alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit




Exhibit 10.12


Heska Corporation 
2016 Management Incentive Plan


1.    The Category Percentages for the 2016 MIP are as follows:
	
		
	Title
	Category Percentage

	Executive Vice President-level
	40.0% of base salary

	Other Officers
	35.0% of base salary

	Directors
	25.0% of base salary






2.    The Plan Allocation for the 2016 MIP is as follows:


50% on achievement of the company-wide financial objective and 50% on individual performance    


3.    The Key Parameters for the 2016 MIP are as follows:


1) Pre-MIP Target Income (Pre-MIP Operating Income excluding acquisitions plus acquisition and development expenses specified at the Compensation Committees February 10, 2016 meeting) and 2) Revenue


4.    The Payout Structure for the 2016 MIP is as follows:
    
	
				
	Pre-MIP Target Income
(% MIP Goal)
	Revenue
(% MIP Goal)
	MIP Payout 
(% MIP Goal)
	Post-MIP Target Income

	$9,800K (85%)
	$106,000K (92%)
	$0 (0%)
	$9,800K

	$10,100K (88%)
	$107,000K (93%)
	$260K (20%)
	$9,840K

	$10,400K (90%)
	$108,000K (94%)
	$520K (40%)
	$9,880K

	$10,700K (93%)
	$110,000K (96%)
	$780K (60%)
	$9,920K

	$11,100K (97%)
	$112,000K (97%)
	$1,040K (80%)
	$10,060K

	$11,500K (100%)
	$115,000K (100%)
	$1,300K (100%)
	$10,200K

	$12,600K (110%)
	$121,000K (105%)
	$1,625K (125%)
	$10,975K

	$13,800K (120%)
	$127,000K (110%)
	$1,950K (150%)
	$11,850K






There shall be no MIP Payout if Pre-MIP Target Income is less than $9,800K or Revenue is less than $106,000K.  If necessary, MIP Payouts shall be determined by interpolating between MIP Payout result rows, subject to a minimum Post-MIP Target Income interpolation.


5.    MIP Payout Features:
    
Eligibility - To earn an MIP Payout, an MIP participant must remain an active employee of Heska Corporation or one of its affiliates through the time of payment of MIP Payouts (planned to be on February 28, 2017).
    
Medium of Payment - MIP Payouts are to be made in cash, although by March 4, 2016 Executive Vice President-level participants may elect to receive up to 50% of his or her MIP Payout in stock, subject to a maximum of 2,500 shares, a maximum grant of such participant’s Incentive Target and vesting based upon MIP Payout achieved.


Maximum payout: The maximum payout to any participant shall be 200% such participant’s Incentive Target, which is calculated by multiplying such participant’s base salary by the Category Percentage applicable to such participant.
Carol R. Gosain 

202 429 6461 

cgosain@steptoe.com 

1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20036-1795 

202 429 3000 main 

www.steptoe.com 

STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 

October 14, 2014 

Mr. PaulL. Gretch 

Director, Office of International Aviation 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Re: JAL Express Co., Ltd. 

Docket DOT -OST -2005-22258 

Dear Mr. Gretch: 

We would like to inform you that JAL Express Co., Ltd. ("JEX") was integrated into 

Japan Airlines Co., Ltd. ("JAL") effective October 1, 2014. Because JEX no longer has a 

separate existence, the exemption authority and statement of authorization granted to JEX in the 

above-referenced docket are no longer necessary. The Department may, for good order's sake, 

wish to cancel these authorities, which will not lapse by their own terms. 1 

Please feel free to contact us at (202) 429-6461 if you have any questions or need any 

additional information. 

cc: Mr. Robert Finamore 

Ms. Shelita Smith 

Sincerely, 

C:x_'"v·-c GoZ\CL~" William Karas 

Carol Gosain 

Attorneys for Japan Airlines Co., Ltd. 

1 The Department granted the authorities by Notice of Action Taken issued in the abovereferenced docket on October 12, 2005. The authorities were to expire on October 12, 2006. On 

September 15, 2006, JEX filed a request to renew them. Since the Department has not yet acted 

on that request, the authorities remain in effect pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) and Part 377 of the 

Department's regulations.
### §1158. Acceptance or rejection by Secretaries of State and Commerce of Commission recommendations

The Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary, is authorized to accept or reject, on behalf of the United States, recommendations made by the Commission pursuant to article V of the Convention.

(Pub. L. 89–702, title I, §108, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1093; Pub. L. 98–129, §2, Oct. 14, 1983, 97 Stat. 838.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1983—Pub. L. 98–129 amended section generally, substituting provisions empowering the Secretaries of State and Commerce to accept or reject recommendations made by the Commission, which were previously contained in section 1157 of this title, for provisions authorizing Federal agency consultation with and technical assistance to the Secretary of Commerce or the Commission. See section 1159 of this title.
### §24. Jurisdiction over park; fugitives from justice

The Yellowstone National Park, as its boundaries now are defined, or as they may be hereafter defined or extended, shall be under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. All the laws applicable to places under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall have force and effect in said park. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to forbid the service in the park of any civil or criminal process of any court having jurisdiction in the States of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. All fugitives from justice taking refuge in said park shall be subject to the same laws as refugees from justice found in the State of Wyoming.

(May 7, 1894, ch. 72, §1, 28 Stat. 73.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This Act, referred to in text, is act May 7, 1894, which is classified to sections 24 to 30a of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.

#### Codification

Section 2 of act May 7, 1894, provided that the Yellowstone National Park should be part of the judicial district of Wyoming, and that the courts of the United States for the district should have jurisdiction of all offenses committed within the park. It was superseded by act Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §115, 36 Stat. 1130, constituting the State of Wyoming and Yellowstone National Park the judicial district of Wyoming, that section being in turn superseded by act June 5, 1924, ch. 260, 43 Stat. 388. Provisions of that act are covered by section 131 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Wyoming: Jurisdiction Over Park

The act admitting the State of Wyoming into the Union, act July 10, 1890, ch. 664, 26 Stat. 222, contained a proviso annexed to the description of the boundaries of the State, in section 2 of the act, as follows: "That nothing in this act contained shall repeal or affect any act of Congress relating to the Yellowstone National Park, or the reservation of the Park as now defined, or as may be hereafter defined or extended, or the power of the United States over it; and nothing contained in this act shall interfere with the right and ownership of the United States in said park and reservation as it now is or may hereafter be defined or extended by law; but exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, shall be exercised by the United States, which shall have exclusive control and jurisdiction over the same; but nothing in this proviso contained shall be construed to prevent the service within said park of civil and criminal process lawfully issued by the authority of said State."
#### Martin *v.*Cowan.

May 11, 1910.

Fish, C. J.

1. In a claim case where the plaintiff in fi. fa. seeks to make out a prima facie case by showing possession in the defendant, it is incumbent on him to show such possession at the time of the rendition of the judgment, or at the time of the making of the levy, or at some time intermediate between the judgment and the levy.

2. In such a case where'the levying officer amended his entry of levy by adding thereto, after the words “defendant in fi. fa.,” the words “being in possession of the property levied upon;” and where the plaintiff in fi. fa. on the trial introduced also the testimony of witnesses which, as it appears in the record, is somewhat ambiguous and renders it uncertain whether the defendant was in possession either at the time of the rendition of the judgment, or at the time of the making of the levy, or between those dates, the presiding judge correctly refused to dismiss the levy, hut erred in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. He should have submitted the case to the jury to determine what was the fact in regard to such possession.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*478Claim. Before Judge Whipple. Ben Hill-superior court.

May *3,*1909.

An execution against Martin was levied on a city lot of realty. He interposed a claim as head of a family, alleging that the property was not his, but belonged to four named minors, “the same being homesteaded and exempted property and the aforesaid children the beneficiaries of said homestead.” On the date of trial the levying officer amended his entry of levy, as shown in the second headnote. As a witness he testified: “At the time of the levy the house was unoccupied; no one was living there. I think the defendant in fi. fa. was out of the county; don’t know how long since defendant was in possession. Do not know whether he was in possession at the date of the judgment or not; defendant had at one time been in possession, but do not know how long it was before the date of the judgment. Property was pointed out to me as defendant’s property, and I knew that he had lived there.” One McDonald testified: “I put the defendant in possession of the property about two years prior to this time. Do not know whether he was living in the house at the time the judgment was rendered or at the date of the levy. I think defendant in fi. fa. was living out of the county last year. I saw him on the property several times afterwards; don’t remember the last time I saw him thére; and I do know he lias been in possession of the property since the date of the judgment and before and since the date of the levy on this property.” The court overruled a motion to dismiss the levy, and (there being-no further evidence) directed a verdict finding the property subject. The claimant excepted.

*Eason*& *Bull,*for plaintiff in error. *J. B.*Wall, contra.
Exhibit 99.1



Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the filing of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
Quarter Ended December 29, 2002 (the Report) by Overhill Farms, Inc. (Registrant), the undersigned hereby certifies that:



| | 1. |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
| | -- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Registrant.
| | -- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|Date: February 14, 2003
|
#### § 16.55 Other rights and services.

Nothing in this subpart shall be construed to entitle any person, as of right, to any service or to the disclosure of any record to which such person is not entitled under the Privacy Act, the Social Security Fraud Reduction Act, or the Judicial Redress Act.
### §8231. Rule of construction

Nothing in this chapter or the amendments made by this subtitle 1 shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the application of the antitrust laws. Any implied or actual conflict between this chapter and any amendments to this chapter and the antitrust laws shall be resolved in favor of the operation of the antitrust laws.

(Pub. L. 111–203, title V, §541, July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 1596.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This subtitle, referred to in text, is subtitle B (§§511–542) of title V of Pub. L. 111–203, which enacted this chapter and provisions set out as notes under section 8201 of this title. Subtitle B did not make any amendments.

1 See References in Text note below.
### §1910. Repealed. Pub. L. 113–287, §7, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3272

Section, Pub. L. 94–429, §11, Sept. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 1344; Pub. L. 98–620, title IV, §402(21), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3358, related to civil actions for just compensation by mining claim holders. See section 100735 of Title 54, National Park Service and Related Programs.
(61 South. 408.)

No. 19,692.

#### STATE v. THOMAS et al.

(Feb. 3, 1913.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1913.)

*(Syllabus by the Court.)*

1. Criminal Law (§ 1082*) — Appeal—Time op Return.

Appeals in criminal cases are returnable to the Supreme Court in not less than 15 nor more than 60 days. See Act No. 106 of 1908.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2725; Dec. Dig. § 1082.*]

2. Criminal Law (§ 1020*) — Appeal—Jurisdiction.

Act No. 274 of 1910 was amended and reenacted by Act No. 135 of 1912 so a.s to reduce the offense of willful trespass on timber from a felony to a misdemeanor, and to substitute imprisonment in jail for imprisonment at hard labor. Under the statute as amended and reenacted, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction except where a fine exceeding $300, or imprisonment exceeding six months is imposed. Const, art. 85.

[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2580; Dec. Dig. § 1020.*]

Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington; Thos. M. Burns, Judge.

Fed Thomas and others were accused of cutting timber from the land of another, and, from an order quashing the indictment, the State appeals.

Dismissed.

R. G. Pleasant, Atty. Gen., J. Vol Brock, Dist. Atty., of Franklinton, and G. A. Gondran, of Donaldsonville (A. D. Schwartz, of Covington, of counsel), for tire State. M. I. Varnado, of Crowley, and G. W. Goodbee, of Franklinton, for appellees.

LAND, J.

The accused were indicted for willfully and unlawfully cutting, removing, and converting to their own use timber from the land of another.

The accused moved to quash the indictment on the ground, among others, that Act 274 of 1910, under which the charge was made, had been repealed by Act 135 of 1912. The motion to quash was sustained by the judge a quo, and the state has appealed.

Motion to Dismiss.

The accused have moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the transcript was filed too late, and on the further ground that the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction ratione materise.

On November 12, 1912, the appeal was granted, “returnable according to law”; and on November 21, 1912, the judge a quo extended the return day for ten days; and the *380transcript was filed in this court on November 2S, 1912.

[1] Counsel for the appellees are in error in supposing that under existing laws appeals in criminal cases must be returned within ten days. By Act No. 106 of 1908, appeals “in all cases, civil or criminal,” are returnable to the Supreme Court in not less than 15 nor more than 60 days. The judge should have fixed the return day when he granted the order of appeal. 1-Ie, however, subsequently fixed the return day within the limitation of 60 days.

[2] Act 274 of 1910, which provided the penalty of imprisonment in the penitentiary or otherwise, has been amended and re-enacted so as to substitute imprisonment in the parish jail. We have no appellate jurisdiction under the statute as thus amended, because the offense is not punishable by imprisonment at hard labor, and no fine or imprisonment in jail has been imposed. Const, art. 85.

Appeal dismissed.
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# Report fraud, waste, and abuse

## Report fraud, waste, and abuse

You may report fraud, waste, mismanagement, or misconduct involving SBA programs or employees either online or by calling the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at 800-767-0385.

You may choose to remain anonymous. However, in that case, the SBA OIG will not be able to contact you for more information regarding your complaint. This may hinder our ability to fully investigate the complaint, and we will not be able to inform you about the results of our review.

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§ 104.33 Hearing. ( a ) *Conduct of hearings.* Hearings shall be before the Special Master or her designee. The objective of hearings shall be to permit the claimant to present information or evidence that the claimant believes is necessary to a full understanding of the claim. The claimant may request that the Special Master or her designee review any evidence relevant to the determination of the award, including without limitation: The nature and extent of the claimant's injury; evidence of the claimant's presence at a 9/11 crash site; factors and variables used in calculating economic loss; the identity of the victim's spouse and dependents; the financial needs of the claimant, facts affecting noneconomic loss; and any factual or legal arguments that the claimant contends should affect the award. Claimants shall be entitled to submit any statements or reports in writing. The Special Master or her designee may require authentication of documents, including medical records and reports, and may request and consider information regarding the financial resources and expenses of the victim's family or other material that the Special Master or her designee deems relevant.
( b ) *Location and duration of hearings.* The hearings shall, to the extent practicable, be scheduled at times and in locations convenient to the claimant or his or her representative. The hearings shall be limited in length to a time period determined by the Special Master or her designee.
( c ) *Witnesses, counsel, and experts.* Claimants shall be permitted, but not required, to present witnesses, including expert witnesses. The Special Master or her designee shall be permitted to question witnesses and examine the credentials of experts. The claimant shall be entitled to be represented by an attorney in good standing, but it is not necessary that the claimant be represented by an attorney. All testimony shall be taken under oath.
( d ) *Waivers.* The Special Master shall have authority and discretion to require any waivers necessary to obtain more individualized information on specific claimants.
( e ) *Award Appeals.* For award appeals, the Special Master or her designee shall make a determination whether: ( 1 ) There was an error in determining the presumptive award, either because the claimant's individual criteria were misapplied or for another reason; or
( 2 ) The claimant presents extraordinary circumstances not adequately addressed by the presumptive award.
( f ) *Determination.* The Special Master shall notify the claimant in writing of the final amount of the award, but need not create or provide any written record of the deliberations that resulted in that determination. There shall be no further review or appeal of the Special Master's determination. In notifying the claimant of the final amount of the award, the Special Master may designate the portions or percentages of the final award that are attributable to economic loss and non-economic loss, respectively, and may provide such other information as appropriate to provide adequate guidance for a court of competent jurisdiction and a personal representative.
III 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 27 

Providing for the use of the catafalque situated in the Exhibition Hall of 

the Capitol Visitor Center in connection with memorial services to be 

conducted in the House wing of the Capitol for the Honorable Elijah 

E. Cummings, late a Representative from the State of Maryland. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 21, 2019 

Mr. BLUNT (for himself and Ms. KLOBUCHAR) submitted the following 

concurrent resolution; which was considered and agreed to 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Providing for the use of the catafalque situated in the Exhibition Hall of the Capitol Visitor Center in connection 

with memorial services to be conducted in the House 

wing of the Capitol for the Honorable Elijah E. Cummings, late a Representative from the State of Maryland. 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That the Architect of the Capitol is author3 ized and directed to transfer the catafalque which is situ4 ated in the Exhibition Hall of the Capitol Visitor Center 

5 to the House wing of the Capitol so that such catafalque 

6 may be used in connection with services to be conducted 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•SCON 27 ATS 

1 there for the Honorable Elijah E. Cummings, late a Rep2 resentative from the State of Maryland. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jesus Cepeda, Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 750]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles H. Solomon, J.), rendered on or about February 1, 2005, unanimously affirmed. No opinion. Order filed. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.E, Friedman, Sullivan, Catterson and Malone, JJ.
§ 44.303 Determination. ( a ) Within 120 days of the receipt of a charge, the Special Counsel shall undertake an investigation of the charge and determine whether to file a complaint with respect to the charge.
( b ) If the Special Counsel determines not to file a complaint with respect to such charge by the end of the 120-day period, or decides to continue the investigation of the charge beyond the 120-day period, the Special Counsel shall, by the end of the 120-day period, issue letters to the charging party and respondent by certified mail notifying both parties of the Special Counsel's determination.
( c ) When a charging party receives a letter of determination issued pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, the charging party, other than an officer of the Department of Homeland Security, may file a complaint directly before an administrative law judge in the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) within 90 days after his or her receipt of the Special Counsel's letter of determination. The charging party's complaint must be filed with OCAHO as provided in 28 CFR part 68.
( d ) The Special Counsel's failure to file a complaint with respect to such charge with OCAHO within the 120-day period shall not affect the right of the Special Counsel to continue to investigate the charge or later to bring a complaint before OCAHO.
( e ) The Special Counsel may seek to intervene at any time in any proceeding brought by a charging party before OCAHO.