alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 115.78 Disciplinary sanctions for inmates. ( a ) Inmates shall be subject to disciplinary sanctions pursuant to a formal disciplinary process following an administrative finding that the inmate engaged in inmate-on-inmate sexual abuse or following a criminal finding of guilt for inmate-on-inmate sexual abuse.
( b ) Sanctions shall be commensurate with the nature and circumstances of the abuse committed, the inmate's disciplinary history, and the sanctions imposed for comparable offenses by other inmates with similar histories.
( c ) The disciplinary process shall consider whether an inmate's mental disabilities or mental illness contributed to his or her behavior when determining what type of sanction, if any, should be imposed.
( d ) If the facility offers therapy, counseling, or other interventions designed to address and correct underlying reasons or motivations for the abuse, the facility shall consider whether to require the offending inmate to participate in such interventions as a condition of access to programming or other benefits.
( e ) The agency may discipline an inmate for sexual contact with staff only upon a finding that the staff member did not consent to such contact.
( f ) For the purpose of disciplinary action, a report of sexual abuse made in good faith based upon a reasonable belief that the alleged conduct occurred shall not constitute falsely reporting an incident or lying, even if an investigation does not establish evidence sufficient to substantiate the allegation.
( g ) An agency may, in its discretion, prohibit all sexual activity between inmates and may discipline inmates for such activity. An agency may not, however, deem such activity to constitute sexual abuse if it determines that the activity is not coerced.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 862 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 862

  To repeal the sunset for collateral requirements for Small Business 
                     Administration disaster loans.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 25, 2019

  Mr. Kennedy (for himself, Mr. Booker, and Mr. Rubio) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                  Small Business and Entrepreneurship

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To repeal the sunset for collateral requirements for Small Business 
                     Administration disaster loans.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Rebuilding Small Businesses After 
Disasters Act''.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF SUNSET FOR COLLATERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SBA DISASTER 
              LOANS.

    Section 2102 of the RISE After Disaster Act of 2015 (Public Law 
114-88; 129 Stat. 690) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``(a) In General.--''; and
            (2) by striking subsections (b) and (c).
                                 <all>
```
### §223. Repealed. Pub. L. 93–620, §10(f), Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2093

Section, act Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 44, §3, 40 Stat. 1177, enumerated occupancy rights of the Havasupai Indians. See section 228i of this title and Codification note set out thereunder.
**Docket Number FA A**  **- 2014**  **- 0566** 
**Contacts.** With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed?

Organization Person Contacted **Date** Response **National Business Aircraft Association Eli Cotti**  2/14/14 **Regional Airline Association** 2/14/14 **Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association Robert Hackman**  2/14/14 **Airlines for America Robert Ireland**  2/14/14
Exhibit 23.2

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

         We consent to the use of our report dated November 2, 2007, except as
to note 24 which is dated May 9, 2008, relating to the consolidated financial
statements of METRO, Inc. as of September 29, 2007 and for the year then ended,
included in the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. Annual Report to
Shareholders, which is incorporated in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
year ended February 28, 2009 filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on May 12, 2009.


/s/ Ernst & Young LLP (1)
Chartered Accountants


Montreal, Canada
May 11, 2009


(1) CA auditor permit No. 8697
#### In the Matter of John Duffy, Appellant, v Robert Dennison, as Chair of the New York State Board of Parole, Respondent.

[824 NYS2d 487]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Sackett, J.), entered July 19, 2006 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner’s request for parole release.

In 1982, petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree and was sentenced to 20 years to life in prison. In August 2005, he made his third appearance before the Board of Parole for parole release. The Board did not release him and ordered him held for an additional 24 months. After the determination was affirmed upon administrative appeal, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court dismissed the petition and this appeal ensued.

We affirm. The record discloses that in denying petitioner’s request for parole release, the Board took into consideration the relevant statutory factors set forth in Executive Law § 259-i, including the serious nature of the crime, petitioner’s positive *1084disciplinary record and program accomplishments, his negligible criminal history and his postrelease plans *(see Matter of Rivera v Dennison,*25 AD3d 856, 857 [2006]). Although the Board placed significant emphasis upon the heinous nature of the crime, it was not required to give each statutory factor equal weight *(see*id.; *Matter of De Lagarde v New York State Div. of Parole,*23 AD3d 876 [2005]). While petitioner asserts that the Board relied upon erroneous information contained in a victim impact statement, the Board members specifically advised petitioner at the hearing that such information would not be considered. Moreover, there is nothing to substantiate petitioner’s claim that the Board’s decision is part of an informal executive policy of denying parole to violent felons *(see Matter of Scott v New York State Div. of Parole,*23 AD3d 950, 951 [2005]). Petitioner’s remaining contentions are equally without merit. Inasmuch as the Board’s decision does not exhibit “ ‘irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” *(Matter of Silmon v Travis,*95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting *Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole,*50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]), it will not be disturbed.

Crew III, J.R, Peters, Carpinello, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
**Exhibit 23**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

The Board of Directors

The Goldfield Corporation: 

Weconsent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No. 333-72241) on Form S-8 of The Goldfield Corporation of our report dated March 30, 2011 with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of The Goldfield Corporation andsubsidiaries as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders’ equity and cash flows for the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, which report appears in the December 31,2010 annual report on Form 10-K of The Goldfield Corporation. 

/s/ KPMG LLP 

Orlando, Florida 

March 30, 2011

Certified Public Accountants
§ 2.35 Mandatory release in the absence of parole. ( a ) A prisoner shall be mandatorily released by operation of law at the end of the sentence imposed by the court less such good time deductions as he may have earned through his behavior and efforts at the institution of confinement. If released pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4164, such prisoner shall be released, as if on parole, under supervision until the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced less 180 days. If released pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4205(f), such prisoner shall remain under supervision until the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced. Insofar as possible, release plans shall be completed before the release of any such prisoner.
( b ) It is the Commission's interpretation of the statutory scheme for parole and good time that the only function of good time credits is to determine the point in a prisoner's sentence when, in the absence of parole, the prisoner is to be conditionally released on supervision, as described in subsection (a). Once an offender is conditionally released from imprisonment, either by parole or mandatory release, the good time earned during that period of imprisonment is of no further effect either to shorten the period of supervision or to shorten the period of imprisonment which the offender may be required to serve for violation of parole or mandatory release.
( c ) A prisoner committed under the Youth Corrections Act must be initially released conditionally under supervision not later than two years before the expiration of the term imposed by the court.
( d ) If the Commission orders a military prisoner who is under the Commission's jurisdiction for an offense committed after August 15, 2001 continued to the expiration of his sentence (or otherwise does not grant parole), the Commission shall place such prisoner on mandatory supervision after release if the Commission determines that such supervision is appropriate to provide an orderly transition to civilian life for the prisoner and to protect the community into which such prisoner is released. The Commission shall presume that mandatory supervision is appropriate for all such prisoners unless case-specific factors indicate that supervision is inappropriate. A prisoner who is placed on mandatory supervision shall be deemed to be released as if on parole, and shall be subject to the conditions of release at § 2.40 until the expiration of the maximum term for which he was sentenced, unless the prisoner's sentence is terminated early by the appropriate military clemency board.
[42 FR 39809, Aug. 5, 1977, as amended at 50 FR 46283, Nov. 7, 1985; 67 FR 67792, Nov. 7, 2002; 68 FR 16720, Apr. 7, 2003]
### §2442. Relationship to existing treaties and statutes

#### (a) In general

Nothing in this chapter 1 shall be construed as contravening or superseding (1) the provisions of any international treaty, convention, or agreement, if such treaty, convention or agreement is in force with respect to the United States on Nov. 8, 1984, or (2) the provisions of any statute which implements any such treaty, convention, or agreement. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as contravening or superseding the provisions of any statute enacted before Nov. 8, 1984, which may otherwise apply to Antarctic marine living resources.

#### (b) Application of more restrictive provisions

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the application of provisions of the Convention, conservation measures adopted by the Commission pursuant to article IX of the Convention, or regulations promulgated under this chapter, which are more restrictive than the provisions of, measures adopted under, or regulations promulgated under, the treaties or statutes described in subsection (a).

(Pub. L. 98–623, title III, §313, Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3406.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

This chapter, the first time it appears in subsec. (a), was in the original "this Act" and was translated as reading "this title", as the probable intent of Congress.

