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AVIATION SAFETY: FAA’S PROGRESS ON KEY 

SAFETY INITIATIVES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 16, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

WILLIAM COWAN, Massachusetts 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

DAN COATS, Indiana 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

JOHN WILLIAMS, General Counsel 

DAVID SCHWIETERT, Republican Staff Director 

NICK ROSSI, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

REBECCA SEIDEL, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 16, 2013 .............................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Rockefeller ........................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Statement of Senator Cantwell .............................................................................. 7 

Statement of Senator Ayotte ................................................................................... 9 

Statement of Senator Blunt .................................................................................... 52 

Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 59 

Statement of Senator Pryor .................................................................................... 60 

Statement of Senator McCaskill ............................................................................. 62 

Statement of Senator Coats .................................................................................... 66 

WITNESSES

Hon. Michael P. Huerta, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration ....... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, National Transportation Safety 

Board ..................................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 28 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

Jeffrey B. Guzzetti, Assistant Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation ........................................................... 35 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

APPENDIX

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 75 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, prepared statement ......... 75 

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senator from New York, prepared statement .. 76 

Letter dated April 12, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from Rhonda 

Sivarajah, Chair, Anoka County Board of Commissioners ............................... 76 

Letter dated April 12, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from Jack Hilbert, 

Douglas County Commissioner, Board of Douglas County Commissioners .... 78 

Letter dated April 12, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from Marty 

Marchun, Douglas County Business Alliance .................................................... 79 

Letter dated April 15, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from Jack A. 

Hilbert, Chair, National Association of Counties Airports Subcommittee ...... 80 

Letter dated April 15, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from Mike Fitzgerald, President & CEO, Denver South Economic Development Partnership ........................................................................................................................ 81

Letter dated April 15, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from Mayor 

Mike Waid, Town of Parker Colorado ................................................................ 81 

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Michael P. Huerta by: 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 83 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 83 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 88 

Hon. Roy Blunt ................................................................................................. 90 

Hon. Kelly Ayotte ............................................................................................. 91 

Page

IV 

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman by: 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 91 

Hon. Bill Nelson ............................................................................................... 92 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 92 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 93 

Hon. Dan Coats ................................................................................................ 98 

Response to written questions submitted to Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. by: 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 103 

Hon. Dan Coats ................................................................................................ 104 

Response to written questions submitted to Jeffrey B. Guzzetti by: 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 105 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 106 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 107 

(1) 

AVIATION SAFETY: FAA’S PROGRESS ON KEY 

SAFETY INITIATIVES 

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D. Rockefeller 

IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, this hearing will come to order. And hopefully, there’ll be some Senators 

who arrive, but you’ve got the two best ones right here. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make my statement. 

Americans take the safety of their aviation system for granted. 

And they should. Given that, all too often, air travel is a difficult 

experience, safety is the last thing passengers need to worry about. 

There are certain expectations built into modern air travel. Airline 

passengers expect their pilot is experienced and rested, that their 

aircraft has been properly maintained and the air traffic controllers 

will guide their planes safely through the skies. But, the industry 

and regulators should never take the safety of the system for 

granted, nor should we. I know that none of us in this room take 

it for granted. Everyone here today is deeply committed to aviation 

safety. That’s the job of many of you, and the interest of all of us. 

Our strong aviation record did not happen overnight. Everyone 

involved has worked hard to cultivate a strong safety culture. The 

FAA, the aircraft manufacturers, and airline employees all hold 

safety as their number one priority, as do we. 

Congress has spent a considerable amount of time in the last few 

years strengthening the FAA, really battling to strengthen it, financially and substantively. It was not easy, but we got it done. 

And the aviation system will become even safer because of the FAA 

Modernization Reform Act, that we did, in fact, pass last year, and 

the Airline Safety Act, which we did, in fact, pass in 2010. 

As you are well aware, our goal was to make certain our aviation 

system continues to be the safest, most efficient and modern in the 

world. The FAA has made considerable progress implementing 

many of the safety initiatives in those bills, and the agency is to 

be commended for that effort. But, now all of the progress that the 

FAA has made is at risk. 

2 

Sequestration is not our friend, and it’s affecting every aspect of 

the FAA’s operations, or perceived operations, as people try to figure out what’s going to happen. I also share my colleagues’ frustration with the lack of transparency, frankly, on how the agency 

made this decision, and how it intends to implement budget cuts. 

A great deal of attention has been placed on the potential closure 

of 149 air traffic control towers, including four in West Virginia. 

I’ve expressed my concerns about the impact of closing those towers, on the airports and the communities, and they’ve expressed 

their concern to me, clearly. I know my colleagues share these concerns, and we will likely be discussing that today. 

But, again, there is frustration from some of us about the lack 

of transparency on how the agency made this decision, how it intends to implement, generally, the budget cuts. We need to have 

a better understanding of the specifics. What I do know is that if 

we fail to reverse the decrease in FAA’s budget, we will not have 

an aviation system that we need to compete in a global economy. 

I made that speech last week, and I’ll probably make it again 

today. Why is it that we are so directly destroying our infrastructure and our possibilities of growth and modernization? It’s incomprehensible, but there it is. 

The hard choices that the FAA has to make to implement the sequester will only be magnified this October, when the next fiscal 

year begins. I know that the agency will never sacrifice safety, but 

it will be forced to limit every aspect of the system’s operations. 

The implementation of NextGen will be delayed. That’s awful, and 

dangerous. But, it’s going to be delayed. Our aerospace industry 

will suffer as certification of new technology and equipment is 

slowed. More towers could be forced to close, and critical safety 

rulemaking, such as pilot training and qualification standards, will 

take longer. 

One of the reasons I have so aggressively advocated for moving 

to a digital satellite-based system with the NextGen program is 

that it will make the system safer. I know that the FAA will never 

compromise safety. But, the erosion of FAA’s budget directly impacts our ability to complete NextGen and other safety initiatives. 

Something has to give, somewhere. Our problem is, we don’t know 

what that’s going to be. It threatens our ability to make the continuous improvement to aviation safety that we have made since the 

Wright Brothers. 

Unlike other transportation systems, we have a comprehensive 

plan to move our aviation system into the 21st century, but our unwillingness to raise sufficient revenues to pay for it means that we 

will fall further and further behind. You fight hard like we did last 

year and the year before, to move ahead. A bill passes, just barely; 

you get ahead. And then, all of a sudden, we’re falling behind. We 

face difficult budgetary situations. We need to make the necessary 

investments in our transportation networks. I don’t think anybody 

would dispute that. But, is it happening? No. Is there a possibility 

of this happening? Maybe. But not likely. 

The United States has been the world’s aviation leader for over 

100 years. We risk that global leadership position if we’re unwilling 

to continue to invest in it. You can’t invest in something with goodwill, good wishes. It’s called ‘‘revenue.’’ It’s called ‘‘money.’’ 

3 

The situation with the lithium battery on the Boeing 787 is a 

perfect example of where the regulators identified a serious safety 

problem and acted swiftly to address it. The company and the FAA 

are evaluating solutions that I hope will soon be proven workable. 

Although the situation with the Boeing 787 has dominated the 

news, the FAA is currently working with the aviation community 

to actively identify and address potential risks before they result 

in an accident. The agency is working with controllers and pilots 

to increase reporting of errors so we can learn from our mistakes. 

We’re putting the future safety of the system at risk if we’re unwilling to sustain our commitment, if we are in the condition, that 

we are not willing to sustain our commitment to these critical effects. 

Everyone agrees that these are vital programs, that they will directly improve the safety of the system. Do we really want to slow 

down these initiatives? I’m not willing to settle for the status quo 

on aviation safety. Maybe we’ll have to. It’s a terrible situation. 

I will seek to maintain the necessary level of funding for the FAA 

and its critical missions as we continue our efforts to address our 

broader fiscal issues. I appreciate the budgetary situation is forcing 

the Federal Government to make difficult choices, but those choices 

still must be smart, driven by good policy and not damage our longterm economic competitiveness. It’s a continued commitment to 

safety that makes the U.S. aviation system the safest in the world. 

We’ve seen that in recent months. Safety has to come above all 

else. There is no number two. There’s only number one. And I’m 

confident, somehow—for what reason, I can’t explain—that this is 

going to continue. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Rockefeller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

Americans take the safety of their aviation system for granted. And, they 

should—given that all too often air travel is a difficult experience, safety is the last 

thing passengers need to worry about. There are certain expectations built into modern air travel. Airline passengers expect that their pilot is experienced and rested; 

that their aircraft has been properly maintained; and that air traffic controllers will 

guide their plane safely through the skies. But, the industry and regulators should 

never take the safety of the system for granted. I know that none of us in this room 

do; everyone here today is deeply committed to aviation safety. 

Our strong aviation record did not happen overnight. Everyone involved has 

worked hard to cultivate a strong safety culture. The FAA, aircraft manufacturers, 

and airline employees all hold safety as their number one priority, as I do. Congress 

has spent a considerable amount of time in the last few years strengthening the 

FAA. It wasn’t easy, but we got it done. And, the aviation system will become even 

safer because of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act we passed last year and 

the Airline Safety Act we passed in 2010. 

As you are well-aware, our goal was to make certain our aviation system continues to be the safest, most efficient, and modern in the world. The FAA has made 

considerable progress implementing many of the safety initiatives in those bills, and 

the agency is to be commended for their effort. But, now all of the progress the FAA 

has made is at risk. Sequestration is affecting every aspect of the FAA’s operations. 

A great deal of attention has been placed on the potential closure of 149 air traffic 

control towers, including four in West Virginia. I have expressed my concerns about 

the impact of closing these towers on the airports and the communities that depend 

on them. I know my colleagues share these concerns and we will likely discuss this 

issue in detail here today. I also share my colleagues’ frustration with the lack of 

transparency on how the agency made this decision and how it intends to implement the budget cuts. We need to have a better understanding of the specifics. What 

4 

I do know is that if we fail to reverse the decrease in the FAA’s budget we will not 

have the aviation system that we need to compete in the global economy. 

The hard choices that the FAA has to make to implement the sequester will only 

be magnified this October when the next fiscal year begins. I know that the agency 

will never sacrifice safety, but it be forced to limit every aspect of the system’s operations. The implementation of Next Gen will be delayed, our aerospace industry will 

suffer as certification of new technology and equipment is slowed, more towers could 

be forced to close, and critical safety rulemakings such as pilot training and qualification standards will take longer. One of the reasons I have so aggressively advocated for moving to a digital satellite-based system with the NextGen program is 

that it will make the system safer. 

I know that the FAA will never compromise safety. But, the erosion of FAA’s 

budget directly impacts our ability to complete NextGen and other safety initiatives. 

It threatens our ability to make the continuous improvement to aviation safety we 

have made since the Wright Brothers. Unlike other transportation systems, we have 

a comprehensive plan to move our aviation system into the 21st Century—but our 

unwillingness to raise sufficient revenues to pay for it means that we will fall further and further behind. 

We face difficult budgetary decisions. We need to make the necessary investments 

in our transportation networks. The United States has been the world’s aviation 

leader for over 100 years—we risk that global leadership position if we are unwilling to continue to invest in it. The situation with the lithium battery on the Boeing 

787 is a perfect example of where the regulators identified and acted swiftly to address a serious safety problem. The company and FAA are evaluating solutions that 

I hope will soon be proven workable. 

It is also a perfect example of why the FAA and the industry cannot take safety 

for granted. With the ever-increasing complexity of aircraft and the air traffic control system, we need to make sure that our safety systems are advancing with the 

same speed of our technological innovation. 

Although the situation with the Boeing 787 has dominated the news, the FAA is 

currently working with the aviation community to actively identify and address potential risks before they result in an accident. The agency is working with controllers and pilots to increase the reporting of errors, so we can learn from our mistakes. We are putting the future safety of the system at risk if we are unwilling 

to sustain our commitment to these critical efforts. 

Everyone agrees that these are vital programs that will directly improve the safety of the system. Do we really want to slow down these initiatives? I am not willing 

to settle for the status quo on aviation safety. I will seek to maintain the necessary 

level of funding for the FAA and its critical missions as we continue our efforts to 

address our broader fiscal issues. 

I appreciate our budgetary situation is forcing every the Federal Government to 

make difficult choices, but those choices still must be smart, driven by good policy, 

and not damage our long-term economic competitiveness. It’s a continued commitment to safety that makes the U.S. aviation system the safest in the world. We’ve 

seen that in recent months—safety has to come above all else. And I am confident 

that this will continue. 

The CHAIRMAN. I call upon my distinguished Ranking Member 

and good friend, John Thune. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

holding this important hearing. 

Aviation safety has to be the FAA’s top priority, and it’s certainly 

a top priority of this committee. Today’s hearing is a good opportunity to review the FAA’s progress on a host of aviation safety 

issues, including mandates from both the Airline Safety and FAA 

Extension Act of 2010 and the FAA Modernization and Reform Act 

of 2012. 

The first of these laws, enacted in response to the tragic loss of 

life related to Colgan flight 3407, included several safety reforms 

for the airline industry. The FAA has made progress in impleVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
5 

menting some of these reforms; most notably, the issuance of the 

flight and duty time rule for airline pilots. However, several initiatives are either behind schedule or otherwise incomplete. 

In particular, I hope that Administrator Huerta will be able to 

give the Committee an update on the pilot qualifications rulemaking, as well as a progress report on the agency’s effort to develop the pilot records database, as directed by the law. I also look 

forward to hearing from the Department of Transportation’s Office 

of Inspector General, which has been tracking the FAA’s efforts to 

meet the requirements of the Airline Safety Act. 

Most recently, Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, which included additional provisions to improve 

safety. Among other things, the law directed the FAA to develop a 

strategic plan to address runway safety. The Government Accountability Office has found that the rate of runway incursions has 

trended steadily upwards in recent years, and the National Transportation Safety Board has again placed improving the safety of 

airport surface operations on its ‘‘Most Wanted List.’’ I look forward 

to hearing from all of our witnesses about ongoing efforts to increase the safety of our runways and what remains to be done. 

Of course, we cannot examine aviation safety without discussing 

the recent incidents involving the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. While 

the NTSB continues searching for the root cause of the battery failures that led to a grounding of the jets, the FAA has now approved 

Boeing’s proposed certification plan that will, hopefully, address 

factors that likely contributed to the failures. I understand testing 

of the design changes have been completed, and FAA is analyzing 

the results. I’m eager to hear about the current status of the two 

ongoing efforts, as well as an assessment of what this case says 

about how the two entities work together. 

Finally, much has been made and said in recent months regarding the potential impact of the sequestration spending reductions 

on aviation. While this is no surprise to many at today’s hearing, 

I’m concerned that, rather than sharpening their pencils and finding budget reductions that inflict as little pain as possible on the 

traveling public, the administration has threatened to close air 

traffic control towers, slow down air traffic, and furlough employees. 

The President, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator have all issued dire warnings about the possible impacts of 

the sequester. Now that the cuts are a reality, it is my hope that 

agency leaders will take a second look at plans to implement budget reductions in a way that minimizes impacts on the traveling 

public and the economy. Airspace users have paid billions in taxes 

and fees that support FAA operations, and they deserve better 

management of services provided. 

This issue did not sneak up on anyone. During Administrator 

Huerta’s confirmation process, the FAA failed to provide requested 

information to Congress and the American public about plans to 

carry out sequestration. This was true even after the President 

signed legislation into law last August that I authored, the Sequestration Transparency Act. And along with House Transportation 

Infrastructure Committee Chairman Schuster, I’ve sent three letters to the Department of Transportation over the past 6 weeks to 

6 

get detailed information about their sequestration plans. Last 

Thursday, Chairman Rockefeller and I sent a letter, also signed by 

Aviation Subcommittee Chairwoman Cantwell and Ranking Member Ayotte and our counterparts in the House, urging the FAA to 

target lower priority spending to avoid contract tower closures. Yet, 

despite my efforts and those of my colleagues, to get straightforward information on the administration’s plan for sequester, 

here we are with a lack of clarity and very low confidence that the 

proposed actions—widespread furloughs and tower closures—are 

the best or only way forward. 

A letter from Secretary LaHood, in response to only one of the 

letters, delivered late last night, leaves much to be desired in our 

efforts to gain more clarity on the decisions to close contract towers 

and the safety analysis conducted before administration officials 

decided to oppose closure of so many air traffic facilities. I hope Administrator Huerta will take today as an opportunity to directly answer questions on this important topic and to work with Committee 

members on the best way forward to implement the sequester reductions, which amount to only 2.4 percent of overall Federal 

spending for Fiscal Year 2013. 

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing, and I thank all of our witnesses for their part in ensuring the 

highest level of safety for the traveling public. I look forward to 

your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Thune follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. Aviation safety has 

to be the FAA’s top priority, and it is certainly a top priority of this Committee. 

Today’s hearing is a good opportunity to review the FAA’s progress on a host of 

aviation safety issues, including mandates from both the Airline Safety and FAA 

Extension Act of 2010, and the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. 

The first of these laws, enacted in response to the tragic loss of life related to 

Colgan flight 3407, included several safety reforms for the airline industry. The FAA 

has made progress in implementing some of these reforms, most notably the 

issuance of the Flight and Duty Time rule for airline pilots. However, several initiatives are either behind schedule or otherwise incomplete. 

In particular, I hope that Administrator Huerta will be able to give the Committee an update on the Pilot Qualifications rulemaking, as well as a progress report on the agency’s effort to develop the pilot records database, as directed by the 

law. I also look forward to hearing from the Department of Transportation’s Office 

of Inspector General, which has been tracking the FAA’s efforts to meet the requirements of the Airline Safety Act. 

More recently, Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 

which included additional provisions to improve safety. Among other things, the law 

directed the FAA to develop a strategic plan to address runway safety. The Government Accountability Office has found that the rate of runway incursions has trended 

steadily upwards in recent years, and the National Transportation Safety Board has 

again placed improving the safety of airport surface operations on its ‘‘Most Wanted 

List.’’ I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses about ongoing efforts to 

increase the safety of our runways and what remains to be done. 

Of course, we cannot examine aviation safety without discussing the recent incidents involving the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. While the NTSB continues searching for 

the root cause of the battery failures that led to a grounding of the jets, the FAA 

has now approved Boeing’s proposed certification plan that will hopefully address 

factors that likely contributed to the failures. I understand testing of the design 

changes has been completed and FAA is analyzing the results. I am eager to hear 

about the current status of the two on-going efforts, as well as an assessment of 

what this case says about how the two entities work together. 

7 

Finally, much has been said in recent months regarding the potential impact of 

the sequestration spending reductions on aviation. While this is no surprise to many 

at today’s hearing, I am concerned that, rather than sharpening their pencils and 

finding budget reductions that inflict as little pain as possible on the traveling public, the Administration has threatened to close air traffic control towers, slow down 

air traffic, and furlough employees. The President, the Secretary of Transportation, 

and the Administrator have all issued dire warnings about the possible impacts of 

sequester. 

Now that the cuts are a reality, it is my hope that agency leaders will take a second look at plans to implement budget reductions in a way that minimizes impacts 

on the traveling public and the economy. Airspace users have paid billions in taxes 

and fees that support FAA operations, and they deserve better management of services provided. 

This issue did not sneak up on anyone. During Administrator Huerta’s confirmation process, the FAA failed to provide requested information to Congress and the 

American public about plans to carry out sequestration. This was true even after 

the President signed legislation into law last August that I authored—the Sequestration Transparency Act. And, along with House Transportation and Infrastructure 

Committee Chairman Shuster, I have sent three letters to the Department of Transportation over the past six weeks to get detailed information about their sequestration plans. 

Last Thursday, Chairman Rockefeller and I sent a letter also signed by Aviation 

Subcommittee Chairwoman Cantwell, and Ranking Member Ayotte and our counterparts in the House, urging the FAA to target lower priority spending to avoid contract towers closures. Yet, despite my efforts and those of my colleagues to get 

straightforward information on the Administration’s plans for sequester, here we 

are with a lack of clarity and very little confidence that the proposed actions—widespread furloughs and tower closures—are the best or only way forward. A letter 

from Secretary LaHood in response to only one of the letters, delivered late last 

night, leaves much to be desired in our efforts to gain more clarity on the decisions 

to close contract towers, and the safety analysis conducted before Administration officials decided to propose closure of so many air traffic control facilities. 

I hope Administrator Huerta will take today as an opportunity to directly answer 

questions on this important topic and work with Committee Members on the best 

way forward to implement the sequester reductions which amount to only 2.4 percent of overall Federal spending for FY 2013. 

Again, I thank the Chairman for calling this hearing, and I thank all of the witnesses for their part in ensuring the highest level of safety for the traveling public. 

I look forward to your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

I would like to call, now, on Senator Cantwell and also on Senator Ayotte, in sequence, because they’re both Chairman and Ranking Member of the Aviation Subcommittee, which is so important. 

Senator Cantwell. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I get started, I just want to honor the victims of the horrific incident that happened in Boston. And I know that all Washingtonians, my Washingtonians, but all Americans, also stand with 

our friends in Massachusetts. Our thoughts and prayers go out to 

the victims of this senseless tragedy, and we honor the first responders, who helped protect the lives of innocent Americans. 

And I want to thank you, Secretary Huerta, for the FAA’s rapid 

response in quickly securing Boston’s airspace, establishing temporary flight restrictions over the immediate vicinity of the explosion. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. 

And it has just been over a year since we passed the FAA ModVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
8 

ernization Reform Act, and there is a lot to do and talk about when 

it comes to safety. 

I want to thank the witnesses today, especially Administrator 

Huerta and Chairwoman Hersman, for updating me constantly on 

the FAA and the NTSB’s review of the 787 battery issue. I appreciate the intensity and focus that both of your agencies have provided for the important aviation issues, and I look forward to continuing being updated on this issue. 

I also want to thank Mr. Guzzetti for his technical assistance on 

the medical safety legislation, when you were at NTSB, several 

years ago, and Mr. Dillingham, for your institutional knowledge on 

aviation issues. They’re very welcome. 

While we’re here today to talk about key safety initiatives, there 

is also a lot to talk about when it comes to sequestration and the 

impacts on safety and operations of over 200 air traffic towers slated for closure. I appreciate my colleague’s effort, Senator Moran, to 

try to restore funding. In my home state, eight towers are on the 

closure list, and these closures cause major disruptions. For example, at Felts Field, in Spokane, which is an area that serves both 

air medical services for four states, and also Paine Field, in Everett, which is the hub of a large aerospace manufacturer, these 

tower closures would have an impact. So, I hope, Mr. Chairman, 

we can resolve these issues. 

Mr. Chairman, prior to your chairmanship, you were the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Aviation Subcommittee for more 

than a decade. And, during that time period, you left a legacy of 

achievements on aviation safety. As a testament to the work of this 

Committee and the work of key agencies and industry players, 

there have been no major domestic crashes of major airlines in 

more than a decade. And, in response to the smaller Colgan crash 

that has been referred to by my colleagues, your Committee held 

nine hearings, and passed meaningful reform legislation in 2010. 

Some of that has been implemented, but other parts require final 

action. For one, the FAA must implement the rules required by 

your legislation, including pilot qualifications, pilot training, pilot 

mentoring and professionalism, database issues, and other safety 

aviation issues, including ensuring that regional carriers meet the 

same safety standards as major airlines, addressing the air traffic 

controller fatigue issues, reducing operational errors, and including 

runway incursions, improving general aviation safety, completing 

the medical safety rules, integrating unmanned aerial vehicles, and 

improving the voluntary reporting system. And we also must remember that there are a number of safety initiatives in the 

NextGen system, so as we move forward on that. 

But, last month, the NTSB released its interim factual report on 

a key issue, the lithium ion battery incident aboard the Boeing 787, 

at Logan Airport, operated by Japan Airlines. And next week, the 

NTSB will be holding a symposium on that issue. The FAA has 

been performing a comprehensive review of the 787’s critical systems, focusing on the electrical system. And, since April 8, the FAA 

has been evaluating Boeing’s test results on the modified battery. 

So, the NTSB ongoing investigation is important, and the interim 

factual report provides information regarding the incident at Logan 

9 

Airport, including descriptions of the damage and components, and 

planned ongoing investigations. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to receiving these final reports 

and recommendations by all entities. And, like everyone else, we 

want these planes to return safely to flight. And yes, there are 

many people in the State of Washington—over 85,000 people, directly and indirect—thousands of others, indirectly, a part of the 

supply chain. I can guarantee you, they want to get it right. 

The FAA and NTSB are doing their respective jobs on this issue, 

and I thank them for that, and the many hours that both of the 

agencies have put forth. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you on the myriad 

of these aviation issues over the next several months, but we both 

know and have talked about this—we want to continue to hold 

hearings on NextGen oversight, the proposed American Airlines/ 

U.S. Airways merger, competitiveness in the aerospace manufacturing, development of airline strategies to foster industry growth, 

and maintaining and upgrading our important airport infrastructure. All of these issues are a part of our safety mechanisms, as 

well. 

So, I thank you for holding this important hearing. I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony today. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator, very much. 

Senator Ayotte. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller. And I want 

to thank you for the opportunity to deliver an opening statement 

today. 

I’m pleased that you decided to hold this hearing, and I want to 

thank all of our witnesses for being here. 

And I would echo the sentiments of my colleague, Senator Cantwell, for the important work that you’ve done in the light of what’s 

happened in Boston. And certainly, my thoughts and prayers are 

with all the victims in Boston and all those who, unfortunately, 

were there for a very positive event that was interrupted by such 

a horrific tragedy. 

I want to begin my remarks, certainly, by expressing my excitement to serve as the Ranking Member on the Aviation Subcommittee, and I certainly look forward to working with Senator 

Cantwell as we have hearings on the topics that you’ve raised. 

And I look forward to working with you, Senator Cantwell. 

In this role, I certainly look forward, also, to working with Ranking Member Thune in making sure that we develop—and as well 

as the Chairman of the Committee—to develop sound policy prescriptions for many of the important issues that come before this 

subcommittee. 

As everyone in the room understands, there are a number of significant safety issues facing both the industry and the traveling 

public, including, number one, which has already been mentioned, 

the impacts of sequestration. I will also be particularly interested 

to hear from Administrator Huerta on the FAA’s response to the 

10 

sequester, including its decision to close the airports, that has already been discussed—excuse me—the air traffic control towers, 

like the one in at Warfield, in my hometown of Nashua, New 

Hampshire. I am also a cosponsor of legislation that would keep 

those towers open, the Protect Our Skies Act, but I have to wonder 

if whether—why we had to bring legislation to do this. And I would 

very much like to hear what the reasoning was for closing these 

control towers versus other areas of the budget, and finding savings to address sequestration, particularly the safety impact. I’ve 

already heard from those that are on the ground in Nashua, New 

Hampshire, of the potential impact of—if we were to close that control tower in my hometown. 

The other issues that I think are very important for us to talk 

about today are the simultaneous investigations by the FAA and 

the NTSB into the Boeing 787 program. And I know we’re all interested in learning about the status of these investigations by the 

NTSB and the FAA, and want to make sure that we understand 

what the path forward is to make sure that these—the Boeing 787 

program can go forward safely. So, I appreciate hearing about that 

today. 

As well as the FAA’s implementation of several safety rules, including rules relating to pilot duty and rest and pilot training, 

while I was not a member of this body during the consideration of 

the Safety Act of 2010, I’ve certainly heard a fair amount of input 

from interested parties about the implementation of this Act. So, 

I look forward to hearing from the FAA about the implementation 

and status of its pending rulemakings. 

After I was sworn in, just over 2 years ago, the first major piece 

of legislation on the Senate floor was the FAA reauthorization bill. 

Looking back, that was an important exercise in this body, in the 

sense that we thoroughly debated a major piece of legislation, considered amendments on both sides, and ultimately passed a reauthorization bill that was important to the safety of the American 

public. I hope, over the course of this Congress, with my colleagues, 

that we will find common ground to advance an aviation agenda 

that continues to keep our airports and carriers healthy and our 

airspace and the traveling public safe. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses. 

And I want to thank all of you for being here and for what you 

do for our country. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

The four witnesses we have are the Honorable Michael Huerta, 

who’s Administrator of something called the Federal Aviation Administration. It’s a wonderful job. No stress whatsoever. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The Honorable Deborah Hersman, who is Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board; Dr. Gerald 

Dillingham, Director of Civil Aviation Issues, the U.S. Government 

Accountability Office; and Mr. Jeffrey Guzzetti, Assistant Inspector 

General, Office of the Inspector General, United States Department 

of Transportation. I hope that was accurate. 

Mr. Administrator, we’re going to start with you. 

11 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL P. HUERTA, ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. HUERTA. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome. Welcome, welcome, welcome. 

Mr. HUERTA. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller, 

Ranking Member Thune, members of the Committee. Thank you 

for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the FAA’s progress 

on key safety initiatives. 

As you are aware, this is my first appearance before you as Administrator of the FAA. I appreciate the work of this Committee, 

and of the full Senate, in moving my confirmation forward. We 

have a great number of challenges and opportunities ahead, and I 

look forward to enhancing our productive working relationship. 

The FAA’s number one priority is safety. It’s our mission, and we 

focus on it 24 hours a day. 

First, let me briefly address the Boeing 787. The company has 

redesigned the internal battery components and conducted extensive testing. This includes limited test flights, without passengers, 

using the redesigned battery prototype. The FAA is currently reviewing these test reports and analysis to make sure that the 787’s 

new battery system ensures the safety of the aircraft and its passengers. 

Turning next to broader safety considerations, while aviation 

safety encompasses many technical issues, we cannot overlook the 

role of human beings in aviation, and how they interact with sophisticated technology. In the last few years, Congress has given us 

much guidance on how to advance aviation safety, and we have accomplished a great deal. The FAA overhauled flight and duty rules 

to guarantee that airline pilots have the opportunity to get the rest 

they need to operate safely, and we’re increasing the required 

hours of experience a pilot must have before operating the controls 

of any airline flight. We’re also finalizing a rule that requires more 

realistic training so that flight crews can better handle rare but serious scenarios. 

The best way to enhance safety across the board is to improve 

the safety culture of an organization. Part of this effort involves 

self-reporting, by our own employees, on safety issues. We’ve put 

programs in place for air traffic controllers and aviation technicians 

to report a problem or even a mistake they may have made, and 

not fear retribution. This makes the system even safer. 

We’re taking many other actions to enhance safety across the 

board, including promoting safety management systems and sharing more data between industry and the FAA. By analyzing this 

data, we’re able to identify trends and hazards across the airspace 

system and mitigate issues before something happens. 

As you know, we’re in a very uncertain and unpredictable fiscal 

environment. The sequester is requiring the FAA to make significant cuts in services and in investments. These cuts will impact air 

traffic control, NextGen implementation, and our certification services. We’re exercising all options to reduce costs: a hiring freeze, 

cutting contracts, cutting travel, and other items not related to 

day-to-day operations. 

One of our largest contracts is the Federal Contract Tower Program. We’ve notified 149 airports across the country that Federal 

12 

funding for their air traffic control towers will end in mid-June. 

These airports have lower activity levels; and, together, these contract towers handle less than 3 percent of the commercial operations nationally, and less than 1 percent of the passengers. Communities still have the option to keep their tower open if they’re 

able to providing the funding, and the FAA stands ready to help 

them with that transition. 

I want to emphasize that, as we undergo the difficult process of 

implementing the deep cuts required by the sequester, we refuse 

to sacrifice safety, even if this means less efficient operations. In 

addition to contract towers, large facilities will also be affected. To 

reach the figure we need to cut from our payroll, which is our largest operating cost, we have to furlough 47,000 of our employees for 

up to 11 days between now and September. The furloughs will reduce controller work hours at all airports with FAA towers, but 

also at radar facilities across the country. Again, safety is our number one concern. We will only allow the amount of air traffic that 

we can handle safely to takeoff and land. This means that travelers 

will need to expect delays. Today, we are meeting with air carriers 

to go over specific operational impacts related to the furloughs, facility by facility. 

Furthermore, our aviation safety inspectors will have to focus 

their attention on the most pressing priorities, and will devote 

their time to overseeing current activities to ensure continued operational safety of the existing fleet. These activities will take precedence over new projects. 

Our overarching principle in making these difficult decisions is 

to maintain safety and to offer the best air traffic services to the 

largest number of people, both now and in the future. It’s my hope, 

and the hope of everyone at the Department of Transportation, 

that our leaders can work together to rally around our Nation’s air 

transportation system and protect the great contribution that civil 

aviation makes to our economy. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I will 

be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Huerta follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL P. HUERTA, ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Thune, members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. This is the first time I am 

testifying before you as the confirmed Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). I appreciate your support for my candidacy. It is a privilege to hold 

this position and I welcome the challenges that will come with it. I hope to enjoy 

a long and effective relationship with you and this Committee. 

There are a number of important ongoing aviation safety-related initiatives that 

I know are of interest to this Committee. We are working hard to meet the future 

demands of aviation. From transitioning to the Next Generation of Air Transportation System (NextGen) to integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the 

national airspace system (NAS), the goals we are striving to meet are challenging, 

especially in light of the existing fiscal constraints. But our workforce is dedicated 

and very aware that achieving these goals are vital to FAA’s ability to continue 

leading the world in aviation safety and innovation. 

Just over a year ago, Congress passed and the President signed the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Reauthorization). As 

the returning members of this Committee may recall, passage of the bill followed 

a long odyssey that involved 23 extensions before a comprehensive bill was passed. 

13 

During that period, I spoke with Members individually about the impact the shortterm extensions were having on our programs. The Airport Improvement Program 

(AIP) was adversely impacted without the stability of a long-term authorization. Airports across the country delayed the start of important capital projects due to the 

concern that funding was being authorized in very small amounts because of the 

short length of the extensions. As a consequence, during extension periods, airports 

were uncertain about committing to projects of all sizes, ranging from safety improvements to crucial infrastructure preservation to environmental impact mitigation, including sound insulation projects. Another impact to airport projects, as a result of multiple extensions was the inability of engineers, construction contractors, 

and material and equipment suppliers to place orders and conduct work. Reduced 

amounts of funding were made available in accordance with the short-term extensions, so committing to long-term investments was problematic. We very much appreciated the passage of a comprehensive authorization that promised important 

stability and predictability. 

Sequestration 

Now, just over one year later, the benefits of reauthorization are in jeopardy due 

to the budget reductions imposed by sequestration. It is essential to the effective 

management of FAA’s programs to have stability and predictability that can be relied upon. Sequestration places us in the position of even greater uncertainty than 

the days of multiple extensions. Our agency has been working hard to plan for and 

implement the required cuts in a way that does not materially jeopardize our ability 

to ensure the highest levels of safety. Seventy percent of FAA’s Operations budget 

is dedicated to employee salaries and benefits, so they will bear a significant portion 

of the cuts. I can assure you that safety is the FAA’s top priority. If sequestration 

means fewer flights can be safely accommodated in the NAS, then there will be 

fewer flights. 

On April 10, I issued final furlough decision letters to over 47,000 employees. The 

furloughs generally will be on discontinuous days, approximately one day per biweekly pay period, for a maximum of 11 days between April 21 and September 30. 

We are also planning to eliminate midnight shifts in over 60 towers across the country starting this summer; cease Federal funding at 149 air traffic control towers at 

airports with fewer than 150,000 flight operations or 10,000 commercial operations 

per year starting June 15, and reduce preventative maintenance and equipment provisioning and support for all NAS equipment. All of these changes will be finalized 

as to scope and details through collaborative discussions with our users and our 

unions. 

As a result of employee furloughs and prolonged equipment outages resulting 

from lower parts inventories and fewer technicians, travelers should expect significant delays. We are aware that these service reductions will adversely affect commercial, corporate, and general aviation operators and the travelling public. 

Beyond the impacts to air traffic, aviation safety employees will also experience 

furloughs that will impact airlines, aviation manufacturers, and individual pilots 

who need FAA safety approvals and certifications. While the agency will continue 

to address identified safety risks, slowed aircraft certification and operations approval processes due to furloughs could negatively affect all segments of the aviation 

industry. 

It is unfortunate that many of the positive benefits of the long-term reauthorization are being undermined by sequestration. 

FY 2014 Budget 

The President released his FY 2014 Budget last week. The FAA’s FY 2014 Budget 

request of $15.6 billion strikes a balance between maintaining current infrastructure while deploying key NextGen benefits to our stakeholders, upholding our critical safety programs, and modernizing our aviation infrastructure. Our request is 

$351 million lower than FY 2012. This 2.2 percent decrease supports the President’s 

effort to reduce the deficit. Approximately half of our funding request is devoted to 

maintaining and improving the agency’s safety programs. This includes the ability 

to perform safety inspections and carry out rulemaking and certification activities 

to move NextGen and commercial space initiatives forward. 

