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92–323 2015

REVIEW OF CDC ANTHRAX LAB INCIDENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 16, 2014 

Serial No. 113–160 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Chairman Emeritus 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

Vice Chairman 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Missouri 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

Ranking Member 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Chairman Emeritus 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

Chairman 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

Vice Chairman 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio) 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Ranking Member 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California (ex officio) 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Tim Murphy, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania, opening statement ................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the state of Colorado, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 4 

Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the state of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the state of 

California, opening statement ............................................................................. 8 

Hon. Phil Gingrey, a Representative in Congress from the State of Georgia, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 111 

WITNESSES

Thomas R. Frieden, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ....... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 115 

Jere Dick, Associate Deputy Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture .................................................. 26 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 28 

Nancy Kingsbury, Managing Director, Applied Research and Methods, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

Sean Kaufman, President and Founding Partner, Behavioral-Based Improvement Solutions, LLC ............................................................................................ 72 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75 

Richard Ebright, Rutgers University, Board of Governors, Professor of Chemistry and Chemical Biology ................................................................................. 85 

Prepared statement 1 ........................................................................................ 88 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Minority memo ......................................................................................................... 112 

Document binder 2

1 The appendices to Mr. Ebright’s testimony are available at http:// 

docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20140716/102479/HHRG-113-IF02-WstateEbrightR-20140716-SD001.pdf. 2 The document binder is available at http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=102479. 

(1) 

REVIEW OF CDC ANTHRAX LAB INCIDENT 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tim Murphy (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Murphy, Blackburn, Gingrey, Harper, 

Griffith, Johnson, Long, Ellmers, Barton, Upton (ex officio), 

DeGette, Braley, Schakowsky, Castor, Tonko, Green, and Waxman 

(ex officio). 

Staff Present: Sean Bonyun, Communications Director; Leighton 

Brown, Press Assistant; Karen Christian, Chief Counsel, Oversight; 

Noelle Clemente, Press Secretary; Andy Duberstein, Deputy Press 

Secretary; Carrie-Lee Early, Detailee, Oversight; Brad Grantz, Policy Coordinator, O&I; Brittany Havens, Legislative Clerk; Sean 

Hayes, Deputy Chief Counsel, O&I; Emily Newman, Counsel, O&I; 

Alan Slobodin, Deputy Chief Counsel, O&I; Phil Barnett, Staff Director; Peter Bodner, Counsel; Brian Cohen, Staff Director, O&I, 

Senior Policy Advisor; Lisa Goldman, Counsel; and Elizabeth Letter, Press Secretary. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. MURPHY. Good morning. The subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations today examines the Center for Disease Control and 

Prevention’s anthrax incident last month that potentially exposed 

dozens of CDC researchers to live anthrax because established 

safety procedures were not followed. 

Last Friday, the CDC director announced the findings of CDC’s 

own internal review of the incident and the corrective actions being 

taken. CDC’s review identified a fundamental flaw. The Agency 

had no written study plan to ensure the safety of its workers and 

the proper handling of live biological agents. 

Like anthrax, the Department of Agriculture’s investigation revealed more disturbing detail. During the inspection, CDC workers 

could not locate some of their anthrax samples. It took more than 

a week for the inspectors and CDC management to track down the 

anthrax samples that are in CDC’s custody. Agriculture inspectors 

also uncovered that CDC was transferring dangerous material from 

biological containment labs in Ziploc bags. Disinfectant that CDC 

2 

labs use for decontamination has expired. This is troubling, and it 

is completely unacceptable. 

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is supposed to 

be the gold standard of the U.S. public health system, and it has 

been tarnished. We rely on CDC to protect us and uphold the highest standards of safety, but the recent anthrax event and newlydisclosed incidents have raised very serious questions about CDC’s 

ability to safeguard properly-selected agents in its own labs. 

The CDC director has called the potential anthrax exposure a 

wakeup call, but our investigation has uncovered this is not CDC’s 

first wakeup call. I am not even sure ‘‘wakeup call’’ is the proper 

term. It is a gross and dangerous understatement. It was a potentially very dangerous failure. Wakeup call is catching something 

before the danger exists. Once a person is exposed to the serious 

pathogens, the danger is of a much higher magnitude. 

In 2006, the CDC Bioterrorism Lab sent live anthrax to two outside labs on the mistaken belief that the shipped anthrax was inactivated. Later that same year, inadequate inactivation procedures 

led another CDC lab to inadvertently ship live botulinum to an outside lab. In 2009, CDC learned from newly-available test methods 

that a strain of brucella, which can cause a highly-contagious infection, had been shipped to outside labs since 2001 because researchers had believed that it was a less dangerous strain. One must 

question the scientific qualifications of these scientists. 

Reports by government watchdogs demonstrate that these events 

are not isolated incidents. Between 2008 and 2010, the HHS Office 

of Inspector General, or OIG, issued three reports documenting 

concerns that CDC labs, such as ensuring physical security of select agents and ensuring personnel receive required training. An 

audit in 2010 found that a CDC scientist discovered select agents 

in a drawer in an unsecured lab during a reorganization, and another CDC scientist found 16 vials of a select agent stored in an 

unsecured freezer that was reportedly left over from an outbreak 

investigation many years earlier. 

This is reminiscent of the recent discovery of smallpox vials in 

a storage room on the NIH campus. This smallpox was in a place 

that no one knew it was there, and it was also discovered by accident. 

In 2011, the OIG found that CDC did not monitor and enforce 

effectively certain select agent regulations at Federal laboratories, 

including those at the CDC. In addition to the Inspector General 

audits, several GAO reports in recent years have raised concerns 

about oversight of high containment labs, including those at CDC. 

Despite the number of red flags, these incidents keep happening. 

We learned last Friday that CDC scientists in March shipped influenza strains to a Department of Agriculture lab that was contaminated with a very deadly flu virus. This cross-contamination was 

discovered on May 23rd, 2014, but it took 6 weeks for this to be 

reported to CDC leadership. 

What we have here is a pattern of reoccurring issues, of complacency, and a lax culture of safety. This is not sound science, and 

this will not be tolerated. These practices put the health of the 

American public at risk. It is sloppy, and it is inexcusable. 

3 

Now, Dr. Frieden, I thank you for testifying today. I have questions about whether the corrective actions you have announced will 

ultimately solve the problems. We will be looking forward to your 

testimony. CDC has already reassigned one lab official from his duties. Taking personnel actions, though, will not address problems 

that based on the number of incidents and reports over the years 

appear to be systemic. 

CDC needs to reassure that proper policies are implemented and 

followed. Dr. Frieden, you said last Friday that you were distressed 

about the delay of notification about the influenza shipments. I 

want to know if you are concerned about why CDC workers are not 

reporting everything, and whether you have reason to believe that 

they may be afraid to report these incidents. 

CDC is not going to solve human errors unless it gets as much 

information as possible from its own people. Since 2007, there have 

been 17 reports at CDC indicating that a worker was potentially 

exposed to a select agent or toxin. Thankfully, as far as we are 

aware, no one at CDC has become sick from improper handling of 

select agents. But CDC should not assume that its luck with these 

near miss events will continue. Sooner or later that luck will run 

out, and someone will get very sick or die. 

CDC needs to strengthen its safety procedures. The risk from 

these deadly pathogens require failsafe mechanisms and 

redundancies similar to those used in other contexts, such as handling weapons. The subcommittee will also review the oversight 

system of Federal laboratories, compliance with select agent regulations, and to explore the possibility of an independent agency to 

oversee the CDC labs. 

I thank all the witnesses for testifying today, and I now recognize the ranking member, Ms. DeGette. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY

The subcommittee today examines the CDC anthrax incident last month that potentially exposed dozens of CDC researchers to live anthrax because established 

safety procedures were not followed. 

Last Friday, the CDC Director announced the findings of CDC’s own internal review of the incident and the corrective actions being taken. CDC’s review identified 

a fundamental flaw: the agency had no written study plan to ensure the safety of 

its workers and the proper handling of live biological agents, like anthrax. The Department of Agriculture’s investigation revealed more disturbing details. During the 

inspection, CDC workers could not locate some of their anthrax samples. It took 

more than a week for the inspectors and CDC management to track down the anthrax samples that are in CDC’s custody. Agriculture inspectors also uncovered that 

CDC was transferring dangerous materials from biocontainment labs in Ziploc bags. 

Disinfectant that CDC labs used for decontamination was expired. 

This is troubling and it is completely unacceptable. 

The Centers for Disease Control is supposed to be the gold standard in the U.S. 

public health system and it has been tarnished. We rely on CDC to protect us and 

uphold the highest standards of safety. But the recent anthrax event and newly disclosed incidents have raised very serious questions about the CDC’s ability to safeguard properly select agents in its own labs. 

The CDC Director has called the potential anthrax exposure a ‘‘wake up’’ call. But 

as our investigation has uncovered, this is not CDC’s first ‘‘wake up’’ call. I’m not 

even sure ‘‘wake up’’ call is the proper term. 

A ‘‘wake up call?’’ That is a gross and dangerous understatement. It was a potentially very dangerous failure. A ‘‘wake up’’ call is catching before the danger occurs. 

Once a person is exposed to a serious pathogen, the danger is of a much higher 

magnitude. 

4 

In 2006, the CDC bioterrorism lab sent live anthrax to two outside labs on a mistaken belief that the shipped anthrax was inactivated. Later that same year, inadequate inactivation procedures led another CDC lab to inadvertently ship live botulinum to an outside lab. 

In 2009, CDC learned from newly available test methods that a strain of Brucella, 

which can cause a highly contagious infection, had been shipped to outside labs 

since 2001 because researchers had believed that it was a less dangerous strain. 

One must question the scientific qualification of such scientists. 

Reports by government watchdogs demonstrate that these events are not isolated 

incidents. Between 2008 and 2010, the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

issued three reports documenting concerns at CDC labs such as ensuring physical 

security of select agents and ensuring personnel received required training. An 

audit in 2010 found that a CDC scientist discovered select agents in a drawer in 

an unsecured lab during a reorganization, and another CDC scientist found 16 vials 

of a select agent stored in an unsecured freezer that was reportedly left over from 

an outbreak investigation many years earlier. This is reminiscent of the recent discovery of smallpox vials in a storage room on the NIH campus. The smallpox was 

undocumented, no one knew it was there, only discovered by accident. In 2011, the 

OIG found that CDC did not monitor and enforce effectively certain select agent regulations at Federal laboratories, including those at the CDC. In addition to the Inspector General audits, several GAO reports in recent years have raised concerns 

about oversight of high-containment labs, including those at the CDC. 

Despite the number of red flags, these incidents keep happening. We learned last 

Friday that CDC scientists in March shipped influenza strains to a Department of 

Agriculture lab that was contaminated with a very deadly flu virus. This cross contamination was discovered on May 23, 2014, but it took six weeks for this to be reported to CDC leadership. 

What we have here is a pattern of recurring issues, of complacency, and a lax culture of safety. This is not sound science and we will not tolerate these practices that 

put the health of the American public at risk. It is sloppy and inexcusable. 

Dr. Frieden, I thank you for testifying today. I have questions about whether the 

corrective actions you have announced will ultimately solve the problem. CDC has 

already reassigned one lab official from his duties. Taking personnel actions, 

though, will not address problems that—based on the number of incidents and reports over the years—appear to be systemic. CDC needs to ensure that proper policies are implemented and followed. Dr. Frieden, you said last Friday that you are 

distressed about the delay in notification about the influenza shipments. I want to 

know if you are concerned about why CDC workers are not reporting everything and 

whether you have any reason to believe they may be afraid to report these incidents. 

Is this going to be like the Veterans Administration, frought with coverups and dependent on whistleblowers, outside investigators, and accidental discoveries. 

CDC is not going to solve human errors unless it gets as much information as 

possible from its own people. 

Since 2007, there have been 17 reports at CDC indicating that a worker was potentially exposed to a select agent or toxin. Thankfully, as far as we are aware, no 

one at CDC has become sick from improper handling of select agents. But CDC 

should not assume that its luck with these near-miss events will continue. Sooner 

or later, that luck will run out and someone will die. CDC needs to strengthen its 

safety procedures. The risks from these deadly pathogens require fail-safe mechanisms and redundancies similar to those used in other contexts such as handling 

weapons. 

The subcommittee will also review the oversight system of Federal laboratories’ 

compliance with select agent regulations, and to explore the possibility of an independent agency to oversee the CDC labs. 

I thank all the witnesses for testifying today. 

# # # 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DEGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Last 

month, scientists at CDC’s BRRAT Laboratory in Atlanta made a 

series of mistakes that could have had deadly consequences. They 

5 

transferred anthrax spores to two other labs, potentially exposing 

dozens of individuals to anthrax. Luckily, nobody has yet fallen ill. 

Like all of us, I am deeply troubled by what we have learned 

about this incident. How did it happen? CDC conducted its own internal investigation that identified numerous failures. There was 

no standard operating procedure for the analysis being conducted 

by the CDC scientists. There was no approved study plan. The scientists used a pathogenic strain of anthrax when a non-pathogenic 

strain could have been used. The scientists used unapproved sterilization techniques for pathogenic anthrax, and then proceeded to 

transfer the material without confirming that it was inactive. 

This is obviously an alarming series of failures, but there were 

other problems at CDC that made this incident worse. CDC has 

provided to the committee a disturbing report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, APHIS. After the anthrax incident, APHIS conducted its own 

inspection of the facility. Inspectors identified serious problems in 

lab operations and decontamination procedures, but also detailed 

major problems with the CDC’s response to the incident, reporting 

that the Agency was inadequately prepared to handle the cleanup 

or to treat those who were potentially exposed. 

I think we can all agree the reports on this incident are bad. But 

what is even more troubling to me is that in context, they reveal 

a broad problem with the CDC’s safety culture. We have received 

report after report from GAO, the HHS IG, and APHIS offering a 

multitude of warnings and recommendations on operations of high 

containment labs. CDC’s after action report identified four other 

cases in the last decade where CDC shipped dangerous pathogens 

offsite. 

The Democratic committee staff prepared a memo describing the 

results from six different APHIS inspections at the CDC Roybal facility in 2013 and ’14. Overall, in the six inspections, APHIS identified dozens of observations of concerns, 29 related to facilities and 

equipment, 27 related to safety and security, and 39 related to documentation and record keeping. In some cases, the APHIS observations revealed that what appeared to be only paperwork problems, 

but in other cases, they found many more serious problems. They 

found reports of scientists using torn gloves and exhaust hoods 

blowing fumes in the wrong direction. Not one of these six inspections gave the CDC a totally clean bill of health. 

Now, I would like to make this memo part of the record, Mr. 

Chairman. I think your staff has seen it. 

Mr. MURPHY. Without objection. 

Ms. DEGETTE. The record shows that CDC had ample warnings 

and should have been focused on the problems in their high containment labs long before the June anthrax release. I just do not 

understand why they did not heed those warnings. Dr. Frieden has 

indicated that he was as surprised as anybody by the scope of the 

problems. And the fact, Dr. Frieden, you were so surprised is a 

problem in and of itself because what it shows is that there is a 

fundamental problem with the culture of identifying and reporting 

safety problems up the chain of command. 

Now, I am sorry to say, Mr. Chairman, these lab safety issues 

are not new to me or the committee. This is one of the detriments 

6 

of having been on this committee for 18 years. We have had multiple hearings on this problem at the CDC over the years. In 2006 

and 2007, we had terrible problems at the CDC facility in Fort Collins, Colorado just north of my district where we had vector-borne 

diseases that were being very sloppily handled. 

Fortunately, we built a new facility since then up in Fort Collins. 

It is a beautiful facility, and we are able to handle these diseases. 

But, you know, these issues are not resolving themselves. And so, 

Dr. Frieden, you have got a strong record at the CDC. I know you 

have got answers and recommendations, and you are acting aggressively to make sure this does not happen again. I appreciate that. 

We all appreciate that. But what we all need to know is what the 

plan is to change the culture at the CDC. We cannot legislate. We 

can do a lot, but we cannot legislate a culture change. It has to 

come from within the Agency. 

I am also glad to have GAO and APHIS witnesses here because 

in retrospect, your warnings were prescient and should have been 

taken more seriously. 

I can assure you these warnings are being taken very seriously 

right now, not just by the Agency, but by the people here on this 

panel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. The gentlelady’s time has expired. And 

I will recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Upton, for 

5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. UPTON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very serious hearing for sure. 2 years ago after allegations about problems 

in CDC’s Building 18, the home of the world’s deadliest agents and 

pathogens, this committee investigated whether the CDC was complying with Federal safety requirements in the operation of its 

main lab facilities. 

In response to our concerns, CDC Director Tom Frieden sent the 

committee a letter in September of ’12. The CDC letter, which I 

would like to include in the record, outlined the Agency’s efforts to 

ensure better oversight and safe handling of select agents at CDC 

labs. 

These measures included rigorous training, constant review of 

safety measures, multiple layers of engineering and operational 

systems. The letter also stated that a senior official, who was not 

identified, would be designated to report directly to the CDC director on safety at CDC labs. These measures sound very similar to 

the corrective actions that Dr. Frieden outlined last week to address the current lab crisis. Why should we believe this time that 

things are, in fact, going to be different? 

We asked CDC 2 years ago to identify each biosafety incident 

that had taken place at its main lab since January 1st of ’05. CDC 

provided the committee with a list back in 2012, but we now know 

from CDC’s internal investigation released last Friday that, in fact, 

the list was not complete. Improper shipments of pathogens in ’06, 

including anthrax, were not included in CDC’s list of safety incidents that, in fact, was provided to this committee. 

7 

CDC staff has now acknowledged to committee staff that the ’06 

incidents, which were reported to the HHS IG, should have been 

included. We do not know why they were not. This raises the question of whether CDC leadership is receiving all the information 

about its own biosafety systems. 

Add to the possible anthrax exposure, the delayed notice provided to CDC leadership about Avian flu shipments, and the discovery of smallpox vials in a cardboard box in an FDA storage room 

on the NIH campus, and these incidents no longer appear isolated. 

A dangerous, very dangerous, pattern is emerging, and there are 

a lot of unknowns out there as well. 

When dealing with pathogens, such as the ones being discussed 

today, unknowns are frankly unacceptable. What you do not know 

can hurt you. Why do these events keep happening? What is going 

to be next? CDC needs to solve the safety problem now as a team. 

The Agency needs to get as much info as possible from its workers 

about the true state of biosafety at CDC, and keep this committee 

and the American people fully informed. There is zero tolerance for 

unlocked refrigerators and Ziploc bags. Those days have to be over. 

I yield to Marsha Blackburn. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON

Two years ago, after allegations about problems in CDC’s Building 18—the home 

to the world’s deadliest agents and pathogens—this committee investigated whether 

the CDC was complying with federal safety requirements in the operation of its 

main lab facilities. In response to our concerns, CDC Director Tom Frieden sent the 

committee a letter in September 2012. 

The CDC letter, which I would like to include in the record, outlined the agency’s 

efforts to ensure better oversight and safe handling of select agents at CDC labs. 

These measures included rigorous training, constant review of safety measures, and 

multiple layers of engineering and operational systems. The letter also stated that 

a senior official—who was not identified—would be designated to report directly to 

the CDC Director on safety at CDC labs. These measures sound very similar to the 

corrective actions Dr. Frieden outlined last Friday to address the current lab crisis. 

Why should we believe this time that things will be different? 

We asked CDC 2 years ago to identify each biosafety incident that had taken 

place at its main lab since January 1, 2005. CDC provided the committee with a 

list back in 2012—but we now know from CDC’s internal investigation report released last Friday that the list was not complete. Improper shipments of pathogens 

in 2006, including anthrax, were not included in CDC’s list of safety incidents that 

was provided to this committee. CDC staff has now acknowledged to committee staff 

that the 2006 incidents, which were reported to the HHS Inspector General, should 

have been included. We don’t know why they were not. This raises the question of 

whether CDC leadership is receiving all the information about its biosafety systems. 

Add to the possible anthrax exposure the delayed notice provided to CDC leadership about avian flu shipments and the discovery of smallpox vials in a cardboard 

box in an FDA storage room on the NIH campus, and these incidents no longer appear isolated; a dangerous pattern is emerging, and there are a lot of unknowns out 

there. When dealing with pathogens such as the ones being discussed today, unknowns are unacceptable. 

What you don’t know can hurt you. Why do these events keep happening? What 

will be next? CDC needs to solve this safety problem now, as a team. The agency 

needs to get as much as information as possible from its workers about the true 

state of biosafety at CDC, and keep this committee and the American people fully 

informed on its progress. There is zero tolerance for unlocked refrigerators and 

Ziploc bags—those days are over. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. I thank the chairman for yielding. I want to 

thank our panel for being here. And as you can hear, on a biparVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:51 Feb 05, 2015 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-160 CHRIS
8 

tisan basis we have plenty of questions for you. We are deeply concerned about the incidents that have occurred at the Federal labs 

that are run by the Department of Health and Human Services, 

CDC, with the anthrax specimens. 

Dr. Frieden, we appreciate the time you spent with us last week, 

but I think we do have plenty of questions for you about the safety 

and the carefulness. We would think that the priority would be 

safety and caring and making certain that you are tending to that 

culture of safety within these labs. 

NIH, with the vials of smallpox, and the fact that this was in an 

unused portion of a storage room. Who all would have access to 

that? And then, of course, the cross-contamination of the influenza 

sample. 

We have all talked about these three events. And the fact that 

they have occurred within this framework of time, the fact that 

there seemed to be a dismissiveness of the serious nature of these 

occurrences, the fact that the CDC’s own report pointed out some 

of the contributing factors in this, and the lack of a standard operating procedure, and best practices; and the fact that this is known 

among the employees at that Agency. 

We know that there are some remediation measures that have 

been implemented, but the culture of safety or lack thereof continues to be a concern to us for public health. I yield back my time. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Waxman for 5 

minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing. I think it is important for us to investigate this incident involving the release of potentially viable anthrax on CDC’s 

campus in Atlanta. 

When I was chairman of the Oversight Committee, we held hearings after the 2001 anthrax attacks. We looked at the safety of 

postal workers and the public in handling mail, and the Postal 

Service and CDC’s response to those attacks. We had hearings 

again in 2003 and 2005 where we found there were still gaps in 

biological detection of anthrax and in communicating test results 

and risks to the public. 

Those hearings showed why CDC’s work on identifying and containing public health risks from these types of biological agents is 

so important. But this work can also pose risks, and that is why 

this oversight hearing is important. 

In 2009 when I was chairman of the full committee, we held a 

hearing on the proliferation of high containment bio labs and the 

lack of oversight over such facilities. Mr. Dingell also held a hearing in 2007, so this is not our first introduction to this subject. 

At our request, GAO, the Government Accountability Office, also 

looked into lab safety. GAO reported in a number of studies, one 

as recently as 2013, on the problems associated with the government’s fragmented piecemeal approach to these labs. No single 

agency has oversight over all high containment bio labs. There are 

9 

no national standards for operation, and we have no record of how 

many labs even exist. 

The Health and Human Services Inspector General also issued 

numerous reports on high containment labs and their handling of 

select agents. The Inspector General identified issues with the 

treatment of select agents and the safety of the individuals working 

with these dangerous pathogens. The Inspector General recommended that the Centers for Disease Control labs improve training for individuals handling select agents, improve record keeping, 

and take appropriate measures to improve safety. 

The American people count on the Centers for Disease Control to 

protect them, and we want to be able to assure them that CDC is 

conducting its research in safe and secure ways. 

I am supportive of Dr. Frieden’s efforts at CDC. We have worked 

with him on numerous issues in the last 5 years, and he has shown 

himself to be an effective leader and a strong communicator. And 

I appreciate the quick actions that he has taken in response to this 

incident. I am encouraged to see that Dr. Frieden has appointed 

Dr. Michael Bell to oversee laboratory safety protocols and procedures. This investigation has shown us that CDC needs to change 

its safety culture, and I hope that Dr. Bell can help instill a new 

mindset at the Agency. 

Still, I am concerned that it took the exposure of dozens of CDC 

staff to anthrax to finally spur CDC to action. So we want answers 

from the CDC about how this incident was allowed to happen in 

the first place. And I look forward to hearing from APHIS and 

GAO about the problems they have identified in the past, how CDC 

should implement their recommendations moving forward, and 

what role Congress should play in making sure that happens. 

Mr. Chairman, this is not the first hearing on the subject. We 

have looked at it before. We need now finally to be sure that all 

the recommendations that we have had are put in place so that we 

can stop something like this from happening again. 

Thank you, and I yield back my time. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now would like to introduce the witnesses on the first panel for today’s hearing. First, Dr. Thomas 

Frieden is the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Today Dr. Frieden is accompanied by Mr. Joseph Henderson, who is the deputy director of the Office of Security and Emergency Preparedness at the Centers for Disease Control. Dr. Jere 

Dick is the associate deputy administrator of the Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Services at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 

Dr. Nancy Kingsbury is the managing director of Applied Research 

and Methods at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. And, 

Dr. Gingrey, did you want to introduce someone who is from your 

district? 

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for giving me 

the opportunity. I know this witness is on the second panel, and 

it will be a little while before we will be hearing from the second 

panel. But it is an honor and a pleasure to introduce off of the second panel Sean Kaufman. 

Mr. Kaufman is the president and founding partner of a company 

called Behavioral-Based Improvement Solutions. His background is 

long-term employment with the CDC before forming his own comVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:51 Feb 05, 2015 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-160 CHRIS
10 

pany in my district, the 11th Congressional District of Georgia in 

Woodstock, Georgia. 

And I would encourage all the members on both sides of the 

aisle, if you have not had a chance—I know we try to read all of 

the testimony, but sometimes we skip one or two along the way. 

But I will assure you that the written testimony from Mr. Kaufman 

really hits the nail right on the head in regard to this overall issue, 

and I would recommend it to you. And I am proud to introduce him 

to you in anticipation of the second panel. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Dr. Gingrey. 

To the panel, you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative hearing, and when doing so has the practice of taking 

testimony under oath. Do any of you have objections to taking testimony under oath? 

All the witnesses indicate no. 

The chair then advises you all that you are under the Rules of 

the House and the rules of the committee. You are entitled to be 

advised by counsel. Do any of you desire to be advised by counsel 

during today’s testimony? 

All the witnesses indicate no. 

In that case, would you all please rise and raise your right hand, 

and I will swear you in. Stand, please.[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. All the witnesses answered in the affirmative. You are now under oath and subject to the penalties set 

forth in Title 18, Section 1001 of the United States Code. You may 

now give a 5-minute summary of your written statement. Dr. 

Frieden, you are recognized. 

TESTIMONIES OF THOMAS R. FRIEDEN, DIRECTOR, CENTERS 

FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION; JERE DICK, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, ANIMAL AND PLANT 

HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; NANCY KINGSBURY, MANAGING DIRECTOR, APPLIED RESEARCH AND METHODS, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS R. FRIEDEN 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before you. I am Dr. Tom Frieden, director of the 

CDC. With me is Mr. Joe Henderson, who heads our Office of Security, Safety and Asset Management. 

I will review the problems that have come to light in the past 

month and tell you what we are doing now to address improving 

lab safety. The fact that it appears that no one was harmed and 

that there were no releases does not excuse what happened. What 

happened was completely unacceptable. It should never have happened. 

If I leave you with just one thought about today’s hearing as it 

relates to CDC, it is this. With the recent incidents, we recognize 

the pattern at CDC where we need to greatly improve the culture 

of safety, and I am overseeing sweeping measures to improve that 

culture of safety. 

11 

CDC works 24/7, and our scientists protect Americans from 

threats, including naturally-occurring threats, like Ebola, and 

MERS, and drug-resistant bacteria, and manmade threats, such as 

anthrax. But we must do that work more safely, and we will. 

There is a recap of the recent incidents that are summarized in 

our report, which has been completed, and we are just at the outset 

of our investigation of the influenza contamination. I would be 

pleased to go through the two diagrams that we have provided to 

the subcommittee which outline what we know to date. But in 

brief, the anthrax incident shows deeply troubling problems: a lack 

of proper protocol, incorrect inactivation procedures, failure to ensure that we were transferring materials that were sterile when we 

thought they were sterile, use of a virulent strain when a non-dangerous form would have been appropriate. 

In the influenza cross-contamination, we are still trying to understand how the cross-contamination occurred and investigating how 

there could have been such a long delay in notification. The risk 

to employees from the anthrax exposure was at most very small, 

and the risk of release to the public was non-existent. But that 

does not change the fact that these were unacceptable events. They 

should never have happened. 

In the past, as the committee has outlined, there were a number 

of specific incidents, and I do believe that CDC staff worked hard 

to address the specific findings of past investigations. But I think 

we missed a critical pattern. Instead of just focusing on those, 

when we issued the anthrax report, we provided not only these two 

incidents, but the prior episodes of what has happened because 

what we are seeing is a pattern that we missed. And the pattern 

is an insufficient culture of safety. 

We are now implementing every step we can to make sure that 

the problems are addressed comprehensively in order to protect our 

own workforce, and to strengthen the culture of safety, and to continue our work protecting Americans. I have taken a number of 

specific steps. I have issued a moratorium on the transfer of all biological materials outside of all BSL–3 and 4 laboratories at CDC. 

I have closed the two laboratories that were involved in this situation until we are sure that they can be reopened safely. I have appointed Dr. Michael Bell, a senior scientist, to be Director of Laboratory Safety reporting directly to me as the single point of accountability. He will review the moratorium and lift it lab by lab 

when we are confident that can be done safely. He will also facilitate expansion and use of that safety culture throughout CDC. 

CDC scientists are world famous for their rigor in scientific investigation, and we will now apply that same rigor to improving 

the safety in our own laboratories. I am convening a high-level 

working group within CDC internally to advise us on every step of 

the process and an external advisory group of outside experts who 

are top in the world to take a fresh look and see what we can do 

to do better. 

We will look at every inactivation and transfer protocol and other 

protocols and improve them as needed. We will look at future incidents, if they occur, with a command structure which should have 

been used earlier in the anthrax exposure. I will ensure that appropriate discipline is taken as indicated by our investigations, and 

12 

will apply lessons learned from this experience to our function as 

a regulatory agency and our select agents’ regulatory program. 

In hindsight, we realized that we missed a crucial pattern, a pattern of incidents that reflected the need to improve the culture of 

safety at CDC. But as with many things, recognition is only the 

first step, and we are taking a number of additional actions to establish and strengthen a culture that prioritizes the safety of our 

own staff, encourages reporting of actual and potential situations 

that may place staff and others at risk, openly assesses those risks, 

and implements redundant systems to keep risks to the absolute 

minimum. 

Part of that culture will be increased reporting of problems or potential problems. One of the aspects of an effective culture of safety 

is rapid reporting of problems so if we do uncover problems in the 

coming weeks and months, this may well be the result of strengthening our culture of safety rather than failing to address it. 

We have concrete actions underway to change processes that allowed these incidents to happen, reduce the likelihood of an occurrence in the future, and apply the lessons broadly. We will do everything possible to live up to the high standards that Congress 

and the American public rightfully expect us to achieve. 

I look forward to your questions, and thank you for inviting me 

to testify today, and for your interest in this important topic. 

[The prepared testimony of Dr. Frieden follows:] 

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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Dr. Dick, you are next. Make sure your microphone is on. Push 

it very close to your mouth. Thank you. It is not on. The green 

light. There you go. 

TESTIMONY OF JERE DICK 

Mr. DICK. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s inspection into the 

release of possibly live anthrax at the CDC’s Roybal campus. I am 

Dr. Jere Dick, associate administrator for APHIS within USDA. 

APHIS conducted a thorough inspection of the incident to learn 

how it happened and determine appropriate remedial measures. 

We will continue to monitor the CDC’s response to ensure all necessary corrective action is taken, and that when work resumes at 

the laboratories, it will be done in full compliance with the health 

and safety of the employees and the public at the forefront. 

