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UNITED STates institute of peace

© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

“In a post-2003 Arab world 

where sectarian identities have 

attained an unprecedented level 

of social and political relevance, 

there is no fire more easily started 

than a sectarian one.”

November 15, 2013

Sunni-Shia Relations After the Iraq War 

Summary

•	 In Iraq, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the social, political, and technological changes of the

21st century are giving birth to a new sectarian landscape.

•	 The three most consequential drivers behind the change in sectarian relations have been

the political change in Iraq of 2003; the nearsimultaneousspread of new media and social

networking in the Arab world; and – perhaps as a consequence of the first two – the ongoing

search for alternativesto familiar but moribund forms of authoritarianism, as demonstrated

most dramatically by the“Arab Spring.”

•	 2003 highlighted the uncomfortable fact that there were multiple, indeed contradictory,

visions of what it meant to be an Iraqi and by extension what it meant to be a part of the Arab

world.

•	 New media,social networking, user-generated websites, and private satellite channels helped

to make Iraq’s accelerated sectarianization contagious.

•	 The mainstreaming ofsectarian polemics hasincreased the relevance of religious, doctrinal,

and dogmatic differencesin viewsregarding the sectarian“other,”a particularly dangerous

development.

Fanar Haddad

E-mail: meifh@nus.edu.sg

peaceBrieF160

Introduction

The Iraq war in 2003 does notsignal the dividing line between a sectarian and a non-sectarian

Middle East, but rather it marks a qualitative shift in how sectarian identities are imagined and how

Sunni-Shia sectarian relations are structured. Throughout the past 10 years, Middle Eastern sectarian relations have had to adapt to unprecedented pressures and challenges, radically altering the

significance and dynamics ofsectarian identity and sectarian relations.

In Iraq, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the social, political, and technological changes of the

21st century are giving birth to a new sectarian landscape. The three most consequential drivers

behind this process have been the political change in Iraq of 2003; the nearsimultaneousspread

of new media and social networking in the Arab world; and – perhaps as a consequence of the

first two – the ongoing search for alternativesto familiar but moribund forms of authoritarianism,

as demonstrated most dramatically by the“Arab Spring.”These three developments have had a

profound impact on sectarian relations: In addition to their unprecedented political relevance,

sectarian dynamicstoday are more regional, more grassroots, and more religiousthan ever before.
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Sunni-Shia Relations After the Iraq War 

page 2 • PB 160 • November 15, 2013

Après Iraq, le déluge!

The political change in Iraq in 2003 wasthe mostserious challenge to the once familiar political and

social landscapes of the Arab world.With respect to sectarian relations, 2003 turned the unthinkable into a political reality: The empowerment of ethnic and sectarian outgroups – namely Shia

and Kurdish political forces. It also allowed, for the first time ever, the full, unfettered assertion of

previously suppressed subnational identities. In other words, 2003 highlighted the uncomfortable

fact that there were multiple, indeed contradictory, visions of what it meant to be an Iraqi and by

extension what it meant to be a part of the Arab world. In 2003, a longstanding and self-evident,

yet relatively well-suppressed, fact wasrevealed: Historical memory, victimhood, conceptions of the

nation’sfriends and foes, its myths and symbols – in other words what“we the people”constitute and

represent – were not a site of consensus but rather of division. Since then, with the partial demise

of more familiar yet outdated forms of authoritarianism,similar Pandora’s boxes have been opened

throughout the Middle East. 

One can fairly ask why it wasthatsectarian identity came to dominate perceptions and why it

became the prime political marker in the new Iraq. After all, 2003 facilitated the airing of innumerable grievances and the expression of countlesssuppressed identities.Why did other frames of

reference – region, class, ideology – fail to dominate Iraq assectarian identity did? Two intertwining

reasonssuggest themselves: First, the inherent – even irrational – suspicion with which many Sunni

Arabsregard organized assertions of Shia identity or Shia mobilization;second, the backgrounds and

proclivities of many of Iraq’s new political elites.

To take the expression ofsectarian identity, we must first recognize that prior to 2003 this was an

issue largely restricted to Arab Shia with Arab Sunnis having little awareness of themselves as Sunnis.

There was no marked Sunni identity and assuch little in the way ofspecifically Sunni expression or

Sunnisymbols or rituals. Reflecting demographic realities and the realities of power, whatever Sunni

rituals,symbols, narratives, or causesthat existed prior to 2003 were perceived in Islamic or national

rather than specifically Sunni terms.

Thus,“sectarianism”– a phrase mired in negativity – was often perceived as a phenomenon restricted to the Shia rather than applying equally to Sunnis.With no Sunni parallel of note, Shia rituals,

symbolism, and, above all, Shia political activism were viewed with suspicion by Arab Sunnis many

of whom were ambivalent with regardsto Shias’national, Islamic and Arab pedigrees. This nurtured

a degree ofsectarian entrenchment – though not necessarily hate – prior to the war as most clearly

evidenced by the depth of Shia feelings of communal victimhood. Needlessto say,such a context

meant that the empowerment of Shia political forces and the enabling of Shia expression in 2003

had an emboldening effect on Shia actors and was a bitter pill to swallow for a significant body

of Sunni opinion both in Iraq and beyond. These early stepstoward sectarian entrenchment were

accelerated by the chaosthat followed the fall of the former regime and by the divisive presence of

the United States. 

In addition to the prejudices and pre-existing sectarian entrenchment mentioned above, the

political orientation and calibre of Iraq’s new political elite further ensured the centrality ofsectarian

identity in post-2003 Iraq. Many of the most prominent post-2003 political actors were, throughout

their careers, more akin to ethnic and sectarian lobbyistsrather than national politicians. Rather than

acting as politicians who happen to be Shia, many if not most of the post-2003 Shia political elite

retained their role assectionalsectarian advocatesfor whom Shia identity and Shia interests were

intrinsic to their political outlook. Their failure to make the transition from Shia rights advocatesto

national politicians validated Sunni prejudices and fears, which were exacerbated by the fact that

many of these political actors were based in or had strong linksto Iran. Finally, the political elite’s
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Sunni-Shia Relations After the Iraq War 

page 3 • PB 160 • November 15, 2013

short-sightedness coupled with their political backgrounds and Shia-centric outlooks meant that

they did little to try to assuage the fears and suspicionsresulting from their empowerment.

One result of these developments was an intense and violentsectarian backlash facilitated

and accelerated by the security vacuum and generalsense of chaosthat followed the fall of the

regime. Accompanying this violent reaction wasthe rise of a robust and explicitly Sunni identity,

rooted in feelings of encirclement and entitlement. Fear of the“other”worked cyclically as both

Sunnis and Shias mobilized against existential threats(real and perceived).

Nor wasthisrestricted to Iraq: Acrossthe region, and particularly in the Mashreq, Arab Sunnis

were increasingly identifying themselves as Sunnis with fears of the“Shia crescent”nourishing

a sectarian outlook on regional events. Unfortunately, what began as an Iraqi tragedy has been

turned into a regional one in a manner and speed scarcely imaginable before the information

and communicationsrevolutionsthat were unfolding just asthe new Iraq was being born.

Iraq’s Sectarianization Goes Viral 

New media,social networking, and the revolutionary changesto the flows of information thatsignalled the end of more familiarforms of censorship in the Middle East were a key part ofthe perfect

storm unleashed by the invasion of Iraq.These monumental changesfacilitated expression and mobilization and gave events, no matter how local,the potentialto become regional.New media,social

networking, user-generated websites, and private satellite channels helped to make Iraq’s accelerated

sectarianization contagious.The extentto which the new Iraq’stortuous birth coincided with the

emergence of new media istruly remarkable:Afterregime change in 2003, Facebook waslaunched in

2004,YouTube came online in 2005 andTwitter wasfounded in 2006. In other words,these technological innovations came at a time when sectarian identity was being scrutinized as never before due

to the Iraq war.As a result,sectarian polemicists,sectarian vitriol, and sectarian violence were among

the pioneering genresin social networking and user-generated media in theArab world. 

In many ways,these innovations brought an end to the taboossurrounding discussion of

sectarian identity and made sectarian polemics mainstream.Whatthis has meantin practice is

that, first, because ofthe proliferation of new media,sectarian entrenchmentisjust aslikely to be

driven from the grassrootslevel asfrom the political elite. Itis of little use to highlightthe role ofthe

sectarian entrepreneur orthe rabid sectarian television-cleric without acknowledging thatthe very

fact oftheir proliferation reflectsthe resonance oftheir message with a significant body of opinion.

Secondly,sectarian dynamics have become more regionalthan ever before with the Sunni-Shia

issue appearing in hitherto unlikely placessuch asNorth Africa, and with local events now having a

transnational echo.

Finally,the mainstreaming ofsectarian polemics hasincreased the relevance ofreligious, doctrinal, and dogmatic differencesin viewsregarding the sectarian“other.” Thisis a particularly novel

and dangerous development: in the era ofthe Arab nation-state sectarian rivalry was driven by and

framed in temporal and nationalterms overlaid by considerations of class, ethnicity,region, and

local grievancesratherthan religion perse.

Since 2003, however, what used to be the preserve of clerical circles – especially ofthe Salafist and

Saudi Arabian variant – has become far more prevalent:The exclusion – indeed hatred – ofthe other

based on their doctrinal beliefs and the mobilization, notjust ofsectarian identity, but ofsectarian

dogma as well.Thisrising trend threatensto decouple sectarian identity from national identity and

to yield more rigid and ruthlessly maintained sectarian boundaries as evidentin many examples

from both Iraq and Syria.
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Sunni-Shia Relations After the Iraq War 

page 4 • PB 160 • November 15, 2013

New media has, of course, been instrumental in militant discourse and jihadi propaganda. The

previous decade’s prolific militant networks have both reflected and shaped sectarian dynamicsin

the post-2003 Arab world. Given that Iraq and Syria – two conflicts perceived in heavily sectarian

terms – have become epicenters of jihadi activity and symbolism, it isscarcely surprising that

sectarian violence and rhetoric occupy a central role in Middle Eastern militancy. Indeed it often

seemsthat the language ofsectarian hate has, to an extent, displaced anti-U.S. and anti-Zionist

rhetoric asthe dominant frame in jihadi discourse in the Arab world. Similarly reflective of the

post-2003 Middle East isthe proliferation and assertiveness of Shia militant groups and the novel

yet worrying phenomenon of transnational Shia militancy. More broadly, militant groupstoday,

whether Sunni or Shia, are likely to project themselves as defenders of the sect alongside whatever

other rolesthey perceive for themselves. The starkest illustration of the novelty of thisisthe changing place of Shia identity in Hezbollah’s public image and public discourse. 

Giving Birth to a New Middle East

The bigger picture within which the changesto sectarian identity and sectarian relations need

to be framed isthe region-wide challenge to older, more familiar political and social frameworks.

Thisislikely to be particularly relevant to sectarian dynamics: The“old way”of ordering sectarian

relationsis now redundant and various Middle Eastern societies are struggling to negotiate an

alternative. What is clear isthat the taboos and awkwardnesstraditionally enveloping the issue

ofsectarian identities have all but withered away. More importantly,submissive acceptance of

a status quo that empowers one sectarian group while disenfranchising another issomething

people—at least the disenfranchised amongst them – will no longer willingly tolerate. Sectarian

relations, like much else in the Arab world since 2003, have been a struggle between those seeking

change (benevolent or otherwise) and those who are threatened by it.

Our understanding of today’s Middle East is hardly served by dismissals of post-2003 sectarian

dynamics as a façade obscuring the reality of local and regional power politics. Even if, for the sake

of argument, we grant thatsectarian entrenchment issolely the fruit of cynical political calculation,

10 years of it can nevertheless have a normative societal effect. Indeed, as novel as all this might

seem to older people, a generation has now grown up in an Arab world where sectarian identities

carry significantsocio-political relevance. However, thisis not an argument for reducing Middle

Eastern dynamicsto theirsectarian component. Despite their increased socio-political relevance,

sectarian identities are not the‘be all and end all’of the 21st century Middle East. Furthermore,

despite toxic levels of politicization,sectarian division isfar from all encompassing and remains

context driven. Sunnis and Shias are asinternally divided as any similarly large groups and pragmatic self-interest isstill likely to trump sectarian loyalties. Nevertheless, identity and communal

relations are never just one static thing; rather, they are inherently ambiguous and, in a post-2003

Arab world where sectarian identities have attained an unprecedented level ofsocial and political

relevance, there is no fire more easily started than a sectarian one.

About This Brief

Fanar Haddad is a research fellow 

at the Middle East Institute, 

National University of Singapore. 

He previously lectured in modern 

Middle Eastern politics at the 

University of Exeter and at Queen 

Mary, University of London. His 

main research interests are identity, historical memory, nationalism, 

communal conflict and minority politics. He is the author of 

Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic 

Visions of Unity (Hurst/Columbia 

University Press, 2011). This USIP 

Peace brief is one in a five-part 

series on sectarianism in the 

Middle East.