id., ECF. Nos. 288, 368. Schlaepfer, who is apparently 

a Swiss citizen and resident, see Civil Case, ECF No. 32 at 2, has not been 

tried.

In the civil case, the court dismissed charges against Schlaepfer. Civil 

Case, ECF No. 99. It enjoined Brandel, however, and found him jointly and 

severally liable to pay disgorgement and interest of almost $6 million and 

imposed a civil penalty of nearly $630,000. Civil Case, ECF No. 98.

28 Lomax Decl., Ex. 16 at 581.
6

Other investors soon began to express concerns.29 In March 2011, Finn 

tried to assuage one investor’s concerns by asserting that Malom’s CEO had 

30 years of international banking experience, and claiming Malom had “made 

billions,” was a “financial powerhouse,” and had “closed deals with Wal Mart, 

Bank of America and the State of New York.”30 Another investor claimed 

Malom manufactured the investor’s alleged breach so that Malom could take 

escrowed funds.31 

Although he did not tell investors, Finn was compensated by Malom and 

M.Y. Consultants for bringing in investors.32 Respondents received 

approximately $845,000 from M.Y. Consultants.33 The 14 investors 

Respondents recruited eventually lost over $6 million.34

In November 2016, the United States District Court for the District of 

Nevada permanently enjoined Respondents from violating Sections 5 and 

17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the Exchange 

Act, and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.35 The court found Respondents and three 

other defendants jointly and severally liable for disgorgement of $6.5 million 

in profits and interest.36 The court also imposed individual civil penalties of 

over $700,000 on both Dwyer and Finn.37

 

29 See Lomax Decl., Ex. 2 (alleging that 17 investors, including LGB9, had 

collectively lost over $7.9 million).

30 Lomax Decl., Ex. 17.

31 Lomax Decl., Ex. 8.

32 Simpson Decl., Ex. 1, Ex. 3, Ex. 7; Lomax Decl. Ex. 22, Ex. 24A at 141–

42; see Lomax Decl., Ex. 4 at 19760 (“We ... are only paid a success fee when 

the project is funded.”), Ex. 5 at 121629 (claiming that Respondents would 

only take “a small percentage” of profits and an “engagement fee” that would 

not be released to Respondents until the investor’s attorney or banker 

approved).

33 Simpson Decl. at 8.

34 Id. at 4–5.

35 Civil Case, ECF No. 57.

36 Id. at 5.

37 Id.
7

Conclusions of Law

The Exchange Act gives the Commission authority to impose a collateral 

bar38 if, as is relevant here, (1) a respondent was associated with or seeking 

to become associated with broker or dealer at the time of the misconduct at 

issue; (2) the respondent was enjoined “from engaging in or continuing any 

conduct or practice ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any 

security”; and (3) imposing a bar is in the public interest.39 

By virtue of Respondents’ default, it is an established fact that “[d]uring 

the time in which they engaged in the conduct underlying the complaint,” 

they “acted as unregistered brokers in violation of Section 15(a) of the 

Exchange Act.”40 The first factor is thus met in this case.41

 

38 A collateral bar, also referred to as an industry bar, is a bar that 

prevents an individual from participating in the securities industry in 

capacities in addition to those in which the person was participating at the 

time of his or her misconduct. See Toby G. Scammell, Advisers Act Release 

No. 3961, 2014 WL 5493265, at *1 & n.1 (Oct. 29, 2014). 

39 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(C), (6)(A)(iii). Exchange Act Section 15(b)(4) 

authorizes sanctions, such as registration revocation, against broker-dealers. 

15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4). Section 15(b)(6)(A) incorporates by reference Section 

15(b)(4) and provides for sanctions against “any person who is associated ... 

with a broker or dealer.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6)(A). The term person associated 

with a broker or dealer includes “any person directly or indirectly controlling, 

controlled by, or under common control with such broker or dealer.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 78c(a)(18). And “the term ‘person’” includes both “a natural person” and a 

“company.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9); see also 1 U.S.C. § 1 (providing that in the 

United States Code, “the word[] ‘person’ ... include[s] corporations, 

companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock 

companies, as well as individuals”). Dwyer, which is an LLC, OIP ¶ II.A.1, is 

thus a person and consequently is subject to sanction under Section 15(b)(6) 

as a person associated with a broker or dealer. See Winning the Money Game 

With Ike, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 83110, 2018 WL 1960468, at *2 

(Apr. 26, 2018) (settled proceeding) (imposing sanctions under Section 

15(b)(6) on an entity); see infra n.41. 

40 OIP ¶ II.A.1.

41 See James S. Tagliaferri, Exchange Act Release No. 80047, 2017 WL 

632134, at *5 (Feb. 15, 2017) (“Because we find that Tagliaferri himself met 

the definition of a ‘broker,’ we also find that he met the definition of a ‘person 

associated with a broker’ for purposes of Exchange Act Section 15(b)(6).”); 

Tzemach David Netzer Korem, Exchange Act Release No. 70044, 2013 WL 

(continued...)
8

Turning to the second factor, the district court permanently enjoined 

Respondents from selling unregistered securities, acting as unregistered 

broker-dealers, committing fraud in the offer or sale of any securities, and 

committing fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any securities.42

The terms of this injunction meet the requirement that a court has enjoined

Respondents from “engaging in ... any conduct ... in connection with the ...

sale of any security.”43

To determine whether imposing a collateral bar would be in the public 

interest, I must weigh the factors set forth in Steadman v. SEC.

44 These

include: 

the egregiousness of the respondent’s actions, the 

isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction, the degree 

of scienter involved, the sincerity of the respondent’s 

assurances against future violations, the respondent’s 

recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct, and 

the likelihood that the respondent’s occupation will 

present opportunities for future violations.45

The Commission also considers the deterrent effect of administrative 

sanctions.46 The public interest inquiry is “flexible” and “no one factor is 

dispositive.”47 

 

3864511, at *8 (July 26, 2013) (it is “well established that [the Commission is] 

authorized to sanction an associated person of an unregistered broker-dealer 

or investment adviser in a follow-on administrative proceeding”).

42 See Civil Case, ECF No. 57.

43 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(C). 

44 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 450 U.S. 91 

(1981); see Gary M. Kornman, Securities Act Release No. 59403, 2009 WL 

367635, at *6 (Feb. 13, 2009), pet. denied, 592 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

45 David R. Wulf, Exchange Act Release No. 77411, 2016 WL 1085661, at 

*4 (Mar. 21, 2016).

46 Id. General deterrence is relevant but not determinative of whether the 

public interest weighs in favor of imposing a collateral bar. See Peter Siris, 

Advisers Act Release No. 3736, 2013 WL 6528874, at *11 n.72 (Dec. 12, 2013), 

pet. denied, 773 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
9

Before imposing a collateral bar, an administrative law judge must 

determine, based on the evidence presented, whether a bar “is necessary or 

appropriate to protect investors and markets.”48 I must therefore “‘review 

[Respondents’] case on its own facts’ to make findings regarding [their] 

fitness to participate in the industry in the barred capacities.”49 A decision to 

impose a collateral bar “should be grounded in specific ‘findings regarding the 

protective interests to be served’ by barring the respondent and the ‘risk of 

future misconduct.’”50 

The Commission has stated as a matter of policy that an antifraud 

injunction “has especially serious implications for the public interest.”51 And 

“‘[f]idelity to the public interest’ requires a severe sanction when a

respondent’s misconduct involves fraud.”52 The Commission has thus 

declared that absent contrary evidence, “it will [ordinarily] be in the public 

interest to revoke the registration of, or suspend or bar from participation in 

the securities industry, or prohibit from participation in an offering of penny 

stock, a respondent who is enjoined from violating the antifraud 

provisions.”

53

Taking these principles into consideration, it is apparent that the public 

interest requires barring Respondents from the industry. The district court 

 

47 Conrad P. Seghers, Advisers Act Release No. 2656, 2007 WL 2790633, at 

*4 (Sept. 26, 2007), pet. denied, 548 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

48 Ross Mandell, Exchange Act Release No. 71668, 2014 WL 907416, at *2 

(Mar. 7, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated in part on other 

grounds, Exchange Act Release No. 77935, 2016 WL 3030883 (May 26, 2016). 

49 Id. (quoting McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2005)). 

50 Id. (quoting McCarthy, 406 F.3d at 189–90); see also John W. Lawton, 

Advisers Act Release No. 3513, 2012 WL 6208750, at *9 (Dec. 13, 2012) 

(“[T]he Commission must consider not only past misconduct, but the broader 

question of the future risk the respondent poses to investors.”), vacated in 

part on other grounds, Advisers Act Release No. 4402, 2016 WL 3030847 

(May 27, 2016).

51 Marshall E. Melton, Advisers Act Release No. 2151, 2003 WL 21729839, 

at *9 (July 25, 2003).

52 Jeffrey L. Gibson, Exchange Act Release No. 57266, 2008 WL 294717, at 

*7 (Feb. 4, 2008), pet. denied, 561 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2009).

53 Melton, 2003 WL 21729839, at *9.
10

enjoined Respondents from violating the antifraud provisions of the 

Securities Act and the Exchange Act and Respondents have presented 

nothing to show that they do not warrant a severe sanction.