1 See Codification note below.
1 of 3

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

------------------------------------------------------ ) 

) 

Benjamin Edelman, ) 

 third-party complainant ) 

) 

v. ) Docket DOT-OST-2013-0024 

) 

American Airlines, Inc. ) 

) 

------------------------------------------------------ ) 

AGREED MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL FILINGS 

Comments with respect to this document should be addressed to: 

Benjamin Edelman 

169 Walnut St. 

Brookline, MA 02445 

E-mail: ben@benedelman.org 

Dated: September 20, 2013 

 
2 of 3

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

--------------------------------------------------------------- ) 

) 

Benjamin Edelman, ) 

 third-party complainant ) 

) 

v. ) Docket DOT-OST-2013-0024 

) 

American Airlines, Inc. ) 

) 

--------------------------------------------------------------- ) 

AGREED MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL FILINGS 

1. I believe additional filings are useful to complete the record as to recent 

practices, and to supplement the record as to disputed questions of fact. 

2. I requested American’s consent to the filing of further materials relevant 

to my complaints in this docket. 

3. Under Rule 408, there is no allowance for such further filings, but counsel 

for American indicated that American does not object to such further filing, subject to my 

prior agreement that I do not object to the filing of the response of American to the 

supplemental submission. By this motion, I so advise the Department. 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ 

Benjamin Edelman 
3 of 3

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that I have, this 20th day of September, 2013 caused a copy of the 

foregoing Reply to be served by electronic mail on the following persons: 

Robert Silverberg, Esq. rsilverberg@sgbdc.com 

Samuel Podberesky, Esq. sam.podberesky@dot.gov 

 /s/ 

 _____________________ 

 Benjamin Edelman
### §1307. Utilization of services and facilities

In carrying out the program, the Secretary may utilize the services of local, county, and State committees established under section 590h of this title. The Secretary is authorized to utilize the facilities and services of the Commodity Credit Corporation in discharging his functions and responsibilities under this program.

(Pub. L. 91–559, §8, Dec. 19, 1970, 84 Stat. 1471.)
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Elder, Fe lton and Senior Judge Willis

CAMPBELL GIBBONS & A SSOCIATES, INC. AND ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0686-05-2 PER CURIAM JULY 5, 2005 LARRY YOUNG

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

(Iris W. Redmond; Brian J. Mc Namara; Midkiff, Muncie & Ross, P.C., on brief), for appellants.

(Edmund R. Michie, on brief), for appellee.

Campbell Gibbons & Associates, Inc. and its insurer (hereinaft er referred to as

“employer”) appeal a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissi on finding that Larry

Young (claimant) proved his September 11, 2003 injury by accident arose out of his

employment. 1 We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm for the reasons stated by th e commission in its final opinion. See Young v. Campbell

Gibbons & Associates, Inc. , VWC File No. 216-32-34 (Feb. 15, 2005). We dispense with oral

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 Employer also contends that the commission erred in awarding claimant temporary total disability benefits for the period from November 21, 2003 through January 8, 2004. Employer concedes that it stipulated to an award of benefits for that peri od of time, but contends that the doctrine of imposition applies because as it was “f ocused on the compensability of the injury the release date of the claimant per his medical records was overlooke d and a stipulation mistakenly entered with regard to his di sability periods.” This argum ent was not raised before nor considered by the commission. Accordingly, we w ill not consider it for the first time on appeal. See Williams v. Gloucester Sheriff’s Dep’t , 266 Va. 409, 410, 587 S.E.2d 546, 547 (2003); Rule 5A:18. Employer did not invoke the “good cause” or “ends of justice” exceptions to Rule 5A:18, and we find nothing in the record to support an argument that a miscarriage of justice occurred.- 2 - argument and summarily affirm because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the Court and argumen t would not aid the de cisional process. See Code

§ 17.1-403; Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-06-00474-CR

David Ellsworth Widmer, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 264TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 58910, HONORABLE MARTHA J. TRUDO, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury found appellant David Ellsworth Widmer guilty of possessing less than one

gram of cocaine. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115 (West 2003). The court imposed

a sentence of two years in state jail.

Appellant’s court-appointed attorney filed a brief concluding that the appeal is

frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no

arguable grounds to be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State, 573

S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);

Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137
2

(Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Appellant received a copy of counsel’s brief and was advised of his right

to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.

