III 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 10 

Recognizing that Chinese telecommunications companies such as Huawei and 

ZTE pose serious threats to the national security of the United States 

and its allies. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 28, 2019 

Mr. GARDNER (for himself, Mr. COONS, and Mr. MARKEY) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 

Foreign Relations 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Recognizing that Chinese telecommunications companies such 

as Huawei and ZTE pose serious threats to the national 

security of the United States and its allies. 

Whereas fifth generation (5G) wireless technology promises 

greater speed and capacity and will provide the backbone 

for the next generation of digital technologies; 

Whereas fifth generation wireless technology will be a revolutionary advancement in telecommunications with the potential to create millions of jobs and billions of dollars in 

economic opportunity; 

Whereas Chinese companies, including Huawei, have invested 

substantial resources in advancing fifth generation wireless technology and other telecommunications services 


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•SCON 10 IS 

around the globe, including subsidies provided directly by 

the Government of the People’s Republic of China; 

Whereas Chinese officials have increased leadership roles at 

the International Telecommunications Union, where 

international telecommunications standards are set, and 

companies such as Huawei have increased their influence 

at the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), 

whose work informs global technology standards; 

Whereas Huawei and ZTE have aggressively sought to enter 

into contracts throughout the developing world, including 

throughout Latin America and Africa in countries such 

as Venezuela and Kenya; 

Whereas, in 2012, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives released a bipartisan report naming Huawei and ZTE as national security threats; 

Whereas, in 2013, the United States restricted Federal procurement of certain products produced by Huawei and 

ZTE and has since expanded restrictions on Federal procurement of those products; 

Whereas, in 2016, the national legislature of the People’s Republic of China passed the Cyber Security Law of the 

People’s Republic of China, article 28 of which requires 

‘‘network operators’’, including companies like Huawei, 

to ‘‘provide technical support and assistance’’ to Chinese 

authorities involved in national security efforts; 

Whereas, in 2017, the national legislature of the People’s Republic of China passed the National Intelligence Law of 

the People’s Republic of China, article 7 of which requires ‘‘all organizations and citizens’’—including companies like Huawei and ZTE—to ‘‘support, assist, and coVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:32 Mar 28, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\SC10.IS SC10

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operate with national intelligence efforts’’ undertaken by 

the People’s Republic of China; 

Whereas, in August 2018, the Government of Australia 

banned Huawei and ZTE from building the fifth generation wireless networks of Australia; 

Whereas, in August 2018, Congress restricted the heads of 

Federal agencies from procuring certain covered telecommunications equipment and services, which included 

Huawei and ZTE equipment; 

Whereas, in December 2018, the Government of Japan issued 

instructions effectively banning Huawei and ZTE from 

official contracts in the country; 

Whereas, on December 7, 2018, a Vice-President of the European Commission expressed concern that Huawei and 

other Chinese companies may be forced to cooperate with 

China’s intelligence services to install ‘‘mandatory 

backdoors’’ to allow access to encrypted data; 

Whereas, in January 2019, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a Worldwide Threat Assessment 

that describes concerns ‘‘about the potential for Chinese 

intelligence and security services to use Chinese information technology firms as routine and systemic espionage 

platforms against the United States and allies’’; 

Whereas, in February 2019, the Government of New Zealand 

expressed serious concern about Huawei building the fifth 

generation wireless networks of New Zealand; 

Whereas the Department of Justice has charged Huawei with 

the theft of trade secrets, obstruction of justice, and 

other serious crimes; 

Whereas, against the strong advice of the United States and 

a number of the security partners of the United States, 


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the governments of countries such as Germany have indicated that they may permit Huawei to build out the fifth 

generation wireless networks of those countries; 

Whereas installation of Huawei equipment in the communications infrastructure of countries that are allies of the 

United States would jeopardize the security of communication lines between the United States and those allies; 

Whereas secure communications systems are critical to ensure the safety and defense of the United States and allies of the United States; 

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and other vital international security arrangements depend on strong and secure communications, which could 

be put at risk through the use of Huawei and ZTE 

equipment; and 

Whereas there has been broad bipartisan consensus in Congress for years that Chinese companies like Huawei and 

ZTE present serious threats to national and global security: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That— 

3 (1) Chinese telecommunications companies such 

4 as Huawei and ZTE pose serious threats to the na5 tional security of the United States and allies of the 

6 United States; 

7 (2) the United States should reiterate to coun8 tries that are choosing to incorporate Huawei or 

9 ZTE products in their new telecommunications in10 frastructure that the United States will consider all 


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1 necessary measures to limit the risks incurred by en2 tities of the United States Government or Armed 

3 Forces from use of such compromised networks; 

4 (3) the United States should continue to make 

5 allies of the United States aware of the ongoing and 

6 future risks to telecommunications networks shared 

7 between the United States and such allies; and 

8 (4) the United States should work with the pri9 vate sector and allies and partners of the United 

10 States, including the European Union, in a regular11 ized bilateral or multilateral format, to identify se12 cure, cost-effective, and reliable alternatives to 

13 Huawei or ZTE products. 

Æ 


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