MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 4 ME 12 Docket: Pen

- 22

- 257 Argued : April	6,	2023 Decided: January	30,	2024 Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J.,	and MEAD, JABAR , HORTON , CONNORS , LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS , JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. RALPH	A.	TRIPP	JR.

LAWRENCE ,	J. [¶1] Ralph	A. Tripp Jr. appeals	from	a	judgment	of	conviction ,	entered	by the	 trial	 court	 (Penobscot	 County, Anderson,	 J. ), for several	 drug

- trafficking offenses, possession	of	a	firearm	by	a prohibited	person , and	criminal	forfeiture of property .		Tripp	argues that he	should	be	immune	from	prosecution	for	his drug

- related	offenses , that	the	State’s conduct during its opening statement	and closing	 argument constituted	 error , and	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 erred by	 not providing the jury with	clear instructions.		We	conclude	that Maine’s immunity
statute s do	not	apply in	 this	case , that any prosecutorial error did	not	affect Tripp’s	 substantial	 rights , and	 that	 the	 trial	 court sufficiently corrected	 any potential	confusion	stemming	 from	its	initial	jury	instructions.		We	therefore affirm the	judgment

.2 I.		BACKGROUND
A. Factual	Background [¶ 2 ] “Viewed	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	jury’s	verdict,	the	record supports	the	following	facts.” State	v.	McLaughlin ,	2018	ME	97,	¶	2,	189	A.3d
262 .		Tripp	and	his	wife,	Amanda	Tripp,	resided	in	a room at	a	rooming house located	in	Bangor.		After	the	Tripps	moved	into	the	rooming house,	residents	of the	building	noticed	an	increase	in	the	number	of	visitors	to	the	building,	both during	the day	and at night,	with	the	most	traffic	occurring	on	the	weekends. Residents	 found	 hypodermic	 needles	 outside	 the	 building	 and	 in	 one	 of	 the shared	 bathrooms. Residents	 also	 frequently	 observed	 the Tripps	 letting visitors	into	the	building ;	the	visitors typically stayed	at	the	rooming house for less	 than	 fifteen	minutes. On	multiple	 occasions,	 two	 prior	 residents	 of	 the rooming house	received	o r	purchased	scheduled	drugs	from	Amanda	or	Tripp. [¶ 3 ] On	the	morning	of	April	17,	2021,	Tripp	called	9

- 1

- 1	to	report	that
a	person was	unconscious	in	one	of	the	shared	bathrooms	of	the	rooming house. Soon	thereafter,	t he	Bangor	Fire	Department arrived	on	the	scene , and Tripp let	 them into	 the	 rooming house and then directed	 them	 upstairs. Once the Bangor	Fire	Department was	upstairs ,	the	Tripps	went	into	their room , denied knowing	 the person, and	refused	 to	answer	 the	paramedic’s	questions about3 the	person

. The	paramedics	found	the person in	the	shared	bathroom	with	his head	under	the	sink	and	his	feet	extending	into	the	hallway,	unconscious,	not breathing,	and	without	a	pulse. Because the	person’s core	body	temperature

was still	warm,	the	paramedics	attempted	to	revive him .		After	their	attempts
to	 revive the	 person failed,	 the	 paramedics	 pronounced	 him	 dead.	 	 The decedent’s	cause	of	death	was later determined	to	be	acute	intoxication	from the	combined	effects	of	cocaine,	heroin,	fentanyl,	metha mphetamine,	ethanol, methylphenidate,	 sertraline,	 hydroxyzine,	 alprazolam,	 clonazepam,	 and buprenorphine. [¶ 4 ] Bangor	Police	arrived	on	the	scene	while	the	paramedics	were	still treating	the	decedent.		Tripp	exited his room after	a	police	officer	knocked, and he	 was	 arrested under a n	 outstanding warrant.	 	 Because	 Tripp appeared
intoxicat ed ,	 he	 was	 transported	 to	 the	 hospital .	 	 At	 the	 hospital, he was questioned	by	a	police	officer

. Tripp disclosed the	decedent’s	first	name to	the officer and said	that	the decedent had	been	in	Tripp’s	room	on	a	few	occasions

. [¶ 5 ] While	executing	a	search	warrant for Tripp ’ s room ,	the	police	seized a	 handgun	 with	 ammunition ; approximately	 twenty

- two	 grams	 of	 a fentanyl

- heroin	 blend ; thirty	 grams	 of	 cocaine ; three	 grams	 of methamphetamine; various	 drug paraphernalia,	 includ ing previously	 used4 Narcan	 packaging and hypodermic	 needles ; and	 baggies	 with	 powdery substances in	them .		The	police	also	seized	Amanda’s	phone,	which	contained several	 text	messages	regarding	drug	 transactions	 that either were intended for Tripp	or	referenced	Tripp. In	addition,	while	Tripp	was	being	admitted	to the	hospital, the	police	seized $1,138	in	cash	and	an	unknown	number	of	small bags	of	cocaine	from	Tripp’s	person.
B. Procedural	History [¶ 6 ] The	 State	 charged	 Tripp	 by	 complaint	 on	 April	 20,	 2021 , with various	offenses, and a	grand	jury	indicted	him on	July	30,	2021

. The	State later filed	two	superseding	indictments,	one	on	September	29,	2021,	and	the	other on	November	24,	2021.		The last indictment	charged	Tripp	with	one	count	of aggravated trafficking	 of	a	 schedule d drug	 that	in	 fact	 caused	 the	 death	 of	a person	 (Class	 A), 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1105

- A(1)(K)	 (202 3 ) ; three	 counts	 of aggravated	 trafficking	 of	 scheduled	 drugs :	 fentanyl	 powder,	 coc aine,	 and methamphetamine (Class	A), 17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1105

- A(1)(B)(1),	(M)	(202 3 ) ; one count	 of	 possession	 of	 a	 firearm	 by	 a	 prohibited	 person	 (Class	 C), 15 M.R.S.5 § 393(1)(A

- 1) (1) (202 3 ) ; and	 two	 counts	 of	 criminal	 forfeiture , 15	 M.R.S. § 5826	(202 3 )

. 1
1. Motion	to	Dismiss [¶ 7 ] Tripp	 filed	 a	 motion	 to	 dismiss the	 indictment on September 24, 2021,	 and	 the trial court	 ( A.	 Murray ,	 J. )	 held	 a	 hearing	 on October 20,	 2021.	 	 In	 his	 motion,	 Tripp	 argued	 that 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1111

- B (202 1 ) 2 barred	 prosecution	 of	 the	 State’s	 aggravated	 trafficking	 charges. Specifically,	 Tripp	 argued	 that	 the	 aggravated	 trafficking	 charges	 were “possession

- based	conduct , ” and	 therefore he	was immune	 from	prosecution

1 On	April	13,	2022,	prior	to	the	start	of	trial,	Tripp pleaded guilty to the charge	of forfeiture	of	a firearm and	requested	that	the trial	court be	the	finder	of	fact	with	respect	to the charge	of forfeiture of	cash.

