Filed 11 / 3 / 20 In re G.T. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re G.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law

. 2d Juv. No. B304295 (Super. Ct. No. J071989) (Ventura County)

VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.T,

Defendant and Appellant.

S.T. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order restraining her from contact with a social worker (Social Worker) from the Ventura County Human Services Agency (the Agency). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 1 § 213.5

. ) We affirm.

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to th e Welfare and Institutions Cod e

.2 FACT UAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In January 2019, t he Agency filed a juvenile petition
after Mother tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine at the birth of her son, G.T. The petition alleged Mother failed to protect G.T

. 2 The juvenile court sustained the petition . It declared G.T

. a depen dent of the court
and ordered him to remain in foster care

. The court ordered family reun ification services for Mother.

In August, the Agency filed a request for a

re straining order against Mother. It alleged Mother’s cousin told
Social Worker that Mother stated “should she ‘lose’ [G.T.] in the upcoming dependenc y hearing . . . that she was going to ‘kill the
social worker . . . and herself’ at the courthouse after the hearing .” The cousin said “this is not an idle threat and that [Mother had] been exhibiting increasingly concerning behavi ors and mental health is sues.” The cousin warned Social Worker to

“ be aware of h er surroundings at all times.”

Social Worker said she recently assisted G.T.’s foster parents with filing a police report against Mother , who had

“ threatened ” the foster paren ts

. Mother told the fo ster parents that G.T.’s “safety was at risk and that [G.T.] would be ‘stolen ,’ and provided information that the [foster parents] had recently been followed to a medical appointment for [ G.T.] and observed
from afar.” The juvenile court granted a temporar y restraining order and set a hearing date for the permanent restraining order. In the meantime, the Agency filed a sixth

- month status report.

2 The petition also alleged that G.T.’s father had abuse d substances and that his whereabouts were unkn own. The father is not a party to this appeal.3

In it, the Agency included further details about the police report

. T he foster parents receiv ed a text message from Mother that
said : “ ‘ you should be aware of possible danger for my son. His father has said he knows where u guys live and also your

names. ’ ” However, the Agency noted that the alleged father was not in contact with the Agency, so there was “no way he could
learn of the location of the doctor visit, the foster parent [ s ’]

name [s] or any identifying information without the mother’s
disclosure .” The status report also stated that Mother told a case aide that her “biggest fea r i s dad is going to break i nto that house and take the baby.”

T he juvenile court held a hearing on the permanent restraining order in January 2020. The Agency submitted a
memorandum describing S ocial W orker ’s call with Mother’s
cousin about Mother’s threats

. The Agency also attach ed a
memorandum that described an incident in November 2019 after a supervised visit at the J uvenile J ustice C enter (J J C). While a social worker from the foster agency and a case aide were preparing to transport G.T. back to the foster home, the alleged
f ather pulled into the J J C parking lot to pick up Mother. The y then began to “circle the parking lot around” the case aide and
the social worker

. As a result, the Agency developed a safety plan for dropping off and picking up G.T. at the J J C. The Agency
told Mother that th is behavior “is viewed as unsafe ” and

“ intimidating .” After the phone call, Mother texted the Agency : “[The alleged father] did just threaten to take the baby. I’m trying to leave now. Just put a restraining order on him if possible, I’m going to . . . .” The Agency informed Mother that alleged father’s behavior has “now caused the Agency to be

con cerned for the safety of” G.T. Mother responded that it was4

“very difficult to leave” the alleged father. A month later, the Agency lear ned that the alleged father continued to sit in the parking lot in fro nt of the JJC. The Agency developed a new safety plan. At the hearing, Mother objected t o the admission of
her cousin’s statements as hearsay. The cour t ruled that it could
consider t he statements “as well as anything else in the file that would support the request. And having looked one more time at the memo, there are some indicia of reliability in some of t he details that are provided.” Mother made an offer of proof that if
called to testify, she would deny making the threat.

After the hearing, the court issued the restraining order against Mother, and order ed it into effect for a period of three years

. DISCUSSION

Mother contend s the court erred when it issued the restraining ord er because it was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

Pursuant to section 213.5, a juvenile court may issue
an orde r “ enjoining a ny person from

. . . stalking, threatening,

. . . harassing, telephoning,

. . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, [or] coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the child’s current or former social worker or court appointed special advocate .” “ A restraining order under section 213.5 is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. The juvenile court ’ s factual findings are upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.” ( In re A.M. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 614, 619.) In reviewing the evidence, we must draw all reasonable inferences to support the court’s decisi on. ( In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866 ( Carlos H .) .) We5

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling, even if other evidence supports the contrary conclusion. ( P

eople v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887

- 888 .) We
will not find an abuse of discretion unless Mother demonstrates
the court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd

manner and that a miscarriage of justice resulted

. ( Carlos H., at p. 866

. ) The juvenile court did not abuse its discreti on her e

. S ubstantial evidence support s the restraining order. ( In re
Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 210

- 211 [“If there is substantial evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance of the restraining order may not be disturbed ”].) The cou sin reported that Mother threatened to kill Social Worker and herself
if she were to “‘lose’” G.T. in the next dependency hearing. The
cousin stated this was not an “idle threat” and warned of
Mother ’s “ increasing ly concerning behaviors

. ”

Other evidence also supports the restraining order

. After a visitation at the JJC, Mother and G.T.’s father circled
around the case aide and another social worker as the y transport ed G.T. back to the foster home. And according to Social
Worker

, Mother also told the fo ster parents that G.T. was at risk
and reported that they had been followed when they took G.T. to

a medical appointment.

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Mother concedes that the juvenile court was permitted to rel y “in whole or in part” o n the cousin’s hearsay statements. ( In re M.B. (201 1) 201 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1071.) However, she argues that the
Social Worker’s memorandum did not support the order

. I nstead, the evidence supported a “conclusion that the father, and not the mother, pose d a physical threat ” to S ocial Worker

. We disagree.6

There wa s ample evidence that Mother posed a threat to Social
Worker. T he court thus did not abuse its discretion when it granted the restraining order.
DISPOSITION
The order (granting the permanen t restraining order
dated January 22, 2020) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J. We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.Tari L. Cody , Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Landon Villavaso, unde r appointment by the Court of Appea l, for Defendant and Appellant.

Leroy Smith, County Counsel, Joseph J. Randazzo, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.