If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

________________________

*Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

RANDY JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

June 13, 2024

v No. 365920

Macomb Circuit Court

FCA US LLC, LC No. 2022-000157-CD

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and RIORDAN and D. H. SAWYER*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this racial discrimination and retaliation action, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial 

court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 

2.116(C)(10). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 16, 2020, plaintiff was suspended from his employment with defendant after 

allegedly hitting his supervisor, Jeff Beyst, in the face. Plaintiff, who denied hitting Beyst, wrote 

an incident report stating that Beyst had aggressively approached him that day and instigated the 

conflict. Beyst also filed an incident report indicating that plaintiff struck him after refusing to 

follow Beyst’s requests to follow company policy and sign into his computer. No one witnessed

plaintiff strike Beyst, but a couple employees overheard yelling between plaintiff and Beyst. After 

concluding an investigation, defendant determined that plaintiff did strike Beyst, and terminated 

his employment. The following year, plaintiff’s union representative secured an agreement from 

defendant allowing plaintiff to return to work, but in a demoted position and without backpay. 

Subsequently, plaintiff filed this complaint alleging that he was subjected to a raciallyhostile workplace. Plaintiff alleged that he was one of two African-American team leaders, and 

that Beyst, his Caucasian supervisor, regularly called him a “n****r” and accused him of not being 

a real team leader. Plaintiff stated that “n r” was also written and left on the bathroom wall. 
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Plaintiff alleged that he filed several harassment complaints with defendant’s Human Resources 

(HR) department, but HR took no remedial actions against Beyst. Plaintiff stated that he was an 

“exemplary” employee and only began receiving complaints against him as a pretext for his 

eventual termination. Based on the foregoing factual allegations, plaintiff claimed that defendant 

violated the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., by racially 

discriminating against him. Plaintiff also claimed that defendant retaliated against him by 

terminating his employment after he engaged in protected activity by filing complaints about the 

racial discrimination.

Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that (1) the evidence in the 

record did not establish that plaintiff was subjected to a racially hostile work environment, and (2)

plaintiff cannot demonstrate that defendant retaliated against him by terminating his employment 

because plaintiff did not engage in any protected activity prior to his termination, as none of 

plaintiff’s complaints mentioned racial discrimination.

The trial court issued a written opinion and order granting defendant’s motion for summary 

disposition. First, the court noted that plaintiff admitted that defendant promptly removed 

“n** **r” from the bathroom wall once defendant was informed of it, demonstrating that defendant 

was not creating an atmosphere of racial hostility, but promptly remedying the issue. Second, 

plaintiff never reported Beyst’s alleged use of “n r” to defendant; plaintiff only reported this 

alleged incident to his union representative. Third, Beyst’s alleged use of “n** **r” on March 16, 

2020, following a heated discussion, could not rationally be perceived as “substantially interfering 

with [plaintiff’s] employment or having the purpose or effect of creating a pervasive[,]

intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment.” Accordingly, the trial court 

dismissed plaintiff’s discrimination claim. Then, the trial court held that, since plaintiff was not 

subjected to racial discrimination, “he could not have opposed a violation of the Act for which 

defendant could have retaliated against him.” Therefore, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s 

retaliation claim.

II. ANALYSIS

A. DISCRIMINATION

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his discrimination claim 

because plaintiff successfully created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was 

racially discriminated against while in defendant’s employment, and because the trial court failed 

to consider plaintiff’s allegations collectively. We conclude that the trial court did not err by

granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff’s harassment claim because plaintiff failed to 

create a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether he was subjected to a racially hostile

work environment, and the trial court properly considered the totality of the circumstances in 

reaching its conclusion.

This Court “reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition.” 

Zarzyski v Nigrelli, 337 Mich App 735, 740; 976 NW2d 916 (2021). A party is entitled to summary 

disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) when the evidence does not present a genuine issue of 

material fact. Jewett v Mesick Consol Sch Dist, 332 Mich App 462, 470; 957 NW2d 377 (2020). 

“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
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nonmoving party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” MacDonald 

v Ottawa Co, 335 Mich App 618, 622; 967 NW2d 919 (2021) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “The reviewing court should evaluate a motion for summary disposition under MCR 

2.116(C)(10) by considering the substantively admissible evidence actually proffered in 

opposition to the motion.” Jewett, 332 Mich App at 470 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

This includes pleadings, affidavits, admissions, and depositions, along with other evidence 

submitted by the parties. Walega v Walega, 312 Mich App 259, 265-266; 877 NW2d 910 (2015).

“Harassment based on any of the enumerated classifications in MCL 37.2202(1)(a) is an 

actionable offense.” Major v Village of Newberry, 316 Mich App 527, 549; 892 NW2d 402 (2016) 

(citation omitted). Race is one of the enumerated classes in MCL 37.2202(1)(a). To establish a 

prima facie case of hostile work environment based on discrimination, a plaintiff must prove:

(1) the employee belonged to a protected group; (2) the employee was 

subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of the protected status; (3) the 

employee was subjected to unwelcome conduct or communication on the basis of 

the protected status; (4) the unwelcome conduct or communication was intended 

to, or in fact did, interfere substantially with the employee’s employment or created 

an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) respondeat 

superior. [Major, 316 Mich App at 550 (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

Although there is no dispute that plaintiff is part of a protected racial class because he is AfricanAmerican, the lower court record does not otherwise demonstrate that plaintiff could establish a 

genuine issue of fact on the remaining four elements. 

Plaintiff argues that Beyst’s use of “n r” revealed that his “hostile” treatment of 

plaintiff was racially motivated, as did the fact that Beyst treated Caucasian team leaders better 

than African-American team leaders. Plaintiff argues that these two things demonstrated that he

was subjected to unwelcome communication and conduct based on his protected class. However, 

plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the fourth and fifth prima facie 

elements. See Innovation Ventures v Liquid Mfg, 499 Mich 491, 507; 885 NW2d 861 (2016) 

(“Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

With respect to the fourth element, plaintiff argues that the racial discrimination he suffered 

created a hostile workplace, and the hostility caused him to be unable to do his job because he did 

not feel comfortable asking Beyst questions, and had to go home on one occasion because the 

discrimination triggered his mental illness. “Whether a hostile work environment was created by 

the unwelcome conduct [is] determined by whether a reasonable person, in the totality of 

circumstances, would have perceived the conduct at issue as substantially interfering with the 

plaintiff’s employment or having the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or 

offensive employment environment.” Major, 316 Mich App at 549 (quotation marks, citation, and 

alteration omitted). 

First, plaintiff’s allegation that he had to go home one day because Beyst’s behavior 

triggered his mental health, even if taken as true, does not seem to rise to the level of “substantial 

interference” with plaintiff’s ability to perform his job because plaintiff only went home early on 
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one day. Plaintiff also alleged that Beyst’s aggression caused him not to ask questions, thereby 

inhibiting him from doing his job. However, plaintiff did not provide any evidence indicating that 

he was unable to perform an aspect of his job because he was afraid to ask Beyst questions.

Second, even if Beyst used the word “n** **r” twice, plaintiff failed to provide evidence 

demonstrating that such limited usage of the offensive term substantially interfered with his 

employment. Importantly, plaintiff testified that defendant promptly removed “n r” from the 

bathroom wall, demonstrating that defendant did not condone the use of the term in the workplace. 

Accordingly, plaintiff did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Beyst’s 

behavior substantially interfered with plaintiff’s ability to do his job. See Grand Trunk Western 

RR, Inc v Auto Warehousing Co, 262 Mich App 345, 350; 686 NW2d 756 (2004) (a party opposing 

a motion for summary disposition cannot rely on mere allegations, it must set forth evidence 

demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact).

Although when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there wassufficient evidence

to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Beyst’s conduct created a hostile work 

environment, the fourth element is premised on demonstrating that the unwelcomed conduct 

creating the hostile work environment resulted from racial discrimination, not just bad 

management. See Major, 316 Mich App at 550 (stating that to establish the fourth element, the 

defendant’s unwelcome conduct or communication based on the plaintiff’s protected status must 

have been intended to, or in fact did, “interfere substantially with the employee’s employment or 

created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.”) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Plaintiff did not demonstrate that he received unwelcomed conduct and communication 

based on his protected status, and there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was not 

subjected to a racially-hostile work environment.