The budget requests $9.7 billion to provide the operation, maintenance, and support of our air traffic control and air navigation systems, ensure the safe operation 

of the airlines and certify new aviation products, ensure the safety of the commercial space transportation industry, and provide overall policy oversight and management. This represents an increase of just 0.6 percent from the FY 2012 enacted 

level. This includes $1.2 billion to continue to promote aviation safety by regulating 

and overseeing the civil aviation industry and continued airworthiness of aircraft, 

14 

as well as certification of pilots, mechanics, and others in safety management positions. The $2.8 billion Facilities & Equipment (F&E) request enables FAA to meet 

the challenge of both maintaining the capacity and safety of the current national 

airspace while keeping a comprehensive asset modernization and transformation effort on track. The $166 million requested for Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D) supports the continuation of work in both NextGen and other research areas such as environmental research, safety research in areas such as fire 

research, propulsion and fuel systems, unmanned aircraft, advanced materials research, and weather research. And the $2.9 billion request for Grants-in-Aid for Airports focuses Federal grant funding on smaller commercial and general aviation airports that do not have access to additional revenue or other outside sources of capital. This is coupled with a proposed increase to Passenger Facility Charges, from 

the current maximum of $4.50 to $8.00, thereby giving commercial service airports 

greater flexibility to generate their own revenue. Finally, in the Operations, F&E 

and RE&D requested amounts, we have included $1.002 billion for the NextGen 

portfolio, an increase of $67.2 million, or approximately 7 percent, above the FY 

2012 enacted level. This level of program funding enables the FAA to continue to 

support near-term NextGen commitments in a budget-constrained environment. 

Boeing 787 

Turning to another matter that has received a great deal of attention, I would 

like to update you on the status of the review of Boeing 787’s lithium batteries. On 

March 12, FAA approved Boeing’s certification plan for the 787 battery system redesign. This was done after a thorough review of the proposed modifications, as well 

as the company’s plan to demonstrate that the modified system will meet FAA requirements. Approval of the certification plan was the first step in the process to 

evaluate the 787’s readiness for return to flight. It required Boeing to conduct extensive testing and analysis to demonstrate compliance with the applicable safety regulations. 

The battery system improvements include a redesign of the internal battery components to minimize risk of a short circuit within the battery, better insulation of 

the cells, and the addition of a new containment and venting system. These added 

protections are expected to help prevent and contain smoke and fumes in the event 

that a battery does malfunction. 

Boeing flew limited non-passenger test flights of two aircraft that had the prototype versions of the new battery containment system installed. The purpose of the 

test flights included validation of the aircraft instrumentation for the battery and 

testing of the battery enclosure, in addition to product improvements for other systems. Boeing completed all required tests and analysis to demonstrate that the new 

design complies with FAA requirements. The FAA is reviewing the test reports and 

analysis and will approve the redesign once we are satisfied Boeing has shown the 

redesigned battery system meets FAA requirements. 

Aviation, from its very beginning, has stretched technological boundaries. Technological change in aviation comes in waves. For more than five decades, the FAA has 

compiled a proven track record of safely introducing new technology and new aircraft. As we continue to do this, I want to make one thing crystal clear. The FAA 

takes very seriously its responsibility to establish aircraft safety standards and certify new products and technologies. 

As you know, we are moving forward with a review of the critical systems of the 

Boeing 787. When we have a concern, we will analyze it until we are satisfied. I 

am confident that the FAA has the expertise needed to oversee the Dreamliner’s 

cutting edge technology. We have the ability to establish rigorous safety standards 

and to make sure that aircraft meet them. The best way to do this is to bring together the best minds and technical experts in aviation to work on understanding 

how these new systems work and how to establish and meet appropriate safety 

standards. 

We enhance safety by keeping the lines of communication open between industry 

and government—by fostering the ability and willingness to share information about 

any challenges we might be facing. We want to create an atmosphere where people 

feel they can share what they know, all in the pursuit of safety. 

We all want the same outcome. We want to harness advances in technology to 

produce safe aircraft. We will never lose sight of our respective roles, but that does 

not mean that there is not a seat at the table for bright minds from industry to 

help inform the best way to navigate the complex technological issues we encounter. 

It would be short-sighted to overlook anyone’s valuable expertise. 

15 

Reauthorization 

As noted above, we were very happy when a comprehensive FAA reauthorization 

was passed last year. Reauthorization required over 200 separate deliverables, nearly half of which were due within the first year of enactment. FAA is on track to 

meet or has met approximately 80 percent of those action items. We have fully completed about half of the deliverables in the law. Now, as I’m sure you can appreciate, all action items are not created equal. Some are very complex and require a 

good deal of input from our workforce and industry partners. I believe that meaningful collaboration is the only way to achieve a workable path forward. Doing what 

we need to do to get the most effective work product is our goal, even if it means 

that certain deadlines are not met. 

Safety 

Safety is FAA’s number one mission. Nothing is more important. Our system has 

never been safer. There has not been a fatal commercial passenger accident in the 

United States since 2009. I am proud of the hard work that has gone into providing 

a basis for achieving this level of safety. We need to make aviation safer and smarter through risk based approaches. The only way to prevent accidents before they 

happen is to accurately identify risk areas and work to mitigate them. That is the 

reason we are working hard to improve runway safety areas (RSAs) at commercial 

service airports. Some of the RSA improvements include the installation of the Engineered Materials Arrest System (EMAS). This soft concrete block system has been 

installed in RSAs at 45 airports in the U.S. These EMAS systems have already 

stopped eight overrunning aircraft with no fatalities or serious injuries to passengers. Voluntary reporting for both FAA and industry employees, safety management systems (for both FAA and industry) and the creation of the Aviation Safety 

Whistleblower Investigation Office have also helped to prevent accidents. All of 

these efforts have been providing the agency with data and information to which 

we have never before had access. More information results in FAA being able to see 

trends and take action to mitigate the associated risks. Adjusting the safety culture 

to ensure employees that they can provide information without fear of reprisal is 

a cornerstone of our approach to safety. 

Prior to Reauthorization, we had been working on the requirements of the Airline 

Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010. That act mandated rulemakings to revamp flight and duty time regulations to better address the 

issue of pilot fatigue, to increase the required number of hours of flight experience 

before a pilot can qualify to be a commercial pilot, and to revise pilot training to 

better simulate challenging conditions so that pilots can better handle serious, but 

rare situations. We completed the flight and duty time rulemaking just over a year 

ago, and plan to complete our work on the final pilot qualification rulemaking (the 

‘‘New Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements Final Rule’’) by August 

2013 and pilot training (the ‘‘Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and 

Aircraft Dispatchers Final Rule’’) by October 2013. Reauthorization has since added 

a number of rulemaking requirements that we are also pursuing. 

With respect to other safety directives in Reauthorization, FAA commissioned an 

Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to develop recommendations to improve our 

aircraft certification process: we delivered our Report to Congress on that effort in 

August of last year and have begun implementation of the report’s recommendations. We also established an ARC consisting of government and industry experts 

to develop recommendations on improving the consistency of regulatory interpretations. We are in the process of finalizing a report informing Congress of the recommendations presented to the FAA. 

Reauthorization also required a number of safety-related reports. We have delivered the report required on runway safety alert systems and the first annual report 

of the Aviation Safety Whistleblower Investigation Office summarizing the disclosures the office has received and how they were handled. In the upcoming weeks, 

we expect to issue reports on the National Service Air Carrier Evaluation Program, 

night vision goggles for helicopter pilots, improved pilot licenses, and limiting access 

to the cockpits in all cargo aircraft. We are also finalizing a report to Congress on 

common sources of distraction on the flight deck. 

Pursuant to Congressional direction, we have also worked with the Occupational 

Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) to draft a statement of policy which permits some OSHA standards to be applied to improve workplace safety for aircraft 

cabin crew. We published a draft policy statement in the Federal Register in December of 2012 for comment, and are in the process of reviewing those comments. 

Also in accordance with reauthorization, in October of last year, the FAA, in conjunction with the Department of State, issued a cable regarding international drug 

16 

and alcohol standards for foreign repair stations. An advanced notice of proposed 

rulemaking (ANPRM) is currently in executive review. 

Delivering Technology 

Our goal in the area of delivering technology is to efficiently and sustainably deliver benefits to our stakeholders and society. One of the responsibilities of the Deputy Administrator is to serve as our Chief NextGen Officer, so that is one of many 

reasons I hope to appoint a Deputy relatively quickly. 

Throughout Title II of the Reauthorization, there is a theme that modernization 

of the system must be done in collaboration with our industry partners. FAA wholeheartedly agrees with this concept. Imposing technological changes without the 

input of the users would be a recipe for failure. We continue to engage through our 

work with Optimization of Airspace and Procedures (OAPM) initiatives, which are 

being done in close collaboration with industry and stakeholders. OAPM is actively 

working in nine of the 13 metroplexes identified in Phase 1 of the program. Of 

these, one of the metroplexes (Houston) is currently in the implementation phase 

with two additional sites (Washington, D.C., and North Texas) planned to start implementation of the new procedures later this summer, depending on how sequestration impacts this plan. The metroplex initiative optimizes procedures in a geographic area where there are a number of airports, rather than focusing on each 

airport separately. Through this initiative, we are untangling our busiest airspace 

and creating more direct routes, cutting fuel, and becoming more environmentally 

friendly. In the congested airspace in the skies above our busiest metropolitan 

areas, these new modifications are being put in place in three years, much more 

quickly than the five to ten years it had taken previously. We are also actively engaged with our industry and government partners in the development of NextGen 

through the NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC). This group is helping to guide 

many aspects of our air traffic modernization work. The NAC also works with FAA 

on developing and tracking performance metrics and advising on the technical challenges of one of the new categorical exclusion provisions included in Reauthorization. 

Reauthorization also provides FAA with the ability to consider using operational 

and financial incentives for commercial and general aviation operators to equip their 

aircraft with NextGen technology. We are actively engaging aircraft operators and 

potential private partners to assess interest and receive feedback on equipage incentive programs and how use of this authority could attract additional investment in 

NextGen technologies and training. 

FAA has completed a departure queue management pilot program that was required in the statute in order to continue to advance plans to enhance surface management at airports. Also, in accordance with Reauthorization, we have issued guidance for AIP funding eligibility that supports the importance of sustainability initiatives in the way that airports do business, and we expect to issue further guidance 

in 2013. We have also initiated a new study on the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems, which is a long-established process for identifying strategic investments. The new study will ensure we are making the best use of available data in 

supporting our decisions to advance safety, capacity, efficiency, and sustainability 

initiatives. 

Finally, in February, pursuant to Reauthorization, the FAA requested proposals 

for interested state and local governments, eligible universities, and other public entities to develop six Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) test sites around the country, which will gather information to help inform research, development, operational 

and privacy issues. We expect to select the six sites by the end of the year. These 

sites will conduct critical research that will help determine how best to integrate 

UAS into the NAS. Once the sites are operational, we expect to learn how UAS operate in different environments and how they impact air traffic operations. I know 

this Committee is very interested in UAS integration. Use of the six sites will provide us with essential information to facilitate integration of UAS into the NAS and 

to address outstanding issues, such as privacy. Prior to finalizing the FAA’s UAS 

five-year ‘‘Roadmap’’, the FAA is coordinating the roadmap with other UAS stakeholder agencies and ensuring alignment of that roadmap with the Joint Planning 

and Development Office’s Interagency Comprehensive UAS Plan. 

Empower and Innovate FAA’s Workforce 

In the current fiscal climate, we have to find a way for FAA’s employees to work 

smarter and enhance our productivity. You tasked us to undertake a thorough review of each program, office, and organization within the agency. Our report on FAA 

Review and Reform highlights 36 initiatives to improve and update processes, eliminate duplication and waste, and make the agency more efficient and effective. The 

17 

initiatives identified cover many aspects of our operations and include improvements to cost analysis, governance, acquisition processes, standard operating procedures, and human resources. Of the 36 initiatives, 16 have been implemented and 

20 are in progress. In addition, we are actively engaging our employees in the development of recommendations for facilities consolidation and realignment. 

At your direction, we are looking closely at improvements to staffing and training 

for our employees. Four studies are underway looking at frontline manager staffing, 

technical training and staffing, air traffic controller staffing and air traffic training 

and scheduling. Due to the requirement to produce the plan by March 31, 2013, the 

interim workforce plans we submitted last month do not reflect the potential effects 

of sequestration. The FAA will adjust the actual staffing and hiring forecasts to reflect future funding levels as they become available. Finally, in accordance with Reauthorization, we developed staffing standards and scheduling plans for New York 

City and Newark air traffic control facilities. We are in the process of considering 

impacts of sequestration to staffing concerns. 

Develop and Fund the Efficient FAA of the Future 

FAA must not only meet our day to day responsibilities, we must also look to the 

future and figure out how to shape the agency to meet the demands and opportunities of the future. As noted earlier, the U.S. aviation system is going through significant, even revolutionary changes. NextGen is a major transformation which will increase our efficiency and safety, reduce delays and reduce fuel consumption. UAS 

have the potential to change the face of aviation. In the midst of these changes, 

budget pressures are making us ask hard questions about what the FAA needs to 

deliver in the coming years to ensure the safety and efficiency of the NAS and how 

to do it most cost-effectively. 

In addition, we will face major changes in our workforce in the coming years. 

About one third of FAA employees will be eligible to retire starting in 2014. So for 

us, succession planning remains a crucial aspect of the agency’s focus, and we realize that we will begin to lose a vast amount of corporate knowledge in the coming 

years. To prepare for that, we must impart this knowledge to today’s emerging leaders and experts to ensure a successful agency in the 21st century. We need to embrace innovation and to work efficiently. 

Efficiencies are not just for the future. Given the economic challenges we are facing, FAA has worked very hard to find cost savings and we have been quite successful. In Fiscal Year 2012, FAA efficiencies and cost cutting resulted in $81 million 

in savings. Prior to sequestration, we have set a target of $91 million in cost savings for Fiscal Year 2013. We recognize that the status quo is not an option and we will continue to strive to achieve additional efficiencies moving forward. 

Finally, we must chart innovative and collaborative ways to engage with all segments of the aviation sector, from airlines to association groups, to general aviation, 

to unions. We must embrace the opportunity to make long-lasting changes together 

that ensure a vital and vibrant aviation industry that serves the needs of this Nation. 

Advance Global Collaboration 

The world is increasingly interdependent, so international collaboration is essential if we want to move forward effectively. FAA needs to continue to work with 

international partners to improve global aviation safety and sustainability. This effort will require us to improve the harmonization and interoperability of new technology with international aviation standards and procedures to improve safety on 

a global basis. We need to work to ensure the roadmaps agreed to by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to advance communications, navigation, 

and surveillance improvements for global air navigation are compatible with our 

NextGen concepts and implementation and our domestic regulatory plan. We are 

working at ICAO to find practical and collaborative solutions to address aviation’s 

greenhouse gas emissions and are encouraged by the European Union decision to 

‘‘stop the clock’’ on application of their emissions trading system on foreign airlines. 

Our international partnership will require us to develop and begin to implement a 

strategic plan for technical assistance, training, and other activities to maximize the 

value of FAA’s expertise and United States resources. The FAA is committed to 

working proactively with countries around the world to create the initiatives and 

achieve the outcomes we need in the areas of safety, air traffic management, and 

the environment to foster a safe, efficient and sustainable global aviation sector. 

Conclusion 

Let me conclude by saying that it is essential to the effective management of 

FAA’s programs to have stability and predictability that can be relied upon. The 

18 

many extensions over the last few years took a toll on FAA’s work in certain areas. 

Now we face an even more extreme uncertainty under sequestration. All of us in 

this room want the same things. We want to get better at what we do, think smarter, improve safety, streamline processes, and remain the agency that can work collaboratively with the world to develop safer and more efficient practices. Sequestration will not stop us from trying to attain these goals, but it will make it much, 

much harder. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to take questions at 

this time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Administrator. 

And now, the Chair of NTSB, Deborah Hersman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, CHAIRMAN, 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Ms. HERSMAN. Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking 

Member Thune, and members of the Committee. 

I appear before you today during one of the safest periods in the 

history of U.S. commercial aviation. Since the 2009 Colgan air 

crash near Buffalo that killed 50 people, some 3 billion passengers 

have traveled safely on U.S. airlines. 

Despite the lack of accidents in U.S. commercial aviation, we 

cannot be complacent. Today, the NTSB continues to investigate 

the January 7 Japan Airlines 787 battery fire at Boston’s Logan 

International Airport. In the more than 3 months since that incident, the NTSB has dedicated significant resources to the investigation. Here is what we know: 

There were multiple internal short circuits in cell 6 of the battery that initiated a thermal runaway, which progressed to neighboring cells. 

On March 7, the NTSB published an interim factual report and 

released hundreds of pages of investigative material. 

Last week, we held a forum to explore the use of lithium ion battery technology across all modes of transportation. We learned that 

these batteries are everywhere, and that they can be very safe. 

But, risks must be managed and mitigated. 

Next week, we will be holding an investigative hearing to focus 

on the design and certification of the 787 battery system. We will 

continue to provide factual updates on the progress of our work. 

My full testimony provides more detail on needed safety improvements regarding pilot training, distraction, and airport surface operations, but let me highlight for you this afternoon two areas of 

civil aviation that have not realized the safety gains of the air carriers, and discuss the use of data, an invaluable safety tool. 

The first area: Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, or 

HEMS. Currently, we are investigating 11 HEMS accidents. Six of 

those have occurred since December. HEMS operations are highpressure. Lives are on the line, and decisions about whether to 

launch, or not, must be made quickly. Conducting a thorough risk 

assessment, improving training, weather monitoring, and adding 

additional safety equipment can help ensure the safety of these 

flights. 

A second area of concern is general aviation, which accounts for 

nearly 1,500 accidents per year, and results in nearly 500 fatalities 

annually. What is especially tragic is that we see the same types 

of accidents over and over again, and so many of them are entirely 

19 

preventable. Improving the safety of GA is on the NTSB’s mostwanted list of transportation safety improvements. As part of our 

education and outreach to decrease these accidents, the Board met 

last month to examine chronic problems that we see in general 

aviation. We’ve developed five safety alerts to pinpoint hazards and 

provide practical remedies. These safety alerts have been provided 

to you with my testimony. 

Finally, at the NTSB, we continue to use and encourage the development of new sources of data and information to support our 

safety analysis. We have seen a very positive trend in collaborative 

efforts between regulators and the aviation community to generate 

and share data and information which can improve safety. 

But, let me be clear, the absence of accidents does not mean that 

our work is done. Safely defying gravity thousands of time each 

day requires constant vigilance. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Good afternoon Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune and Members of 

the Committee. I appear before you today during the safest period of U.S. commercial aviation history. Although significant technological advances, new and important statutory mandates and regulatory changes, and more comprehensive crew 

training have greatly contributed to aviation safety, it was not that long ago—36 

years ago last month—that the world’s most deadly aviation accident occurred in 

Tenerife, Canary Islands, when two jumbo jets collided on the airport runway, killing a total of 583 passengers and crewmembers. Since that disaster, the aviation 

industry has made steady progress in improving safety and advancing technology 

quickly. There have been significant technological advances, new and important 

statutory mandates and regulatory changes, and more comprehensive crew training—all greatly contributing to the current level of aviation safety. 

Yet, also at this time the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating a battery incident that led to the grounding of the 787 fleet by the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA). (The FAA has not grounded a fleet since 1979.) Concurrent investigations of two separate, but similar incidents involving 787 batteries 

are occurring in the United States and Japan—the coordination and sharing of information with our international investigative partners is going well. 

Today, I will discuss current aviation safety issues being addressed by the NTSB, 

including our continuing investigation of the Boeing 787 battery smoke and fire 

event in Boston, airport surface operations, general aviation safety, helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS) operations, pilot training and distraction, flight and 

duty time, and the recent Memorandum of Understanding between the NTSB, FAA, 

and various aviation industry organizations to share deidentified aggregate safety 

information to help prevent accidents. 

The NTSB’s Most Wanted List and Aviation Safety 

The annual Most Wanted List identifies the NTSB’s top advocacy priorities for improving transportation safety. The current list identifies the following five aviation 

safety-related issues: 

• Improve Safety of Airport Surface Operations, discussed further below 

• Improve General Aviation Safety, also discussed below 

• Improve Fire Safety in Transportation 

• Preserving the Integrity of Transportation Infrastructure 

• Eliminate Distraction in Transportation, also discussed below 

For the aviation safety issues identified in its Most Wanted List, the NTSB continues to work with the FAA, manufacturers, operators, labor organizations, airports, and aviation safety organizations to reduce the safety risks to the traveling 

public, crewmembers, and others. Also, although NTSB data show that it has classified 113 of its Recommendations to the FAA regarding safety issues identified in 

various NTSB Most Wanted Lists as ‘‘Open-Unacceptable Response,’’ the FAA has 

20 

made steady progress in reducing the number of its overall open safety recommendations. During calendar year 2012, the FAA reduced by 7.7 percent its total 

number of NTSB open safety recommendations, and during the first three months 

of 2013 the FAA has further reduced the number of open safety recommendations 

by 4.5 percent compared to end of 2012. I am also heartened that Administrator 

Huerta has made the FAA’s reduction in the number of open NTSB safety recommendations a major priority for the agency. 

Boeing 787 Battery Fire and Smoke Incident at Boston’s Logan 

International Airport 

On January 7, 2013, a Japan Airlines (JAL) Boeing 787 was parked at the gate 

at Boston’s Logan International Airport after completing a flight from Narita, 

Japan, when a member of the cleaning crew discovered smoke in the rear of the 

cabin. At about the same time, a maintenance manager in the cockpit observed the 

automatic shut down of the auxiliary power unit (APU), which was providing power 

to the aircraft at the time. A mechanic opened the rear electronic equipment bay, 

which is only accessible from outside the aircraft, and reported finding heavy smoke 

in the compartment and flames coming from the front of the APU battery case 

which housed a lithium ion battery. Airport firefighters were called to the plane and 

worked to contain the heat generated by the battery for 1 hour and 40 minutes. 

Figure 1. Smoke emanating from the aft electronic equipment bay. Source: Boston Herald. 

As indicated above, fire safety was placed on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of 

transportation safety improvements in November 2012. For that reason, among others, the NTSB responded to the JAL event by sending investigators to evaluate the 

aircraft in Boston. About a week later, a similar event occurred while an All Nippon 

Airways 787 was in flight over Japan. The NTSB is investigating the JAL event and 

the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) is investigating the ANA event, however 

both agencies are cooperating and sharing investigative information. 

The lithium ion battery is comprised of 8 cells, and the nominal charge of each 

cell is 3.7 volts. Flight data recorder data show that about 36 seconds before the 

APU shut down, the voltage began to fluctuate and dropped from a full charge of 

32 volts to 28 volts 7 seconds before the shutdown. 


416NTSB1.eps
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Figure 2. 787 Exemplar battery. 

In the JAL event, each of the 8 cells experienced some thermal damage, and investigators believe there were multiple short circuits in battery cell 6 that started 

a thermal runaway that progressed throughout the battery. The side of the battery 

where cell 6 is located had the most extensive damage. All 8 cells have vent discs, 

which rupture when the internal pressure in a cell increases to a predetermined 

level. Seven of the eight discs ruptured, and the cell with the unopened vent disc 

lost electrolyte liquid. 


416NTSB2.eps
22 

Figure 3. Damaged APU battery highlighting cell 6, the source of the short circuit. 

In its notice of proposed Special Conditions for the Boeing 787 airplane issued in 

2007, the FAA indicated that large, high capacity, rechargeable lithium ion batteries 

were a novel or unusual design feature in transport category airplanes. The FAA 

noted that this type of battery has certain failure, operational, and maintenance 

characteristics that differ from those of the nickel-cadmium and lead-acid rechargeable batteries approved at that time for installation on large transport category airplanes. As such, the FAA approved the use of these batteries by issuing nine special 

conditions to provide a level of safety equivalent to existing airworthiness regulations. Boeing performed a series of tests to demonstrate that the battery complied 

with the conditions and would not pose a higher safety risk. It was determined that 

the probability of a smoke event was once in every 10 million flight hours. However, 

as of January 16, 2013, when the FAA issued its airworthiness directive grounding 

the 787 fleet, the fleet had accumulated less than 52,000 in-service flight hours and 

had two smoke events involving its lithium ion batteries. 

The NTSB continues to devote significant resources to its investigation of the Boston incident. We continue to serve as the accredited representative to the JTSB investigation of the January 15, 787 battery incident in Japan. Recently, NTSB has 

tested exemplar batteries and cells. Also, investigators travelled to the battery manufacturer to observe the manufacturing process and interview personnel, and staff 

has met with Thales Avionics Electrical System of France, the company with which 

Boeing contracted to design and manufacture the 787 electrical power conversion 

subsystem. 

Last week, the NTSB held a public forum on lithium ion batteries in transportation. We learned that lithium ion batteries are becoming more prevalent in the 

various transportation modes, national defense, and space exploration. Panelists 

stated that because of their high energy density and light weight, these batteries 

are natural choices for energy. These benefits, however, also are the source of safety 

risks. We also heard about manufacturing auditing, robust testing, and monitoring 

and protection mechanisms to prevent a catastrophic event. Next week, we will hold 

an investigative hearing on the design, certification, and manufacturing process for 

the 787 lithium ion battery system. We will continue to provide factual updates as 

our investigation of the Boeing 787 battery fire incident proceeds. 


416NTSB3.eps
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1http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2012/ARA1201.pdf 

Airport Surface Operations 

While we have seen a reduction in airborne accidents, surface operations remain 

problematic, and this is the reason that Airport Surface Operations is on the 

NTSB’s Most Wanted List. Safety of Airport Surface Operations includes runway incursions, runway excursions, runway confusion, and collisions with other aircraft 

and/or airport vehicles. 

Figure 4. Southwest Airlines Flight 1248, Runway excursion and collision during landing at 

Chicago, Midway International Airport, December 8, 2005. 

The NTSB has over 20 open safety recommendations to the FAA addressing airport surface safety, including 6 that we have classified as ‘‘Open-Unacceptable Response.’’ These recommendations are as recent as September 2012 as well as dating 

back to 2000 and address a myriad of subjects that include ground safety movement 

systems for flight crews, wing tip clearance safety systems, enhanced wind dissemination information to flight crews, and pre-landing distance assessments. 

General Aviation Safety 

As I stated earlier, the U.S. commercial aviation system is experiencing an unprecedented level of safety. General aviation (GA) fatality rates have shown little 

movement in spite of efforts to improve safety. There have been about 1,500 GA accidents per year for the past decade. Although GA represents about 51 percent of 

the estimated total flight time of all U.S. civil aviation, it accounted for 97 percent 

of fatal accidents in 2010.1 The NTSB determines the probable cause of all 1,500 

of these accidents, and one thing we have learned is that unfortunately, the same 

factors continue to cause most of the accidents. 


416NTSB4.eps
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Figure 5. Sioux Falls, SD general aviation accident, December 9, 2011. 

The leading causes of GA accidents are loss of control, engine failure, flying in 

conditions that are beyond the pilot or aircraft’s abilities, and collision with terrain. 

GA is essentially an airline or maintenance operation of one, which means the entire aviation community must work harder to reach each pilot or mechanic who populates this community to address these issues and ensure this deadly cycle is broken. GA Safety is on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List for the second year in a row 

in order to bring attention to the issue. 

Within the last year, the Board has issued a number of safety alerts as a way 

to reach the GA community to highlight many of these high risk issue areas. For 

example, to address the risks associated with flight into severe weather, the NTSB 

issued a safety alert to raise awareness in the GA community about the latency of 

NEXRAD weather images; that the age of the actual data used to generate the 

weather images on the display could differ significantly from the age indicated on 

the display screen. Just last week, we held a Board meeting to discuss GA safety 

and issued 5 new safety alerts, which are included with my testimony. The NTSB’s 

purpose in issuing these safety alerts is to increase awareness, education, and training for private pilots and aviation maintenance technicians. The alerts are brief information bulletins that pinpoint particular safety hazards and offer practical remedies to address these risks. They will also serve to focus the NTSB’s GA outreach 

efforts during the coming year. The specific alerts are: 

‘‘Reduced Visual References Require Vigilance’’ 

‘‘Prevent Aerodynamic Stalls at Low Altitude’’ 

‘‘Is Your Aircraft Talking to you? Listen!’’ 

‘‘Mechanics: Manage Risks to Ensure Safety’’ 

‘‘Pilots: Manage Risks to Ensure Safety’’ 

Additionally, over the past several years, the NTSB has conducted several GA 

safety studies. In 2012, we examined experimental aircraft, which represents about 

10 percent of the GA fleet but represent a higher proportion of GA accidents. The 

NTSB recommended expansion of documentation requirements for initial aircraft 

airworthiness certification, verification of the completion of Phase I flight testing, 

improvement of pilots’ access to transition training, encouragement of the use of recorded data during flight testing, ensuring that buyers of used experimental aircraft 

receive necessary operating and performance documentation, and improvement of 

aircraft identification in registry records. In a study of airbag restraints in GA aircraft, the NTSB concluded that aviation airbags can mitigate occupant injuries in 

some severe but survivable crashes. In 2010, the NTSB looked at ‘‘glass cockpits’’ 

in GA, which are the newer electronic displays in some planes. The results of this 


416NTSB5.eps
25 

study suggest that the introduction of glass cockpits has not yet resulted in a measurable improvement in safety when compared to similar aircraft with conventional 

instruments. There is a need to ensure pilots have system specific knowledge to 

safety operate aircraft with glass cockpit avionics and to capture maintenance and 

operational information to assess the reliability of glass cockpit avionics. 

We will continue our efforts to improve the safety record of general aviation and 

look forward to finding new and innovative ways to communicate this message to 

more pilots and mechanics. 

Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) 

Helicopter EMS operations provide an important service to the public by transporting seriously ill patients or donor organs to emergency care facilities. The pressure to safely and quickly conduct these operations in various environmental conditions (for example, inclement weather, at night, and unfamiliar landing sites for helicopter operations) has the potential to create more risk for HEMS than other passenger operations. 

The NTSB has issued more than 20 safety recommendations during the past 13 

years to the FAA to improve the safety of these operations and conducted a 4-day 

public hearing on HEMS safety in February 2009. In 2010, the FAA issued a notice 

of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to address many of the NTSB’s recommendations, 

such as the carriage of safety related equipment, flight data recorders, operational 

requirements, better weather monitoring and reporting, development and implementation of safety management systems and flight-risk evaluation programs, including 

training, and amendments to load manifest requirements for single-engine Part 135 

operations. 

Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 112– 

95) required the FAA to complete this rulemaking by June 1 of last year. Unfortunately, that rulemaking has stalled. 

Last week, on April 9, the NTSB held a Sunshine Act public meeting to discuss 

the crash of an EMS helicopter on August 26, 2011, near Mosby, Missouri that resulted in the deaths of the pilot, flight nurse, flight paramedic, and the patient. The 

NTSB determined that the probable causes of this accident were the pilot’s failure 

to confirm that the helicopter had adequate fuel onboard to complete the mission 

before departing on the mission’s first leg, his improper decision to continue the mission and make a second departure after he became aware of a critically low fuel 

level, and his failure to successfully enter an autorotation when the engine lost 

power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the accident were (1) the pilot’s distracted attention due to personal texting during safety-critical ground and flight operations, (2) his degraded performance due to fatigue, (3) the operator’s lack of a 

policy requiring that an operational control center specialist be notified of abnormal 

fuel situations, and (4) the lack of practice representative of an actual engine failure 

at cruise airspeed in the pilot’s autorotation training in the accident make and 

model helicopter. 

26 

Figure 6. HEMS accident in Mosby, MO, August 26, 2011. 

Currently, the NTSB is investigating 12 HEMS accidents, including 6 that have 

occurred since December. We see the same problems in our accident investigations 

and believe that if the following recommendations are incorporated in to HEMS operations, they will be safer. 

• Operate under Part 135 rules 

• Establish Operations Control Centers (OCC) 

• Perform recurrent training and testing of OCC personnel 

• Improve HEMS pilot training 

• Perform more stringent weather evaluations 

• Require flight risk evaluation programs 

• Install safety equipment on HEMS helicopters (terrain awareness and warning 

systems, night vision imaging equipment, autopilots, recorders, radio altimeters, 

406 MHz emergency locator transmitter, water safety equipment) 

• Receive regular instrument flight training 

• Establishment of Safety Management Systems for HEMS operators 

• Better airspace infrastructure for low altitude helicopter operations 

Pilot Training and Distraction 

The last U.S. commercial aviation accident occurred on February 12, 2009, while 

Colgan Air flight 3407 crashed on approach to the Buffalo Niagara International 

Airport in Buffalo, NY. As a result of that accident investigation, the NTSB made 

pilot training recommendations, some of which Congress included in the Airline 

Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111– 

216). The NTSB called for crew training requirements, establishment of mentoring 

and professionalism programs, and a pilots’ records database. In the Colgan Air 

flight 3407 accident investigation, we found that industry changes—including twopilot cockpits and the advent of regional carriers-had resulted in opportunities for 

pilots to upgrade to captain without having accumulated significant experience as 

a first officer in a Part 121 operation. Without these important opportunities for 

mentoring and observational learning, which characterize time spent in journeyman 

pilot positions, it was difficult for a pilot to acquire effective leadership skills to 

manage a multicrew airplane. 


416NTSB6.eps
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2 ASIAS began in 2007 and now has 44 airline members and receives voluntary data representing 95 percent of all commercial air carrier operations. It connects 131 data and information sources across the industry and is integrated into the Commercial Aviation Safety Team 

(CAST) process. CAST is a joint government and industry effort that uses a data-driven strategy 

to reduce the risk of commercial aviation fatalities. ASIAS uses aggregate, protected data from 

industry and government voluntary reporting programs, without identifying the source of the 

data, to proactively determine safety issues, identify safety enhancements, and measure the effectiveness of solutions. ASIAS is managed by an Executive Board and consists of representatives of various FAA offices, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, U.S. military 

safety organizations (the latest membership summary shows USAF Safety Center and Naval Air 

Force Atlantic as government participants), commercial airlines, manufacturers, and labor organizations. 

Also as a result of the NTSB’s investigation of both Northwest Flight 188 that 

overflew their destination of Minneapolis because they were distracted by their 

laptops and the Colgan Air Flight 3407, we issued a safety recommendation to the 

FAA to amend the Federal Aviation Regulations to require Part 121, 135, and 91 

subpart K operators to incorporate explicit guidance to pilots prohibiting the use of 

personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck. The Congress mandated that 

the FAA promulgate a rule which would prohibit the use of personal wireless communications devices and laptop computers by flight crewmembers during all phases 

of flight in Part 121 operations. The FAA is required by the statute to issue a final 

rule implementing the prohibition no later than February 2014. I would note that 

the FAA issued an NPRM for this requirement this past January. The NTSB recently submitted comments to the docket in support of the proposed rule but recommended that the final rule incorporate the broader scope of its February 2010 

safety recommendation by expanding the proposed rule to Part 135 and 91 subpart 

K operators. 

Flight and Duty Time 

For more than 20 years, the issue of reducing accidents caused by fatigue was on 

the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of safety improvements. We removed fatigue from our 

Most Wanted List in November 2012 to acknowledge the new flight and duty time 

rules enacted by the FAA. For the first time, the new rule recognizes the universal 

factors that lead to human fatigue such as time of day, length of duty day, workload, whether an individual is acclimated to a new time zone and the likelihood of 

being able to sleep under different circumstances. However, we remain concerned 

that the new rule does not apply to cargo pilots. Fatigue is fatigue, whether you 

transport passengers or pallets; it degrades every aspect of human capability. Another fatigue issue not addressed by the new rules is pilot commuting; a concern 

identified in the Colgan Air accident. 

We have seen the effects of fatigue in too many of our accident investigations. We 

will continue working toward one level of safety throughout the industry. 

Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) System 

Aviation has experienced great improvements in safety due in part to embracing 

and understanding data. As I have pointed out in speeches over the past several 

years, ‘‘data saves lives . . . and, in this era of dynamic growth and greater complexity, data is more important than ever.’’ Also, data collection, analysis, and dissemination are important international aviation safety issues. For example, the 

Safety Information Protection Task Force of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has been looking at the various sources of safety information, the diverse requirements of member states regarding public transparency and personal 

privacy, and the different civil and criminal justice systems. The willingness of the 

FAA and the aviation industry to share data with the NTSB will have a direct positive effect on aviation safety and is consistent with a provision in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 concerning public disclosure of aggregate, deidentified aviation safety information. 

As a result of almost two years of discussions, the NTSB and the FAA and industry ASIAS Executive Board Co-Chairs signed a Memorandum of Understanding last 

November that outlines the procedures, guidelines, and roles and responsibilities for 

the ASIAS Executive Board to address specific written NTSB requests for ASIAS 

information.2 The NTSB will initiate written requests for ASIAS information related 

to aircraft accidents involving U.S. air carriers that occur in the United States and 

address safety issues that both the NTSB and the ASIAS board determine are significant. The NTSB will not publicly disclose ASIAS information it receives via the 

process unless the ASIAS Executive Board agrees. In addition, the MOU requires 

the NTSB to share with ASIAS its archived air carrier accident and incident flight 

data recorder information related to a request. 

28 

Closing 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss aviation safety 

and I am prepared to answer your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Hersman. 

And now, Dr. Gerald Dillingham, Director of Civil Aviation 

Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

STATEMENT OF GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking 

Member Thune, and members of the Committee. 

First, I would also like to acknowledge that we are in the safest 

period of the modern aviation era. This outstanding achievement is 

attributable to the dedicated and skilled men and women at FAA 

working together with other key stakeholders, including manufacturers, operators, and the oversight of the Congress. 

To build on this historic record, FAA is moving toward a greater 

reliance on proactive risk-based safety approach, with less reliance 

on a reactive or after-the-accident analysis of events. This afternoon, my statement focuses on the progress and challenges that 

FAA faces as it makes this shift. 

The first is adapting its certification process to an ever-evolving 

aviation industry. And second is the collection and analysis of data 

that is critical for proactive risk management. 

With regard to FAA certification processes, from our work we’ve 

found that, overall, FAA does an excellent job of following its processes. However, FAA must continue to address longstanding concerns, as well as emerging issues, about its certification processes. 

