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“Democracy requires 

grassroots participation that 

is embraced by the majority of the population: The 

Provincial Councils are one of 

the best ways to inspire such 

participation and to promote 

long-term, local democratization in Afghanistan.”

March 26, 2014

Why Afghanistan’s Provincial 

Council Elections Matter

Anna Larson

E-mail: anna.w.larson@gmail.com

Noah Coburn

E-mail: noahstrutherscoburn@gmail.com

peaceBrieF170

Summary

•	 Afghanistan’sProvincialCouncils(PCs)representoneofthebesthopesforthe futureoflocaldemocracy inAfghanistan.Yetsince theirshaky formationin2005,they continue tobeoverlookedby

international actorspreferringtointeractwithparliamentarians,ministers andappointedgovernors.

•	 The significance assignedbyAfghanstowinningPCseatshassteadily increasedoverthe lastdecade.

Indeed,formany,theApril 5PCelectionswilldomore thanthepresidentialpolltodetermine

whetherdemocraticpractices continue totake rootinlocalpolitics.

•	 PCelectionsofferachancetobuildlocal,personaltiesandaccountabilitymechanismsconnectingto

increasinglycentralizedgovernmentresources,and,inparticular,anopportunityforanewgeneration

ofyoung,motivatedAfghanstobegintheirpolitical careers.Asthelocally-visiblemanifestationoftheAfghanpoliticalsystem,PCsaretheimmediatefaceofdemocracy—oralackthereof—formanyAfghans.

•	 In2009,withmostnewsstories coveringthewidespreadfraudinthepresidential contest,theuproar

overthe fraudanddelay throughoutthePCpollingprocessrarely receivedcoverageonnewspaper

frontpages.Yetthoseproblems contributedsignificantly topeople’ssenseof alienationanddisillusionmentwiththeir country’spolitical actors andelectoral institutions.

•	 Inspiteofthese experiences,Afghans areonce againpreparingtogotothepolls.Voters, candidates,

parties andlocalorganizations areputtinggreater emphasisthaneverontheprocessofprovincial

councilpolling—expressingconcernabouttheprospectsforfraud,mobilizingaroundtheir candidates andcampaigninginearnest. Ifdue attentiontotheprocessisnotpaidby the Independent

ElectionCommission(IEC) andby international agencies,popularparticipation infuture elections

coulddrop.ProspectsforAfghan democratizationwilldependmuchonhowthese andfuture

provincial-level elections are conducted. 

The Increasing Significance of Provincial Councils

At their inauguration in 2005, newly-elected PC councilors could be forgiven for being unsure

about their role over the coming years. With an official mandate released only after campaigning

started, and the PC law waiting for parliamentary approval until more than a year after councilors

were elected to office, no one could readily articulate the job of a PC member. As one member of

the Balkh PC expressed in July 2006,“For four months we have not been able to do anything as

we have had no building, no logisticalsupport, no salary, no clear mandate or any regulationsto

follow.”1The initial enthusiasm after the electionssoon tapered off into boredom and frustration,

with many PCsrelying on provincial governorsfor funding and thus having little incentive or

ability to monitor the performance of these appointed leaders.2
© USIP 2014 • All rights reserved.

Why Afghanistan’s Provincial Council Elections Matter

page 2 • PB 170 • March 26, 2014

In spite of this, by the time campaigns for PC seats began in 2009, the number of candidates

across the country had increased by 300, and a surprising number of incumbents were recontesting their positions.3

Perhaps more telling was the decision of many PC members not to

run again but rather to campaign in the following year’s Wolesi Jirga (lower house) polls.

In the four years since they had been established, PC seats had become valuable political

commodities—spaces in which relatively young or unknown individuals could make names for

themselves and begin political careers, albeit ones often connected to existing powerbrokers.

Councils varied across the country both in terms of the access they provided for members to

government resources and the influence they held over government officials. Initially, most

Provincial Councils were weak and disorganized, with little public recognition. Yet in some areas,

the Councils have had impact. For example, in Nangarhar, the PC became widely known for the

determination shown by half of its members to hold Governor Gul Agha Sherzai accountable

for his alleged involvement in corruption, embezzlement of development funds and illegal land

grabs. On the other hand, in Balkh, the Council remained beholden in most senses to Governor

Mohammad Atta Noor. Nevertheless, across the country PC positions were now (salaried) vehicles

for self-promotion, providing a valuable connection between the home districts of councilors

and the provincial-level administration. Whatever the official mandate, the informal roles of PC

members had propelled them into positions of increasing influence. 

The PC Polls in 2009: A Local Catastrophe

PC electionsin 2009 took place alongside the presidential poll, which for the international community and media took precedence. Indeed, very little attention was paid to the local-level elections

that were being contested fiercely in communities across Afghanistan. The connection between

the two elections wasimportant as well: In many cases, dealsfor mutualsupport were made

between presidential and PC candidates, heightening the importance of PC councilseats and their

potential connection to the center. PC campaigns were organized locally by the same brokersthat

organized presidential campaigns, campaign rallies often included endorsementsfor candidatesin

each race and networks of ballot-stuffing and duplicate-voting often overlapped. The day after the

polls, pink resultssheets displayed outside local polling stations prompted frenzied mobile phone

calls as polling agentsinformed their candidates of the news—which in many cases would only

change once the IEC had“re-counted”and published the ”official”results. The changes between

the first, directly and publicly presented results and those that were declared final after alterations

in Kabul convinced many that power had been captured by the elite, and that results had been

negotiated behind closed doors. In Nangarhar, thissuspicion was confirmed by the delay between

polling and results: It took four monthsfor the winning candidatesto be announced,showing

local communitiesthat any hint of a democratic process had devolved into political maneuvering

and backroom bargains.4

It led one former government worker to compare democracy to lipstick:

“it looks beautiful butsoon wears off,”he said. 5

Over those four years, PCs had not become vehicles for democratization and were often as

plagued by the grip of current elites as any other institution in the country. But setting aside the

patronage and power-brokering so pervasive in all levels of Afghan politics, many PCs made a

connection, if shaky, between local communities and the state. Many Afghans considered that a

connection worth having. Indeed, the widespread fraud and violence that took place over locallevel election contests across the country clearly demonstrated the significance that had come to

be attached to PC seats.
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Why Afghanistan’s Provincial Council Elections Matter

page 3 • PB 170 • March 26, 2014

The Importance of Provincial Councils in 2014 and Beyond

Another five years on—and indeed a year late—PC elections will take place on April 5. And once

again, the international community is paying little notice, with the presidential poll and uncertainties

over the future international troop presence overshadowing the local elections.What is perhaps

surprising isthat in spite of the widespread fraud and elite bargaining thatseemed to have destroyed

much public hope in the democratic processin 2009, informal campaignsfor PCsthistime began

well ahead of the officialstart date of March 3, with the nomination period having been hotly

contested and the subject of much conversation acrossthe country. Political parties have selected

their own candidatesto support,strategically narrowing these down to two or three per province

so as not to divide their votestoo much, and they are placing great emphasis on winning PC seats.

PC candidatesthemselves are using parties and presidential candidates as meansto gain material

and politicalsupport for their campaigns, turning up at these candidates’own rallies and introducing themselvesto voters. A number of parties are planning to organize joint campaignsfor their

preferred presidential and PC candidates. As a result of these interconnections, it islikely that fraud in

both polls will also be deeply intertwined. 

Arguably, thislevel of enthusiasm and preparation ahead of time might not have occurred had

PC electionsthis year not coincided with the contest for a new president,signifying Afghanistan’s

first democratic transition of power, the importance of which is heightened by the imminent

departure of foreign troops. This context isimportant, asit indicatesthe potential re-division of

political power in Afghanistan. The enthusiasm to participate in the 2014 electionssuggests a

widespread interest in helping determine how that re-division of political power occurs, but also a

clear intention among many elitesto claim their own territory in the new political landscape. 

