evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must raise claims that are supported by 

specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, 

would entitle him to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 

P.2d 222, 225 (1984). 

First, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to negotiate a plea deal. Appellant fails to demonstrate that his 

counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant 

included a declaration from an attorney who represented him for a 

different criminal matter which states that counsel from the public 

defender's office, including counsel for the instant conviction, discussed a 

plea offer from the State which would have encompassed appellant's 

pending charges and that appellant rejected that offer. Therefore, 

appellant fails to demonstrate that his counsel for this matter did not 

attempt to negotiate a plea deal. Moreover, appellant fails to meet his 

burden to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 

performance, as he fails to demonstrate that counsel could have obtained 

any more favorable concessions from the State or that the district court 

would have accepted it, as there was substantial evidence of his guilt and 

appellant had a lengthy criminal record. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 

, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012). Therefore, the district court did not 

err in denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Second, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to explain the waiver of rights, the charge, or the habitual criminal 

enhancement. Appellant also argues that he has difficulty understanding 

and retaining information that he reads, which caused him to lack a clear 

understanding of the guilty plea agreement. Appellant fails to 

demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient or that he was 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A eD 
prejudiced. Appellant acknowledged in the guilty plea agreement and at 

the plea canvass that he understood the rights he waived, the charge 

against him, and the possible sentences. Appellant further acknowledged 

in the guilty plea agreement and at the plea canvass that counsel had 

answered all of his questions. Appellant fails to demonstrate a reasonable 

probability of a different outcome had counsel explained these issues in 

more detail to appellant. Therefore, the district court did not err in 

denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Third, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to investigate the case in preparation for a possible trial. Appellant 

fails to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient or that 

he was prejudiced. Appellant acknowledged in the guilty plea agreement 

that he had discussed possible defenses with counsel Appellant fails to 

demonstrate that there was any evidence available that counsel would 

have discovered through reasonably diligent investigation that would have 

had a reasonable probability of causing appellant to insist on going to 

trial See Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004). 

Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim without 

conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Fourth, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

pressuring him to plead guilty because counsel was too inexperienced for a 

trial. Appellant fails to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was 

deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant acknowledged in the guilty 

plea agreement and at the plea canvass that he entered his guilty plea 

voluntarily and did not act under duress or coercion. Therefore, the 

district court did not err in denying this claim without conducting an 

evidentiary hearing. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A e 
Fifth, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file more than one motion. Appellant fails to demonstrate either 

deficiency or prejudice for this claim as he fails to identify any motion that 

objectively reasonable counsel would have filed which would have had a 

reasonable probability of causing appellant to refuse to plead guilty and 

insist on going to trial. See Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502-03, 686 P.2d at 225. 

Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim without 

conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Sixth, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to argue that appellant abandoned the crime. Appellant fails to 

demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient or that he was 

prejudiced. Appellant and an accomplice had already begun the process of 

breaking into a business when a police officer arrived on the scene. It was 

only at that time did they attempt to leave the scene of the crime. Under 

these circumstances, appellant did not legally abandon his attempt to 

burglarize the business. See Stewart v. State, 85 Nev. 388, 390, 455 P.2d 

914, 914-15 (1969) ("[O]nce an intent to commit a crime has been formed 

and overt acts toward the commission of that crime have been committed 

by a defendant he is then guilty of an attempt, whether he abandoned that 

attempt because of the approach of other persons or because of a change in 

his intentions due to a stricken conscience." (internal quotations marks 

omitted)). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Seventh, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object when the district court failed to discuss the sentencing 

range for the habitual criminal enhancement during the plea canvass. 

Appellant fails to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice for this claim. After 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 4 

(0) 1947A 
the district court informed appellant of the sentencing range for attempted 

burglary, the State reminded the district court that it was seeking 

adjudication as a habitual criminal. The district court then informed 

appellant of the sentencing range for the habitual criminal enhancement 

and appellant stated that he understood. Appellant fails to demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that he would have refused to plead guilty and 

would have insisted on trial had counsel raised an objection as the district 

court correctly explained the possible sentences to appellant. Therefore, 

the district court did not err in denying this claim without conducting an 

evidentiary hearing. 