For example, industry has long expressed concerns about the variation in FAA inspectors’ and designees’ interpretation of standards 

of certification and approval decisions. This situation could be exacerbated in the future by factors such as the fiscal constraints on 

the government spending and the agency’s ability to provide inservice training and attract the talent necessary to maintain up-todate knowledge of industry changes. 

For example, as aviation technology evolves, FAA will need new 

skills and tools to understand new aircraft or equipment during 

certification. The absence of these skills and tools could lead to 

delays in certification or misinterpretation of a regulation or a 

standard. 

In addition, while FAA has worked to manage the certification 

workload with the use of designees, there have been some concern 

expressed about whether there is adequate oversight of the designees, particularly for the new Organizational Designation Authorities, or ODAs. 

With regard to FAA’s data collection and analysis for risk-management purposes, our studies have identified a number of areas 

where FAA’s risk-based oversight could be improved. For example, 

our research has shown that adequate data about runway excursions are not being collected. Runway excursion can be just as dangerous as runway incursions. But, without these data, FAA cannot 

assess or mitigate the potential risk. 

29 

Similarly, the lack of complete data for incidents that occur in 

the ramp area, general aviation operations, and the inspection of 

initial pilot training activities limits FAA’s oversight and ability to 

target its scarce resources and to understand the impact of its efforts to mitigate risk in these areas. For example, the rate and 

number of operational errors appears to have increased considerably in recent years. However, because of multiple changes in reporting policies and processes during that same time period, it 

makes it very difficult to know the extent to which the apparent 

increase in operational errors are due to more accurate reporting, 

an increase in the occurrence of incidents, or both. 

In response to our recommendation, congressional mandates, 

in—on its own volition, FAA has efforts underway, or planned, to 

address each of the areas that I’ve identified, as well as others listed in our written statement. 

I want to emphasize that these efforts will require sustained attention and oversight to ensure that the agency’s ability to comprehensively and accurately assess and manage risk is not impaired. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would urge all stakeholders not to 

become complacent with the extraordinary safety record that has 

been achieved to date, and continue to do whatever may be necessary to make a safe system even safer. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dillingham follows:] 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Even with nearly 80,000 flights each day within the national airspace system, 

there has not been a fatal commercial aviation accident in more than 4 years. The 

U.S. airspace system is arguably one of the safest in the world, with key aviation 

stakeholders—the FAA, airlines, airports, aircraft manufacturers, and the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)—working together to ensure these results. 

As the Federal agency responsible for regulating the safety of civil aviation in the 

United States, FAA is responsible for, among other things: setting aircraft certification standards, collecting fleet and flight activity data, conducting safety oversight 

of pilot training and general aviation operations, and safely integrating aircraft into 

the national airspace. As the aviation industry evolves, FAA must remain diligent 

in its efforts to ensure the continued safety of aviation. In 2010, Congress passed 

the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, which, in 

part, called for FAA to better manage safety risks. 

This testimony focuses on (1) FAA’s aircraft certification process and (2) FAA’s 

use of data to enhance safety and improve aviation oversight. The testimony is 

based on GAO’s previous work and updated with industry reports and information 

provided by FAA officials. 

GAO has previously recommended that FAA address several data quality weaknesses. FAA concurred with most of these recommendations and has taken steps toward addressing some. 

Aviation Safety 

FAA EFFORTS HAVE IMPROVED SAFETY, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN IN KEY AREAS

What GAO Found 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for approving the design and airworthiness of new aircraft and equipment before they are introduced 

into service. FAA approves changes to aircraft and equipment based on evaluation 

of industry submissions against standards set forth in Federal aviation regulations 

and related guidance documents. In September 2011, we reported that, overall, FAA 

did a good job following its certification processes in assessing the composite fuselage and wings of Boeing’s 787 against its airworthiness standards. However, the 

approval process—referred to as certification—presents challenges for FAA in terms 

of resources and maintaining up-to-date knowledge of industry practices, two issues 

30 

1General aviation includes all forms of aviation except scheduled air carriers and military. 

2Pub. L. No. 111–216, 124 Stat. 2348 (2010). 

that may hinder FAA’s efforts to conduct certifications in an efficient and timely 

manner. FAA is currently assessing its certification process and identifying opportunities to streamline it. 

FAA plans to continue analyzing data reactively to understand the causes of accidents and incidents, and to augment this approach through implementation of a 

safety management system (SMS). SMS is a proactive approach that includes continually monitoring all aspects of aviation operations and collecting and analyzing 

appropriate data to identify emerging safety problems before they result in death, 

injury, or significant property damage. FAA has put in place various quality controls 

for its data; however, GAO has identified a number of areas where FAA does not 

have comprehensive risk-based data or methods of reporting that capture all incidents. The following are among the key areas GAO identified as needing improved 

data collection and analysis. 

• Runway and ramp safety. Additional information about surface incidents could 

help improve safety in the airport terminal area, as data collection is currently 

limited to certain types of incidents, notably runway incursions, which involve 

the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on a runway and certain 

airborne incidents, and does not include runway overruns, which occur when an 

aircraft veers off a runway or incidents in ramp areas, which can involve aircraft and airport vehicles. 

• Airborne operational errors. FAA’s metric for airborne losses of separation—a 

type of operational error—is too narrow to account for all potential risk. 

• General aviation. FAA estimates of annual flight hours for the general aviation 

sector, which includes all forms of aviation except commercial and military, may 

not be reliable. 

• Pilot training. FAA does not have a comprehensive system in place to measure 

its performance in meeting its annual pilot school inspection requirements. 

FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues and data challenges in 

many of these areas. For example, FAA is planning to develop a program to collect 

and analyze data on runway overruns, but it will be several years before FAA has 

obtained enough information about these incidents to assess risks. Sustained attention to these data collection and analysis issues will be necessary to ensure that 

FAA can more comprehensively and accurately assess and manage risk. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, PH.D. DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL

INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts to oversee aviation safety. Even with nearly 80,000 flights each 

day within the national airspace system (NAS), there has not been a fatal commercial aviation accident in more than 4 years, and although hundreds of fatalities continue to occur each year in general aviation,1 the number of overall general aviation 

accidents has trended downward. The U.S. airspace system is arguably one of the 

safest in the world, with key aviation stakeholders—FAA, the airlines and other aircraft operators, airports, aircraft manufacturers, and the National Transportation 

Safety Board (NTSB)—working together to achieve these results. Nevertheless, we 

must not become complacent because of the extraordinary safety record that has 

been achieved to date. Congress, FAA, and other stakeholders must remain diligent 

in their oversight of aviation safety. 

As the Federal agency responsible for regulating the safety of civil aviation in the 

United States, FAA is responsible for, among other things, setting aircraft certification standards and ensuring that manufacturers and suppliers meet those standards, collecting fleet and flight activity data, conducting safety oversight of pilot 

training and general aviation operations, and safely integrating aircraft and equipment into the national airspace. With air travel projected to increase over the next 

20 years and agencies governmentwide experiencing budget reductions as part of 

the 2013 sequestration, it will be critical for FAA to apply its limited resources in 

a manner that will allow it to maintain and enhance the safety of the NAS. In 2010, 

Congress passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension 

Act (Airline Safety Act),2 which, in part, called for FAA to better manage safety 

risks. While FAA and other stakeholders continue to address safety concerns in a 

31 

3FAA issues certificates for new air operators, new aircraft, and aircraft parts and equipment, 

and approvals, based on the evaluation of aviation industry submissions against standards set 

forth in Federal aviation regulations and related FAA guidance documents. 4See GAO, Aviation Safety: Certification and Approval Processes Are Generally Viewed as 

Working Well, but Better Evaluative Information Needed to Improve Efficiency, GAO–11–14 

(Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2010). 5See GAO, Aviation Safety: Status of Action to Oversee the Safety of Composite Airplanes, 

GAO–11–849 (Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2011). 6 ‘‘A Report from the Aircraft Certification Process Review and Reform Aviation Rulemaking 

Committee to the Federal Aviation Administration: Recommendations on the Assessment of the 

Certification and Approval Process,’’ May 22, 2012. 

reactive fashion by analyzing and investigating accidents and incidents, they have 

also begun to address safety issues in a more proactive fashion—before accidents or 

incidents occur. This proactive approach involves identifying, analyzing, and managing safety risks that are inherent throughout the system, and is being undertaken 

by FAA as part of its implementation of safety management systems (SMS). This 

risk-based oversight approach is becoming the standard throughout the global aviation industry and is recognized by aviation leaders, such as the International Civil 

Aviation Organization (ICAO), as the next step in the evolution of safety. In addition to SMS, FAA’s certification process attempts to ensure that safety is built into 

the aircraft and equipment used in the NAS.3 While the agency has taken steps to 

improve its oversight approach, challenges remain in key areas. 

My statement today highlights two areas that are important to FAA’s safety efforts: the certification process and the collection and analysis of risk-based data as 

part of SMS. This statement is drawn from a body of work that we have completed 

from June 2009 to October 2012 regarding FAA’s safety oversight efforts. We have 

updated this information through a review of FAA documents and interviews with 

FAA officials. A list of related GAO products is included at the end of this statement, along with footnoted references to these products throughout the statement. 

The reports and testimonies cited in this statement contain more detailed explanations of the methods used to conduct our work. This body of work was conducted 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Certification is a Key Component of FAA’s Aviation Safety Oversight 

Among its responsibilities for aviation safety, FAA issues certificates that approve 

the design and production of new aircraft and equipment before they are introduced 

into service; these certificates demonstrate that the aircraft and equipment meet 

FAA’s airworthiness requirements. FAA also grants approvals for such things as 

changes to air operations and equipment. Certificates indicate that the aircraft, 

equipment, and new air operators are safe for use or flight in the NAS. While industry stakeholders have expressed concerns about variation in FAA’s interpretation of 

standards for certification and approval decisions, stakeholders and experts that we 

interviewed for our 2010 report indicated that serious problems occur infrequently.4

In addition, in September 2011 we reported that FAA did a good job following its 

certification processes in assessing the composite fuselage and wings of Boeing’s 787 

against its airworthiness standards.5

The certification process also provides an example of how FAA is attempting to 

use a more proactive approach in finding solutions to a potential problem. In the 

case of flammability regulations that govern transport type aircraft, FAA has primarily developed its regulations on a reactive basis. That is, as accidents and incidents have occurred, their causes have been investigated, and the findings used to 

develop regulations designed to prevent the future occurrence of similar incidents 

or accidents. To supplement this oversight method, FAA has proposed a new, threatbased approach for flammability regulations that will base the flammability performance for different parts of the aircraft upon realistic threats that could occur 

in-flight or in a post-crash environment. 

FAA recognizes the value of certification as a safety tool, however the agency 

faces some significant challenges, including resources and maintaining up-to-date 

knowledge of industry changes. According to a report from the Aircraft Certification 

Process Review and Reform Aviation Rulemaking Committee,6 these certification 

challenges will become increasingly difficult to overcome, as industry activity is expected to continue growing and government spending for certification resources remains relatively flat. As one means of responding to its certification workload, FAA 

32 

7FAA delegates many certification activities to FAA-approved individuals and organizations 

(called designees) to better leverage its resources. FAA’s designees perform more than 90 percent of FAA’s certification activities. 8GAO–11–849. 

9FAA is undertaking the transition to SMS in coordination with the international aviation 

community, working with the ICAO, an agency of the United Nations that promotes the safe 

and orderly development of international civil aviation worldwide, to adopt applicable global 

standards for safety management. ICAO requires SMS for the management of safety risk in air 

operations, maintenance organization, air traffic services, and airports as well as certain flight 

training operations and for organizations that design or manufacture aircraft within its member 

states. 10See GAO, Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk Management, 

GAO–12–898 (Washington D.C.: September 21, 2012). 11On November 8, 2012, FAA signed a memorandum of agreement with NTSB that will allow 

for greater sharing of safety data between the two organizations. 12See GAO, Aviation Safety: Enhanced Oversight and Improved Availability of Risk-Based 

Data Could Further Improve Safety, GAO–12–24 (Washington, D.C.: Oct 5, 2011). 

relies on designees,7 however, our prior work has shown that there are concerns 

that designee oversight is lacking, particularly with the new organizational designation authorities in which companies rather than individuals are granted designee 

status. There are also concerns that, when faced with certification of new aircraft 

or equipment, FAA staff have not been able to keep pace with industry changes and, 

thus, may struggle to understand the aircraft or equipment they are tasked with 

certificating.8 SMS implementation within FAA should reduce certification delays 

and increase available resources to facilitate the introduction of advanced technologies. In response to a provision in the 2012 FAA Reauthorization, FAA is assessing the certification process and identifying opportunities to streamline the process. 

Better Quality and More Complete Data Could Help FAA Further Improve 

Safety Oversight 

As we stated above, FAA plans to continue using data reactively to understand 

the causes of accidents and incidents, and is implementing a proactive approach— 

called an SMS approach—in which it analyzes data to identify and mitigate risks 

before they result in accidents. FAA is also overseeing SMS implementation 

throughout the aviation industry.9 Safety management systems are intended to continually monitor all aspects of aviation operations and collect appropriate data to 

identify emerging safety problems before they result in death, injury, or significant 

property damage. Under SMS, which FAA began implementing in 2005, the agency 

will analyze the aviation safety data it collects to identify conditions that could lead 

to aviation accidents or incidents and to address such conditions through changes 

to FAA’s organization, processes, management, and culture. As we reported in September 2012, according to FAA, the overarching goal of SMS is to improve safety 

by helping ensure that the outcomes of any management or system activity incorporate informed, risk-based decision making. FAA’s business lines, such as the Air 

Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Organization, are currently at different 

stages of SMS implementation and it is likely that full SMS implementation will 

take many more years.10

SMS relies heavily on data analysis and, while FAA has put in place various data 

quality controls, it continues to experience data challenges including limitations 

with some of its analyses and limitations to or the absence of data in some areas.11

Data limitations and the lack of data may inhibit FAA’s ability to manage safety 

risks. For example, we found that some FAA data used in risk assessments may 

not be complete, meaningful, or available to decision makers. We have also reported 

that the agency currently does not have comprehensive risk-based data, sophisticated databases to perform queries and model data, methods of reporting that capture all incidents, or a level of coordination that facilitates the comparison of incidents across data systems. Furthermore, technologies aimed at improving reporting 

have not been fully implemented.12 As a result, aviation officials managing risk 

using SMS have limited access to robust FAA incident data. Implementing systems 

and processes that capture accurate and complete data are critical for FAA to determine the magnitude of safety issues, assess their potential impacts, identify their 

root causes, and effectively address and mitigate them. 

Our recent work on aviation safety and FAA oversight issues has identified a 

number of specific areas where FAA’s risk-based oversight could be improved 

through improved data collection and analysis, including: runway and ramp safety, 

airborne operational errors, general aviation, pilot training, unmanned aircraft systems, and commercial space. FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues 

in many of these areas, including making changes to or committing to make changes 

to its data collection practices in response to our recommendations in most of these 

33 

13GAO–12–24. 14GAO–12–24. 15The terminal area is the area around an airport extending from the airfield or surface to 

about 10,000 feet vertically and out to about 40 miles in any direction. 16See GAO, General Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Help Identify and Mitigate 

Safety Risks, GAO–13–36 (Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2012). 

areas. Nonetheless, sustained FAA attention will be necessary to ensure that the 

agency’s ability to comprehensively and accurately assess and manage risk is not 

impaired. 

• Runway and ramp safety. Takeoffs, landings, and movement around the surface 

areas of airports (the terminal area) are critical to the safe and efficient movement of air traffic. In a June 2011 incident at John F. Kennedy International 

Airport in New York, for example, a jumbo jet carrying 286 passengers and 

crew almost collided with another jumbo jet, which reportedly missed a turn 

and failed to stop where it should have to avoid the occupied runway. Safety 

in the terminal area could be improved by additional information about surface 

incidents, which is currently limited to certain types of incidents, notably runway incursions and certain airborne incidents, but does not include runway 

overruns or incidents in ramp areas. Without a process to track and assess 

these overruns or ramp area incidents, FAA cannot assess trends in those areas 

and the risks posed to aircraft or passengers in the terminal area. FAA is planning to develop a program to collect and analyze data on runway overruns, 

something we recommended in 2011, but it will be several years before FAA has 

obtained sufficient information about these incidents to be able to assess 

risks.13 FAA still collects no comprehensive data on ramp area incidents and 

NTSB does not routinely collect data on ramp accidents unless they result in 

serious injury or substantial aircraft damage. In 2011, we recommended that 

FAA extend its oversight to ramp safety and FAA concurred. 

• Airborne operational errors. Operational errors —also referred to as losses of 

separation—occur when two aircraft fly closer together than safety standards 

permit due to an air traffic controller error. We reported that FAA’s risk-based 

process for assessing airborne losses of separation is too narrow to account for 

all potential risk and changes in how errors are reported affect FAA’s ability 

to identify trends. For example, FAA’s current process for analyzing losses of 

separation assesses only those incidents that occur between two or more radartracked aircraft. By excluding incidents such as those that occur between aircraft and terrain or aircraft and protected airspace, FAA is not considering the 

systemic risks that may be associated with many other airborne incidents. FAA 

has stated that it is planning to include these incidents in its risk assessment 

process before the end of 2013, something we recommended in 2011.14 In addition, FAA’s changes to reporting policies affect its ability to accurately determine safety trends. For instance, we reported in October 2011 that the rate and 

number of reported airborne operational errors in the terminal area increased 

considerably since 2007.15 However, multiple changes to reporting policies and 

processes in 2009 and 2010 make it difficult to know the extent to which the 

recent increases in reported operational errors are due to more accurate data, 

an actual increase in the occurrence of incidents, or both. 

• General aviation. General aviation is characterized by a diverse fleet of aircraft 

flown for a variety of purposes. In 2010, FAA estimated that there were more 

than 220,000 aircraft in the active general aviation fleet, comprising more than 

90 percent of the U.S. civil aircraft fleet. The number of nonfatal and fatal general aviation accidents decreased from 1999 through 2011; however, more than 

200 fatal accidents occurred in each of those years. In October 2012, we reported that general aviation flight activity data limitations impede FAA’s ability 

to assess general aviation safety and thereby target risk mitigation efforts.16

For example, FAA estimates of annual general aviation flight hours may not be 

reliable because of methodological and conceptual limitations with the survey 

upon which flight activity estimates are based. These limitations include survey 

response rates below 50 percent. Without more comprehensive reporting of general aviation flight activity, such as requiring the reporting of flight hours at 

certain intervals, FAA lacks assurance that it is basing its policy decisions on 

an accurate measure of general aviation trends, and NTSB lacks assurance that 

its calculations of accident and fatality rates accurately represent the state of 

general aviation safety. 

Lack of comprehensive flight hour data is an issue we have also identified in 

other segments of the aviation industry, including helicopter emergency medical 

34 

17See GAO, Aviation Safety: Better Data and Targeted FAA Efforts Needed to Identify and 

Address Safety Issues of Small Air Cargo Carriers, GAO–09–614 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 

2009); GAO, Aviation Safety: Improved Data Collection Needed for Effective Oversight of Air Ambulance Industry, GAO–07–353 (Washington, D.C.: February 21, 2007); and GAO–13–36. 18GAO–13–36. 19See GAO, Initial Pilot Training: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Improve FAA 

Oversight, GAO–12–117 (Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2011). 20 According to our 2012 analysis of NTSB data, the pilot was a cause in more than 60 percent 

of the general aviation accidents from 2008 through 2010. 

services (HEMS) and air cargo transportation. We recommended in 2007 and 

2009 respectively that FAA take action to collect comprehensive and accurate 

data for HEMS and general aviation operations.17 In 2011, we confirmed that 

FAA now annually surveys all helicopter operators and requests, among other 

things, information on the total flying hours and the percentage of hours that 

were flown in air ambulance operations. Our recommendations to FAA for air 

cargo and general aviation data remain unaddressed. 

FAA’s ability to further reduce the number of fatal general aviation accidents 

is hindered by a lack of key data on pilots. For instance, we reported in October 

2012 that FAA does not maintain certain key information about general aviation pilots, including how many are actively flying each year and whether they 

participate in recurrent training in addition to FAA’s voluntary training program. Without this information, FAA cannot determine the potential effect of 

the various sources and types of training on pilot behavior, competence, and 

link this to the likelihood of an accident. The lack of pilot data also makes it 

difficult to identify the root causes of accidents attributed to pilot error and determine how to mitigate risks. We recommended in 2012 that FAA expand the 

data available for root cause analyses of general aviation accidents by collecting 

and maintaining data on each certificated pilot’s recurrent training and also 

that FAA should require the collection of general aviation flight hours.18 FAA 

partially concurred with both of these recommendations and stated that it anticipates addressing these and other data collection concerns by September 30, 

2014. 

• Pilot training. There are about 3,400 pilot training organizations in the United 

States. For the most part, all pilot schools must provide training that includes 

both classroom and flight training. FAA has an annual inspection program that 

includes the oversight of pilot schools, pilot examiners, and flight instructors— 

gatekeepers for the initial pilot training process. Our 2011 analysis of FAA data 

indicated that FAA completed the large majority of the required inspections for 

the pilot schools that are certified by FAA, which generally supply most of the 

pilots that fly for scheduled commercial airlines.19 However, the extent to which 

FAA undertakes required inspections for the thousands of remaining pilot training organizations, which may provide training to recreational pilots, is unclear. 

Our 2011 analysis of FAA inspection data found that, while FAA requires its 

inspectors to conduct on-site inspections of each of these schools and their pilot 

examiners at least once per year, the agency does not have a comprehensive 

system in place to adequately measure its performance in meeting its annual 

inspection requirements. Without complete data on active pilot schools and pilot 

examiners, it is difficult to ensure that regulatory compliance and safety standards are being met. In addition, it is unclear whether required inspections for 

pilot examiners were completed because FAA’s data system lacks historical information. One potential implication is the quality of training that recreational 

pilot candidates receive, which could contribute to the many general aviation accidents in which pilot error is cited as a contributing factor.20 In 2011, we recommended that FAA develop a comprehensive system to measure performance 

of pilot school inspections and noted that this recommendation may require 

modifying or improving existing data systems. In responding to our recommendation, FAA officials said they agreed that improvements in oversight 

data were needed and indicated that they believe efforts already in existence 

or under way address our recommendations. 

• Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). FAA and the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) are taking steps to ensure the reliability of both 

small and large UAS by working on certification standards specific to UAS and 

undertaking research and development efforts to mitigate obstacles to the safe 

and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace. Some of these obstacles include vulnerabilities in UAS operation that will require technical soluVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
35 

21These obstacles include the inability for UAS to sense and avoid other aircraft and airborne 

objects in a manner similar to manned aircraft and vulnerabilities in the command and control 

of UAS operations. 22See GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Measuring Progress and Addressing Potential Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration Into the National Airspace System, GAO–12–891 

(Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2012). 23FAA is required to issue a final rule for small UAS by August of 2014 at the latest under 

the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–95, § 332(b) (2012). 24The National Aeronautics and Space Administration expects to procure from private launch 

companies two manned launches per year to the International Space Station from 2017 to 2020. 

To date, FAA has not licensed any commercial space launches carrying humans. 25Sec. 827, Pub. L. No. 112–95. 26See GAO, Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and Monitoring to 

Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space Tourism Industry, GAO–07–16 (Washington, D.C.: October 2006). 

tions.21 However, we found that these research and development efforts related 

to overcoming these obstacles cannot be completed and validated without safety, 

reliability, and performance standards for UAS operations, which FAA has not 

developed due to data limitations.22 Standards for UAS operations are a key 

step in the process of safely integrating regular UAS operations into the national airspace.23 Once standards are developed, FAA has indicated that it will 

begin to use them in UAS regulations; until then, UAS will continue to operate 

as exceptions to the regulatory framework rather than being governed by it. 

• Commercial space. FAA also oversees the safety of commercial space launches 

that can carry cargo and eventually humans into space. FAA is responsible for 

licensing and monitoring the safety of such launches and of spaceports (sites for 

launching spacecraft).24 However, FAA is prohibited by statute from regulating 

commercial space crew and passenger safety before 2015 except in response to 

a serious injury or fatality or an event that poses a high risk of causing a serious injury or fatality.25 FAA has interpreted this limited authority as allowing 

it to regulate crew safety in certain circumstances and has been proactive in 

issuing a regulation concerning emergency training for crews and passengers. 

However, FAA has not identified data that would allow it to monitor the safety 

of the developing space tourism sector and determine when to regulate human 

space flight. To allow the agency to be proactive about safety, rather than responding only after a fatality or serious incident occurs, we recommended in 

2006 that FAA identify and continually monitor indicators of space tourism industry safety that might trigger the need to regulate crew and passenger safety 

before 2015 and use it to determine if the regulations should be revised.26 According to agency officials, FAA is working with its industry advisory group, the 

Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, to develop guidelines 

for human spaceflight. 

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of the Committee, 

this concludes my written statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions 

that you may have at this time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Dillingham. 

And now, Mr. Jeffrey Guzzetti, Assistant Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, United States Department of Transportation. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY B. GUZZETTI, ASSISTANT 

INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. GUZZETTI. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, 

and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on FAA’s safety oversight efforts. 

Like the other witnesses have just indicated, FAA operates the 

world’s safest air transportation system. However, our audit work 

continues to identify opportunities for FAA to improve safety. 

My testimony today is going to focus on three areas: One, the 

need for improved air traffic safety data collection and use; the 

36 

need to strengthen risk-based oversight; and last, progress and 

challenges with implementing mandated safety requirements. 

First, FAA has recently taken steps to enhance the data collection on air traffic safety risks, including controller and pilot errors 

that result in separation losses between aircraft. However, better 

data collection and analysis are needed before the agency can establish an accurate baseline of errors, identify the trends and root 

causes of those errors, and initiate strategies to prevent those errors. For example, we found that FAA does not analyze all separation losses that are obtained from their automated detection systems. FAA also does not validate the losses that are reported 

through its nonpunitive self-reporting system, known as ATSAP. 

Addressing these challenges will become even more critical as FAA 

integrates unmanned aircraft into the airspace system. 

Second, FAA faces challenges to maximize the safety inspector 

resources that it needs to focus its oversight on the greatest risks. 

One challenge is for FAA to overhaul its staffing model so that the 

agency can accurately identify the number of inspectors it needs, 

and determine where they are needed most. Currently, their model 

is unreliable, due to a number of shortcomings with the data that 

it uses. 

FAA also needs to ensure that inspectors are trained and 

equipped with effective tools to perform risk assessments of repair 

stations. In 2007, FAA implemented an oversight system to target 

higher-risk repair stations; however, our recent review indicates 

that inspectors do not always use the risk assessment process. 

FAA also needs to ensure strong oversight of its program that 

delegates to private companies the authority to certify aircraft and 

components. Under this program, company representatives appoint 

individuals to perform this certification work on FAA’s behalf, 

without FAA’s concurrence. This delegation of authority reduces 

FAA’s oversight role and could diminish the agency’s awareness of 

appointees’ qualifications and their performance history. 

Finally, FAA has made important progress implementing mandated safety initiatives since the tragic Colgan accident. This includes advancing air carriers’ use of voluntary safety programs. For 

example, as of January 2012, FAA data showed that 70 percent of 

Part 121 air carriers participated in at least one voluntary safety 

program, and that figure is rising. However, work remains to implement these programs at the smaller carriers. For example, only 

12 percent of the carriers with fewer than 15 aircraft have flight 

data recording programs that monitor aircraft performance. 

FAA also met an important congressional mandate by issuing a 

rule that imposes stricter rest periods for pilots. However, the new 

regulation does not address pilot commuting, a potential contributing factor to fatigue, which we recommended FAA thoroughly explore. 

FAA has also encountered delays in issuing rules related to pilot 

qualifications, crew training, and mentoring programs. In addition, 

the agency must overcome obstacles to establish a pilot records 

database so that air carriers will have better background information on the pilots that they intend to hire. 

37 

1 Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111– 

216, August 1, 2010. 

Concerns also remain regarding implementation of safety management systems by small carriers, and information sharing between codeshare partners. 

In conclusion, we will continue our reviews of FAA programs, 

and work with the FAA and the Department to ensure intended 

safety improvements are realized. While FAA has made significant 

progress in many areas, we remain concerned that serious controller errors, runway incursions, and other incidents are on the 

rise. To maintain a safe airspace system, FAA must improve its use 

of safety data, establish effective risk-based approaches for oversight, and fully address congressional mandates. 

This concludes my statement. I would be happy to address any 

questions you or any other members have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Guzzetti follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY B. GUZZETTI, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERALFOR

AVIATION AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me to testify on the Federal Aviation Administration’s 

(FAA) progress on safety oversight initiatives. At the outset, let me state unequivocally that FAA operates the world’s safest air transportation system. In addition, 

FAA has a number of initiatives under way to enhance safety in the National Airspace System (NAS). However, new legislated requirements and the need to improve 

how the Agency collects and uses safety data have created significant challenges for 

FAA. Our completed and ongoing work has identified opportunities for FAA to improve its safety oversight. 

My testimony today will focus on FAA’s (1) need for comprehensive data collection 

and analysis to enhance the safety of air traffic operations; (2) need to strengthen 

its risk-based oversight approach for repair stations and manufacturers; and (3) 

progress and challenges with implementing mandated safety requirements. 

In Summary 

Through voluntary safety programs such as the Air Traffic Safety Analysis Program (ATSAP), FAA has taken important steps to collect safety data on air traffic 

operations, including data on controller and pilot errors that create in-flight and 

ground collision risks. However, to accurately identify all safety incidents, analyze 

trends in safety risks, and address their root causes, FAA needs to refine its data 

collection approach by expanding and enhancing the reliability of its key data 

sources. FAA faces similar challenges with establishing an effective risk-based oversight system for repair stations and aircraft manufacturers. To target its surveillance to the highest-risk areas, FAA needs to better determine the number of inspectors it needs and where to place them, and ensure risk assessments are performed. Finally, despite commendable progress on implementing key elements of the 

Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010,1 FAA continues to be challenged 

with meeting provisions for improved pilot training, qualification, and screening requirements, as well as advancing safety initiatives at smaller carriers. 

A Lack of Integrated Data Collection and Analysis Hinders FAA’s Efforts to 

Enhance Air Traffic Safety 

Over the past several years, FAA has rolled out numerous initiatives to enhance 

the safety of air traffic control operations, but significant challenges continue to 

hinder these efforts. A top priority for FAA is to accurately count and identify 

trends that contribute to operational errors—events where controllers do not maintain safe separation between aircraft. FAA’s ATSAP program—a voluntary, non-punitive system through which controllers can report safety incidents—has the potential to enhance safety, but system improvements are needed before the Agency can 

realize expected benefits. Other priorities that FAA must continue to address are 

38 

2FAA defines a runway incursion as any incident involving an unauthorized aircraft, vehicle, 

or person on a runway. Runway incursions are classified into three categories: (1) operational 

errors (when the actions of a controller cause an incident); (2) pilot deviations (when the actions 

of a pilot cause an incident); and (3) vehicle/pedestrian deviations (when the actions of a vehicle 

operator or pedestrian cause an incident). Serious runway incursions are those in which a collision was barely avoided. 3 As of Jan 30, 2012, FAA no longer uses the term ‘‘operational errors’’ but instead tracks 

losses of separation as ‘‘occurrences.’’ Occurrences might not be an exact replacement for operational errors. Occurrences may include other types of losses of separation besides operational 

errors. 4We have calculated, based on FAA data, that the total number of operational errors may 

have increased up to 2,509 for Fiscal Year 2012, with the most serious errors increasing up to 

275, but we are unable to state this is 100 percent accurate due to limitations in FAA data. 

Specifically, FAA stopped using the term ‘‘operational errors’’ in 2012. 5FAA’s Efforts To Track and Mitigate Air Traffic Losses of Separation Are Limited by Data 

Collection and Implementation Challenges (OIG Report No. AV–2013–046), February 27, 2013. 

OIG reports and testimonies are available on our website at http://www.oig.dot.gov/. 

controller fatigue, runway incursions,2 and wildlife hazards. Two significant safetyrelated challenges also remain: (1) FAA’s progress in developing a safety data analysis system to proactively identify risk, and (2) introducing Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into U.S. airspace. 

Data Collection and Analysis Enhancements Are Needed To Identify and Mitigate 

the Root Causes of Separation Losses 

FAA statistics indicate that reported operational errors 3—when required separation is lost due to a controller error—rose by 53 percent between Fiscal Years 2009 

and 2010 (see figure 1). While total operational errors remained at these levels in 

2010 and 2011, the most serious reported errors, those in which a collision was 

barely avoided, continued to increase, from 37 in Fiscal Year 2009, to 43 in Fiscal 

Year 2010, and 55 in Fiscal Year 2011. Further, since the beginning of Fiscal Year 

2012, both the total and most serious number of reported operational errors appears 

to have increased.4

Figure 1. Operational Errors for Fiscal Years 2006 Through 2011 

Source: OIG analysis of FAA data. 

However, the reason these increases occurred is unknown. According to FAA, the 

increases are the result, in part, of its increased use of data in the Traffic Analysis 

and Review Program (TARP)—an automated system for detecting loss of separation 

incidents at terminal locations. However, as we reported in February 2013,5 operational errors at the high altitude en route centers—which have had an automated 

system for detecting loss of separation incidents in place for years—have also increased from 353 in Fiscal Year 2009 to 489 in Fiscal Year 2010, suggesting that 

the increase in reported errors during this period was linked in part to a rise in 

actual errors. 

In January 2012, FAA issued new policies and procedures for collecting, investigating, and reporting all separation losses. However, their effectiveness is limited 

by incomplete data and the lack of an accurate baseline on the number of separation 


416JEFF1.eps
39 

6Long Term Success of ATSAP Will Require Improvements in Oversight, Accountability, and 

Transparency (OIG Report No. AV–2012–152), July 19, 2012. 7 Event reports identify actual or potential losses of separation, including operational errors, 

or other situations that may degrade air traffic safety. 8FAA changed how it categorizes event reports in January 2012. However, the committees 

that review ATSAP reports still do not contact facilities if they believe an event is unknown 

to management. 9 ERCs consist of a member from the Air Traffic Organization, a controller union representative, and a member of FAA’s Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service. ERCs evaluate each report 

submitted to the program to determine whether it meets the established criteria for inclusion 

in the database. If so, the ERC accepts the report into ATSAP. 10PSP is defined in Article 52 of FAA’s 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association. It is designed to allow bargaining unit employees to 

address conduct and/or performance issues of their peers before such issues rise to a level requiring corrective action by the Agency. 

losses. At the time of our ATSAP review last year,6 approximately 50 percent of all 

ATSAP event reports 7 were classified as ‘‘unknown,’’ meaning they were not included in FAA’s Quality Assurance database when they were reviewed, and therefore may have been excluded.8 Likewise, as we reported in February, FAA does not 

analyze and report all separation losses automatically flagged by TARP. Instead, 

FAA investigates only those losses of separation that are within less than 70 percent of the required separation distance. 

Significant Improvements to ATSAP Are Needed To Achieve Expected Program 

Benefits 

FAA implemented ATSAP reporting at all air traffic control facilities in October 

2010 and continues to make needed improvements to the program. As of December 

31, 2012, more than 58,000 reports have been collected through ATSAP. However, 

FAA’s methods for analyzing the data may not accurately identify root causes and 

safety trends. For example, causal factors are reported quarterly under ATSAP 

using general terms such as ‘‘actions or plans poorly executed’’ or ‘‘training in 

progress during event,’’ which are too broad to identify root causes and develop specific actions to mitigate them. 

We identified other weaknesses in the ATSAP program. Improvements in these 

areas would enhance the Agency’s ability to identify and address risks through 

ATSAP. For example: 

• FAA has not finalized the process to effectively communicate ATSAP data to air 

traffic facility managers so that safety improvements can be made at the facility 

level. By December 31, 2013, FAA plans to deploy a nationwide rollout of a pilot 

program to provide personnel at FAA facilities and offices access to ATSAP 

data. 

• At the time of our review, FAA had not effectively communicated and implemented changes to performance management under ATSAP. 

• Event Review Committees (ERC)9 have accepted reports for ATSAP that do not 

adhere to ATSAP reporting criteria, and FAA lacks a process to review ERC decisions. For example, ERCs have accepted reports that concern air traffic controller conduct—rather than specific performance issues—such as a controller 

watching a personal video player while on duty. These types of conduct issues 

are inappropriate for inclusion in a confidential safety program such as ATSAP, 

and failure to adhere to the program’s reporting criteria may lead to the incorrect perception that ATSAP is an amnesty program. 

• ERCs can refer reports that include conduct issues to FAA’s Professional Standards Program (PSP)10 for peer counseling. However, the PSP does not require 

documenting corrective actions for accountability, transparency, and resolution. 

More importantly, final decisions regarding matters referred to the PSP are 

made, in many cases, by bargaining unit employees at the facility level rather 

than FAA management. 

FAA Is Making Changes to Its Scheduling Practices But Continues To Face 

Challenges in Mitigating Controller Fatigue 

A series of high-profile incidents in early 2011 involving controllers who were 

sleeping while on duty sparked public concern about controller fatigue and prompted 

FAA to institute a series of policy changes. These include placing an additional air 

traffic controller on the midnight shift at certain facilities and mandating a minimum of 9 hours off between evening and day shifts. 

40 

11Pub. L. No. 112–95 (2012). 12 Review of FAA’s Call to Action Plan for Runway Safety (OIG Report No. AV–2010–071), July 

21, 2010. 13Specifically, these incidents declined from 25 reported in Fiscal Year 2008 to 6 reported in 

Fiscal Year 2010. 

As directed by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012,11 we are assessing 

these new controller scheduling practices with a focus on safety considerations during schedule development, the cost effectiveness of scheduling practices, and the impact of scheduling practices on air traffic controller performance. 

Sustained Focus on Efforts To Reduce Serious Runway Incursions Is Needed 

Reducing runway incursions—potential ground collisions—is a key performance 

goal for FAA that requires heightened attention at all levels of the Agency. As we 

noted in our report to this Committee in July 2010,12 the number of the most serious runway incursions—incidents in which a collision was barely avoided—decreased after runway safety initiatives detailed in FAA’s August 2007 Call to Action 

plan were implemented.13 However, between Fiscal Years 2010 and 2012, reported 

serious runway incursions tripled from 6 in Fiscal Year 2010 to 18 in Fiscal Year 

2012. 

Additionally, the total number of all runway incursions increased 21 percent between Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012, from 954 to 1,150, and the total number of incidents continues to increase. For the period of October through December 2012, total 

incursions increased by approximately 20 percent compared to the same period in 

2011. (See figure 2.) 

Figure 2. Runway Incursions, Fiscal Year 2006 Through Fiscal Year 2012 

Source: OIG analysis of FAA data. 

More concerning is that this increase occurred during a period when total air traffic operations declined by 1 percent (between Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012). As a result of these concerns, we plan to initiate another review of FAA’s Runway Safety 

Program next month. 

Over the past several years, FAA has worked to deploy technology that could help 

prevent runway incursions. For example, in Fiscal Year 2011, FAA deployed the Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE–X) system at 35 major airports. 

ASDE–X enhances runway safety by providing detailed information to air traffic 

controllers regarding aircraft operations on runways and taxiways. However, while 

ASDE–X is a step in the right direction, it does not provide alerts directly to pilots, 

which has been a longstanding recommendation by the National Transportation 

Safety Board (NTSB). To address this shortcoming, FAA is planning to integrate the 

use of ASDE–X with two other systems—Runway Status Lights (RWSL) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B)—to provide simultaneous alerts 

to controllers and pilots of potential ground collisions. Progress in achieving these 

enhancements will be impacted by a number of issues, such as establishing requirements for technical upgrades, testing to verify system integrity, and determining 

whether the ASDE–X capabilities will meet FAA’s goals of increasing capacity while 


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41 

14These totals exclude wildlife strike reports from military operations and foreign or unknown 

states. 15FAA Has Not Effectively Implemented Its Wildlife Hazard Mitigation Program (OIG Report 

No. AV–2012–170), August 22, 2012. 16FAA Safety Briefing, ‘‘ ‘Accidental’ Meetings Between Airplanes and Wildlife,’’ November/December 2011. 

improving safety. We have initiated an audit into this area to assess FAA’s progress 

in integrating ASDE–X with other technologies such as RWSL and ADS–B to improve runway safety. 

FAA Must Step Up Its Efforts To Reduce Wildlife Hazards at or Near Airports 

The threat of wildlife hazards to aviation safety was evident in the January 2009 

wildlife strike involving U.S. Airways Flight 1549 shortly after takeoff from 

LaGuardia Airport, which forced the flight crew to land the airplane in the Hudson 

River. In addition to creating major safety risks, strikes can cause significant downtime and damage to aircraft—estimated to be over 600,000 hours of aircraft downtime and $625 million in damages annually. Over the past 2 decades, reported wildlife-aircraft strikes have quadrupled from 1,770 in 1990 to 9,463 in 2012.14

While FAA’s Wildlife Hazard Mitigation Program seeks to reduce wildlife hazards, 

we recently reported that the Agency cannot fully assess how effective its policies 

and guidance are at reducing the number and severity of wildlife strikes because 

reporting wildlife strikes is voluntary.15 A 2009 study commissioned by FAA concluded that only 39 percent of actual strikes were reported. Consequently, it is unclear whether increases in reported strikes are due to increases in actual strikes or 

increased reporting. Similarly, it is unclear whether any decreases in strike reports 

are a result of achieving program goals or a lack of industry reporting. 

Without full reporting and complete data on wildlife strikes, it is difficult to fully 

analyze the magnitude of safety issues, the nature of the problems, and the economic cost of wildlife strikes. FAA reported that wildlife strikes are probably one 

of the most pressing issues facing air traffic in the vicinity of airports and concluded 

that the lack of good data is one of the biggest challenges that managers at airports 

face.16 Accordingly, it is incumbent on FAA to address the gaps in strike data by 

improving oversight and enforcement of its Wildlife Hazard Mitigation Program requirements. Otherwise, the Agency will not be able to ensure that the $366 million 

in increased program spending over the next 20 years will be used effectively to 

track and analyze trends in wildlife strikes, identify potential new hazards, and 

mitigate their risk. 

FAA Faces Challenges With Developing a Comprehensive Safety Data Collection and 

Analysis System for Proactive Identification of Risk 

To help maintain our Nation’s aviation safety record and further reduce the number of aviation accidents, FAA has been moving toward a data-driven approach for 

airline safety oversight. In 2007, FAA implemented the Aviation Safety Information 

Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system, a tool that collects and analyzes data from 

multiple databases to proactively identify and address risks that may lead to accidents. ASIAS enables authorized users to obtain data from confidential databases— 

including voluntary safety programs such as the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program and the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)—as well as 

from publicly available data sources such as NTSB’s Accident and Incident Reports 

database. Although ASIAS was never intended as a surveillance tool, it can still 

play a role in air carrier risk identification and mitigation. However, access to the 

confidential ASIAS data for FAA and industry representatives has been limited due 

to airline proprietary concerns. 

In the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010, Congress directed our office 

to assess FAA’s ability to establish a comprehensive information repository that can 

accommodate multiple data sources and be accessible to FAA aviation safety inspectors and analysts who oversee air carriers. Accordingly, we are currently assessing 

FAA’s progress in implementing ASIAS, its process and plan for allowing system access at both field and headquarters levels, and its use of ASIAS data to assist in 

commercial air carrier risk identification and mitigation. We expect to issue our report later this year. 

Introducing UAS Within U.S. Airspace Presents Significant New Challenges in 

FAA’s Safety Oversight 

FAA predicts there will be roughly 10,000 active UAS in the United States in 5 

years, with more than $89 billion in worldwide UAS spending over the next 10 

years. However, FAA has approved these operations only on a limited, case-by-case 

basis, due in part to the safety risks associated with UAS integration into the NAS. 

42 

17 ‘‘Staffing Standards for Aviation Safety Inspectors,’’ September 20, 2006. 18 Congress directed our office to review inspector and analyst staffing issues in Section 205 

of the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–216, enacted August 1, 

2010. 19 Based on our analysis of FAA data, these fluctuations appear to be caused by a number 

of underlying issues such as inaccurate and outdated data. 

While the capabilities of unmanned aircraft have significantly improved, they have 

a limited ability to detect, sense, and avoid other air traffic. Given the growing interest and potential safety issues associated with UAS flights, Congress recently directed the Secretary of Transportation, in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act 

of 2012, to develop a comprehensive plan for integrating UAS into the NAS no later 

than September 30, 2015. At the request of the Chairmen and Ranking Members 

of this Committee and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 

as well as their Aviation Subcommittees, we are currently assessing FAA’s progress 

on integrating UAS into the NAS. We expect to issue a report later this year. 

Implementing Risk-Based Oversight is Critical to Ensure Safety in the 

Aviation Industry 

To maximize its safety inspector resources, FAA needs to target its oversight of 

the aviation industry, including repair stations, air carriers, and manufacturers, to 

address the greatest risks. However, shifting to risk-based oversight of the aviation 

industry continues to be a challenge for FAA. FAA deployed a new oversight system 

for repair stations in 2007, but it lacks the data and full implementation needed 

to be a true risk-based system. FAA is also increasingly delegating certain functions, 

such as approving new aircraft designs, to aircraft manufacturers and other private 

companies but has not fully addressed weaknesses in its delegation program. Further, the Agency has not fully implemented a risk-based tool used to identify which 

aircraft certification projects represent the highest risk. 

FAA Lacks a Reliable Model for Determining How Many Inspectors It Needs 

To effectively oversee a dynamic aviation industry, it is critical that FAA place 

its approximately 4,300 safety inspectors where they are most needed. A 2006 National Research Council (NRC) study,17 conducted at the direction of Congress, 

found that FAA’s methodology for allocating aviation safety inspector resources was 

ineffective. NRC determined this was partially because FAA’s method (1) did not 

predict the consequences of staffing shortfalls (that is, what inspections are not 

being accomplished due to staffing); (2) failed to account for some important factors 

affecting inspector workload, such as designee oversight; and (3) relied on expert 

judgment rather than validated data to reach conclusions. NRC recommended that 

FAA develop a new approach, and, in response, FAA introduced a new staffing 

model in October 2009. 

We have evaluated the model as part of an ongoing audit of inspector staffing, 

as requested by Congress.18 Thus far, FAA officials are not confident in the accuracy 

of the model’s staffing projections and therefore have not fully relied on the number 

projected by the model when requesting additional inspectors during the annual 

budget process. As of January 2013, FAA reported the results of its staffing model 

six times, with each iteration showing very different nationwide employee shortages 

(see figure 3).19

FAA is working to further refine the model so that it more effectively identifies 

the number of inspectors needed and where they should be placed to address the 

greatest safety risks. We expect to issue our report on inspector staffing later this 

year. 

43 

20 If ODAs fail to comply with regulations or fail to pass an FAA audit, FAA can remove them 

from the program. 

Figure 3. FAA’s Model-Projected Safety Employee Shortfalls 

Source: OIG analysis of FAA data. 

Oversight of Repair Stations Remains a Concern 

FAA’s oversight of aircraft repair stations has been a longstanding concern. According to FAA, there are nearly 4,800 FAA-certificated repair stations worldwide 

that perform maintenance for U.S.-registered aircraft. Since 2003, we have recommended that FAA strengthen its oversight of air carriers’ contracted maintenance 

providers by developing a comprehensive, standardized approach to repair station 

oversight and targeting inspector resources based on risk assessments. In response, 

FAA implemented a new risk-based system in 2007 to target surveillance efforts to 

facilities based on risk. 

However, our review indicates that the system continues to rely on inspectors 

completing mandatory inspections rather than inspections based on risk. Additionally, some inspectors do not use the risk assessment process at all; those that do 

are hindered in their ability to assess risk due in part to limitations in data availability and quality. As a result, FAA has been ineffective at conducting risk-based 

oversight. 

FAA’s surveillance at foreign and domestic repair stations also lacks the rigor 

needed to identify deficiencies and verify they have been addressed. Systemic problems we identified during our 2003 review—such as inadequate mechanic training, 

outdated tool calibration checks, and inaccurate work order documentation—persist 

at the repair stations we recently visited. FAA guidance requires inspectors to review these specific areas during repair station inspections, but inspectors overlooked 

these types of deficiencies. Given U.S. air carriers’ continued reliance on repair stations to perform their aircraft maintenance domestically and abroad, it is imperative 

that FAA improve its risk-based system to provide more rigorous oversight of this 

industry. We plan to issue our report on FAA’s oversight of repair stations later this 

month. 

Ineffective Oversight of Organizations With Designated Authority Weakens FAA’s 

Role in Aircraft Certification 

Through its Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program, implemented in 2009, FAA delegates to aircraft manufacturers and other private companies the approval of individuals to certify aircraft or components on FAA’s behalf. 

Once FAA approves the company’s selection process,20 ODA company representatives appoint personnel who perform work on FAA’s behalf without FAA concurrence, significantly reducing FAA’s role in approving these personnel. While FAA 

maintains some involvement with the selection process during an ODA holder’s first 

2 years, it is unclear how FAA is involved beyond that timeframe. 


416JEFF3.eps
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21FAA Needs To Strengthen Its Risk Assessment and Oversight Approach for Organization 

Designation Authorization and Risk-Based Resource Targeting Programs (OIG Report No. AV– 

2011–136), June 29, 2011. 22 14 CFR Part 121, Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations. 23FAA and Industry Are Taking Action To Address Pilot Fatigue, but More Information on 

Pilot Commuting Is Needed (OIG Report No. AV–2011–176), September 2011. 

FAA has not yet provided its certification offices with clear, written guidance on 

how to oversee ODAs’ personnel appointments. As a result, certification offices are 

currently left to define FAA’s role in tracking these personnel and to determine how 

companies select them. For example, only three of the five FAA certification offices 

we visited consulted an FAA database to pre-screen prospective ODA employees’ 

performance histories, and FAA’s certification engineers in the field expressed confusion about whether this check would continue beyond an ODA’s first 2 years. With 

less FAA involvement in the selection process, there is the risk that an ODA company could appoint certification responsibilities to individuals whose qualifications 

are inadequate or who have a history of poor performance. We identified instances 

of FAA engineers experiencing pushback from ODA companies when trying to take 

corrective actions against appointed personnel. This has led to individuals with performance problems continuing to perform important certification functions. In response to our June 2011 report,21 FAA is developing and implementing policies, procedures, guidance, and training to address the deficiencies we identified with the 

Agency’s oversight of ODA. 

In September 2007, as another way to leverage limited FAA engineering resources, FAA implemented use of the Risk-Based Resource Targeting (RBRT) system, which is designed to identify higher risk aircraft certification projects. However, RBRT has not effectively measured risk because it relies primarily on subjective input from FAA certification engineers, does not contain detailed data, and has 

experienced repeated technical difficulties. For example, engineers reported numerous problems with the system, including a tendency to identify projects as low risk 

regardless of inputs that suggested higher risk factors, such as a company’s lack of 

experience with the design of aircraft to which they have assigned personnel to certify. In response to our June 2011 report, FAA is developing processes to incrementally improve the RBRT system. 

FAA Has Made Progress in Implementing Mandated Safety Initiatives, But 

Significant Challenges Remain 

Since the Airline Safety Act was passed in 2010, FAA has improved pilot rest requirements and made strides in advancing voluntary safety programs. However, 

challenges remain for enhancing pilot qualification standards and training, establishing mentoring programs, and developing a pilot records database to improve the 

screening process for pilot applicants. 

FAA Met Requirements to Address Pilot Fatigue and Improve Participation in 

Voluntary Safety Programs 

FAA has made important progress in meeting key elements of the Act, including 

issuing a final rule on pilot rest requirements and increasing air carrier use of voluntary safety programs. We have some concerns regarding pilot commuting, however, as detailed below. 

In January 2012, FAA updated its flight and duty time regulations for Part 121 22

air carrier pilots to better ensure pilots are well rested when they fly. This is a significant achievement for the Agency given that these were the first modifications 

to the regulations since 1985 and that the proposed rule received over 8,000 comments from the aviation industry, mostly opposing the proposed requirements. 

Under the new regulations, pilots are required to affirmatively state that they are 

fit to fly and are prohibited from flying during a scheduled duty period when they 

report fatigue. Other key changes include requiring a 10-hour minimum rest period 

prior to duty—a 2-hour increase over the previous rule—and 30 consecutive hours 

free from duty per week—an increase of 25 percent over the previous requirements. 

While these changes could substantially enhance safety, the regulations do not address pilot commuting—a factor that may significantly contribute to fatigue, as 

many pilots in the industry reside hundreds or even thousands of miles from their 

duty locations. In September 2011, we recommended that FAA collect and analyze 

information on pilot domicile and commuting to better target solutions to reduce 

pilot fatigue.23 The Agency agreed to complete by February 2013 a ‘‘scan of available 

data’’ on pilot commuting and determine whether additional data could offer significant safety benefits. However, FAA recently updated its response stating that it had 

determined that collecting and analyzing data on pilot commuting was not warranted because pilots have an obligation to be fit for duty. Despite this stance, FAA 

45 

24 Voluntary Safety Programs, Response to P.L. 111–216, Sec. 213, January 28, 2011. 25FAA recently reported that air carrier participation in voluntary safety programs continues 

to increase. 

indicated that our recommendation has now been substantially addressed. The 

Agency also cited a September 2012 study by its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute 

regarding flight attendant commuting that found ‘‘no significant relationship between commute times and flight attendant performance.’’ While we are currently 

evaluating FAA’s response, we remain concerned that the Agency is not adequately 

addressing pilot commuting. 

In addition to its rule on pilot fatigue, FAA has made commendable progress in 

advancing voluntary safety programs at air carriers, another key component of the 

Act. For example, as required by the Act, FAA provided Congress with a report 24

on air carrier use of three voluntary safety programs that the Agency oversees. Data 

gathered through these voluntary programs can be used to identify the trends and 

patterns that represent safety risks: 

• Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)—A joint FAA/industry program that allows aviation employees to self-report safety violations to air carriers and FAA 

without fear of reprisal through legal or disciplinary actions. 

• Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA)—A program for the routine collection and analysis of digital flight data generated during aircraft operations. 

• Advanced Qualification Program (AQP)—A voluntary alternative to traditional 

pilot training regulations that replaces programmed hours with proficiencybased training, and incorporates data-driven processes enabling air carriers to 

refine training based on identified individual needs. 

As of January 2012, FAA data showed that 70 percent 25 of Part 121 air carriers 

participated in at least one voluntary safety program and just under half of those 

carriers used more than one. The highest concentration of new growth for these air 

carriers has been with the ASAP and FOQA programs. 

However, work remains to implement these programs at smaller carriers. While 

all carriers with more than 50 aircraft in their fleet have implemented ASAP, only 

41 percent of carriers with 15 or fewer aircraft have adopted the system (see table 

1). Similarly, just 12 percent of these small carriers have FOQA, and only 7 percent 

have advanced qualification programs for pilot training. 

Table 1.—Air Carrier Voluntary Safety Program Participation 

Program 

Number of 

Carriers Participating 

Large Carriers 

(more than 50 aircraft) 

Medium Carriers 

(16 to 50 aircraft) 

Small Carriers (15 or fewer aircraft) 

ASAP 60 of 88 

(68%) 

24 of 24 

(100%) 

19 of 23 

(83%) 

17 of 41 

(41%) 

FOQA 38 of 88 

(43%) 

22 of 24 

(92%) 

11 of 23 

(48%) 

5 of 41 

(12%) 

AQP 19 of 88 

(22%) 

13 of 24 

(54%) 

3 of 23 

(13%) 

3 of 41 

(7%) 

Source: OIG analysis of FAA data as of January 2012. 

Challenges Remain in Meeting Key Pilot-Related Provisions and Ensuring Air 

Carriers Meet Safety Standards 

Despite the important progress FAA has made in implementing the Act’s requirements, the Agency has encountered delays in issuing key rules impacting pilots— 

specifically those addressing new screening and qualification enhancements, air carrier training standards, and mentoring and leadership programs. The Agency also 

faces challenges in establishing a new centralized, electronic pilot records database 

to provide air carriers with better background information on pilots they intend to 

hire. Finally, FAA will need to address concerns regarding establishing safety management systems and information sharing and mentoring between code share partners. 

Pilot Qualifications. FAA is behind schedule in meeting the Act’s requirement to 

substantially raise airline pilot qualifications. FAA expects to issue a final rule by 

August 2013—1 year after the Act’s deadline. As mandated by the Act, FAA’s proposed rule (issued in February 2012) would require all Part 121 pilots to hold an 

46 

26 An Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) Certificate is the highest level of pilot certification. Pilots 

certified as ATP are authorized to act as pilot-in-command of an aircraft in commercial airline 

service. Additional eligibility requirements are contained in 14 CFR 61.153. 27 New Approaches Are Needed To Strengthen FAA Oversight of Air Carrier Training Programs 

and Pilot Performance (OIG Report No. AV–2012–027), December 20, 2011. 28 Check airmen are pilots employed by air carriers who evaluate a pilot’s proficiency during 

examinations. 29FAA and Industry Are Advancing the Airline Safety Act, But Challenges Remain to Achieve 

Its Full Measure (OIG Report No. AV–2013–037), January 31, 2013. 

Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate,26 which is currently required only for Pilots-in-Command. First Officers would need 1,500 hours of flight time to obtain an 

ATP certificate—six times the current minimum of 250 hours needed for a commercial pilot’s certificate. Although FAA’s proposed rule would provide some flexibility 

in meeting these requirements for pilots with relevant degrees or military flight experience, air carrier representatives remain opposed to the rule because they feel 

a pilot’s quality and type of flying experience should be weighted more heavily than 

the number of flight hours. 

FAA’s delayed rulemaking is a particular concern because, under the terms of the 

Act, the requirement that all pilots possess ATP certificates will automatically take 

effect if FAA cannot issue a final rule by August 2013. If this happens, air carriers 

would not be allowed the flexibility provided in FAA’s proposed rule. As a result, 

air carriers may not have adequate time to make necessary adjustments to their 

pilot training and qualification programs to meet the new requirements by the Act’s 

deadline. 

Crew Training. FAA is more than 18 months overdue on issuing a final rule revising pilot training requirements, due in part to significant industry opposition to the 

rule. FAA’s current proposed rule (issued in May 2011) is an important safety initiative that will require pilot training programs to incorporate flight simulators and 

enhance pilots’ abilities to work together during emergencies, as well as how to recognize and recover from stalls. 

With advancements in pilot training on the horizon, it is important that FAA enhance its oversight practices. For example, under the new rule, carriers will be required to provide remedial training for pilots with performance deficiencies. However, it will be difficult for FAA to gauge the effectiveness of this training unless 

it corrects weaknesses we reported in December 2011.27 Specifically, we reported 

that FAA was not tracking poorly performing pilots due to inadequate guidance for 

its inspectors on how to gather data on pilot performance. Currently, FAA guidance 

requires inspectors to compare pilot proficiency checks that they have performed 

against those conducted by the carriers’ check airmen.28 However, we questioned 

the viability of this requirement since nearly all pilot proficiency checks are conducted by check airmen, not FAA inspectors. As a result, FAA inspectors may not 

have sufficient data to make a meaningful comparison. 

Pilot Mentoring. FAA is also more than 20 months overdue in meeting a mandated timeline to issue a proposed rule requiring air carriers to establish pilot mentoring, leadership, and professional development committees to improve pilot performance. The delay is due in part to setbacks in developing an appropriate balance 

between the costs and benefits of these programs. 

While FAA intends to issue a proposed rule that would reinforce safe flying practices, air carriers are reluctant to allocate resources to implement these new safety 

programs without a final rule and FAA guidance. As we reported in January 2013,29

seven of nine carriers we visited did not have formal mentoring programs, and none 

had professional development programs for their pilots. 

Pilot Records Database. FAA achieved an early milestone to begin developing the 

electronic database for pilot screening by October 2010. Additionally, in July 2011, 

an advisory committee provided FAA with recommendations on the database’s design and functionality. However, the Act did not establish a milestone for completion 

and FAA has yet to make long-term implementation decisions. To achieve the goal 

of enhancing the screening process of newly hired pilots, FAA must overcome three 

key challenges: 

• First, FAA must determine the level of detail that should be captured from air 

carrier pilot training records, such as recurrent flight training data. The Act 

stipulates that comments and evaluations made by check airmen be included 

in the database; however, industry is highly protective of these data and opposes their inclusion. FAA must also address how to include historical air carrier pilot training records into its new system. 

• Second, the Agency will need to develop a strategy to transition to the new 

database while ensuring air carriers receive all available data in the interim. 

47 

30 NDR is a central information system that allows States to electronically exchange information on licensed drivers through a computerized network. 31Growth of Code Sharing Warrants Increased Attention (OIG Report No. AV–2013–045), February 14, 2013. 

Since database implementation is years away, we are concerned whether air 

carriers can currently obtain all relevant information on pilots before they are 

hired. 

• Finally, FAA identified multiple challenges for accessing records from the National Driver Register (NDR)30 and incorporating them into the database. For 

example, FAA must decide how to ensure data reliability of pilot records and 

resolve conflicting data retention policies for the database versus NDR data 

sources. 

Safety Management Systems. FAA did not meet an August 2012 deadline for 

issuing a final rule to require that all Part 121 air carriers implement Safety Management Systems (SMS). SMS, which is currently voluntary, provides air carriers 

with a comprehensive process for managing safety risks and integrating safety activities into normal, day-to-day operations. Specifically, SMS provides operators with 

business processes and management tools to examine data from everyday operations, isolate trends that may be precursors to incidents and accidents, and develop 

and carry out appropriate risk mitigation strategies. 

Since 2007, FAA has taken steps to assist air carriers in developing these systems 

through a pilot program designed to promote voluntary air carrier adoption of SMS 

and develop implementation strategies. As of January 2013, 95 percent of all Part 

121 air carriers (80 of 84) are participating in the pilot program. 

When fully implemented across all carriers, SMS has the potential to significantly 

advance safety. However, there is industry concern that the SMS rule will not be 

scalable for air carriers of varying size and operations, making it more costly and 

difficult for smaller carriers to integrate into their operations. In addition, FAA’s 

proposed rule (issued in November 2010) does not address concerns from air carriers 

and NTSB about public disclosure of SMS-collected data. Most of these concerns 

focus on whether the data can be used in litigation. NTSB is also concerned that 

air carrier employees may be discouraged from providing important safety information due to a lack of SMS data protection. 

Code Sharing. The 2009 Colgan accident raised important questions about code 

sharing—when a mainline air carrier contracts with a smaller regional carrier to 

provide flights to its hub airports—including how closely the mainline carriers monitor the operations of their regional counterparts. FAA’s 2009 Call to Action plan 

for airline safety encouraged mainline and regional carriers to collaborate on code 

share safety programs and mentoring. Yet, FAA does not have procedures to advance the Agency’s commitment to ensure an equivalent level of safety between 

mainline air carriers and their code share partners. 

In February 2013, we reported that while FAA sponsors biannual information 

sharing events across the industry, it has not taken steps to encourage mainline 

carriers to share safety information and best practices with their code share partners.31 As a result, some safety programs developed internally between code sharing 

partners are more robust than others. For example, one major carrier meets with 

its code share partners on a monthly basis to discuss safety practices, while other 

carriers we reviewed only met quarterly with their code share partners. Further, because FAA does not review domestic code share arrangements, the Agency has not 

assessed whether certain aspects of these agreements, such as financial incentives 

based on performance, could have unintended safety consequences. 

Conclusion 

With an increasingly complex air system—one that relies on rapidly evolving technologies, specialized services, and expanding partnerships—maintaining a safe and 

viable NAS is a challenging mission. While FAA has taken noteworthy action to address safety concerns raised by Congress, our office, NTSB, and others, we have 

noted that further opportunities remain to mitigate safety risks. These include improving collection and analysis of air traffic safety data, establishing an effective 

risk-based approach for overseeing repair stations and manufacturers, and fully addressing provisions of the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010 and the 

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. We will continue our work with FAA 

and the Department to ensure intended air safety improvements are realized. 

This concludes my statement. I would be happy to address any questions from the 

Chairman or Members of the Committee at this time. 

48 

Source: OIG analysis of FAA-reported data. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir. 

We will proceed to questions, based upon the order of arrival. 

And so, the first one, Administrator Huerta, is to you. You’ve got 

to cut $627 million from the FAA budget for the remaining 6 

months of this fiscal year. Initial cuts include closing of more than 

100 contracted air traffic control towers and the elimination of midnight shifts at 60 other air traffic towers. The agency will also have 

to furlough its employees for 11 days, starting April 21. In addition, the FAA recently provided information indicating that they 

need to make cuts of $486 million to the operations account, $142 

million from the facilities and equipment account—that’s NextGen. 

NextGen programs are getting cut by about $3 million, but furloughs will have an even greater impact on that program because 

hundreds of subject-matter experts, including air traffic controllers, 

will have to forego their work in this area to return to their core 

activities, if I’m correct on that. 

So, my question to you, sir, is, How will the sequestration cuts 

and furloughs affect critical safety activity, such as oversight of airline operations, of the implementation of NextGen, and the certifiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE

416JEFF4.eps
49 

cation activities of the agency, or any other concerns you may 

have? 

Mr. HUERTA. Mr. Chairman, two principles have guided us as we 

have looked at the impact of the sequester in the current Fiscal 

Year. As you pointed out, we have to identify cuts totaling $637 

million in the remaining 6 months of the year. As an operating 

agency, 70 percent of our operations budget is people, 84 percent 

of our people are in the field, in the facilities that actually deal 

with the flying public. 

Sequester, as you know, is designed to be a blunt instrument, 

and we have limited flexibility, in terms of how we can implement 

it. We have to apply it by program, project, and activity within the 

various accounts within the FAA’s budget. 

Our overriding principle is, first and foremost, to maintain the 

highest levels of safety; and, second, to minimize its impact on the 

maximum number of passengers. Our approach has been to focus, 

first, in contractual areas and out-of-pocket expenses. We have had 

tremendous cost reductions in such things as travel, training, and 

information technology services. In addition, we’re also focusing on 

how we can look at our contract base to see if there are cuts that 

we can take that would enable us to maintain the safety of the system while, at the same time, preserving essential people-related 

services. Nonetheless, we have also been forced to look at reductions in service at facilities that have lower levels of activity. 

When we looked at air traffic control towers, what we focused on 

were towers that had less than 150,000 annual operations and 

10,000 commercial operations. I should point out that we have 

thousands of public-use airports that operate in the country every 

day in a non-towered capacity, including several thousand publicuse airports. It is not unsafe, but the rules of how such a facility 

operates are different. In order to maintain the highest levels of 

safety, what you sacrifice is efficiency. 

In addition to focusing on these lower-activity facilities that are 

covered by contracts, we have to look for other cuts. Given the 

large percentage of our budget that is made up of payroll expenses, 

the only way we can get to the number we need to cut is to focus 

on reducing our payroll expense, and that’s what brings us to the 

furlough. 

The furlough affects all of our personnel across the FAA, except 

those that are exempted by statute, which is our Airport Improvement Program. Air traffic controllers, technicians that maintain 

aviation equipment, and aviation safety inspectors are all subject 

to the furlough. 

The impacts on large facilities will be a reduction of about 10 

percent in available hours to operate at those facilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. Could you say that again, please, sir? 

Mr. HUERTA. A reduction of about 10 percent of available controller hours. That’s 1 furlough day pay for every 2-week pay period. Those instructions have been provided to the facilities to build 

facility schedules, based on availability of controller hours. 

We would expect that schedule reductions will result in significant delays in the larger facilities. The actual impact is very specific to the airport in question. It depends on the airport’s configuration, how it is staffed, and what its traffic count looks like. But, 

50 

you’ve heard me say, in the past, that large hub airports could expect delays of up to 90 minutes in peak travel periods. 

We are faced with a series of bad choices, but the way the sequester law is designed, we have limited flexibility in moving funds 

between accounts. 

You asked about the impacts on NextGen. In order to preserve 

hours for the core operation we have pulled back individuals that 

work in collaborative workgroups to plan for the implementations 

of new technology back to their home facilities. We need them to 

be available to work traffic and to provide needed safety oversight. 

What that means is, a lot of the operational testing that we do to 

implement new technologies is something that gets delayed as a result. 

These are all difficult decisions that we need to make, so we are 

hopeful that we will be able to resolve the sequester as we go into 

Fiscal Year 2014, or even later this year. We would like to be able 

to recover some of the lost ground that is the result of sequestration. Aviation, as you know, contributes $1.3 trillion to our national 

economy, so we need to do everything that we can to support it. 

The CHAIRMAN. But, if things get better, as you say, you’re still 

constrained by a budget previously passed, are you not? 

Mr. HUERTA. For Fiscal Year 2013, our budget is effectively the 

continuing resolution amount, which is the fiscal 2012 level, minus 

the amount of the sequester. The President has put forward a proposed budget for 2014 that, if adopted, would provide adequate resources to maintain the operations of the FAA and the needed investments in NextGen. But, we have to see how the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. As they were last year? 

Mr. HUERTA. I’m sorry? 

The CHAIRMAN. As they were in the last fiscal year? 

Mr. HUERTA. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. 

Oh, I’m way over my time. I apologize. 

To you, Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. You’re the Chairman. Do you want to keep 

going? 

The CHAIRMAN. No. No. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator THUNE. OK. All right, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to, if I could, get a response to a question having to do 

with the Colgan 3407 accident that happened 4 years ago. Congress 

directed the FAA to conduct several rulemakings to improve airline 

safety; among them was the pilot qualifications rule. The bill we 

passed required the FAA to issue a rule within 3 years to increase 

pilot-experience hours to a minimum of 1,500 hours. The law allowed the FAA to give credit toward this minimum-hours requirement to those with relevant academic training. Without the final 

rule, the 1,500-hour requirement will go into effect without the 

equivalences included in the law, and that is not what Congress intended. 

And my question is, Will the FAA publish a final rule before the 

August 1, 2013 deadline with such equivalences? 

Mr. HUERTA. Yes. 

Senator THUNE. Good. 

51 

I’d like to follow up on these budget issues and sequestration 

issues, which I think that the Chairman touched on several levels. 

But, there have been a number of questions that have been posed, 

by myself and other members of this committee, requesting more 

detailed support for FAA’s claims on its sequester reductions. And 

those requests for information have, at best, been answered with 

what I would characterize as incomplete responses. And so, my 

question Mr. Administrator, is, how can you expect Congress and 

the public to trust the soundness of your decisions when you don’t 

offer up concrete details to back up claims regarding the impact of 

sequestration on the National Airspace System? 

Mr. HUERTA. Senator Thune, the sequester law requires that we 

provide a detailed report. We do intend to provide that report once 

we’ve completed our work on the implementation. 

However, I will say that, as I indicated in my opening statement 

and in response to Chairman Rockefeller’s question, our focus has 

been to maintain aviation services and to minimize impact on the 

maximum number of travelers. 

Much has been made about: Can’t the FAA reduce its contract 

expenditures? Well, at the direction of this committee and with the 

support of industry, we have contracted out a large number of service operations that represent greater partnership with the private 

sector to carry out the needs of the aviation system. For example, 

our largest contract, close to $250 million, is FAA’s telecommunications infrastructure system. That is the communication system 

that allows all air traffic facilities to communicate with one another. That function was previously performed by Federal employees; that’s now done by contractors. 

Our second largest contract was as a result of the privatization 

of flight service station activities. These are essential services that 

give pilots briefings on weather and flight conditions that enable 

them to have important information before they take a flight. 

And our third largest contract area, as I mentioned, is contract 

towers. 

We have achieved savings in areas—36 million dollars, this year, 

for IT. We’ve reduced our travel budget by 30 percent. We have 

completely eliminated training for an air traffic control support 

during the summer months. That saves us money this year. The 

decision may create a staffing problem for us in the years ahead. 

But, we have to figure out how to manage through that. 

Even with all of this, because our budget is primarily driven by 

people, and people providing services, we have no choice but to look 

at furloughs of our employees. 

As we reduce hours of employees that are available to perform 

essential services, our primary and overriding focus is going to be 

on safety. And so, in order to maintain the safety of the operation, 

it will become more inefficient in high-traffic periods. It’s just the 

way the numbers work. We are a very people-heavy organization, 

and an organization that is focused on providing essential safetyrelated services to the traveling public. To maintain safety, we 

have to run a less efficient operation. 

Senator THUNE. Well, let me ask you if you would consider, or 

are you considering, making use of existing reprogramming and 

52 

transfer authorities, when it comes to reducing the impacts of sequestration on air traffic control functions? 

Mr. HUERTA. Yes. We have an existing authority, as you mentioned, in order to transfer up to 2 percent within a particular type 

of funding to fund essential services. And we have taken full advantage of that flexibility in order to get our furlough impact on 

our critical safety functions down to 11 days. And it would be my 

hope to buy back more of those furlough days as we see how we— 

how the system plays itself out and how we’re able to manage and 

find savings on a continuous basis. This is not a one-shot deal; 

we’re managing this on a weekly basis. And our efforts are, again, 

How do we minimize the impact on the maximum number of travelers? 

Senator THUNE. What does the FAA plan to do in FY14 when it 

comes to the proposed contract tower closures this year? For instance, would the FAA continue those closures next year, or utilize 

the flexibility it has to manage where those budget reductions come 

from? 

Mr. HUERTA. The President’s budget, which has been put forward 

for Fiscal Year 2014, assumes that the sequester has been resolved. 

If the President’s budget is adopted by the Congress, we would 

have adequate funding for a contract-tower program. 

Senator THUNE. How about if that budget is not adopted? 

Mr. HUERTA. Then it depends on what the appropriators provide 

to us. 

Senator THUNE. But, you would use that flexibility, in a future 

year, if the appropriators give you that flexibility. 

Mr. HUERTA. If, in a future year, appropriators provided budgetary flexibility, we would have to see how it’s allocated, what it 

looks like and what flexibilities we actually have to move money 

around. Whatever Congress provides to us, we will work within it. 

Senator AYOTTE. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Blunt. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Huerta, you mentioned that you had worked to find enough 

flexibility so that essential employees would have fewer furloughed 

days. Is that right? 

Mr. HUERTA. Not exactly, sir. What the Sequester Act provides 

for us, and what our Appropriations Act provides, is funding flexibility to move 2 percent of available appropriations across accounts. 

Senator BLUNT. Right. 

Mr. HUERTA. In doing that, what we did was balance out accounts within the FAA with the focus on maximizing the availability of air traffic controllers and aviation safety—— 

Senator BLUNT. So, are there some people at the FAA that will 

have more furlough days than 11? 

Mr. HUERTA. No. 

Senator BLUNT. So, there was no priority for essential employees, 

just a priority for all employees, if you could achieve it. 

53 

Mr. HUERTA. Actually, what we were trying to do was get down 

to 11 for the critical safety-related functions. Without moving 

money around, the number of days would actually have a higher 

number. 

Senator BLUNT. Right. But, you’re telling me nobody is going to 

be furloughed more than 11 days. 

Mr. HUERTA. That is correct. 

Senator BLUNT. Right. So, it was all functions, not just—it 

helped with the critical functions, since your view, at this point—— 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

Senator BLUNT.—is, you treat everybody equally. 

Mr. HUERTA. Yes. There is an overriding principle of fairness—— 

Senator BLUNT. Right. 

Mr. HUERTA.—that we have to look at, as well. 

Senator BLUNT. Well, now, there’s no overriding principle of fairness if it’s a bad weather day. You have a list of employees who 

have to show up, as a priority. 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. And—— 

Senator BLUNT. There’s no overriding principle of fairness that 

day. 

Mr. HUERTA. Let’s take a bad weather day. One of the things 

that we have looked at is, How do we significantly reduce what we 

spend on overtime? That’s a very costly way to staff facilities. What 

we’re preserving overtime for is exactly those sorts of situations— 

bad weather days. 

Senator BLUNT. All right. Well, what I’m going to do is—I’ve got 

a piece of legislation that I’ve offered as an amendment to the CR, 

and I’ll offer it again, which does prioritize the employees—and you 

have a lot of them—that are essential safety employees. I think 

President Obama, in April 2011, sent a directive out, ‘‘If there’s a 

government shutdown, here are the employees that have to show 

up.’’ President Clinton did the same thing when there was a government shutdown, in 1995. And you might—I ask—I’m going to 

ask you just to look at that and see if it’s something that you would 

be able to look at and maybe even be supportive of, because it just 

essentially does allow some priority for essential employees. My 

view is that the law will probably stand. And we can not have a 

sequester if we just appropriate money below that number, or if we 

appropriate money above the number, then I’d like to see what we 

could do to make this more workable. 

On towers—have you got—had safety reports on the towers that 

you’ve closed? 

Mr. HUERTA. Yes, we have. 

Senator BLUNT. Could I get a copy of those? 

Mr. HUERTA. What we’ve done, in looking at the tower closures 

is, we have considered whether there are safety impacts—— 

Senator BLUNT. I’m going to run out of time. Is that a yes or a 

no? Can I get a copy of those? 

Mr. HUERTA. We can provide you a response for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The FAA developed a national safety case to determine what needed to be done 

to convert Towered airports into non-Towered airports and captured those standards 

into a Safety Risk Management Document (SRMD). That process identified approximately 20 mitigations that would have to be applied at each airport. That airportVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
54 

by-airport information was captured as part of the SRMD and could be made available to the Senator. 

Senator BLUNT. And, Mr. Dillingham, on towers that affect civil 

aviation, most of those towers also have a combination of general 

aviation and commercial. How important is it to have that visual 

sense of the ground? 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. The opinion varies, but—but, the majority of 

people that we’ve talked to are very concerned that their tower will 

be closed, and that we’re not—we’re not at the point where remote 

operations are as safe—or appear to be as safe as if you had that 

vision on the ground. Because the weather can be one way at that 

airport, but if you’re a long ways away and you don’t have the appropriate weather equipment, you won’t be able to advise the pilot, 

and it—the situation is reduced, as such. 

Senator BLUNT. But, I think we also—you’re looking to figure 

out, on commercial aviation, how you can have another tower handling takeoffs and landings in a commercial site that you would— 

the tower would be closed in. Is that right, Mr. Huerta? 

Mr. HUERTA. You would use what’s called the TRACON, Terminal Radar Approach Control. There are three levels of facilities: 

the tower on the airport, the TRACON, which provides approach 

control, and a center which provides high altitude traffic separation. And the TRACON would control traffic approaching a nontowered airport. 

Senator BLUNT. And what you wouldn’t have there would be the 

visual sense of the field. But, with some safe—some standards— 

and what I want to be sure we do here is, if some of these airports 

continue to have commercial travel—— 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

Senator BLUNT.—that don’t have a tower, I want that to be as 

safe as it can possibly be, but I don’t want us to lead people to believe that it’s less safe than it is by saying a tower would be better 

but we could do it another way. 

Mr. HUERTA. We’re not doing anything that is not safe, but what 

it does change is how the airport operates. In general, what it 

means is that there is greater separation between flights that are 

operating in a non-towered environment in order to provide a safe 

operation, but, as I said, it is less efficient. 

Senator BLUNT. And my last question would be, You will direct 

your staff to get the tower safety reports to me and anybody else 

who has asked for them as quickly as you can? 

Mr. HUERTA. We will provide you a response for the record. 

Senator BLUNT. OK, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. You got your yes. 

Senator BLUNT. I usually stop at ‘‘yes.’’ 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cantwell. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator Huerta, I truly appreciate your willingness to become FAA Administrator. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CANTWELL. And it would have been enough of a commitment to be FAA Administrator under the implementation of 

NextGen. That, in and of itself, would have been a herculean task. 

To take on this task in the midst of sequestration, in addition, is 

55 

just another twist and turn. And you have gained a reputation in 

this town for being a straight shooter. My interactions with you, 

you’ve always been very information-rich. And so, I was hoping I 

could follow on with what some of my colleagues were talking 

about, at least in this first round, about this tower issue. Because—— 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

Senator CANTWELL.—first of all, the Department of Transportation, with so many protected programs, it seems to me that the 

FAA is getting a disproportionate share of the impact. Is that a accurate assessment? 

Mr. HUERTA. That is correct. The way the sequester law is written, it exempts about three-quarters of the budget of the Department of Transportation; essentially, all the grant programs, which 

are primarily the Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit 

Administration. It also exempts our airport improvement program, 

which is about $3.35 billion. Therefore, the impact does fall disproportionately on the operating parts of DOT, and notably the 

FAA. 

Senator CANTWELL. And unlike, you know, some of the floor activity, we had to do more surgical approaches with various aspects 

of the budget. The Moran amendment, which might have helped in 

this area, wasn’t brought up. So, you’ve been having to deal with 

this in a very blunt way. And so, I have a couple of questions about 

that. 

On this tower issue, I think I’ve mentioned both to you—and I 

did in my statement, earlier—about both Paine Field, in the middle 

of a big commercial aviation manufacturer, and Felts Field, in Spokane, which is in the same proximity of the Spokane Airport, and 

Fairchild Air Force Base. So, they may have gotten beat out by 

some California cities in suing the Federal Government over proposed closures, but they are going to be close behind or join that 

case, because they feel very strongly about this. You and I have 

had a chance to talk about this issue as it relates to your analysis. 

But, I have a question: prior to the agency’s decision, and then revoking it and then saying it’ll be implemented in June, was it the 

FAA’s intention to remove the equipment from these towers? 

Mr. HUERTA. No. We’re working through all of those decisions on 

a case-by-case basis. In some instances, local airports and sponsors 

have asked if they could retain equipment. In some instances, there 

is an interrelationship between, for example, communications 

equipment in the tower and how it relates to the communication 

equipment at the airport. So, we’re working through those with individual airport sponsors. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, wouldn’t that be very devastating, to 

have this equipment removed? Because then if either the sequester 

issue was resolved or a community response was activated, how 

would you deal with this loss of equipment? So, I think we need 

a clear answer—— 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

Senator CANTWELL.—about equipment, as well. We hope the answer is that the equipment stays. 

56 

Mr. HUERTA. For the most part, the equipment stays. But, there 

are certain limited circumstances where we might come to a different conclusion, and we can talk about those specific facilities. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, I think, as my colleagues have mentioned, this is a very important issue. When a community of a significant size says they’re going to sue over this issue, I take it very 

seriously. 

And I hope that, Mr. Chairman, we can resolve this issue, either 

on the floor or some instance, because I think—while the public understands tightening of the belt, I don’t know that they understand 

that the FAA, within the Department of Transportation, is taking 

a very direct hit on this. And I think that it has various communities in my State concerned about it. 

Mr. Guzzetti mentioned that part of the safety culture and regime that we have to establish is implementing the mandates of 

Congress. And so, obviously, we did, in a major piece of safety legislation, ask for various rules on qualification of pilots and training 

and mentoring and database issues and, you know, a whole sort of 

other things. Mr. Dillingham mentioned this issue of runway incursions and getting the right data. 

So, is the sequestration going to impact us getting those rules? 

Mr. HUERTA. Well, the rules have different schedules. I was already asked about the issue of pilot qualifications, and I said that 

we would make the August deadline, and we will. 

Another rule that is an extremely high priority for us is the rule 

related to crewmember training. You’ll recall, at my confirmation 

hearing last year, I committed to completing that rule by October 

of this year. We are on track, and we will complete that rule by 

October of this year. 

Senator CANTWELL. Will the sequestration affect any of the rulemaking? 

Mr. HUERTA. In other rulemakings, I would expect to see delays. 

But it depends on the availability of hours I have for people in the 

rulemaking office and across the agency to do the needed work in 

a timely fashion. If I have fewer hours available to me, it does affect the full scope of everything the FAA does. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, as Mr. Guzzetti said, it’s important to 

get these mandates fulfilled. 

So, anyway, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to keep looking at 

this issue. I know my time is expired, but it’s important to understand what isn’t going to get done during sequestration as these 

important rules that we mandated—we want to see them implemented. 

I didn’t even mention the cargo, you know, issue. You know, 

we’ve implemented rules, but people who are flying in our skies 

want to know that those who are flying cargo planes also meet the 

same kind of standards as other pilots for fatigue and operation. 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cantwell. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator Huerta, I wanted to ask you again, also—I know 

you’ve been asked about the tower closure issue, but there’s something that I’m trying—I’m struggling with, in terms of your criteria 

57 

of which towers were closed. And let me give you an example, in 

my own state: 

Warfield, in Nashua, New Hampshire, that tower was slated for 

closure; now it has been extended to June. 

Mr. HUERTA. Correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. We also have an airport, in Lebanon, New 

Hampshire, that has a contract tower—is operated in a contract 

tower. And it is my understanding that Lebanon has less traffic operations than Nashua. Can you explain to me why one, and not the 

other, and what—how you distinguish between certain towers, why 

one was closed and why was—why one wasn’t? 

I will also add, just as a sort of overlay to all this, Lebanon happens to be an airport that receives about 2.3 million in essential 

air subsidies every year, despite being only 67 or—76 miles, so 

about an hour and 10 minutes away from our much more—larger 

airport, the Manchester Regional—Boston Regional Airport, in 

Manchester, New Hampshire. And so, can you help me understand, 

What’s the distinction? Why close Nashua’s tower? I certainly don’t 

want you to close Lebanon’s, too, but it seems a little arbitrary to 

me. 

Mr. HUERTA. We have two categories of contract towers. We have 

the Federal Contract Tower Program and then we have the Federal 

Cost Share Contract Tower Program. If Lebanon is in the Federal 

Cost Share Contract Tower Program, they have funding that extends through the Fiscal Year, and we would need to make a decision at that point. I will need to get back to you as to whether Lebanon falls into that category. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Nashua, NH FAA Contract Tower (FCT) was identified for defunding since 

it did not have 150K total operations or 10K commercial operations in FY2012. The 

Lebanon, NH FCT was not considered since it had more than 10K commercial operations in FY2012. DOD/DHS identified no impacts associated with the defunding of 

this FCT. Neither of these FCTs are part of the Cost Share program. 

Mr. HUERTA. With respect to Nashua, though, like all the other 

148 contract towers, it was a tower that fell below the 150,000 annual operations and 10,000 commercial operations. 

Senator AYOTTE. Do you have operations that fall below the 

standard that you just identified that are not contract towers, but 

actually run the—controlling is done by FAA employees? 

Mr. HUERTA. We do. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, in fact, I think, the initial list proposed for 

closure would have had about 238 towers, under that standard. Is 

that right? 

Mr. HUERTA. That would be correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, why was the decision made to close all the 

contracting towers, versus the towers that had the FAA employees 

that perhaps could have gone on to do other work? 

Mr. HUERTA. It’s a question of timing. We would treat all towers 

having similar operations the same way. The contract towers enable us to achieve savings because of the contractual nature in the 

current fiscal year. It takes longer to close an FAA-staffed tower. 

Senator AYOTTE. How much does it cost to run—do the—in terms 

of the FAA-employed tower versus the contract tower, what is more 

expensive, in terms of operations? 

58 

Mr. HUERTA. I think, in general, they are comparable, but they 

depend on how the facility is specifically staffed. Every tower is 

staffed with positions up—set up differently. 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. I would ask, for the record, for a more detailed analysis of what the—— 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

Senator AYOTTE.—cost differential is between those. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The DOT Inspector General stated in a November 2012 Report (AV–2013–009) 

that the average contract tower costs about $1.5 million less to operate than a comparable FAA tower. 

Senator AYOTTE. And is—was Essential Air Services exempted 

from the sequestration? 

Mr. HUERTA. We don’t administer Essential Air Services at the 

FAA. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, DOT administers it? 

Mr. HUERTA. DOT administers it. It’s in the FAA’s budget, but 

it’s administered by the Department. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, you don’t know whether or not that was exempt from sequestration? 

Mr. HUERTA. I do not. 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. I would appreciate an answer to that, because there is over—of course, as I understand it, in looking how 

much is in Essential Air Services, that’s a pretty substantial 

amount of funding on an annual basis, particularly when we’re 

looking at—in fact, we’re $218 million on the books, to serve 117 

communities for Essential Air Services, and yet we’re looking for 

$45 million to $50 million to keep the contract towers open, isn’t 

that right? 

Mr. HUERTA. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. Appreciate your getting back to me on that. 

And also, the answer on why Lebanon versus—— 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

Senator AYOTTE.—Nashua, and the cost differential. 

Do you expect that we’ll have to pay damages in the suits—the 

lawsuits from these communities? 

Mr. HUERTA. I can’t really comment on the outcome of pending 

litigation. 

Senator AYOTTE. And if, hypothetically, we were to pay damages 

for breach of contract under these communities, it could potentially 

cost us more than the closures, depending on the level of the damages. 

Mr. HUERTA. As I said, I can’t really comment on pending litigation. 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. Well, I appreciate your being here today, 

and I look forward to the follow-up answers. 

And thank you all for being here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Nelson. 

59 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. We, of course, are trying to get results, Mr. Administrator. Would you consider cost-sharing with the local governments on these contract towers? 

Mr. HUERTA. Senator Nelson, about 50 communities have made 

proposals to pick up the costs associated with the Contract Tower 

Program. In discussions with those communities, we’re willing to 

look at whatever proposal a community wants to make. 

Senator NELSON. But, your problem is one of dollars. 

Mr. HUERTA. My problem is one of dollars. In the—— 

Senator NELSON. Just don’t have the dollars. 

Mr. HUERTA.—current fiscal environment, I have to find the 

same amount of savings. 

Senator NELSON. So, the proposals that you have in front of you 

on cost sharing, you have not rejected. 

Mr. HUERTA. The proposals that have been made, for the most 

part, are to pick up the cost of the operating tower, as opposed to 

a cost-share scenario. The local communities have asked if we 

would be willing to negotiate an orderly transition so that there 

wouldn’t be a gap in service. They asked if they could somehow put 

together a proposal that would enable them to secure local funding, 

would we arrange a handoff that would ensure no interruption in 

air traffic control services? Those discussions had a lot to do with 

our decision to delay closure until June 15 to allow ample opportunity for communities to consider options such as those. 

Senator NELSON. By you delaying until June, are you still going 

to be able to save the money that you have to under the sequester? 

Mr. HUERTA. It does reduce our savings by about $8 million. 

Senator NELSON. As you well know, there are airports and then 

there are airports. And some of these airports come from a wealthy 

community with a fairly sizable tax base, and then others do not. 

Is that something that you would consider with regard to cost sharing? 

Mr. HUERTA. We will consider what a community puts forward, 

but it comes back to the question of the total number of savings 

that I need to achieve. I think that the other thing we have to consider is treating communities equitably as we look at the full scope 

of impacts resulting from sequester. 

Senator NELSON. Well, you don’t give me a lot to report back to 

my 14 airports. They are very grateful, by the way, that some of 

them that were going to be closed in April are not going to be 

closed until June. And so, we’ll continue to work on this. And unfortunately, I think most of us think that this sequester’s not going 

to go away until the new fiscal year, so we are facing a problem— 

as we would say in Florida, ‘‘a problema.’’ 

Madam Chairman, I want to ask you—you’ve got a pilot study 

going on, at the Orlando Airport, on runway status lights so that 

if, suddenly, an airplane gets onto an active runway that also has 

an inbound flight, that the lights change color. It’s to alert the inbound aircraft. Has this proved to be a useful tool for pilots? 

Ms. HERSMAN. The NTSB has made runway safety and surface 

operations a priority. It’s on our most-wanted list. But, the specific 

study you have mentioned is being handled by the FAA. We do 

60 

think runway status lights can help prevent runway incursions. 

And I’ll defer to the Administrator to address it. 

Senator NELSON. OK. Well, while you’re still talking, let me just 

ask you, Since you’re the head of safety, what do you think about 

the closure of the contract towers? 

Ms. HERSMAN. The FAA is faced with many difficult decisions, as 

all of us are, as our budgets are impacted. The NTSB has not 

looked at the safety of towered versus non-towered airports, specifically. 

But, the reason we enjoy such a good safety record in aviation 

is because of the redundancies, the multiple layers of safety. One 

of the things that we do know is, when you eliminate those layers, 

you can introduce risk into the environment. We have investigated 

accidents that occurred with commercial service at non-towered airports. There are safety benefits in the aviation system, and those 

redundancies are important. 

Senator NELSON. Runway status lights? 

Mr. HUERTA. Senator Nelson, yes, runway status lights do show 

great promise. We have a number of studies around the country. 

It is a difficult program to implement, because they have to be 

carefully sequenced with construction programs at the airport. As 

the Chairman mentioned, runway incursions are an area of high 

priority, not just for the NTSB, but also for the FAA. We have a 

number of technologies that we’re testing. They do show great 

promise for reducing runway incursions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pryor. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

your leadership and concern about these issues. 

I want to thank our panel for being here today. I know that 

you’ve been asked quite a bit about the contract tower program, 

but let me follow up just a couple of questions there. 

What—and if this has been asked already, I apologize, Mr. 

Huerta—but, what communication is the FAA currently having 

with the contract towers selected for closing? Are you talking to 

them at all? 

Mr. HUERTA. We’ve had a lot of discussions when we made the 

initial announcement, and we’ve had individual discussions with 

specific communities about how they would like to move forward. 

A number of communities—around 50 or so—have spoken with us 

very directly about our willingness to work with them on a handoff 

of responsibility for funding. That is something that we’ve been 

taking quite seriously, because if a community does want to step 

up and cover the cost of funding their tower, we very much want 

to work with them in that regard. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. But, have you talked to all the communities 

that have been impacted? 

Mr. HUERTA. Well, we’ve had a number of conference calls with 

the association that represents all the contract towers, and we have 

provided regular communication to all the communities. 

Senator PRYOR. All right. Let me ask about your criteria and the 

things you consider when you do this. We have one example in ArVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
61 

kansas, Texarkana, Arkansas, which straddles the line between 

Texas and Arkansas. And that airport has a limited line of sight. 

And did you all take that into consideration when you made the 

decision about how important the tower is to that particular airport? 

Mr. HUERTA. In addition to the criteria mentioned, such as the 

number of operations, number of commercial operations, how they 

serve or benefit an adjacent hub airport, how they might relate in 

serving broader interstate objectives, we are looking at the facility 

itself. How it actually operates within the framework of overall 

day-to-day operations. 

It is important to point out that every one of these towers, except 

one, is closed for a significant portion of every day. So, they have 

existing rules of how to operate in a non-towered capacity. Therefore, when they convert to 24-hour non-towered operations, they 

simply revert to those established rules. 

Yes, it does have impacts on efficiency, as I’ve talked about, but 

there are close to 5,000 public-use airports in the country that operate every day in a non-towered capacity. The important thing is 

making sure that you have the procedures in place to operate in 

a safe fashion. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Well, you mentioned one of the factors you 

considered was whether they have commercial flights, et cetera. 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

Senator PRYOR. This particular airport, in Texarkana, also handles 5,000 military transits a year. You didn’t mention the military 

in your statement. And this runway 04 has the only ILS backcourse approach within range of several military training bases. So, 

did you take military usage of the Texarkana Airport into account? 

Mr. HUERTA. We consulted with the Defense Department, and we 

did accept every one of the priority contract towers that they felt 

needed to be kept open. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. We have a similar situation at the Fayetteville, Arkansas, Airport. The Little Rock Air Force Base is, I don’t 

know, 150 or so nautical miles from there, and the Little Rock Air 

Force Base is a C–130 training base. They like to land in Fayetteville, because it’s a little more urban; it’s in a hillier, mountainous 

environment, and it does have a shorter runway. So, did you consult with the Air Force before you made that decision, on Fayetteville? 

Mr. HUERTA. We consulted with the Air Force to identify their 

priority towers, nationwide, and we accepted every one that they 

identified. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Have you shared the criteria that you’ve 

used with the airports? And the reason I ask is because the City 

of Fayetteville has told me that they’ve been unable to get your criteria that you used. And, in fact, they’ve indicated that you really 

haven’t shared much information with them at all. 

Mr. HUERTA. 150,000 flight operations, 10,000 commercial operations, that’s the first cut; below that threshold. Second, do they 

serve a function that supports a large hub airport. Third, are there 

national security or national defense considerations that we determined, in consultation with the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security, should be considered. One thing 

62 

that we did not consider is impact on a local community. We did 

look at impacts that exist far beyond a local community. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

And now, Senator McCaskill—— 

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And—— 

The CHAIRMAN.—who has returned—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Beg your pardon? 

The CHAIRMAN.—from a conversation, giving advice to the White 

House. Am I right? I’m impressed. 

Senator MCCASKILL. No. I was not—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No? 

Senator MCCASKILL.—giving advice to the White House. I 

was—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I was yelling at someone. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Well, that’s the same thing. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I came back to yell at poor Mr. Huerta, 

now. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. I just got warmed up. 

First, thank you all for being here. I appreciate it very much. 

I have a thing about rules in the government, and that is, they 

only work if they’re respected. And if the rationale for a rule is specious or arbitrary, it not only is frustrating for people who are impacted by the rule, it undermines every other rule that is promulgated by the government. 

Which brings me to the rule on personal electronic devices on airplanes. It appears to me to not be grounded in any kind of data 

or evidence whatsoever. And so, I would first ask you, Mr. 

Huerta—I have searched, I have asked, I have interviewed many, 

many experts. My staff has. Is there some scientific data that is 

hiding from my staff that would indicate a Kindle being on during 

takeoff could have any possibility whatsoever of interfering with 

the electronics of an airplane? 

Mr. HUERTA. The question has more to do with—first of all, let 

me back up. 

This is a matter that is of great personal interest to me. One of 

the things that I have asked our staff for, through an aviation rulemaking committee, is to look into the nature of these rules. Are 

there things that we could do to change them in the future? 

The rules that currently govern the use of portable electronic devices have been around, as you mentioned, for a very long time. 

The current rulemaking framework is set up such that any airline 

can conduct tests to determine that there is no interference. If that 

is determined, then they would be free to adopt a program for portable electronic—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I’m—— 

63 

Mr. HUERTA.—devices. 

Senator MCCASKILL.—aware of all that. It’s, as you know, very 

impractical, for each individual airline to take on the cost of testing 

each individual instrument and making some certification to you 

on each individual interest—instrument by each individual airline. 

Let me ask it this way. Is the rule supposed to apply to general 

aviation? 

Mr. HUERTA. That’s a good question. The rule, as it’s currently 

designed, focuses on commercial aviation. I don’t know. I’ll have to 

get back to you with that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Regulations for PED use apply to general aviation (see part 14 CFR § 91.21) with 

one major difference. In general aviation, the operator of the aircraft (who is also 

the pilot) can allow PED use if the pilot has determined that it will not interfere 

with the communication and navigation systems on the aircraft. For all other operations, the airline (part 119 certificate holder, termed ‘‘the operator’’) must make 

this determination. In general aviation, the pilot is concerned with the individual 

aircraft. Responsibility for the control of PED use as well as any impact the PED 

may have is placed on the pilot. In an airline, the air carrier must take responsibility because the public is placing its trust in the airline to ensure passenger safety 

during flight. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I will tell you that it is not followed 

in general aviation. People are not told to turn off their electronic 

devices. Because everyone who flies those airplanes knows that 

they’re not a risk. 

Let me tell you this story. This happened many, many times as 

I was on a lot of airplanes, the last 2 years. A woman who clearly 

was flying for the first time. We were going out to the runway, and 

almost tearfully, she grabbed the flight attendant as she went by 

and said, ‘‘Oh, my God, I have left my cell phone on, and it’s in 

the overhead.’’ She was very upset. And the flight attendant, of 

course, said what I’ve heard flight attendants say a million times, 

‘‘Don’t worry about it. Stay seated and in your seatbelt.’’ Right? So, 

she knew that phone was on, up in the overhead, and we were taking off. She was crying in her seat, because she was sure she was 

going to bring down that airplane. 

And, as you well know, there are dozens of people that inadvertently leave their phones on during takeoff and landing, or leave on 

something else during takeoff and landing. The pilots are using 

iPads right now. These electromagnetic signals do not stack. 

There’s not any difference, scientifically, between one iPad in the 

cockpit and 400 in the airplane. And your people are still telling 

us that, even if the ARC makes a rule recommendation, that 

they’re still going to recommend ‘‘not during takeoff and landing,’’ 

even if it’s just for a few minutes. 

In your rule, you actually say that it’s about distraction and 

missing significant safety announcements and personal injury. I’ve 

never had a flight attendant say, ‘‘Put down your copy of ‘War and 

Peace,’ ’’ which would be a much bigger personal injury and just as 

much of a distraction as reading ‘War and Peace’ on a Kindle, except a Kindle would be a lot safer. 

So, this is a great example of a rule that really is arbitrary, at 

this point, and I am anxious for someone to document to me why 

there is any reason that the flying public should be made to be feel 

insecure about someone next to them who hasn’t turned it off 

64 

quickly enough. I don’t think you realize the tension that’s on an 

airplane around this. I mean, the flight attendants get tense. The 

people who don’t turn them off—somebody sitting next to you, they 

haven’t turned them off, they get worried; they think they’re going 

to crash. 

I just feel really strongly that this is a great example of a rule 

that needs to go away. And so, I would ask you if there is scientific 

data that is going to support continuing this rule in any way beyond the ARC’s recommendation, which I understand is going to 

come in July. And, by the way, I would like you to make that process open. They’re closed now. There’s no reason. Their consideration should not be closed; they should be open. If we’re not going 

to be able to have a new rule by Christmas, I would really like 

something in writing from you on the record as to what the problem would be around that. 

Mr. HUERTA. Certainly. As you said, the ARC will complete its 

rule during the summer. The reason that we convened the rulemaking committee was to look at precisely the question that you’re 

talking about. The ARC is made up of all of the interests, not just 

those that are in support, but also those that have operational concerns about how any changes would be implemented. And I’m very 

much looking forward to the findings, and we will act on them. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Portable Electronic Device Aviation Rulemaking Committee (PED ARC), 

which was convened to review current policies and procedures, is completing its review and will submit its recommendations to the FAA by July 31, 2013. 

The major impediment to allowing unlimited use of PEDs in flight by December 

2013, if this is an ARC recommendation, is that all existing technical guidance for 

demonstrating acceptable use of portable electronic devices in flight (i.e., non-interference with key systems) requires aircraft operators to perform aircraft tests and 

evaluations. This guidance, prepared by technical committees of experts from aircraft manufacturers, airlines, and avionics manufacturers, requires detailed airplane tests and evaluations to ensure safety of the operation. Most airlines, with 

a number of different airplane models in their fleets, would have difficulty completing these tests and evaluations to allow unlimited use of PEDs for the entire 

flight, including take-off and landing, by December 2013. We would expect ARC recommendations for streamlined testing and analysis of critical aircraft systems that 

can be done by the airline, to allow expanded use of PEDs. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And when you look into the GA question 

that I asked, if you would also look into whether or not there is 

an announcement made on Air Force One that all devices must be 

turned off. 

Mr. HUERTA. Certainly. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Air Force One is owned and operated by the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD 

has authority to approve its own operations. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Because if it’s safe enough for the President 

of the United States, it’s safe enough for the flying public. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCaskill, I don’t care what the White 

House said to you or you said to them. This has been a treasured 

5 minutes. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. He’s a good guy. He’s working hard, but I 

want that rule changed. 

65 

The CHAIRMAN. You—more than any human being on the face of 

the Earth, you want this rule changed. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And I think she may have a point. I don’t know 

anything about it, but I’d like to ask Chairwoman Hersman: 

We’re terrific at putting in rules and regulations and just leaving 

them, because they’re sort of the safe thing to do when you start 

out. I have heard the same thing, that pilots are using iPhones, or 

whatever—iPads—in the aviation cockpit. I’ve heard people who 

argue, exactly like she does, and I sort of return to my, ‘‘Oh, no, 

this is what we do in aviation.’’ And Senator McCaskill is sort of 

moving me on this subject. And I think it’s good that she is, because it drastically affects so many people. 

Now, you could say, ‘‘Well, what if everybody was using it? 

Would that make a difference?’’ And I don’t know the answer to 

that. But, I think it’s a fair question. 

Excuse me, Senator Coats, I interrupted your turn. 

I think it’s a fair question. I think she deserves an answer. 

And, Chairwoman Hersman, I think, to the extent that you have 

views on this, I’d like to know what they are. Because if it sounds 

like a safety rule—I don’t need to know now, because I’ve interrupted Senator Coats—but, we do have a practice of making rules 

and regulations, and sort of sticking by them. No matter if the 

technology or the facts, or human nature, whatever it is, takes us 

to quite another place. I think it’s a fair question to raise, would 

have tremendous significance to an awful lot of people. And if there 

is any danger in it, I don’t think she would want to touch it—Senator McCaskill—any more than I would. But, if it allows people to 

get a lot more work done or a lot more accomplished in their own 

trip, then I think it’s worth taking a look. 

Let me just ask you—and, again, I apologize to the good Senator—is there a way to find out, conclusively, if it interferes with 

flight? The process, the carrying out of flight? Does that exist? 

Either one. 

Ms. HERSMAN. In our accident or incident investigations, we have 

never identified a personal electronic device in the cabin affecting 

the safety of flight. But, we have identified situations where the 

cockpit crew have been distracted by their devices. In fact, we just 

had a—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s like distracting the pilot. 

Ms. HERSMAN.—helicopter EMS accident, where we had a texting 

helicopter pilot. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Ms. HERSMAN. We have identified portable electronic devices, in 

the cockpit, being a distraction, but have not identified safety 

issues with their use in the cabin. 

The CHAIRMAN. But, there’s a huge difference there, because the 

pilot’s flying an airplane. 

Mr. HUERTA. He’s flying the plane. 

Ms. HERSMAN. Absolutely. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator—— 

Ms. HERSMAN. Absolutely. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. 

66 

Well, I’d like to pursue it, but I can’t, because Senator Coats is 

a very dear friend of mine, and he has a chance to be heard. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN COATS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator COATS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d be—this is an interesting topic, and I’d be willing to yield 

some of my time if you want to consume more. 

But, I am—I’m anxious to hear what the results of the study are, 

because I have—you know, we now have to carry two electronic devices, one for official use and one for personal use. And several 

times, I’ve found my—one of them in my briefcase, still turned on, 

when I’m on an airplane. I had—I didn’t break into tears, but I was 

a little concerned that maybe I was interfering with somebody’s 

communications. 

It’s comforting to hear that there are no incidences of interference from the passengers, but—whether it’s us texting when we 

drive or pilots texting while they’re flying, that is a concern. Now 

I’ve got to worry, not only about the person in front of me shutting 

off their device, and me shutting off my device, I have to worry 

about the pilot shutting off his device. So, hopefully you can get us 

that answer, sooner rather than later. 

I want to ask you a question, Administrator Huerta. First of all, 

let me commend the FAA, the way you handled the process in reconsidering the exemption for cargo carriers for pilot flight time, 

duty, and rest regulations. I guess—it’s my understanding there 

was some errors that may have been made in developing the costbenefit justification, but the FAA did do the right thing, and did 

its due diligence to make sure that it got it right. So, I think we 

commend you for that, taking that action. 

But, along those lines, as you know, the pilot training regulations 

passed in the 2010 legislation—and some executive orders were 

issued by the President—both President Clinton and President 

Obama—clarifying that the agency specifically must adopt a regulation—I’m quoting now—‘‘only upon a reasoned determination 

that its benefits justify the costs.’’ 

So, my question is this. Has FAA conducted that study on increased pilot training and experience requirements? And, if so, 

what did you learn? 

Mr. HUERTA. That is still an ongoing rulemaking. Part of the 

work that we do, with every rule, is the development of a cost-benefit analysis. That is work that we’ve had underway for a while. 

It is our expectation—and I’ve committed to this—that we will 

complete that rule by October of this year, and make it available 

for everyone to see at that time. 

Senator COATS. OK, thank you. 

Talk to me a little bit about the relationship, in hiring pilots, between flight hours and proficiency. Is there flexibility there? I 

mean, it a—just a hard line, in terms of, ‘‘You’re going to fly this 

kind of plane, you’ve got to have this many hours, no matter how 

proficient you might have been in the testing, in the procedures, in 

the knowledge, et cetera’’? 

Mr. HUERTA. That is also the subject of an ongoing rulemaking. 

Congress called upon us to develop a new pilot qualification rule 

67 

by August of this year. The provisions of law under which that rule 

is developed become self-executing on August 1. Unless we promulgate a rule, then 1,500 hours becomes the required number of flight 

hours of experience that a pilot has to have to pilot a commercial 

aircraft. 

Now, the rule that we are currently looking at considers things 

such as military experience, that can count toward meeting of the 

hours requirement. And that rule will be completed before August 

1. 

Senator COATS. And would you concede, though, that it’s possible 

that—two candidates; one could have 1,500 hours and really not be 

proficient, and another could have 1,200 hours and be very proficient. How do you adjust for that kind of thing, particularly at a 

time when some people are saying we may have shortage in hiring 

qualified pilots? 

Mr. HUERTA. That is certainly a possibility, but becoming a pilot 

requires more than just experience. That’s where the training becomes important, that’s where the rules that we’ve promulgated relating to flight duty and rest become important. How does—all— 

how does an individual conduct themselves in all aspects of carrying out their job, to ensure that they’re proficient and are maintaining the highest levels of safety? 

Senator COATS. But, the 1,500 is a bottom—minimal requirement, regardless—— 

Mr. HUERTA. It’s—— 

Senator COATS.—of how that person has performed in every 

other category. 

Mr. HUERTA. As the law was passed by Congress, unless we complete our rulemaking and that rulemaking provides for things that 

can serve as credit against the 1,500 hours, then, on August 1, 

1,500 hours becomes self-executing. 

Senator COATS. I see. So, that’s possible, that your rulemaking 

would allow some flexibility for that. 

Mr. HUERTA. That is correct. 

Senator COATS. Thank you. 

Time’s expired, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Coats. 

Senator Thune has a question. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to wrap up here, pretty quickly, but first want to 

drill down on a couple of these budget questions. 

I also want to say to the Senator from Missouri’s proposal, that 

I will lend bipartisan support to her request that we revisit this 

issue of banning the use of hand-held devices on airplanes. 

And, at a minimum, I was telling you, Mr. Chairman, that, in 

my part of the country, we de-ice a lot, and, when the door closes, 

even if you’re going to the de-icing pad, they tell you that you have 

to shut these devices down. And it just seems like that these ‘‘rules 

for rules’ sake’’ sometimes really go beyond what’s even practical, 

let alone safe. 

So, let me, if I might, just ask the question. Mr. Administrator, 

I mentioned, earlier in a question about the transfer authority that 

you have, allowing for 2 percent transfers between activities. That 

does not require advance permission—— 

68 

Mr. HUERTA. That’s correct. 

Senator THUNE.—correct? OK. So, in the rest of this year, fiscal 

2013 and FY–2014, would you utilize that 2 percent transfer authority to protect airspace users from furloughs and tower closures? 

Mr. HUERTA. That doesn’t provide for enough resources to protect 

us from furloughs and tower closures. 

Senator THUNE. In addition to that 2 percent transfer authority, 

would you request permission to reprogram funding to protect airspace users from tower closures and furloughs, as soon as possible? 

That’s also something that you can ask for. 

Mr. HUERTA. We can ask the Appropriations Committee for reprogramming authority. That also would not get us there completely. 

Senator THUNE. OK. You have, in your budget within the operations account $179 million for travel, $134 million for supplies, 

and $541 million for consultants. And I guess my question is, since 

those two things don’t get you there, are these areas in which you 

would be willing to find some savings to offset the sequester cuts 

so that the towers don’t have to close? 

Mr. HUERTA. We’ve reduced travel by 30 percent by eliminating 

all but operational travel. For example, a radar technician needing 

to travel to a site to repair a radar that might go out, or travel associated with an aviation inspector needing to inspect a manufacturer of avionics or some other aviation equipment would be the 

type of travel that is permitted. 