The same holds true with respect to the final prima facie element, respondeat superior. 

Although there was no dispute that Beyst was an agent of defendant, see Sheridan v Forest Hills 

Pub Sch, 247 Mich App 611, 622-623; 637 NW2d 536 (2001), plaintiff failed to create a genuine 

issue of material fact regarding whether defendant had notice of Beyst’s alleged discrimination. 

“[A]n employer must have actual or constructive notice of the alleged harassment before liability 

will attach to the employer.” Id. at 621.

Where . . . the plaintiff seeks to hold the employer responsible for the hostile 

environment created by the plaintiff’s supervisor or co-worker, she must show that 

the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed 

to take prompt remedial action. . . . The employee can demonstrate that the 

employer knew of the harassment by showing that she complained to higher 

management of the harassment . . . or by showing the pervasiveness of the 

harassment, which gives rise to the inference of knowledge or constructive 

knowledge. [Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

With respect to actual notice, plaintiff filed two complaints in 2019 which alleged that 

Beyst accused him of not being a real team leader, harassed him, and acted aggressively toward 

him. However, plaintiff did not allege that Beyst’s ill behavior was racially motivated, and never 

mentioned racial discrimination or Beyst’s alleged use of “n** **r” in his two reports concerning 

the March 16, 2020 incident. Because plaintiff did not allege that the harassment was racially 
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motivated, plaintiff’s complaints to defendant were insufficient to give defendant actual notice of 

the alleged racial discrimination. See Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich 408, 428; 697 NW2d 

851 (2005) (holding that the plaintiff failed to put the defendant on notice that sexual harassment 

was occurring because her letters to the defendant only mentioned “harassment” and a “hostile 

work environment,” without noting that the harassment was based on her protected class). 

Additionally, plaintiff did not refute defendant’s evidence that plaintiff never made a report of 

discrimination to the HR department.

Even assuming plaintiff’s conversations with his union representatives included 

discussions of racial discrimination, that was also insufficient to give defendant actual notice of 

racial discrimination because a labor union is a separate entity from an employer, and plaintiff 

offered no evidence demonstrating that his union representative communicated with defendant 

about plaintiff’s alleged racial discrimination complaints. See MCL 37.2201(a) and (c) (defining 

employers and labor organizations as separate entities). Plaintiff testified that he did not know 

whether his union representative contacted defendant about plaintiff’s complaints. Without any 

evidentiary support for his assertion, plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding whether defendant had actual notice of plaintiff’s racial discrimination complaints. See 

Grand Trunk, 262 Mich App at 350 (a party opposing a motion for summary disposition must set 

forth evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact).

Additionally, plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether defendant 

had constructive notice of the alleged racial discrimination. A defendant can be charged with 

constructive knowledge of harassment if the harassment was so pervasive that it gave rise to the 

inference that defendant had notice thereof. Sheridan, 247 Mich App at 621. If plaintiff presented 

evidence that Beyst habitually treated Caucasian employees noticeably better than AfricanAmerican employees, or that Beyst routinely used the term “n r” or a similar inappropriate 

term in the workplace, plaintiff might have been able to demonstrate defendant had constructive 

notice of Beyst’s racial discrimination. However, plaintiff provided no evidence demonstrating 

that Beyst treated African-American employees worse than Caucasian employees.1 Nor was there 

any evidence that Beyst used the term “n** **r” more than twice, which does not equate to 

pervasive use, such that defendant should be charged with constructive notice thereof. See id.

(holding that a defendant can be charged with constructive knowledge of racial discrimination 

 

1 Plaintiff failed to provide evidentiary support for his allegation that Beyst treated the Caucasian 

team leaders better than the African-American team leaders. In fact, Jason Cannon, a Caucasian 

team leader, alleged that Beyst aggressively interacted with him on March 16, 2020, telling him to 

turn the “f***ing line on” and invading Cannon’s personal space. Cannon stated that he had never 

been so poorly treated by a supervisor. That Beyst directed aggressive behavior toward Cannon 

and plaintiff undermines plaintiff’s assertion that Beyst treated plaintiff poorly because of his race, 

especially since plaintiff failed to provide any evidence indicating that Beyst mistreated other 

African-American workers. Further, plaintiff argues that Beyst’s comments, telling plaintiff that 

he was not a real team leader, were necessarily racially motivated because plaintiff was the only 

African-American team leader. Plaintiff, however, admitted that Beyst had multiple other AfricanAmerican team leaders under his authority, and Beyst also picked on Cannon, a Caucasian team 

leader.
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when the discriminatory conduct is pervasive). Accordingly, plaintiff did not create a genuine

issue of material fact.