2 Title	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1111

- B	(2021)	provides, A	person	who	in	good	faith	seeks	medical	assistance	for	or	administers	naloxone hydrochloride	 to	 another	 person	 experiencing	 a	 drug

- related	 overdose	 or	 who	 is experiencing	a	drug

- related	overdose	and	is	in	need	of	medical	assistance	may	not	be arrested	or prosecuted	for	a	violation	of	section	1107

- A,	1108,	1111	or	1111

- A	or	a violation	 of	 probation	 as	 authorized	 by	 chapter	 49	 if	 the	 grounds	 for	 arrest	 or prosecution	 are	 obtained	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 person’s	 seeking	 medical	 assistance, administering	naloxone hydrochloride	or	experiencing	a	drug

- related	overdose. Amendments	 to 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1111

- B	 (2021) became	 effective after	 Tripp’s	 crimes	 were committed but	prior	to	Tripp’s	conviction	and	appeal, though these amendments	are	not	relevant	for the	purposes	of	this	appeal. See P.L.	2021,	ch.	299,	§ C

- 1	(effective	Oct.	18,	2021) ; P.L.	2021,	ch.434, §	 8	 (effective	 Oct.	 18,	 2021)

. Relevant	 to this	 appeal,	 however,	 are	 the	 subsequent	 substantive amendments	to	section	1111

- B	that	were	made	while	Tripp’s	appeal	was	pending. See P.L. 2021,	ch. 7 2 4,	§	1 (effective	Aug.	8,	2022) ; P.L.	2021, ch. 759,	§ C

- 1 (effective	Aug. 8, 2022) (codified	at 17

- A M.R.S.	§	1111

- B	(2023) ). Therefore,	where	we	cite	the	2021	version	of	section	1111

- B,	we	refer	to the	version	of	the	statute	in	effect	prior	to	the amendments	effective October 1 8,	2021.		Where	we cite	the	2023	version	of	the	statute,	we	refer	to	the most	recently	amended	and	current	version	of section	1111

- B ,	which	became	effective on August 8, 2022.6 under	section	1111

- B,	because	 the	indictment	based	 the	charges	only	on	 the quantity	of	drugs	seized	and	did	not	allege that he manufactur ed ,	transferr ed ,
or	s old	any scheduled	drugs. The trial court	denied	Tripp’s	motion	to	dismiss on	November 1,	2021, and reason ed , T he	exemption	from	criminal	liability	statute	clearly	identifies	the four	 crimes	 for	 which	 a	 defendant	may	 not	 be	 prosecuted	if	 the grounds	 for	 the	 charge	 were	 obtained	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 person seeking	 medical	 assistance.	 	 The	 legislature	 did	 not	 include [a] ggravated [t] rafficking	 or	 any	 drug	 trafficking	 charge	 in	 the statutory	provision	exempting	a	defendant	from	criminal	liability. Nor	did	the	legislature	use	any	broad	language	about	possession	of drugs	in	the [e] xemption	from	criminal	liability	statute.
2. Jury	Trial [¶ 8 ] The trial	court ( Anderson,	J. ) conducted	a	jury	trial	on	April	13

- 15 and 19

- 21, 2022.		During its opening	statement,	 the	State	commented	on	 the events	that	occurred	prior	to	Tripp	calling	9

- 1

- 1,	as	well	as	Tripp’s	decision	to enter	his room and	his	refusal	to	answer	the	paramedics’	questions. 3 During closing	argument,	the	State	again	commented	on	Tripp’s	refusal	to	answer	the paramedics’	questions

. 4 At	a	later	stage	of	the	State’s	argument,	t he trial	court

3 The	prosecutor	stated,	“You’ll	hear	that [Tripp] and	Amanda	shut	themselves	into [their	room] , denied	knowing	[the	decedent],	and	refused	to	answer	even	basic	questions	from	the	medics	who were	trying	to	save [the	decedent’s] life.”

4 The	prosecutor	argued, You	heard	 that [Tripp] and	Amanda

.	.	. shut	 themselves	into [their room ] and wouldn’t	answer	questions	from	the	EMTs	or	paramedics.		They	wouldn’t	admit	to7 sustained	Tripp’s	objection	to	the	prosecution’s comment, “ A nd	I’m	going	to	ask you,	when	you	are	deliberating,	don’t	compromise	on	[the	decedent’s]	life,”	and issued	a	curative	instruction. 5 [¶ 9 ] At	 the	close	of	evidence	on	April	20,	2022,	 the trial	court denied Tripp’s	motion	for a judgment	of	acquittal.		The trial	court proceeded	to	orally instruct	the	jurors and	then	gave	the jurors	a	written	version	of	its	instructions. At	one	point	during the	oral jury	instruction s ,	the trial	court stated	that	it	was not	reading	aloud	a portion	of	the	instructions	because	the	instructions	were “exactly	the	same ” as	t hose	it	gave	earlier	for	the other	possession charges .		The

knowing	this	person;	wouldn’t	say	who	he	was;	wouldn’t	help	to	identify	the	patient so	that	maybe	they	could	find	his	medical	history	or	anything	else	that	might	help them	to	try	to	resuscitate	this	person.		They	wouldn’t	tell [the	EMTs	or	paramedics] what	he	took.		Nothing.		They	were	panicked.		They	turtled.		They	shelled	themselves in	that	apartment	and	willed	it	to	all	go	away.		But	it	did	not.		They	did	not	expect	the neighbors	to	point	the	police	directly	to [their room ] ,	which	they	did. In	 addition,	 the	 prosecutor	 argued	 that	 Tripp	 “dragged	 the	 [decedent’s]	 body	 outside	 [of	 his room ]”	and	that “there,	under	the	sink,	is	likely	where	[the	decedent]	drew	his	last	breath	and	died, alone,	abandoned	by	his	friend,	abandoned	by	his	dealers	.	.	.	.”

5 The trial	court ’s	limiting	instruction	stated,	in	full, I	just	wanted	to	say	something	briefly	based	on	the	last	comments	that	were	just made.	 	 I’ll	 be	 giving	 you	 full	 instructions	 on	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 case,	 including deliberation,	including	giving	up	a	well

- reasoned	belief	simply	because	you	want	to go	home, and	I’m	going	to	advise	that	you	don’t	do	that. I’m	going	to	talk	about	jury deliberations	and	giving	up	beliefs,	things	like	that.		So,	I	will	be	giving	you	the	proper instructions	on	that,	and

-- and	the	word	compromise	on	his	death	was	mentioned. It’s	not	correct	to	appeal	to [a] jury’s	sympathies	or	emotions	or	things	like	that	in an	argument.		I	will	be	telling	you	that	you	rationally	look	at	the	facts,	and	you	make your	findings	based	on	a	rational	application	of	the	facts,	and	you	come	out	and	give us	your	ver -- your	verdict, and	that	is	basically	what	you’re	going	to	have	to	do.8 trial	 court , however , clarified	 that	 the	 jurors	 could	 read	 the	 skipped instructions	later	if	they	 felt that they	needed	to do	so

. T he oral	and written
instructions also referenced	the	attorneys ’ explanation s of	the	statutory terms “contributing	factor”	and	“cause

. ” In	addition,	the	oral	and	written	instructions directed	 the	jurors	 to	decide	 the	aggravated	 trafficking	charge	 first	and	only address	 lesser	 included	 offenses	 if	 necessary; to skip	 consideration	 of	 the charge	of aggravated	trafficking	in	fentan yl	powder;	and to decide	the charge of trafficking	in	cocaine. The trial	court later	issued	further	instructions	to	the jury	to clarify the order	of the	jury’s analysis. [¶1 0 ] As	to	the	count	charging	Tripp	with	trafficking	in	scheduled	drugs that contributed	 to	 the	 death	 of	 the	 decedent ,	 t he	jury	 returned	a	 not	guilty verdict , but the	 jury found	 Tripp	 guilty	 of	 the	 lesser	 included	 offense	 of aggravated trafficking in scheduled	 drugs (Class	 A),	 17

- A	 M.R.S. § 1105

- A(1)(M) .	 	 The	 jury	 also	 found	 Tripp	 guilty	 of	 trafficking in fentanyl powder,	cocaine,	and	methamphetamine ,	and of illegal	possession	of	a	firearm. The trial	court separately found	that	the $1,138	seized	from	Tripp was	subject to	criminal	forfeiture

.9 3. Sentencing [¶1 1 ] The trial	court held	a	sentencing	hearing	on	July	18,	2022.		With respect	 to the	 charge of aggravated trafficking in fentanyl , the trial	 court sentenced	Tripp to	incarceration for a	term	of	twenty	years	with	all	but	twelve years	suspended and four	years	of	probation. The	trial	court	sentenced	Tripp

to incarceration	 for terms	of twelve	years each	 for	the charges	of aggravated trafficking	in	 cocaine	and	methamphetamine, for	a	 term	 of ten	 years	 for	 the lesser	included	offense	of	aggravated	trafficking	in	scheduled	drugs,	and for	a term	of three	years	for	illegal	possession	of	a	firearm,	with	each sentence	to run
concurrent ly with his twenty
- year sentence for aggravated trafficking	 in
f

entanyl powder .		Tripp	timely	appealed. M.R.	App. P. 2B(b)(1)

. II.		DISCUSSION
A. Title 17
- A	M.R.S.	§	1111
- B	(202 3 )	does	not	retroactively	apply	and the	appropriate version	of	the immunity	statute	to	be	applied	in	this case	 is	17
- A	M.R.S.	 § 1111
- B	 (2021),	which	was the	 version	of	 the statute in	effect	at	the	time	that	Tripp’s	crimes	were	committed. [¶1 2 ] Tripp	argues	that	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1111

- B	(202 3 ) should	retroactively apply	to	this	case

— rather	than	17

- A M.R.S.	§	1111

- B	(2021) applying

— and	that10 the more	 recently	 amended statute would	 provide	 him	 with	immunity	 from prosecution	for	all	charges	brought	against	him. 6 [¶1 3 ] “We	 review	 de	 novo	 whether	 a	 statutory	 amendment	 will	 be applied	retroactively	or	prospectively.” MacImage	of	Me.,	LLC	v.	Androscoggin Cnty

. ,	2012	ME	44,	¶	21,	40	A.3d	975

. When	an	action	is pending and a statute applicable to	 that	 action	 is	 amended , “ the	 legislatively	 created	 rule	 of construction	set	forth	in	1	M.R.S.	§ 302 (2023) applies. ” State	v.	Beeler ,	2022 ME	47,	¶ 1 n.1,	281 A.3d 637

. In	relevant	part,	section	302	provides, The	repeal	or	amendment	of	an	Act	or	ordinance	does	not	affect any	punishment,	penalty	or	forfeiture	incurred	before	the	repeal	or amendment	takes	effect,	or	any	action	or	proceeding	pending	at	the time	of	the	repeal	or	amendment,	for	an	offense	committed or	for recovery	 of	 a	 penalty	 or	 forfeiture	 incurred	 under	 the	 Act	 or ordinance	repealed	or	amended.		Actions	and	proceedings	pending at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 passage,	 amendment	 or	 repeal	 of	 an	 Act	 or ordinance	are	not	affected	thereby. We	have	explained	that	“section	302	provides	a	rule	of	construction	only,	and the	rule	is	controlling	absent	clear	and	unequivocal	language	to	the	contrary.” Reagan	 v.	 R a cal	 Mortg. ,	 1998	 ME	 188,	 ¶	 7,	 715	 A.2d	 925 (quotation	 marks omitted).

6 Tripp	further	asserts	that	Maine’s	Saving	Statute,	1	M.R.S.	§ 302	(2023),	is	unconstitutionally overbroad	such	 that,	when	it	is	applied	in	conjunction	with	 the	amended	section	1111

- B,	his	due process	 and	 equal	 protection	 rights	 under	 both	 the	 Maine	 Constitution	 and	 the	 United	 States Constitution	are	violated. We	find	Tripp’s	arguments	unpersuasive	and	do	not	address	them	further.11 [¶1 4 ] Although	“punishment,	penalty	or	forfeiture” is not	defined	within section	 302,	 we	 have	 applied	 the	 statute	 whe re the	 Legislature has ma d e amendments	 to	criminal	statutes. See,	e.g. , State	v.	All e y ,	263	A.2d	66,	68

- 69 (Me. 1970) (“Punishment	is	the	penalty	for	the	transgression	of	the	law,	and	the sentence	imposed	 by	 the	 trial	court	is	a	‘punishment’	 or	‘penalty’	within	 the terms	 of	 [section	 302].”	 (citation	 omitted)).	 	 We	 have	 also	 held	 that	 a “[p]unishment,	 penalty	 or	 forfeitur e	is	incurred [] at	 the	 time	 the	 offense	 for which	 punishment	 is	 imposed is committed .” Id. at	 69 (emphasis	 added) (alteration	and	quotation	marks	omitted). [¶1 5 ] This	general	rule	of	statutory	construction	may	be	overcome	if	a provision	 expressly	 cites	 section	 302	 or	 states	 explicitly	 that	 it	 should	 be applied	 to pending	proceedings

. MacImage ,	2012	ME	44,	¶	22,	40 A.3d	975. With	respect	to	an	amended	criminal	statute, “ [a] bsent	clear	and	unequivocal language	to	the	contrary ,	a	statutory	amendment	does	not	affect	any	penalties that	 were	 incurred	 before	 the	 amendment	 took	 effect,	 nor	 does	 it	 apply	 to crimes	 committed	 prior	 to	 the	 time	 the	 amendment	 was	 enacted.” State	 v. Shepley ,	 2003	ME	 70,	 ¶ 9,	 822	 A.2d	 1147 (emphasis	 added) ; see, e.g. , Beeler , 2022	ME	47,	¶ 1	n.1,	281	A.3d	637. Thus,	to	determine	whether	an	amended criminal	 statute	 retroactively	 applies,	 we	 have	 consistently	 examined12 “(1) whether	 the	 Legislature	 expressed	 the	 intent	 to	 make	 the	 statute retroactive	 in	 its	 application”	 and,	 if	 so,	 (2)	 “whether	 that	 retroactive application	[of	the	statute]	violates	any	provisions	of	the	Maine	Constitution.”
E

.g. , MacImage ,	2012 ME	44,	¶¶ 21

- 37,	40	A.3d	975. [¶1 6 ]	 	 In	 this	 case, the	 amended	 version	 of	 section	 1111

- B	 must

overcome section	302’s general	rule	of	statutory	construction	in	order	to	have a	 retroactive	 effect on Tripp’s	 charged	 crimes. 7 The	 amended	 version	 of
section 1111

- B,	however, does	not	say	that	it	should be	retroactively	applied	to pending	actions. G iven the absence	of	clear	and	unequivocal	language	to	the contrary, the	 newly	 amended	 section	 1111

- B cannot retroactively	 apply	 to Tripp’s	criminal	penalties

. Because Tripp’s	penalties	were incurred	at	the	time that	 his	 crimes	 were	 committed, see All e y ,	 263 A.2d at 69,	 the	 appropriate immunity	 statute	 to	 be	 applied	 in	 this	 case	 is	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 1111

- B	 (2021), which	 was	 in	 effect	 at	 the	 time	 that	 Tripp’s	 crimes	 were	 committed , see

7 Tripp	 argues	 that section	 302 s hould	 not	 apply	 in	 this	 case	 because	 immunity	 is	 not	 a “punishment,	penalty	or	forfeiture.”		Tripp’s	argument,	however, is	contrary	to the	plain	language	of the	statute.		Section	302	plainly	states	that	“[t]he	repeal	or	amendment	of	an	Act	or	ordinance	does not affect any	 punishment,	 penalty	 or	 forfeiture	 incurred	 before	 the	 repeal	 or	 amendment	 takes effect. ” 1	M.R.S.	 §	302	 (emphasis	added).		Retroactively	applying	 the	amended	version	of	section 1111

- B,	thereby	providing	Tripp	with	immunity to	prosecution ,	would certainly “affect”	the	penalty and	punishment	that	applies	to	Tripp’s	charged	crimes.13 generally	 supra n.2

. We therefore need	 not determine	 whether	 retroactive application	of	the	statute	would	violate	Tripp’s	constitutional	rights.
B. The	 trial	court	correctly determined that,	pursuant	 to	17
- A	M.R.S. § 1111
- B	 (2021),	 Tripp is not	 immune	 from	 the	 charges	 brought against	him
. [¶1 7 ] Tripp	next	argues	that,	even	if	the	newly	amended	section	1111

- B does	not	retroactively	apply	in	 this	case,	 the	 trial	court	erred	by	denying his motion	to	dismiss on	the	ground	that 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1111

- B	(2021) provides	him with	immunity	from	prosecution .		Tripp	asserts	that,	because	he	was	charged for	trafficking	based	on	his	possession	of	certain	quantities	of	scheduled	drugs , the	 State	 needed	 to	 prove	 possession at	 trial ,	 and	 the	 Legislature ’s

cross - referencing	 the	 unlawful	 possession	 statute, 17

- A M.R.S.	 § 1107

- A (202 1 ) ,	 shows	 that	 it intended	 to	 include	 possession

- based	 crimes	 in	 its immunity	statute

. 8 [¶1 8 ] We	have	not	yet	had	the	opportunity	to	review	the	circumstances in	which	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1111

- B	(2021)	provides an	accused with	immunity	and, therefore,	 this	 case	 presents	 “an	 issue	 of	 first	 impression”	 and	 “a	 matter	 of statutory	 interpretation	 that	 we	 review	 de	 novo.” Genujo	 Lok Beteiligungs

8 The	subsections	of	the	unlawful	possession	statute	relevant	to	Tripp’s	argument	have	remained unchanged	since	that	time. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1107

- A	(2023).14 GmbH	v.	Zorn ,	2008	ME	50,	¶	25,	943	A.2d	573. “When	interpreting	a	statute, we	 first	look	at	 the	 plain	meaning	 of	 the	 statutory	language,	 seeking	 to	give effect	to	legislative	intent,	and	consider	the	particular	language	in	the	context of	the	whole	statutory	scheme.” Racal	Mortg. ,	1998	ME	188,	¶	7,	715 A.2d	925 (“We	construe	the	language	[of	a	statute]	to	reach	a	harmonious	result	and	to avoid	 absurd,	 illogical,	 or	 inconsistent	 results.”).	 	 We	 look	 to	 the	 legislative history	of	the	statute only if	it s	language	is amb iguous. See	i d