The $500 million that you talk about with respect to consultant 

contracts, that is a budgetary category that takes account of everything which is a non-construction contract. The largest single contract in that category is the services contract that I previously 

mentioned, which is FAA’s telecommunications infrastructure, the 

communication network that a private company provides for use at 

all the FAA facilities. That accounts for about half of the amount. 

The next largest contract is for the services for flight service stations. Those are services that are provided to pilots. 

The third largest contract is for the contract towers that have 

generated so much concern. Of the amount you mentioned, that is 

actually what you would call ‘‘traditional consultant services,’’ is 

around $20 million. And yes, we have gotten rid of the vast majority of that. 

Senator THUNE. Well, as you know, there’s a bill up here that’s 

got substantial bipartisan support—I think, 29 bipartisan cosponsors on that particular issue. And it seems, to me at least, when 

you look at the FAA budget, and you break it down, and you look 

at the personnel accounts, which is about 70 percent, you still have 

about 30 percent of your budget that is in these other categories. 

And I certainly would hope that you would give careful scrutiny 

and scrub those areas of the budget to see what might be done to 

prevent something from happening that many people up here certainly are concerned about, as well as people all across the country. 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Cantwell. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

69 

And, Administrator Huerta, could we add to this list, too, What 

is the impact on NextGen implementation from sequestration? If 

you have a general idea, you can tell me now—if you want to get 

back to us—but, what will the impact on that be? 

Mr. HUERTA. I’ll provide you a general sense of what we’re seeing 

this year, and then, for the record, provide a more detailed response. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

President Obama has proposed a workable solution to our Nation’s budget challenge and the FAA’s 2014 budget request of $15.6 billion is part of that. This budget 

request supports our critical safety programs, modernizes our aviation infrastructure, and strikes a balance between maintaining current infrastructure while deploying key NextGen programs to support the growth and changes in aviation. It 

does all this at funding levels that are $351 million lower than FY 2012. This is 

a 2.2 percent decrease, which is part of the President’s effort to reduce the deficit. 

If the President’s Budget is not adopted, FAA will have to consider all of the severe cost-saving measures debated this year, including employee furloughs, which 

in turn could have an impact on the development and implementation of NextGen. 

In addition, given the limited number of days employees can be furloughed, reductions in force will also be considered for all segments of FAA’s workforce. 

Mr. HUERTA. Within the current year, the principal impact we 

will see is related to the need to bring operational personnel back 

to their home facilities to work on day-to-day operations. What that 

means is that we’re pulling individuals off of what we call collaborative workgroups. These are workgroups that we set up with FAA 

employees to work with contractors and to work with our engineering and planning staffs that are deploying NextGen. Their job is to 

actually work through the details of how is the system going to 

handle live traffic. 

This is an extremely important aspect of what we do. In the past, 

the agency hadn’t done as much of this. That has gotten the FAA 

into trouble on large programs. For example, a few years ago, there 

was a program called DRAM, which is the modernization of our en 

route platform. Once we adopted these collaborative workgroups, 

we found that we had a much more seamless transition to new 

technology. So, the need to pull back resources and personnel from 

these activities will delay the implementation of some of these new 

technologies. 

Senator CANTWELL. Aren’t—— 

Mr. HUERTA. We’re viewing that—— 

Senator CANTWELL. Aren’t there some competitiveness issues 

with us getting NextGen implemented? 

Mr. HUERTA. Well, where it affects us right now is in our program called the Optimization of Airspace Procedures. That’s the deployment of performance-based navigation that has the ability to 

reduce fuel burn, reduce costs, reduce emissions and noise impacts 

in local communities. We have a number of these procedures 

around the country. You have probably one of the best known up 

there in Seattle, an initiative called Greener Skies. 

It does slow down the deployment of those procedures, for two 

reasons. One is, we don’t have the people that can work through 

the operational details so that we’re able to deploy them between 

now and the end of the fiscal year. The second reason that developing and maintaining procedures, in and of itself, is an expendiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
70 

ture: it involves paying for contractors, for design, for publication 

and training. 

Senator CANTWELL. So, I’d love to get more details—— 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

Senator CANTWELL.—I mean, a written response, so that we 

could share that with our colleagues, about what the impact on 

that is. 

I’d like to turn—so, what is the—what are the mechanisms the 

FAA is going to use to resolve the adverse conditions on the 787 

issue? And how will you—I mean, is that something the Secretary 

does as an official final decision, or how do you decide about ETOP 

issues, all of that? Could you give us some idea? 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. What Boeing presented to us last month was 

a certification plan. The certification plan had several components 

to it, but it essentially resulted in a redesign of the battery systems 

within the airplane, and a containment system to provide another 

layer of safety. We asked for certain thresholds to be met, in order 

to maintain the highest levels of safety. Once the certification plan 

was approved by us last month, Boeing embarked on a series of 

tests that we required, about 20 distinct tests, to prove that the 

system would operate as designed. 

Boeing has completed the testing, and has provided a very extensive set of documents to the FAA. Those documents are currently 

under review. That review will result in us making a final determination as to whether the aircraft can return to flight. 

Coincident with that review was a review where we went back 

and looked at our original determination relating to ETOPS flight. 

The question there is, when the airplane was grounded, it was certified for ETOPS of 180 minutes. So, the question for us was, 

Would we return it to service at that level? That review is a concurrent review that is ongoing. When we make our final determination with respect to return to flight, we will also address that question. 

Senator CANTWELL. So, is this something the Secretary decides, 

or the FAA decides, or—— 

Mr. HUERTA. This is a determination and a recommendation 

that’s made by all technical experts. It was my decision to ground 

the fleet, and I would be the one making the recommendation, 

going forward. 

Senator CANTWELL. I see my time is expired, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, so is mine. 

Senator CANTWELL. Oh. 

The CHAIRMAN. The—I’ve got a cybersecurity thing that I have 

to be at. And what you can do, Senator Cantwell, is to close out 

this hearing and continue your line of questioning, because they 

can’t move. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to do that? 

Senator CANTWELL. I—— 

Mr. HUERTA. That’s fine. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think you would. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, there are many issues, Mr. Chairman, 

that we could continue to go over, but—I’ve asked my questions for 

71 

today, but—I don’t know whether the Ranking Member wants to 

stay. And I’m happy to stay, if that’s the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, my schedule just changed. 

Senator CANTWELL.—if that’s—— 

The CHAIRMAN. So, you go right ahead. 

Senator CANTWELL. And continue and ask questions, Mr. Chairman? Or—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Probably not. I mean, I—you don’t want to get 

me started on general aviation, do you? But, you go ahead. 

Senator CANTWELL. OK. 

Well, the only other question I had was for Mr. Dillingham about 

the process for—with composites. We were very involved with composite manufacturing and getting the FAA Center of Excellence established, which was a program to help collaboration between research institutions, the FAA, and manufacturers identify issues. 

And I think you did a report, on that certification process, in which 

you think that that worked well. Is that—— 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, that’s what—— 

Senator CANTWELL.—the model for what we should be doing? Is 

that what—— 

Dr. DILLINGHAM. We looked in depth at the certification of the 

composite aspect of the Dreamliner 787. And, in all cases, we found 

that FAA did an excellent job. It could be a model for, you know, 

future situations, such as Attlee does. Clearly, composites are going 

to be an ever-increasing part of aviation manufacture, as it has 

been for decades now; it will continue to grow. 

Senator CANTWELL. And, Mr. Secretary, in all the balancing of 

these issues—NextGen, the towers, sequestrations, battery issues, 

all of that—how do you prioritize these rulemakings that Mr. 

Guzzetti was talking about being so essential? Do you prioritize 

them in a ranking? 

Mr. Chairman, having oversight of the Coast Guard Committee 

for a while, and then being challenged with the implementation of 

the—what was then called Deepwater Acquisition program, we got 

to a point where so many members had so many interests in these 

various priorities—and I could go into this issue of the helicopter 

and medical issue. 

But, do you prioritize these rulemakings within the agency so 

that we can give members some idea of their prioritization? 

Mr. HUERTA. We go through a regular process of identifying what 

the deadlines are for rulemakings, given available resources. Every 

rulemaking requires a level of technical expertise associated with 

developing and ultimately promulgating and implementing a rule. 

Those actions rely on staff that are available or contractors that 

are available to perform the needed cost-benefit analysis that Senator Coats asked about. It’s marrying the technical expertise that 

we have with the timetables that have been developed, the complexity of the rule, and then evaluates the benefit that the rule will 

enable us to achieve as a result of its implementation. That’s a regular process that we do go through. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, it would be, I think, nice for the larger 

aviation community to have a sense of the prioritization of those 

rules. I mean, I’m sure some of it can be simultaneously, but—— 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

72 

Senator CANTWELL.—in the context of people being able to weigh 

in on that prioritization, so we just have a little more definition 

about what’s coming next, and when. And I know—— 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

Senator CANTWELL.—that you commented today, which was 

great, on the actual pilot rules that had to be implemented, and 

their timeframe. But, since we just went through this entire list of 

things that you’re responsible for in a shrinking budget, I think 

part of our challenge is to communicate what—exactly what that 

means from a timeframe to our constituents. So—— 

Mr. HUERTA. Sure. 

Senator CANTWELL.—I would appreciate that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

FAA Priority Rules for 2013 

1. Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements (Final Rule)—This rule 

amends the eligibility and qualification requirement for pilots engaged in Part 

121 air carrier operations and modifies requirements for an airline transport 

pilot certificate (ATP). Addresses requirements of PL 111–216, the Airline Safety 

and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, which also has a 

self-enacting provision requiring ATP that will go into effect August 2, 2013. 

2. Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations (Final Rule)—The rule addresses 13 NTSB recommendations and the causes of over 150 helicopter air ambulance and commercial helicopter accidents that occurred between 1991 and 

2010 in which over 250 people died. Addresses requirements of FAA Reauthorization. 

3. Safety Management Systems (SMS) for Part 121 Certificate Holders (Final 

Rule)—This rule would require 14 CFR Part 121 certificate holders to establish 

a safety management system. It responds to requirements of PL 111–216, The 

Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010. Qualifications, Service and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers—N&O 

(Final Rule) – This rule will amend training programs by requiring training in 

areas that are critical to safety. Addresses requirements of L 111–216, The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010. 

4. Small UAS (NPRM)—The notice proposes specific rules for the operation of 

Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) in the National Airspace System 

(NAS). Currently, public and civil aircraft (commercial and for hire only) operations must be approved on a case-by-case basis to operate in the NAS. Addresses requirements of FAA reauthorization. 

5. Drug and Alcohol Testing for Foreign Repair Stations (ANPRM)—This proposed 

rule would require controlled substance testing of some employees working in foreign repair stations. Addresses requirements of FAA reauthorization. 

6. Supercooled Large Droplet Icing Conditions (Final Rule)—This action addresses 

safety concerns about the adequacy of icing certification standards. It would address two NTSB safety recommendations. 

7. Airport SMS (SNPRM)—This proposal would require certain certificate holders 

under 14 CFR part 139 to establish a safety management system (SMS) for its 

entire airfield environment (movement and non-movement areas) to improve 

safety at airports hosting air carrier operations. 

8. Flight Simulation Training Device Qualifications and Standards (NPRM)—This 

proposal would modify the flight simulation training device qualifications requirements to improve evaluation and testing methods for extended envelope 

training tasks. This rulemaking will support the training tasks required in the 

training rulemaking. 

Senator CANTWELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

I’m going to defer on general aviation, although I did, in the 

briefing, read their statistics, as compared to legacy aviation, and 

I was stunned by the difference with respect to safety deaths, the 

rest of it. 

73 

This was an important hearing. I don’t think that we totally connected, the way I would have liked. 

And, Mr. Administrator, I think we really do want to find out— 

I’m pretty sure I speak for Senator Thune on this—that—what sequestration actually does. And what we got was a series of things, 

as opposed to a prioritized laundry list of sacrifices, which, in the 

end—I mean, in other words, we could—I come out of this hearing 

with the feeling we can do it, we can make it, somehow. And I’m 

not sure if I’m coming out with the right feeling, if sequestration 

sticks around. And—but, I don’t say that to elicit a response; I simply say that to—it’s difficult, on a subject like this, to make it resonate, and particularly when it affects so many people, potentially, 

and it’s such a large problem. 

But, anyway, we’ve worked at it, and grinding away is part of 

the deal in the U.S. Congress. And we have done that. And I thank 

all of you very much. 

And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(75) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman, the past few years have been the safest in history for America’s 

aviation system. Although industry fatality rates are at all-time lows, the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) has recently had to address several high profile safety incidents, reminding us that we must remain vigilant and never let safety take 

a back seat. 

One major threat to aviation safety is sequestration. Because of the sequester’s 

cuts, the FAA will furlough air traffic controllers and limit hours or close down service at some towers, including at Newark Liberty, Atlantic City, and Trenton-Mercer 

Airports in New Jersey. These furloughs and closings will harm local communities, 

affect working families, and strain a system that already suffers from too many 

delays. 

The FAA predicts that due to budget cuts, passengers at major airports-such as 

Newark Liberty—could experience delays of up to 90 minutes during peak hours. 

I opposed the bill that created sequestration because I was concerned about these 

types of damaging consequences. And we are now seeing them in every program. 

Whether from cuts to Head Start, medical research, or our aviation system, sequestration is bad for Americans. 

While the FAA works to cope with sequestration’s cuts, the agency must also continue its critical safety missions without interruption. For example, understanding 

and fixing the lithium ion batteries on Boeing 787s must be a top priority. We must 

continue to be thorough in this investigation and analysis to ensure that this risk 

is eliminated, and that in the future we catch these kinds of problems before the 

planes are in the skies. 

And we must also act quickly to implement all of the recommendations from the 

‘‘Airline Safety Act’’ that Congress passed in response to the Colgan Air crash four 

years ago. The FAA has made significant progress in implementing the new law. 

However, more work needs to be done to complete all safety requirements and ensure the traveling public knows pilots are always well-trained and well-rested. Tragically, the Colgan crash showed us these are matters of life and death, and we must 

take further action to improve the safety of our aviation system. We simply can’t 

afford to ignore the lessons from past accidents and crashes. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing on an issue that affects all 

Americans. And I thank our witnesses for testifying about how we can continue to 

ensure the safety of our aviation system as we cope with the impacts of sequestration. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing focusing on the safety of our air transportation system. 

I held a hearing in the Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee reviewing the announced merger between U.S. Airlines and American last month. As the commercial 

aviation industry continues to change, safety and the protection of passengers is essential. 

Safety in our skies and on our tarmacs is necessary to the flow of commerce and 

to keep the public safe. In fact, 2012’s safety performance was the best in history 

for commercial aviation. 

However, we have some serious issues in front of us and more can still be done 

to improve the safety on the ground and in our airspace for commercial as well as 

general aviation. 

With sequestration many agencies are making decisions on where to cut, and the 

FAA is no different. While the FAA has been clear that the agency will make cerVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
76 

tain the aviation system continues to operate safely, I am concerned about the longterm impacts of these cuts. 

I have some concerns regarding the FAA’s progress on safety rulings and decision 

to close air traffic control towers. I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you, Administrator Huerta, as well as all of the investigators and overseers about maintaining 

safe operations from the manufacturing process, on the runway and at airports, as 

well as in the air. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

I would like to thank Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Thune for holding this important hearing on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) progress 

on safety initiatives. I have worked tirelessly with my colleagues on the Commerce 

Committee and the Families of Flight 3407 to ensure that the important reforms 

the Congress mandated in the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act (PL 111–216) 

are implemented I in a timely fashion. Unfortunately, critical rulemakings required 

by this legislation have missed a series of deadlines over the past three years. Despite these shortcomings, I was recently encouraged to receive a letter from FAA 

Administrator Huerta that committed the agency to completing their work on the 

Pilot Qualifications and Flight Crew Member training rules by August and October 

of this year, respectively. 

However, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) April 2013 

Significant Rulemakings report, the FAA was delayed by nearly thirty days in the 

submission of the Pilot Qualifications rule to the DOT for review. While this delay 

concerns me and the many stakeholders involved in this issue, I remain optimistic 

that the DOT and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will review, clear, and 

publish this rule by the July 26 deadline outlined in the report. I implore the Administrator and his counterparts at DOT and OMB to make a steadfast commitment 

to this schedule. 

In addition, the Flight Crew Member training rule is expected to be sent to DOT 

for review by June 3, 2013. I urge the Administrator to assure the Committee that 

this deadline will also be met in a timely fashion. When it comes to aviation safety 

and making sure the mistakes made on Flight 3407 can never be allowed to happen 

again, these rules are the cornerstones of achieving that reform. Therefore, the flying public can ill afford any deviation from these deadlines. 

Thank you to Administrator Huerta for his testimony today and I again thank the 

Chair and Ranking Member for their leadership on this important issue. 

COUNTY OF ANOKA

OFFICE OF COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

Anoka, MN, April 12, 2013 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Chairman Rockefeller: 

I am writing on behalf of the Anoka County Board of Commissioners to request 

that this letter be submitted for the record in your upcoming hearing titled, ‘‘Aviation Safety: FAA’s Progress on Key Safety Initiatives.’’ It is our sincere hope that 

you will take the opportunity afforded by this hearing to discuss with FAA Administrator Michael Huerta the negative impact of the planned air traffic control tower 

closures on not only local communities like ours, but also on the national interest. 

In a March 5, 2013 letter, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) advised affected contractors and facilities that the administration expects to cease funding air 

traffic control services on a vast majority of the contract air traffic control towers 

throughout the United States. This cessation of funding is necessary for the FAA 

to implement the budget sequestration. The tower at the Anoka County-Blaine Airport (ANE) is one of 149 towers expected to be closed. 

The Anoka County-Blaine Airport (ANE) is one of six reliever airports in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area and is a reliever airport for Minneapolis-St. 

Paul International Airport (MSP). ANE is the only large reliever airport in the 

north metro area and its closing would be devastating not only to the economic vitality of the northern portions of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, but 

also on the national economy. The congestion and flight delays that would likely inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
77 

crease at MSP as a result of the loss of a viable alternative airport would adversely 

affect the commercial airline industry nationwide. 

In addition to the detrimental effects of the cuts on the commercial airline industry, closing the tower at ANE would hurt some of Minnesota’s largest companies, 

including several Fortune 500 companies, like Medtronic and Cargill, and the vendors that serve them. As these large companies operate nationwide and worldwide, 

reduced or more costly access to necessary transportation facilities would not only 

affect local and state economies, but also the national economy. 

On a purely local level, the Anoka County-Blaine Airport has a significant economic impact. The most recent study of the reliever airports in the Minneapolis-St. 

Paul metropolitan area was completed by the Wilder Foundation in 2005. It reported that nearly 110,000 operations occurred at the Anoka County-Blaine Airport 

in 2004. Also, there were 12 businesses leasing land and reporting income in excess 

of $5 million in non-revenue receipts. It was estimated in that study that 41,000 

visitors arrived in the metro area via ANE and 350 jobs were dependent on airport 

operations. The total economic impact of ANE in 2004 was estimated at just over 

$35 million annually. 

Since the study was completed there have been significant improvements to the 

airport. Anoka County invested nearly $20 million in runway expansions, an Instrument Landing System, lighting improvements and necessary taxiways and ramp 

areas. A new Fixed Based Operation has been constructed by our private partner, 

Key Air of Minnesota, who also invested millions of dollars in a new facility on the 

northwest quadrant of the airport. This business has brought many new jobs to the 

area and the operator reported more than $7 million in revenue to the Metropolitan 

Airports Commission in 2012. 

In addition to the negative economic impact of the tower closures, the closures 

also have significant implications for aviation safety. I have attached a photograph 

of the Anoka County-Blaine Airport and would like to note the following points. 

ANE airfield has two runways that are approximately at 90 degrees to each other. 

They are about the same length: one is 5,000 feet; the other is 4,800 feet in length. 

These two runways intersect near their midpoint (see photograph). There is an instrument landing system available on the East-West runway, which means most jet 

traffic will land and take off in an east-west direction using the instrument landing 

system. Prop aircraft, however, normally take off into the wind and often will choose 

to use the North-South runway. While there are procedures in place that each pilot 

must follow, operating without a control tower to manage the flow is an accident 

waiting to happen. 

In addition, most airports have a sight line from the ends of each runway to the 

others. At ANE, as you can see from the photo, this is not the case. From Runway 

36–18 you cannot see either end of Runway 9–27, and of course either end of Runway 9–27 cannot see the beginning of Runway 36–18. Also it is doubtful that there 

is an open line of sight between Runways 18–36 and 2–79 for most of the year, 

compounding this issue. Consequently, a jet landing on Runway 2–79 or 9–27 as the 

case may be, depending on the direction of approach, would not be seen by a plane 

attempting to take off from Runway 18–36. The situation could arise where a crash 

would occur at the intersection of these two runways. 

As a final point, we would like to note that it does not appear that FAA exercised 

good judgment in determining which airports should remain towered and at which 

airports the towers should close. Of the 251 contract towers nationwide, ANE ranks 

number 46 from an operations perspective at just under 80,000 operations in 2012. 

There are 75 towers scheduled to remain open that have fewer operations than ANE 

and 34 of those scheduled to remain open have less than half as many operations 

as ANE. Of the 149 towers slated to close, only 21 had more operations in 2012 than 

ANE. 

78 

This distressing news comes at a time when we should be adding jobs and 

strengthening our economy; not taking jobs away and weakening our position for 

future growth. Consequently, we request that Congress reallocate the sequestered 

cuts to ensure that the tower at ANE and many other towers throughout the reliever airport system throughout the country remain operational. Please act immediately to help us keep the Anoka County-Blaine Airport operating at its peak efficiency. 

Thank you for your consideration. 

Sincerely, 

RHONDA SIVARAJAH, 

Chair, 

Anoka County Board of Commissioners. 

Attachment: Photograph 

Copies To: 

The Honorable John Thune, Ranking Member 

U.S. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

560 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Amy Klobuchar 

302 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20024 

The Honorable Al Franken 

309 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20024 

The Honorable Michelle Bachman 

2417 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

The Honorable Erik Paulsen 

127 Cannon House Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20003 

Gary Schmidt 

Director of Reliever Airports, Metropolitan Airports Commission 

DOUGLAS COUNTY COLORADO—OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

April 12, 2013, Castle Rock, CO 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller, 

I am writing on behalf of the Douglas County Board of Commissioners to request 

that this letter be submitted for the record in your upcoming hearing titled, ‘‘Aviation Safety: FAA’s Progress on Key Safety Initiatives.’’ We hope that you will take 

the opportunity afforded by this hearing to seek clarification from FAA Administrator Michael Huerta on the planned elimination of overnight shifts at certain air 

traffic control towers, and to share with Administrator Huerta the negative impact 

of this plan. 

On February 22, FAA released a list of 72 air traffic control towers at which they 

would eliminate overnight shifts in response to budget cuts imposed by the sequester. Included on that list was Centennial Airport (APA) in Arapahoe County, Colorado. 

Since releasing the list in February, FAA has not made available any details on 

the planned cuts. Airports on the list still do not know when the cuts will take effect, or even if FAA still plans to move forward with the cuts in light of the recent 

legal action taken against the administration regarding its plan to outright close 

149 control towers. Clarification on this matter would be extremely helpful so that 

all involved parties can develop a plan to mitigate the damage done by the elimination of the overnight shift at APA. 

Eliminating the night shift at Centennial Airport would have a significant impact 

on both the local and national economies. APA is the second busiest general aviation 

airport and the 35th busiest U.S. airport, producing over $800 million of economic 

output per year and supporting over 10,000 jobs. The airport is also one of the few 

self-sustaining general aviation airports in the country. One source of revenue for 

79 

APA comes from international flights, 40 of which land at the airport at night in 

an average year. With the loss of nighttime customs services as a result of these 

cuts, APA would be unable to accommodate those flights, costing fixed-base operators at the airport between $800,000 and $1.3 million in annual sales. The loss of 

revenue from just this one source alone outweighs the cost savings from eliminating 

the nighttime shift. 

In addition to the direct impact of airport activities on the economy, APA is the 

only reliever airport for Denver International Airport (DEN) that has a staffed 

nighttime control tower. Most airlines will not land at an airport without a control 

tower, meaning planes would have to be diverted out of the state of Colorado in the 

event of a problem at DEN. Additionally, if flights that would ordinarily land at 

APA have to land at DEN as a result of the unmanned control tower, congestion 

and flight delays at DEN could very well increase, creating an adverse economic impact on airline operations across the country. 

Not only will the elimination of nighttime shifts have a negative impact on the 

economy, it will also create a number of safety concerns. Because of Centennial Airport’s proximity to Denver International Airport, flights taking off from APA sometimes inadvertently enter DEN’s Class B airspace without contacting the proper air 

traffic staff at DEN. Today, when air traffic controllers at the APA tower observe 

a plane approaching Class B airspace, they radio a warning to the pilot to watch 

his altitude. 

Absent those warnings, planes from APA will likely enter DEN airspace fairly 

regularly, threatening the safety of those planes and the numerous commercial 

flights taking off and landing at DEN. 

APA also serves as a significant hub for air ambulance companies and state, local, 

and Federal law enforcement agencies. Such aircraft are necessarily on-call 24/7, 

and rely on the assistance of air traffic controllers to direct traffic flow during 

stressful emergency missions. The loss of such assistance poses a safety risk not 

only to first responders, but also to those people that they are rushing to help. 

It is for these reasons that we strongly urge FAA to reconsider its decision to 

eliminate the overnight shift at Centennial Airport. And while we believe that Centennial Airport has a particularly strong case, many other airports included on 

FAA’s list have numerous compelling reasons why they should continue to be fully 

funded as well. The Douglas County Board of Commissioners respectfully requests 

that Congress and FAA take any and all necessary steps to avoid these economically 

harmful and dangerous cuts. 

Sincerely, 

JACK HILBERT, 

Douglas County Commissioner, 

Board of Douglas County Commissioners. 

DOUGLAS COUNTY BUSINESS ALLIANCE

Castle Rock, CO, April 12, 2013 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller, 

I am writing on behalf of the Douglas County Business Alliance to request that 

this letter be submitted for the record in your upcoming hearing titled, ‘‘Aviation 

Safety: FAA’s Progress on Key Safety Initiatives.’’ We hope that you will take the 

opportunity afforded by this hearing to seek clarification from FAA Administrator 

Michael Huerta on the planned elimination of overnight shifts at certain air traffic 

control towers, and to share with Administrator Huerta the negative impact of this 

plan. 

On February 22, FAA released a list of 72 air traffic control towers at which they 

would eliminate overnight shifts in response to budget cuts imposed by the sequester. Included on that list was Centennial Airport (APA) in Arapahoe County, Colorado. 

Since releasing the list in February, FAA has not made available any details on 

the planned cuts. Airports on the list still do not know when the cuts will take effect, or even if FAA still plans to move forward with the cuts in light of the recent 

legal action taken against the administration regarding its plan to outright close 

149 control towers. Clarification on this matter would be extremely helpful so that 

all involved parties can develop a plan to mitigate the damage done by the elimination of the overnight shift at APA. 

80 

Eliminating the night shift at Centennial Airport would have a significant impact 

on both the local and national economies. APA is the second busiest general aviation 

airport and the 35th busiest U.S. airport, producing over $800 million of economic 

output per year and supporting over 10,000 jobs. The airport is also one of the few 

self-sustaining general aviation airports in the country. One source of revenue for 

APA comes from international flights, 40 of which land at the airport at night in 

an average year. With the loss of nighttime customs services as a result of these 

cuts, APA would be unable to accommodate those flights, costing fixed-base operators at the airport between $800,000 and $1.3 million in annual sales. The loss of 

revenue from just this one source alone outweighs the cost savings from eliminating 

the nighttime shift. 

In addition to the direct impact of airport activities on the economy, APA is the 

only reliever airport for Denver International Airport (DEN) that has a staffed 

nighttime control tower. Most airlines will not land at an airport without a control 

tower, meaning planes would have to be diverted out of the state of Colorado in the 

event of a problem at DEN. Additionally, if flights that would ordinarily land at 

APA have to land at DEN as a result of the unmanned control tower, congestion 

and flight delays at DEN could very well increase, creating an adverse economic impact on airline operations across the country. 

Not only will the elimination of nighttime shifts have a negative impact on the 

economy, it will also create a number of safety concerns. Because of Centennial Airport’s proximity to Denver International Airport, flights taking off from APA sometimes inadvertently enter DEN’s Class B airspace without contacting the proper air 

traffic staff at DEN. Today, when air traffic controllers at the APA tower observe 

a plane approaching Class B airspace, they radio a warning to the pilot to watch 

his altitude. Absent those warnings, planes from APA will likely enter DEN airspace fairly regularly, threatening the safety of those planes and the numerous commercial flights taking off and landing at DEN. 

APA also serves as a significant hub for air ambulance companies and state, local, 

and Federal law enforcement agencies. Such aircraft are necessarily on-call 24/7, 

and rely on the assistance of air traffic controllers to direct traffic flow during 

stressful emergency missions. The loss of such assistance poses a safety risk not 

only to first responders, but also to those people that they are rushing to help. 

It is for these reasons that we strongly urge FAA to reconsider its decision to 

eliminate the overnight shift at Centennial Airport. And while we believe that Centennial Airport has a particularly strong case, many other airports included on 

FAA’s list have numerous compelling reasons why they should continue to be fully 

funded as well. The Douglas County Business Alliance respectfully requests that 

Congress and FAA take any and all necessary steps to avoid these economically 

harmful and dangerous cuts. 

Sincerely, 

MARY MARCHUN, 

Douglas County Business Alliance. 

DOUGLAS COUNTY, COLORADO—OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

Castle Rock, CO, April 15, 2013 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller: 

As Chair of the National Association of Counties Airports Subcommittee, I lend 

my support to Douglas County’s efforts to express its concerns about the proposed 

FAA cuts to air traffic control tower shifts across the country, as outlined in the 

attached letter. 

And, from a national level position, I also ask that you speak against these cuts. 

On a national level, we have the same concerns that this will significantly impact 

the safety of our citizens and will result in more adverse economic impacts in the 

areas targeted. Surely, cuts can be found that will not be as far reaching as this. 

Thank you for your consideration of this request. 

Sincerely, 

JACK A. HILBERT, 

Chair, 

National Association of Counties Airports Subcommittee. 

81 

DENVER SOUTH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP

Englewood, CO, April 15, 2013 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller, 

The Denver South Economic Development Partnership is an organization of government and business leaders committed to the economic vitality and sustainability 

of the South Metro Denver region. I am writing today, on behalf of this community, 

to request that this letter be submitted for the record in your upcoming hearing, 

‘‘Aviation Safety: FAA’s Progress on Key Safety Initiatives.’’ We hope that you will 

take this opportunity to seek clarification from FAA Administrator Michael Huerta 

on the planned elimination of overnight shifts at certain air traffic control towers, 

and to share with Administrator Huerta the negative impact of this plan. 

On February 22, FAA released a list of 72 air traffic control towers at which they 

would eliminate overnight shifts in response to budget cuts imposed by the sequester. Included on that list was Centennial Airport (APA) in Arapahoe County, Colorado. 

Since releasing the list in February, FAA has not made available any details on 

the planned cuts. Airports on the list do not know when the cuts will take effect, 

or even if FAA still plans to move forward. Clarification on this matter would be 

extremely helpful so that all involved parties can develop a plan to mitigate the loss 

of the overnight shift at APA. 

Eliminating the night shift at Centennial Airport would have a significant economic impact. APA is the second busiest general aviation airport and the 35th busiest U.S. airport, producing over $800 million of economic output per year and supporting over 10,000 jobs. 

APA serves many international flights, 40 of which land at the airport at night 

in an average year. Without nighttime customs services, as a result of these cuts, 

APA would be unable to accommodate those flights, costing fixed-base operators at 

the airport between $800,000 and $1.3 million in annual sales. The loss of revenue 

from just this one source alone outweighs the cost savings from eliminating the 

nighttime shift. 

In addition to the direct impact of airport activities on the economy, APA is the 

only reliever airport for Denver International Airport (DEN) that has a staffed 

nighttime control tower. Most airlines will not land at an airport without a control 

tower, meaning planes would have to be diverted out of the state of Colorado in the 

event of a problem at DEN. 

APA also serves as a significant hub for air ambulance companies and state, local, 

and Federal law enforcement agencies. Such aircraft are necessarily on-call 24/7, 

and rely on the assistance of air traffic controllers to direct traffic flow during emergency missions. The loss of such assistance poses a safety risk not only to first responders, but also to those they are rushing to help. 

It is for these reasons that we respectfully request FAA to reconsider its decision 

to eliminate the overnight shift at Centennial Airport. 

Sincerely, 

MIKE FITZGERALD, 

President & CEO, 

Denver South Economic Development Partnership. 

TOWN OF PARKER COLORADO

Parker, CO, April 15, 2013 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller, 

I am writing on behalf of the Town of Parker Town Council to request that this 

letter be submitted for the record in your upcoming hearing titled, ‘‘Aviation Safety: 

FAA’s Progress on Key Safety Initiatives.’’ We hope that you will take the opportunity afforded by this hearing to seek clarification from FAA Administrator Michael Huerta on the planned elimination of overnight shifts at certain air traffic 

control towers, and to share with Administrator Huerta the negative impact of this 

plan. 

82 

On February 22, FAA released a list of 72 air traffic control towers at which they 

would eliminate overnight shifts in response to budget cuts imposed by the sequester. Included on that list was Centennial Airport (APA) in Arapahoe County, Colorado. 

Since releasing the list in February, FAA has not made available any details on 

the planned cuts. Airports on the list still do not know when the cuts will take effect, or even if FAA still plans to move forward with the cuts in light of the recent 

legal action taken against the administration regarding its plan to outright close 

149 control towers. Clarification on this matter would be extremely helpful so that 

all involved parties can develop a plan to mitigate the damage done by the elimination of the overnight shift at APA. 

Eliminating the night shift at Centennial Airport would have a significant impact 

on both the local and national economies. APA is the second busiest general aviation 

airport and the 35th busiest U.S. airport, producing over $800 million of economic 

output per year and supporting over 10,000 jobs. The airport is also one of the few 

self-sustaining general aviation airports in the country. One source of revenue for 

APA comes from international flights, 40 of which land at the airport at night in 

an average year. With the loss of nighttime customs services as a result of these 

cuts, APA would be unable to accommodate those flights, costing fixed-base operators at the airport between $800,000 and $1.3 million in annual sales. The loss of 

revenue from just this one source alone outweighs the cost savings from eliminating 

the nighttime shift. 

In addition to the direct impact of airport activities on the economy, APA is the 

only reliever airport for Denver International Airport (DEN) that has a staffed 

nighttime control tower. Most airlines will not land at an airport without a control 

tower, meaning planes would have to be diverted out of the state of Colorado in the 

event of a problem at DEN. Additionally, if flights that would ordinarily land at 

APA have to land at DEN as a result of the unmanned control tower, congestion 

and flight delays at DEN could very well increase, creating an adverse economic impact on airline operations across the country. 

Not only will the elimination of nighttime shifts have a negative impact on the 

economy, it will also create a number of safety concerns. Because of Centennial Airport’s proximity to Denver International Airport, flights taking off from APA sometimes inadvertently enter DEN’s Class B airspace without contacting the proper air 

traffic staff at DEN. Today, when air traffic controllers at the APA tower observe 

a plane approaching Class B airspace, they radio a warning to the pilot to watch 

his altitude. Absent those warnings, planes from APA will likely enter DEN airspace fairly regularly, threatening the safety of those planes and the numerous commercial flights taking off and landing at DEN. 

APA also serves as a significant hub for air ambulance companies and state, local, 

and Federal law enforcement agencies. Such aircraft are necessarily on-call 24/7, 

and rely on the assistance of air traffic controllers to direct traffic flow during 

stressful emergency missions. The loss of such assistance poses a safety risk not 

only to first responders, but also to those people that they are rushing to help. 

It is for these reasons that we strongly urge FAA to reconsider its decision to 

eliminate the overnight shift at Centennial Airport. And while we believe that Centennial Airport has a particularly strong case, many other airports included on 

FAA’s list have numerous compelling reasons why they should continue to be fully 

funded as well. The Town of Parker Town Council respectfully requests that Congress and FAA take any and all necessary steps to avoid these economically harmful 

and dangerous cuts. 

Respectfully, 

MIKE WAID, 

Mayor, 

Town of Parker. 

83 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

HON. MICHAEL P. HUERTA

Regarding the Potential Need for Secondary Barriers to Protect the Flight 

Deck 

Question 1. The fortified flight deck door was mandated on commercial aircraft 

in the aftermath of the attacks on September 2001. What actions have been taken 

to address the residual risks of a flight deck breach when the fortified flight deck 

door is opened in flight? 

Answer. FAA regulations (14 CFR 121.584) require that the cabin be secure before 

the flight deck door can be opened during flight. The FAA requires that each air 

carrier document its door transition procedures for compliance with the regulation 

in its Flight Operations Manual (FOM), which it is required to submit to the FAA 

for approval. The FAA’s principal operations inspector (POI) for the carrier signs the 

FOM, which is the air carrier’s ‘‘binding contract’’ with the FAA on how it will comply with all applicable regulations. 

Question 2. A number of years ago, the FAA endorsed the concept of installed secondary flight deck barriers on aircraft to ICAO and in 2011 facilitated the publication of guidance on their design and performance. Has the FAA encouraged the airlines to use this guidance and install these devices? If not, does the FAA have plans 

to encourage the airlines to do so? 

