1

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: 

Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy

BY MODIBO GOÏTA

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is increasingly well integrated with local communities and 

criminal networks in the Sahel.

◆ Counterterrorism efforts among Sahelian governments remain uncoordinated and too narrowly focused 

to contain and confront AQIM’s long-term and sophisticated strategy in the region.

◆ To prevent AQIM from further consolidating its presence in the Sahel, regional policies must be 

harmonized and security forces refocused so as to minimize collateral impacts on local communities.

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 11 / FEBRUARY 2011

night raids by AQIM in Arlit, Niger, resulting in the 

kidnapping of seven employees and family members 

from the compound of the French multinational nuclear services firm Areva, benefited from “excellent 

information” inside the company, according to its security consultants.1

Recent attacks also reflect growing operational 

capacity. Just days after the Niger kidnappings, but 

approximately 1,200 kilometers to the west, Mauritanian troops engaged AQIM militants and pursued 

a highly mobile convoy for several days into northern 

Mali. Weeks before this operation, a suicide bomber’s 

truck exploded into a military barracks wounding several soldiers in Nema, Mauritania. The attack was 

A sustained upsurge in the frequency of kidnappings, attacks, arrests, and bombings in the Sahel in 

the past several years has heightened concerns that 

al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is gaining 

traction in West Africa. Indeed, AQIM now has a 

substantial presence over vast stretches of the Sahel. 

A low-intensity terrorist threat that once lingered on 

the margins is now worsening at an escalating rate.

Previous AQIM attacks largely consisted of opportunistic kidnappings of tourists and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers in the Sahel. Recent attacks, however, have demonstrated a greater 

degree of sophistication and intelligence-gathering 

capability. For example, the September 2010 over-
2

notable in that it was carried out farther from sites 

of previous AQIM operations and in the center of a 

relatively large Mauritanian town. In January 2011, 

a Tunisian gunman linked to AQIM threw a homemade bomb at the French embassy in Bamako, Mali. 

This was followed days later by the kidnapping of two 

French nationals from a restaurant in Niamey, Niger. 

The two were later found dead following a failed rescue attempt near the Malian border. In early February 

2011, three suspected terrorists were killed and eight 

Mauritanian troops wounded when two explosivesladen trucks detonated in Nouakchott. Their objective: to assassinate the Mauritanian president.

Previously believed to be relatively weak and 

isolated, AQIM’s advances are the results of a patient effort to cultivate deeper roots in remote regions of the Sahel. AQIM is now increasingly well 

integrated with local Sahelian communities and 

many AQIM leaders have established direct collusive associations with government and security officials. Most ominously, AQIM groups are developing 

cooperative relationships with regional drug traffickers, criminal organizations, and rebel groups to 

augment their resources and financing. As a result, 

AQIM can not only more ably confront and resist 

government security services but also undermine 

Sahelian states from within.

If more energetic steps are not taken to confront 

AQIM’s new Sahelian strategy, the eventual establishment of sanctuaries, mini “Waziristans,” in the 

region is a real possibility. AQIM already operates 

across a region of several hundred thousand square 

kilometers. Northern Mali, in particular, is becoming 

a central redoubt. AQIM’s attacks and presence have 

threatened vital economic activity. Once a popular 

tourist destination, this region is now largely off limits to foreigners given the risk of kidnapping. Unfortunately, efforts to confront Islamic terrorist groups 

in West Africa are uneven, uncoordinated, and short 

lived. A combination of security sector adjustments, 

development engagement, and international partnerships is needed to comprehensively counter AQIM’s 

strategy and uproot its expanding connections to Sahelian communities.

A NEW DIMENSION TO THE THREAT

Contemporary dynamics among terrorist groups 

in the Sahel trace their roots to Algeria’s political crises during the 1990s. Among the many groups active 

then, the Armed Islamic Group (AIG) became the 

most notorious Islamic terrorist organization in Algeria. Its exceedingly violent strategy, however, cost 

AIG the popular support it initially enjoyed. Eventually a dissident branch called the Salafist Group 

for Preaching and Combat (known by its French 

acronym GSPC) eclipsed its predecessor, though it 

failed to recapture AIG’s initial reach or capabilities. 

Having made little progress on its own, in 2006–2007 

the GSPC announced its allegiance to al Qaeda. Operating under a new name, al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb shortly thereafter executed a series of largescale bombings and attacks in Algiers and northern 

Algeria. However, under intense pressure from Algeria, it was unable to maintain a high operational 

tempo. AQIM has since been most present and active 

in the western Sahel—a largely desert and sparsely 

populated region that spans the borders of Algeria, 

Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and parts of Chad.

Though active in various forms for many years, 

the strength, appeal, and reach of Islamic terrorist 

groups in West and North Africa have generally 

ebbed and flowed without achieving critical mass 

or momentum. However, marked distinctions have 

emerged between AQIM as previously constituted 

in the Maghreb and the networks presently active 

in the Sahel. The earlier organization tended to operate in or base itself near major cities and execute 

episodic large-scale attacks. In contrast, acts currently 

perpetrated by AQIM in the Sahel are increasingly 

a mixture of criminal and low-level terrorist actions. 

While there have been periodic attacks in capital cities, most incidents have targeted regions distant from 

government outposts (see figure). In this way, AQIM 

Dr. Modibo Goïta is a Professor at the Alioune Blondin 

Beye Peacekeeping School in Bamako, Mali.

“the eventual establishment of 

sanctuaries, mini “Waziristans,” 

in the region is a real possibility”
3

is taking advantage of Sahelian states’ inability to exercise effective control over their peripheral territory. 

More importantly, AQIM is able to advance its longterm strength and viability by integrating with local 

communities to gradually deepen its roots, grow its 

resource base, and develop its operational strength.2

Without any significant government presence in the 

Sahel, AQIM faces few challengers. 

This strategy of integration is pursued in several 

ways. Marriage with locals has proven effective in 

developing strong ties. For example, Mokthar Belmokhtar, an Algerian AQIM leader, married the 

daughter of one of the chiefs of the Arab Barabicha3

tribe in northern Mali, thereby consolidating his 

growing alliances with nomadic groups in the region 

that run local smuggling routes.4 AQIM is also attempting to cast itself as an ally and potential protector of local communities. It often fiercely condemns 

the arrests of locals or civilian causalities resulting 

from government raids. By the same token, AQIM is 

exceedingly careful not to inadvertently target local 

communities and interests in the Sahel.

AQIM’s illegal activities also generate income 

and job opportunities for communities and individuals in the region. Reinvesting ransoms received from 

kidnappings, AQIM has hired local bandits and rebels in Niger, Western Sahara, and elsewhere in the region.5

 While many of the Tuareg communities in the 

Sahel have kept their distance from AQIM, several 

community spokespersons have noted that declining 

economic opportunities are driving some “into the 

arms of AQIM.”6 Ironically, it is AQIM’s low-level 

terrorist attacks and criminal activities that have 

largely contributed to the worsening economic situation in the Sahel. Tourism once drove a significant 

amount of business activity in the region, but visitor numbers have dropped sharply as a consequence 

of AQIM kidnappings. A key airline that serviced 

several Sahelian cities, Point Afrique, recently suspended flights, further isolating the region.

Perhaps most worrying, AQIM is branching out 

beyond kidnap-for-ransom operations to generate rev-

“with deepening roots in local 

communities and the regional 

economy, AQIM is developing 

enhanced resilience against 

counterterror efforts”

FIGURE: ZONE OF AQIM INFLUENCE

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Modified by Author.
4

enue. Moroccan authorities recently arrested a network of 34 individuals attempting to smuggle 600 kilograms of cocaine destined for Europe from Algeria and 

Mauritania.7 Among those arrested were members of 

AQIM, including individuals based in northern Mali. 

Northern Mali has also become a storage point for 

much of the cocaine that transits the region. Narcotics traffic is likely to yield much higher revenues than 

other AQIM activities, such as kidnapping.8 While 

AQIM is thought to have received a total of $70 million in kidnapping ransoms since 2006, the 600-kilogram cocaine shipment would have sold for some $60 

million at wholesale prices in Europe. 

With deepening roots in local communities and 

the regional economy, AQIM is developing enhanced 

resilience against counterterror efforts. The problem, 

again, is particularly acute in northern Mali, a central 

staging and planning area and the site of growing 

numbers of clashes with AQIM. Most ominously, local leaders in northern Mali have felt their influence 

erode. Recently, the council of local leaders in the 

Kidal region acknowledged, “the Salafists control the 

area better than anyone.”9 In short, AQIM’s longterm Sahelian strategy is beginning to bear results.

INADEQUATE RESPONSES

Governments in the Sahel have taken some 

steps to respond to AQIM but have failed to devise 

a strategy to counter AQIM’s increasingly sophisticated and locally entrenched methods. Some leaders 

in the Sahel have been hesitant to acknowledge the 

mounting threat. Decisions are often made for shortterm gains with little regard for long-term implications. Cooperation among neighboring countries is 

improving somewhat, but disagreements and challenges remain.

Among the Sahel’s statesman, Malian President 

Amadou Toumani Touré has been the most forthcoming regarding the true extent of the terrorist 

threat in his country. On the occasion of Army Day 

in January 2010, he announced, “in our country, the 

problems of insecurity, particularly due to drugs, terrorism, and cross-border banditry, in all their complexity, have generated a profound need to identify 

their causes and strategies to curb their perverse effects.”10 Touré has gone so far as to say, “Certain local elected officials are well acquainted with the drug 

traffickers, bandits, and even terrorists.”11

A “total struggle” against AQIM pledged by 

President Touré, however, has yet to be fully realized. Official reaction to setbacks is often unsettling 

silence, as with AQIM’s abduction, execution, and 

refusal to return the body of customs official Lieutenant Sidi Mohamed Ag Acherif in August 2010.12 

The government has also released AQIM prisoners in 

response to demands and threats to kill hostages. The 

rise in AQIM kidnappings and the use of safe houses 

in northern Mali to guard captives has benefited not 

only AQIM but also many entrepreneurial Malian 

officials who are often negotiators and go-betweens. 

Such negotiators retain substantial portions of multimillion dollar ransoms.13 These factors have further 

complicated government efforts to tackle the challenge in northern Mali.

Acquiescence to demands for ransoms and the 

release of detained AQIM operators has also strained 

regional ties. Mauritania recalled its ambassador in 

Bamako for 8 months after Mali released four Mauritanian AQIM detainees in early 2010. Another AQIM 

mercenary was released by Mali in August 2010 after 

he was extradited from Mauritania. Despite strong 

rhetoric, Malian government policy seems primarily 

aimed at avoiding direct confrontation with AQIM—

even its foreign elements—within its territory.14

Whereas Mali’s counterterror efforts have been inconsistent, Mauritania typically resorts to overly blunt 

security responses. Operational blunders and civilian 

casualties have resulted, playing precisely to AQIM’s 

advantage. In July 2010, a joint Mauritanian-French 

special forces operation into northern Mali to rescue a 

kidnapped French citizen incorrectly identified the camp 

in which he was being held. Though six AQIM members 

were killed, the operation was largely viewed as a failure. 

AQIM later announced in a televised address that it had 

executed the hostage in retaliation for the attack.

Mauritania’s heavy-handed security responses 

have also exposed it to other aspects of AQIM’s strategy. During a Mauritanian operation in September 

2010, as many as four civilians, including a young girl, 

were killed when Mauritanian aircraft attacked a convoy of AQIM militants in northern Mali. Nearby fighting also killed and dispersed livestock owned by local 
5

communities.15 This prompted angry condemnations 

from local Malian leaders. AQIM released a statement 

denouncing Mauritania for targeting “innocent and 

defenseless Muslims.” It also offered “condolences to 

the families of the dead . . . and all the Berebeche 

tribes and the proud Tuareg of Azouad” and vowed to 

“shield our nation.”16 AQIM’s rhetoric leveraged the 

civilian causalities resulting from Mauritania’s attacks 

to further drive a wedge between local Sahelian communities and their national governments.

The Malian government has in the past permitted Mauritania to conduct operations in Mali’s border 

areas, but the “right of pursuit” remains unclear and 

is not uniform among Sahelian states. Algeria opposes the right of cross-border pursuit. Mauritania 

has exercised it without informing neighboring states. 

Mali has maintained an ambiguous position. AQIM 

exploits this lack of clarity by operating in border 

regions to conduct or plan attacks in one state before 

fleeing into a separate jurisdiction.

For its part, Algeria has sought to lead regional efforts to unify counterterrorism strategies in the Sahel. It 

hosts the African Center for the Study and Research on 

Terrorism and more recently established a joint intelligence center in its capital, Algiers, and a joint military 

headquarters in southern Algeria with Mauritania, Niger, 

and Mali. However, it is much less welcoming of foreign 

support beyond the continent, which it sees as a possible 

pretext for foreign powers to establish military bases.

Algeria’s suspicion of foreign assistance has constrained the flow of resources that could improve surveillance in the Sahel’s vast ungoverned areas that 

serve as AQIM sanctuaries. Resource limitations, in 

turn, prevent Sahelian governments from adopting 

a more comprehensive strategy to counter AQIM in 

the Sahel. As Malian President Touré has noted, it is 

not enough to focus entirely on security. Rather, in 

addition to coordination on military and intelligence 

matters, regional partners should engage in efforts to 

enhance the quality of development in the region.17

D E V E L O P I N G C O M P R E H E N S I V E 

COUNTERMEASURES

Countering AQIM’s Sahelian strategy requires 

a range of short- and long-term adjustments across 

the region.

Governments in the Sahel need to align their 

currently disjointed counterterror measures. Specifically, the right of pursuit and hostage negotiation 

policies are priority issues that require harmonization. 

Determining a precise regional policy regarding the 

right of pursuit will undermine AQIM’s ability to exploit borders to its operational advantage. This need 

not require a liberal right of pursuit, but at minimum 

institutionalized and functional mechanisms to alert 

neighboring security services to AQIM attacks or 

movements are necessary. Joint border patrols can 

also enhance coordination and familiarize security 

services with AQIM cross-border tactics.

Ransoms for kidnapped hostages should end 

immediately. These payments are a violation of 

United Nations Security Council resolution 1904 

and contravene a July 2010 decision by the assembly of the African Union (AU) to “strongly 

condemn” such practices. Sahelian governments 

should refuse to facilitate ransom negotiations 

and investigate and punish officials who engage in 

them. Additionally, Sahelian states should better 

align punishments for offenses related to terrorism. 

This can foster shared confidence and speed the 

process of extradition.

Given AQIM’s expanding area of operations 

and growing boldness, adjustments in the tactics 

employed by the region’s security forces are also 

vital. As seen in Mauritania and northern Mali, 

governments continue to rely on conventional military means to respond to small and highly mobile 

AQIM units. These imprecise and blunt measures 

have resulted in civilian casualties or permitted 

AQIM groups to escape across borders. They are 

also unsuited to the low-level terrorism and criminal 

acts that dominate AQIM’s operational repertoire. 

Governments in the Sahel need to develop smaller, 

“AQIM’s rhetoric leveraged the 

civilian causalities resulting from 

Mauritania’s attacks to further 

drive a wedge between local 

Sahelian communities and their 

national governments”
6

more agile units that can quickly respond to AQIM 

attacks and target AQIM units more precisely so 

as to avoid civilian deaths and collateral damage. 

While additional training and equipment would improve performance, restructuring security units and 

adjusting their use-of-force doctrines are practical 

first steps to developing this capability.

Sahelian governments also need to collect 

information more systematically on AQIM’s involvement in smuggling and kidnapping. Such 

investigations typically require some degree of police involvement and capabilities. Reliable police 

involvement would, in turn, enhance the security 

sector’s ability to engage local Sahelian communities in a way that builds trust and recognizes their 

wariness of collaborating with the government. 

Military units typically are not adept in building 

relationships with communities.

Governments should better use already available 

intelligence, surveillance, transportation, and communications systems to further improve the effectiveness of their responses. At times, credible information 

of imminent attacks has been acquired, but poorly 

disseminated or acted on too slowly. Leveraging intelligence can quicken responses to AQIM attacks and 

thus undermine its ability to cross into other jurisdictions to evade or slow pursuit.

Governments also need to slow the integration 

of terrorist groups with local populations by designing and implementing programs that address basic 

community needs. Initiatives that improve food 

security, water security, health care, education, and 

employment, particularly for youths, would offer 

communities incentives to resist AQIM’s settlement in the region. Efforts to contain and reverse 

the slide in tourism in the Sahel will likely face the 

least resistance among communities historically 

wary of government interference. Governments 

could attempt to rebuild confidence among foreigners wishing to tour the Sahel’s remote areas 

by identifying safe towns and markets to visit, creating mechanisms to alert travelers to changing 

security conditions, and establishing ways tourists 

can quickly reach appropriate government agencies when necessary. Assisting businesses involved 

in ground and air transportation between major 

cities and distant communities can also stimulate 

other forms of trade and interaction. As much as 

possible, such assistance should favor local businesses in the Sahel and also develop markets and 

bazaars, which are frequented by tourists and local 

communities alike.

Corruption is also a significant problem that 

inhibits government performance across the Sahel, 

including counterterrorism efforts. For example, 

Mali’s recent and publicly available government 

audit revealed that a record $224 million of government funds for rural development, water and 

food security, transfers to subnational authorities, 

and other public expenditures were mismanaged 

or misappropriated in 2009.18 The audit, however, makes no mention of the military, Ministry 

of Defense, or Ministry of Internal Security and 

Civil Protection despite reports that some military 

officers sell arms and hardware to militant groups, 

even AQIM.19 The appropriation of government 

funds—whether for development initiatives or security sector improvements—should be wholly transparent and accountable to prevent diversion and 

mismanagement. Such practices also enhance the 

government’s credibility, trustworthiness, and impact. While Mali’s audit revealed mismanagement of 

resources, that the assessment was even undertaken 

and publicly released are promising steps that other 

governments in the Sahel should replicate.

International partners beyond the Sahel can 

also contribute to addressing the growing threat 

posed by AQIM. The Economic Community of 

West African States and the AU can provide a 

venue and leadership to harmonize policies and institutionalize information-sharing and cross-border 

judicial cooperation. The United States, European 

Union, and other donors can provide assistance, 

communications capacity, and training to restructure and improve security forces and livelihoods 

within the Sahel. Cooperation with foreign gov-

“[Sahelian] governments continue 

to rely on conventional military 

means to respond to small and 

highly mobile AQIM units”
7

ernments is also essential for confronting AQIM’s 

transnational criminal enterprises, such as rising 

drug traffic bound for Europe and kidnap-forransom that targets foreign tourists, NGO workers, and employees of multinational corporations. 

Many of the ransoms paid to AQIM have reportedly come from European governments, including 

at least 12 million euros from Spain, Germany, 

and Switzerland in 2009 and 2010.20 Thus, while 

Sahelian countries must take the lead in shaping a 

response to AQIM, close coordination with other 

African and non-African governments is crucial 

to understanding and confronting AQIM’s Sahelian strategy. 

CONCLUSION

While AQIM no doubt still harbors ambitions 

to conduct operations in North Africa, its name no 

longer adequately explains its current strategy. Rather, al Qaeda in the Islamic Sahel may be more apt 

given its deepening connections with communities 

and rising presence there. Governments in the Sahel should acknowledge this reality and work more 

closely to prevent the organization from further entrenching itself. Better intelligence, mobility, and 

community focus by the region’s security sectors are 

needed to respond to attacks and target AQIM units 

and bases. At the same time, governments need to 

protect livelihoods and create economic opportunities so as to maintain the divisions that historically 

have separated indigenous Sahelian communities 

from Salafist terrorist groups—and which AQIM is 

actively seeking to bridge. Removing the roots that 

AQIM is setting down in the Sahel is the only way 

to contain and reverse the growing threat it poses 

to the region.

NOTES

1

 “Al-Qaeda Warns France Not to Attempt Hostage Rescue, 

Site Says,” RFI, September 23, 2010.

2

 Lamine Chikhi, “AQIM Gets Help from Mali Officials—

ex-Rebel” Reuters, August 12, 2010.

3

 “Comment j’ai négocié avec Belmokhtar pour libérer les 

otages,” L’Indépendant, September 1, 2010. 

4

 “Algeria Upset by French Push on al-Qaida,” UPI, October 

5, 2010.

5

 “Kidnappings in Niger and Possible French Responses,” Stratfor, September 16, 2010. “Insecurity Forces Aid Workers from Niger 

Regions,” Reuters, August 17, 2010. “Kidnapper of Spanish Hostages 

Says It Was Just for Business,” Agence-France Presse, August 24, 2010.

6

 Stephanie Plasse, “Tuareg and AQIM: The unlikely jihadist 

bedmates,” Afrik News, November 8, 2010.

7

 Aida Alami, “Morocco Battles Al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb,” Global Post, November 2, 2010.

8

 Mawassi Lahcen, “Kidnapping, Drug Trafficking Dominate 

AQIM Activities,” Magharebia, December 8, 2010.

9

 Adama Diarra, “Tessalit: Comment les Deux Soldats Ont 

Retrouvé la Libérté,” L’Essor, August 20, 2010.

10 “Message du président Touré à l’occasion de la Fête de 

l’armée: Rappel des Acquis, Appel à la Mobilisation Contre les 

Nouvelles Menaces,” L’Essor, January 21, 2010.

11 “ATT à propos de la lutte contre le terrorisme : ‘Certains 

maires connaissent bien les trafiquants de drogue,’” L’Indépendant, 

April 15, 2010.

12 Diarra.

13 “Spain Paid Ransom to Free Hostages Held by Al Qaeda 

North Africa,” North Africa Journal, August 24, 2010.

14 “Affrontements entre l’armée mauritanienne et AQMI dans 

la région de Tombouctou,” L’Indépendent, September 24, 2010.

15 “Mali: Civilians Have Disappeared After the Fighting,” 

Ennahar Online, September 19, 2010, available at <www.ennaharonline.com/en/international/4735.html>

16 “Mauritania v AQIM in Mali: Summary of a report on 

part of the weekend raid,” The Moor Next Door, September 2010, 

available at <http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2010/09/20/

mauritania-v-aqim-in-mali-summary-of-a-report-on-part-of-theweekend-raid/>.

17 Patrick Johnson and René Dassié, “Algeria Snubs France 

in Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative,” Afrik News, September 

28, 2010.

18 “Mali Report Claims CFA 112 billion lost to mismanagement in 2009,” African Press Agency, August 4, 2010.

19 Chiki.

20 Michael Petrou, “Source: Germany and Switzerland Paid 

Ransom for Kidnapped Canadian Diplomats,” Macleans, April 29, 

2009. See also “Spain Paid Ransom to Free Hostages Held by Al 

Qaeda North Africa.”
8

AFRICA CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC STUDIES

Director: Ambassador William 

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 21

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Web site: www.africacenter.org

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REGIONAL OFFICE 

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Phone: 221 33 869 61 00

Email: FelekeE@ndu.edu

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN ADDIS ABABA

Regional Manager:

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Phone: 251 11 517 4000 

Email: AndersonBG@state.gov

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808

Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at 

http://www.africacenter.org.

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AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

http://www.africacenter.org

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