. [¶1 9 ] Title	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1111

- B	(2021)	provides,	in full , A	 person	 who	 in	 good	 faith	 seeks	 medical	 assistance	 for	 or administers	 naloxone	 hydrochloride	 to	 another	 person	 experiencing	 a drug

- related	 overdose	 or	who	is	experiencing	a	 drug

- related	 overdose and	is	in	need	of	medical	assistance	may	not	be	arrested	or prosecuted for	a	violation	of	section 1107

- A , 1108 , 1111 or 1111

- A or	a	violation	of probation	 as	 authorized	 by chapter 49 if	 the	 grounds	 for	 arrest	 or prosecution	 are	 obtained	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 person’s	 seeking	 medical assistance , administering	 naloxone	 hydrochloride	 or	 experiencing	 a drug

- related	overdose. The	 statute unambiguously	identifies	 the	 violations	 for	which	 the	accused is immune	from	arrest	or	prosecution. If the	accused,	in	good	faith,	either	sought medical	 assistance	 or	 administered	 naloxone	 for	 another	 person	 while that
person was	 experiencing	 a	 drug

- related	 overdose, the	 accused can	 seek immunity from	arrest	or	prosecution only	for	the	four	enumerated	crimes	within the	statute

.15 [¶ 20 ] Our	conclusion	is	further	supported	by	considering the	statute in the	context	of	the	statutory	scheme	of Chapter	45	(Drugs) , which	demonstrates that the	Legislature	intended	to	bar	prosecution	for	crimes	that	are	associated with	 drug	 use	 while	 still	 permitting	 prosecution	 for	 crimes	 that	 involve trafficking,	 furnishing,	 cultivating	 or	 fabricating,	 or	 importing	 drugs. Compare 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §§	 1107

- A,	 1108,	 1111,	 1111

- A	 (2021), with
17

- A M.R.S. §§ 1103	 to	1106

- A,	1116	 to	1118

- A,	1124	(2021). Moreover, the Legislature	demonstrat ed within 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1111

- B	(2021) itself that	it	knew how	to	reference both individual	statute s and	entire	chapters. I f the	Legislature wished	to	include	trafficking	crimes in 17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1111

- B	(2021) ,	it	would have	cited either to	those	statutes	specifically	or to Chapter	45	in	its	entire t y. Cf. State v. Flemming ,	377	A.2d	448,	456	(Me. 1977) (Dufresne,	C.J.,	concurring) (explaining	 that,	 if	 the	 Legislature	 intended	 to	 include	 terms	 within	 an amendment,	“it	could	easily	have	employed	apt	language	therefor.”	(quotation marks	omitted)). The trial	court therefore correctly determined that Tripp	was16 not	immune	from prosecution under	the	version	of	section	1111

- B	in	effect	at the	time	he	committed	the	charged	offenses.
C. Where	prosecutorial error occurred	in	this	case, such error	either did	not	affect	Tripp’s	substantial	rights	or	was harmless. 9
1. T he	 State’s	 references	 to	 Tripp’s	 refusal	 to	 speak	 with paramedics did	not	constitute	prosecutorial	error.

a. Tripp	did	not	invoke	his	right	to	remain	silent. [¶ 2 1]	 	 We review	 for	 obvious	 error	 when	 a	 defendant	 “d[oes]	 not explicitly	object	 to	 the	 testimony	and	 the	prosecutor ’ s	comments	concerning his [right	to	remain	silent] .” State	v.	Lovejoy ,	2014	ME	48,	¶	19,	89	A.3d	1066

. “[T]o	vacate	a	conviction	based	on	the	obvious	error	standard	of	review,	there must	be	(1) an	error,	(2)	that	is	plain,	.	.	.	(3)	that	affects	substantial	rights	.	.	. [and]	(4) the	error [must] seriously	affect [] the	fairness	and	integrity	or	public reputation	 of	 judicial	 proceedings.” Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted)

. “The defendant ’ s	 burden

. .	 .	is	 significant , ” and	w e	 have	 explained	 that “ [w] hen	 a

9 In	this	case,	Tripp	does	not	allege	that	the	prosecutor’s	statements	were	made	in	bad	faith	and instead	focuses	on	the	impact that the	prosecutor’s	statements	had	on	his	trial. Therefore ,	our	review will	focus	on	Tripp’s	claim	of	prosecutorial error and	an	assessment	of	the	impact	of	the	alleged	error on	Tripp’s	due	process	rights. See State	v.	White ,	2022	ME	54,	¶¶ 19

- 20 & n.9,	285	A.3d 262	(using “the	 term	 ‘error’	 instead	 of	 ‘misconduct’	 because	 our	 review	 focuses	 not	 on	 the	 prosecutor’s subjective	intent	but	on	the	due	process	rights	of	the	defendant”). Further,	although	Tripp	alluded to	article	1,	section	6,	of	the	Maine	Constitution	in	his	appellate	brief,	he	failed	to	develop	an	argument based	 on	 that	 provision	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution , and	 we	 deem	 any	 state	 constitutional	 claims waived. Contra	id. ¶	31	n.13.		We	 therefore	address only Tripp’s	claims	asserted	under	 the	 Fifth Amendment	of	the	United	States	Constitution.17 prosecutor’s	statement	is	not	sufficient	to	draw	an	objection,	particularly	when viewed	in	the	overall	context	of	the	trial,	that	statement	will	rarely	be	found	to have	 created	 a	 reasonable	 probability	 that	 it	 affected	 the outcome	 of	 the proceeding.” State	v.	Dolloff ,	2012	ME	130,	¶	38,	58	A.3d	1032

. [¶ 22 ]	 	 The	 Fifth	 Amendment	 right	 to	 remain	 silent includes measures that	 exist	 in	 multiple	 contexts,	 including	 “protections	 against	 compelled self

- incrimination	both	before	and	after	arrest.” Lovejoy ,	2014	ME	48,	¶¶	20

- 22, 89	 A.3d	 1066

. Although	 w e	 have regularly considered	 a	 defendant’s	 Fifth Amendment	 right	 to remain sile nt when interacti ng with law	 enforcement officers , see, e.g. , id. ¶	17 ; State	v.	Rutherford ,	2019	ME	128,	¶¶	3,	20,	214	A.3d
27 ; State v. Nobles ,	 2018 ME	 26,	 ¶¶	 22

- 26,	 179	 A.3d	 910 , we have not yet considered	 whether	 the	 right to	 remain	 silent extend s to situations	 where paramedic s , rather	than	law	enforcement	officers , question a	defendant about the emergency	situation	they	are	responding	to. H owever ,	we need	not	address this	question now . 10 E ven	if the	right	to	remain	silent	extends	to	a	paramedic ’s

10 If , in	 the	 future , we	 were	 to	 consider whether the	 right	 to	 remain	 silent	 applied	 in	 such circumstances,	we	would	need	 to	square	a	defendant’s	right	 to	remain	silent	with	our	recognized health	 and	 safety	 exception. Compare Coppola	 v.	 Powell ,	 878	 F.2d	 1562,	 1565	 (1st	 Cir. 1989) (explaining	that	“[t]he	privilege [to	remain	silent] can	be	asserted	in	any	proceeding,	civil	or	criminal, administrative	or	judicial,	investigatory	or	adjudicatory”	and	that	“viability	of	the	privilege	depends on	whether	a	responsive	answer	to	the	question	might	result	in	harmful	disclosure” (quotation	marks omitted) ) ,	with State	v.	Lockhart ,	2003	ME	108,	¶	18,	8 30 A.2d	433 (“[A]n	officer	is	permitted	to	ask questions	 to	 identify	 the	 suspect,	 check	 his	 or	 her	 identification	 and resolve	 any	 health	 or	 safety18 questioning , we	conclude	that	Tripp	failed	to	demonstrate	that	he	invoked	his right	to	remain	silent in	this	non

- custodial	context .		Although	“we	have	never required	 the	 use	 of	 any	 specific	 words	 for	 a	 person	 to	 enjoy	 constitutional protection	for	his	or	her	silence ,” we	do	require	that “ the	record	demonstrate the	defendant’s	intention	to	exercise	the	constitutional	right	against	compelled self

- incrimination .” Lovejoy ,	2014	ME	48,	¶	25,	89	A.3d	1066. “Thus,	in	many contexts,	 a	 defendant	 is	 not	 deemed	 to	 have	 exercise d	 the	 constitutionally protected	right	against	compelled self

- incrimination by	virtue	of	silence	alone.” Id. [¶ 23 ] “ To	determine	whether	a	defendant	did	express	the	intention	to exercise	 this	 Fifth	 Amendment	 right,	 a	 court	 must	 consider	 the	 specific circumstances	 in	 which	 a	 defendant	 was	 questioned	 and	 the	 defendant ’ s response	to	that	questioning. ” Id. ¶	26.		Here,	after	Tripp	let	the	paramedics into	the	rooming house	and	directed	them	upstairs to	the	unconscious	person , he	went	into	his room ,	denied	knowing	the person,	and	refused	to	answer	the paramedic’s	questions	about	the	person. He	was	not	in	custody,	and b eyond remaining	 silent, Tripp	 did	 not	 expressly	 state	 nor	 otherwise	 manifest	 his

concerns	 regarding	 the	 suspect	 or	 others .” (emphasis	 added) (alterations	 and	 quotation	 marks omitted)).19 intention	to	exercise	the	constitutional	right	against self

- incrimination

. These facts	 are not	 sufficient	 to	 demonstrate	 Tripp’s	 invocation	 of	 his Fifth Amendment right	 against	 self

- incrimination. Cf id

. ¶ 26 (invocation	 of	 right against	 self

- incrimination	 by	 terminating	 telephone	 conversation	 with detective	 after	 stating	 desire	 to	 speak	 with	 a	 lawyer	 and	 refusing	 to	 return detective’s	subsequent	phone	calls); State	v.	Patton ,	2012	ME	101,	¶	15,	50	A.3d 544	(request	 to	speak	with	a	lawyer	during	pre

- arres t,	pre
- Miranda warning interaction	 with	 law	 enforcement	 constitutes	 invocation of right	 to	 remain silent); see	also Wainwright	v.	Greenfield ,	474	U.S.	284,	295	n.	13 (1986)	(noting that	“silence”	includes	“the	statement	of	a	desire	to	remain	silent,	as	well	as	of a	desire	to	remain	silent	until	an	attorney	has	been	consulted”). b. The	 evidence	 of	 Tripp’s	 refusal	 to	 answer	 the paramedics’	 questions	 was	 admissible ; therefore , the State’s	 references	 to	 this	 conduct	 did	 not	 constitute prosecutorial	error. [¶ 24 ] In	 this	 case,	 the	 State	 elicited	 testimony	 that	 Tripp	 refused	 to answer	 the	 paramedics’	 questions	 regarding	 the	 decedent’s	 condition

. As noted	above, because	Tripp	did	not	invoke his	right	against	self

- incrimination, this	testimony	was	admissible	at	trial. See	Nobles ,	2018	ME	26,	¶	26,	179	A.3d 910.	 	 During	 closing	 argument,	 the	 State	 suggested	 that	 Tripp’s	 silence evidenced	a	consciousness	of	guilt. “ A	lawyer	is	permitted	to	argue	on	[ her	or20 his ]	analysis	of	the	evidence,	for	any	position	or	conclusion	with	respect	to	the matters	 stated	 therein,	 and	 the	 central	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 comment	 is fairly	based	on	 facts	in	evidence. ” Dolloff ,	2012	ME	130,	¶ 43,	58	A.3d	1032 (citation	 omitted); see	 also	State	 v.	 Cheney ,	 2012	ME	 119,	 ¶ 35,	 55	A.3d	 473 ( “T he	State	is	free

