United States Institute of Peace • www.usip.org • Tel. 202.457.1700 • Fax. 202.429.6063

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© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

“At various points in history... 

sectarian identity has assumed 

greater prominence. Elites have 

instrumentalized it and ordinary 

citizens have defined themselves 

by it to the exclusion of other 

affinities. In this regard, sectarianism should be regarded as a 

symptom of longstanding deficits 

in Gulf governance and the 

unequal distribution of political 

and economic capital.”

November 15, 2013

Syria’s Sectarian Ripples across the Gulf

Summary

•	 Like the Iraq war and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon’s 2006 war, Syria’sinternecine conflict has enabled the Gulf’sruling families, media commentators, clerics, parliamentarians, and activiststo

invoke and amplify Sunni-Shia identities, often for goalsthat are rooted in local power politics.

•	 By-products of the mounting sectarian tension include the fraying of reform cooperation

among sects and regions, and pressure on the Gulf’sformal political institutions.

•	 Traditional and social media have served to amplify the most polarizing voices as well as provide reform activists new meansfor cross-sectarian communication that circumvent governmental effortsto control or block such activities.

Frederic Wehrey

E-mail: fwehrey@ceip.org

peaceBrieF161

Background

The Gulf Arab states have been major playersin Syria’s war and, in turn, the war’s effects have rippled

acrossthe domestic landscapes of the Gulf in waysthat are often unseen but nonethelesssignificant.

Chief among these has been a rise in sectarian partisanship by official and non-official actors alike.

Like the Iraq war and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon’s 2006 war, Syria’sinternecine conflict has enabled

the Gulf’sruling families, media commentators, clerics, parliamentarians, and activiststo invoke and

amplify Sunni-Shia identities, often for goalsthat are rooted in local power politics. There islittle danger thatsectarianism will escalate into violent conflict acrossthe Gulf, but it has nonethelessfostered

a toxic political environment, casting a chill over cross-sectarian reform cooperation, eroding the

position of moderate bridge-builders, and potentially radicalizing segments of Sunni and Shia youth.

Gulf regimes are mindful that managing these consequencesrequires a delicate balancing act: They

are fearful ofsectarianism’s potential to spin out of control, yet they also see in it a useful reminder of

monarchy’sindispensability as an arbiter over a fractious and divided citizenry.

A Chilling Effect on Cross-Sectarian Reform Activism

In SaudiArabia,these effects have been particularly malignant.As Salafi clericsframe the civil warin

sectarian terms—demonizing theAlawis—the Shia ofthe Eastern Province have come underincreased

pressure. Many are believed to sympathize with the Syrian regime, despite the factthatNimr al-Nimr,

an outspoken and immensely popular Shia cleric who received part of hisseminary training in Sayida

Zaynab inDamascus, has publicly called forthe downfall of Bashar al-Assad.Yet asthe Syrian opposition

hastaken on a more jihadist,takfiri hue,the Shia of SaudiArabia—and elsewhere in theGulf—have

grown increasingly ambivalent about backing the uprising.As hinted at by one Shia interlocutorin early

2013:“Initially, we allsupported the Syrian opposition – but now itis an all out civil war.”1
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Syria’s Sectarian Ripples across the Gulf

page 2 • PB 161 • November 15, 2013

Aby-product ofthis mounting tension has been the fraying ofreform cooperation among sects and

regions. Shia reformists who once lauded the willingness of Sunni activists elsewhere in the country

to engage now detect a new reticence borne ofthe Syrian war.Thisis especially evidentregarding the

Sahwa cleric Salman al-Awda, a towering figure in the Kingdom’s clerical universe who has moderated

his viewstoward the Shia, distinguishing between“political Shiism”and Shiism as a sect. But Shia

interlocutors argue thatthe“sectarianization”ofthe Syria war hasimposed limits on al-Awda’s burgeoning rapprochement.“He isfearfulthattoo much contact with the Shia in such a climate will alienate his

Sunni base,”noted one activistin the Eastern Province in early 2013.2

Of course,this erosion of potential bridge-builders between the sectsis not new—it echoessimilar

tensionsthat afflicted SaudiArabia and theGulf during the height ofthe Iraqi civil war. In both cases,

the ultimate victors have been the ruling families.The Syrian war has provided a useful distraction for

Gulf citizenry and a cautionary exemplar ofthe dangers ofrevolutionary upheaval in fractured societies.

Polarized Political Institutions

Aside from affecting societal relations at the informal level,sectarianism has also buffeted the Gulf’s

formal political institutions. Thisis particularly evident in the parliaments of Kuwait and Bahrain.On

February 28, 2012, a Sunni-sponsored proposal in the Kuwaiti National Assembly to recognize the

Syrian National Council asthe legitimate representative of the Syrian people spurred significant

clashesthat fell along sectarian lines. Forty-four MPsincluding all Cabinet ministersin the session

backed the proposal, five voted against it, one abstained while three MPsrefused to vote. Most of

those who opposed the motion were Shia MPs, leading to heated debate and accusations of disloyalty to the state.“The Syrian people are resisting the Iranians, Hizballah and the Iraqi militias,”argued

the Salafi MP Muhammad Hayif al-Mutayri,“yet the agentssitting among usin the National Assembly

remain silent about this matter.”In the aftermath of these clashes, Kuwaiti newspaper columnists

lamented thatsectarianism had“derailed the National Assembly from itsstraight path.” 4

InBahrain,the flawedandlargelypowerlessparliamenthaslongbeenanarenaofsectarianwrangling.

Inthemidstofthe Syriawar,pro-government Salafiswithclose tiestoroyalhardlinershave increasingly

usedthe Syrianconflicttogalvanize their Sunni constituents. InAugust 2012,socialmedia inBahrainwas

abuzzwithnewsthatprominent SalafiMPsfromthe al-Asala societyhadvisitedthe Free SyrianArmy to

deliverhumanitarianaidtohospitals andshelters.Citingthe“callsofreligionandpan-Arabism,”the Salafis’

visitwaswidelypublicizedwithphotos. Inthe ensuingweeks,however,the visitstokedacrimony,with

Shiaoppositionists arguingthatithadviolatedBahraini lawsonsupportingterrorgroups andmoney

laundering,butpro-government voicesdefendingit as aprivate,humanitarianmission. Shia commentatorsfoundthe visit especially ironicbecause thegovernmentinusual circumstancesheavily scrutinized

andregulatedthe transferof Shia charitabledonations(khums)outsideBahrain.5 Inearly andmid-2013,

therewas additional evidence that al-Asala’ssupporttoSyrianjihadistshadgrownmore formal and

robust,withreportsthat fiveBahraini Salafishadbeenkilledfightingalongside Syrianjihadistsfromthe

Jabhat al-Nusra.6Althoughthe ForeignMinistrydistanceditselffromthese activities andurgedBahrainis

toavoidtravelingtoconflict zones,pro-government commentatorslambastedthe Shias’criticismoftheir

visit as yet anothersignoftheirperfidy,“sectarianbigotry,”andsupportfortheAssadregime.7

Like the Iraq war,the 2006 Lebanon war, and theHuthirebellion in northYemen,the Syria conflict

pushed the Bahraini Shia to defend their nationalistlegitimacy against accusations of outside loyalty.

For many Bahrani Sunnis—officials and opposition—ongoing protestsin Manama’s Shia suburbs were

seen as a sort ofretaliation by Iran forGulfArab supportforthe anti-Assad uprising.“You pinch me here,

I’ll pinch you there,”noted one senior official in the Bahraini Foreign Ministry.8 Hardlinersin the regime

have echoed this:the commander of BahrainDefense Forces(BDF), Field Marshal Khalifa binAhmedAl
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

Syria’s Sectarian Ripples across the Gulf

page 3 • PB 161 • November 15, 2013

Khalifa hasrepeatedly argued thatthe anti-Assad forcesrepresentthe only true, homegrown popular

uprising in theArab world; otherrevoltsin Egypt,Tunisia, and especially Bahrain have been the

products of foreign incitement.9

Sectarian Freelancers and the Double-Edged Sword of Media

Traditional and social media have proven to be double-edged swordsregarding sectarianism in the

Gulf.On the one hand, Twitter and Facebook amplified the most polarizing voices on both sides of

the Sunni–Shia divide, creating a cycle of escalation that provided a pretext for regimesto enact

sweeping restrictions on freedom of expression. At the same time,social media has given Shia and

Sunni reform activists new forms of cross-sectarian communication that circumvent governmental

effortsto either block such activities or channel them into regime-sponsored venues.

In Kuwait,this dynamic has been particularly evidentin the efforts of Salafi charitiesto fundraise for

Syrian jihadist groups.The Salafi cleric,Dr. Shafi al-Ajmi has been among the most vitriolic purveyors

ofsectarianism, calling forthe torture of Syrian soldiers and demonizing the Shia.Although the

Kuwaiti government has attempted to muzzle him by cancelling hisTV show and shutting down his

sermons, he isstill actively fundraising onTwitter.10 The government’s ambivalent view about curtailing his activitiesreflectsits desire to manage the sensitive balance of power between the royal family

and powerfultribal blocs with a Salafi orientation.

InSaudiArabia,therehasbeena longtrendofhardline Salafi voices appropriatingregional conflicts

andinvokingsectariansolidarity.The Syria crisishasbeennodifferent. Inmost cases, clericalstatements

adheredclosely totheofficial Saudi lineonSyria,providinghelpfultheologicaltopcovertoSaudi

foreignpolicy. InFriday sermons,Tweets, andFacebookposts,the clericshavedemonizedtheAssad

regime andtheAlawis, expressedsolidaritywithciviliansuffering, andpushedforgreaterGulfinvolvement,toinclude armingthe Syrianopposition.Yettherehave alsobeenmoremilitant callsforjihadand

independent aidtothe Syrianopposition—manyofthemby the very same jihadi-takfiri clericswhoexhortedyoungSaudi volunteerstokill Shia inthe IraqWar. Inother cases,newer figureswithweak clerical

pedigreehave exploitedthe Syria crisis andits attendantsectarianismtoincrease theirpopularity and

rally constituents. Fearfulthatthisfreelancingcouldproduce a replayofthe IraqandAfghanexperience,

whenbattle-hardenedjihadistsreturnedtotheKingdomtoattack themonarchy,the Saudigovernmenthasshutdownthe clerics’independentfundraisingdrives andcensoredtheirmediaplatforms.11

These efforts extendedtomodest curtailmentsinsectarianvitriol inthegovernment-controlledmedia.

Ininterviewsinearly 2013, EasternProvince activistsspoke approvinglyofthese improvements.That

said,there are stillpolarizingvoices,particularly inthe socialmedia realm,thatraisedoubtsinthe Eastern

Province aboutthegovernment’strue intentions.Tocountersuchactors, Saudi youthfrombothsects

haveutilizedTwittertopromote cross-sectarianunderstanding.Agovernment crackdownagainst Shia

protestorsin2012 spawnedapopularhashtag,“#KulnaQatif”(We are allQatif),thatofferedexpressions

ofsolidarityby Sunnis. Fortheirpart, agroupof Shia youthlaunchedaTwitter campaignin2013 toinvite

SunnisfromJeddahtoa celebrationofthenightoftheProphet’sbirthinthe EasternProvince.Asimilar

initiativeofdialogue, knownastheQatifOutreach(TawasulQatif),hasbeenongoingfornearly four

years.12Yetthere are limitstothis youthful activism.Older activistslamentthatthis virtualoutreachhas

yettotranslate intoany sortofsustained, coordinatedactionbecauseofthe rulingfamily’ssuccessful

effortstocircumscribepoliticalspace intheKingdom.

Treat the Root Causes, Not the Symptoms

Contrary to some assumptions,Gulf governments did not manufacture sectarianism from thin air, nor

doesit arise solely from the contagion ofregional crises orthe clashing foreign policies ofthe region’s
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Syria’s Sectarian Ripples across the Gulf

page 4 • PB 161 • November 15, 2013

sectarian rivals, Iran and SaudiArabia. Itis also not a primordial, immutable feature ofGulf political and

social life. Like any identity,sectarian affiliation has coexisted alongside a number of otherfrequently

competing attributes—class versus class,tribal versus nontribal, indigenous versusimmigrant,settled

versus nomadic, generation versus generation, and so on.At various pointsin history, however,sectarian identity has assumed greater prominence. Elites have instrumentalized it and ordinary citizens have

defined themselves by itto the exclusion of other affinities.

Inthisregard,sectarianismshouldbe regardedas a symptomoflongstandingdeficitsinGulfgovernance andtheunequaldistributionofpolitical andeconomic capital. Specifically,thedearthofinclusive,

participatory institutions;discriminationinkey sectorslike education, clerical establishments, andthe

security services;the absenceof civilsociety; anduneveneconomicdevelopment are the real culpritsof

sectarianism.Certainly,media—andinparticular,socialmedia—hasplayeda significantrole ininflaming

andentrenchingSunni-Shiapassions,offeringthemostpolarizingvoices ahighly visibleplatformto

peddle a sectariannarrative.ButGulfrulerswhowishtode-escalate thesepassionswoulddowelltolook

beyondmedia censorshiptogenuine, lastingreformsinthepolitical andeconomic realm.

Notes

1.	 Author’sinterview with a Shia youth activist,TarutIsland, SaudiArabia,January 24, 2013.

2.	 Author’sinterview with a Shia writer,Qatif, SaudiArabia,January 26, 2013.

3.	 KuwaitTimes,“Sparks Fly as Kuwaiti MPsVote to Recognize Syrian Council,”February 29, 2012,

http://www.bridgingthegulf.org/en/news/news/Sparks_ fly_as_Kuwaiti_MPs_vote_to_recognise_

Syrian_council____.html?id=239.

4.	 MuhyiAmir andHasan al-Muhanna,“Jalsa Suriyya...Tafiya”(ASectarian Session on Syria), al-Jaridah

(Kuwait), March 2, 2012.

5.	 “BahrainiGroupDenies Flouting RulestoAid Syria Rebels,”GulfNews,August 12, 2012, http://gulfnews. com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahraini-group-denies-flouting-rules-to-aid-syria-rebels-1.1061012.

6.	 Husein Marhoon,“Bahraini Salafistsin Spotlight,”al-Monitor,June 18, 2013. http://www.almonitor.

com/pulse/originals/2013/06/bahrain-jihadists-syria-salafism.html

7.	 See for example, Sawsan al-Sha’ir,“al-Ta‘assub ma Sabiq al-Israr wa al-Tarasid”(Bigotry with Premeditation and Surveillance) al-Watan (Bahrain),August 13, 2012. http://www.alwatannews. net/

ArticleViewer.aspx?ID=Q78Tx4xWG2aKB733337GUx5va4Q933339933339

8.	 Personal interviewwitha seniormemberoftheBahraini ForeignMinistry,Manama,Bahrain, February

29, 2012.

9.	 Husaynal-Harbi,“Al-MushirKhalifabinAhmedal-Khalifali-al-Ray:Naamhunakamuamarali-qalb

nidhamal-hukm. . .walaysali-muaradasilabi-al-RabalArabi”(FieldMarshalKhalifabinAhmedal-Khalifa

toal-Ray:Yes,ThereIsaConspiracytoOverthrowtheRulingSystem. . .andThereIsNoConnection

BetweentheOppositionandtheArabSpring),al-Ray,March11,2011.

10.	 See hisTwitter account at: @sHaFi_Ajmi

11.	 See FredericWehrey,“SaudiArabiaReinsInItsClericsonSyria,”Carnegie EndowmentforInternational

Peace,June 14, 2013. http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/14/

saudi-arabia-reins-in-its-clerics-on-syria/bu10

12.	 See the program’sTwitter account, https://twitter.com/tawasul_qatif.Author’sinterviews with activistsin Riyadh and the Eastern Province,January 2013.

About This Brief

Frederic Wehrey is a senior associate 

in the Middle East Program at the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on 

political reform and security issues 

in the Arab Gulf states, Libya, and 

U.S. policy in the Middle East more 

broadly. He is the author of the 

forthcoming book, Sectarian Politics 

in the Gulf From the Iraq War to the 

Arab Uprisings (Columbia University 

Press, December 2013). This Peace 

Brief is one in a five-part USIP series 

on sectarianism in the Middle East.