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S. HRG. 109–1125 

THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 19, 2005 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

LISA J. SUTHERLAND, Republican Staff Director 

CHRISTINE DRAGER KURTH, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

DAVID RUSSELL, Republican Chief Counsel 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SAMUEL E. WHITEHORN, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Policy Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 19, 2005 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Burns ................................................................................... 5 

Statement of Senator DeMint ................................................................................. 19 

Statement of Senator Inouye .................................................................................. 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2 

Statement of Senator Kerry .................................................................................... 6 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 7 

Statement of Senator McCain ................................................................................. 3 

Statement of Senator Snowe ................................................................................... 29 

Statement of Senator Stevens ................................................................................ 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2 

Statement of Senator Vitter .................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4 

WITNESSES

Chertoff, Hon. Michael, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security .............. 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

(1) 

THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2005 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:15 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Building, Hon. Ted Stevens, Chairman of 

the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize for the delay in this hearing caused 

by the appearance of India’s Prime Minister before the joint session 

of Congress. 

We do welcome you, and we thank you for coming to the Committee to discuss your recently announced plan to streamline the 

operations, policies, and structures within your department. 

Congress responded quickly to the September 11 attacks by first 

creating the Transportation Security Administration and soon after 

that the Department of Homeland Security. 

At that time, it was apparent to the U.S. economy that the public 

trust and commercial aviation be restored, and a coordination from 

the Federal bureaucracies and, as well as, with State and local governments be achieved to defend against terrorism. 

Being mindful of the speed with which the Department of Homeland Security was created, Congress authorized the Secretary in 

the ‘‘Homeland Security Act’’ to reassess the Department’s operation and structures and make modifications where necessary. 

We do commend you, Mr. Secretary, for taking advantage of that 

authority and for your proactive efforts and dedication to make this 

Nation safer. 

The purpose of this hearing is to understand in greater detail the 

processes by which you have conducted your review, and the organizational modifications you propose in this effort to make the Department of Homeland Security operate more efficiently and effectively. 

We have reviewed your plan, and I believe your proposals do 

make sense, but I think you have to approach one critical component of the security concept. That is the enlistment of more volunteers to help defend our homeland. 

Hiring people to do every security job in this country will bankrupt this country. I firmly believe Americans have been waiting for 

instructions from their government since the attacks of September 

2 

11 so they, too, could play a role, and serve the security of our Nation. 

And I will put the rest of my comments in the record, if I may. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

I welcome Secretary Chertoff, and thank him for appearing before the Committee 

today to discuss his recently announced plan to streamline the operations, policies, 

and structures within the Department of Homeland Security. 

Congress responded quickly to the September 11 attacks, by first, creating the 

Transportation Security Administration, and soon after that, the Department of 

Homeland Security. At the time, it was imperative to the U.S. economy that the 

public trust in commercial aviation be restored, and that coordination between Federal bureaucracies, as well as with State and local governments, be achieved to defend against terrorism. 

Being mindful of the speed by which the Department of Homeland Security was 

created, Congress authorized the Secretary in the Homeland Security Act to reassess the Department’s operations and structure, and make modifications where necessary. I commend Secretary Chertoff for taking advantage of this authority, and 

for his proactive efforts and dedication to making this Nation safer. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to understand in greater detail the processes 

by which Secretary Chertoff conducted his review, and the organizational modifications that he has proposed in his effort to make DHS operate more efficiently and 

effectively. 

I have reviewed the Secretary’s plan and while I believe many of his proposals 

make sense, I think the Secretary’s review fails to highlight one critical component 

of an effective homeland security approach. That is, the enlistment of volunteers to 

defend the homeland. Hiring people to do every security job will bankrupt this country. I firmly believe that Americans have been awaiting instructions from their government since the attacks of September 11, so that they can play a role in defending 

this Nation. I can remember riding a train from Texas to Los Angeles when I was 

an Air Force Lieutenant and a local volunteer walked up and down the aisle of the 

train to check each passenger’s identification to ensure that we were supposed to 

be riding the train. 

As DHS moves toward implementing the Secretary’s plan in October, I hope the 

Secretary further studies ways by which he can involve our citizenry. 

The CHAIRMAN. And, Senator Inouye. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII 

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I ask 

that my statement be made part of the record. 

I also request that the statement of Senator Rockefeller be made 

part of the record. Because of an unavoidable family matter, he 

cannot be with us this morning. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inouye follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

Today, we will examine Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff’s comprehensive review of the Department’s organization and policy direction. Specifically, we hope to 

learn more about the role of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in 

this latest reorganization. 

Chairman Stevens, Senator Rockefeller, and I, along with Senators Snowe, Dorgan, Lautenberg, Cantwell, and Pryor, introduced the Transportation Security Improvement Act of 2005, S. 1052, to better equip the TSA for its transportation security mission. I look forward to hearing the Secretary’s perspectives on our bill in 

light of his comprehensive review. 

We are anxious to improve our legislation and make certain that the Department 

has what it needs to keep our transportation infrastructure secure. 

Transportation security is economic and national security, and the most prudent 

step we can take to improve it is to strengthen and empower the TSA. 

3 

While I was encouraged to learn that the TSA will continue to be the ‘‘lead agency’’ for transportation security, I remain concerned about the proposed realignment’s 

potential effects on port, rail, and transit security. The reorganization also appears 

to have altered the DHS’s areas of concentration, particularly regarding policy, intelligence, operations, and preparedness. 

While I commend the Secretary for this substantive undertaking, I would not be 

doing my job if I did not raise for further discussion three principal areas of concern 

I have with his announcement: 

1. The transfer of port security functions away from the TSA; 

2. The Department’s poorly defined commitment to rail and transit security; 

and 

3. The future of the TSA’s vetting and credentialing programs, such as the Registered Traveler program and hazmat background checks. 

Given the recent terrorist bombing of London’s commuter rail and buses, the 

bombings in Madrid last year, as well as similar transit attacks in Moscow, Tel 

Aviv, and Tokyo, we need greater detail and attention to rail and transit security, 

not less. 

However, just one day after the reorganization announcement, in an interview 

with the Associated Press, Secretary Chertoff suggested that rail and transit security would not be a top priority during his tenure. I hope that he will address those 

comments today, particularly since our legislation directs greater attention and 

more resources toward these transportation modes. 

It is a gross miscalculation to de-emphasize rail and transit security. As we have 

witnessed repeatedly, transit systems are a primary target for international terrorists. Such attacks are highly visible, produce mass casualties, cause broad economic 

disruption, and generate widespread fear. 

In fact, a recent Associated Press poll indicated that 57 percent of Americans now 

believe a transit-related attack in the U.S. is inevitable. The same poll also demonstrated that Americans are not shying away from their daily routines. We must 

show similar resolve and work together to prove that an attack is far from certain. 

It is our job to do everything possible to ensure that while the threat risk will 

likely continue, the actual vulnerability will diminish. 

S. 1052 redoubles our efforts to secure our rail lines, motor carriers, and ports, 

and provides the Department with the tools needed to accomplish the goals articulated in the Secretary’s review. 

We look forward to working with the Secretary, in the weeks and months ahead, 

to ensure that our transportation systems are as safe and secure as possible. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just like to say, Secretary Chertoff, I was pleased to hear 

your philosophies concerning the need for the Department to be 

risk-oriented in its decisionmaking processes and act as an effective 

steward of public resources. It is one of the most diverse and largest government agencies. 

And I was also pleased to read in your testimony your strong 

commitment for improving our Nation’s immigration policies, as 

well as, securing our borders. 

And I hope that your visit to the Arizona-Mexico border may help 

shape your policy views. It was not the coldest day we have had. 

And we appreciate the fact that you were willing to come to the 

border and see the situation on the ground. And I hope you will 

come back as we continue to try to improve our border security. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of things to say, but I really 

want to hear from the witness. I thank Mr. Chertoff, Secretary 

Chertoff, and I congratulate him on the job that he is doing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vitter, your comments. 

4 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this 

hearing. 

And I, too, want to thank the Secretary for your work, Mr. Secretary. You clearly have one of the toughest jobs in Washington. 

Thank you for taking it on. 

I will be very brief and I will submit the rest of my comments 

for the record. 

I, too, have studied your proposals. I do have an overall concern 

which is—and we have talked about this briefly on the phone— 

which is a lot of centralization in the front office in Washington 

and lack of a regional structure around the country. And I just 

wanted to briefly highlight that concern. 

I continue to believe that to best coordinate emergency preparedness and response, there should be some regional structure in the 

department rather than all sorts of different agency structures, all 

with communication only to Washington. 

I think regional headquarters and directors would enable the department to better coordinate with local officials and better facilitate preparation and response. 

I think this is particularly true since different regions have very 

different threats. For instance, my home, Louisiana, has ports, 

maritime issues. But, Texas, right next door, has a very different 

major threat which is the threat from the border. And I think regions could effectively help focus on those different threats in different parts of the country. 

Now, I want to be clear. I am not proposing some nationwide 

building program of plush headquarters in regions around the 

country. What I am describing does not have to be a lot of overhead, a lot of sort of headquarters that are devoid of direct responsibility in terms of the actual work of the departments. 

But I would liken it to combatant commanders in the field and 

different theaters in the military, strategically placed around the 

Nation, in the case of homeland security, to enhance security and 

focus on the different threats that different regions of the country 

face. 

So that would be my general comment and concern. Again, we 

have talked about this briefly on the telephone. And I will look forward to following up as you develop the structure to see if that concern can be addressed in other ways. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I will submit the rest of my comments for 

the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this timely hearing. I appreciate the work 

the Secretary is doing, and I look forward to hearing more about the plans to reorganize the Department. 

Mr. Secretary, you have one of the toughest jobs in Washington, and I applaud 

you for your efforts. I do have one issue, however, with where I see the Department 

heading. 

I believe that to better coordinate emergency preparedness and response, regional 

authorities should be established in the Department. Regional directors would enVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065180 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\65180.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
5 

able the Department to coordinate better with local officials and facilitate better cooperation with all the DHS agencies, so that everyone can work together most efficiently. 

Different regions have different threats. For example, Louisiana has ports and 

maritime issues, but Texas has a threat from the border. Every region has a different focus and needs a different regional strategy for homeland security. The 

Coast Guard has a regional system that is a good example. The Coast Guard districts were not thrown together randomly, but they were designed with mission in 

mind. 

We need regional staff with authority over the many Department components in 

an area to command the response needed effectively. 

I am not proposing a nationwide building program with new plush headquarters 

around the Nation. Instead, we need to have regional authorities—like commanders 

in the field for the military—strategically placed around the Nation, to provide efficiency to enhance security. 

If history teaches us anything, it is that change is often not received well, even 

if it is for the common good. Let’s use the Department of Defense as an example. 

It took years to integrate the services, to take advantage of efficient operations 

and coordinated efforts. Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, made DOD a 

functional department. It set up a system to use all the services in a combined way 

to accomplish their tasks, and be able to function effectively and respond to events 

in a coordinated way. Some functions—the Title X functions like training, equipping, and managing resources—were separated out from the war-fighter activities, 

thereby, allowing the Combatant Commanders to concentrate their efforts at the 

operational and tactical level. 

As in the Department of Defense, we should have the leadership at the top setting 

policy, but at the same time, we should empower regional directors of the Department of Homeland Security—the equivalent of commanders in the field for DOD— 

to perform day-to-day operations, and make decisions to accomplish their mission 

of securing our Nation and responding to threats. I think this may be the idea in 

the reorganization plan with the creation of an operations office, but I think it is 

missing a regional component. 

If you look at Miami, New Orleans, Houston, or any other area where DHS has 

many component organizations, there is no organization or command structure that 

allows for joint training, resources, operations, or intelligence that will produce a 

collective result and stop terrorism. 

Should an incident happen in any of these locations, who would be the point-ofcontact in charge? TSA, ICE, USCG? Surely we should not have all the agencies acting independently, and a command structure solely based in Washington will not 

be effective. In order to solve this problem, a system with regional directors is needed to ensure efficient operations and the best, quickest, most effective response to 

incidents and preparing for potential incidents. These regional directors should be 

empowered to respond and coordinate preparedness and response, under guidelines 

established by the Secretary and his leadership team. 

I would like for the Secretary to explain why he chose against a regional structure. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Burns. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA 

Senator BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Mr. Chertoff. We appreciate you. 

There are just a couple of areas, and most of the areas are which 

you have already taken a position and thinking about changing. So 

I will look forward to your testimony. 

I did want to talk to you a little bit about EAS airports. I think 

there are a couple of states where we may address a problem, but 

that is in question. But I just look forward to hearing your comments this morning. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry. 

6 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Just a brief statement, if I may. First of all, thank you for holding this hearing. 

Mr. Chertoff, thank you for coming in and sharing some time 

with us. I was pleased to support your nomination. I know you are 

working hard to protect the country. 

There are a lot of areas to focus on. Obviously, you have heard 

some of them expressed in the concerns of my colleagues. 

I would just like to focus on one quickly in my opening comments, if I can, and that is the issue of port security, specifically 

management of the grant program, and the status of national prevention and contingency plans. 

In January, the DHS Inspector General issued a report you are 

well familiar with, saying that the current design of the grants program compromises DHS’s ability to direct resources to the Nation’s 

highest priorities. 

And assessing the administration of the program, the IG found 

that only one staff person at TSA managed the distribution of 811 

grants in 2003, found that 82 of 86 grant applications transferred 

from TSA to the Office of Domestic Preparedness lacked merit but 

still received funding, and most importantly, found that of the $564 

million that was awarded through 2004, only $106 million was actually spent to improve port security. 

This is a fairly amazing statistic, as well as reality, when you 

measure what experts have told us about ports and the potential 

threat which you are well familiar with. 

I know that you and DHS concurred with most of the recommendations, but it has never been set forth, sort of, precisely 

how that is going to ultimately be implemented. 

Last week, on the Homeland Security Appropriations bill, I submitted an amendment to require the Inspector General and others 

to report within 90 days detailing how that implementation is taking place, and will take place. 

So obviously I hope you will cooperate in that effort. But more 

importantly, I am really concerned, and I think others are, that we 

remain unprepared. 

Now, I heard your comments the other day, and I respect the distinction you are trying to draw. I would concur that we cannot prevent everything. And there are certain limits, and there are certain 

realities we have to live with. 

But the department still has not finished a national maritime security plan mandated by the ‘‘Maritime Transportation Security 

Act.’’ The country still has no plan to reroute commerce should a 

port be attacked. And that lack of planning could prove destructive 

to our economy if there were a major port being closed, especially 

if oil or natural gas deliveries were stopped. 

So I would urge you to tackle this. Obviously I have some questions on it when the question period comes. I hope we never need 

it, but there is no doubt in my mind that railroads, highways, and 

cities are all impacted by what does or does not happen with respect to port security itself, because they are so interconnected. 

And I will look forward to having a chance to explore this with 

you a little bit. 

7 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lautenberg, you have a comment? 

STATEMENT OF FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for asking 

Secretary Chertoff here. I am pleased to see him. 

Last week, we saw the beginning of the plan for reorganizing the 

Department of Homeland Security and make it more effective. And 

I congratulate Secretary Chertoff for moving on that front. 

It is a very complicated department or organization, 180,000 people, and a merging of lots of different departments of government. 

So it will not be easy and it has not happened yet, but we are on 

the right track with this. 

Unfortunately last week, I think the Senate in some form undermined what the secretary is offering as his view of how we ought 

to distribute funds from the Department of Homeland Security and 

that is based on risk. And instead we had a vote that suggested 

that no significant portion of the funds ought to be distributed 

based merely on population. 

But if you had an epidemic in California, you would not send the 

vaccine or the antidote to Illinois, and we ought not to be doing 

that here. And I hope that we will be able to confirm that the most 

effective way to protect our society is to distribute funds on risk assessments. 

And we congratulate the secretary for standing firm on that. He 

said that we should have at least 90 percent going, based on risk 

assessment to those communities, those places at risk, and last 

week we voted to reduce it to 60 percent. It is not a particularly 

good idea. 

In terms of the transportation systems, I disagreed with the secretary on the fact that he suggested states ought to take over the 

security for their own transit systems. But many of these are interstate and they are part of an integral transportation system that 

affects the entire country. 

And I do not think that the states are in a position—I look particularly at my state where 860,000 people, each and every day, 

take buses and trains and rely on mass transit, public transit systems to move them around. 

And we saw what happened in London, too, recently when the 

attack took place there and at the transportation, focused on transportation network knowing that that would have a devastating effect, not only on the functioning of the society, but the psychology 

of the society. 

And I think it is really important, Mr. Secretary, that we continue to focus all assistance possible on our transportation systems. 

I look forward to an opportunity to ask some questions. 

And I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for doing this. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Secretary, we are pleased to have your statement. 

8 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Inouye. I request that my full statement be made part of the 

record. 

And I thought I would take the opportunity just very briefly to 

outline the highlights and to respond to a couple of, I think, salient 

issues. 

It is a pleasure for me to be before the Committee. I think it is 

my first time since I have become secretary. And I look forward to 

continuing to work with the Committee as we go forward, not only 

with respect to the reorganization, but with respect to implementing policies which I know concern all of us very deeply as part 

of the effort to enhance our homeland security. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will put your statement in the record in full 

and all opening statements in the record in full without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Chertoff follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Chairman Stevens, Senator Inouye, and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to address you today, and for your ongoing support 

of the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to keep America secure and free. 

I am honored, and pleased, to appear before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation today to discuss the outcomes and results of our Second-Stage review. Shortly after my confirmation as Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security, I announced my intention to conduct a systematic evaluation 

of the Department’s operations, policies, and structures to ensure that our form and 

function are most effectively aligned to maximize our ability to achieve the security 

outcomes associated with our overriding mission of protecting the homeland. Today, 

I am able to report more fully on the results of that process. 

All Americans owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the patriots and pioneers 

who built this Department in record time. Because of their dedication, security at 

our ports, airports, critical infrastructure, and borders has been significantly 

strengthened. Our nation has thwarted plots and captured terrorists. As a result, 

in the period since 9/11, the American people have begun to live under an umbrella 

of greater security, with greater peace of mind than we imagined on that terrible 

day. 

My job—and the job of the leadership team at the Department—is to provide the 

strategic direction, tools, and aggressive support needed by our colleagues to build 

upon that foundation and continue to advance the effectiveness, agility, and capacity 

of this Department every day. 

2SR Philosophy 

Our review was conducted with several core principles in mind. 

First, as I have said before, DHS must base its work on priorities driven by risk. 

Our goal is to maximize our security, but not security ‘‘at any price.’’ Our security 

strategy must promote Americans’ freedom, prosperity, mobility, and individual privacy. 

Second, our Department must drive improvement with a sense of urgency. Our 

enemy constantly changes and adapts, so we, as a Department, must be nimble and 

decisive. 

Third, DHS must be an effective steward of public resources. Our stewardship will 

demand many attributes—the willingness to set priorities; disciplined execution of 

those priorities; sound financial management; and a commitment to measure performance and share results. Perhaps most of all, DHS must foster innovation. 

Finally, our work must be guided by the understanding that effective security is 

built upon a network of systems that span all levels of government and the private 

sector. DHS does not own or control all these systems. But we must set a clear national strategy, and design an architecture in which separate roles and responsibilities for security are fully integrated among public and private stakeholders. 

9 

We must draw on the strength of our considerable network of assets, functioning 

as seamlessly as possible with state and local leadership, law enforcement, emergency management personnel, firefighters, the private sector, our international partners, and certainly the general public. Building effective partnerships must be core 

to every mission of DHS. 

2SR Process 

From across the Department and elsewhere in the Federal Government, we pulled 

subject matter experts and talented individuals away from their day jobs to focus 

on how well we tackle our tough fundamental challenges: prevention, protection, 

and all-hazards response and recovery. 

This Second Stage Review utilized 18 action teams—involving more than 250 

DHS staff—to evaluate specific operational and policy issues. We asked each team 

to answer a couple of simple questions. First, freed from the constraints of existing 

policies and structures—writing on a clean slate—how would you solve a particular 

problem? And then, how would you take the best solutions and implement them aggressively? 

We actively sought opinions from hundreds of public and private partners at the 

Federal, State, local, tribal, and international levels. Finally, we examined the DHS 

organizational structure, to make sure that our organization is best aligned to support our mission. 

This work, along with the experience of the last two years in the Department’s 

existence, will now play a critical role in setting our agenda moving forward. 

Six Imperatives 

In the weeks and months to come, the Department will launch specific policy initiatives in a number of key areas. Here, then, are six of the key imperatives that 

will drive the near-term agenda for DHS. We must: 

1. Increase preparedness, with particular focus on catastrophic events. 

2. Strengthen border security and interior enforcement, and reform immigration 

processes. 

3. Harden transportation security without sacrificing mobility. 

4. Enhance information sharing with our partners, particularly with State, 

local, and tribal governments, and the private sector. 

5. Improve DHS stewardship, particularly with stronger financial, human resource, procurement, and information technology management. 

6. Re-align the DHS organization to maximize mission performance. 

We will put more muscle on the bones of these six areas and others with additional actions and policy proposals in the weeks and months ahead. But, for now, 

let me give you a broad overview of our agenda for the future of the Department. 

1. Preparedness 

First, preparedness. In the broadest sense, preparedness addresses the full range 

of our capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to acts of terror or other 

disasters. Preparedness is about securing America’s critical infrastructure, which is 

not a government asset; roughly 85 percent is privately owned or operated. 

At the outset, we must acknowledge that although we have substantial resources 

to provide security, these resources are not unlimited. Therefore, we as a nation 

must make tough choices about how to invest finite human and financial capital to 

attain the optimal state of preparedness. To do this we will focus preparedness on 

objective measures of risk and performance. 

Our risk analysis is based on these three variables: (1) threat; (2) vulnerability; 

and (3) consequences. These variables are not equal—for example, some infrastructure is quite vulnerable, but the consequences of attack are relatively small; other 

infrastructure may be much less vulnerable, but the consequences of a successful 

attack are very high, even catastrophic. DHS will concentrate first, and most relentlessly, on addressing threats that pose catastrophic consequences. Some of the tools 

needed to prevent, respond, and recover from such awful scenarios are already in 

place; but others need significant improvement. 

The first step in enhancing national preparedness, is establishing a preparedness 

baseline that measures the effectiveness of our planning for preventing, protecting 

against, and responding to terrorist acts or disasters. A second stage review team 

has, therefore, constructed the model for an analytic matrix that will set that baseline. The matrix will allow us to analyze possible threats and will map the current 

state of prevention, protection, and response planning with regard to each. This maVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065180 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\65180.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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trix will be a critical tool enabling us to identify and remedy current gaps in preparedness. 

Bringing greater planning discipline to each of these risk scenarios is another dimension of our preparedness mission. And simple common sense counsels that we 

begin by concentrating on events with the greatest potential consequences. That is 

why the Department’s National Preparedness Goal—and additional, risk-based planning—will form our standard in allocating future DHS grants to our State and local 

partners, so, that we build the right capabilities in the right places at the right 

level. Federal money should be distributed using the risk-based approach that we 

will apply to all preparedness activities. And DHS needs the discretion to award infrastructure protection grants in a more flexible manner, as provided by the Administration’s proposed Targeted Infrastructure Protection Plan. 

Of course, Federal funds are not the only resources available to strengthen the 

protection of our valued infrastructure. Three years ago, Congress passed the SAFETY Act to enable our private sector partners to develop innovative technology to protect the homeland, without the fear of unduly high transaction costs imposed by the 

possibility of frivolous lawsuits. There is more opportunity to take advantage of this 

important law, and we will do so. 

Finally, of all the catastrophic threats we face, a nuclear attack on our soil would 

be uniquely threatening to our society. The President’s budget asks Congress to establish and fund a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), to develop and deploy the next generation of systems that will allow us to dramatically improve our 

ability to detect and intercept a nuclear threat. We have begun to take the steps 

to make this office a reality. The DNDO will report directly to me under our new 

structure—and I ask that Congress support this essential and critical resource. 

2. Borders and Immigration 

Our second imperative is the need to strengthen border security and interior enforcement, as well as improve our immigration system. We cannot have one approach without the other. 

As to the first, we must gain full control of our borders to prevent illegal immigration and security breaches. Flagrant violation of our borders undercuts respect for 

the rule of law and undermines our security. It also poses a particular burden on 

our border communities. We are developing a new approach to controlling the border that includes an integrated mix of additional staffing, new technology and enhanced infrastructure investment. But control of the border will also require reducing the demand for illegal border migration by channeling migrants seeking work 

into regulated legal channels. I look forward to working with Congress this year to 

improve border security significantly through the President’s Temporary Worker 

Program (TWP). 

Immigration policy is about more than keeping illegal migrants out. Our heritage 

and our national character inspire us to create a more welcoming process for those 

who lawfully come to our shores to work, learn, and visit. Secretary Rice and I will, 

in the near term, announce a detailed agenda of work and innovation that the Department of State and DHS have begun together, to ease the path for those who 

wish to legitimately visit, study, and conduct business in this country, while at the 

same time ensuring that our national security interests are protected. 

Of course, most people come to our shores to seek a better life for themselves and 

their children. Ours is a nation of immigrants, but, for legal immigrants trying to 

become American citizens, the process can be confusing, frustrating, and seemingly 

endless. Part of the problem is that the current business model fosters a long delay 

between application and final adjudication of applicants for residence and citizenship, during which many applicants stay here as temporary residents. But this system puts some of the most important security screening at the end of a lengthy 

process rather than the beginning, and leads to an unnecessarily high rate of rejection late in the process. 

As a result, too often, this system leaves a negative first impression of our nation 

with our new fellow countrymen. Worse yet, it causes unnecessary security risks because people enjoy temporary residence while we are completing the screening process. Restructuring this process to enhance security and improve customer service 

will be an important part of our agenda. 

3. Transportation Security 

Creating better systems to move people and goods more securely and efficiently 

was a core objective in founding DHS. It remains so today. 

(a) Enhancing Transit Safety. The recent tragic events in London served as a reminder of the terrorist threat against innocent civilians in our mass transit systems. 

We believe mass transit security is a shared responsibility between Federal, State, 

11 

and local partners, and the Federal Government has provided significant support for 

security efforts over the past three years. Following last year’s Madrid train bombings, DHS took important action not only by increasing funding for rail security, but 

also by conducting over 2,600 individual consequence assessments. Since 9/11, the 

Transportation Security Administration and the Department of Transportation’s 

Federal Transit Administration have worked extensively with the transit industry 

and first responders to strengthen the overall security capabilities of transit systems, with a special emphasis on the largest systems. Together, we have developed 

a significant tool-kit of protective measures, which include the coordination and 

training needed to recover from possible attacks. Multiple funding streams within 

DHS will be available to support such projects, including roughly $8.6 billion enacted and requested, since 2003, for our State Homeland Security and Urban Area 

Security Initiative grant programs. 

We are also working to develop next-generation explosive detection equipment 

specifically for use in mass transit systems. We will continue to apply resources to 

this groundbreaking work. At the same time, we must also prepare for terror attacks of even greater consequence—attacking transit systems with biological, radiological or chemical agents. We plan to expand the deployment of the PROTECT 

chemical detection and emergency management system. This capability has been 

successfully prototyped in the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area transit system, 

and will provide a significant and important chemical detection capability for other 

transit systems across the Nation. 

We also now have a network of bio-sensors, but we will accelerate the development and deployment of next generation technologies that more quickly detect biological, radiological and chemical attacks. 

(b) Strengthening Aviation Security. After 9/11, TSA was created to deny terrorists 

the opportunity to use aircraft as weapons and to defend our vital national infrastructure. Extraordinary progress has been made, but more remains to do. In aviation, our security and efficiency can be strengthened by better use of technology, 

both existing and next-generation technologies. 

Congress intended TSA to be almost entirely supported by user fees, but it is not. 

The Administration has proposed a modest increase in user fees to fund the infrastructure needed for this job. I believe travelers are willing to pay a few dollars 

more per trip to improve aviation security and enhance efficiency. I look forward 

to working with both Congress and the aviation industry to find a formula that will 

work. By collecting user fees for aviation, we can free up precious DHS resources 

for other important security priorities. 

(c) Passenger Identity Screening. Too often, security screening for passengers at 

airports is frustrating. We are still dependent upon a pre-9/11 technology system to 

conduct the most elementary form of terrorist screening—matching names against 

watch lists. Our job is to identify people at airports whom we already know and believe to pose a risk to aviation. Our existing watch list does identify threatening 

people, but it is not fully automated for aviation screening, and it yields an unacceptably high number of false positives, which drains our security resources. 

Getting this right is urgent. The short-term solution lies in enhancing our ability 

to screen individuals more precisely against named terror suspects, by utilizing 

more precise, identifying information, such as date of birth. That kind of system— 

being developed through our Secure Flight program—will limit cases where low-risk 

travelers are selected for additional screening. It will dramatically reduce the number of cases where travelers are delayed for questioning, simply because they may 

have the same name as someone on the watch list. But even this approach may not 

be complete, because it remains focused on only identifying already known high-risk 

travelers. 

Putting aside known risks, the more comprehensive and efficient passenger 

screening system that DHS must develop, will give us the ability to automatically 

clear low-risk travelers. By clearing these low-risk travelers, TSA can reasonably 

focus on a smaller and more distinct pool of passengers that might pose a threat 

to aviation. The result: less frustration; faster service; better security. Better forms 

of screening will also promote privacy, because they will reduce the number of mistakes or unnecessary interventions that annoy travelers. 

TSA’s Registered Traveler and Secure Flight programs are keys to increasing the 

precision, reliability, and speed of identity screening for domestic air travelers. 

Equally important are improved protocols to screen inbound international airline 

passengers and expanded deployment of US–VISIT for overseas visitors. All these 

screening programs should be integrated so that screening is consistent and interoperable. 

(d) (Supply Chain) Security Management. After 9/11, this country put in place 

vital measures intended to protect the global movement of marine cargo that touchVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065180 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\65180.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
12 

es our shores as it moves from origin to destination. U.S. Customs and Border Protection is screening all inbound containers, and inspecting those that merit further 

scrutiny. Increasingly, screening and inspection are taking place at the port of departure overseas—before cargo arrives here. 

But we should not rest where we stand. I believe that we can gather, fuse, and 

assess more complete data from the global supply chain to develop a more accurate 

profile of the history of cargo in a given container. Data about what cargo is moving 

from the initial point of shipping to the final destination, will allow us to target risk 

better. With more informed targeting, we can more efficiently conduct inspections 

of cargo that is either high-risk or unverified. This ‘‘Secure Freight’’ initiative will 

allow us to expedite large portions of the inbound that sustains our Nation’s economy, and focus with more precision on the unknown. 

That brings us to inspections. We must enhance and speed inspections that we 

need to perform, so that we minimize freight delays, and increase total inspection 

capacity. To this end, we must complete our deployment of radiation portal detectors 

at ports, while advancing research on more sophisticated non-intrusive detection 

protocols and equipment. 

4. Information Sharing 

The ability to share information with our international, State, and local partners, 

the private sector, law enforcement, and first responders is absolutely critical to our 

success. Otherwise, we are effectively tying the hands of those who are on the 

ground and charged with the responsibility of protecting their community, their 

neighbors, and their families. 

We recognize the need for better and more inclusive information sharing. Information sharing is a two-way street. Therefore, we will work with the White House 

Homeland Security Council and our Federal colleagues, not only to help forge common Federal tools for information sharing, but also work with state and local officials—and private sector infrastructure owners—to fuse and share a richer intelligence base. In short, we will promote greater situational awareness. 

5. DHS Stewardship 

DHS must be a responsible steward of the public trust. Congress is justifiably 

making significant investments in homeland security, and that entails significant 

procurements at DHS. We must ensure that we carry out these procurements responsibly. 

One of my very first acts as the new Secretary, was to contact the Department’s 

Inspector General and my Chief Procurement Officer and instruct them to evaluate 

DHS procurements and our contracting practices. I asked for suggestions regarding 

any needed changes—and I’ve received just that. We will rely on these recommendations to make procurement integrity and efficiency a management focus throughout 

the Department’s work. 

We will also emphasize improving financial controls and financial systems, seeking operating efficiencies, strengthening human capital policies, and delivering core 

information technology systems. Last week’s attack in London re-emphasized for me 

the need to act on another Second Stage Review recommendation: better integration 

and consolidation among the Department’s multiple crisis management centers. We 

will do that. 

DHS employees also deserve an organization that provides top-notch professional 

career training, an organization that actually enables individuals to broaden these 

experiences by working in other components of the Department without impeding 

their career paths. DHS should reward the strongest performers and team players. 

Our review has given us some specific recommendations for building this type of organization, and we will look forward to sharing more details with employees in the 

weeks and months to come. 

6. DHS Structural Re-Alignment 

I have concluded that some structural changes are needed at DHS to improve mission performance. Modest but essential course corrections regarding organization 

will yield big dividends. Most can be accomplished administratively—a few require 

legislation. 

These organizational changes include four important areas of focus which include: 

(1) formation of a new, department-wide policy office; (2) significant improvements 

in how DHS manages its intelligence and information sharing responsibilities; (3) 

formation of a new operations coordination office and other measures to increase 

operational accountability; and (4) an important consolidation effort that integrates 

the Department’s preparedness mission. 

(a) Policy. We propose the creation of a central policy office led by an Under Secretary for Policy. This office also will bring together our international affairs staff, 

13 

a significant and new strategic planning capability, DHS-wide policy development 

assets, a senior policy advisor focused on refugee asylum policies, and enhanced private sector liaison resources. Collectively, the Policy Directorate will strengthen the 

Department’s ability to develop and plan vital policies. This office is not a new 

idea—it builds in part upon the foundational work of the Border and Transportation 

Security policy staff, which is to be folded into the new policy directorate. Creation 

of a DHS policy shop has been suggested by Members of Congress, Secretary Ridge, 

and numerous outside experts. Now is the time to make this a reality. 

(b) Intelligence. Systematic intelligence analysis lies at the heart of everything we 

do. Understanding the enemy’s intent and capabilities affects how we operate at our 

borders; how we assess risk in protecting infrastructure; how we discern the kind 

of threats for which we must prepare to respond. 

More than 10 components or offices of the Department of Homeland Security are 

intelligence generators, and all of us in the Department are consumers and appliers 

of intelligence. We need to have a common picture—across the Department—of the 

intelligence that we generate and the intelligence we require. We need to fuse that 

information, and combine it with information from other members of the intelligence 

community, as well as, information from our State, local, and international partners. 

DHS can also do a better job of sharing the intelligence we are gathering, and 

the intelligence we are analyzing with our customers inside the Department, within 

the intelligence community, and with our frontline first responders at the State and 

local level. 

Therefore, we will designate the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis as 

the Chief Intelligence Officer. The Chief Intelligence Officer will head a strengthened Information Analysis division that will report directly to me. This office will 

ensure that intelligence is coordinated, fused, and analyzed within the Department 

so that we have a common operational picture. It will also provide a primary connection between DHS and others within the intelligence community—and a primary 

source of information for our State, local, and private sector partners. 

(c) Operations. Intelligence and policy mean little if not translated into action. 

Under our plan, all seven primary operational components will have a direct line 

to the Secretary, but—to improve our ability to coordinate and carry out operations—we will establish a new Director of Operations Coordination. The Director 

of Operations Coordination will work with component leadership and other federal 

partners to translate intelligence and policy into actions—and to ensure that those 

actions are joint, well-coordinated, and executed in a timely fashion. The Operations 

Coordination Director will manage DHS’s hub for crisis management. 

This integrating office will not disrupt our operators in the field, nor will it interfere with component chains-of-command. We do not aim to fix what already works. 

(d) Preparedness. Finally, let me turn to the critical area of preparedness. The Department of Homeland Security has primarily been viewed as a terrorist-fighting entity. But, in fact, we are an ‘‘all hazards’’ Department. Our responsibilities certainly 

include not only fighting the forces of terrorism, but also fighting the forces of natural disasters. 

To ensure that our preparedness efforts have focused direction, we intend to consolidate the Department’s existing preparedness efforts—including grants, exercises, 

and most training—into a single directorate led by an Under Secretary for Preparedness. Going forward, FEMA will be a direct report to the Secretary—but it will 

now focus on its historic and vital mission of response and recovery, the importance 

of which was illustrated powerfully as Hurricane Dennis made landfall this week. 

The Preparedness Directorate will continue to rely on FEMA’s subject matter expertise and the expertise of our other components in promoting preparedness. It will 

also include our Infrastructure Protection division, as well as the U.S. Fire Administration, currently in FEMA, which will strengthen our linkages with the fire service. 

Further, as part of our consolidated preparedness team, I was pleased to announce last Thursday that Dr. Jeffrey W. Runge will serve as the Department’s 

Chief Medical Officer. Working within the Preparedness Directorate, Dr. Runge will 

be my principal advisor on medical preparedness, and will serve as a high-level 

DHS representative to coordinate with our partners at the Department of Health 

and Human Services, the Department of Agriculture and State governments. The 

Chief Medical Officer and his team will have primary responsibility for working 

with HHS and other Departments in completing comprehensive plans for executing 

our responsibilities to prevent and mitigate biologically-based attacks on human 

health and on our food supply. 

We also appreciate both the efficiencies and the vulnerabilities of the modern 

technology on which so much of our society depends. To centralize the coordination 

of the efforts to protect technological infrastructure, we will create the new position 

14 

of Assistant Secretary for Cyber and Telecommunications Security within the Preparedness Directorate. 

Constantly Improving Our Efforts 

The six areas of focus just described are all areas that will be priorities for the 

Department moving forward in the near term. They offer, at least, an initial roadmap of large categories of our activity for the months ahead. 

We look forward to working with this Committee, other Members of Congress, our 

colleagues in the Administration, and our partners to ensure that this agenda for 

DHS can be implemented. And we will continue to roll out new thinking and specific 

solutions to the issues that directly affect our security and daily lives. 

Of course, we have not been idle while waiting for this moment. To the contrary, 

we have taken immediate steps to promote security in a commonsense and balanced 

way. Since my confirmation, for example, we have resolved a long-simmering dispute by supporting the placement of hazardous material warning placards on rail 

cars. We have also announced a plan to open Ronald Reagan National Airport to 

general aviation. And, we affirmed a strong and achievable implementation plan for 

the Visa Waiver Program that requires biometric technology standards for passports 

issued by program participant nations. 

What is notable about these decisions is that they did not simply pile on security 

restrictions. Instead, we have modified or even relaxed security measures that were 

no longer necessary, where risk analysis warranted. After all, a balanced approach 

means that the balance moves down as well as up. 

Moving forward, we will evaluate our decisionmaking, strengthening security 

where needed, and eliminating unnecessary burden when possible. Last week, I announced two decisions that illustrate this approach. 

In the former category, after extensive consultation with the Department of State 

and the Department of Justice, DHS has decided to strengthen our US–VISIT program. In the future, first-time visitors to the United States will be enrolled in the 

program by submitting ten fingerprints. Subsequent entries will continue to require 

a 2-print scan for verification. This will dramatically improve our ability to detect 

and thwart terrorists trying to enter the United States, with no significant increase 

in inconvenience. 

In the latter category, TSA will suspend the post-9/11 requirement that commercial airline passengers using Reagan National Airport in Washington must remain 

seated for 30 minutes after departure and before arrival. This 30-minute seating 

rule was a sensible measure when first applied. Now, almost four years later, significantly enhanced layers of security ranging from hardened cockpit doors to air 

marshals, make it reasonable to eliminate this requirement. 

Our work in protecting the homeland will always seek reasonable balance. Over 

time, as intelligence warrants and as progress allows, DHS will be open to change. 

We will be straightforward. If something goes wrong, we will not only acknowledge 

it, we will be the first to fix the error. But, we also will stand up and let people 

know when we’ve done things the right way, or see a better way ahead. 

Conclusion 

This is an exciting time for our organization. Change brings opportunity—and 

after an historic first two years—our young Department continues to hold one of the 

most important roles in government—the safety and security of our Nation. 

We set these priorities for ourselves, and make these adjustments to the Department in order to serve our mission, to protect our families, our fellow citizens, our 

visitors, and our homeland. 

So, moving forward together, let us answer this call by building upon that which 

has been honorably founded these past two years at DHS. We will proceed with 

unyielding focus and quiet determination. 

Once again, I thank this Committee for their constant support and valuable input, 

and I look forward to working with you as we move to put these changes into effect. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Thank you. 

Obviously, the events of July 7 are still very much in our mind. 

They are a forceful reminder of the fact that there are enemies out 

there who seek to hurt us, and seek to damage our infrastructure, 

our economy, to kill our people. 

They are sophisticated. If they can do it in a way that maximizes 

the negative effect on our way of life, they want to do that. And 

15 

as painful as that attack is, and as much of a reminder as it is, 

I think it also needs to inspire us to continue to be disciplined and 

strategic in the way we think about protecting homeland security. 

I should also underscore what I think all of us feel which is our 

tremendous sense of solidarity with the British people, and with all 

those who lost loved ones in that terrible incident of July 7. 

Let me talk briefly about the general outline of our Second-Stage 

Review and where we are headed. But let me pause just for a 

minute, in light of London, to just emphasize something that I 

think perhaps got drowned out a little bit last week in terms of discussion about the issue of mass transit security. 

The whole issue of transportation, the whole issue of infrastructure in this country is very much on the mind of those who work 

in the Department of Homeland Security. And, again, we want to 

be strategic about it. We want to be risk-based, which means we 

want to measure consequence, vulnerability, and threat in assessing how to go about doing what we need to do to protect America. 

We want to be balanced, and that means we want to always consider the costs involved, the fact that we want to not only protect 

our lives but our way of life, the fact that we want to work as partners with other government agencies, State and local government, 

and with the private sector. 

We do not want to own the responsibility. We cannot own the responsibility for homeland security alone. We must share that responsibility. 

And as you said, Mr. Chairman, that sharing has to go down, 

even to individuals who have to play a role in protecting our country. And we are now advising people and have advised people, 

when they get on public transportation, or are in public places, that 

they be mindful and be aware of what is around them, and not 

hesitate if they see something suspicious, such as an unattended 

package, to make that fact known to the authorities. 

So this is very much a shared issue. But, of course, we have to 

tailor our approach to the particular sector of the economy and infrastructure. 

And so, for example, in the area of mass transit where the boots 

on-the-ground are largely owned by State and local police, no one 

has suggested, and I do not think anyone would suggest, that the 

Federal Government blunder in and execute a mass takeover of 

transit police. 

What we want to do is work with the transit authorities, with 

the transit police to give them the benefit of our technology, biological detectors, chemical detectors, and sophisticated detection technology which includes the use of video cameras. And we have done 

that and we are continuing to do that. And I look forward to talking about that as we proceed with the hearing. 

The purpose of the Second-Stage Review was to take stock of 

where we are, recognizing the tremendous challenge and accomplishment of my predecessor, and his leadership team in this department, but understanding that there is room for improvement 

and recognizing that we face a dynamic enemy; we need to be 

adaptable and nimble in the way we address the challenge of terrorism. 

16 

I wanted to lay out a number of agenda items for policy in my 

remarks last week. They were not meant to be comprehensive. 

There are many things we have to attend to. 

But among the things I think that are very important are the 

issue of preparedness, particularly with respect to potentially catastrophic threats such as nuclear threats, biological threats, chemical threats, threats that would, if they materialized, number casualties not in the hundreds or thousands but in the hundreds of 

thousands or millions perhaps, and threats that would have devastating effects on our cities, our countryside, and our economy. 

Transportation. Part of the strength of the country is the fluid 

and convenient movement of people and goods, in and out of the 

country and throughout the country. We need to make sure we protect the security of that movement, but that we do it in a way that 

does not compromise the efficiency and the convenience which are 

the hallmarks of our system. 

Borders and immigration. Senator McCain, I was pleased and I 

did find it very, very informative to go down, and actually see, with 

my own eyes, the challenge that is faced by our border patrol down 

in Arizona, and really across the southern and the northern borders. 

And we are working very aggressively now to come up with an 

integrated, strategic approach to the issue of controlling the borders. There are some people who say, well, you know, it has not 

been done up to now, so it cannot be done. I disagree with that. 

I think we can do it. It takes some strategic thinking. It takes the 

application of will. 

I know the public and the Congress are demanding that we take 

action, and we are very focused on executing a strategy that will 

get us to where we need to be as quickly as possible. 

Information sharing. The key to working with partners is to 

share information both ways. Some of the elements in the proposal 

I have put forth involve some structural changes. 

One part of what I want to do is invite, and I have, in fact, invited State homeland security advisors to come meet with me and 

the top leadership team to see how we can move forward on fusion 

centers. 

Management. We are stewards of the public trust. That means 

when we get resources from Congress, we owe it to the public and 

Congress to spend the money wisely and efficiently. We need to do 

some retooling of our own structures and our processes to do this. 

One thing I would observe in response to Senator Kerry’s opening statement is, within a very short time after I arrived on the 

job, I called up the Inspector General and I said, ‘‘Look, I want to 

get your best learning on best practices, what we are doing right, 

what we are not doing right, to make sure that our procurement 

and our management is working as best as it could, as it can.’’ 

Finally, let me touch briefly on the structural changes that we 

are proposing. 

A centralized policy and planning office that will give us the capability to do the kind of strategic policymaking and planning, from 

a department-wide perspective, that will allow us to get our arms 

around such big issues as control of the border, and management 

of our transportation security preparedness. 

17 

A chief intelligence officer who fuses all of the information collected by the eleven components in our department that currently 

deal with intelligence and making us better consumers, better analysts, and better purveyors of intelligence to our partners. 

Operations, giving us, for the first time, an operational capability 

that spans a department. 

And, finally, preparedness, recognizing the unusual challenge 

that is placed upon us in guiding the preparedness across the country which requires us not only to work with our sister departments 

here at the Federal level, but with our State and local partners, 

and with the private sector which, in fact, owns about 85 percent 

of the infrastructure. 

And that includes particular emphasis on an Assistant Secretary 

to focus on cyber and telecommunications and a Chief Medical Officer who will look to bring together, and manage the architecture 

for our response to biological hazards, whether they deal with 

human health, or animal health, and agriculture. 

Finally, we are trying to make sure we never lose sight of common sense, and that we recognize that balancing means sometimes 

you bring the balance down as well as up. We do not want to only 

enhance burdens on the public, we want to relieve burdens where 

prudence and sound judgment suggest we can do that. 

And two initiatives I announced last week, which I think embody 

that, are the decision to go forward with a ten fingerprint scan for 

new visitors to the United States that will build upon US–VISIT 

and make it even more effective. 

And, finally, our relaxation of the 30-minute rule with respect to 

Reagan Airport, which was done not only to alleviate the burden 

on passengers, but really, as a recognition that as we scale up what 

we do to protect aircraft, we should be open to scaling down burdens that are no longer necessary, in order to make sure we have 

security. 

So that is our agenda. We have got much more work to do. I look 

forward to working with the Committee in pursuing these goals. 

And I am delighted to answer questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Secretary, I was impressed by your statement that we need to secure the borders and also discussions we 

have had. We need to use better technology. 

I think the temperature on the border today across Arizona, 

Texas, New Mexico, and California is probably in the 120 degrees. 

And it is very hard on people. 

It seems to me that UAVs, lasers, and technology is probably a 

better approach than just hiring more people, although I certainly 

think we need more people. 

I am curious about your views about our relationship with the 

Mexican government as to the need for cooperation there, and also 

your views on what kind of immigration reform. I think you were 

talking about a guest worker program to relieve some of the pressures on the border. 

And are you concerned about the increasing numbers of people 

from, ‘‘countries of interest’’ that are coming across our border and 

18 

we do not have the ability to detain them, so, therefore, they get 

a permission slip and move on? 

I know that is a number of questions, but I am very—I think 

they are sort of connected. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, I will try to address each of them in turn. 

I begin by saying, I agree. This is a solution that requires smartness of technology, not merely additional agents, although additional agents are part of it. It requires looking at the whole system 

and integrating the technology and the people. 

And that I think also applies to the question of what do we do 

with people after we catch them. Simply catching them and releasing them into the general public is not a solution. It is simply moving the problem around into a different arena. So, I think a systems approach makes a lot of sense. 

The issue of crossing the border, particularly at this time of year 

when it becomes a true humanitarian issue, I think is one that 

ought to concern not only this country, but the Mexican government as well. 

I have spoken with my counterpart, both the current Ministry of 

Government over there and his predecessor, Senior Creole. We 

have made it very clear that we think this is a humanitarian issue, 

as well as an issue that affects us as a country. 

And we are anxious to cooperate with them, and we have cooperated with them in helping them do what they ought to do, which 

is to focus on the smuggling organizations that cause an enormous 

amount of damage to people who are victimized, including encouraging people to cross the desert, and putting them in a situation 

where many of them lose their lives. 

We are encouraging them to do things like focus on the organizations. We are exchanging information with them. There is no question that part of our strategy has to include disabling those groups 

that profit off the smuggling of people into this country. 

Another element has to be trying to remove some of the incentive 

which, of course, is the demand that pulls people into the labor 

market here. And that means trying to create a structured, regulated channel to bring people in to do work for which there is obviously a substantial market, thereby reducing some of the pressure 

to move illegal people into the country. 

And I think if we do that, we allow ourselves to target our resources more effectively on keeping out those people who are not 

coming in to work, but are potentially coming in to commit crimes, 

or to commit acts of violence, or even terror. 

Finally, on the issue of other than Mexicans, I think it is unacceptable to have a situation where we release a large number of 

people on their recognizance, or on bond because we cannot simply 

send them back to Mexico, and because it takes a certain number 

of days to get them removed to their home countries. 

Part of this idea of putting together a program, a strategic view, 

is to look at that entire system. And that means we not only have 

to get access to more beds, so we can detain people, which would 

in turn allow us to do expedited removals, we have to then look at 

what are the obstacles that are preventing us from sending people 

back quickly. 

19 

Sometimes that means other countries that are dragging their 

feet, frankly, in terms of accepting their own citizens back. And we 

have got to push them to make sure that does not happen, and we 

may have to push them pretty hard. 

Part of it may be use of technology, for example, to speed up consular conferences, which now we wait for a consular officer to come 

visit a detention facility. That has to happen before we can move 

somebody back. Maybe we ought to do video conferencing and cut 

the wait from days to hours. Maybe we need to put some additional 

resources into flying people back. 

We are looking at the whole system, and it is very much our objective to move briskly to eliminating the release of these, other 

than Mexicans on bond, and also to speed up the cycle in which we 

move them back. And I think if we do that, we will be taking a 

big step forward in doing what we need to do to get control of our 

borders. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I thank you very much for that comprehensive answer. And obviously we need to get the attention of 

the Administration, and our colleagues, to the compelling need for 

overall campaign finance reform. And I think your comments both 

here, and publicly, can be very helpful. 

I would be remiss without asking you what the lessons of what 

happened in London, how they apply to us, that maybe you could 

just provide us with what you have learned so far. And thank you. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. I think it—we do not have all the lessons yet because we do not—obviously we are working with the British to get 

a full picture of the plot. 

I think there is a recognition that although we do tend, and I 

think properly tend to focus on people coming in from outside, we 

also have to focus on so-called sleeper cells inside the country. And 

that is—you know, one of the reasons that getting—making sure 

we have good intelligence, real-time intelligence about what is 

going on with potential sleeper cells in the United States, is an important component of our preventing these acts. 

And I will take the opportunity to say, you know, the ‘‘Patriot 

Act,’’ which gave us some of the tools to do this, in my prior experience as Head of the Criminal Division was a very, very important 

tool in giving us the kind of awareness of what is going on in this 

country that we need in order to protect ourselves. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Vitter. He’s gone. 

Senator DeMint. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Chertoff. I appreciate your being here. I am encouraged by your comments today and over the previous week, your 

ideas for reform. Obviously we cannot protect every public forum 

in this country. 

It is frustrating to recognize that, but we clearly cannot have 

protection on everything that is in public here. So I continue to beVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065180 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\65180.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
20 

lieve that the President’s strategy to pursue terrorists wherever we 

can find them, before they get here, is the right approach. 

I am encouraged, as is Senator McCain, your emphasis on the 

border. There is no way we can protect anything inside this country 

if we are not able to control who is coming and going. So if we are 

coming down this funnel, in effect, it seems like we have got to 

work on the big targets like our border. 

I also appreciate internally, your emphasis on major priorities 

and weapons of mass destruction. While politically that’s going to 

be very difficult, and we have already seen the fallout of you attempting to use our resources in a way that could prevent a largescale attack that could, you know, just cripple our economy in addition to killing and hurting thousands of people, it is going to be difficult not to continue, for political reasons, to spread our resources 

over every area that might be attacked. 

I guess my question to you is, I guess as you wade into this and 

start to set priorities, knowing there is going to be a lot of political 

pressure to divide resources of every bus, train, football game, or 

whatever, can we as an Agency, the way you are structured and 

with, I guess, the way we are organized and democracy in this 

country, can you stand the political pressure and move ahead with 

what clearly I think you are on the right track to do? 

I know it is a hard question to answer in this forum, but I guess 

my encouragement would come from knowing that there is a determination in your Agency and the White House, and hopefully to a 

large degree in Congress, to let you do your job to protect us. Can 

you do that? What signals do you see so far politically? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, Senator, let me say when I—in the 5 

months, little over 5 months I have been on the job, there has been 

a complete consistency in approach not only in my department but, 

you know, in the White House, all over the Administration. 

And we need to be risk-focused in the way we deal with homeland security. I think when you live every day with looking at the 

threats that are out there, and there are a wide variety of different 

kinds of threats—some of them are more imminent than others— 

I think you become acutely aware of the need to make sure that 

we are applying our resources, not only in ways that will avoid 

short-term threats, but long-term threats. Some of the long-term 

threats as you observed are really potentially catastrophic. 

When you envision some of the types of things that are out there 

with weapons of mass effect and the consequences, you realize that 

even if there is no imminent threat, we have to start to think about 

building protections that will take us out maybe a year, 2 years, 

5 years, even 10 years, because the consequences would be so serious. 

I think, you know, my basic principles in trying to move forward 

on this are these. I will, and I think everyone in my department 

will be forthright about how we see it. You are going to hear the 

same answer whether we get asked the question here, or get asked 

the question somewhere else. We are going to be consistent about 

it. 

We want to make sure we always work within the system, and 

not break the system, in order to protect, meaning that as we devise an approach to protecting our rail, or protecting our aviation, 

21 

or protecting something else, we do not want to become so focused 

on security that we destroy that which we are trying to protect. 

We need to be balanced. And we need to make sure that we do 

not give the terrorists the victory that would come by turning us 

into a fortress state. We do not want to be a fortress state. We 

want to be secure, but we do not want to be a security state. 

Finally, partnership is really important. I think the way to move 

forward on this is to work with our partners in State and local government, and in the private sector, so we all bring our advantages 

to the table. There are some things that local government does very 

well. They do better than we do. 

The transit police, the local police who are the eyes and ears, 

who know the community are a critical resource in terms of prevention and intelligence. I do not want to supplant them or push 

them aside. I want to work with them. 

On the other hand, we have the ability in the Federal Government to focus on cutting-edge technology, detection equipment that, 

for example, allows us to rapidly detect biological or chemical hazards. We ought to be bringing that to the table, whether it be in 

the rail system or in other public settings. 

So if we think, if we are smart, we are cooperative, we are partnership oriented and we are balanced, I think there is a good prospect in giving the American people what they have a right to expect which is security that allows them to continue to live in a way 

that we all cherish, but protects our lives and the lives of our loved 

ones, and our country. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Burns. 

Senator BURNS. Mr. Secretary, there are a couple of areas I want 

to pursue. I noticed in the press that you are pursuing another security fee for the aviation industry and its passengers. And I think 

both Houses of Congress have spoken to that very loudly in the last 

couple of years. And I see no reason why you should pursue that 

because I do not perceive it to become a reality. 

But I mentioned to you about which I am very much interested, 

and I Chair the Aviation Committee here, and the Subcommittee, 

and we are looking at the FAA and an overhaul there on reauthorization next year. 

I like your idea on Registered Traveler. I think that program 

should be accelerated. We note that most of the—all of the travelers that were pre-9/11, are back with us. We have a growing 

problem now that they are flying in regional jets. 

There are more airplanes in the air now than there ever has 

been to carry those people. And so it is causing some congestion 

problems, not only in our skies, but, also, whenever we start talking about our facilities to secure our airports and to tighten them 

up. 

So I am very much interested in your Registered Traveler program, also the new technologies to be used at airports, and I also 

liked your idea on risk-based management approach. In that area, 

we have a situation, as far as airlines are concerned. 

I have a feeling that as we increase our security around our more 

populated areas, we tend to forget that we have got about 580 

miles of border with Canada, which is very porous. We have farmVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:18 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065180 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\65180.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
22 

ers that farm both sides of that border, as you well know. They 

own land in Canada, and they also own land in Montana. So we 

have been spoiled up there because of our freedom to move back 

and forth on that border. 

But we also have a situation with our smaller EAS communities, 

essential air service communities, where they have no screeners, 

which poses a problem that if you get on an airplane in Wolf Point, 

Montana, which is only 40 miles from the Canadian border, and 

you check your luggage, they bring it to—say your mini-hub is Billings, they have to reclaim that luggage if they are transferring to 

another flight and reclaim it and then recheck in again and back 

through security. 

This is—and I think only Montana and New Mexico has this 

problem. And I would caution; I think New Mexico poses more of 

a problem than does Montana. But what it does, you have to have 

a lot more connection time in order to facilitate the traveling. 

I would just—we can get together on that. We can talk about 

that and maybe we can come up with ways to take care of that in 

those areas. 

But as far as your new technology concern and this situation, 

risk-based management, I applaud you because we have to use 

some common sense. 

I think Senator DeMint is exactly right. There is not enough 

money in this government to protect every nook and cranny of this 

country, because people are mobile. We have a mobile society. They 

do not want to lose that freedom. 

And so as the Chairman had mentioned the other day, we are 

going to have to, I think, probably most of our security in some of 

these areas is going to have to be home-grown, volunteers, and people who notice things and have the capability of heading off some 

things. 

But Intel is very important. And you mentioned it a while ago. 

If you have an intelligence office within, how will that fit in with 

what we have done with the rest of the intelligence community in 

bringing together a czar, so to speak, for intelligence in this country? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Senator, let me try to respond to—— 

Senator BURNS. I know it is a whole load of stuff, but I give you 

the whole load of hay in one wagon. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. I will try to take the pitch fork and go through, 

you know. Let me start with the last question which may be the 

shortest answer. 

I think what we are going to do by getting someone in our Department who will be the coordinator of all intelligence that we 

generate, and we generate a lot because we have interactions at 

the border that actually have some very interesting—yield some 

very interesting insights, we have one point of contact with the 

DNI, the new intelligence Czar, which I think will make his job 

easier. 

But, frankly, I think it will give us a better seat at the table, and 

make sure that we have a better ability, as we provide more to our 

partners in the community, to also ask that we have more elbow 

room and better visibility into what they are generating, which is 

important for our mission. 

23 

Let me talk more generally about the issue of aviation security. It is true that I have pursued a very modest, I think, a $2 or $3 

additional passenger fee for aviation security. Evidently I have not 

pursued it too successfully. 

But I think my theory is this: obviously we need to do something 

to move our general aviation security posture into the next generation meaning we need to get better technology, we need to have 

Registered Traveler programs that allow us to focus more on people 

that we have reason to wonder about, and we also need machines 

that will allow us to do a quicker and less cumbersome process of 

screening. I think that is going to benefit everybody. 

And if to do that, in order to move that online, we can ask the 

public to give us a couple of dollars, what I call the price of a soda 

and a newspaper at the airport, and use some other techniques to 

accelerate the ability to acquire and deploy this kind of machinery. 

I think that additional money will be money well spent. And, 

frankly, I think it will be money that benefits the airline industry, 

because it will make it more convenient for travelers, which means 

you will get more people using the airports. 

And, of course, ultimately the aviation industry shares the same 

interest in security we all do. We know that the business of aviation depends upon people having confidence in security. And I 

think it would be more devastating to the industry to have that 

confidence shaken. 

So I would like to continue to work with Congress to see a way 

to get adequate resources, to let us really move forward on nextgeneration technology. And I think at the end of the day, that will 

make people happier travelers and happier travelers, I think, make 

for frankly better business for the aviation industry and for a safer 

airline system. 

Senator BURNS. Well, the airlines will tell you that it is pretty 

hard to pass along any fees back to the passenger now, because it 

takes away their ability to adjust for their cost. And from what I 

have seen, they are right about that. 

And as far as your traveler is concerned, you know, we had to 

take off our shoes. It cost me a couple of—well, about a dozen pair 

of socks, I suppose. And I wear awfully good socks. And that happened. 

But I also found out they get very nervous when you have a set 

of spurs in your bag, if you are traveling between here and Montana too. I never got those spurs back. But, anyway, we would 

work with you. 

And as far as the EAS, I think we would work with you and 

come up with some plan. When we reauthorize the aviation part 

of that, we want you to be involved in that a little bit, because we 

feel like that it is part and parcel of what we are trying to do with 

the new technologies that we are going to employ. 

We are going to change the FAA just a little. And, of course, that 

is a very slow process, as you well know, understanding the bureaucracy. And I thank you for your willingness to cooperate and 

to communicate on that issue. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Kerry. 

24 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I was kind of curious what the Senator uses the spurs for in 

Washington, but I will not go there. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, as I mentioned in my opening, the 

‘‘Maritime Transportation Security Act’’ requires the maritime security plan. This is prior to your coming in. It was passed in 2002. 

It did not have a deadline in it. 

But because the deadline was not met by DHS again prior to 

your coming there, the Congress put a December 31, 2004, deadline 

into the Intelligence Reform Bill. That was missed by DHS, who 

then said it would be completed by April 1, 2005. That was missed. 

It was not completed. 

It was then expressed to this Committee’s staff that it would be 

expected on June 1. That deadline has passed. And, again, there 

is still no plan. 

So the question looms large, particularly in light of what you 

have said about catastrophic possibilities, why no plan, where is 

the plan, when can we expect the plan? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, Senator, I know we are working on this 

issue both in terms of the maritime security plan, and what we 

called, ‘‘maritime domain awareness.’’ And it is in the interagency 

process; meaning that we are coordinating this, obviously, not only 

with agencies within DHS like Customs and Border Protection and 

Coast Guard, but also with Department of Defense and Department of Transportation. 

I guess the lesson I have drawn from the recitation of missed 

deadlines is, I ought to hesitate to give you a deadline here if I am 

not comfortable that I can back it up. But I will get back to you 

with what the deadline is. 

But on the other hand, I would not want to leave the impression 

that we are not working on it, or we are not doing additional things 

in the area of port security, because one of the things which we focused on, as part of this review is, the whole issue of how do we 

deal with the problem of cargo and people coming into our ports 

through the maritime domain, and to start to think about more 

comprehensive policies to deal with the major threats. 

And as I know you know, when you look at the ports, there are 

threats that both come from the land side and from people mounting a direct attack on the port itself. 

And then there is the somewhat distinct question of cargo coming 

in, which is the whole container issue, which we are dealing with 

partly through targeting and screening, partly through detection 

equipment, but which also, I think, ultimately requires us to look 

more comprehensively at the whole way in which the cargo system 

and the container system operates. 

Senator KERRY. Well, can I interrupt you—— 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Sure. 

Senator KERRY.—there for a minute just to kind of use the time 

as effectively as we can? I appreciate what you are saying. But you 

said, and I accept what you said, that the catastrophic threat with 

devastating impact is the most significant thing we need to be 

thinking about. 

25 

We have discovered containers with human beings in them who 

have been smuggled in, and they died. And there are others who 

have gotten in obviously. 

Containers, according to most experts, are one of the prime targets because there are millions of them. And we are currently inspecting what percentage now, are we up to two, three percent? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. I think it is a little more than that, but we screen 

a hundred percent. We inspect some small portion of those. 

Senator KERRY. And the question is, when you look at the potential of either dirty bombs, or biological, or other kinds of threats, 

why some of the proposals with respect to security and tracking 

have not been put in place over the course of a 4-year period? Why 

a more robust inspection process when law enforcement itself suggests that unless you get up around 20 percent, you are not reaching a sufficient deterrent level? 

So the question is, how do we get there and particularly in view 

of the fact that out of $564 million, only $106 million has been 

spent as of several months ago? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Let me tell you where we have been, what we 

have done so far, and where we are going. We screen a hundred 

percent of the cargo that comes, and we inspect a percentage of it 

based upon how we score the risk of the cargo, depending on, 

among other things, what we know about the shipper, what we 

know about the underlying cargo, whether the shipper is involved 

in essentially a Registered Traveler program. 

And then with respect to inspection, we are in the process of deploying detectors that can detect radiation as well as nonintrusive 

screening devices. For example, something that allows you to essentially look into a container—— 

Senator KERRY. I am familiar with it. 

Mr. CHERTOFF.—and determine whether there is something there 

that is a danger. So—— 

Senator KERRY. The point is that technology has existed now—— 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Correct. 

Senator KERRY.—for some period of time. If we are on a, quote, 

‘‘war footing’’ and we have this available funding—obviously we do 

not have all the money in the world, but we do have money that 

is unspent—why has that not been put on a sort of ‘‘war footing’’ 

deployment schedule? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, I think some of the money that is—when 

you deal with money that is unspent, I think some of that involves 

grants, and I think one of the issues with grants is—of course, 

sometimes the grantee does not spend the money that quickly. 

Sometimes, of course, they have to obligate the money first, as you 

know, and then they only draw down the money once they get the 

delivery of the goods. 

I guess for the public, the way I would explain it is, you know, 

when I get a contractor in the house, first I get him to sign up with 

a contract, but I do not pay him the money until he does the work. 

Sometimes that takes a month. Sometimes it takes more than a 

month. And that is just kind of common sense. You do not want 

to pay until you get the stuff. And that is sometimes why there appears to be a delay in drawing down the funds. 

26 

Senator KERRY. A lot of Americans would ask the very practical 

question of how many years does it take, how many months does 

it take when your security is at risk. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. It should not take years. And one of the things 

we want to do is work with our grantees to make sure they are 

more prompt about obligating, and getting contractors who deliver 

more quickly so we can pay the money out. 

But I will say we have deployed dozens and dozens of—I do not 

have the exact figure—but many radiological detectors in ports. We 

have got them, a number of ports now completely covered by radiological detectors. 

But again, we also want to move to the next level of technological 

ability which is one of the reasons we have pushed so hard for this 

Domestic Nuclear Detection office, because in the end, we really 

need to get a better quality of detector. We have a good quality 

now, but a better quality, and that means we have got to jump 

start some research and really move forward on it. 

So I share your urgency. And one of the things I am very eager 

in doing is continuing to push our initiative overseas. We now have 

a number of foreign ports where we do the inspection overseas. We 

need to continue to do that and work with our allies overseas to 

really get a global network of these inspections. 

Senator KERRY. Well, I could not agree more. The only frustration that I have, and a lot of people have, is that we have been 

talking about this for several years. This priority of getting the 

ports abroad involved in the full inspection, as well as the tracking 

security devices to make sure there has been no tampering during 

transit, has all been part of the discussion for a long period of time 

now. And it seems to me, we have been frustrated. 

The last question just quickly. The light is on. Do you feel as if 

you—I know there has been a struggle. You testified in the House 

about the risk-based judgment of where the grants should go. Senator Lautenberg raised part of the risk question. 

But Congress has frustrated you, to some degree, by insisting 

this be a competitive program. And my question to you is, do you 

have—do you believe the power now to be able to assert the risk, 

awarding of those grants sufficiently, or is Congress still standing 

in the way of that? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. You know, I think as the President’s budget proposal indicated, our fondest desire would be to have a situation in 

which as much of the money as possible is not driven by a geographically-based formula, but driven by risk altogether. 

I think under that kind of a system, we—I do not know that you 

can call them winners or losers because it would not be driven by 

political jurisdiction. It would be driven by where the consequences 

would be, where the vulnerabilities are, and where the threats 

would be across the country. 

So obviously as we move toward that, the closer we move to that, 

the more ability we will have to apply some of the tools. And they 

are, you know, pretty sophisticated tools that we are now developing that will allow us to identify where the consequences are the 

greatest, and use some of our intelligence to see where the threats 

and the vulnerabilities are. 

27 

So the more we can encourage that move, I think the happier we 

are going to be. 

Senator KERRY. Well, I think it is important. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, the obvious lesson that came out of the London 

bombings was to use technology effectively, wherever it is available 

and the pictures that were taken. 

And I assume that as you look to streamline the functioning of 

the DHS operation that, not only will it be reassignment of personnel, or the redefinition of their responsibilities, but also the 

greatest employment of technology that we can get. 

And I ask you this. Is DHS totally kept up-to-date on developments within the military because there are weapons, detection 

systems that we know at Fort Mammoth that they have developed 

a technique for interrupting a signal from a remote to a detonator, 

and things of that nature, also to deter the course of a heat-seeking 

missile with radar. 

And all of those things help to make us safer. But I wonder, does 

your department get constantly kept up-to-date on these developments, even if they are not finished products to help you in your 

planning? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. We do work with the Department of Defense on 

a whole range of issues including detection equipment, various 

kinds of countermeasure equipment to see what, in fact, technology 

that is developed and can be applicable here at home. 

And, in fact, that is something we want to do more of, not only 

with respect to technology, but with respect to planning capabilities. 

I have asked the Defense Department, and Secretary Rumsfeld 

has agreed to give us some assistance, in terms of people who can 

bring to our planning department the kind of capabilities the Defense Department has in integrating a large plan to react, need to 

be prepared to react to a potential emergency. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Do we have a fairly easy swap of intelligence information with our friends around the world? What kind 

of channels do we use in terms of advanced knowledge of what they 

are seeing in their own countries, because I wonder whether— 

would it make sense, or is it effectively being done now that there 

is a central anti-terrorist intelligence program, and whether or not 

it is possible to form an alliance, a functioning alliance that says, 

look, we are all worried about the same problems? I do not think 

there is any country that feels exempt from the threat. 

And I wonder whether it would not be a good idea, if unless the 

information flow is as we would like to see it, to have a central 

agency composed of all of the democratic societies who are concerned about this, so that there is easy access for all countries on 

anything related to terrorist activity that they see. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, you know, we do work very closely with our 

allies, and we work both through intelligence channels and law enforcement channels. 

And just drawing back on my experience when I was at the Department of Justice, we had very close working relationships with 

28 

a lot of countries in terms of some of what they were doing with 

counter-terrorism, and I think we are continuing to build on those. 

Among the things we are talking to our friends about, are ways 

to better exchange data—fingerprint data—information about people that are turned away at one border that might present themselves at another border. 

And, in fact, we are talking to some of our allies right now about 

ways to enhance that—well, I guess the jargon term is connectivity, 

giving people an ability to get some connection into our databases, 

obviously not unrestricted, but to look for, for example, people that 

have been turned away, because there are risks, from the United 

States. And if they want to go to England, or they want to go to 

another country overseas to make sure that that person’s, let us 

say, fingerprints or name can be run against some of our databases. 

I think you are quite right. I mean, the terrorists are constantly 

probing for seams between the democratic and freedom-loving societies, and we want to make sure we do not let them exploit that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Secretary, since we passed legislation 

in the Senate that reduces the amount of grant money to the areas 

of highest risk to 60 percent, if that becomes law, will those restrictions harm your efficiency or your capacity to attack the problems 

that we are so concerned about? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, of course, Senator, we do not yet know 

what the final formula for the appropriations will be or the precise 

final language. 

As I have said, we believe that a formula that is risk-based in 

terms of all of our activities, including grant funding, gives us the 

highest ability to use our analytical tools to make sure that we are 

spending our resources wisely. 

Obviously, we will work within whatever constraints Congress 

ultimately sets in terms of the appropriations, and within those 

constraints, we will continue to drive as much as possible toward 

a risk-based approach to what we do. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Because there was a letter that you sent 

out, I think it was last week sometime, asking that we commit the 

funds, as up to 90 percent, directed to areas of highest risk. And 

that makes sense, I think, to everybody. And, yet, we are fighting 

a battle here. 

And I am looking for your help on this, because we need to be 

sure that it is clearly understood that the place that we ought to 

apply our resources is to the areas of highest risk. And it is very 

hard to do something like that through here, as you know. 

But we encourage you to continue sounding that message, and 

also, Mr. Secretary, to continue the assignment that you have 

taken on to refine the functioning of the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

The question was asked, Mr. Chairman, about why it has taken 

so long. My gosh. This is probably the biggest change in government structure in the United States in the last 50 or more years. 

And we are grateful that you have taken on the assignment, and 

we encourage you to keep working on it. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Snowe. 

29 

STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. 

The area I would like to probe today is maritime security. I 

Chair the Coast Guard Subcommittee on this committee. And I am 

deeply concerned about maritime security, and our ability to respond to those enormous challenges that represent a tremendous 

threat to our homeland security. 

I think it is important to ensure that the Coast Guard gets the 

tools that are necessary to respond to those challenges. I think it 

is important that we implement the ‘‘Maritime Transportation Security Act’’ with respect to providing the necessary funds to implement the port plan. 

I think it is also important that we expedite the Transportation 

Worker Identification Program so that we can identify the workers 

in the manifest and the cargo that is contained in ships coming 

into our ports. 

And, frankly, I think we have been woefully inadequate in implementing those programs and expediting the targeted goals currently in law. 

So, I would like to have you address some of those issues here 

this morning and what your views are. 

In addition, I was also deeply concerned about the fact that recently during the course of our hearing with respect to the Coast 

Guard, we received a revised implementation plan for the Deep 

Water, a recapitalization program for the Coast Guard assets and 

the ships and their planes. 

Frankly, the idea of requiring our men and women to serve on 

some of these ships, and to face the compelling challenges they do 

day-in and day-out, and now to have a revised plan that is suggesting that we need fewer assets than we were requesting in the 

pre-9/11 environment. There are fewer assets now being requested 

in this revised implementation plan in the post-9/11 event. And 

also the tremendous challenges that we are now facing, it is hard 

to believe we need fewer assets. 

And, frankly, the idea of, you know, extending the recapitalization program of these planes and these ships for 20 to 25 years, I 

have proposed accelerating the time table for buying new ships and 

planes into a ten to fifteen year time table. Frankly, we could do 

that and save money. 

But at the very least to target the cutters, whether it is the fast 

response, the national security cutters, and also the off-shore cutters in a more expeditious time table of ten to fifteen years. 

I mean, the Coast Guard, and the men and women who serve in 

the Coast Guard, desperately need to have new assets without 

question. I mean, we now rank 40th of 42nd world’s oldest naval 

fleet. You know, we are next to the Philippines and Mexico. I 

mean, we are in dire straits. 

I cannot imagine why we would suggest extending this time table 

to 20 and 25 years. It simply does not make sense, certainly from 

national security, for putting our men and women in harm’s way, 

and asking them to go out to sea, you know, in these, you know, 

rusting assets. It is more than we should ever expect. 

30 

So I would like to have some of your views on this with respect 

to maritime security and some of the issues that I have raised. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, Senator, I think I observed in my remarks 

last week, we view the whole issue of maritime security and marine cargo as a big priority for us. And that means looking at the 

entire maritime cargo system, including the security of the ports 

themselves, but also our ability to assure that the cargo that is 

coming in in containers, is cargo as to which we have either a reliable sense that we know what is in the cargo, or we have the inspection tools necessary to tell us what is in the cargo. 

That involves not only continuing to do what we are doing now, 

which means rolling out more inspection machines and radiological 

detection machines, it also means continuing to work with our 

partners overseas in making sure that we are pushing back inspections and screening at the port of embarkation, not when the cargo 

actually arrives. 

And ultimately what we really want to do is, again, break a little 

bit out of the box by going to the private sector, which really has 

a very capable and sophisticated machinery for keeping track of its 

cargo and its supply chain, and building upon that capability to 

give us an earlier look at the history of cargo before it comes into 

the final container. 

One of the things I wanted to do when we had the incident, for 

example, right after I arrived, about illegals hiding in a container, 

was to try to understand how that could happen if we were doing 

some inspection overseas. And the answer was that at some earlier 

point in the chain, that particular container had been loaded on the 

ship, so it had not come through that last port of embarkation. 

So we need to build a system that works better. But I think I 

take a back seat to nobody, in terms of my recognition that the 

danger to our ports is one of the highest consequence dangers we 

face, and we need to find a way to continue to elevate our defenses, 

but make sure we do not compromise the ability of our ports to operate. 

And that is why when people say, well, you should inspect a hundred percent of the cargo, we all know that that would be the death 

of the port, because you could not move anything through. 

As far as the port is concerned, the Coast Guard does superb 

service, did superb service before 9/11 and does even more superb 

service since 9/11. And I have sat down with the Commandant, and 

other top leaders of the Coast Guard and said to them, ‘‘look, we 

need to make sure in putting our plan forward which includes, not 

only capitalization of new assets, but reengineering and refitting 

existing assets to fill the gaps that while we may be tightening the 

belt, we are not tightening the belt to the point that we are actually cutting off our circulation.’’ 

In other words, the plan that we put forward is one that they assure me, and I am confident, allows us to perform the enhanced 

mission that Coast Guard has, without putting our brave men and 

women at risk, or compromising our ability to even carry out the 

traditional legacy missions. 

Now, in a world with unlimited resources, which is not the world 

in which we live in, one might say let us accelerate this. But anyone, you know, sitting in this hearing understands we are also 

31 

dealing with issues of border security which demand resources, potential weapons of mass effect which require a significant investment of technology, concerns we have about our mass transit and 

our aviation security. 

So we have to build plans that are adequate and do the job, but 

recognize that we have to make sure that we cover the entirety of 

the job and that we do not—in order to make sure that as we are 

enhancing resources in one area that we do not cripple ourselves 

in another. 

Senator SNOWE. I just think I would like to work with you on 

this question, because I do believe that we have to come up with 

a much different response for the Coast Guard and in these reinvestments. They desperately need to have new ships. 

And, you know, OMB is obviously where this is coming from. 

And I know you do not have to comment on that. But I do believe 

we have to do something much differently. 

And I plan to look at, and hopefully working with the Chairman 

of this committee, to look at a revision, at least a more targeted 

recapitalization, you know, of ships so that at least we can get 

these ships online sooner, because the missions they are required 

to implement, I mean, talking about maritime domain awareness, 

they clearly need to have these ships sooner than later. 

And, frankly, it will be a much greater savings in all respects 

rather than now using our legacy assets as part of the Deep Water 

solution. It simply does not make sense in all areas. So I hope we 

can work together on that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. I look forward to doing that, and also to see if 

there are ways we can make the building of these vessels cheaper 

and quicker. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, it has been my policy as the 

Chairman to ask questions last, so I want to get down to, sort of, 

the guts of this thing. It is a reorganization, and I have been going 

over the organization chart. 

As I understand it, we end up with a secretary, a deputy secretary, four under secretaries, a chief of staff, executive secretary, 

military liaison, three assistant secretaries, fourteen directors, and 

several boards. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

32 


719CHART1.eps
33 


719CHART2.eps
34 

Well, how does this change the employment level of the Department? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, I think it is neutral with respect to the people who are on the line. It trims out a number of supervisors. It 

flattens the organization to some extent. We actually wind up 

eliminating the number of direct reports and the operating components which I think are where most of our people are. Actually, it 

flattens the distance between them and the top management of the 

department by eliminating a layer of appointees between the components and the top management. 

The CHAIRMAN. But I remember when the Department of Defense was organized, it was supposed to bring about efficiency and 

everything in terms of the new directorate capability. We had a 


719CHART3.eps
35 

whole series of secretaries, under secretaries and assistant secretaries. And then we still had the same organization for all the services below that. 

Have you not achieved the same thing? It seems to me you are 

sort of top heavy. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Actually, we have actually reduced the amount 

of, I guess, what we would call above the water line. And what we 

have done is, we have flattened the management piece so that 

there are no additional layers of review, but we have built in, I 

think, greater accountability. 

What we have tried to do is say, look, when we have a particular 

mission to accomplish, we want to make sure there is one person 

and one office that has the span of control, and the accountability 

to make sure that mission gets performed. 

The CHAIRMAN. But you have transportation security, customs 

and border protection, Secret Service, director of citizenship and 

immigration, commissioner of immigration and custom enforcement, director at FEMA, and the commandant of the Coast Guard. 

Now, that is your operational level. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. That is right. 

The CHAIRMAN. No change in that by this reorganization. Those 

are entities that were folded into the department. But you have a 

new under secretary for management, a new under secretary for 

policy, a new under secretary for preparedness, and a new assistant secretary for Congressional and intergovernmental affairs, a 

new assistant secretary for public affairs, a new chief intelligence 

officer, and the assistant secretary for office of intelligence analysis, a new director of operations and coordination, and a new 

screening coordination office. 

Now, that is sort of a bundle of new people. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Actually, I am happy to—maybe it will help a little bit if I indicate a lot of these actually existed and we have eliminated a lot of posts that existed. There has been currently and was 

in the beginning an under secretary for management. There was an 

under secretary for science and technology. That continues. 

The under secretary for preparedness essentially replaces or retitles what was an under secretary for infrastructure protection 

and information analysis. While we have had an assistant secretary for legislative affairs, we are simply putting a little bit more 

into that person’s responsibility and we have had all these other 

positions, some of which have been, frankly, mandated by Congress. 

So, I think that we are actually reducing the number of under 

secretaries and people in that kind of upper-middle level. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am reminded of my old friend that was Chairman of this committee for many years, Senator Magness, and he 

used to say that the busiest man downtown is the sign painter. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. I think that is probably right. 

The CHAIRMAN. The second busiest is the one with the carpet, because if you go up high enough, you get a carpet on the floor. You 

remember? 

Now, what have you done here in terms of this? You have yourself and your deputy and chief of staff, executive secretary, and 

36 

military liaison on your organization chart right up here. Those are 

the people you meet with, right? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, actually, no. The people that I meet with— 

I mean, I meet with them—are the operating component heads. I 

mean, I am very much a believer that you, if you—— 

Mr. CHERTOFF. That is the bottom line, right? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Right, the bottom line there. Those are the folks 

who—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Who coordinates all this middle group? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Well, some of the middle group here is pretty 

thin and pretty small. I mean, the military liaison is really a few 

people and they essentially help us deal with the Defense Department. The Assistant Secretary of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs should be dealing with—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. But you do have four under secretaries—— 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN.—but only three assistant secretaries. That is 

sort of reverse of the normal government process. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Actually, what happened is all these folks at the 

bottom are people who used to be assistant secretaries. And we 

have essentially retitled them. Again, to make it clear—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But none of them on your chart, none of them 

show any interaction with this group in the middle, with the operational people. These are all advisors to you, right? They are not 

subject to the control of the under secretaries at all, at least if I 

understand how to read these charts. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. The charts are probably a little bit more simple 

than, you know, perhaps they should be. Basically we divide the 

components into two pieces. There are the operating components 

that basically own most of the assets and have most of the people. 

And those are along the bottom. 

Then we have various components that perform functions that 

you would in some ways consider staff functions. They service the 

whole department as a whole. That has to do with management. 

That allows us to unify our procurement, our management, and our 

financial operations across the whole department. 

General counsel, which makes sure all the legal stuff is coordinated; Congressional affairs, which coordinates all the legislative 

affairs; and then you have some under secretaries that perform 

again a function that tends to span the entire department. 

Science and technology gives us the backbone, the research backbone that supports all the operating components as well as State 

and local government and things like that. 

Policy, again, it is a function that is a staff function. It helps us 

drive policy and planning for the whole department. It is not something that people report through. 

And preparedness, again, is a somewhat unique position because 

it reflects an unusual mission we have in the department which is 

with respect to a lot of preparedness. We do not own the assets or 

employ the people. It is the State and local government and the 

private sector that does. We have to network that. And we need to 

have one person who is responsible for managing that network for 

the department. 

37 

So all these under secretaries essentially are operating across the 

department. They are dealing with the components for expertise 

and for coordination, but they do not own most of the people, and 

they do not own most of the stuff. 

Most of the people and most of the assets are controlled or owned 

by the individual components. I mean, although pictorially they are 

at the bottom, it does not really represent their importance. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lautenberg has a question, and then I 

am going to ask you my last question. 

Go ahead. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

It is kind of mystifying when you say, Mr. Secretary, that a hundred percent of the cargo coming in is screened. And it is a little 

confusing. 

Are we talking about looking at manifests? And what do we do 

about those ports where the screening operation is done, kind of, 

considerably ahead of the time for shipment? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. I think screening, as you pointed out, does not involve actual physical inspection. What it does do is, it takes information from the manifest, what we know about the ship or what 

we know about the port and other information, and based upon an 

algorithm or an analysis that includes intelligence that we gather 

rates them in terms of their risk and whether we believe it is, 

based on any number of these characteristics, we think it is risky 

cargo or not risky cargo. 

And then there is, of course, a range in the middle where there 

is some judgment that is exercised based on some additional gathering of facts. 

So what we do is, we target those elements of cargo that based 

on all of these considerations, are those that we have some serious 

question about. And those do get inspected. They get inspected either nonintrusively or even sometimes by breaking into the cargo. 

So although the manifest and the information is one element of 

this, it is not the only element. There are other elements as well. 

Part of what we try to build into this is a, kind of, registered 

cargo program, where certain companies do have arrangements 

where if they put into place some protective measures, that essentially gives them a higher reliability score in terms of what we inspect. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I want you to know that included in the bill now 

under port security is a risk assessment, the basis for distribution. 

I hope that we will be able to do that in other programs as well. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for your patience. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, my last comment is this. We have 

jurisdiction over all forms of these containers, surface, transportation, ocean, and road, and air. We have got to get a hold on this 

container thing. 

I would like to suggest that we arrange a meeting with your people and just take the whole gang of this committee down to your 

department, and have some sort of briefing of how you are handling this problem, where are the problems, because I think we do 

not have time for everyone to ask the questions. We are much better off if we just got a little bit of a lecture from your people. 

38 

Last, the bottom line. How much does this increase the cost of 

doing business for homeland security? 

Mr. CHERTOFF. The reorganization is neutral as to cost. What it 

does do is it will hopefully save us, actually save us money and certainly aggravation, in making sure we are able to do what I think 

the public and Congress expected us to do when they set it up 

which is running one department which is focused on bringing all 

the tools together to accomplish the very important things we have 

to accomplish. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I admire what you are doing, but some of 

us are on both this committee and the Appropriations Committee. 

And this is the department that is ever increasing its costs. I hope 

you are right. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHERTOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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