We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree that the appeal is frivolous

and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. Counsel’s

motion to withdraw is granted.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

__________________________________________

W. Kenneth Law, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Puryear and Henson

Affirmed

Filed: April 20, 2007

Do Not Publish
## NO. 12-08-00466-CR IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S

JERA MY WAYNE HA STINGS, § APPEAL F ROM THE 114TH APPELLANT V. § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF TH E ST ATEOFTEX

AS, APP ELL EE § SMI TH CO UN TY

, T EXAS MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION PER CU RIAM This appea l is being dismi ssed for w ant of jurisdi ction. Appellant wa s convicted of driving while intoxicated with a c hild passenger , a state ja il felony, and placed on communit y supervision fo r thr e e ye ars . H is c ommun ity su pe rv isi on wa s r e vo ke d o n O c tob e r 5 , 2 00 8, and he atte mpt s to appea l the revoc ation. In a c riminal case , an appe al is perf ecte d when notic e o f ap p ea l is filed within thi rty days
a ft e r the day se nte nc e is imp os e d or su sp e nd e d in op e n c ou rt un le ss a mot ion fo r ne w t ri a l is tim e ly filed. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.2(a)( 1). Appe llant did not f ile a motion for new tria l. There fore , his notice of appe al was due to have been filed on or befor e November 5, 2008. Howeve r, Appe llant did not file his notice of a

ppeal until November

21, 2008, and ther efor e the notice was untimely. Along with his noti ce of

appea l, Appellant filed a

motion requesting an extension of time for filing his noti ce of

appea l. Texas Rule of A ppellate Proc edure 26.3 provides th at a m o t i on for extension of time to file a notice of appea l must be filed within f ifteen days of the deadline f or filing the notice of

appea l. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.3. Accor dingly, Appellant was re quired to file his motion on or bef ore N ovember

20, 2008. Howeve r, the motion wa s not f iled until Nove mber 21, 2008, and there fore was untimely. See id .2

Becaus e t h i s court ha s no authority to allow the late f iling of a notice of a

ppeal e xcept a s provided by Rule 26.3, the a ppeal must be dismissed. S ee S la to n v . St ate , 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); Ol iv o v . St ate , 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) . Acc ordingly, Ap pe lla nt’ s mo tio n is ov e rr ule d, a ndtheapp e a l is dismiss ed for want of jurisdiction

. Opinion delivere d Dec ember 3, 2008. P an el consi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.

(DO N OT PUBLISH)
#### § 4.101 Applicability.

This subpart provides procedures for exemption on a case-specific basis from all or part of Part I of the Federal Power Act (Act), including licensing, for small hydroelectric power projects as defined in § 4.30(b)(31).

(Energy Security Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611; Federal Power Act, as amended (16 U.S.C. 792-828c); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C. 2601-2645); and the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7101-7352); E.O. 12009, 3 CFR 142 (1978))

[Order 202, 47 FR 4243, Jan. 29, 1982, as amended by Order 413, 50 FR 11687, Mar. 25, 1985; Order 482, 52 FR 39630, Oct. 23, 1987; Order 2002, 68 FR 51121, Aug. 25, 2003; Order 800, 79 FR 59111, Oct. 1, 2014]
#### § 34.7 Filing requirements.

Applications must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission in accordance with filing procedures posted on the Commission's Web site at *http://www.ferc.gov.* If an applicant seeks to protect any portion of an application from public disclosure, the applicant must make its filing in accordance with the Commission's instructions for filing privileged materials and critical energy infrastructure information in this chapter.

[Order 737, 75 FR 43403, July 26, 2010, as amended by Order 769, 77 FR 65474, Oct. 29, 2012]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                          51,453
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  279,888
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (6,101)
<INVENTORY>                                    202,950
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               616,549
<PP&E>                                         675,425
<DEPRECIATION>                               (248,358)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,404,609
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          369,863
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           44,834
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,338
<OTHER-SE>                                    (27,686)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,404,609
<SALES>                                      1,149,373
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,149,373
<CGS>                                          881,554
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  881,554
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               305,674<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              85,879
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (123,734)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (5,328)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (118,406)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 31,196
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (149,602)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.29)
<FN>
<F1>INCLUDES $104,351 RELATED TO ONE-TIME NON-CASH COMPENSATION EXPENSE CHARGES.
</FN>


</TABLE>