.	.	. to	forcefully	argue	to	the	jury	that	the	evidence	does	not support	or	is	not	consistent	with	the	defendant's	theory	of	the	case .” ).		Because Tripp	did	not	invoke	his	right	to remain	silent , he	has	not	established	any	error , let	 alone	 obvious	 error	 “so	 clear	 under	 existing	 law	 that	 the	 court	 and	 the prosecutor	were	required	to	address	the	matter	even	in	the	absence	of	a	timely objection.” Nobles ,	2018	ME	26,	¶	2 1 ,	179	A.3d	910 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. 2. Although	 the	 State’s	 references	 to	 Tripp’s	 involvement	 with the	 decedent’s	 death	 constituted	 prosecutorial error , the error	did	not	affect Tripp’s substantial	rights. [¶ 25 ]		Where	Tripp	did	not	object	 to	 the	State’s	closing	arguments,	we review	 for	obvious	error. See	Lovejoy ,	2014	ME	48,	¶	19,	89	A.3d	1066. We review	“allegations	of	prosecutorial [error] in	the	overall	context	of	the	trial.” Dolloff ,	 2012	 ME	 130,	 ¶	 4 4 ,	 58	 A.3d	 1032. In Dolloff , we	 explained	 that “prosecutors	[must]	walk	a	careful	line”	due	to	the	“competing	obligations”	of making	“unflinching	and	assertive	efforts	to	prosecute	those	who	are	alleged	to have	 committed	 crimes” and “avoid[ing]	inviting	 a	jury	 to	make	its	 decision21 based	 on	 bias,	 prejudice,	 conjecture,	 or	 any	 other	 impermissible	 basis.” Id. ¶¶ 40

- 41. W e	also	summarized	the	types	of	statements	that	“will	almost	always be	 placed	 in	 the	 category	 of	 [prosecutorial error ] , ” which	 include “[m]isrepresenting	 material	 facts	 in	 the	 record	 or	 making	 statements	 of material	 fact	 unsupported	 by	 any	 evidence	 .	 .	 .	 [and]	 [m]aking	 statements pandering	to	jurors’	sympathy,	bias,	or	prejudice.” Id. ¶ ¶ 42

- 43

. [¶ 26 ] In	this	case, the	State’s	comments	regarding	Tripp’s	thoughts	and actions	 prior	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 paramedics	 and	 police	 constituted prosecutorial error because those comments were not supported	 by	 the evidence	presented	at	trial. For	example ,	no	evidence	was	presented	to	support the	prosecutor’s	comments	that Tripp and	Amanda	“dragged	the	[decedent’s] body	 outside	 [of	 their room ]”	 nor	 that	 the	 decedent “likely	 .	 .	 .	 drew	 his	last breath	and	died,	alone,	.	.	.	[under	the	sink]

. ” See	supra n. 4

. These	statements constituted	plain	error. See Dolloff ,	2012 ME 130,	¶	3 6 ,	58	A.3d	1032 (“An	error is	 plain	 if	 the	 error	 is	 so	 clear	 under	 current	 law,	 that	 the	 trial	 judge	 and prosecutor	 were	 derelict	 in	 countenancing	 it,	 even	 absent	 the	 defendant’s timely	assistance	in	detecting	it.”	(citations,	and	alteration	and	quotation	marks omitted)). Nevertheless, we	conclude that this plain	error did	not	affect	Tripp’s substantial	rights because t he jury	acquitted	Tripp on	the	charge	of	aggravated22 trafficking	of	a	schedule d drug	that	in	fact	caused	the	death	of	a	person

. Thus, the jury apparently did	not	give any weight to	the State’s comments ,	and the prosecutorial error could	not	have	been sufficiently	prejudicial	to	have	affected the	outcome	of	the	proceeding

. 3. The State ’s request	 that	 the	 jury not	 compromise	 on	 the decedent’s	life	during	deliberations	was	harmless	because	the trial	 court	 gave	 a	 prompt	 curative	 instruction	 that	 directly addressed	 the	prosecutor’s error and	adequately	eliminated any	prejudice. [¶ 27 ] “ The	importance	of	bringing	alleged	error,	including	prosecutorial misconduct,	immediately	to	the	attention	of	the	trial	court	is	manifested	in	the standards	of	review	for	errors	that	were	objected	to	at	trial .” Dolloff ,	2012	ME 130,	¶	3 1 ,	58	A.3d	1032 ; see M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	52(a). Because	Tripp	objected	to the	 prosecutor’s	 statement	 asking	 the	 jurors	 to	 not	 compromise	 on	 the decedent’s	life	 during	 deliberations,	 “ we review	 to	 determine	whether	 there was	actual [error] and,	if	so,	whether	the	trial	c ourt’s	response	remedied	any prejudice	resulting	from	the [error] .” Lovejoy ,	2014	ME	48,	¶ 31 ,	89	A.3d	1066.

“ W e	will generally	defer	to	the	determination	of	a	presiding	Justice,	who	has	the immediate	feel	of	what	is	transpiring,	that	a	curative	instruction	will	adequately protect	against	the	jury	giving	consideration	to	matters	which	have	been	heard but	have	been	stricke n	as	evidence.” Dolloff ,	2012	ME	130,	¶	32,	58	A.3d	103223 (quotation	 marks	 omitted)

. “Any	 concern	 created	 by	 improper	 statements made	by	a	prosecutor	is	likely	to	be	cured	by	a	prompt	and	appropriate	curative instruction,	especially	when	such	an	instruction	is	specifically	addressed	to	the prosecutor’s [error]

. ” Id. (quotation	 marks	 omitted). Therefore, a	 curative instruction	will	only	be	deemed	inadequate	to	eliminate	prejudice	“where	there are	 exceptionally	 prejudicial	 circumstances	 or	 prosecutorial	 bad	 faith.” Id. (quotation	marks	omitted). [¶ 28 ] In	 this	 case,	 the	 trial	 court promptly provided	 a	 curative instruction	 upon	 Tripp’s	 objection	 to	 the	 prosecutor ’s statement. As	 noted
supra ,	making	statements	pandering	to	jurors’	sympathy,	bias,	or	prejudice	is almost	always error ,	and	we	affirm	the	trial	court’s	categorization of	the	State’s

statement	as error . In	its	curative	instruction

— which	was given	immediately after	 holding	 a	 sidebar	 in response to	 Tripp’s	 objection

— the	 trial	 court instructed	the	jury that	it	was	“not	correct	to	appeal	to [a] jury’s	sympathies	or emotions	like	that	in	an	argument”	and	that	the trial court	would	later	give	the jury	“proper	instructions”	on	deliberation	and	to	making	findings	“based	on	a rational	application	of	the	 fact s .” See	supra n.5. Thus,	in	its	prompt	curative instruction,	 the	 trial	 court	 specifically	 addressed	 the	 prosecutor’s error and24 adequately	 eliminated any prejudice	 that	 may	 have resulted

. We therefore conclude that such	error	was	harmless

. D. The	 trial	 court	 sufficiently	 corrected	 any	 potential	 confusion stemming	 from	 its	 initial	 jury	 instructions	 and	 therefore did	 not commit	obvious	error	because Tripp’s	rights	were	not substantially affect ed
. [¶ 29 ] Because	Tripp	did	not	raise	an	objection	to	the trial	court’s jury instructions,	we	review	 for	obvious	error. State	v.	Villacci ,	2018	ME	80,	¶	9,
187 A.3d	576

. Our	review	considers	“the	jury	instructions in	their	entirety to determine	if	the	instructions	failed	to	inform	the	jury	correctly	and	fairly	in	all necessary	respects	of	the	governing	law.” Id. (emphasis	added)	(alteration	and quotation	 marks	 omitted); see	 also State	 v.	 Clark ,	 2021 ME	 12,	 ¶	 16,
246 A.3d 1165 (“We	 review	 jury	 instructions	 as	 a	 whole	 for	 prejudicial

error . . . .” (quotation	marks	 omitted) ).	 	 The	 trial	 court	 has	 the	 discretion	 to provide	 the	jury	with	written	instructions	 that	cover	“all	or	a	part	of	what	is orally	provided.” M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	30(b)

. [¶ 30 ] In Lockhart ,	 we concluded that the	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 commit obvious	error	by orally providing instructions	to	the	jury	on	the	State’s	burden of	proof	but	not	includ ing them	in	the	written	instructions provided	to	the	jury

. 2003	ME	108,	¶	44, 83 0 A.2d	433

. In	our	review,	we	“[c]onsider[ed]	the	spoken and	 written	 instructions	 as	 a	 whole”	 to	 determine	 if	 the	 missing	 written25 instructions	substantially	affected	the	defendant’s	rights. I d

. I n	reaching	our conclusion,	we	reasoned	that	the	defendant	“did	not	object	to	the	absence

.	.	. [of	 the	 instruction] in	 the	 proposed	 written	 instructions	 when	 they	 were discussed	by	counsel	and	the	judge.” Id

. [¶ 3 1] Here,	Tripp	is	mistaken	that	the	trial	court	instructed	the	jury	to rely	on	the	attorneys'	definitions	 for	the	statutory	element	of	a	“contributing factor.” Rather,	the	trial	court	merely	referenced	the	attorneys’	“discuss[ion]	of the	meanings	 of	 the	words”	and	 proceeded	 to	 provide	 the	jury	with	 specific instruction	 on	 the	 law. A lthough	 the	 trial	 court’s	 reference	 may	 have	 been confusing	in	isolation,	 when	looking	 at	 the	instructions	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 trial court	informed	the	jury	of	the term’s	lega l	meaning

. [¶ 32 ] We	also	 find	 unconvincing Tripp ’s assert ion that	 the	 trial	 court erred	by not	read ing the	written	instructions	in	full. Here,	t he trial	court	merely skipped	over	portions	that	were	“exactly	the	same”	as the identical	elements	in other	 charged	 offenses. In	 addition ,	 the trial court	informed	 the	jury of the definitions	it	was skipping and why	it	was	skipping	them ,	and then directed	the jury to	the	appropriate	location	in	the	written	instructions	to	refer to if the	jury had	 additional	 questions. Moreover ,	 the trial court’s	 written	 instructions, which	Tripp	did	not	object	 to, provided	a	sufficient,	stand

- alone	definition	of26 the redundant portions. Therefore, the	oral	and	written	jury	instructions,	in their	entirety,	correctly	and	fairly	informed	the	jury	of all necessary	respects	of the	governing	law. [¶ 33 ] Finally,	 w e	 disagree	 with Tripp ’s	 assertion that,	 given	 the trial

court ’s	 deviations	 and	 ambiguities	 between	 the	 oral	 instructions,	 written instructions,	and	jury	verdict	forms,	the trial court	obviously	erred	by	failing	to provide	 the	 jury	 with	 a	 clear	 roadmap	 of	 how	 it	 should	 analyze	 the	 several charges. W hen	all	 the	jury	instructions	are	 taken	as	a	whole,	 the trial court provided the	 jury with	 a	 sufficient	 roadmap	 to	 reach	 a	 guilty	 or	 not	 guilty verdict	for	each	crime	as	charged. Although Tripp is	correct	that	the written instructions	appear	to have misstate d the	steps	that	the	jury	should	have	taken as	they	analyzed	the	various	charges,	the trial court appears	to	have corrected the jury	 instructions	 and	 clarified	 the verdict	 form	 to	 account	 for	 these
misstatements ; answered	a	question	from	the	jury	as	to	the	correct	analysis	it should	 take	 with	 respect to the offenses	 as	 charged,	 including	 the	 lesser included	offense for	 the	charge	of	aggravated	 trafficking	of	a	scheduled	drug that	in	fact	cause d	the	death	of	a person ; and clarified	that	the	jurors	“do	not have	to	take	up	[ the	charges ]	in	the	order	in	which	[the trial court]	mentioned them	in	[its]	instructions	or,	for	that	matter, [as	they	appeared] in	the	verdict27 form

. ” The	 trial	 court	 further	 clarified	 that	 the	 jury	 must “ do	 the	 thorough analysis ” on	each	count,	but the	analysis	on	each	count could “ be	done	in	any order	that	[the	jury]	want[ s ]	to	do	it.” 11 W e therefore conclude	that	the	trial
court appropriately	 and	 sufficiently	 corrected	 any	 potential	 confusion stemming	 from	 its	 initial	 jury	 instructions and	 that	 Tripp’s	 rights	 were	 not substantially	affect ed

. As	a	result,	the	trial	court	did	not	commit	obvious	error. See	State	v.	Lovejoy ,	2014	ME	48,	¶	19,	89	A.3d	1066	(holding	that	elements	of obvious	error	include	that	the	error	affect	the	defendant’s	substantial	rights). The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Jeremy	 Pratt,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 and	 Ellen	 Simmons,	 Esq.,	 Camden,	 for	 appellant Ralph	A.	Tripp,	Jr. Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Jason	Horn,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen. (orally) ,	Office of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Penobscot	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2021

- 1115 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY

11 Tripp	did	not	object	to	any	of	these	curative	instructions.