Finally, plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred by failing to consider each of plaintiff’s 

allegations of discrimination collectively, instead considering each individually and determining 

that the weight of the individual factors was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 

While it is true that the trial court was required to evaluate plaintiff’s claim based on the totality 

of the circumstances, the trial court only considered, individually, the four factual allegations 

plaintiff relied on to establish his claim in order to demonstrate that three of the four were not 

supported by the record. See Major, 316 Mich App at 550 (explaining that hostile work 

environment claims are evaluated based on whether a reasonable person would, in the totality of 

the circumstances, perceive the at-issue conduct as creating a hostile work environment). Then, 

while assuming Beyst did use “n****r” in reference to plaintiff on March 16, 2020, the trial court 

evaluated that allegation and concluded that such limited use of the term did not substantially 

interfere with plaintiff’s employment. The trial court did not consider the evidence in a piecemeal 

fashion, but considered whether each provided evidence of race discrimination, which if they had, 

would have been considered in totality. The trial court did not err when it granted defendant 

summary disposition of plaintiff’s racial harassment claim.

B. RETALIATION

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his retaliation claim on the basis 

that plaintiff failed to establish his racial discrimination claim. 

The ELCRA states the following in MCL 37.2701: 

Two or more persons shall not conspire to, or a person shall not:

(a) Retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has 

opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a 

complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or 

hearing under this act.

It is well-settled that “[t]o establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under the 

Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that this was 

known by the defendant; (3) that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; 

and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 

employment action.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 161; 934 NW2d 665 

(2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The trial court held that, because plaintiff was not subjected to race discrimination, he could 

not have opposed a violation of ELCRA and suffered retaliation from that opposition. The trial 

court erred in that regard, because opposing a violation of ELCRA is only one type of protected 

activity; filing a complaint alleging a violation of ELCRA is another type of protected activity. 

See id. (stating that “protected activity” includes filing a complaint pursuant to the ELCRA). More 

to the point, plaintiff did not have to establish that his opposition was to an actual violation of the

ELCRA to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See e.g., Reznik v inContact, Inc, 18 F4th 
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1257, 1262-63 (CA 10, 2021). However, the trial court still reached the correct outcome. See 

Bailey v Antrim Co, 341 Mich App 411, 420; 990 NW2d 372 (2022) (holding that a trial court’s 

decision can be upheld on appeal where the right result was reached, though for the wrong reason).

This holds true because plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding 

whether he engaged in a protected activity. “MCL 37.2701(a) prohibits retaliation where a party 

lodges a charge or a complaint about a violation of the CRA.” Rymal v Baergen, 262 Mich App 

274, 315; 686 NW2d 241 (2004). None of plaintiff’s complaints or reports to defendant included 

allegations of racial discrimination; rather, they only included general allegations of harassment. 

In Mitan v Neiman Marcus, 240 Mich App 679, 682; 613 NW2d 415 (2000), this Court held that 

the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she engaged in a protected activity because the complaints 

of discrimination that she raised to her employer did not allege that the discrimination was based 

on a protected characteristic.2 

Accordingly, plaintiff failed to create a material issue of fact regarding the first prong of 

his retaliation claim because he provided no evidence demonstrating that he engaged in a protected 

activity by filing complaints about racial discrimination with defendant. See Grand Trunk, 262 

Mich App at 350 (a party opposing a motion for summary disposition must set forth evidence 

demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact). The trial court properly granted summary 

disposition of plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

Affirmed.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

/s/ David H. Sawyer

 

2 Further, plaintiff provided no factual support for his assertion that he told his union representative 

that Beyst’s hostility was the result of racial discrimination.