USDA was designated by Congress as the partner with CDC in 

the oversight of select agents because of our expertise and experience, safely working with select agents over the past century, 

through our efforts to prevent dangerous disease agents from impacting U.S. agriculture and the environment. For decades, APHIS 

has also safely operated high containment laboratories that handle 

select agents, including those of concern for human health. Our 

personnel are leading diagnosticians, and experts in the effective 

working of high containment laboratories. 

To ensure objectivity, APHIS and CDC signed a memorandum of 

understanding in October of 2012, which makes APHIS the lead inspection agency for CDC entities. 

Since the MOU was finalized, APHIS has carried out 11 inspections of the four CDC laboratories. 

APHIS takes any potential release of a select agent or toxin very 

seriously, with the goal of quickly ensuring that the release is contained and determining what led to the release to ensure no future 

incidents. On June 13th, CDC officials discovered a potential release of anthrax and notified APHIS. CDC voluntarily closed impacted labs on June 16th. 

APHIS made its inspection a priority and quickly began its work 

to ensure that all select agents were secured, and that there were 

no other breaches in biosafety or biosecurity. The specially-trained 

APHIS inspection team of veterinarians and a plant pathologist 

spent nearly 2 weeks, beginning on June 23rd, conducting a facility 

review of the laboratories and interviews with CDC personnel. 

APHIS briefed CDC officials on July 2nd, outlining deficiencies so 

that they could immediately begin taking corrective actions. 

APHIS found that the laboratory did not use an adequate inactivation protocol and did not ensure that the protocol was, in fact, 

validated. The initial response to this incident by the CDC laboratories was inadequate both in securing as well as disinfecting laboratories. For example, individuals without approval to handle select agents were able to access space containing or potentially contaminated with anthrax at least 4 days after the incident was discovered. We also found that employees did not have appropriate 

training in some instances. 

27 

We found no clear management oversight of the incident at the 

labs and no clear single manager overseeing the overall CDC incident response, which resulted in employee confusion about how to 

respond. In addition, CDC’s Occupational Health Clinic was not 

prepared to respond to the potential exposure of a large number of 

workers. 

APHIS currently has in place a cease and desist order with select 

agents and toxins at the two impacted select agent laboratories. We 

will require that corrective actions be taken to ensure the integrity 

of these research programs. We have directed CDC to provide 

APHIS with its plan for coming into compliance by July 25th. And 

before allowing CDC to resume select agent work in the laboratories, APHIS will conduct a re-inspection to ensure that all corrective actions have been taken. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to 

answer any questions that you or the members of the subcommittee have. 

[The prepared testimony of Mr. Dick follows:] 

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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Dr. Dick. 

Ms. Kingsbury, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Please point 

that microphone very close to your mouth. A lot closer than that. 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting—— 

Mr. MURPHY. Bring it really—ma’am. Dr. Kingsbury? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Pardon me? 

Mr. MURPHY. Bring the mic really close, please. 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Really close. 

Mr. MURPHY. Really close. Thank you. 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Is that better? Yes. OK. 

TESTIMONY OF NANCY KINGSBURY 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Thank you very much for inviting us to come to 

talk to you about some of our past work on biosafety issues. As Mr. 

Waxman noted in his statement, we have been doing this work for 

quite a while. We started with the original anthrax attacks, and we 

have gone on to a number of other issues over the years. 

Basically, our past work has a couple of major themes. One of 

them is a lack of strategic planning and oversight of the whole picture of biosafety laboratories. APHIS and CDC are only a part of 

that picture, and since 2001, there have been an increasing number 

of biosafety laboratories both within that sector, but also across the 

whole government. There are six or seven different agencies involved, and no one entity has been charged with developing a strategic plan. 

We became particularly concerned about that as budgets began 

to shrink, recognizing that the management and operation of these 

laboratories is an expensive venture. And if they are not properly 

maintained, other kinds of problems can arise. 

We have also observed that there is a continued lack of national 

standards for designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating these laboratories. There is guidance. The biosafety and 

microbiological and biomedical laboratories guidance is available, 

but it is not required, and there is no process by which an entity 

needs to make sure that they are following that guidance. We think 

this broader government perspective about both how many of these 

laboratories we need and for what purpose, and also a better 

framework for oversight is still needed. 

We have done some work since the most recent episode became 

public. We did take a team to Atlanta. I want to thank Dr. Frieden 

for his staff’s cooperation with us when we were there. Coming together with something I am prepared to sit here and talk about on 

something like 10 days’ notice is a bit of a challenge for us, but his 

staff was very good at providing everything we asked for. 

I am not going to add very much to that debate. I think the two 

previous witnesses have covered the details pretty well. The one 

thing I would add, however, is while we agree that there is a requirement to have standard operating procedures that are reviewed 

at appropriate levels for biosafety, we believe it is also important 

that those procedures be validated. And by that we mean independently tested so that we can be assured that if these procedures are 

followed, there will be no further episodes. So I will just add that 

one thought to the debate about the incident itself. 

33 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my statement. 

[The prepared testimony of Ms. Kingsbury follows:] 

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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Dr. Kingsbury. I will now recognize 

myself for 5 minutes. 

Dr. Frieden, is anthrax a biological agent that has been or could 

be used in warfare? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. 

Mr. MURPHY. And the mishandling of anthrax can have some 

real consequences. If someone were sickened by anthrax, what 

would some of the symptoms be? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Anthrax can cause a variety of symptoms, but the 

most severe forms are respiratory anthrax, which can cause severe 

illness or death. 

Mr. MURPHY. I have an image here of some workers handling 

testing for anthrax, et cetera. One sees that generally you’re—this 

is not in a lab, but some other workers investigating. When I tour 

labs, and thank you for this slide, the number of levels there of 

what is required for breathing, for covering clothes before and after 

is pretty severe. 

I have got to ask this question. Now, these are lined, but this is 

a Ziploc bag. And I haveto think what in heaven’s name would go 

through the minds of some scientists thinking a Ziploc bag is 

enough to protect someone from anthrax when we have other instances of all that paraphernalia someone has to wear when they 

are dealing with anthrax. Have you talked to these personnel involved with transporting anthrax and asked them why? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I have been directly involved in the investigation. 

I will be directly involved in the remediation of the problems that 

we find. Many of the issues that are mentioned in the APHIS findings relate to what was done with the material that was believed 

to have been inactivated. So once the laboratory had said here is 

killed anthrax, it was handled by the staff in those lower containment laboratories as if it were not infectious. 

Our subsequent studies suggest that it is likely that it was not, 

but the core error there was the failure to—— 

Mr. MURPHY. But, Dr. Frieden, this is like saying I did not know 

the gun was loaded, but somebody got shot. But you should always 

assume it is. For someone to say, well, I did not think the anthrax 

was live is not acceptable. And quite frankly, I wonder if you have 

the ability to not only reprimand such personnel, but to fire them, 

to suspend them from working with pathogens that are deadly. 

Quite frankly, do they understand that the extent to which this 

went could have left them in a condition where they were charged 

with criminal negligence, or negligent homicide, or reckless 

endangerment? Do they understand the seriousness of this to the 

American public health? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I think, first, your idea, Mr. Chairman, of a twokey system as is used in other circumstances is quite appropriate 

here both within the high containment laboratories and to verify 

that stuff coming out is safe if it does come out, because stuff has 

to come out of those laboratories to be tested or worked with elsewhere. 

In terms of disciplinary proceedings, what we want to do is strike 

the right balance. On the one hand, we recognize the need to make 

sweeping improvements in our culture of safety, and part of that 

means that staff need to feel comfortable any time saying, ‘‘hey, 

48 

there may be a problem here,’’ coming forward. At the same time, 

if our investigation finds that there is negligence, that people 

knowingly failed to report, or took actions that were likely to or 

should have been known to endanger themselves or others, then we 

will take appropriate action. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I am looking at Dr. Dick, who has said that 

people who were not approved were able to handle select agents, 

were able to access space containing or potentially contaminated 

with anthrax at least through June 17th, 4 days after the incident 

was discovered. Now, my assumption is these scientists and their 

aides are pretty smart people, but it is extremely disturbing to 

think that they are not thinking of this. 

But let me ask this. It has been a week since you learned about 

the March 2014 CDC shipment of H5N1 influenza. And there was 

a 6-week delay in notifying. Have you found out why there was a 

6-week delay, and was there a cover-up involved in that, or are the 

bureaucratic hurdles too high? What was the cause? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I have only gotten some very preliminary information on that. I will make a general point, however. When we look 

at emergencies in emergency departments or intensive care units 

in the healthcare sector, the biggest problem is not usually a failure to respond effectively when people recognize there is an emergency. It is a failure to recognize that the situation is an emergency 

or something that requires immediate attention. But we have not 

completed our investigation of that, and we will look at all possibilities. 

Mr. MURPHY. Is there any kind of notification or alarm system 

that lets people know when there has been a release or a problem 

there? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. There are multiple alarm systems within CDC. In 

this case, it was a cross-contamination of a culture, so somehow, 

and we have not figured out how yet, a relatively low virulence 

Avian influenza was cross-contaminated in our laboratory with the 

high pathogenic H5N1. 

Mr. MURPHY. I get more alarms going off when you try and walk 

out of Walmart with a shirt that has not been paid for. You see 

those happening all the time. Is there any evidence of cover-up 

here from employees not wanting to let someone else know that 

somebody else—— 

Dr. FRIEDEN. No. We have seen at this point no evidence of a 

cover-up, but we do see the need to strengthen the culture of safety 

that encourages reporting any time there is a problem or a potential problem so that we can assess it and take rapid and prompt 

action. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now recognize Ms. DeGette for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kingsbury, let me 

just make sure that I heard your testimony right. You testified that 

there is an increasing number of labs that are handling these bioagents, correct? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Correct. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And you said that there is really no one agency 

in charge, is that correct? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Correct. 

49 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, you said that today, but in 2007, the GAO 

testified before this committee the same thing, no single government agency was responsible for tracking all of these labs. 

Ms. KINGSBURY. That is correct. 

Ms. DEGETTE. That is correct, too. Dr. Frieden, are you aware of 

this finding by the GAO going back all the way to 2007? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes, I am. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And do you agree with Dr. Kingsbury that there 

are an increasing number of labs handling these bioagents? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. If we look over the past 10 years or so, it is my understanding that there is an increasing number. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And do you agree with her that there has never 

been one agency in charge despite the red flags going up all of 

these years? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. There is a clear division of responsibilities between 

CDC and APHIS in terms of select agent oversight, inspection, and 

enforcement. Several years ago at my direction, we turned over the 

inspection of CDC’s select agent laboratories to APHIS, which has 

conducted them since that point. But the overarching issue of laboratory safety is one that does touch many parts of both the public 

sector and the non-governmental sector. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So are you saying that APHIS is in charge now 

since you put that into effect the last few years? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. In terms of the inspection of laboratories which are 

working with select agents, there is a clear division of responsibility between ourselves and APHIS. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Does that mean APHIS is in charge, yes or no? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. APHIS is in charge of investigating CDC’s select 

agent laboratories. APHIS is not in charge of the overall enterprise. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So do you think we need to clarify who is going 

to be in charge of the overall enterprise? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. We are certainly willing to look at every suggestion 

to improve laboratory safety and biosecurity. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Do you think it would be useful if we had one 

agency in charge of all of the inspections and making sure people 

were doing things in the right way? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I have seen several suggestions for how we could 

improve the process BSL–3 oversight and select agent oversight. 

And my sense is that each of these ideas is certainly worth exploring. 

Ms. DEGETTE. What do you think about that, Dr. Kingsbury? Do 

you think it would be useful to have one agency in charge? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Well, we have said for a number of years, as you 

know, that there needs to be some entity in charge of a national 

strategy, not necessarily in charge of every laboratory in the country. The other thing I would point out—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. So you are saying an agency in charge of developing the protocols and how you are going to do this? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. And ensuring biosafety and biosecurity. But the 

more important issue, and from a strategic point of view, is how 

many of these laboratories do we really need, for what purpose, 

against what threat. One of the interesting things that I have become a little bit more sensitive to in the last few weeks is that the 

whole structure we have that CDC and APHIS are involved in is 

50 

around the select agent agents, and there are a lot of other bugs 

out there in other laboratories that are not select agents that also 

need to be protected. And there is very little visibility about that 

sector of this enterprise. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And, Dr. Frieden, I am going to assume that you 

are going to agree with Dr. Kingsbury that it would be very useful 

to have national safety and security standards that would apply to 

everybody. Is that correct? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I am not sure I understood the question. I am 

sorry. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Well, what GAO says is that we do not have 

one single agency developing national biosafety and security standards, and as a result, we have all these labs doing this type of research, a proliferating number of labs. But there is nobody developing standards across all those agencies. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I think there are many aspects of both biosafety 

and biosecurity which merit careful investigation. And if we can 

figure out better ways to do them, we are certainly completely open 

to that—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. And do you think the protocol should apply to everybody? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. The protocols may be very specific for the different 

situations, but they should all adhere to the highest standard of 

safety. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Dr. Dick, what is your opinion of this? 

Mr. DICK. I think that there should be a single oversight body. 

Right now for the Select Agent Program, there is a single oversight 

body made up of the Division of Select Agents and Toxins at CDC. 

There is a single oversight body in Agriculture that makes up the 

other half of that Select Agent Program. 

Together we meet on a monthly basis. We have the directors and 

assistant directors of the programs that are in the two programs, 

and we have OGC and other counsel present. 

Ms. DEGETTE. But if that is the case, why are we having all 

these problems then? 

Mr. DICK. And so, what we need, what we have is a single set 

of biosafety and biosecurity regulations that are followed by both 

sides. 

Ms. DEGETTE. But we do not have that now, is that what you 

are saying? 

Mr. DICK. No. What I am saying is that I think we currently do 

have that. I do agree with Dr. Frieden that eventually after we get 

done with this investigation, we should take a very close look at 

all of the issues and see if there are updates that need to be made 

to biosafety and biosecurity. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now recognize Dr. Gingrey for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I am going to address my questions of this panel to Dr. Frieden. Dr. Frieden, thank 

you very much for being here and providing the subcommittee with 

your testimony. I actually have a number of questions for you, in 

fact four, and I will get right to those since time is of the essence. 

Firstly, can you please describe the policies and procedures CDC 

has in place to handle biosafety issues that may arise from human 

51 

error like what happened in the Bioterrorism Rapid Response and 

Advanced Technology Laboratory in Atlanta on June the 5th? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. We have extensive policies and procedures. But 

what we are doing now is implementing a moratorium on all transfers out of BSL–3 and BSL–4 laboratories while we review each 

laboratory’s policies and procedures to ensure that there is appropriate inactivation before any materials are transferred out. 

Mr. GINGREY. And I appreciate that answer, and you explained 

that to us I think last week in an informal setting, and I think that 

is a good thing. That leads to my second question. What is the impact and the cost of the BRRAT Laboratory shut down? You shut 

down those two laboratories for X number of days. Do you have a 

cost estimate in regard to them being offline for a period of time? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I do not have a cost estimate for that. The impact 

of the moratorium is potentially significant, and so we are working 

rapidly to rigorously assess protocols and where there are situations such as the diagnosis of drug resistant tuberculosis, or helping to control the Ebola outbreak, or beginning work on next year’s 

flu vaccine. We will work to ensure that we can do that safely in 

time, but there are real challenges with this moratorium. 

One of the things that the BRRAT Lab does, the lab that was 

associated with the anthrax incident, is to provide to the Laboratory Response Network, a network of over 150 laboratories, proficiency testing to make sure that they can rapidly identify anthrax 

and other dangerous pathogens safely. So we will figure out a way 

to do that safely in time. 

Mr. GINGREY. Well, I would think time is of the essence in regard 

to cost. But as you say, safety is the most important factor. You 

got to get it right, and I certainly agree with that. 

Should inactivated select agents be added back to the select 

agent list? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I think that what we need to ensure is that any 

inactivation is done completely because once something is inactivated, it may be able to be used. It may be necessary to use that, 

for example, to diagnose it. And you would not want to have to follow select agent requirements without diagnosing something in a 

hospital lab, or a clinical lab, or even in the field. 

But the key point here is to have that two-key system that the 

chairman mentioned in that meeting, that two-key system to make 

sure that when an inactivation is undertaken, it is validated and 

verified that the materials are inactive. 

Mr. GINGREY. The last question, Dr. Frieden. In your testimony, 

you noted you only learned of the March 13th, 2014 shipment from 

the CDC influenza lab of a virus that was cross-contaminated with 

H5N1 to a USDA laboratory on July the 9th. So that is from March 

13th when it actually occurred to when you were informed or 

learned of it July the 9th. 

Can you please describe how you are going to improve communications of these incidents up and down the chain of command? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Thank you. In fact, it was the afternoon of our 

meeting, which was in the morning, when I learned about this, if 

I remember correctly. What your question gets to is really the crux 

of the matter, which is how do we improve the culture of safety at 

52 

CDC? And I think that is going to involve a number of steps that 

we think will succeed, but will take time. 

We need to encourage reporting. We need to encourage all staff 

to take responsibility in addition to having a single point of accountability for laboratory safety. We need to have a clear vision 

of working safely. We are, after all, the prevention agency, and we 

want to apply that same rigor that we apply to our work in the 

field and in disease control to preventing any incident from happening in our laboratory. 

We also want to build on many of the organizational strengths 

and identify the laboratories that are doing this very well within 

CDC and identify the practices that they are taking that will prevent these incidents. 

And finally, I think coming up with ways to monitor progress 

and track progress, and identifying what are called the critical control points. What are the flashpoints? What are the areas where 

problems may occur, and then developing redundant, effective, validated, monitored ways to address those critical control points, 

whether it is inactivation, or transfer of materials, or making sure 

that materials transferred only contain those materials. 

We have terrific scientists at CDC, and they are now focusing 

their creativity, their energy, their commitment on improving our 

culture of safety. 

Mr. GINGREY. Dr. Frieden, thank you very much. And, Mr. 

Chairman, I will yield back my 30 seconds. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Waxman for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Frieden, last Friday when you released the CDC report on the anthrax incident, 

you announced you were imposing a moratorium on CDC transferring any biological samples out of any BSL–3 or BSL–4 labs until 

they had conducted a lab-by-lab assessment. Additionally, you 

closed the Bioterrorism Rapid Response and Advanced Technology, 

or the BRRAT Laboratory, and announced that it will remain 

closed until it is approved to reopen under safer conditions. These 

seem like appropriate interim steps until CDC can undertake a 

comprehensive safety review and ensure that the proper procedures 

and protocols are in place moving forward. 

Dr. Frieden, how long do you anticipate this moratorium lasting 

and the BRRAT lab being closed? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. The short answer to your question is as long as it 

takes to ensure that they can open safely. The longer answer is 

that there are some things that need to resume, for example, proficiency testing for select agents in the Laboratory Response Network. And that is something that we will look at very carefully. 

But I am committed that we will not open them until we can open 

them safely. 

Mr. WAXMAN. What steps are you taking to lift the moratorium 

and reopen the facilities? When will you know or how will you 

know when it is safe to do so? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I have appointed Dr. Michael Bell, who is a top expert at CDC not only in laboratory science, but also in safety. He 

works within the hospital infection control and safety unit of CDC 

to oversee a high-level working group reporting to me. And they 

53 

will develop in the next day or so, finalized criteria by which they 

will assess each of the laboratories. 

And then each laboratory will look at its own protocols and practices and determine whether they are validated, effective, and scientifically proven, and implemented in a way that we can be sure 

they will be applied. And then each laboratory will apply to him 

for resumption and lifting of the moratorium. I will review his recommendations and ultimately approve laboratory-by-laboratory a 

reopening of this process. 

I would just mention this is not a small thing because many of 

our laboratories that have BSL–3 laboratories have adjacent BSL– 

2 laboratories. And much of their work has to be done in the BSL– 

2, so they inactivate in the BSL–3 and then move it to the BSL– 

2. That work has all stopped at this point until we can ensure that 

we are doing it safely. And this is one of the things that really is 

a tipping point for improving the culture of safety at CDC. 

Mr. WAXMAN. One of the more disturbing findings of CDC’s own 

report on this incident is that scientists use a pathogenic strain of 

anthrax when they could have used a non-pathogenic strain, is that 

not correct? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes, that is. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, when the moratorium is lifted and the 

BRRAT Lab is reopened, will you have clearer standards and protocols to make sure scientists are not unnecessarily using potentially 

dangerous strains of bacteria when it is not necessary? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. 

Mr. WAXMAN. GAO and APHIS both conducted investigations of 

the BRRAT Laboratory following the June anthrax exposure. Dr. 

Kingsbury and Dr. Dick, you believe the moratorium and lab closure an appropriate response to this incident, do you not? 

Mr. DICK. Yes, I do. 

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. We should not forget today that the reason 

CDC conducts their special agent research is to help keep the 

American public safe. CDC serves a critical role for studying dangerous pathogens and finding cures and vaccines for deadly diseases. These labs are critical to our Nation’s response to bioterrorism threats. So I am interested in learning about how this moratorium and the lab closures are affecting the critical research that 

these labs were conducting. 

Dr. Frieden, how do the moratorium and lab closures limit CDC’s 

research capabilities? What happens to the studies, some of which 

I am guessing were operating on detailed schedules that were 

being conducted in the labs? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. We are looking at the moratorium now in detail 

and identifying any laboratories which need to resume transfers for 

individual patient care or for public health response with highest 

priority. And we expect that those laboratories we will be able to 

get reopened for transfer very soon. 

But we have already heard from, for example, the laboratory that 

deals with drug-resistant tuberculosis, the laboratory that deals 

with Ebola, and the laboratory that deals with Avian influenza, 

that they have deadlines coming up for either patient care or public 

health response. And we will address that very quickly. But we will 

always put safety first. 

54 

Mr. WAXMAN. How do the closures and moratorium affect research occurring at other labs outside of the Roybal campus? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. We provide proficiency testing and other materials 

to laboratories, and so there may be impacts on some of our partners. But the one that we are most aware of now and we will work 

to address before the deadline is provision of materials that companies need to make next year’s flu vaccine. And we anticipate being 

able to do that on time. 

Mr. WAXMAN. My time has expired, but it seems to me that protecting the safety and health of your scientists, the moratorium, 

and the lab closures appear to be the appropriate response. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. I 

now recognize Mr. Barton for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In answer to a previous 

question, Dr. Kingsbury raised the point about how many laboratories there are. The GAO has indicated that there are probably too 

many laboratories. 

My first question would be to you, Dr. Frieden. Why do we have 

so many laboratories, and are they all necessary? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I do not know that there is a right number of laboratories out there. Our job within CDC is to make sure that we 

only work with dangerous pathogens where it is necessary to do 

that and that we do so safely. And we will be taking a fresh look 

everywhere we work with these pathogens internally at CDC to 

make sure that it is kept to the minimum necessary to serve the 

function of responding to infectious disease outbreaks. 

We still have anthrax in nature and respond to events like that. 

We still have Ebola with the largest outbreak in history now in 

West Africa. So the challenges we have are substantial. 

In terms of outside laboratories, our function in the Division of 

Select Agents and Toxins is to ensure that the laboratories that are 

there are operating safely. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, it would seem that one way to increase security would be to have fewer locations and fewer laboratories. I 

mean, if you are only using the extreme case, if you are trying to 

protect a hundred, that is going to be more difficult than if you are 

just trying to protect one. 

I do not know what the magic number is, but I think especially 

since the GAO has said there are probably too many, that would 

be worthy of a look-see. Dr. Kingsbury, do you have an opinion on 

that? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Well, I am not sure we have actually said there 

may be too many. I think what we have actually said is nobody 

knows how many there are, and nobody knows how many we need. 

And that goes beyond the scope—— 

Mr. BARTON. Well, that is even worse in a way. 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Yes. That goes beyond the scope of CDC and 

APHIS. And until there can be some kind of strategic look at what 

our requirements actually are, and they may be changing because 

of things like the Ebola outbreak and so forth. But somebody ought 

to be thinking about this, I think, a little bit more broadly than a 

single agency at a time. And that is basically our point. 

55 

Mr. BARTON. Well, I am going to ask the question. Why are there 

435 members of Congress? What is magic about 435? And the answer is that is as many seats or desks at the time they could put 

on the House floor. When they got 435, they could not put anymore, and so it is an odd number, and they just stopped. But there 

is nothing magic about it. 

Ms. KINGSBURY. That is correct. 

Mr. BARTON. And the same thing with the laboratory situation. 

I think there should be a strategic review, and the sooner the better. 

The staff has asked me to ask this question. It concerns the fact 

that beginning in 2012, the United States Department of Agriculture and the Centers for Disease Control entered into a memorandum of understanding that allows the USDA Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service to inspect the CDC laboratories for compliance with the Federal Select Agent Program. Since the Select 

Agent Program was authorized in 2002, the CDC had been inspecting its own laboratory. Why did CDC decide to turn its inspection 

process over to the Department of Agriculture? Was that because 

CDC did not think that it could do the job itself? I will ask Dr. 

Frieden that. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. We have made a number of improvements both in 

our own laboratories and in our regulatory function through the Division of Select Agents and Toxins. And as I looked at this issue, 

I was concerned that there was at least the appearance that we 

could not be objective in inspecting our own laboratories. 

I did not believe that was the case. I believed that one part of 

CDC which has no organizational affiliation with another could do 

that objectively, but I did not think the appearance was a good 

idea. So I requested and APHIS graciously agreed to take over inspections of our own campus so that there would not be that appearance of a problem. 

Mr. BARTON. If you had to do it over again, would you do the 

same thing? Was it a good decision to let USDA do the inspection? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. I believe that decision was appropriate. If I 

had it to do over again, I wish I had recognized the pattern of incidents that we now recognize, which is why we put those prior incidents into our July 11th report. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back, or I can 

tell an Aggie joke. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURPHY. OK. Thank you. He yields back. Now, I will recognize Ms. Castor for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member, for calling this hearing today. I had the opportunity 

to visit the CDC last spring, and on the surface they appear very 

serious about laboratory security. And yet every few years there 

are these lapses, and now an anthrax scare, and an Avian flu issue 

that was not reported in a timely manner. 

And we have very high expectations for everyone at the CDC. I 

am impressed with everything that is happening there, but for the 

high containment biological laboratories, to have these lapses is not 

acceptable. 

So it is really troubling that although numerous government 

agencies over the past few years have warned CDC about problems 

56 

at the high containment labs, it appears CDC has not heeded those 

warnings. We know of at least 14 separate reports, letters, and lab 

investigations from GAO, the U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and HHS Inspector General that documented a 

series of safety lapses and lack of oversight at CDC high containment labs. 

Dr. Kingsbury, your testimony is invaluable here. Can you tell us 

more about the concerns GAO has identified with regard to safety 

lapses at the high containment labs? You have said now someone 

has got to look at the number of labs across the country as well. 

Who is that? What entity is that? What are your recommendations 

there? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. I wish I was in a position to say I know the answer to that. One of the difficulties that we faced in making that 

suggestion is that when you look around the government, because 

they are being built and managed across multiple agencies and 

each agency has its own mission and its own focus, it is difficult 

to think about who would be the single agency. 

We have discussed the issue with the Office of Science and Technology Policy at the White House, but while they have some overarching responsibilities, they do not have staff and management officials that would permit actually doing it that way. 

So we do not really have a good answer to that question, but we 

think it is worth just keeping the issue on the table, particularly 

in tight budget times. 

Ms. CASTOR. You mentioned in your opening statement that you 

have heightened concerns because of budget cuts. Talk a little bit 

about that. Is there a particular area we should be focused on? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Well, it is just that, as I said in my statement, 

the building, and management, and upgrade of these kinds of laboratories is relatively expensive compared to just building ordinary 

buildings. And so, if we are going to have X number of laboratories, 

I would like to see the strategy that was going to permit us even 

in tight budget times to continue to fund them, to continue to upgrade them when necessary, and to manage the biosafety and biosecurity programs that are necessary to keep them safe. So that 

total picture just is not available now, and that worries us. 

Ms. CASTOR. OK. Dr. Dick, do you think this has anything to do 

with budget cuts? 

Mr. DICK. I do not believe that it has anything to do directly with 

budget cuts. We have been able to accomplish our mission in support of the Select Agent Program over the recent years and provide 

the funding that is necessary. 

Ms. CASTOR. OK. And before the June anthrax incident, APHIS 

conducted at least six separate investigations at CDC’s Roybal 

campus facilities in 2013 and 2014. Can you summarize your findings in those investigations? 

Mr. DICK. Yes. I think there were a number of findings, some of 

which were found in the recent finding, some of which were not. 

Simple things that people maybe think are simple, unlocked refrigerators, those kinds of things, up to and including more serious incidents, if you will around inactivation protocols not being up to 

date. 

57 

Ms. CASTOR. And, Dr. Frieden, it is troubling. I mean, this has 

gone on for years now with GAO, APHIS, the Inspector General, 

outside experts calling attention to these issues. And I am encouraged because you have been forthcoming in your statements. You 

have not been defensive. But what is your current action plan now 

going forward in detail? Is there a culture among researchers? 

What is it, and get specific for us from this day forward with these 

recommendations, what are you going to do in the timeframe? 

Thank you. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Well, first, I think for path incidents, the staff at 

CDC and the scientists did take the reports seriously and did respond to those individual reports. What we missed was a pattern. 

And you are absolutely right that that pattern was an inadequate 

culture of safety. So the overarching challenge now is to ensure 

that we establish and strengthen a culture of safety in all of our 

laboratories throughout all of CDC. And there are a number of 

steps that we are doing to begin to do that. 

The first is the moratorium so that we can stop and think about 

that particular procedure of inactivation, make sure it is done 

right, the appointment of a single point of accountability for laboratory safety throughout CDC, the establishment of a working group 

that that person and Mr. Henderson will lead. The invitation to an 

external advisory group, and I intend to invite some of the leading 

independent experts of the country by the end of this week to serve 

on that advisory group for CDC. A hard look at all of the critical 

control points where there may be a problem with lab safety, and 

reviewing to make sure that we have protocols in place that are 

validated and verified. It gets back to that trust but verify approach. 

We need to make sure that we are empowering our laboratory 

staff to report and to identify ways to improve safety and security. 

We also need to verify that that is happening. 

Mr. MURPHY. OK, thank you. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

I will now recognize Ms. Blackburn of Tennessee for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Frieden, I want 

to come back to you. And if you will go to tab 15, the USDA APHIS 

investigation, and let us look at that. This started 10 days after the 

event. There were 18 days after possible exposure, and you had a 

lot of really awful basic errors. Even you admit there is not a culture of safety. There is not that double check system. 

And it is something that when you look at worker safety, how it 

was compromised, and then the management lacking the basic information on what substances to use to have the contamination 

cleaned up. 

So looking at this tab and that investigation, I want you to detail 

for the committee what new policies have been designed as a result 

of this and how did CDC guarantee that the new policies are followed, effective immediately. 

You know, our hospitals and organizations get all sorts of new 

rules from HHS on Friday afternoons at 4:00. They are effective 

immediately. So I want you to detail for us how you implemented 

that and what the new policies are. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. So effective immediately, all transfers not just from 

these two laboratories, but from every single BSL–3 and BSL–4 

58 

laboratory at CDC have been stopped. Effective immediately, these 

two laboratories, the BSL–3 part of the influenza laboratory, and 

the BRRAT Lab for the bioterror response, have been closed. Those 

two laboratories will not be reopened until both APHIS and I are 

confident that they can be reopened safely. 

We have also appointed a single point of accountability to look 

at this and to review before we reopen, before we begin any more 

transfers, procedures that are in place to ensure that they can be 

done safely. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. How could it possibly have transpired that your 

management team could not even decide on the formula of bleach 

to use to clean up the contamination or to see whether the on-site 

clinic was thorough and consistent in examining the staff potentially exposed to the anthrax? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. In the first week after the anthrax potential exposure was identified, we did not respond in the way that we would 

respond to an outside emergency. And that is one of our after action findings that when we deal with emergencies, whether it is 

Ebola, or fungal meningitis, or another problem, we activate our 

Emergency Operations Center. Or even if we do not activate it, we 

utilize the resources of that center to have a systematic, structured, 

intensive, immediate response. That was not done for the first 

week after the anthrax potential exposure, and that is something 

that we will be sure to do in the event of any such internal event 

in the future. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Let me ask you this. Did the management team 

get preferential treatment to the point that they were unaware 

that the staff was turned away? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. No. Absolutely not. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. OK. And then why did the staff not feel confident in expressing their worries to their managers so that they 

could get adequate treatment? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I am not certain what is behind that. I do know 

that part of encouraging and strengthening the culture of safety is 

making sure that people are encouraged and, in fact, reinforced 

and rewarded for bringing forth problems if they think there are 

problems and potential problems. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Do you think it had to do with the existing 

work culture that was there at the CDC? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I think at CDC scientists are so used to risk, they 

go out into dangerous places where they are not sure what the 

risks are going to be. But sometimes if you work year in and year 

out with pathogens that are scary, you can get inured to that danger. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. OK. Let me ask you another question. Once the 

June incident was discovered, why? Why did it take you so long to 

track down the anthrax, and why was there not a record of where 

this was stored? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Well, on June 13th, as soon as we identified that 

there was the potential that any of the plates that were sent out 

of the containment lab were not sterile, we immediately recovered 

those plates and put them back in the secure facilities. That is the 

best of my understanding. 

59 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Why was there not a record of where it was 

stored, and why was it stored in unlocked refrigerators, stuck in an 

un-posted room or in hallways? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. My understanding, and we will have to confirm 

that in the coming days, is that those findings relate to primarily 

the materials that were believed to have been sterile and sent out 

of the laboratory. It is not as if there were anthrax cultures being 

kept in an unlocked, unsecured place. 

I think the point there was there was that once that initial error 

was made of thinking something had been inactivated when it had 

not been or may not have been inactivated, then that material was 

then out of the containment space. That is my understanding. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. All right. I now recognize Mr. Green of Texas for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, for all of our panel, 

there are a number of Federal agencies that handle some of these 

substances, not just CDC. Is there a general protocol that all the 

agencies look at and coordinate handling these substances? Dr. 

Frieden? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. When it comes to select agents, then both CDC and 

APHIS establish standards and then inspect and enforce those 

standards. Other than select agents, there are agency-by-agency or 

entity-by-entity approaches that may be specific to the type of research or to the type of agent. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. So there is some umbrella type standard for all 

Federal agencies. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. For select agents there is. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Dr. Kingsbury, can you summarize your recommendations for us, and can you elaborate on which of these recommendations would require congressional action? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. If you are talking about our recommendations, 

I think that resolving this issue of whether there is a national 

strategy probably cannot be done without congressional action, and 

it will take some thought to get us there. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Dr. Frieden, do you agree with these recommendations, and will you be implementing them that you can 

within your control? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. In terms of laboratory safety recommendations for 

CDC, we will do everything to implement these recommendations. 

The report that we released on July 11th has a number of steps 

that we are already beginning to implement. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Any of them require congressional action, or is 

that something you control within your Agency? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. At this point, I am not aware of anything that 

would require congressional action for us to take appropriate steps. 

Mr. GREEN. Dr. Dick, do you have any recommendations for Congress or CDC that Congress needs to deal with? 

Mr. DICK. At this point in this investigation, we do not have anything that cannot be controlled through the Select Agent Program 

and our work with CDC. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Dr. Frieden, does CDC, based on the findings 

in your report, have any recommendation to Congress? You have 

none for us? 

60 

Dr. FRIEDEN. We are focused at this point on doing our jobs as 

well as possible, ensuring that we strengthen laboratory safety 

throughout CDC, and use the findings from this experience to 

strengthen our regulatory function through our Division of Select 

Agents and Toxins, which inspects and regulates hundreds of entities around the country that work with these materials. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Let me ask you about the CDC budget. And 

again, I have heard other questions from my colleagues that this 

was not a budget issue as much. Has CDC received adequate funding from Congress to conduct its safety mission, period? Obviously 

you have other missions. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I think the challenges for safety are more than just 

funding. There are a variety of issues in implementing safety policies and procedures, and I do not think the primary issue here is 

a lack of funding. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Some of the witnesses we have been hearing 

from today have stated CDC employees need better training and 

that there needs to be better standard operating procedures, but 

overall there is a problem with the culture at CDC. Dr. Frieden, 

do you agree with these assertions? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I do agree with them. I think that while we have 

scientists who are the best in the world at what they do, they have 

not always applied that same rigor that they do to their scientific 

experiments to improving safety. And that is why we are taking a 

number of steps to strengthen the culture of safety at CDC. 

And part of that is to encourage reporting of potential or actual 

problems. And because of that it is possible, though I do not know 

of anything at this point that I am aware of, it is possible that in 

the coming weeks and months we will hear of other things in the 

past or that occur. And that may be a reflection that we have 

strengthened that culture of safety rather than that we failed to 

address it. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, if it is an issue of culture, and again, like you 

said, you have some great labs, and I am familiar with some of 

them. Is it just because they deal with these dangerous substances 

so often they get lax, and they are more interested in what they 

are working with than maybe the safety of what they are dealing 

with? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I think that is a significant part of it, that if you 

work with something, even if it is a deadly microbe, day in and day 

out, year after year, you get a level of familiarity that may lead to 

doing things that you really should not do. And that is why we 

have to have double checks in place, policies, and protocols, training, and a culture of safety with the vision that we will work to 

minimize risk such that no worker and the public are never exposed to a risk that could have been prevented in our laboratories. 

Mr. GREEN. And I guess that complacency, it needs to be monitored literally every day 24/7 because of what you do. Is that part 

of what you are trying to do at CDC with the guidance for other 

agencies? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Absolutely. That is what we have done by establishing a single point of accountability for laboratory safety, an empowered working group that will work with that individual, but 

emphasizing that even with that individual and even with that 

61 

group, laboratory safety is really something that everyone who 

touches a laboratory needs to be conscious of and think of ways to 

continuously improve. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would have 

a follow-up in a few months to see the success. And again, it is almost like re-training some of the smartest people in the country to 

be certain what they are doing with the substance they are dealing 

with. And I yield back my time. 

Mr. MURPHY. I think that is a good idea, but I do want to add 

also, Dr. Kingsbury, when you were responding to Mr. Green’s 

question about other congressional authorization would be required, can you get this committee details on what that would be? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. I do not actually have a basis on which to be 

specific about what might need to be done. I think we probably 

need to continue to work with your staff to talk through what some 

of the options might be going forward. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Mr. Harper is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing on a very important issue. And certainly some 

agencies can be dysfunctional and there is no concern or no real 

harm in that. But the CDC is one that cannot be dysfunctional, so 

we are very concerned about safety within the labs for obviously 

the workers there, and certainly for the public on how we are going 

to address that. 

And if I could, Dr. Frieden, to refer to Tab 7. That is a letter that 

you sent in September 2012 to the committee responding to concerns about CDC lab safety. In that you stated that a senior official 

was designated to report directly to you about safety issues and 

those things there. Who was that senior official? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I will have to get back to you about that to get you 

the name and the details of what was done pursuant to that letter. 

Mr. HARPER. OK. Then obviously the question would be, and I 

wish you could have answered today, was who was that senior official, and what were the results of that action. And then the question that perhaps you can answer now is how is the appointment 

of Dr. Michael Bell as the new CDC point person over lab safety 

when we do not even know who the old point person was, how is 

that going to be more effective other than we know his name? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. What I believe to be the case is that we did in 2012 

similar to what we did in other incidents was we did address comprehensively the specific problems that were identified. So there 

were concerns about some airflow issues. There were concerns 

about some of the security issues in our laboratories. 

And while I would never say that we are 100 percent resolved 

on those things, we really focused on those particular problems. 

What we missed was the broader pattern, and that is what Dr. Bell 

is overseeing now. 

Mr. HARPER. So does this mean that there will be always a point 

person, is that what your plan—— 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. Dr. Bell is the person now. We will transition 

that to a single point of accountability for lab safety. And one of 

the things that Dr. Bell and his group will do is to recommend 

where that entity should sit within CDC to be most effective. 

62 

Mr. HARPER. Dr. Dick, the CDC reported that since 2007 there 

have been two surprise inspections of CDC, both performed by 

CDC’s Division of Select Agents and Toxins before APHIS took over 

inspections of CDC labs. Since 2012 I am showing that APHIS has 

conducted 11 inspections of CDC labs. I would like to know why 

APHIS has not conducted any surprise inspections of CDC labs, or 

have they done that? 

Mr. DICK. Thank you for the question. We conduct surprise inspections to enforce compliance between renewal inspections, which 

is every 3 years. As we stated, we came on in late 2012 as the oversight entity for CDC. At the Roybal Lab, we actually have been 

there six, seven if you include this last incident, times in that year 

and a half. So we have not had an opportunity to do a surprise inspection since we are there regularly. 

Mr. HARPER. So the last time a surprise inspection was done was 

when? 

Mr. DICK. We have not done a surprise inspection prior to taking 

over in 2012. I am not familiar with before that. 

Mr. HARPER. And obviously I will not ruin the surprise by asking 

when one is planned. But it does seem like we—— 

Mr. DICK. We intend to follow up on—— 

Mr. HARPER [continuing]. That that is a great tool to have. 

Mr. DICK. Absolutely, and certainly first and foremost we are 

going to be following up on the current incident with them and 

making a revisit when CDC indicates that they are ready for us to 

revisit. And then we will be doing surprise inspections after that 

point. 

Mr. HARPER. Let us say that, and this is for you, Dr. Frieden, 

or for you, Dr. Dick. If it is determined that a dangerous biological 

agent has been stolen, who do you report that to? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. So we have a protocol for dealing with theft. There 

has been no theft of a biological agent reported from either CDC 

or any of the regulated facilities in the 10 years of the program to 

my knowledge. When there are concerns for potential theft or 

misplacement, we work with law enforcement, including the FBI, 

to do a joint investigation. I would just mention that our expansion 

of surprise inspections was something that we directed over the 

last few years at CDC because we felt that was very important to 

do. 

Mr. HARPER. So you said there have been no reports of stolen 

agents. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. That is my understanding. 

Mr. HARPER. But what about missing biological agents? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. There have been losses at certain facilities, and in 

those circumstances we also coordinate with the FBI. Usually it is 

an issue of inventory control, so as earlier we were talking about 

critical control points, such as inactivation of virulent pathogens. 

Similarly, inventory is a critical control point. 

Mr. HARPER. Yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I do want to ask clarification of Mr. 

Harper’s question, though. When he asked about theft of an item, 

your inventory control is not so tight that someone could not, I 

mean, someone could take something, replicate it, and walk out 

with something. Am I correct on that? 

63 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Inventory control is one of the critical controls to 

prevent loss or theft. But there have been to my knowledge no 

thefts reported from any of the select agent regulated labs, including CDC’s, over the past decade. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there was at the Army one in Texas, I believe, a few years ago. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I am not familiar with that. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Mr. Tonko, you are recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Welcome to our panelists. The 

CDC is responsible for registration and oversight of all laboratories 

that possess, use, or transfer select agents that could pose a threat 

to human health, while APHIS is responsible for those select 

agents that pose a threat to animal or plant health. Select agents 

that pose a threat to both human and animal health, like anthrax, 

are regulated by both CDC and APHIS. 

So that being said, Dr. Kingsbury, can you tell us what GAO has 

found with regard to the increase in the number of high containment bio labs? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. I have got that on. I am not sure I understand 

your question. I think within the Select Agent Program, I think 

there is information about how many laboratories there are, and 

they are regularly inspected as these gentlemen have just been 

saying. 

Our concern about the national strategy is that there are a lot 

of other laboratories that deal with highly infectious pathogens 

that are not considered to be select agents, and nobody knows how 

many of those laboratories there are. 

Mr. TONKO. But with the high containment bio labs, in that 

given category, is there an increase that has been measured by 

your review? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. I mean, I did not hear the word. 

Mr. TONKO. Is there an increase in the number of—— 

Ms. KINGSBURY. There has been an increase since the anthrax 

attacks in 2001. The last time we actually tried to count them was 

2 or 3 years ago, and I think at that point it looked like there were 

slightly fewer than there had been the year before, which we sort 

of think is maybe just a budget problem. But that, again, is the 

only ones that people are actually aware of. 

I think there are private entities and perhaps State government 

entities that have BSL–3 and BSL–4 laboratories that are not overseen in the same way and that is of a little concern to us. 

Mr. TONKO. Well, what accounts for the growing numbers of 

these labs that you suggested are out there? 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Well, following the anthrax attacks in 2001, 

there are a number of agencies whose missions touched on the 

issue of biological weapons and whether those pathogens could be 

used to attack our country. And so each within their own sphere 

developed a program to counter those possible threats, and each 

got funded by the Congress to build additional laboratories and so 

forth. So it is just a fragmented program that had a very strong 

rationale at the beginning, but right now I think there is perhaps 

a different rationale that might be articulated. But nobody is in 

charge of doing that. 

64 

Mr. TONKO. So with this increase in the number of labs and 

these various missions associated, what would your recommendations be to addressing—— 

Ms. KINGSBURY. Well, we have made recommendations that 

there should be a single entity that has responsibility for developing a national strategic plan and national standards for the operations of high containment laboratories. The dilemma is figuring 

out how to do that in the current environment with competing interests among the agencies involved and so forth. There is even a 

competing interest issue in the Congress since different committees 

of the Congress have different jurisdictions over these different 

agencies. 

So it is a tough problem to solve, but we think it would be worth 

spending some time even at a theoretical strategic level to begin to 

address this issue and think through how we would go about doing 

it in the future. 

Mr. TONKO. And, Dr. Frieden, what are your views here in terms 

of the growing numbers of these labs and how to move forward 

with the activity here in the U.S.? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I do think this is a complicated topic for which 

there is probably not a quick and simple solution. But just logically, the more places work with dangerous pathogens goes on, the 

more possibility there is of accidents or accidental releases. So ensuring the work that happens is happening in a safe environment 

is critical. 

And the key concept I think we have to apply is risk benefit. I 

do not think we can ever guarantee zero risk for some of the things 

that are done, but we can do everything humanly possible to get 

that risk as low as possible. But we have to ensure that the benefit 

is something that is reasonably likely to occur. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. Thank you very much. With that I yield 

back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Griffith for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that, and 

I appreciate you all being here today to testify to us. 

Dr. Frieden, if I could get you to turn to Tab 5 in the booklet. 

And as you look at that Tab 5, that is the HHS Inspector General 

report regarding the CDC Roybal facility, which says it was sent 

to you. Have you seen this before at some point? The front page 

says it was sent to you. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I have it. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. OK. And then if I could direct you to page 5, and 

on page 5 it says that the Inspector General’s Office could not 

verify that 10 out of 30 sample-approved individuals for select 

agents had received the required training. And do you see that on 

that page? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. And likewise it says that select agent inventory 

records are incomplete, and you also acknowledge that that is on 

that page? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. 

65 

Mr. GRIFFITH. And then if go over to page 6, the report says that 

there were agents stored in areas not listed in the registration. You 

see that at the top of the page as well, page 6. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you. And one example given is that scientists found a vial of select agent in a drawer and another scientist discovered 16 vials stored in an unsecured freezer. Do you 

see that in that paragraph? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Yes. And the report on page 6 also states that 

there were unauthorized transfers and packages received by unapproved individuals. Now, my concern is this. This is at the Roybal 

facility. Were these not the same kind of violations that then 

popped up and were found in subsequent inspections by the USDA 

in 2013 and 2014, and then revealed again in the matter that 

brings us here today in the anthrax and influenza incidents of 

2014? Are they not the same types of problems? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. The answer is yes and no. The specific problems 

that were found led to a specific response. For example, on security 

we implemented layers of security. We strengthened the systems. 

We improved personal background checks and security. So in each 

of these, we felt—— 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Let me ask you this question. Did you all do a system-wide after these problems were discovered because we have 

2010, and then we have got 2013, and earlier in 2014? Did you all 

ever do a system-wide re-check? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Not adequately. Not adequately. We addressed the 

specific problems, I believe, with a sincere effort to rectify them, 

but what we missed was the broader pattern that we are now addressing by strengthening our culture of safety in our labs. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. All right, and I do appreciate that, and I know 

that you are having to answer a lot of tough questions, and I appreciate your demeanor here today. I do think that is appropriate 

and appreciated. 

That being said, let us look over page 7, and then on top of page 

8 there are five recommendations there. If you could read those out 

loud that take place, and then let me know if they were followed 

up on. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Well, I can shorten this by saying that the key one 

is the fifth, and the fifth has to do with confirming that materials 

are inactive before transferring them. And that was specifically 

what was not done in the anthrax incident. So if we had applied 

this broadly, this incident would not have happened. 

Specifically, just to give you a sense of it, in 2006, the same laboratory, the BRRAT Lab, had a pretty similar incident, and that 

is why I directed that it be put into our July 11th report. And after 

that incident, they implemented a standard operating procedure for 

that particular type of biological material leaving their laboratory. 

But when they had a different type of biological laboratory—excuse 

me—biological material leaving the same laboratory, they did not 

apply that standard operating procedure that would have inactivated it. 

So I do think it is the lack of adequate pattern recognition that 

has led us until these last few weeks not to undertake the kind of 

66 

comprehensive, sweeping change and improvement in our laboratory safety culture that we are now implementing. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, I appreciate that. Now, what about the other 

four? Number five may have been the most important, but could 

you look at the other four? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. The first has to do with physical security measures, 

and I believe we have taken a number of steps there. There are 

still steps that we need to do better on in that area having to do 

with staff coming in and not swiping in every time. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. And you have indicated you are going to have 

training, which is number three. What about number two? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. I think we have made a great deal of progress 

on ensuring that only approved individuals are allowed access to 

select agents, and Mr. Henderson can speak more to that. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. All right. You have got 20 seconds to do number 

four. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Inventory is an area where we have done a number 

of things, but given the recent incident at NIH and the fact that 

inventory is a flashpoint, we will be reviewing all of our inventory 

work. It is a massive job to do it right, but we will do that as well. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, and I appreciate that. The safety of the 

American public rests in your hands. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now recognize Ms. Schakowsky for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to 

thank the witnesses. As you can see from the tone of this hearing, 

there is complete bipartisan concern about what happened here. 

And what I wanted to concentrate on is not the incidents themselves, but then the response in particular to the anthrax release. 

The CDC report described delays in identification of potentially 

exposed individuals, and potentially affected lab rooms, and communication of the possible release of anthrax to all CDC staff that 

may have been exposed, and that there was no clear lead for response to this incident in the first week. 

So, I know you have discussed a number of these things, but it 

is the management piece once a problem was discovered. And so, 

I wanted to ask you, Dr. Frieden, what was your response to this 

finding? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. This was our finding, and we indicated that when 

we deal with outside events, and we are currently dealing, for example, with Ebola in West Africa where we have the largest outbreak ever, we activate our Emergency Operations Center, or sometimes we will use the facilities of the Emergency Operations Center 

to manage our response more effectively. 

We should have done that the moment we learned of the potential exposure. What that allows us to do is break down a big problem into smaller problems and address them one by one: communications, employee safety, clinical care, decontamination, scientific 

evaluation and investigation. And so, instead of doing that in a systematic way, it was done unsystematically, and not as well as it 

should have been done. 

67 

In those first few days, which I remember vividly, we were really 

focused on the employees who may have been exposed and making 

sure that they got into care and got on treatment. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. But it took a while to even identify who those 

people were. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. In the effort to do that, we identified that we 

did not have the kind of systems that were needed or the systems 

that we had in place were not used promptly, for example, viewing 

security camera coverage to see who had come into and left the facilities on time. That was not done because one part of the Agency 

did not know or did not use those resources. The root cause of that 

problem was not activating our Incident Command System. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. OK. Dr. Dick, can you elaborate on that finding about response? 

Mr. DICK. Yes. I think our findings were very similar to Dr. 

Frieden’s. We had an independent team that came in during. There 

was still an ongoing investigation by CDC and their staff, and our 

Select Agent Group was interviewing employees and workers from 

the various sections that were responding to this. 

We found very similar findings to those that he just indicated. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. You know, I wanted to follow up for a second 

on what the chairman was saying about the possibility of even 

stealing something that is a threat. You know, in the smallpox incident, it turned out that the vials were discovered at NIH, but they 

could have been somewhere else. Nobody seemed to know. And that 

is really disturbing, too, that, you know, who knows? Somebody 

could have taken them out. So I am not sure when you say that 

nothing has been stolen, that it also says that nothing could have 

been stolen. Respond to that, Dr. Frieden? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Well, we have taken a number of steps to strengthen the security aspects of select agent registration. Those steps include suitability assessments for all people who work with tier one 

agents. They include looking at cyber security issues and personnel 

reliability, ongoing access of personnel who have access to tier one 

agents, increased physical security standards, incident response 

plans, and ongoing training. So I do think that the concern for theft 

is real. 

Some of these organisms still occur in nature and ensuring that 

where there are laboratories not just in this country, but around 

the world, that you test on them. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Well, let us worry about this country right 

now, and smallpox, of course, would be a big concern. Let me just 

end with this, if I could, Mr. Chairman. Whenever I hear the word 

‘‘culture,’’ and a ‘‘cultural problem,’’ I know we have a real challenge on our hands, you know. Hand washing change the face of 

medicine. It is not sexy, and people do not win Nobel Prizes over 

that kind of thing. But it really as part of the culture has made 

our medical system much more successful, huge advance. 

And so, these kinds of small things that deal with culture, and 

attitude, and awareness of these kinds of very simple things, we 

need to really figure out, you need primarily to figure out how to 

make them part of the everyday thinking of your staff. And, you 

know, we are willing participants here. And I yield back. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Thank you. 

68 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Johnson of Ohio 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, want to 

thank our witnesses for joining us today. Dr. Frieden, it looks like 

you are the guy on the hot seat. You are getting peppered with all 

the questions, and I have got a few for you as well. 

You know, the mission of CDC laboratories, as you well know, includes carrying out work to protect the American public against 

bioterrorist activities. Now, critical lab activities are shut down 

pending the outcome of your remedial evaluation and reform. So 

how will CDC be able to address any bioterrorism or other emergencies which might occur before they reopen? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. There is just one particular laboratory that is shut. 

There are multiple other laboratories at CDC that continue their 

operation that would be able to respond to bioterrorist and a potential bioterrorist incident. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. So there is no concern on your part that because of these CDC errors that we may be limiting our ability to 

protect the public. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. No, I am confident that the incidents that we saw 

did not cause any release of agents into the community. They most 

likely did not cause any actual exposure to CDC staff. But they 

really are a tipping point in our recognition of the need to improve 

our laboratory safety. But we are still fully functional in terms of 

being able to respond to an event. 

It is just that step of sending something out of a high containment space into a lower containment space that I have issued a 

moratorium on, and we will lift that laboratory by laboratory as 

soon as we are confident we can do that safely. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. Is the CDC planning to use the National 

Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity as the external committee 

to advise CDC on laboratory quality and safety? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. What I intend to do is to invite an external advisory group specific to look at CDC and specific to tell us every way 

they think we can do better in—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. But what about the National Science Advisory 

Board for Biosecurity? Are you going to be using them? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. That is not our current plan to the best of my understanding. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK, because NIH on Sunday purged almost half 

of the members from that board, and I was inquisitive about 

whether you knew about this, why the Administration took this action, and whether or not NIH consulted. Do you use that advisory 

board for anything? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I would have to get back to you. It is primarily 

managed by NIH, so I would have to defer to them for the management of that group. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Well, that is good. That eliminates one 

question for you then. For Dr. Dick, in light of the anthrax incident 

investigation APHIS recently completed, do you think that prior inspections of CDC laboratories were sufficient? 

Mr. DICK. I do. 

69 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. Well, given the fact select agents were stored 

in undesignated places, should such problems have come to light 

fully as a result of prior inspections? 

Mr. DICK. Yes. I think the important thing to recognize is that 

when we review their protocols, the protocols were in place. And 

because of the primary cause of this incident, and that was that 

this bacteria was not inactivated, it was transferred to a laboratory 

that would not necessarily have to have a locked cabinet. And so, 

therefore, when we provide our report on select agents, as was indicated earlier, we also report on those laboratories where that select 

agent went, in this case not deactivated. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. All right. Well, that concludes my questions, 

Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Long for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Frieden, are you familiar with this picture? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I certainly am. 

Mr. LONG. Well, I am going to turn 59 years old in less than a 

month, and this vial is dated 17 months before I was born. And apparently it was located in a cooler where? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. On the NIH campus. 

Mr. LONG. Last week. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. A little over that. 

Mr. LONG. In recent—— 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. 

Mr. LONG. Recently. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. 

Mr. LONG. So this vial of smallpox that is older than I am had 

been in a cooler, am I given to understand, in one location? I cannot even imagine a cooler running for 60 years, 61 years. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. My understanding is that it was a walk-in cold 

room that was used for storage. 

Mr. LONG. And someone walked in and discovered this smallpox. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. What happened was that that laboratory, as I understand it, was transitioned from NIH to FDA many years ago 

when FDA took over some of those functions. FDA is moving into 

its new facilities. In the course of moving, it was doing a complete 

inventory of everything in its facility, and the workers there discovered a large box that had this vial and others in it. 

Mr. LONG. Workers like moving workers? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. No, laboratory scientists. 

Mr. LONG. Lab workers. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Sorry, laboratory scientists, yes. 

Mr. LONG. OK. Well, recently there was a case of someone that 

wanted to remove information from NSA, and he got in a position 

to do that. And with a $1,500 thumb drive, he was able to take all 

kinds of severe government secrets with him out of his position he 

had worked in. Does it bother you at all that people could, if they 

had cruelty and meanness in mind, that they could get into a cooler 

like this and take a 61-year-old vial of smallpox? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. We are certainly concerned that smallpox, which 

should not have been there, was there for many years. And we 

want to ensure that on our campus, and NIH is looking at their 

70 

campus, and FDA at theirs, there are not other examples of collections because this was a collection of organisms that are in place 

and in places where they should not be. 

This particular box was clearly created by a scientist who was 

very experienced or a group of scientists. The materials were essentially freeze dried, or lyophilized is the scientific term for it, and 

then sealed in that ampule that you held up the picture of. And 

that was done before smallpox eradication was undertaken, so it 

was not done with malicious intent. It was done just to preserve 

something for future—— 

Mr. LONG. No, no, I know that, but just the fact that this could 

lay around for 61 years. I cannot even conceive of that thought. But 

let me take you to a press conference last Friday now that we have 

moved from 61-plus years ago. At a press conference last Friday, 

you indicated that the CDC does research to figure out how better 

to treat people if they are exposed and prevent it, if they are exposed, and how better to prevent it through vaccination. You also 

stated the fact that anthrax continues to occur in nature, that anthrax has been used as a weapon. 

My question is this. How many CDC laboratory workers received 

the FDA licensed anthrax vaccine prior to the anthrax incident last 

month as recommended by the CDC, its Advisory Committee on 

Immunization Practices committee for lab workers since 2002? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I would have to get back to you on the exact number, but we offer anthrax vaccine to anyone for whom anthrax vaccine is indicated. We do not require people to get vaccinated, but 

we offer it to anyone who might be exposed through their laboratory or epidemiologic work. 

Mr. LONG. So you think that is a pretty active program? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Oh, yes. 

Mr. LONG. Do you have any idea? I mean, you say you have to 

get back to me, which is fine if you will. I appreciate it. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I would have to get back to you. 

Mr. LONG. OK, because it is reported that you told Reuters on 

June 30th the fact that anthrax exposure was even a concern or 

that it might have happened is unacceptable. Employees should 

never have to be concerned about the safety from preventable exposures. And as you note, to date more than 12 million doses of 

BioThrax, the FDA licensed anthrax vaccine, have been administered to more than 3 million individuals. So if you can get back to 

me with that, I would appreciate it. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. I will. 

Mr. LONG. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now recognize Ms. Ellmers of North 

Carolina for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ELLMERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 

panel. This is a very good discussion, and I appreciate your candid 

responses. I think that at this point the most important thing that 

we all can do is get to the bottom of it and correct the issues at 

hand so that these things do not happen again. 

I did want to clarify something. Dr. Frieden, there was a question posed to you about the number of missing possible toxic substances. And I know you had acknowledged that over time there 

has been an account of some missing, but not stolen, correct? If 

71 

something is missing, how do you determine that it absolutely was 

not stolen? And if anyone else on the panel would like to comment 

on that, I would appreciate it as well. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. So to give you an example, there may have been 

a package that was sent from one location to another and had a 

select agent in it. It did not arrive at the second location. The FBI 

was involved in that investigation, and the FBI concluded in one 

particular case as an example that the package had been inadvertently destroyed, but it had not been stolen or lost. Is there anything you would like to add to that? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Just one thing I think is important is we take 

the notion of chain of custody very seriously, so we are always trying to be mindful of where the select agents are stored, and if they 

are in transport, we have eyes on them or somebody trusted to be 

with them as much as possible. Occasionally, Dr. Frieden is correct, 

there could be an accounting issue where something has been destroyed and they did not complete the paperwork, and then we 

have to go and try to understand what happened. And there have 

been a couple of instances like that. 

Ms. ELLMERS. OK. Thank you for clarifying that for me. And 

again, getting back to just some of the toxic substances that have 

been found in boxes that may not have stated what they were in 

a refrigerated walk-in storage or otherwise. When the NIH ran 

across their most recent problem, they put in place what they call 

a clean sweep. And I know you had said that there was a transition 

between NIH and FDA. Were they already in the process? I mean, 

is that what the clean sweep is that you were talking about, or did 

they institute the clean sweep afterwards? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. My understanding is that both NIH and FDA are 

doing complete inventory checks and follow-up to the discovery of 

the smallpox vials. 

Ms. ELLMERS. OK. So once that happened— So I guess my question for you is, is the CDC doing the same? 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. We will undertake a comprehensive inventory 

review at all of our facilities. 

Ms. ELLMERS. At all the facilities. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. That is my understanding. 

Ms. ELLMERS. Including the one that is shut down now obviously. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. Yes. Yes. 

Ms. ELLMERS. But all of them. 

Dr. FRIEDEN. All of our lab facilities. 

Ms. ELLMERS. Great. Well, thank you. I have time if anyone 

wants to use it, Mr. Chairman. But I yield back right now if no one 

else wants my time. 

Mr. MURPHY. Right. I believe that concludes our first panel. So 

I thank all the witnesses for coming today, and we will just let you 

step away while we prepare the second panel. 

I would also remind everybody that we will have some follow-up 

questions for you, so please get back to us quick. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Chairman, will you yield for one second? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, I will be glad to. 

Ms. DEGETTE. I would just hope that we would have this panel 

back in the fall after Dr. Frieden completes his investigation and 

puts his controls in place. I think it is really important for us to 

72 

know what they are doing, and I know they are working hard on 

this. 

Mr. MURPHY. I agree with that, and we would like to hear again, 

so we will have you back.[Recess.] 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, while they are getting ready, I will get the 

next panel introduced. We will have Mr. Sean Kaufman, who is the 

President and Founding Partner of Behavioral-Based Improvement 

Solutions, LLC. We also have Dr. Richard Ebright, who is a Board 

of Governors Professor of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Rutgers University, and Laboratory Director at the Waksman Institute 

of Microbiology. 

While the witnesses are stepping up here, I will be swearing 

them in. Are you sitting in your right seats there? I am sorry, I 

do not know what the means. Mr. Kaufman, are you ready? Where 

is Dr. Ebright? The witness is AWOL I guess. 

What we may do to get going here, Mr. Kaufman, let me swear 

you in so you can get started on your testimony, and then we will 

swear in Dr. Ebright when he returns. 

So you are aware the committee is holding an investigative hearing and doing so has a practice of taking testimony under oath. Do 

you have any objections to testifying under oath? 

Mr. KAUFMAN. No. 

Mr. MURPHY. And advise you under the rules of the House, you 

can be advised by counsel. Do you have a desire to be advised by 

counsel during testimony today? 

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. MURPHY. You do have counsel with you? 

Mr. KAUFMAN. I do not. 

Mr. MURPHY. OK, thank you. Could you please raise your right 

hand and I will swear you in.[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you very much. You are now under oath 

subject to the penalties set forth in Title 18, Section 1001 of the 

United States Code. You may now give a 5-minute summary of 

your written statement. Go ahead. 

TESTIMONIES OF SEAN KAUFMAN, PRESIDENT AND FOUNDING PARTNER, BEHAVIORAL-BASED IMPROVEMENT SOLUTIONS, LLC; RICHARD EBRIGHT, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, 

BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY AND 

CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 

TESTIMONY OF SEAN G. KAUFMAN 

Mr. KAUFMAN. Fantastic. Thank you. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGatte, and the members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to be here to testify on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention anthrax laboratory incident. 

Let me begin by commending the CDC, specifically the actions 

taken to protect the workforce and inform the general public during this very serious issue. I stand by my belief that when someone 

does something wrong, we cannot forget what they have done right, 

and in general we must not forget that CDC has an outstanding 

history of service. 

For over 10 years I have been providing biosafety training programs for individuals working in high containment laboratories. 

73 

My background is in behavioral science, and I specialize in motivating individuals to behave to mitigate risks associated with infectious diseases. 

There are three main challenges we face when doing scientific research: the agent, the people working with the agent, and the organization where the work is being done. The first challenge of working safely with infectious agents has been for decades, and can be, 

appropriately mitigated. Effective engineering controls, personal 

protective equipment, and standard operating procedures are already in place. However, it is important to recognize that one person and one error, whether it is unintentional or intentional, can 

negate all these controls in an instant. 

This leads me to the second challenge we face when looking at 

safe science, and that is the people working with the agent. Human 

risk factors, such as risk perceptions, attitudes, behavior, complacency, outrage, apathy, and perceived mastery must be addressed 

to sustain optimal performance of the scientific workforce. 

We must accept and learn from and control for human error in 

the laboratory environment. In other words, we must stop focusing 

on the who and start focusing on the why, how, and what went 

wrong, passing no judgment other than we are all human, which 

would lead to solutions minimizing further human error. 

Our final and greatest challenge is the existing social norms or 

safety culture within an organization. Let me repeat myself. The 

greatest challenge we face specific to safe science is not the agent. 

It is not the worker. It is the culture of the organization. The culture of an organization permits norms to be developed, and it is 

within these norms that behavior is either deemed acceptable or 

unacceptable. 

As a former proud CDC employee, I am very, very disappointed 

by what I am hearing. It has been and remains very clear that this 

issue is a systemic one or an organizational issue rather than an 

issue of a laboratory director and two scientists. I have become irritated by the unnecessary finger pointing and statements surrounding disciplinary actions of scientists who worked in parallel 

with the culture of the organization and made an unintentional 

error. 

The incident highlights the need for scientific protocols to be reviewed and verified, ensuring they work and they can be done by 

those working in a laboratory. This incident highlights the need to 

ensure those protocols are followed, and if they are not, consequences aimed at minimizing future failures are immediately applied. 

This incident calls for more evidence-based biosafety research to 

determine what specifically works and minimize risks associated 

with the challenges that we face, which again are the agent, the 

people, and the organization. 

In the years I have been doing training, I have been forced to 

speak a common language around the world. No matter where you 

are in the United States of America or around the world, people 

can relate to the concept of neighborhood, house, and family. I have 

used a home, sweet home approachfor establishing a healthy culture in my laboratory trainings. 

74 

Please consider this analogy. A laboratory is a home. The scientists working within the laboratory are a family. The scientific 

protocols are the house rules. If one member of the family breaks 

the house rules, it puts the whole family at risk. If breaking the 

rules is not addressed, the whole house is at risk and begins to affect other houses in the neighborhood. 

Let me clarify. If scientists do not follow their house rules, it impacts other laboratories within the organization. CDC is a neighborhood that houses hundreds of houses or actually has hundreds 

of labs. If the neighborhood does not establish a set of ground rules 

for all the houses, then each house begins to do their own thing, 

and inevitably the neighborhood is at risk. 

Building a culture of safety starts with establishing a commitment to the residents, or the scientists, of that neighborhood or 

that organization. We do not banish family members for unintentional errors. We encourage homeowners or labs directors to come 

together and find solutions. We establish consequences for neighborhood members, scientists who blatantly choose to break neighborhood rules. We support each other, especially when unintentional accidents occur. 

We talk about incidents, not hide them, so the whole neighborhood learns and grows from them. We recognize that together we 

are safer. This commitment is contagious and spreads to homes 

throughout the neighborhood, and that includes laboratories 

throughout an organization. This is just the start of culture change, 

folks. The seed we plant today is what we will reap 5 years from 

now. 

Somewhere out there may be a scientist or an organization who 

finds something unexpected in a freezer, or as a human being 

makes an unintentional error. A choice has to be made. Do I report 

this or not? I ask this committee to facilitate a process which encourages organizations to report incidents and accidents rather 

than punishing them for doing so. 

CDC remains a national treasure, and the United States of 

America remains the land of opportunity for scientists and biological research. Placing untested mandates as a result of this incident 

on scientists and institutions of research may not only push science 

and innovation outside of infectious disease research, but worse, it 

could shift it to other regions of the world. 

I ask this committee to continue to take a leadership role while 

considering the implications of this hearing and future legislation. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared testimony of Mr. Kaufman follows:] 

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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Kaufman. 

Dr. Ebright, you were not available when I swore him in, so I 

am going to have to swear you in. But first ask you when we are 

doing an investigative hearing, we take testimony under oath. Do 

you have any objection to testifying under oath? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. I do not. 

Mr. MURPHY. And the chair advises under the rules of the House 

and the rules of the committee you are entitled to be advised by 

counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel today? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. I do not. 

Mr. MURPHY. In that case, would you please rise and raise your 

right hand, and I will swear you in.[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. You are now under oath and subject to 

the penalties set forth in Title 18, Section 1001 of the United 

States Code. You may now give a 5-minute verbal summary of your 

written statement. 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD EBRIGHT 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank 

you for inviting me to discuss the 2014 CDC anthrax incident and 

its implications. I am a Board of Governors professor of chemistry 

and chemical biology at Rutgers University and laboratory director 

at the Waksman Institute of Microbiology. I will discuss three topics: first, the 2014 CDC anthrax incident; second, broader biosafety 

and biosecurity issues in CDC bioweapons agent laboratories, also 

known as select agent laboratories; and, three, broader biosafety 

and biosecurity issues at the more than 1,000 other government, 

academic, and corporate select agent laboratories across the U.S. 

that are regulated by the CDC. 

My assessments are based on information in published CDC, 

HHS OIG, USDA OIG, GAO documents, published press reports, 

and on my knowledge of biosafety and biosecurity standards for 

work with bacterial pathogens. I turn first to the 2014 CDC anthrax incident. 

I note that the 2014 CDC anthrax incident did not involve one 

violation in one laboratory, but instead involved an entire series of 

violations. The 2014 CDC anthrax incident involved multiple violations of biosafety and biosecurity recommendations in each of three 

different CDC laboratories. There were at least seven distinct violations in total. Had any of three violations in one CDC laboratory 

not occurred, the incident would not have occurred. Had any of four 

violations in two other CDC laboratories not occurred, the impact 

of the incident would have been mitigated. 

I note further that the incident reprised nearly exactly a 2004 incident. In the 2004 incident, workers at Southern Research Institute in Frederick, Maryland used an inappropriate procedure to inactivate a sample of anthrax bacteria, used an inappropriate procedure to verify inactivation, and sent putitatively inert, but actually 

viable, anthrax bacteria to Oakland Children’s Hospital, where 

eight persons were exposed before learning that the anthrax bacteria were viable. 

The CDC, as the agency with regulatory responsibility for select 

agent work relevant to human health, investigated the 2004 Oakland anthrax incident, and in 2005 issued a report on the incident. 

86 

The 2005 CDC report included revised biosafety and biosecurity 

recommendations both for laboratories that prepare and provide inactivated anthrax bacteria and for laboratories that receive and use 

those inactivated anthrax bacteria. 

Had the CDC implemented the recommendations in its own 2005 

report, the 2014 CDC anthrax incident could not have occurred. 

But the CDC did not implement the recommendations in its 2005 

report. The fact that the CDC in 2014 made exactly the same errors that had been made in the 2004 Oakland anthrax incident 

shows that the CDC did not learn from that incident. 

I turn now to biosafety and biosecurity in CDC’s select agent laboratories. I submit that the 2014 CDC anthrax incident is not an 

isolated incident, but it is instead part of a pattern, and a pattern 

that could have been recognized a half decade ago, and should have 

been. Last week, a CDC report listed multiple other incidents, none 

previously disclosed to the public, in which CDC laboratories sent 

putitatively inactivated or attenuated, but actually viable and virulent select agents to other laboratories. These previously undisclosed CDC select agent incidents are fundamentally similar to the 

2014 incident. In particular two previously undisclosed incidents 

from 2006 involved anthrax and appeared to be essentially identical to the current incident. All of these incidents raise both safety 

and security concerns. 

I note further that HHS OIG audits have documented further 

biosafety and biosecurity violations in CDC select agent labs. HHS 

OIG audits of the CDC select agent labs in 2008, 2009, and 2010 

reported major violations. These violations included failures to ensure physical security, failures to restrict access, and failures to 

document inventories. They also included the failure to provide required training to workers with training being unverifiable for fully 

one in three workers in the most recent available report. Perhaps 

most egregiously, the violations included unauthorized transfers to 

select agent labs to other laboratories or individuals. 

I note further that press reports from 2007 to the present have 

documented further biosafety and biosecurity deficiencies in CDC 

select agent laboratories. Examples just to summarize include inadequate provisions for emergency backup power, failure to maintain 

negative pressure airflow in bio containment areas, non-functioning 

doors, non-functioning door seals, jury-rigged repairs with duct 

tape, failure to close entry doors, failure to latch entry doors, failure to assign distinct key codes to the key cards for select agent 

laboratories, and in at least one case, the discovery of an 

unescorted, unauthorized person in a restricted area. Taken together, the available documents indicate that the CDC has not adequately ensured biosafety and biosecurity in its own labs, and are 

consistent with pervasive and systematic violations of biosafety and 

biosecurity in its own labs. 

I turn now to biosafety and biosecurity at CDC. 

Mr. MURPHY. Could you summarize the rest of your statement 

here because we are—— 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Regulated select agent labs. The CDC and the 

USDA have regulatory responsibility for biosafety and biosecurity 

in the approximately 1,000 other U.S. select agent labs: government, academic, and corporate. There is no basis for confidence 

87 

that biosafety and biosecurity standards are higher or that select 

agent inspections are more stringent at CDC regulated, non-CDC 

select agent labs, than in CDC select agent labs. There also is no 

basis for confidence that biosafety and biosecurity standards are 

higher or that select agent inspections are more stringent at USDA 

regulated select agent laboratories than CDC select agent laboratories. 

Deficiencies in select agent standards at these CDC regulated 

and USDA regulated other laboratories are amply documented in 

an HHS and USDA OIG audits. 

Mr. MURPHY. Doctor, we are over time. I will give you 15 more 

seconds. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. One final point, which is I note that the CDC and 

USDA not only performed and fund select agent work, but also regulate biosafety and biosecurity for select agent work. This represents a clear conflict of interest. This systematic clear conflict of 

interest may at least partly account for the deficiencies that I have 

mentioned. Thank you. 

[The prepared testimony of Mr. Ebright follows:] 

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[The appendices to Mr. Ebright’s testimony have been retained 

in committee files and can be found at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20140716/102479/HHRG-113-IF02-Wstate-EbrightR20140716-SD001.pdf.] 

Mr. MURPHY. I thank the two witnesses. I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Kaufman, you specialize in the area of behavior and behavioral change, along those lines. We have heard from you and other 

witnesses today this culture of complacency is a concern. Congress 

has investigated at length problems at the Veterans Administration. We are outraged because of the care we have for our veterans. 

But we saw that there were cash incentives for people to cover 

things up, to shred them, to hide waiting lists. 

We also had in this committee hearings with Mary Barra, the 

CEO of General Motors. Americans were outraged about this, and 

it was described as the culture of complacency or the GM nod. Now 

we see this behavior problem getting into an area of which before 

if you were not a veteran or if you did not buy those Chevy cars, 

you were at least not at risk. But this, when you release a pathogen, it is pretty indiscriminate around anybody who is exposed to 

it. 

So does this routine familiarity around pathogens tend to lead 

people to cut some corners and just get complacent about this? 

Mr. KAUFMAN. I think that there is a—and I believe you know 

this, too. I think that there is an inherent risk in behavior in general. You over-behave, you run the risk of becoming complacent. 

You under-behave, you run the risk of being under-prepared. I 

think it is a very, kind of a balance, and that, in essence, is really, 

in essence, what professional development, and training, and assessments can be used for to keep that healthy balance in check. 

In this case, though, if we are talking about the anthrax incident 

in the laboratory, I do not believe that this was a complacency 

issue or even an incompetency issue. I believe this was a scientist 

that implemented a protocol from another laboratory where it was 

used for good purposes, and I would love to share what those purposes are. And unfortunately there was no process to vet that protocol. 

And so, when it was adapted from one laboratory to another, the 

inactivation time it takes to kill one agent versus another is a lot 

more with the spore forming BA or bacillus anthracis than it was 

with the brucella. 

Mr. MURPHY. But we heard so many things that Dr. Ebright was 

just saying, too, the way the doors were handled, that we have 

heard about people being in an area that they were not authorized 

to be there, that a key was left in a refrigerator. It seems to me 

there are several other elements here where rules are in place and 

people are just downright sloppy. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes. Chairman Murphy, I think the things that 

you are saying are very true, and they actually must be addressed 

and concerned. But I think they also have to be put into perspective. You know, this key in a freezer is almost like, and you used 

a loaded gun or a gun earlier in the session. It is almost like saying 

that I have a house, and inside my house I have a gun, and my 

house has a door with locks, and it also has a house alarm. And 

104 

upstairs in the master bedroom is hidden a safe, and inside that 

safe is a gun with a trigger lock that has a key in it. 

Mr. MURPHY. But that is not the case here. If a key was left in 

the refrigerator and people can come into that area, too, if people 

were all piggybacking on each other’s card here, those are violations of rules. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. Chairman Murphy, like I said, I am not going to 

argue the fact that it is a problem because it is. But I am discussing the perspective, and I am telling you I have seen those refrigerators. They are not common practice refrigerators that people 

just go walking by. These refrigerators are in places where you actually have to have access. 

I came in as a civilian. I am not related to CDC. I have been to 

the laboratory. I have seen these freezers. They are not—— 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, but the issue is how people behaved, and that 

is a question I had for Dr. Frieden before is should someone be required to use their actual card so only certain persons can get in, 

whoever has authorization. It records when they were in there. 

And in some cases the deadly pathogens require two sets of eyes 

in there. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. MURPHY. But part of this, too, I mean, I am not clear on 

what you are saying, Mr. Kaufman. I want to be clear on that that 

in some cases, are you making excuses for the persons and saying 

that there was not enough protocol? I am not sure what you are 

saying. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. No. No, sir. I am not making excuses. What I am 

saying is that there is a healthy respect for what truly is going on 

here, and I think we have to look at the spectrum. We cannot be 

arrogant and say this is just what happens in science, but we also 

cannot be living in an illusion where this is the end of the earth. 

We have got to stop all research. We have got to minimize and cut 

things down to a certain number of laboratories as a result of what 

happens here. 

I think we have to take a balanced approach and take a look at 

really what happened, and in the culture in which it happened. 

That is what I am saying. 

Mr. MURPHY. Dr. Ebright, do you concur? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. I disagree. 

Mr. MURPHY. Can you please explain? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. So these are problems of individuals, but they are 

problems of individuals acting in a context. That context has two 

components. The one is the laboratory culture, and we have talked 

several times or heard several times today about a culture of lax 

attitude towards safety. That is part of the problem. We have also 

heard several times today about researchers becoming inured to 

working with dangerous or hazardous materials. That is part of the 

problem. 

What has not been mentioned before with respect to culture is 

hubris, and hubris is fundamentally part of the problem here, a 

sense of the scientist that he or she should be able to proceed without restriction and without management. So these are all issues 

with the culture. 

105 

But in addition to that culture, you have an institutional structure. You have institutional management, and then you have the 

oversight of that institution. I think these are even bigger problems 

that are even more significantly responsible for the issues that I 

described. 

I mentioned the fact that CDC and USDA regulate their own biosafety and biosecurity. They perform the work. They fund the work. 

That is an inherent conflict of interest. Until that regulatory responsibility is moved out of those two agencies and out of any agency that performs select agent research and funds select research, 

I believe you can predict with high confidence the same types of 

problems, the same patterns, and the same cultures will remain in 

place in CDC labs, in USDA labs, and in the approximately 1,000 

other labs they regulate. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. My time is way over. I am going to now 

to recognize Ms. DeGette for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will follow up on 

your questions. Mr. Kaufman, I have no doubt that these individuals have no ill motives. They are well motivated. They are trying 

to do their research. And, Dr. Ebright, I think you would agree 

with that as well. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. I would. 

Ms. DEGETTE. But let me just put this in context. I do not know 

if you were here when we gave our opening statements. I have 

been on this subcommittee since 1997, and I have got to tell you 

that the reason why we are so concerned here is because this kind 

of practice keeps happening over and over again. It is not just one 

isolated incident. 

As our memo that I put into the record said, there were six inspections. APHIS identified 29 observations of concerns of facilities 

and equipment, 27 related to safety and security, and 39 on documentation and record keeping. And a lot of times what we are dealing with in this situation is very, very extreme bioagents that could 

kill a number of people. And you are nodding your head, so I am 

assuming you understand this, yes or no? 

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, I do. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. So what we are trying to figure out, and like 

I say, I think the people are trying to do their job. I think they are 

well motivated. But with all due respect, we are not overreacting 

here. This has got to be solved. 

So what I want to ask you since you were here is, did you hear 

Ms. Kingsbury’s testimony where she said that we need to have 

one agency at least in charge of developing national standards? 

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, I did. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And what do you think of that? And she admitted 

that it is going to be difficult to do that because of overlapping jurisdictions. But would you agree that it is worth an effort to try to 

do that? 

Mr. KAUFMAN. I know you like yes and no answers, and I am trying to think. I agree that we should explore what we are doing 

today and where we could go in the future, yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Dr. Ebright, what do you think about that 

suggestion? 

106 

Mr. EBRIGHT. There definitely should be a single national agency 

that sets policy recommendations, policy standards, and advises on 

needs and how those needs should be met. There also should be a 

national entity that regulates and oversees the select agent work. 

They need not be the same, but they both need to be there. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And let me just say that we have seen this in this 

subcommittee, not just at CDC. We have also seen it in the labs. 

And we saw it at Los Alamos some years ago where some very 

highly confidential nuclear data disappeared because a researcher 

took it home to his house. It is the same kind of, you call it hubris 

or whatever. It is an assumption that there is important research 

going on, and that nothing bad is going to happen. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Correct. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And so, what I think is that, and in fairness I 

think what Dr. Frieden thinks, too, is you need to put systems in 

place so that it is not relying on somebody to have that kind of 

judgment where really you should have a system. Would you agree 

with that? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Absolutely. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And, Mr. Kaufman, would you also agree with 

that? 

Mr. KAUFMAN. Absolutely. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK, great. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I do not have 

anything further. Thank you for clarifying, and I will yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back. I will now 

recognize Ms. Blackburn of Tennessee for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we are all 

kind on the same path here with our questions. 

Dr. Ebright, I want to come to you. Let us go back to the CDC 

report from the 2004 anthrax incident, and you mentioned that. 

And that incident stated ‘‘inactivated anthrax should be cultured 

both at the preparing lab before shipment and at the research lab 

several days before use to ensure sterility.’’ So did CDC follow their 

own advice in this? OK, go ahead. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. No, they did not. Apparently not in 2006. Definitely not in 2014. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. OK. So what we have is a continued pattern of 

refusing to learn from their past mistakes. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Indeed refusing to read their own reports and follow their own recommendations. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. OK. You are the director of a biomedical research lab. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Yes. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. And you do some of this same work with dangerous pathogens. And how important is it to you that all personnel in your lab strictly follow your biosafety protocols, and that 

in order to follow those biosafety protocols, they have an understanding that they have culture of safety that is lacking at CDC? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. I think it is critically important. And for biosafety 

working with biohazardous organisms at any level—one, two, 

three, or four—that message of safety has to come first. That safety 

training has to come first. And before any experiment is even 

begun, there has to be a process of risk benefit assessment in 

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fits, weights the risks against the benefits, assesses that the risks 

are outweighed by the benefits. And that process needs to be reviewed by another set of eyes. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Do you follow this as standard operating procedures? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Yes we do for our biological, biohazard research. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Yes. Is it clearly understood from all of your 

personnel, do they see this as written best practices, and do they 

understand that they are expected and required to follow? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. They understand that they are expected and required to follow these practices. They are monitored in these practices, and the message consistently is that these agents require respect, and they must be handled with respect. And before any experiment, that risk benefit assessment must occur. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. And if one of your personnel failed to follow 

those protocols, what would you do to them? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Depending on the nature of the failure, they would 

face consequences up to and including termination. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. OK. And we do not see that pattern taking 

place at CDC. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. We have not seen evidence for it. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. OK. Do you think that CDC is in need of a 

major correction, and do you have advice for CDC on what that correction would be? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Many of the things that we heard Dr. Frieden suggest will be undertaken at the CDC are precisely the steps that are 

required at the CDC. The question is whether this time will be different from the previous time, and the time before that, and the 

time before that. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. And if they did not do that, I think probably according to what you have said, you would terminate the whole 

bunch. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Again, in this particular case, personnel action will 

not be sufficient to resolve the issue. This issue is institutional and 

organizational. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Correct. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. They cannot have the regulatory authority to regulate themselves. It simply does not work. It does not work in many 

areas of human endeavor, and it definitely does not work in this 

area. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Mr. Kaufman, anything to add to that? 

Mr. KAUFMAN. I continue to stand by my belief and my conviction, because over the last 10 years I have traveled the world, including several Federal labs in the United States, and I have asked 

scientists to please report laboratory accidents and incidents so we 

have a chance to learn from them. And if we take this chance now 

and turn it into a punitive aspect against scientists that make unintentional injuries, it is well-known that punishment does three 

things. It builds resentment, it teaches no new behavior, and it 

hides true behavior. 

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ion, are not a way to go, certainly not against the scientists that 

unintentionally makes a mistake. 

If a scientist willingly, and there are scientists that do that, go 

against SOPs, that is a completely different job issue than a scientist that is doing their job within a culture and does not go outside of the SOP that is provided to them. 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. I got a comment to that, Mr. Kaufman. It builds 

resentment. You got to be kidding me. You are telling me these 

people with Ph.D.s do not understand that anthrax is dangerous? 

Are you kidding me? They need more training? You are making 

your statement that CDC anthrax lab incident was all a result of 

training failure, safety training for scientists working at high containment facilities consistent multiple basis, blah, blah, blah. Are 

you kidding me? Are you making excuses for these scientists? 

If they do not understand that anthrax is used for a weapon, its 

spores can kill people, it killed people and harmed people at the 

U.S. Capitol, then they should not be working there. And it sounds 

like you are saying they need more training. Boo hoo. 

This is a bad situation. And I do not think you understand the 

seriousness of this, and it sounds like you are making excuses. 

Look at this. The Washington Post. Today’s cartoon. Do you think 

the employees at CDC are proud of this? Ha ha ha. It is funny. No, 

it is not. This is tragic. It could have been lethal for people. 

And I hear you telling Ms. Blackburn that we are going to build 

resentment. I am sorry, I do not buy that at all. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. May I comment? Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Murphy. I again am not defending what is going with CDC. 

In fact, I have said that I am disappointed even as a former 

CDC—— 

Mr. MURPHY. Disappointed is not the right word. You should find 

this to be abhorrent. Any words other than yes or no, was it wrong 

or not wrong. We can make excuses for—Mary Barra sat here from 

GM, and she said this was wrong. There is no question about it. 

Dr. Frieden said this was wrong. There is no gray zone in this. I 

do not get it. I will let you respond to that. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. I appreciate that. I know the individuals involved, 

and when I say training is needed and training is a solution, there 

are several phases of training, and on-the-job specific training, 

which includes SOP verification, is needed for scientists, which has 

been mentioned in previous panel aspects as well. 

I am not making light of this situation. I am not making light 

of this situation at all. I am simply saying that if we choose to punish people who come forward when they make a mistake—— 

Mr. MURPHY. That is different. I am not talking. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is what I am saying. 

Mr. MURPHY. That is different. We want people to be willing to 

do that. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. Thank you. That is what—— 

Mr. MURPHY. But I thought that you were saying here, and I 

think it is in your statement here, too, they need more training. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. They need on-the-job—— 

Mr. MURPHY. They do not training to know that this is bad. 

When you put anthrax in a Ziploc bag or any pathogen, you do not 

109 

training to know that. So I have gone over. Mr. Griffith, you are 

recognized. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is subjective. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, and I guess my concern is that what we 

have here is a series of reports that Dr. Ebright has brought out 

some of the questioning that I did and others did earlier. We have 

had a series of reports that date back a good period of time, and 

yet the changes have not been made. And so, it is a concern. 

A mistake is one thing. Having a standard operating procedure 

which is so flawed that you have repeated mistakes is something 

that I have to agree with the chairman on. That is our problem. 

And I agree with you, Mr. Kaufman, you do not want to punish 

somebody who merely makes a mistake. You want him to come forward as quickly as possible and let us fix it. But you got to stop 

the same mistake happening over and over again. 

Dr. Ebright, how do we make these reforms happen this time? 

How do we do that because while CDC has to protect the American public from anthrax and other things, our job is to do oversight and make sure that they are doing their jobs. So how do we 

make it happen? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. I think the two steps that Congress and the Administration could follow to reduce the probability that this happens again in CDC’s own labs and in the labs that CDC and USDA 

regulate outside those facilities, the two most important steps are, 

first, to reduce the number of select agent laboratories. The number of select agent personnel, the volume of select agent research, 

increased by a factor of 20 to 40 over the last decade. 

That volume of registered individuals, that volume of activity 

needs to be rolled back to close to the level of where it was at the 

beginning of that increase. That would represent taking the current 1,000, or more than 1,000 select agent labs in the U.S. and 

reducing it to 50. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. All right. Let me ask you a question real quick. 

High containment select agent, are those interchangeable terms or 

they different? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. They are very close to interchangeable. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. OK. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Most select agent research, particularly most research, are consequences done at Biosafety Level 3. Biosafety Levels 3 and 4 are considered high level containment. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. So your first recommendation is let us squeeze it 

back down to 50 instead of a thousand of these select agent—— 

Mr. EBRIGHT. Roughly. The increase was a factor of 20 to 40. I 

would recommend we roll back a factor of 20 to a factor of 40. A 

thousand divided by 20 is 50. A thousand divided by 40 is 25. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. All right. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. So that, I believe, is the single easiest, single fastest, and certainly most economical approach 

Mr. GRIFFITH. All right. And you had a second because obviously 

my time is limited. 

Mr. EBRIGHT. OK. Last one is independent entity that carries out 

the regulation and oversight of biosafety and biosecurity in those 

labs, not an agency that performs the work, not an agency that 

funds the work. 

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Mr. GRIFFITH. OK. Now, you said we need to scale back, but let 

me ask you. Why has there been an expansion? And the phrasing 

I have is the high containment laboratories, you said they are 

closed. Why has there been such a great expansion? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. So it was in large measure, essentially in whole, 

a response to the 2001 anthrax mailings. At the time of 2001 anthrax mailings, it was understandable because it was expected here 

and elsewhere that the U.S. was under attack with a biological 

weapon from a foreign source. It was expected that biology would 

be put on a mobilization footing to address this threat. We expanded by a factor of 20 to 40. 

Now, more than a decade later, more than a decade after it has 

become absolutely clear that the 2001 anthrax mailings did not 

come from a foreign source, and after it has become clear that the 

investigation believes it came from within the U.S. biodefense establishment, we have the strange situation that we have expanded 

that establishment by a factor of 20 to 40 without reason and without reassessment. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. And the risks are self-evident? 

Mr. EBRIGHT. The risks follow mathematically. When you increase the number of personnel by a factor of 20 to 40, particularly 

when you recruit people without prior experience, new to the field, 

you increase risks, and you increase those risks by a factor of 20 

to 40 or more. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. On those points, Mr. Kaufman, are you in agreement that we need to scale it back some? 

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am not. I agree with GAO. I think that there 

is not enough information to make the decision to either back off 

or go up. We do not have a baseline. And I also would like to say 

that the capacity of high containment laboratories are not built for 

the threats we just see today. They are built for the threats that 

we do not see coming around the corner tomorrow. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Let me switch gears and ask about the research 

implications or the implications from research of re-engineering 

pathogens such as the experiments by the University of Wisconsin 

scientists that generated a virus similar to the 1918 influenza outbreak that killed tens of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands 

worldwide, and other ways to make H5N1 Avian flu virus more 

contagious in ferrets. I mean, is this part of the expansion or is 

this—— 

Mr. EBRIGHT. This is part of the expansion. This is work that is 

funded as biodefense research. And this is a prime example of the 

culture of hubris. This is work that should not be performed. Flat 

and blank, should not be performed. 

In those cases where elements of this work are deemed essential, 

when the research information could be obtained in no other way, 

then this work should only be performed in a very limited number 

of institutions, perhaps one or two nationally, and only after extensive review of risk benefit weighing at the national level, and only 

under the most stringent safety and security standards. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. I appreciate that very much. I appreciate both witnesses being here. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate having the hearing. 

I like the opportunities to learn, and I have learned a great deal 

from this hearing. Thank you so much. 

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*The information has been retained in committee files and is also available at http:// 

docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=102479. 

Mr. MURPHY. I thank the gentleman for yielding back, and I certainly would encourage all members of this committee to go visit 

some of the labs around the country. Particularly, go to CDC headquarters and see for their own eyes how this works. And certainly 

for members of the CDC who may be listening, I hope they understand the seriousness of what Congress views today on this. 

I ask unanimous consent that the members’ written opening 

statements be introduced in the record, and without objection, the 

documents will be entered in the record. 

I also ask unanimous consent to put the document binder in the 

record subject to redactions by staff *. 

In conclusion, I want to thank all the witnesses and members 

who have participated in today’s hearing, and remind members 

they have 10 business days to submit questions for the record. I 

would ask that all the witnesses agree to respond promptly to the 

questions. 

Thank you very much. And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PHIL GINGREY

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling today’s hearing to review the incident of potential exposure of 84 CDC staff to anthrax on June 5th at the Bioterror 

Rapid Response and Advanced Technology (BRRAT) laboratory in Atlanta. I want 

to thank Dr. Thomas Frieden, Director of the CDC, for being forthcoming in his 

written testimony as to the problems that occurred and how the agency has already 

taken steps to address them. 

I would also like to welcome a constituent of mine who will be testifying on the 

second panel, Sean Kaufman from Woodstock Georgia in Cherokee County, who was 

previously employed by the CDC and has unique knowledge on the inner workings 

of high-containment laboratories. 

Mr. Chairman, the CDC main research facility in Atlanta is incredibly important 

for the region and the local economy. I hope that we can use today’s hearing to learn 

more about how the agency can improve upon safety measures so that we can ensure that incidents that put employees in harm’s way can be avoided in the future. 

I yield back. 

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