Answer. The FAA worked with RTCA Committee 221, chaired by Boeing and 

United Airlines and comprised of air carrier, manufacturer, and labor representatives, to evaluate the viability of effective secondary barriers. The group sponsored 

extensive testing of possible procedures and equipment at the Federal Air Marshal 

Training Center in Atlantic City, describing its findings in a report (DO–329) that 

included suggested best practices for use by flight and cabin crewmembers. This 

document is available to operators for use in developing Flight Operations Manual 

(FOM) procedures, as well as to FAA inspectors who must review and sign the carrier’s FOM. The FAA encourages all operators to use these findings in developing 

procedures. 

Safety Rules Related to Pilot Training 

Question 3. Administrator Huerta, I am very concerned about potential delays on 

important safety regulations that the FAA is working to finalize regarding pilot 

qualifications and training. Will your agency complete these critical safety rules on 

time? 

Answer. 

• The FAA issued the Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air 

Carrier Operations notice of proposed rulemaking on February 29, 2012, to address the provisions in Public Law (P.L) 111–216, the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, that would require all pilots in Part 121 operations have an airline transport pilot certificate. The final 

rule is in the Executive Branch review process; FAA anticipates the rule will 

be published by July 31, 2013. 

• The FAA issued a Supplemental Notice for Proposed Rulemaking for Qualification, Service and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers May 20, 2011. 

The comment period ended on September 19, 2011. 

• The FAA expects to publish the final rule in October 2013. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

HON. MICHAEL P. HUERTA

Impacts of Sequester and the President’s FY 2014 Proposed Budget 

Question 1. Administrator Huerta, if the President’s FY 2014 budget for the FAA 

is not adopted, should the public expect to see the furloughing of FAA staff, closure 

of some contract and federally staffed control towers, the overnight closure of certain 

air traffic control towers, etc. starting October 1, 2013? 

Since agencies are limited in the numbers of days they can furlough staff during 

a fiscal year, if the President’s budget is not adopted will the FAA have to consider 

the possibility of having to reduce-in force some of its safety personnel? 

Question 1a. If it appears that the FAA may have to revisit the potential closure 

of air traffic control towers this fall, during the intervening time, will it conduct an 

airport-by-airport assessment of the safety impacts of closing individual towers? 

Similarly, has or will the FAA undertake any studies into how overnight closure of 

84 

nearly 150 air traffic control towers will impact safety or efficiency within the broader aviation system? 

Question 1b. Are there safety-related elements of NextGen that are getting delayed as a result of sequestration? 

Answer. The Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013 (P.L. 113–9) provided FAA with 

the budget flexibility needed to end employee furloughs across the agency and keep 

149 low-activity contract towers originally slated for closure in June open for the 

remainder of Fiscal Year 2013. This legislation, however, is not a complete solution 

to sequestration for FAA, much less for the rest of the Federal Government. The 

transfer authority allows us to forestall some of the most acute impacts of sequestration to the flying public. Nonetheless, we remain obligated to slash $637 million 

from the FAA’s budget by the end of the fiscal year. That means that other cost 

saving measures we have implemented (a hiring freeze; contract reductions; suspension of bonuses and awards; and reduced spending on overtime, training, travel, 

supplies, and information technology) will continue. 

Without additional Congressional action, on October 1 the FAA will again face the 

prospect of reductions to aviation services to achieve the long-term funding reductions called for in the Budget Control Act. That is why the FY 2014 President’s 

Budget replaces the across the board spending cuts required by sequestration with 

a balanced approach to solving our Nation’s budgetary challenges. 

If the President’s Budget is not adopted, FAA will have to consider all of the severe cost-saving measures debated this year, including employee furloughs, closure 

of low activity air traffic control facilities, and reductions to overnight staffing at 

some control towers. In addition, given the limited number of days employees can 

be furloughed, reductions in force will also be considered for all segments of FAA’s 

workforce. 

The FAA conducted a safety study of the potential impact of closing 149 towers. 

That study identified that approximately 70 towers were likely to remain open as 

a result of local funding and that additional evaluation was required at a few facilities to determine the impact of their closure on the controlling FAA facility and to 

mitigate any identified impacts. Efficiency impacts were considered out of scope 

from a safety point of view and clearly anticipated as a result of withdrawing funds 

and the potential absence of air traffic control services. We would conduct the same 

type of safety assessment if we consider closing facilities in the future. 

Safety will not be compromised by sequestration. NextGen funding for the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing program, which provides data for 

NextGen, has not been impacted. 

Rulemaking on Pilot Qualifications 

Question 2. Administrator Huerta, this committee helped pass significant safety 

legislation after the crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407 aimed at improving the level 

of safety for our Nation’s regional airlines. 

The pilot qualifications rule and the pilot training rule are long overdue. It was 

a topic of discussion at your confirmation hearing. 

If the FAA doesn’t issue a final rule before August 1, 2013, the default is that 

all pilots, including the first officer, will be required to have 1,500 hours of flight 

experience in order to receive the Air Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate that is required to fly commercial aircraft. 

The FAA sent the proposed final rule to Secretary LaHood’s Office on March 19, 

2013. When does the Secretary’s office have to send the final rule OMB to meet the 

August 1, 2013 deadline? 

Answer. OST passed the rule to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on 

April 30, 2013. 

Question 2a. Bottom line is this: will the FAA issue its final rule on pilot qualifications before August 1, 2013 and what happens if the FAA is late? 

Answer. The FAA expects the Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements 

for Air Carrier Operations final rule will be published by July 31, 2013. If the rule 

is not published before August 2, 2013, the self-enacting provision of P.L 111–216, 

the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, that 

requires all pilots in Part 121 operations have an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate, including the associated flight experience of 1,500 hours, will go into effect. 

Question 2b. If the co-pilot experience requirement ends up being 1,500 hours, do 

you expect there to be a pilot shortage as I have heard some airlines argue? 

Answer. The FAA specifically sought input in the Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations notice of proposal rulemaking on 

the effect the ATP requirement would have on pilot supply. In the NPRM, the FAA 

took advantage of the relieving option within P.L 11–216, which would permit some 

85 

pilots to obtain the ATP certificate with less than 1,500 hours. The FAA determined 

this proposal may address some of the pilot supply concerns expressed by some carriers. 

Question 2c. What preparations is the agency making to implement either the default rule or the new pilot qualifications rule? 

Answer. The FAA expects to publish the Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations final rule before August 2, 2013. The final 

rule is in external executive review. In additional to drafting the final rule, the FAA 

has prepared new and updated existing guidance material associated with the final 

rule. 

One Level of Safety Across Major Airlines and Regional Air Carriers 

Question 3. Administrator Huerta, for years the FAA has spoken of ‘‘one level of 

safety’’ across all airlines, from the large major air carriers to their small regional 

code-share partners. 

It has been over four years since the Colgan airlines crash and I am still not convinced that in practice all regional carriers operate at the same levels of safety as 

the major airlines do. 

When you define ‘‘one level of safety’’ does it mean the exact same level of safety 

or an equivalent level of safety that regional carriers can convince the agency of? 

Doesn’t the flexibility of allowing an equivalent level of safety defeat the idea behind 

‘‘one’’? 

Answer. FAA does not make a distinction between ‘‘major’’ and ‘‘regional’’ carriers, 

as all Part 121 air carriers are required to meet the same standards of 14 CFR Part 

121. Each carrier holds its own air carrier certificate, is required to meet the same 

regulatory standards, and is overseen by the FAA under the same system of oversight. The FAA believes that all carriers operating in accordance with the regulations meet an appropriate level of safety. 

Question 3a. Do you believe that mainline air carriers are finding ways to ensure 

that their regional code-share partners implement the most effective safety practices? 

Answer. In its audit ‘‘Growth of Domestic Airline Code Sharing Warrants Increased Attention’’, the DOT OIG recommended the FAA publish best practices for 

the sharing of safety information between Part 121 air carriers in a code share relationship. In our response to the OIG, we noted the recommendation would be addressed through the implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS). An 

SMS is a comprehensive, process-oriented approach to managing safety throughout 

an organization that includes: an organization-wide safety policy; formal methods 

for identifying hazards, controlling, and continually assessing risk; and promotion 

of a safety culture. SMS stresses not only compliance with technical standards but 

increased emphasis on the overall safety performance of the organization. SMS’s 

proactive emphasis on hazard identification and mitigation, and on communication 

of safety issues, would provide certificate holders robust tools to improve safety. The 

OIG agreed the implementation of SMS would meet the intent of its recommendation. The FAA expects to publish the final rule requiring carriers to implement SMS 

in October 2013. 

Question 3b. In February 2013, the USDOT IG issued a report that recommended 

that the FAA take a closer look at the code-sharing agreements between major airlines and their regional partners. The IG expressed concern about the potential impact that contractual obligations, such as those for on-time performance, may have 

on the safety of a mainline air carrier’s code-share partner. Does the FAA examine 

code-sharing agreements to see whether contractual obligations may put greater 

pressure on regional carriers to take risks? 

Answer. The FAA recognizes that financial conditions may adversely impact safety and for that reason, the FAA has a process and guidance for inspectors on the 

enhancement of surveillance when an air carrier experiences labor unrest, financial 

distress or changes in the air carrier’s operations (such as adopting a new codeshare agreement). To support this process, the FAA asks air carriers to provide to 

their FAA Certificate Management Offices (CMO) their contract performance 

metrics, to include any penalties for failure to meet those metrics. This information 

will be used by the CMO in the development of surveillance programs or to modify 

existing surveillance programs to address any risk created by the metrics. However, 

the FAA will also issue a request by Aug 1, 2013 to air carriers not experiencing 

the difficulties outlined above, to provide current contract metrics. We will also request future metric changes or new contract metrics be provided as they arise. The 

FAA will use this information in development of FY14 surveillance programs. Any 

86 

changes to that information will be reviewed for potential modifications to an air 

carrier’s existing surveillance program. 

Status of the Pilot Records Database 

Question 4. Administrator Huerta, the USDOT IG’s January 2013 report on Airline Safety Act implementation discusses the delays associated with the creation of 

a pilot records database. 

If you recall, Colgan Air was not aware of a number of failed check rides by each 

of the crew members on Flight 3407 when they were hired. The Committee looked 

to address this by requiring the creation of an electronic pilot training record database in the Airline Safety Act. 

The report raised concerns about the FAA’s implementation of this database regarding the timeline for completion and also for what information needs to be included—such as the importance of requiring written comments when a pilot fails a 

check ride. 

Administrator Huerta, can you address the IG’s concerns, both in regards to a 

timeline for implementing this database, as well as making sure the information it 

contains is as comprehensive as possible? 

Answer. Our timeline for implementation of the Pilot Records Database (PRD) requirement is dependent on completing rulemaking to require use of PRD by appropriate operators and the development of an information technology (IT) capability 

to support the database. We are planning for a final rule by the end of FY15. For 

the IT database required to support a PRD, assuming no major changes to our functional requirements are needed as a result of rulemaking and available funding for 

system development and fielding, we expect to begin deployment of the PRD in mid 

FY17. 

PL 111–216 requires the FAA to capture certain training records and pilot evaluator (‘‘check airman’’) comments maintained by the air carrier. The FAA is continuing to evaluate methods of complying with Congressional intent in a manner 

that is cost beneficial and does not create any undue burdens on the airline industry. 

Voluntary Safety Actions and Calls-to-Action 

Question 5. Administrator Huerta, your predecessor Administrator Babbitt had a 

voluntary call-to-action for pilots after the Colgan Air crash and a voluntary callto-action for air traffic controllers after a number of incidents of unprofessional behavior. Do you think these two voluntary calls-to-action were fully successful, partially successful, or not successful, and why? 

Answer. We believe our Call to Action for the use of voluntary safety actions has 

been successful. We convened an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) on flight 

and duty time limitations. Its work led to a change in flight duty time and rest regulations. We verified that all Part 121 air carriers had methods to identify and better train poor-performing pilots. We saw a substantial increase in participation in 

both the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. Additionally, all of the major pilot labor organizations 

agreed to develop guidelines on discipline in the flight deck, professionalism in the 

pilot workforce and best practices for mentoring. 

We accelerated implementation of a Professional Standards program for air traffic 

controllers modeled on the successful program in the airlines which is now fully implemented; 

We conducted studies on air traffic controller and technician fatigue and made 

changes to scheduling practices and established Fatigue Risk Management System, 

and asked an Independent Review Panel (IRP) to review the selection, assignment, 

and training of air traffic controllers. The Panel produced a report outlining 49 recommendations to the agency. We accepted the report in its entirety and are working 

to implement all 49 recommendations. 

Air Medical Safety 

Question 6. Several years ago I worked with both Chairwoman Hersman and Mr. 

Guzzetti on legislation to improve the safety of Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS). My legislation built on several NTSB recommendations. 

It took a year with several fatal air medical service accidents for the FAA to initiate a rulemaking in 2010. The FAA Modernization and Reform bill included a 

large section piece of my Air Medical Safety Improvement and instructed the FAA 

to complete its rulemaking. 

Regrettably, there have been several air medical crashes over the past year. Last 

week, the NTSB met to determine the probable cause of an August 2011 HEMS 

crash. One of the safety issues identified is the need for HEMS pilots to receive 

87 

flight training in a simulator to train in skills that are too risky to perform in a 

helicopter. 

Administrator Huerta, what is the status of the final rule on the air medical service standards and when will the final rule to be issued? 

Answer. The Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations (Final Rule) 

addresses 13 NTSB recommendations and the causes of over 150 helicopter air ambulance and commercial helicopter accidents that occurred between 1991 and 2010 

in which over 250 people died. It addresses the requirements of the FAA Reauthorization. The final rule is in executive review and we anticipate it will be issued in 

August 2013. 

Certification Process and Global Supply Chains 

Question 7. Administrator Huerta, transport aircraft manufacturers, business jet 

manufacturers, and general aviation manufacturers increasingly design and produce 

their new products in multiple countries. As you know, the supply chains for these 

new aircraft are also increasingly global in nature. It presents a number of challenges to regulators. There are a series of bilateral treaties in place which helps to 

the extent that specific instances and situations have been identified and addressed. 

As treaties are products of their time, new issues arise that were not envisioned and 

lead to open questions. 

What, if any, are the differences between how the FAA oversees manufacturing 

facilities and how its European counterpart, EASA, oversees manufacturing facilities? 

Answer. The FAA and EASA oversight processes are similar. Both oversee manufacturing and quality systems and yield the same results. The FAA focuses more 

oversight at the product level to ensure product/article conformance to approved design. EASA applies more of a systems approach; it issues and oversees its Production Organisation Approvals (POAs) based on an organizational production system. 

Question 7a. Administrator Huerta, the EASA–FAA bilateral for Technical Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness and Environmental Certification, section 

1.1.6 states that projects involving a separate country of design and country of manufacture are an open question as to regulatory jurisdiction, and shall be settled 

through working arrangements by EASA, FAA, and the applicants. When did this 

topic first come up? Why was an agreement not reached during negotiations regarding these types of situations? 

Answer. A scenario where the State of Design (SoD) is different from the State 

of Manufacture (SoM) can have many unique aspects influenced by industry business arrangements and corresponding regulator oversight standards. Bilateral 

agreements facilitate oversight of such arrangements and require that appropriate 

working procedures are established to document the roles and responsibilities of 

each authority, acting as either SoD or SoM. Having the flexibility to customize a 

working arrangement to the particular situation is preferred, since all possible scenarios cannot be envisioned when establishing the bilateral agreement. 

The issue of splitting SoD and SoM oversight responsibilities has been addressed 

during the evolution of the FAA/EASA Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA) 

and its predecessor agreements. We do not have a specific date to cite when EASA 

and FAA resolved to address the SoD/SoM issues through working arrangements. 

Question 7b. In the case of the new Airbus facility in Mobile, has the FAA started 

discussions with EASA and Airbus as to which regulatory regime will be responsible 

for certifying the production facility and the aircraft produced at said facility? 

What type of certifications will be required for Airbus to assemble at Mobile? Is 

it a production certificate? 

Answer. Production and design certification will be handled by EASA and the Mobile final assembly line (FAL) will function as an extension of the EASA Production 

Organization Approval (POA). No FAA certifications will be required for the facility 

in Mobile. The FAA may be asked to assist Airbus with oversight of the facility 

under the auspices of the FAA/EASA bilateral aviation safety agreement, although 

the FAA has not yet received any such request. 

Question 7c. Will an airworthiness certificate be required for every airplane produced? 

Answer. For aircraft destined for American operators, the airplane will be ‘‘exported’’ from the EASA system to the FAA system, and an airworthiness certificate 

will be issued by FAA. In cases where the final airplane is destined for another 

country, a standard airworthiness certificate will be issued by the destination country. 

Question 7d. It is my understanding that Airbus intends for EASA, not the FAA, 

to certify its future manufacturing facility at Mobile? If true, is the FAA considering 

88 

giving up its jurisdiction to a foreign regulator in the case of Mobile? And if so, can 

you explain why? 

Answer. Airbus intends to apply to EASA for an extension of its EASA-issued Production Organization Approval (POA), thereby remaining under EASA’s jurisdiction. 

The facility in Mobile will act as an extension of the existing Airbus POA and, as 

such, State of Manufacture responsibilities lie with EASA as the technical agent for 

France, the State of Design. 

Question 7e. Assuming that the FAA retains its responsibility to oversee production at Mobile, what organization within the aircraft certification office (AIR) would 

be responsible for conducting that oversight? What impact would this have on resources in the AIR office? 

Answer. The FAA has not received any request from EASA to assist with oversight. If the FAA is requested to assist with oversight of the Mobile facility, then 

the geographic manufacturing inspection office would be responsible (under the 

FAA’s Central Region Small Airplane Directorate). 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

HON. MICHAEL P. HUERTA

Question 1. I am committed to investing in our Nation’s infrastructure and making sure we have the safest airports at all our airports, large and small. That is 

why I have cosponsored the Protect Our Skies Act led by Senators Moran and 

Blumenthal that would keep our air traffic control towers open. There are four air 

traffic control towers slated for closure in Minnesota. Two towers are FAA operated 

at Flying Cloud, Eden Prairie while the two towers at Janes Field in Anoka County 

and St. Cloud Regional are contract towers. Anoka County has written a letter 

about why their tower is important to the community and I request that it be submitted for the record. 

Administrator Huerta—What do fewer towers mean for aviation safety and the 

economies of local communities? What about those towers at airports acting as relievers for large airports like Minneapolis/St. Paul? How is the FAA engaging with 

communities who are desperately working to keep their towers and operations open? 

Answer. The Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013 (P.L. 113–9) provided FAA with 

the budget flexibility needed to end employee furloughs across the agency and keep 

149 low-activity contract towers originally slated for closure in June open for the 

remainder of Fiscal Year 2013. This legislation, however, is not a complete solution 

to sequestration for FAA, much less for the rest of the Federal Government. The 

transfer authority allows us to forestall some of the most acute impacts of sequestration to the flying public. Nonetheless, we remain obligated to slash $637 million 

from the FAA’s budget by the end of the fiscal year. That means that other cost 

saving measures we have implemented (a hiring freeze; contract reductions; and reduced spending on overtime, training, travel, supplies, and information technology) 

will continue. 

The FAA conducted a safety study of the potential impact of closing 149 towers. 

That study identified that approximately 70 towers were likely to remain open as 

a result of local funding and that additional evaluation was required at a few facilities to determine the impact of their closure on the controlling FAA facility and to 

mitigate any identified impacts. Efficiency and local economic impacts were considered out of scope from a safety point of view and are clearly anticipated as a result 

of withdrawing funds and the potential absence of air traffic control services. 

Prior to the enactment of P.L. 113–9, the FAA worked closely with communities 

to enable non-Federal tower operations to continue by assisting with arrangements 

to transfer equipment and other maintenance and logistics support to local authorities. 

Question 2. Administrator Huerta—Transitioning our air traffic system to 

NextGen technologies will provide numerous benefits to our aviation system increased capacity, fewer delays, greater fuel efficiency, and reduced emissions. Additionally, NextGen systems allow for increased safety for passengers and aircraft of 

all types. Implementation of NextGen technologies, including approach and departure technologies known as RNAV, are of interest to airport communities like the 

Minneapolis/St. Paul metro area. While the goal is to make our airports safer it is 

also important for the FAA and airport officials to talk to the public about impacts, 

including environmental impacts. 

Can you talk about the FAA’s role when it comes to public outreach and the way 

the FAA involves stakeholders including operators and communities? Does this include sharing information about any environmental analysis conducted to establish 

89 

changes in procedures? Will you commit to working with the communities surrounding airports, such as the Twin Cities metro area? 

Answer. The FAA engages in a multi-dimensional process for such activities; these 

dimensions can be better described as being formal and informal processes. 

Formally, FAA is in full compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) and other national and local laws and directives that require public notification and engagement regarding the notification of activities or initiatives and the 

impacts from such activities or initiatives through either the Rulemaking processes 

or other directed-venues like public-notice announcements. Another formal venue is 

our collaborative teams formed by our technical staff and specialists, local aviation 

stakeholders including local airport personnel, and National Airspace System (NAS) 

users. These diverse groups come together to design and implement new procedures 

utilizing new technologies that make up our NextGen program’s portfolio. Examples 

include the on-going Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex 

(OAPM) as well as our 3rd Party Vendor procedures design projects. 

The FAA continues to engage these stakeholders so they will provide us with valuable input, gain confidence in our path forward and make the necessary financial 

investments for NextGen to succeed. The FAA has a long history of working closely 

with a broad cross section of industry partners either directly or through RTCA (a 

group that facilitates expert advice to the agency on technical issues) to build consensus and incorporate important recommendations in our NextGen planning. 

One example of our partnerships for NextGen is the Greener Skies initiative in 

Seattle, Washington, where we are partnering with Alaska Airlines, the Port of Seattle and the Boeing Company. We have created new NextGen, satellite-based approaches for all airlines flying into Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SeaTac). 

These flight tracks are shorter, more fuel efficient and environmentally-friendly. 

Informally, the FAA provides information to the public though our public websites 

like http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/. Here, descriptions and current statuses of many 

of our NextGen programs are made available, including the NextGen Implementation Plan (NGIP). This plan is the FAA’s primary outreach document for keeping 

the aviation community, Congress, the flying public and other stakeholders informed about NextGen, along with public media news articles and interviews. This 

public outreach is not only conducted by our national leadership but also by our regional and local field personnel within the communities where they work and live. 

For example, at the kick-off event of every OAPM Study team, public outreach is 

conducted through the local media, who are invited to participate in the kick-off 

event. The FAA participates in these activities at the highest levels and engage in 

an open and frank Q & A session about NextGen with the local media. Local interest groups, communities, and the general public have the opportunity to also express their views and join in the discussion through the regular and official venues 

already established in their areas for matters related to aviation and through their 

elected officials. 

Also, we have an on-going initiative in collaboration with some major airports for 

an interactive display designed to educate passengers about the scope and benefits 

of NextGen. The Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) International Airport interactive kiosk 

located at Terminal C, Gate 17, is designed to educate the public about NextGen 

and the benefits it will create. The NextGen interactive kiosk was jointly developed 

by the FAA and DFW Airport. 

More specifically, in reference to Minneapolis, the FAA has worked closely with 

the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) and their citizens-based Noise Oversight Committee (NOC) on the design and implementation of NextGen PerformanceBased Navigation (PBN) arrival and departure procedures. The FAA continues to 

partner with the MAC and NOC, relying on their extensive experience with communities around Minneapolis-St Paul International Airport (MSP) on effective ways to 

solicit and address the community’s issues related to environmental and operational 

matters. These efforts will continue as we move forward in delivering the benefits 

of NextGen to MSP and the entire Minneapolis metropolitan area. 

Lastly, the FAA has joined with industry stakeholders and community representatives through the Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP), led by the Transportation Research Board (TRB), to develop a template on ‘‘best practices’’ for engaging and informing the aviation community/public on the impacts and benefits of the 

various elements of NextGen technologies. 

Our on-going commitment to work with the NextGen stakeholders and the communities surrounding airports is represented by the expansive and inclusive formal 

and informal process described in this response. In the FAA, we all are part of the 

communities that we serve, where we work and live, and feel that our efforts will 

bring about positive and lasting benefits for all. 

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RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. ROY BLUNT TO

HON. MICHAEL P. HUERTA

Question 1. Mr. Huerta, you’ve warned air travelers about the potential for significant delays due to air traffic reductions necessitated by air traffic controller furloughs. Can you explain why 30-to 40-percent reductions in air traffic at certain airports may occur given that the agency’s sequestration cut is 10 percent, and the 

agency’s controller workforce has grown by approximately 600 controllers—from 

14,537 in 2007 to 15,041 today—while airline operations have dropped by 12 percent 

during this same period? 

Answer. While traffic is down overall, there are some markets where traffic has 

increased. The National Airspace System is truly a system of interdependent operations and seemingly small reductions of available controllers can significantly affect the operations at a particular airport or facility. In addition, we face staffing 

challenges at some of our major facilities and that was compounded by the furlough. 

Each facility operates differently and may have differing impacts depending on the 

specific traffic conditions at that airport. Commonly, a small reduction in available 

certified controllers prevents an individual facility from staffing an operational position which, in turn, reduces efficiency. 

There were no good options for achieving the savings required by sequester. We 

stopped all hiring and promotions and reduced spending to include contracts, training, travel, information technology, and all other categories, but that left us significantly short of the savings target. The only option remaining was to furlough all 

employees so we targeted eleven furlough days beginning April 21 through the end 

of the year, which would have resulted in one furlough day per pay period. We allocated furlough days equally across the whole system. From an operational standpoint, that resulted in a reduction of 10 percent of the available hours that an employee was available to work. 

Question 2. You and I have spoken multiple times previously, most recently last 

November, about the status of the solicitation for the new FAA training facility. 

Given that the FAA is currently conducting training activities at a temporary facility, can you tell me what the current timeline is and when you expect a decision 

to be announced? 

Answer. We anticipate awarding a contract for FAA training services in the second or third quarter of Fiscal Year 2014. 

Question 3. On April 1, I asked the head of the Air Traffic Control Tower Program 

at the FAA for the safety mitigation studies that the FAA has completed for the 

five contract towers currently operating in Missouri, of which four are slated to be 

closed. I know Senator Thune previously made a similar request for the studies for 

all domestic contract towers to be made available to him as well. When can I expect 

those? 

Answer. The FAA developed a national safety case to determine what needed to 

be done to convert Towered airports into non-Towered airports and captured those 

standards into a Safety Risk Management Document (SRMD). That process identified approximately 20 mitigations that would have to be applied at each airport. 

That airport-by-airport information was captured as part of the SRMD. 

Question 4. I understand that the safety studies conducted by the FAA regarding 

the effects of closing these towers on airport operations were preliminary in nature 

and that the FAA is currently undertaking in-depth safety mitigation studies of all 

of these towers. Why were the contracts for these towers revoked before the official, 

complete safety studies were completed? Where is the FAA in the process of completing these in-depth studies? 

Answer. Safety analyses were performed, consistent with the Safety Management 

System used by the Air Traffic Organization (ATO). It is important to recognize that 

changes to the National Airspace System (NAS), such as defunding the contract towers, require several steps in the safety review process before any change is actually 

made. A decision to move forward with a change does not, by itself, impose any 

change in the NAS, but it does trigger a further assessment of the safety issues and 

risks associated with implementing the change and an analysis of the necessary risk 

mitigation steps. Changes to the NAS are not actually made without an approved 

implementation plan that properly manages any safety risks. This is the process 

that was followed with the decision to defund contract towers. 

The FAA developed a national safety case to determine what needed to be done 

to convert Towered airports into non-Towered airports and captured those standards 

into a Safety Risk Management Document (SRMD). That process identified approximately 20 mitigations that would have to be applied at each airport. That airportby-airport information was captured as part of the SRMD. 

91 

Question 5. As a bi-product of pushing back the closing dates for the Contract 

Towers at airports, the FAA has had to find new off-sets to comply with the sequester. Where did the FAA cut commensurate spending to comply with the sequester? 

Answer. With the enactment of P.L. 133–9 (Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013), the FAA was allowed to transfer $253 million from accounts previously exempted 

from sequestration. This infusion of funds allowed the agency to cancel a scheduled 

11 day furlough for all employees and keep the 149 low activity contract towers 

originally slated for closure in June open for the remainder of Fiscal Year 2013. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. KELLY AYOTTE TO

HON. MICHAEL P. HUERTA

Question 1. In the hearing, I asked you to clarify the FAA’s decision to close the 

contract tower in Nashua, New Hampshire, and to keep open the contract tower in 

Lebanon, New Hampshire. Since both towers are non-cost share, contract towers 

and since Lebanon has less traffic than Nashua, explain the FAA’s decision to close 

the tower at Nashua and to keep open the tower at Lebanon. What is the distinction? 

Answer. The Nashua, NH FAA Contract Tower (FCT) was identified for defunding 

since it did not have 150K total operations or 10K commercial operations in FY 

2012. The Lebanon, NH FCT was not considered since it had more than 10K commercial operations in FY 2012. 

Question 2. Is the Essential Air Service (EAS) program subject to sequestration? 

If so, has any portion of EAS been cut pursuant to sequestration? How much? 

Answer. The EAS program is subject to a sequester of approximately 5 percent, 

however, the funding mechanisms in place for the program provide the Department 

with sufficient authority to cover the Fiscal Year 2013 requirements. For this reason, we do not believe, at this time, that EAS will experience a shortfall due to sequestration. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN

Question. The NTSB has investigated several crashes of planes that were operating under contracts with Federal agencies, including the Department of Defense 

and the U.S. Forest Service (for firefighting). What recommendations has the NTSB 

made to improve the clarity, consistency and effectiveness of aircraft that are under 

contract for public use? What steps should the FAA and/or other agencies be taking 

to prevent future tragedies? 

Answer. The NTSB has been on record for years calling for clear lines of oversight 

and regulation for these special operations to ensure the safety of the operators and 

the public. In 2011, the NTSB held a forum to discuss public aircraft, their use and 

oversight. 

Many of the FAA regulations do not apply to aircraft operating under public aircraft operations. However, several government agencies contract with private companies for services as public aircraft, but require FAA certification as part of the 

contract. In the FAA’s current guidance, any aircraft or airman certified by the FAA 

is subject to the FAA’s normal surveillance activities regardless of whether operating under civil or public operations. 

In a recent investigation of an accident involving a Department of Defense (DOD) 

contractor, the flight operations were governed by the military requirements when 

it operated as specified in its contract, but in the same contract, was also required 

to use aircraft with a valid FAA airworthiness certificate. The operator met the requirements of the contract with an FAA Special Airworthiness Certificate—Experimental. FAA regulations governing Experimental certificates state: 

‘‘Experimental certificates are issued for the following purposes: (a) Research and 

development. Testing new aircraft design concepts, new aircraft equipment, new 

aircraft installations, new aircraft operating techniques, or new uses for aircraft. 

(b) Showing compliance with regulations. Conducting flight tests and other operations to show compliance with the airworthiness regulations including flights 

to show compliance for issuance of type and supplemental type certificates, 

flights to substantiate major design changes, and flights to show compliance 

with the function and reliability requirements of the regulations. 

(c) Crew training. Training of the applicant’s flight crews. 

(d) Exhibition. Exhibiting the aircraft’s flight capabilities, performance, or unusual characteristics at air shows, motion picture, television, and similar proVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
92 

ductions, and the maintenance of exhibition flight proficiency, including (for persons exhibiting aircraft) flying to and from such air shows and productions. 

(e) Air racing. Participating in air races, including (for such participants) practicing for such air races and flying to and from racing events. 

(f) Market surveys. Use of aircraft for purposes of conducting market surveys, 

sales demonstrations, and customer crew training only as provided in § 21.195.’’ 

These regulations also prohibit the use of an aircraft with an experimental certificate to carry persons or property ‘‘for compensation or hire.’’ Therefore, flights under 

the provisions of the contract were conducted as public aircraft operations. 

The NTSB has recommended that the FAA: 

Take appropriate actions to clarify FAA authority over public aircraft, as well 

as identify and document where such oversight responsibilities reside in the absence of FAA authority. (A–10–150) 

Also, the NTSB has asked the FAA to: 

Develop and implement a surveillance program specifically for 14 CFR Part 135 

operators with aircraft that can operate both as public aircraft and as civil aircraft to maintain continual oversight ensuring compliance with 14 CFR Part 

135 requirements. (A–10–149) 

We believe if these recommendations are implemented and if the FAA exercises 

its current oversight authority, public aircraft operations will be safer. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BILL NELSON TO

HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN

Question 1. In the last five years, how many aviation accidents have occurred at 

or around airports with air traffic controllers and at airport without air traffic controllers on duty (non-towered airports)? 

Answer. According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, in 2011 (latest 

available information) there were over 19,000 civil-use airports in the United States. 

Of that number, approximately 510 have at least part-time air traffic control (ATC) 

towers. In the data the NTSB does collect about aviation accidents, we do not track 

the number of accidents occurring at towered airports versus non-towered airports. 

The causes of many of our accidents are operational and mechanical and we continue to see these types of accidents. For this reason, we have Improve General 

Aviation Safety on our Most Wanted List: http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl.html. 

Also, most recently, we issued six Safety Alerts to the general aviation community— 

pilots and mechanics—in hopes preventing those accidents we see too often. 

Question 2. Based on the aviation accidents that the National Transportation 

Safety Board has investigated during your chairmanship, do you think non-towered 

airports pose an elevated risk for incidents? 

Answer. We have no evidence that there is a higher rate of accidents and incidents at non-towered airports. However, the aviation system is complex with multiple layers of safety, and control towers are another layer of safety in the system. 

Question 3. Does the NTSB consider the air traffic control tower status during investigations, whether as a contributing factor to the cause or the efficiency and 

quality of the response? 

Answer. When investigating any accident or incident where air traffic control 

services are involved, we always evaluate the role of ATC in both its primary role 

of traffic separation and its support role of improving safety by providing other 

weather and advisory services to pilots. We note both positive and negative aspects, 

and document any areas that are exemplary or need improvement. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN

General Aviation Safety 

Question. Chairwoman Hersman, in your testimony you said that general aviation 

fatality rates have shown little movement in recent years despite of efforts to improve safety. 

You cite several leading causes that continue to cause most of the accidents. 

These are loss of control, engine failure, flying in conditions that are beyond the 

pilot or aircraft’s abilities and collision with terrain. What can be done beyond the 

improved safety alerts? 

93 

Answer. General aviation (GA) is a recreational activity that relies on the pilot 

community to make good decisions before, during, and after flight. Over the past 

10 years, the accident rate for GA has averaged 6.7 accidents per 100,000 flight 

hours, which in 2012 equated to 1,470 accidents. Because of this stubborn average, 

in June 2011, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) added Improve 

General Aviation Safety to its Most Wanted List (MWL), and we renewed our commitment to this issue by also including it on our 2013 MWL. We believe that our 

focus on the topic has increased awareness of the safety issues related to being a 

pilot or mechanic in GA. 

Additionally, in June 2012, the NTSB conducted a 2-day forum, ‘‘General Aviation 

Safety: Climbing to the Next Level,’’ that focused on key safety issues such as pilot 

training and performance; pilot access to and use of weather-related information; 

and aircraft design, maintenance, and certification. Panelists included representatives from industry, government, academia, and professional associations. The forum 

was well attended and received considerable media coverage. In addition, throughout the year, staff educated general aviation pilots through briefings and seminars. 

To increase educational efforts, the NTSB will be producing videos for our website 

to accompany and enhance the GA safety alerts. We will also distribute them to 

type clubs and flight schools. 

In early April, we met with various Federal agencies, academia, and appropriate 

organizations to determine what additional information NTSB staff can collect during accident investigations that would assist in the development of safety improvements by not just the NTSB but outside entities as well. Finally, we plan to work 

with outside organizations such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and 

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University as they develop training aids for general 

aviation pilots. 

We welcome the opportunity to work with policymakers, like you, to find additional ways to sharpen the focus on improving GA safety—an area in which we see 

the same accidents over and over. Through education, I believe we can make a positive difference in the rate and number of accidents and fatalities in recreational flying. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS PROVIDED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN

Question 1. During the FAA’s initial certification of the 787 aircraft, Boeing 

claimed that its batteries would emit smoke less than once in every 10 million hours 

of flight. However, the 787 fleet experienced two batteries emitting smoke in less 

than just 100,000 hours of flight. 

Given the disparity between the predicted smoke events and the actual events, 

did the FAA certification process work as intended to mitigate the risk of equipment 

malfunction? 

Answer. The ongoing NTSB investigation is examining the certification process for 

the lithium ion battery used in the 787. The certification process acknowledges that 

equipment malfunctions can occur and, as a result, requires the development of a 

design safety assessment for all equipment on the aircraft to understand and mitigate the risks of equipment malfunction. As part of the safety assessment process, 

the manufacturer takes steps to identify foreseeable failures and analyze their safety effect on the passengers, crew, and aircraft. Evaluating this information as part 

of the design certification process allows the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

to ensure that the manufacturer incorporates sufficient design features, warning indications, and/or flight crew procedures to effectively mitigate the risks such failures 

pose to the aircraft and those on board. Correspondingly, the design safety assessment is a critical step in the certification process. 

As part of the certification process of the 787–8 Electrical Power System, Boeing 

performed a design safety assessment of the main and auxiliary power unit (APU) 

lithium-ion battery to determine the potential hazards that battery failures could 

introduce to the airplane and its occupants and to demonstrate that the risk associated with these failures was sufficiently mitigated. Boeing anticipated that the combined group of failures that could result in battery venting with smoke could occur 

less than once in every 10 million flight hours. However, within about 58,000 flight 

hours, the 787–8 fleet experienced two (one main and one APU) battery failures that 

resulted in smoke emission from the battery. Based on testimony provided at the 

National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) April 2013 investigative hearing on 

Boeing 787 battery design and certification, the testing and analysis performed as 

part of the certification process did not accurately predict how often a single cell 

would vent, resulting in the emission of smoke and electrolyte, or that the venting 

94 

of a single cell could propagate to the other seven cells inside the battery case, causing the release of smoke and electrolyte from the battery. 

Although the probability of this battery failure condition was not accurately assessed as part of the certification process, neither the Japan Airlines battery fire 

incident at Boston Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, or the All 

Nippon Airways battery smoke incident at Takamatsu, Japan, resulted in injury to 

the passengers or crew or significant damage to the airplane. In the Japan Airlines 

battery fire incident, smoke entered the cabin of the airplane after the airplane’s 

only electrical power source, the APU, shut down in response to the battery failure, 

as it was designed to do. This event was after all passengers and crew had disembarked the plane. The cleaning personnel on the airplane at the time the smoke 

began to enter the cabin quickly exited without harm. 

According to information released by the Japan Transport Safety Board regarding 

the circumstances of the All Nippon Airways battery smoke incident, passengers reported odor but not smoke in the main cabin during the incident flight. The airplane 

did not lose electrical power during the incident, thereby allowing the ventilation 

system in the forward electrical equipment bay to function as designed to exhaust 

smoke released from the battery outside the airplane. 

Although the impact of the battery smoke emissions in these incidents was minimal, given the importance of probability analyses to the accuracy of design safety 

assessments used in the FAA’s certification process, the NTSB believes that the underlying factors driving the inaccuracy of the failure predictions must be identified 

to ensure that safety risks in future certification programs are accurately defined 

and understood. 

Question 2. What steps should be taken to improve the FAA certification process 

to prevent this type of incident from happening again? 

Answer. As part of its investigation, the NTSB is examining a number of factors 

affecting the accuracy of Boeing’s probability assessment for a battery venting with 

smoke. The NTSB investigation is also examining the methods, data, and expertise 

used in the certification process to determine that the battery met all applicable 

FAA safety requirements, in particular the nine Special Conditions defined by the 

FAA in 25–359–SC, which are attached. 

Based on its findings to date, the NTSB believes that examination of these factors 

is the first step needed to support the development of useful improvements to the 

FAA certification process. The NTSB will look for vulnerabilities in the underlying 

processes used to evaluate and approve airplane systems and equipment certified 

under Special Conditions, as well as potential implementation shortcomings that 

may be unique to the 787 APU and main lithium-ion battery system certification 

program. The NTSB will make safety recommendations, as warranted, aimed at preventing similar incidents or accidents in the future, and I will share these recommendations with you when they are issued. 

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RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DAN COATS TO

HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN

Question 1. Chairman Hersman: Watching the 787 investigation from the outside, 

it seems there are four distinct investigations going on, at the JTSB, the NTSB, the 

FAA, and Boeing. Since there hasn’t been an accident, who has cognizance and authority over the outcome of these investigations? 

Answer. Senator Coats, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is responsible for the investigation of the January 7 JAL battery fire that occurred at 

Boston’s Logan International airport. Fire on board an aircraft is a safety of flight 

issue, and as such, the NTSB is reviewing the certification and testing of the battery, the manufacturing process used for the battery, and other issues relevant to 

the battery fire. The NTSB issued an interim factual report on March 7, containing 

initial factual information about the battery examination. We hope to complete our 

final report in the next 6 months and issue recommendations to keep this type of 

fire on board an aircraft from happening again. 

In accordance with international agreements, the JTSB is conducting an investigation in to the January 16 ANA battery event. The FAA is conducting separate 

certification reviews, and Boeing is leading its own independent review. They are 

the best entities to respond to questions about their on-going reviews and investigations. I can tell you, however, that the JTSB, FAA, and Boeing are all parties to 

our limited battery fire investigation, and the parties are working together to provide factual information related to the January 7 fire, and their participation will 

result in a more complete final report. 

Question 2. Chairman Hersman: As you know Congress passed legislation in 2010 

that enacted regulations making it tougher to become an airline pilot. Specifically, 

the bill required the FAA to draft and enact a number of regulations with regards 

to the experience a pilot must have before they can be hired to engage in airline 

(Part 121) flying. At the core of the proposed regulations is that all airline pilots— 

captains and first officers—must have an Airline Transport Pilot Certificate by August of 2013. The ATP certificate comes with a new eligibility requirement of between 750 and 1,500 hours of total flight time (the ‘‘1,500 hour rule’’), with 750 

hours applying to military pilots and 1,500 hours applying to most civilian pilots. 

For civilian-trained pilots, this represents about a 700-hour increase over current 

airline hiring minimums. I’m not an expert in this area, but I imagine that given 

a choice an airline will hire pilots who show proficiency, rather than a specific number of hours. 

By forcing airlines to look for such high hours, do you reduce the pool of candidates to such a degree that it has an unintended, negative safety consequence? 

Answer. The NTSB has focused our recommendations on crew proficiency on specific procedures and training, needed regulations, and needed guidance to crews and 

operators rather than flight hour minimums. For greater insight on these issues, I 

have attached NTSB comments to the recent NPRM the FAA issued on the topic. 

Question 2a. How would you characterize the impact this potential rule has on 

the pool of qualified applicants available to commercial airlines? 

Answer. It would be difficult to determine the impact of this potential rule on the 

pool of qualified applicants. The NTSB has consistently advocated that qualification 

as an airline flight crewmember should be based on knowledge, skills, professionalism, and proficiency. 

Question 3. Chairman Hersman: In your written testimony you stated ‘‘industry 

changes—including two pilot cockpits and the advent of regional carriers had resulted in opportunities for pilots to upgrade to captain without having accumulated 

significant experience as a first officer in a Part 121 operation.’’ 

In your tenure as Chairman, what correlation have you seen between low hours 

and accidents at regional and mainline carriers? 

Answer. In several of our investigations, the NTSB has seen airline pilots with 

various levels of flight hours who make mistakes. As a result, the NTSB has issued 

recommendations that we believe will improve the knowledge, skills, professionalism, and proficiency of flight crew. 

Question 3a. Can you please share with us the specific accidents at Part 121 carriers that occurred as a result of pilots upgrading to captain without accumulating 

experience in Part 121 operations? 

Answer. Unfortunately, we have not yet conducted a more in depth search of all 

our aviation investigations in which pilot training was a leading or contributing factor. 

Question 4. Chairman Hersman: As you may know Purdue University’s College 

of Technology has a very highly regarded flight training program. Universities like 

99 

Purdue are producing competent pilots, who are flying in Part 121 environments, 

who will have about 400–500 hours upon graduation. How will these pilots bridge 

the gap between their current training and the hour expectations of the anticipated 

rule? 

Answer. The NTSB believes that a combination of focused academic training and 

structured flight training can benefit aspiring pilots. The FAA’s recent NPRM does 

not address how to define, conduct oversight of, and apply this academic credit. We 

believe these issues must be addressed to fully evaluate how academic class time 

can be treated as training. 

Question 4a. Has any thought been given to pilots who entered flight training assured that they would be eligible for hire upon graduation, who will now have to 

go and spend years outside of the structured training environment? 

Answer. As stated previously, the NTSB believes that appropriate knowledge, 

skills, professionalism, and proficiency are attributes a new pilot should have. 

Question 4b. Is there a danger that they will lose some of their knowledge and 

training during this period of time? 

Answer. Programs should increase and enhance pilots’ knowledge, skills, proficiency, and professionalism. 

Question 4c. There is, already, an enormous cost burden on future pilots. Will this 

rule put the cost of training out of reach for aspiring pilots? 

Answer. The NTSB does not conduct cost-benefit analysis, but through our investigations, awareness of industry training technology, standards, and initiatives, we 

know that flight training devices and simulators, if used appropriately, may decrease the cost of training and provide a structured training environment for the 

development of airmanship skills, honing procedures, and learning how to address 

abnormalities and emergencies. 

In addition, during a May 2010, forum on pilot professionalism in aviation, ab 

initio training, which allows prospective pilots selected by an airline to participate 

in training ranging from basic ground to flight training to develop the pilot’s line 

qualifications, was discussed. Ab intitio is practiced in other countries. This approach to training lessens the cost to the pilot and exposes them to the airlines culture and the multi-crew concept from the very beginning of their career. 

Last, we know of accredited university gateway programs that provide pilots with 

a career path through mentoring and training from the university level to the airlines. Although we have not conducted analyses of the costs of these approaches, or 

the cost of additional hours of experience, we believe there exist innovative and 

technically competent ways to address this issue at the industry level. 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, DC, April 30, 2012 

Office of the Chairman, 

Docket Operations, M–30, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Attention: Rules Docket No. FAA–2010–0100 

Dear Sir or Madam: 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled ‘‘Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations,’’ which was 

published at 77 Federal Register (FR) 12374 on February 29, 2012. The notice proposes to create new certification requirements for pilots in air carrier operations, including requiring that first officers in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 

121 operations hold an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate and type rating for 

the aircraft to be flown; allowing pilots with an aviation degree or military pilot experience but fewer than 1,500 hours total time as a pilot to obtain an ATP certificate with restricted privileges; and requiring at least 1,000 flight hours in air carrier operations to serve as pilot-in command (PIC) in Part 121 air carrier operations. 

The notice also proposes to modify the requirements for obtaining an ATP certificate 

with an airplane category multiengine class rating or type rating to require 50 

hours of multiengine flight experience and completion of a new FAA-approved ATP 

certificate training program that would include academic training and training in 

a flight simulation training device. According to the NPRM, these changes would 

help to ensure that pilots entering an air carrier environment have the training and 

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1 According to the NPRM, the PIC requirements would affect pilots operating under Part 121, 

as well as those operating under Part 135 and Part 91, subpart K. In addition, the proposed 

ATP certification training program would affect certificate holders under Parts 121, 135, 141, 

or 142 if they offer the program. 2On April 8, 2010, the NTSB submitted comments on the ANPRM; citing the increasing complexity of the operating environment and the airplanes that are flown today, the NTSB indicated 

general support for the proposed changes in requirements for eligibility, training, and qualifications for air carrier pilots operating under Part 121. The NTSB’s comments also identified the 

need to ensure these changes would apply to all revenue air carrier operations, including those 

conducted under Part 135. Finally, the NTSB acknowledged that the FAA must provide the personnel required to support oversight of the changes discussed in the ANPRM. 

aeronautical experience necessary to adapt to a complex, multicrew environment in 

a variety of operating conditions.1

The NPRM cites the 2009 Colgan Air accident near Buffalo, New York, as an 

event that focused public, congressional, and industry attention on flight crew experience requirements and training for conducting Part 121 air carrier operations. In 

February 2010, the FAA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 

(ANPRM), titled ‘‘New Pilot Certification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations’’ 

(75 FR 6164, February 8, 2010) that sought input on current Part 121 eligibility, 

training, and qualification requirements for seconds-in-command (SICs).2 The current NPRM is based on comments in response to the ANPRM, input received from 

an aviation rulemaking committee established in July 2010, and statutory requirements for modifying ATP certification outlined in the Airline Safety and Federal 

Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–216). 

Adding to that foundation, the NPRM states that the FAA conducted a study of 

61 NTSB investigation reports from Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 through FY 20 10 (31 

Part 121 accidents and 30 Part 135 air carrier accidents, with 107 fatalities, 28 serious injuries, and 44 minor injuries). The study showed that the accidents examined 

involved pilot deficiencies in aircraft handling, including stall and upset recognition 

and recovery, high altitude training, active pilot monitoring skills, effective crew resource management (CRM), stabilized approaches, operations in icing conditions, 

and hypoxia training. The NPRM asserts that the changes to air carrier pilot qualification would address, in part, 21 NTSB safety recommendations in the following 

areas: 

Safety Issue Recommendations 

Training flight crews to respond to sudden, unusual, 

or unexpected aircraft upsets 

A–96–120, A–04–62, A–07–3, and A–09–113 

Developing and conducting stall recovery training 

and providing stickpusher familiarization training 

for pilots of stickpusher-equipped aircraft 

A–1 0–22 and –23 

Training in high altitude operations A–07–1 and –2 

Training and guidance for rudder use in transportcategory aircraft A–02–2 

Airport situational awareness A–07–44 

Stabilized approach concept A–01–69 and A–08–18 

Landing performance calculations A–07–59 and A–08–41 

CRM training A–03–52 

Pilot monitoring duties A–10–10 

Requirements for flight crewmember academic training regarding leadership and professionalism A–1 0–15 

Training in icing conditions A–07–14 

Hypoxia awareness training A–00–110 

Training in landing and taking off in crosswinds with 

gusts 

A–10–110 and –111 

The NTSB is generally supportive of the proposed rule as it relates to many of 

the issues previously identified in our safety recommendations. Specific comments 

on several areas of the NPRM follow. 

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3Many of the recommendations cited in the NPRM contain explicit requirements for procedural change or apply more broadly to other operational areas in the industry. For example, 

although Safety Recommendation A–07–44 identifies the need for specific callouts to be used 

during ground operations when entering a runway before takeoff, the training outlined in the 

NPRM and AC only specifies that situational awareness on the ground be covered as a topic 

area. In addition, Safety Recommendation A–08–18 identifies the need for specific action regarding go-around callouts, but neither the NPRM nor the AC contains any clearly identifiable reference to go-arounds. Finally, Safety Recommendation A–10–23 identifies the need for 

stickpusher familiarization training for pilots of stickpusher-equipped aircraft, but neither the 

NPRM nor the AC specifically outlines stickpusher familiarization. 4For example, Safety Recommendation A–09–22 asks the FAA to ‘‘require principal operations 

inspectors to review their operators’ pilot guidance and training on task allocation and workload 

management during emergency situations to verify that they state that, to the extent practicable, the pilot running the checklists should not engage in additional nonessential operational 

Continued 

Academic Credit To Reduce Flight Experience Requirements 

Although the NTSB has not made recommendations for flight hour m1rumums for 

air carrier pilots (instead focusing its recommendations on specific procedures and 

training, needed regulations, and needed guidance to crews and operators), we stated in our comments on the ANPRM that: 

Ensuring a high level of knowledge, skills, and professionalism for flight crewmembers is essential, but total flight hours or an airline transport pilot certificate does not necessarily equate to the level of knowledge, skills, and professionalism required for consistently safe flight operations. 

The comments went on to state that, ‘‘the NTSB recognizes the value of academic 

training for air carrier pilots, but the NTSB also believes that academic training is 

not a substitute for practical experience.’’ 

An important tenet in the recent NPRM is the concept that, ‘‘in certain circumstances, the combination of focused academic training and structured flight 

training can substitute for actual flight experience’’ (p. 12379). The NTSB concurs 

with the FAA’s acknowledgement that there may be multiple pathways to becoming 

a qualified air carrier pilot. However, there remain unresolved issues for how academic credit should be applied, including student performance within an accredited 

academic program and the type of degree conferred. These issues are not addressed 

in the NPRM and require more evaluation before this proposal is implemented. It 

is essential that the content and rigor involved in academic training be clearly defined and, most importantly, appropriate resources allocated to conduct evaluation 

and oversight of these alternative methods of qualification. 

ATP Certification Training Program 

The NPRM discusses the establishment of an FAA-approved ATP certificate training program for a multiengine class ATP or type rating. The proposed training program outlined under section 61.154 would include 24 hours of classroom training 

and 16 hours of simulator training (8 in a full flight simulator of at least Level C 

standards) and is intended to provide pilots with the core knowledge and understanding in areas critical to operating high performance aircraft in a complex and 

high altitude environment. The training would be provided by an authorized training provider and would be required to be completed before a pilot would be eligible 

to take the ATP knowledge test. Issued as part of the NPRM, draft Advisory Circular (AC) 61–ATP, ‘‘Airline Transport Pilot Certification Training Program for Airplane Category Multiengine Class Rating or Type Rating,’’ contains an outline of the 

curriculum topics and objectives for both the classroom and simulator training making up this training program. The AC is intended for use by training providers when 

developing the program and by the FAA when reviewing and approving the programs. 

Many of the topics contained in the draft AC address issues from NTSB safety 

recommendations; in fact, the FAA notes that most of the 21 recommendations cited 

in the NPRM are addressed, in part, by the proposed amendments and advisory material. Although the NTSB concurs with the FAA’s assessment that, in most cases, 

the topics addressed will serve to partially satisfy the action requested in existing 

recommendations, the amount of specificity provided in the proposed rule and AC 

does not allow a comprehensive review of the degree to which the FAA’s proposed 

actions would satisfY the intent of the NTSB’s recommendations. In some instances, 

neither document provides evidence that a recommendation topic is addressed.3

The NTSB notes that recent safety recommendations in this area have focused on 

attempts to improve crew response to in-flight emergencies, including task 

prioritization and training.4 While AC 61–ATP does include a classroom training obVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
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tasks, such as radio communications.’’ Safety Recommendations A–09–24 and –25, respectively, 

ask the FAA to ‘‘establish best practices for conducting both single and multiple emergency and 

abnormal situations training’’ and ‘‘. . . require that these best practices be incorporated into 

all operators’ approved training programs.’’ 5Safety Recommendation A–11–39 asks the FAA to ‘‘require that role-playing or simulatorbased exercises that teach first officers to assertively voice their concerns and that teach captains to develop a leadership style that supports first officer assertiveness be included as part 

of the already required crew resource management training for 14 Code of Federal Regulations 

Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K pilots.’’ 6Safety Recommendation A–10–13 asks the FAA to ‘‘issue an advisory circular with guidance 

on leadership training for upgrading captains at 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, 

and 91K operators, including methods and techniques for effective leadership; professional 

standards of conduct; strategies for briefing and debriefing; reinforcement and correction skills; 

and other knowledge, skills, and abilities that are critical for air carrier operations.’’ Safety Recommendation A–10–14 asks the FAA to, ‘‘require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 

135, and 91K operators to provide a specific course on leadership training to their upgrading 

captains that is consistent with the advisory circular requested in Safety Recommendation A– 

10–13.’’ 7Safety Recommendation A–10–15 asks the FAA to ‘‘develop, and distribute to all pilots, 

multimedia guidance materials on professionalism in aircraft operations that contain standards 

of performance for professionalism; best practices for sterile cockpit adherence; techniques for 

assessing and correcting pilot deviations; examples and scenarios; and a detailed review of accidents involving breakdowns in sterile cockpit and other procedures, including this accident Obtain the input of operators and air carrier and general aviation pilot groups in the development 

and distribution of these guidance materials.’’ 

jective named ‘‘differences between emergency and non-normal checklist procedures 

and checklists,’’ the guidance on emergency procedures should be made more explicit 

to incorporate the issues identified in these NTSB recommendations. CRM is another topic relevant to previous NTSB recommendations and outlined in AC 61– 

ATP. However, the list of proposed topics in the AC does not explicitly refer to the 

importance of first officer assertiveness, which is an issue addressed in Safety Recommendation A–11–39.5 This recommendation is not cited in the NPRM, but the 

NTSB believes that it is within the scope of the draft advisory material and suggests amending the AC to include information consistent with Safety Recommendation A–11–39 to help support this important aspect of CRM. 

The NTSB is encouraged that the NPRM proposes to centralize the process for 

approving ATP certification training programs. Specifically, the NPRM states that 

only authorized training providers can administer the training required under section 61.154. These providers can be certificate holders providing training and operating under Parts 141, 142, 121, or 135, and each provider must receive approval 

of their ATP certification training program by the FAA Air Transportation Division 

(AFS–200). The NTSB notes that, theoretically, centralization should help to ensure 

standardization of these programs, but suggests that additional guidance documentation with more specific and robust detail about the content of the proposed 

training is necessary to provide a solid foundation on which the FAA can evaluate 

the program content (and to assist training providers to develop courses likely to 

receive FAA approval). For example, additional detail, such as cross-referencing material from draft AC 120–STALL, would be appropriate in the discussion of stall 

training in AC 61–ATP. In addition, the FAA will need to provide the appropriate 

oversight resources to these programs-not only in their initial approval but also to 

conduct ongoing oversight to demonstrate that the content delivered is consistent 

with the approved program. The rigor with which these programs are implemented 

and overseen will determine their ultimate influence on improving safety in air carrier operations. 

Pilot-in-Command Requirements for Air Carrier Operations 

The NPRM proposes primarily experience-based requirements for new PICs in air 

carrier operations. However, the NTSB has previously issued safety recommendations addressing the need for a specific leadership training course for upgrading captains.6 Although the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation A–10–15 7 and describes 

it as applicable to leadership and professionalism training, it addresses only the latter topic. The NPRM does not mention Safety Recommendations A–10–13 and –14, 

which were issued with –15, but the NTSB believes that a leadership training 

course for upgrading captains is within the scope of the proposed rulemaking and 

that section 121.436 should be amended to include a specific requirement for such 

a course. 

In addition to the requirements already outlined in section 121.434, the NTSB has 

recommended that Part 135 pilots who need a type rating for the aircraft they fly 

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8Specifically, Safety Recommendation A–10–57 asks the FAA to ’’require that pilots who fly 

in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 operations in aircraft that require a type rating gain a minimum level of initial operating experience, similar to that specified in 14 CFR 

121.434, taking into consideration the unique characteristics of Part 135 operations.’’ Safety Recommendation A–10–58 asks the FAA to ’’require that pilots who fly in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 operations in an aircraft that requires a type rating gain a minimum 

level of flight time in that aircraft type, similar to that described in 14 CFR 121.434, taking 

into consideration the unique characteristics of Part 135 operations, to obtain consolidation of 

knowledge and skills.’’ 9Safety Recommendation A–04–62 asks the FAA to ‘‘. . . evaluate issues concerning the level 

of automation appropriate to teaching upset training and develop and disseminate guidance that 

will promote standardization and minimize the danger of inappropriate simulator training.’’ 1GAO, Aviation Safety: Status of FAA’s Actions to Oversee the Safety of Composite Airplanes, 

GAO–11–849 (Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2011). 

be required to have a minimum level of initial operating experience.8 Given the applicability of the NPRM to Part 135 pilots who are engaged in air carrier operations, 

the NTSB believes it would be appropriate to incorporate similar experience requirements for these pilots as exist for Part 121 pilots. 

The NTSB supports the use of simulators in training environments and notes that 

the training program outlined in the NPRM specifies that training on topics such 

as low energy states/stalls and upset recovery techniques will be conducted in a 

Level C or higher full-flight simulator. Simulators, regardless of their fidelity, are 

dependent on their physical limits of motion, as well as the efficacy of the available 

computer programs (which are often limited in issues of upset training because of 

the lack of flight test data at the extreme areas of the flight envelope). Simulators 

are not always adequate in portraying upsets and stalls and may inadvertently introduce negative training. Consistent with Safety Recommendation A–04–62,9 the 

FAA should allow flexibility in determining what level of simulation or automation 

is appropriate for specific training. 

Summary Observations 

This NPRM addresses many training issues applicable to becoming an air carrier 

pilot, including some critical issues demonstrated in recent accident history to be 

responsible for accidents. The NTSB is encouraged that its recommendations were 

considered in the development of this proposed rule, especially as the issue areas 

relate to the core content to be provided to new entrant pilots through the ATP certification training program. However, the intent of our recommendations in this 

area is for all pilots to receive training in these topics. Therefore, it is important 

that air carriers provide equally robust training in these topic areas for their current air carrier pilots on a recurrent basis. 

The NTSB appreciates the opportunity to comment on this NPRM. 

Sincerely, 

DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, 

Chairman. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, PH.D. 

Question 1. In September 2011, the GAO released a report entitled ‘‘Status of 

FAA’s Actions to Oversee the Safety of Composite Airplanes’’. Did the GAO find that 

FAA followed its certification process in assessing the Boeing 787 airplane’s composite fuselage and wings against applicable FAA airworthiness standards? 

Answer. GAO found that FAA followed its certification process in assessing the 

Boeing 787 airplane’s composite fuselage and wings against applicable FAA airworthiness standards.1 FAA applied five special conditions when it found that its 

airworthiness standards were not adequate to ensure that the composite structures 

would comply with existing safety levels. These special conditions, which relate to 

novel features of the airplane’s composite fuselage and wings, require Boeing to take 

additional steps to demonstrate the 787’s structures meet current performance 

standards. 

FAA evaluated technical issues related to the composite feature, identified regulatory standards that may not be adequate, consulted with technical and scientific 

experts, and documented Boeing’s position. FAA documented its evaluation of the 

airplane’s design issues and gaps in the regulatory standards. We also found sufficient evidence that in developing each of the special conditions, FAA involved technical specialists and, in some cases, relied on research done at its technical research 

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2FAA also developed five means of compliance issues papers that described how Boeing would 

demonstrate compliance of the 787’s composite fuselage and wings with regulatory standards. 

umented the implications of the composite features on safety, why the existing airworthiness standards were not adequate, and how the special conditions would enable the 787 airplane to meet the current level of safety. 

Question 2. FAA applied five special conditions when it found that its existing airworthiness standards were not adequate to ensure that the composite structures 

would comply with existing safety levels. Did the GAO find that the FAA followed 

its processes which included monitoring Boeing’s compliance with these special conditions? 

Answer. On the basis of our review of FAA’s documentation and discussion with 

FAA officials about its activities in developing the five special conditions, we found 

that FAA followed the special conditions process.2 Specifically, we found that FAA 

followed its process by documenting the technical issues related to the design of the 

composite fuselage and wings, determining the special conditions and equivalent 

level of safety finding, obtaining public comments on draft special conditions, and 

monitoring Boeing’s compliance with those conditions. 

We found that FAA tracked the status of the deliverables Boeing provided in 

order to determine that the manufacturer complied with the special conditions and 

was demonstrating that it could meet safety levels. We found that FAA tracked the 

dates each deliverable was received and approved. For most deliverables, FAA staff, 

rather than a designee, was responsible for approving the deliverable, especially for 

more significant tests and documents. Although FAA desginees were the responsible 

officials for witnessing the certification tests, Boeing representatives invited FAA 

staff to observe the tests as well, and FAA staff attended many of them. Boeing tested full-scale structures, such as a portion of the wing span, the horizontal stabilizer, 

and the fuselage. Some of these tests were conducted to simulate how certain composite structures would perform in a crash. One such test, which FAA technical staff 

monitored, involved vertically dropping a section of a composite fuselage from a 

height and at a rate that FAA required. The test validated the analytical model 

used to assess the behavior of the 787 fuselage for all the design conditions required 

under the special conditions. 

The scope of our review was limited to the special conditions applied to the design 

of the 787 composite airplane’s wings and fuselage. We focused on the special conditions and equivalent safety level finding because we were interested in determining 

whether FAA followed it process for developing them and the information was publicly available. We did not conduct a comprehensive review of all of the airworthiness standards that affect the composite fuselage or wings nor did we make an assessment of whether FAA should have created special conditions for the composite 

features in addition to those identified by FAA. We did not review the formulation, 

testing, or certification of any other special conditions, nor did we evaluate the inspection process for the production of aircraft post-certification. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DAN COATS TO

GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, PH.D. 

Question. Dr. Dillingham, you have a strong research-based background in the 

area of pilot training metrics. Based on your previous research, do you think that 

a pilot shortage would play out unevenly across the country, impacting smaller and 

more remote communities the hardest? 

Answer. Our previous research in this area, from 2011, highlighted various industry concerns about a potential pilot shortage but found the existing evidence mixed 

as to whether a shortage was occurring or might occur in the future. Further, our 

research did not explicitly address how or whether a potential pilot shortage might 

differently impact various markets across the country. 

Nonetheless, we reported in 2011 that regional airlines told us they were expecting legislative changes to pilot requirements and rest rules to impact their ability 

to hire qualified entry-level pilots. In particular, the new rules will require pilots 

to have adequate rest between shifts, and have more flying hours before they can 

become qualified to work as commercial pilots, thus increasing the cost and time it 

takes for people be enter this occupation. Labor economics literature suggests that, 

if an employer cannot find adequate labor at the wage and working conditions it 

is offering, the employer can change those conditions to attract more workers. At 

this time, it is unknown whether regional airlines serving smaller and more remote 

communities will respond to any difficulties finding appropriately trained pilots— 

if those problems develop—by offering higher pay, or assistance with training costs 

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in order to attract their desired workforce. Such activities will raise costs for these 

carriers, who are then likely to pass some or most of those costs on to passengers 

in the form of higher fares. It follows then, that because higher fares will likely lead 

to some curtailment in demand, any developing shortage of pilots may be somewhat 

mitigated by a reduction in the level of aviation service. Whether that dynamic 

would play out differently across different sized communities is unknown at this 

time. 

Looked at more broadly however, many factors, beyond the availability of pilots, 

affect the services that airlines choose to provide. For example, high and volatile 

fuel prices, lack of demand resulting from difficult economic conditions, changes in 

fleet composition, among other factors can all affect whether airlines choose to serve 

various communities. These factors may play a more important role in how services 

to these markets are impacted than the possible impacts of a potential pilot shortage. 

We have work currently underway to revisit these issues in light of continued industry concerns and reports about a pilot shortage, and the impending implementation of pilot rest rules and new pilot requirements. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

JEFFREY B. GUZZETTI

Challenges to FAA Finalizing Rulemaking Required Under the Airline 

Safety Act 

Question 1. Mr. Guzzetti, the IG’s January 2013 status report on the implementation of the Airline Safety Act says, ‘‘FAA faces significant challenges to fully implement the Act, such as meeting timelines for rulemaking efforts while balancing competing interests of stakeholders involved with controversial safety measures.’’ 

For example, FAA is experiencing lengthy delays and considerable industry opposition in issuing and finalizing rules that will enhance pilot qualification standards, 

revise crew training requirements, and establish mentoring and professionalism programs.’’ 

What can the FAA do to overcome these hurdles and issue final rules for pilot 

qualification standards, crew training requirements, and mentoring and professionalism programs that reflect the intent of the authorizing legislation? 

Answer. It is important for FAA to do all they can to expedite these rulemaking 

efforts. 

The success of FAA’s efforts to issue final rules on pilot qualification standards, 

crew training requirements, and mentoring and professionalism depends on the 

Agency’s ability to work with air carriers, industry associations, and other agencies 

to resolve their concerns, if possible, in a timely manner. 

However, we note that rulemaking activities are complex, require extensive public 

notification and comment periods, and can encounter significant industry opposition. 

For example, FAA encountered significant industry pushback due to the increase in 

flight hours the Act mandates for pilots. Similarly, industry is concerned that the 

proposed crew training rule imposes overly prescriptive training hours rather than 

basing pilot training on skills most needed to safely perform flight operations. Finally, FAA has encountered a lengthy delay in issuing a proposed rule establishing 

mentoring and leadership programs, due in part to challenges in developing the appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of these programs. 

To overcome these challenges, FAA will need to work with the various stakeholders to address these issues without losing the intent of the legislation. 

Code-Sharing Between Mainline and Regional Carriers 

Question 2. Mr. Guzzetti, do you believe that mainline air carriers are finding 

ways to ensure that their regional code-share partners implement the most effective 

safety practices? 

Answer. We found that mainline carriers have begun implementing safety information sharing practices with their code-sharing partners. However, the amount, 

type, and frequency of shared information vary greatly. 

We are concerned that FAA has not provided guidance to the industry on how to 

implement safety information-sharing programs or outlined its expectations for 

sharing best practices on code share partnerships. In our recent audit report regarding FAA’s role in domestic airline code sharing, we issued a recommendation to FAA 

to provide this guidance. 

FAA responded to our recommendation by stating that it intends to require each 

Part 121 air carrier to implement a safety management system (SMS). SMS is a 

comprehensive, process-oriented approach to managing safety that includes an orgaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:43 Jun 04, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94798.TXT JACKIE
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nization-wide safety policy; formal methods for identifying hazards, controlling, and 

continually assessing risk; and promotion of a safety culture. FAA believes that a 

tailored SMS program within each airline will be an effective method for safety information sharing. FAA projects that the SMS rule will be issued this September, 

but it is uncertain when it will be fully implemented. Notwithstanding the expected 

benefits of SMS, we believe that continued FAA oversight is needed to ensure mainline carriers are working with their regional partners and implementing the most 

effective safety practices. 

Question 3. In your February 14th report on code-sharing, you recommended that 

the Office of the Secretary and the FAA takes a closer look at the code-sharing 

agreements between major airlines and their regional partners for the potential impact that requirements for contractual obligation such as on-time performance may 

have on safety. 

Can you explain the concerns that your office may have, and what your investigation uncovered in terms of DOT and FAA having awareness of what actually is written into these code share agreements? 

Answer. We found that DOT’s Office of the Secretary (OST) and FAA do not review most domestic code share agreements. Therefore, DOT and FAA have a limited 

awareness of what is contained in these agreements, despite the fact that the increased use of code share agreements between U.S. air carriers has changed the 

aviation landscape. 

OST is required to assess potential economic impacts on competition for domestic 

code share agreements only between two major carriers. However, because just 20 

percent of active Part 121 carriers are considered ‘‘major,’’ the number of agreements that OST is required to review is limited. OST does not voluntarily review 

other ‘‘non-major’’ agreements because it believes that agreements between major 

carriers are the only ones with the potential to adversely impact the market. However, the addition or cancellation of code share agreements between major carriers 

and non-major carriers may affect competition and consumer access in smaller markets. For example, after its merger with Northwest Airlines, Delta Air Lines announced that it was suspending its Delta Connection service to 24 smaller markets 

as the carrier sought to adjust service to these markets. As we noted in our February 2013 report, OST may be missing competitive and economic impacts on smaller markets. 

FAA—the safety regulator—is not required by law to review any domestic code 

share agreements and does not voluntarily do so. FAA considers domestic code share 

agreements to be purely financial arrangements and relies on its oversight of individual carriers to ensure the safe operation of passenger flights. Even so, in its 2009 

Call to Action on Aviation Safety and Pilot Training, the FAA committed to work 

with DOT ‘‘to develop the authority to review agreements between air carriers and 

their regional partners.’’ Despite this commitment, FAA did not pursue this effort. 

Our work shows that FAA can and should take a more active role. Specifically, we 

found that FAA does not review performance metrics contained in code share agreements to ensure they do not have an adverse impact on safety. These metrics, such 

as incentives for on time performance, may have unintended safety implications. As 

a result, FAA must take a more active role in reviewing these agreements. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

JEFFREY B. GUZZETTI

Question. Following the Colgan Air crash outside Buffalo, New York, Congress required the FAA to increase pilot qualifications so that first officers have a minimum 

of 1,500 hours of flight time. The final rule on pilot qualifications is substantially 

overdue. What impacts will there be on pilots, and passengers, if the FAA does not 

complete the rule quickly? 

Answer. Without FAA’s final rule, air carrier pilots will have to meet the more 

stringent qualification requirements of the Act that will automatically take effect on 

August 1, 2013. This means that air carriers will have to remove any pilot from 

their duties if they do not hold a valid Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate; 

which requires a minimum of 1,500 hours of flight time. We do not know, and neither does FAA, how many pilots this would affect, or the impact on flight cancellations. Our recent audit report regarding FAA’s progress on the Act addresses this, 

and cites our recommendation that FAA determine how many pilots do not meet the 

heightened qualification standards required by the Act, and assess the data for the 

potential impact on FAA and air carrier operations. 

Through a rulemaking, FAA has the opportunity to provide flexibility on the pilot 

flight hour and advanced certificate prerequisites. For example, the proposed rule 

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enables FAA to allow pilots with a 4-year aviation degree or military flight experience to obtain the new, restricted ATP for Co-Pilots/Second-In-Command as an alternative to the 1,500 hour requirement. 

FAA’s delayed rulemaking is a particular concern because air carriers may not 

have adequate time to make necessary adjustments to their pilot training and qualification programs to meet the new requirements by the Act’s deadline. As we have 

stated, the impact on passengers is uncertain, and is an important watch item for 

this Committee. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

JEFFREY B. GUZZETTI

Question. I am committed to investing in our Nation’s infrastructure and making 

sure we have the safest airports at all our airports, large and small. That is why 

I have cosponsored the Protect Our Skies Act led by Senators Moran and 

Blumenthal that would keep our air traffic control towers open. There are four air 

traffic control towers slated for closure in Minnesota. Two towers are FAA operated 

at Flying Cloud, Eden Prairie while the two towers at Janes Field in Anoka County 

and St. Cloud Regional are contract towers. Anoka County has written a letter 

about why their tower is important to the community and I request that it be submitted for the record. Can you talk about the need for more air traffic controllers 

to address fatigue and improve safety? 

Answer. Air traffic controllers are an important component to the safe operation 

of air traffic in the air and on the ground. As such, ensuring a well-rested, alert 

controller workforce is critical to the safe and efficient operation of the National Airspace System (NAS). 

FAA currently has more than 15,000 controllers to guide pilots through the NAS. 

In response to a number of incidents of sleeping or unresponsive controllers in 2011, 

FAA has taken action to mitigate the impact of fatigue on controllers by revising 

its scheduling policies. For example, the Agency increased the minimum rest periods 

between shifts and increased the number of controllers assigned to midnight shifts. 

At this time, FAA is still determining how many controllers it needs. We believe 

it is critical that FAA establish proper staffing levels for each of its air traffic control facilities to ensure it has the appropriate number of controllers at the appropriate location. 

Æ