Eighth, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea claiming that appellant 

did not understand the possible sentences and that his plea was not 

knowing and voluntary. Appellant fails to demonstrate either deficiency 

or prejudice for this claim. As discussed previously, appellant was 

informed of the possible sentences in the guilty plea agreement and at the 

plea canvass. Appellant also acknowledged in the guilty plea agreement 

and at the plea canvass that he understood the rights he waived by 

entering his plea and that he did so voluntarily. Therefore, appellant fails 

to demonstrate that he would have met his burden to prove his plea was 

invalid or that a presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea had a 

reasonable likelihood of success. See Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 

721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986). Therefore, the district court did not err in 

denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Ninth, appellant argues that his counsel failed to properly 

investigate or present mitigation evidence regarding appellant's mental 

health and difficult past at the sentencing hearing. Appellant fails to 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 5 

(0) 1947A 
demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient or that he was 

prejudiced. At the sentencing hearing, counsel asked for leniency due to 

appellant's difficult childhood, his problems with an addiction to 

methamphetamine, his friend's suicide, and because he could be 

rehabilitated. The district court rejected counsel's argument and 

specifically sentenced appellant due to his lengthy criminal history. 

Appellant fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different 

outcome at the sentencing hearing had counsel investigated these issues 

further or presented additional mitigation evidence of a similar nature. 

Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim without 

conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Tenth, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to properly argue against adjudication as a habitual criminal by 

stressing that the convictions were nonviolent and remote. Appellant fails 

to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Counsel argued that the past 

convictions were nonviolent. Moreover, appellant fails to demonstrate 

that trial counsel's performance was deficient because the habitual 

criminal statute makes no special allowance for nonviolent crimes or 

remoteness of the prior convictions; these are merely considerations 

within the discretion of the district court. See Arajakis v. State, 108 Nev. 

976, 983, 843 P.2d 800, 805 (1992). Appellant fails to demonstrate a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome at the sentencing hearing 

had counsel stressed these issues because appellant had recently been 

convicted of two additional felonies and had recently been charged with 

additional crimes as well. Therefore, the district court did not err in 

denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 6 

(0) I947A 
Eleventh, appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object when the State introduced improper extraneous 

information such as convictions that occurred after appellant committed 

this offense, that appellant faced additional burglary charges, and that 

appellant had used a false name with the district court. Appellant fails to 

demonstrate deficiency or prejudice for this claim. Appellant fails to 

demonstrate that it was improper for the district court to consider 

appellant's criminal history or appellant's fraudulent use of a false name 

with the court. See Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 

(1976) (holding that a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal so long as 

it was not based solely on impalpable or highly suspect evidence). In 

addition, the district court specifically declined to consider the false name 

evidence when sentencing appellant. Appellant fails to demonstrate a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel objected to the 

State's discussion of this information. Therefore, the district court did not 

err in denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Twelfth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to seek a continuance for the sentencing hearing because a 

representative of the Attorney General's Office was at the hearing 

regarding a pending charge regarding appellant's use of a false name. 

Preliminarily, as any later conviction for fraudulent use of a false name 

was not encompassed by the instant judgment of conviction, any challenge 

relating to that conviction is not cognizable in this post-conviction petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus. See NRS 34.724(1). To the extent appellant 

argues that the presence of the Attorney General's Office representative 

harmed him for this case, appellant fails to demonstrate either deficiency 

or prejudice for this claim. This claim is belied by the record as counsel 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 7 

(0) 1947A e 
requested a continuance due to the presence of the representative, but 

that request was not granted by the district court. See Hargrove, 100 Nev. 

at 502-03, 686 P.2d at 225. Appellant also fails to demonstrate prejudice 

because the district court specifically declined to consider the false name 

evidence when sentencing appellant for the instant conviction. Therefore, 

the district court did not err in denying this claim without conducting an 

evidentiary hearing. 

Having concluded that appellant is not entitled to relief, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 1 

k cetati J. 

Hardesty 

 J. 

Douglas 

J. 

cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge 

Langford McLetchie LLC 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

'Appellant's reply brief does not comply with NRAP 32( a)(4) because 

the text is not double spaced. Counsel for appellant is cautioned that the 

failure to comply with the briefing requirements in the future may result 

in the imposition of sanctions. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 8 

(0) 1947A e