This also meansthere is greaterincentive among all involved to monitorlocal elections—in particular

forfraud—and thus PC elections may welltake place in a more transparent mannerthis yearthan in

2009 (though a narrative of fraud will undoubtedly form part of any losing candidate’s post-election

rhetoric).Whether or not actual fraud levels are lowerin the provincesthan in 2009,the counting of

provincial ballots atthe center must be conducted according to due processthatis communicated to

voters.With more atstake now than in 2009,the public outcry at unexplained discrepancies between

local and central polling centers could rise to new levels. By contrast, if PC elections are conducted

well and accorded by international and national government actors with the significance they have in

the provinces,they could set a precedentforfuture elections. PC elections with those characteristics

could prove a particular boon to a younger generation ofAfghan leaders, many of whom have been

frustrated by the slow advance of democracy and economic growth in the country. 

If PC positions continue to be seen as an effective means of participating locally in political

processes, this development could encourage a younger, better educated generation of Afghans

to engage more actively in politics. Democracy requires grassroots participation that is embraced

by the majority of the population: The Provincial Councils are one of the best waysto inspire such

participation and to promote long-term, local democratization in Afghanistan. 

For thisto happen, the international community, IEC and Afghan government do not necessarily need to spend large amounts of money on new electoral programs, butshould place greater

emphasis on the Provincial Council polls during the election period. In particular, they need to

take stepsthat reflect the importance of the PC vote,such as:

•	 Emphasize the PC elections publicly through more frequent acknowledgement of their

importance in public service announcements and official statements from embassy and

monitoring groups.
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Why Afghanistan’s Provincial Council Elections Matter

page 4 • PB 170 • March 26, 2014

•	 Assign election monitors to focus as well on provincial-level polls while observing the

presidential vote.

•	 Pay particular attention to the counting process at the central level and communicate

reasons for any delays or changes to the voting public.

•	 Create clear reporting mechanisms at the most local level possible, so that communities

can quickly address discrepancies between local counts and how they are recorded in

Kabul.

•	 Ensure that future international funding for Afghan election support focuses both on

presidential contests and those at the provincial level, including parliamentary elections

scheduled for 2015.

•	 In the longer term, work to support young PC members so that a new generation of

Afghans becomes active in the democratic system.

Notes

1.	 Interview, AL, Balkh PC Member, July 7, 2006.

2.	 For more on candidates’expectationssurrounding the PC electionsin 2005,see Wilder,

Andrew (2005).“A House Divided? Analyzing the 2005 Afghan Elections.”Kabul: Afghanistan

Research and Evaluation Unit, pp. 41-42.

3.	 In 2005, 3,025 candidates competed in the PC elections nationwide, and, in 2009, 3,324 were

listed on the ballotsin total.

4.	 For more on Provincial Council electionsin Nangarhar,see Coburn, Noah and Larson, Anna.

Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Electionsin an Unstable Political Landscape. NewYork:

Columbia University Press(2013). Chapter 8.

5.	 Originally translated as“Democracy islike the lipstick of women, which looks beautiful but

does not have any resistance against licking,”cited in Larson, Anna.“Deconstructing Democracy in Afghanistan.”Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, p. 47, May 2011.

About This Brief

Noah Coburn is a political 

anthropologist at Bennington 

College in Vermont. Anna Larson 

is a researcher in governance in 

fragile states and associate research 

fellow at the University of York, 

United Kingdom. They have been 

conducting research on politics, 

democratization, violence and 

elections in Afghanistan since 2005. 

Their book Derailing Democracy in 

Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable 

Political Landscape, which focuses 

on elections and the challenges of 

democratization in Afghanistan, was 

published in December 2013 and is 

available from Columbia University 

Press.