### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 15, 200 4
MIC HAE L BR AX TON v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 97-B-1350 Steve Dozier , Judge

No. M2004- 00791-CCA -R3-P C - F iled May 31, 2005

The pe titioner, Michael B raxton, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County

Criminal Court of ag g ravated ra

pe and a g g ravated assault. He rec eived a total effe ctive sente nce of twenty -three y ear s incarc eration in the Tennessee Depa rtment of C orre ction. Subsequently , the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief , which petition the post-conviction court summarily dismiss ed as being untimely . The pe titioner appea ls the dismis sal, arg uing that his pe tition was not barre d by the statute of limitati o n s

. Up on our re view of the rec ord and the parties’ briefs, w e re verse the judgme nt of the post-conviction court and rema nd for a hearing on the timeliness of the petitioner’s petition.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s R e ve r se d and Re m ande d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Michae l Bra x ton, Only , Tenne ssee, Pro Se.

Paul G. Sum me rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; John H. B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Pame la Ander son, Assistant District Attorne y Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On Ma rc h 2 4, 19 98 , the pe tit ion e r wa s c on vic te d o f a g g ravate d r ape a nda g g ra vate d a ssa ult

. The pe titioner, then repr esente d by counsel, filed a

timely notice of a

ppeal. This court a ffirme d the convictions on direc t appea l. See State v. Micha el B raxton, No. M1998-00255-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1072866, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Nov. 29, 1999). O n J anuary 28, 20 0 0, theT hi s mo t i on ha s no bear i ng on t he i ns t ant ca s e. 1

-2- petitioner, proc eeding pro se, f iled an application for permission to a ppeal to our supr eme c ourt. On J une 26, 2000, our supr eme c ourt denied pe rmission to appeal.

On Fe bruary 14, 2003, the petitioner sent a letter by cer tified mail to the supr eme c ourt cler k inq u i ri ng about the status of his application for permission t o appea l. A copy of this letter wa s appar ently forwa

rded to the petit ioner’s trial counsel by the s upreme court clerk. On March 3, 2003, the petitioner’s tria l counsel sent the pe titioner a letter. T here in, trial counsel explained:

I have c hecke d my

file. It appea

rs that I did rec eive a copy

of t h e S u p re m e C o u rt ’s Or d erd at ed J u n e 2 6 , 2 0 0 0

. I am en cl o s i n g a c op y of that a lso

. . . . My fi le do e s not inc lud e a ny le tte r f ro m me to y ou reg ar d i ng this Order. I have c oncluded that, since I was not repr esenting y ou in connec tion with y our Appli cation for Permission to Appeal to the Supre me Court, I did n o t s end y ou a copy of the Orde r. Frankly , while I

cannot r emember

exactly wh at I

thought at the tim e , I

be lie ve that I mus t ha ve a ssu me d th a t th e Cou rt wo uld send y ou a copy

of the Or der since y ou filed the Applica tion pro se.

There afte r, on F ebrua

ry 24, 2004, the petitioner filed thr ee se par at e documents in the Davidson County

Criminal Court. First, the petitioner filed a “Motion to Amend J udg ment of Conviction,” where in the petitioner re quested pre trial jail cre dits. Second, the pe titioner filed a 1

“ Mo tio n to To ll the On e (1 ) Y e ar S ta tut e of L imi ta tio n o f the Sta te Pos t Co nv ic tio n St a tut e .” I n th is motion, the petitioner alleg ed that following this court’s opinion on his direct appe al, he f iled a pro
se ap p l i c a t i o n f

o r p e r m i s s i o n t o ap p e a l t o t h e s u p r e m e c o u r t

. H e f u r t h e r a l l e g e d t h a t t he su pr e me court c lerk failed to notify him that his application had bee n denied. The petitioner contende d that althoug h his trial c ounsel had prope rly withdrawn f

ollowing this court’ s opinion, noti ce w as sent by the supreme court c lerk to his former trial counsel, not to the petitioner. Counsel did not provide the petitioner notice of

the denial of

his application for pe rmission to appe al. Acc ording ly , the petitioner
arg ue d th a t du e to h is f

a ilu re to r e c e ive no ti c e of the de nia l of

his app lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ion to appea l, he did not timelyfile his pet i t i o n fo r p o st-conviction re lief. F inally , the petitioner filed a pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f, a lle g ing nu me ro us ins ta nc e s o f i ne ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l.

T h e po s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt s u m m ar i l y d i s m i s s ed t h e pe t i t i o n wi t h o u t an ev i d en t i ar y h ea ri n g, finding that the petition was untimely

. The court discounted the petitioner’s c laim that he had not
re c e ive d n oti c e of

the su pr e me c ou rt ’s de nia l of his app lic a tio n for

pe rm iss ion to a

pp e a l. T he po stconviction court noted, “The Court’s rec ords i ndicate that the mandate f rom the Supreme Court wa s sent to the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ections. .

. . There fore , the C ourt is of the opinion that the pe tit ion sh ou ld b e ov e rr

ule d a nddis mis se d w ith ou t a he ari ng.” The pe tit ion e r n ow app e a ls this
ru l i n g.
II. Ana lys is-3-

We beg in our ana ly sis by

noting that post-conviction “[r]elief under this part shall be g rante d when the c onviction or sentenc e is void or voidable be cause of t h e ab ri d gment of any rig ht g uara nteed by the Constit ution of Tenne ssee or the Constituti on of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103 ( 2003). The Post-Conviction Procedur e Ac t provides that

a pe rs on in c us tod y

un de r a se nte nc e of a cou rt of

thi s st a te mus t petition for post-conviction relief under this pa rt within one (1) y ear of the date of

the fi nal a c tio n o f the hig he st s ta te app e llate c ou rt to which an a

ppeal is take n . . . or consideration of such pe tition s hall be barr ed. . . . Time is of the e ssence o f t h e ri gh t to file a petition for pos t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f

. . . a n d th e o n e

- y e ar li mi tati o n s p e r io d is an
e le me nt of the ri g ht to fi le su c h a n a c tio n a ndis a c on dit ion up on its exercise. Ex cept as specific ally provided in subse ctions (b) and (c ), the r ig h t t o f

il e a p e ti ti o n f

o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f

. . . s h a ll be exti ng uished upon the expiration of the limitations period.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102(a ) (2003)

.
Howeve r, Tenne ssee c ourts “have previously rec og nized that in certain circ umstances, strict ap p l i ca t i o n o f t h e s t at u t e o f l i m i t at i o n s wo u l d d en y a d ef en d an t a re as o n ab l e o p p o rt u n i t y t o b ri n g a post-conviction claim and thus, would violate due proce ss.” Wil liams v. St ate, 44 S.W.3d 464, 468 (T e nn . 2 00 1)

. No ta

bly , ou r su pr e me c ou rt

ha s “ e mph a size d th a t a

po st- c on vic tio n p e tit ion e r s ho uld not be denied a

rea sonable opportunity

to raise a claim due to anothe r’s misconduct.” Sample v. State, 82 S.W .3d 267, 277 (Tenn. 2002) ; see a lso W illiams, 44 S .W.3d at 468.

We f indthat th e fa c tua l sc e na ri o in the ins ta nt c a se is a na log ou s to t hat pres entedin Wil liams. I n Wil liams, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief nine months after the statute of limitations had ex pired, a lleg ing that counsel fa iled to notify him of his intent to wit hdraw afte r the pe titioner’s convictions wer e affirmed on direc t appea l by this court. 44 S.W .3d at 466 n.4. Ad dit ion a lly , c ou ns e l f

a ile d to fi le a n a

pp lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ion to ap pe a l to the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court. I d. Our supre me cour t reve rsed the dismissal of the pe tition and gr anted the pe titioner an evidentiary

hearing, noting that “the recor d indicates that [t he petiti oner] might have been de nied the op po rtun ity

to c ha lle ng e his c on vic tio n in a tim e ly ma nn e r thr ou g h n o fault of his ow n b ut b e c a us e of th e p o s s ib le mi s r e p r e s e n tati o n o f h is c o u n s e l. ” I d

. a t 4 6 8

. T h e c o u r t s tate d , “ I f a d e f endant
e rr on e ou sly

be lie ve s th a t c ou ns e l is c on tinui ng to re pr e se nt h im o r h e r, the n th e de fe nd a nt i s essentially

prec luded from pur suing c erta in remedie s independe ntly .” I d. at 469.

I n th is c a s e , th e p e ti ti o n e r c o n te n d s th a t th e s u p r e me c o u r t c le rk ’ s o f f ic e f a il ed to provide notice as to whe n h i s ap p l i ca tion for permission t o appea l to the supreme c ourt had be en denie d. Thus, he alleg es that throug h no fault of his own, he wa s unawa re of the date that his direct appe al had concluded and the statute of limitation to fil e a post-c onviction petition began to run. I d. at 469 (stating that “the Post Conviction P roce dure A ct clea rly contemplates that a post-conviction petition is appropriately

filed only

afte r the direc t a

ppeal proce ss ha d conclude d”); see also Eric Wrig ht v.-4-

State, No. W2001-0038 6

- CC A -R3-PC, 2001 W L 1690194, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. at J ackson, D ec. 17 , 2 00 1) . Impo rtant ly , we can f indno e vid e nc e in the re c or d b e fo re us to s up po rt the po stconviction court’s finding “that the mandat e fr o m t he Supreme Court was sent to the Te nnessee Depa rtment o f C orre ctions.” Reg ardle ss, even if notice of the mandate had be en sent to the Tenne ssee De partment of Correc tion, suc h would not c onstitut e evidenc e that the petitioner re ceive d notice. The ref

ore, w e are constrained to reve rse the post-conviction court’s summary denial of the petition an d rema nd for a ppointment of counsel and f or an e videntiary

hearing “ to determine ( 1) wh e the r du e pr oc e ss tol le d the statut e of lim itatio ns so a s to g ive the [pe tit ion e r] a rea so na ble op po rtun ity

a ft e r the e xpir a tio n of the lim itatio ns pe ri odto p re se nt h is c la im i n a me a nin g fu l ti me a ndma nn e r; a nd(2 ) i f s o, wh e the r the [pe tit ion e r’ s] f ili ng of the po st- c on vi cti on pet it ion in [Februa ry 2004] wa s wi t h i n the re asonable opportunity aff orded by the due pr ocess tolling.” Wil liams, 44 S.W .3d at 471.

III. Conclusi on
Acc ording ly , we r ever se t he post -convic tion court’s dismi ssal of the pe titioner’s claim and
rema nd for f

urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE