This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 34,649 4 LEMUEL WILSON, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 Karen Townsend, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 12 Allison H. Jaramillo, Assist ant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 ZAMORA, Judge. 17 {1} Defendant has appealed following the re vocation of his probation. We issued 18 a notice of proposed summary disposition in which we proposed to affirm. Defendant 192 has filed a memorandum inopposition. Af ter due consideration, we remain 1 unpersuaded. We therefore affirm. 2 {2} The pertinent background information was previously set forth in the notice of 3 proposed summary disposition. We will avoid undue repetition here , and focus instead 4 on the content of the memorandum in opposition. 5 {3} Defendant continues to arguethat he should have beenallowed to withdraw his 6 plea. [MIO 4-7] He advances two sub-arguments. First, Defendant argues that the trial 7 court’s failure to advise him about th e sentence range renders the plea unknowing 8 and/or involuntary. [MIO 4-6] The rule applicable to plea proceedings in magistrate 9 court merely requires advisement as to any mandatory minimum and the maximum 10 possible penalty. See Rule 6-502(B) NMRA. This was satisfied. As we previously 11 observed, at the time of sentencing no mandatory minimum applied. Defendant was 12 advised of the number of days left on his probationary term; this correlates with the 13 maximum extent of the magistrate court’s authority. See NMSA 1978, § 31-20-5(A) 14 (2003); State v. Nieto , 2013-NMCA-065, ¶ 5, 303 P.3d 855 (discussing the 15 sentencing authority of the magistrate courts, relative to probation violations). 16 Defendant does not contend otherwise. [M IO 6] Accordingly, Defendant was duly 17 advised of the applicable parameters. 183 {4} We understand Defendant to suggest that he should have been “advised of all 1 the possible penalties,” [MIO 1] in reliance upon State v. Gallegos , 2007-NMCA-112, 2 142 N.M. 447, 166 P.3d 1101. However, the “range” discussed in Gallegoswas 3 simply the realm between th e mandatory minimum and the statutory maximum, within 4 which the trial court was at liberty to exercise its discretion. See id. ¶¶ 14-15. Nothing 5 in Gallegos , or any other authority of which we are aware, would require a more 6 complete description of all potential se ntencing outcomes. We therefore reject 7 Defendant’s first assertion of error. 8 {5} Second, Defendant renews his argument that the admission should be deemed 9 unknowing or involuntary based on the trial c ourt’s failure to ensure that he was 10 represented by counsel. [MIO 6-7] As we previously noted, inso far as this was a 11 simple case in which Defendant did not di spute commission of the violation, did not 12 offer justification or mitigation, and did not otherwise suggest complex or difficult 13 issues, it is not at all clear that Defendant was entitled to representation . See State v. 14 Leon , 2013-NMCA-011, ¶¶ 11-12, 292 P.3d 493 (ide ntifying relevant considerations 15 in this context). Defendant ’s apparent dissatisfaction w ith his sentence [MIO 6] does 16 not convince us otherwise. 17 {6} Even if we were to assume thatDefendant was en titled to counsel, he 18 undisputedly waived that right when he entered the plea. [DS 3; RP 30] 194 Notwithstanding that waiver, Defendant continues to assert that he was entitled to 1 counsel at sentencing, based on his alleged request for representation at that juncture. 2 [MIO 6-7] However, as we previously observed, conflicting evidence was presented 3 on this matter. [RP 108, 111] Th e district court was at liberty to resolve that conflict 4 in the State’s favor, and to conclude as it did that Defendant failed to alert the trial 5 court of his desire for representation prior to or during the sentencing hearing. [RP 6 113, 116] See State v. Anaya , 2012-NMCA-094, ¶ 33, 287 P.3d 956 (upholding a 7 determination by the district court that the defendant did not make a request, and 8 relatedly observing that where “testimony provides substantial evidence to support the 9 district court’s finding . . . we will not di sturb it on appeal”). We therefore reject 10 Defendant’s argument. 11 {7} Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and in the notice of proposed 12 summary disposition, we affirm. 13 {8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

15 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 16 WE CONCUR: 17

18 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 195 1 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 2