Moreover, Respondents’ conduct was egregious. They were key players in 

a fraudulent scheme and personally recruited 14 investors who lost over $6 

million.54

Additionally, Respondents were enjoined from selling unregistered 

securities and acting as unregistered brokers.55 The registration 

requirements in Section 5 and Section 15 are central to the Commission’s 

investor-protection mission.56 By selling unregistered securities in violation of 

Section 5 of the Securities Act, Respondents deprived investors of information 

they needed to make informed investment decisions.57 This is particularly 

important here because compliance with Section 5 could well have prevented 

the fraud that Respondents perpetrated.

Respondents’ conduct was not isolated. They participated in the scheme 

for approximately 18 months and received at least 13 commission payments 

during that time period for their efforts.58 Finn also made seven payments, 

totaling $143,050 to other participants in the scheme.59

Finn also acted with a high degree of scienter. He never mentioned that 

he would be compensated for bringing in investors. He promoted investment 

schemes that, on their face, offered highly unlikely returns. But the indicia of 

fraud—risk-free investments and quick, guaranteed, and fantastic returns—

show that Finn knew or should have known that investors would not receive 

those returns. The steps Finn took to prevent investors from learning the 

 

54 Simpson Decl. at 4–5, Ex. 1. Finn’s actions and state of mind are 

attributed to Dwyer. See Bernerd E. Young, Exchange Act Release 

No. 774421, 2016 WL 1168564, at *19 n.81 (Mar. 24, 2016); Clarke T. 

Blizzard, Advisers Act Release No. 2253, 2004 WL 1416184, at *5 (June 23, 

2004).

55 OIP ¶ II.A.I, B.2.

56 See Allen M. Perres, Securities Act Release No. 10287, 2017 WL 280080, 

at *3 (Jan. 23, 2017), pet. denied, 695 F. App’x 980 (7th Cir. 2017).

57 See Perres, 2017 WL 280080, at *3.

58 Simpson Decl. at 8.

59 Id. at 9.
11

truth further shows that he acted with scienter. And Finn’s scienter is 

imputed to Dwyer.60 

Because Respondents have not participated in this proceeding, they have 

not made assurances against future misconduct or demonstrated that they

understand or recognize the wrongfulness of their misconduct.

Additionally, allowing Respondents to remain in the securities industry 

would present them with future opportunities for further misconduct and 

would put the investing public at risk. This determination is supported by my 

finding that their conduct was egregious.61 

Finally, imposing a collateral bar will serve the Commission’s interest in 

deterring others from engaging in similar misconduct. 

In light of the factors discussed above, I find that it is in the public 

interest to impose collateral and penny-stock bars against Respondents.

Order

The Division of Enforcement’s motion for summary disposition and 

sanctions is GRANTED. 

Under Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sean P. Finn 

and M. Dwyer LLC are BARRED from associating with a broker, dealer, 

investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer 

agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization. 

Under Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sean P. Finn 

and M. Dwyer LLC are BARRED from participating in an offering of penny 

stock, including acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent, or other 

person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer, or issuer for purposes 

of the issuance of trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting to 

induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock. 

 

60 See Blizzard, 2004 WL 1416184, at *5.

61 See Geiger v. SEC, 363 F.3d 481, 489 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that a 

finding of egregiousness “justifies the inference” that misconduct will recur); 

Warwick Capital Mgmt., Inc., Advisers Act Release No. 2694, 2008 WL 

149127, at *11 (Jan. 16, 2008) (“The existence of a violation raises an 

inference that the violation will be repeated, and where the misconduct 

resulting in the violation is egregious, the inference is justified.”).
12

This initial decision will become effective in accordance with and subject 

to the provisions of Rule 360.62 Under that rule, a party may file a petition for 

review of this initial decision within twenty-one days after service of the 

initial decision. A party may also file a motion to correct a manifest error of 

fact within ten days of the initial decision, pursuant to Rule 111.63 If a motion 

to correct a manifest error of fact is filed by a party, then a party shall have 

twenty-one days to file a petition for review from the date of the 

undersigned’s order resolving such motion to correct a manifest error of fact. 

The initial decision will not become final until the Commission enters an 

order of finality. The Commission will enter an order of finality unless a 

party files a petition for review or motion to correct a manifest error of fact or 

the Commission determines on its own initiative to review the initial decision 

as to a party. If any of these events occurs, the initial decision shall not 

become final as to that party. 

Respondents may move the Commission to set aside the default under 

Rule of Practice 155(b), which permits the Commission, at any time, to set 

aside a default for good cause, in order to prevent injustice and on such 

conditions as may be appropriate.64 A motion to set aside a default shall be 

made within a reasonable time, state the reasons for the failure to appear or 

defend, and specify the nature of the proposed defense in the proceeding.65

Such motion, if filed, should be directed to the Commission, as the hearing 

officer may only set aside a default “prior to the filing of the initial 

decision.”66

_______________________________

James E. Grimes

Administrative Law Judge

 

62 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360.

63 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.111.

64 17 C.F.R. § 201.155(b).

65 Id.

66 Id.