UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4631

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVIN JEROME STEWART,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 10-4633

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVIN JEROME STEWART,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District 

of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief 

District Judge. (2:96-cr-00115-DCN-2; 2:09-cr-00295-DCN-1)

Submitted: December 22, 2010 Decided: January 21, 2011

Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Gordon Baker, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alston Calhoun 

Badger, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Appellant Davin Jerome 

Stewart appeals the judgment of conviction entered after a jury 

trial and the amended judgment revoking supervised release. 

Stewart was convicted of one count of bank robbery and aiding 

and abetting such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 

(d), and 2 (2006), one count of using and carrying a firearm 

during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006), and one count of being a 

felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). He was sentenced to a total of 

171 months’ imprisonment for the three convictions. Based on 

the convictions, the district court revoked Stewart’s supervised 

release and sentenced him to an additional thirty month term to 

run consecutive to the underlying sentences. Stewart’s counsel 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), certifying there are no meritorious issues for appeal 

but raising for the court’s consideration whether the evidence 

was sufficient to support the convictions and whether the 

sentences were reasonable. Stewart was given the opportunity to 

file a pro se supplemental brief but declined. The Government 

did not file a brief. We affirm. 

“A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his conviction bears a heavy burden.” 
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United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A jury’s verdict “must be 

sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most 

favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United 

States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see United States v. Perkins, 

470 F.3d 150, 160 (4th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence is 

“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alerre, 430 

F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The court considers both circumstantial and direct 

evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences from such evidence 

in the government’s favor. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 

326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). In resolving issues of substantial 

evidence, this court does not reweigh the evidence or reassess 

the factfinder’s determination of witness credibility, see

United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 563 (4th Cir. 2008), and 

“can reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the 

prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Moye, 

454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

We conclude there was more than sufficient evidence to 

support all three convictions. The evidence showed that Stewart 

was captured by police after being seen running from one of the 
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getaway vehicles. Near where he was seized was a bag of dyestained money, blue gloves and a ski mask similar to what was 

worn by the robbers. There was also evidence that one of his 

fingerprints was lifted off of one of the bullets taken from one 

of the guns. It also appeared from the surveillance video of 

the robbery that Stewart fit the physical type of the robber who 

jumped the counter and seized the money. Although Stewart was 

not observed using a gun, his accomplice was seen brandishing 

two guns during the robbery. Furthermore, Stewart stipulated to 

being a convicted felon and that the handguns and ammunition 

were manufactured outside South Carolina. We conclude there was 

ample evidence showing that Stewart was an active participant in 

the robbery, that he aided and abetted the use of a firearm in 

furtherance of a crime of violence, and that he was a felon in 

unlawful possession of ammunition. 

This court reviews a district court’s sentence for 

reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. 

Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2007). This review 

requires appellate consideration of both the procedural and 

substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

In determining procedural reasonableness, this court considers 

whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s 

advisory Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
6

(2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, 

and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. 

“Regardless of whether the district court imposes an above, 

below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the 

record an individualized assessment based on the particular 

facts of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 

325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, this court reviews the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the 

circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its 

discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied 

the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. 

Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). If the 

sentence imposed is within the appropriate Guidelines range, on 

appeal it is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Go, 517 

F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008). This presumption may be rebutted 

by a showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 

445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

We review a sentence imposed after revocation of 

supervised release to determine whether it is within the 

prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. 

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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We have reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report, the 

Supervised Release Violation Report and the sentencing 

transcript and find no error. Accordingly, we affirm the 

sentences. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record for meritorious issues and have found none. We therefore 

affirm. This court requires that counsel inform the client, in 

writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If the client requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy was served on the client. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED