An-Nasiriyah U.S. Marines in Battle

23 MARCH - 2 APRIL 2003
U.S. Marines from Task Force Tarawa sweep through the military garrison of

the Iraqi 23d Infantry Brigade on 25 March 2003 in Nasiriyah. The Iraqi 23d

Infantry Brigade was engaged mainly by 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, and

attached elements. The Marines here are wearing chemical protective Mission

Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) suits over their regular utility uniform

for protection against a possible chemical attack.

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples
Iraq and An-Nasiriyah on the Eve of War

On 23 March 2003, 5,800 U.S. Marines and U.S.

Navy Corpsmen—the warriors of Task Force

Tarawa—began Ughting a ferocious battle in

the city of an-Nasiriyah, Iraq. As the Urst large-scale battle

fought by U.S. Marines in Operation Iraqi Freedom,

Nasiriyah became a test of the Coalition’s ability and

resolve to defeat a determined, resourceful foe that relied

on a combination of conventional units and tactics and

irregular forces willing to violate the laws of war. Task

Force Tarawa’s Marines adapted quickly, and the battle of

Nasiriyah, with its asymmetrical warfare, emphasis on

combined arms and joint operations, and Coalition

forces’ ability to react quickly and aggressively against

unexpected enemy tactics became emblematic of the

2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom campaign.

Nasiriyah lies in a date-growing region along the banks

of the Euphrates River in Dhi Qar Province about 225

miles southeast of Baghdad. Its population, made up

almost entirely of Shi’a Muslims, was an estimated

560,000 in 2003, making it the fourth most populous city

in the country. It was founded in 1840 near the ruins of

the ancient city of Ur, the birthplace of Abraham.

Re events that brought the Marines to Nasiriyah,

however, were far more current. Only six days before they

stormed into the city, President George W. Bush had

issued an ultimatum giving Iraqi President Saddam

Hussein and his two sons 48 hours to leave Iraq. Re

United States had viewed the Iraqi government with

heightened concern since the terrorist attacks of 11

September 2001. Hussein’s regime was believed to

sponsor global terrorism and also to be building and

stockpiling weapons of mass destruction—nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons for use against its

neighbors and Western nations.

Soon aWer 11 September, it became clear that the

immediate source of the terrorist who carried out those

attacks was Afghanistan rather than Iraq. Even during the

oSensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan, however, the

Bush administration anticipated the need to topple

Hussein’s regime, leading the U.S. military to start

planning for a possible invasion of Iraq. Hussein had

ignored or violated 16 United Nations resolutions, many

of them requiring him to disclose what had become of

the mass destruction weapons his country had once

possessed and to allow international inspectors to search

for them or verify their destruction. In light of Hussein’s

intransigence, the Bush administration concluded, as did

many experts around the world, that Iraq still harbored

those weapons, and with aggressive intent.1

Planning and Deployment

Task Force Tarawa, whose name was a colorful

designation for 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d

MEB), had existed as a standing, Ughting organization for

less than three months. Re 2d MEB originally consisted

only of a staS and commander, Brigadier General Richard

F. Natonski. Marine expeditionary brigade staSs had been

discontinued due to budget cuts of the 1990s and were

only revived in 2000. When the Marine Corps revived

them, it tried to do so economically by assigning Marine

expeditionary brigade billet titles to the staS personnel of

II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF). Rus, every staS

oTcer and staS noncommissioned oTcer of 2d MEB had

another, primary duty as a member of II MEF’s staS. Until

December 2002, the attention they were able to devote to

Marine expeditionary brigade planning was limited by

their primary duties as members of the II MEF staS.2

Marine planners had long known, however, that 2d

MEB would have a role to play in Operations Plan 1003V,

the contingency plan to liberate Iraq. It would end up

being one of four major combat organizations under I

Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), including 1st

Marine Division, 3d Marine AircraW Wing, and the 1

(United Kingdom) Armoured Division. I MEF in turn

would end up Ughting alongside the U.S. Army V Corps.

More detailed planning commenced in September 2002;

at that time, 2d MEB was referred to as Task Force South.

As planning proceeded, 2d MEB’s anticipated mission

was to arrive in Kuwait aWer hostilities commenced,

relieve 1st Marine Division in the Umm Qasr oil Uelds,

and block in the direction of Basra. Ris would facilitate

a rapid march north by 1st Marine Division, which in

turn would draw attention and Iraqi combat power away

from the Coalition main eSort, which was the 3d Infantry

The Battle of An-Nasiriyah

by Colonel Rod Andrew Jr., USMCR

On the Cover: A UH-1 Huey helicopter cuts through the sky as the

sun sets over Nasiriyah.

Photo by SSgt Chad McMeen

1
Division of the Army’s V Corps. Ris plan was further

articulated at planning conferences in mid-December in

Kuwait and Qatar.3

It was also during the fall of 2002 that planners began

to designate the forces that would constitute 2d MEB

once it became a combat unit. Re command element

contained personnel drawn from the II MEF staS, 2d

Intelligence Battalion, 2d Radio Battalion, 8th

Communications Battalion, 2d Force Service Support

Group, 4th Civil ASairs Groups, 2d Marine Liaison

Element, and 2d Force Reconnaissance Company. Re

commander would be Brigadier General Natonski, a

career infantry oTcer who had previously commanded

at the battalion and Marine expeditionary unit levels. As

a commander, he had led units in operations in Somalia,

Bosnia, and Kuwait. Natonski was a large, powerfully

built man with a deep voice. He spoke deliberately and

forcefully but combined this strong demeanor with

courtesy and tact.

Re ground combat element was the 2d Regimental

Combat Team (RCT-2), which in turn was built around

the nucleus of 2d Marine Regiment, based at Camp

Lejeune, North Carolina. Re commanding oTcer of 2d

Marines, Colonel Ronald L. Bailey, would command RCT2. Bailey was a seasoned oTcer with broad experience in

operational units. Re bulk of his regiment had just

completed a combined arms exercise in Twentynine

Palms, California. Re regimental staS and a large

proportion of the regiment were still preparing for coldweather training in Bridgeport, California, as late as early

December. Rey had hints that they might be deploying to

a completely diSerent environment in Iraq instead, but

nevertheless could not ignore preparations for Bridgeport.

Rus the 2d Marine Regiment was in the position of

having to prepare for parallel and mutually exclusive

missions. Not until the planning conference in midDecember did Colonel Bailey learn that the bulk of his

regiment would indeed be going to Iraq. From that point,

he had a little over a week to call his Marines oS holiday

leave and get his regiment embarked and ready to sail.5

Regimental Combat Team 2 had three infantry

battalions. Re 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, was led by

Lieutenant Colonel Rickey L. Grabowski, a former

enlisted Marine and drill instructor and son of a Vietnam

veteran who had subsequently spent a career as an oTcer

in the U.S. National Guard. Tough, disciplined, and

methodical, Grabowski worked hard to ensure that

training emphasized small-unit leadership, particularly

encouraging subordinates to take the initiative.6 His

battalion had recently returned from a combined arms

exercise. It was augmented by Company A, 2d

Amphibious Assault Vehicle Battalion, commanded by

Captain William E. Blanchard, and was the only battalion

in the task force that would ride into battle in FMC AAV7A1s (amphibious assault vehicles, or “tracks”) and thus

be “track-mounted.” Because of this, 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, would form the task force’s vanguard during the

invasion of Iraq and bear a large brunt of the heaviest

Ughting on the Urst day in Nasiriyah.7

2 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Task Force Tarawa

Around the time of the December 2002 planningconferences, I MEF commander Lieutenant General

James T. Conway asked Brigadier General Richard F.

Natonski if he would like to choose a diSerent name for

the 2d MEB. A history major in college, Natonski had a

keen sense of the historical importance of what he and his

Marines were involved in. Conscious of being an East

Coast (2d Marine Division) unit as part of a West Coast

Marine expeditionary force, Natonski was intrigued with

the idea of giving 2d MEB a name that evoked its 2d

Marine Division heritage.

Natonski asked for ideas from the Marine Corps

History Division, but none of the suggestions appealed to

him. One day while visiting the I MEF Headquarters

building, he noticed a plaque in the lobby

commemorating the battle of Tarawa. Natonski decided

to adopt the moniker “Task Force Tarawa” for 2d MEB, a

name that recalled the legendary battle fought by 2d

Marine Division against the Japanese in the Gilbert

Islands in November 1943.4

Photo by LCpl Bryan J. Nealy

BGen Richard F. Natonski, commander of Task Force Tarawa, speaking

to a reporter in an-Nasiriyah.
Re 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, was commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Royal P. Mortenson, the son of a

World War II Marine who had been wounded on Guam.

Articulate and charismatic, Mortenson was determined

that none of his Marines would die due to his mistakes

or neglect. His Marines had recently completed coldweather training in the mountains around Bridgeport.

Despite the now-likely deployment in Iraq, Mortenson

nevertheless believed that the training had been useful

because it had encouraged and naturally fostered smallunit cohesion and attention to detail. Re battalion had

been preparing for deployment as part of 1st Marine

Division, so it was at full strength and at a high level of

training and cohesion.8

Lieutenant Colonel Paul B. “Brent” Dunahoe

commanded 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. He was a Virginia

Military Institute graduate whom one oTcer described

as “tough and pragmatic.”9 Only days before deploying,

this battalion reached deployable strength by the addition

of more than 160 brand new arrivals—second lieutenants

just graduated from Infantry OTcers Course and raw

enlisted Marines straight from the School of Infantry.

23 March - 2 April 2003 3

U. S. Marine Corps Map
Some of the latter had not even completed the full course

but had been yanked out of training early and sent to

Dunahoe’s battalion.10

Re artillery unit was 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Glenn T. Starnes, a

Texas A&M graduate described as “quietly professional and

conUdent,” but also quietly intense.11 One of Starnes’s main

concerns was the performance of the new family of digital

communications and Ure support equipment. He was also

apprehensive about what he considered a lack of necessary

logistical capabilities for a unit about to go into combat.12

Task Force Tarawa also enjoyed the support of a

company of tanks. Company A, 8th Tank Battalion, was

a Reserve company based at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Its

commander was Major William P. Peeples, a city planner

in Avon, Indiana. Brigadier General Natonski recalled

that “we were very fortunate with our support from the

Marine Corps Reserves.”13 Major Peeples’s tank company

mobilized, boarded buses, and arrived in Camp Lejeune

within three days of receiving a phone call to mobilize. A

reconnaissance company from San Antonio, Texas, had

nearly an identical timeline. Rere was also a civil aSairs

group detachment from the Reserves, and augmentation

by Reserve oTcers and enlisted personnel was vital for

the 2d MEB staS as well.14

Re combat service support element was Combat

Service Support Battalion 22 (CSSB-22), 2d Force Service

Support Group. Initially, Task Force Tarawa also had an

aviation combat element, Marine Air Group 29 (MAG29). Re task force deployed with 7,089 Marines and

sailors. Upon arriving in Kuwait, however, Task Force

Tarawa had to detach MAG-29, thus losing its own

organic air assets. Re task force also lost formal

operational control of CSSB-22 to 1st Force Service

Support Group, although its Urst assigned tactical task in

Iraq was direct support of Task Force Tarawa. Rus, by

the time the task force crossed the line of departure into

Iraq, it was simply a ground maneuver element, not a

Marine air-ground task force. It then had roughly 5,800

Marines and sailors.15

It was not until late December that subordinate

commanders of what would become Task Force Tarawa

got conUrmation that they were indeed deploying as part

of that unit. Once the word got out, things happened

quickly. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Mortenson,

commander of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, which was

originally envisioned as Vying to Iraq to become part of

1st Marine Division, found out on 29 December that his

battalion was instead sailing as part of 2d MEB. Re entire

battalion was called oS Christmas leave and told to return

on 2 January. In formation on the morning of the 3d, the

Marines and sailors learned that they would be on ships

by 5 January, and there was no way to know when they

would be back.16

On 6 January 2003, 2d MEB was oTcially activated. By

9 January, loading began on the ships of Amphibious Task

Force East at Norfolk, Virginia, and Morehead City,

Wilmington, and Onslow Beach, North Carolina.

Amphibious Task Force East shipping consisted of the

USS Saipan (LHA-2), USS Bataan (LHD-5), USS

Kearsarge (LHD-3), USS Ponce (LPD-15), USS Portland

(LSD-37), USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44), and USS Ashland

(LSD-48), all under the command of Rear Admiral

Michael P. Nowakowski, USN. On 15 January,

Amphibious Task Force East and Task Force Tarawa

sailed for the Persian Gulf.17

Two days aWer sailing, the mission of Task Force Tarawa

changed. Initially, it had been to relieve the 1st Marine

Division in the Umm Qasr oil Uelds in the southeastern

corner of Iraq, allowing the division to continue driving

north toward Baghdad. Task Force Tarawa’s new mission

was to secure bridges to facilitate the movement of the rest

of I MEF north toward Baghdad and to preserve the

combat power of 1st Marine Division. Lieutenant General

James T. Conway did not want the division, the main

eSort of the MEF, expending its combat power in seizing

and holding bridges and supply routes. Task Force Tarawa,

then, would be part of the supporting eSort for I MEF. In

turn, I MEF was the supporting eSort for the main eSort,

the 3d Infantry Division of the Army’s V Corps, which

would be advancing on the Marines’ leW. Rus, Task Force

Tarawa’s anticipated role was to be the support of the

support of the main eSort. Few if any anticipated that in

performing this mission, Task Force Tarawa would Ught

one of the deUning battles of the campaign.18

By the middle of January, 2d MEB was at sea and

headed for Iraq. Knowing that Ughting skills can degrade

while on ship, leaders throughout the task force made

plans to maintain as much of their combat proUciency as

possible. Each unit conducted on-board training,

including live-Ure training; physical Utness; small-unit

leadership training; nuclear, biological, and chemical

warfare defense training; tactical decision games; mission

planning; and staS rehearsals.19

One concern of Rear Admiral Nowakowski and Brigadier

General Natonski during the sea voyage was the passage of

four narrow sea lanes. During transits of the Strait of

Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Bab-el- Mandeb near

the port Aden, Yemen, and the Strait of Hormuz, the

brigade assumed a rigid force protection posture, with ships

4 Battle of An-Nasiriyah
posting robust guard units and Marines manning

antiaircraW guns, machine guns, and sniper riVes to guard

against possible terrorist attacks at these choke points.

Along the way, elements of the task force participated in a

one-day tactical air control exercise in Djibouti on 7-8

February using Ure support teams and mortars to practice

employment of tactical aviation and close air support.20

Task Force Tarawa and Amphibious Task Force East

arrived at Kuwait Naval Base on 15 February 2003. Over

the next three days, the units of the task force oS-loaded

and occupied their sectors in Tactical Assembly Area

Coyote. Task Force Tarawa’s camps within the assembly

area were named Camp Shoup and Camp Ryan in honor

of heroes of the Marines’ 1943 Tarawa campaign. Most of

the forces traveled from the naval base to their new

staging areas by bus, but 2,600 personnel were

transported by helicopter, a trip of 95 miles. Ris airborne

movement was conducted as a force protection measure.

From mid-February to mid-March, the Marines were able

to take advantage of nearly 30 days of zeroing and

calibrating weapons, live-Ure exercises, and other training

at Udari Range Complex and in other areas in Kuwait.21

To the Highway 1 Bridge

On 17 March, the task force received its order to move

to Assembly Area Hawkins near the Kuwait-Iraq border

on 19 March. Brigadier General Natonski’s Marines made

up the far leW Vank of I MEF, with 1st Marine Division on

its right and V Corps on its leW. Available battlespace was

limited; in fact, Assembly Area Hawkins was actually

located within V Corps’ assigned area. In the Urst day or

two of the invasion, Task Force Tarawa was forced to use

battlespace “borrowed” from V Corps as it advanced

north to accomplish its Urst mission. Rat was to secure

Jalibah AirUeld, on order, to facilitate the establishment of

a logistics base, code-named Logistics Support Area Viper.

On order, the task force would then conduct a relief in

place with elements of the Army’s 3d Infantry Division at

a key bridge where Highway 1 crossed the Euphrates River

about 12 kilometers west of the city of Nasiriyah. Ris

bridge became known as the “Highway 1 bridge.”22

Planners at I MEF and V Corps headquarters

considered Highway 1 a main supply route facilitating the

further advance of Coalition forces. However, it was not

23 March - 2 April 2003 5

Map illustration by Vincent J. Martinez
enough. If the entire expeditionary force and large

elements of V Corps were dependent on this one route,

bottlenecking would occur, slowing the advance and

leaving Coalition forces densely packed and vulnerable

to weapons of mass destruction. Having two axes of

advance would give I MEF more freedom of action and

keep the enemy guessing. Rus, by 6 February, nine days

before Task Force Tarawa came ashore in Kuwait,

Lieutenant General Conway and his staS had formulated

another mission for Task Force Tarawa: be prepared to

secure crossing sites on the eastern side of Nasiriyah.

Nasiriyah was a major population center and was

situated, as Brigadier General Natonski put it, at “a

conVuence of all the Army and Marine forces going into

Iraq.”23 A railroad, several highways, and two major

waterways converged in or around the city. Rere were

two sets of bridges, or “crossing sites,” in Nasiriyah. Rese

bridges spanned the Euphrates River in the southern

section of the city, as did the Saddam Canal, which ran

along its northern border. Re western bridge over the

Euphrates (the “southwestern bridge”) and the western

bridge over the Saddam Canal (the “northwestern

bridge”) were at either end of a route that would take

vehicles through the most built-up, densely populated

sector of the city. Rere was a risk that securing those

bridges might involve the task force being drawn

unnecessarily into intense urban Ughting.24

Instead, Task Force Tarawa was to seize the eastern

bridge over the Euphrates (“southeastern bridge”) and the

eastern bridge over the Saddam Canal (“northeastern

bridge”). Connecting these two bridges was a stretch of

road four kilometers long that Army planners had

nicknamed “Ambush Alley” based on the possibility of an

ambush of any Coalition forces attempting to use it.

Despite the foreboding moniker, few expected

determined enemy resistance in Nasiriyah. Resistance by

the Iraqi army had been weak to that point, and it seemed

signiUcant that the Iraqis had not destroyed the bridges in

and around Nasiriyah, a measure that would have been

expected of a defending force that planned to oSer

determined resistance.

Re control of the two eastern bridges and Ambush

Alley would allow I MEF forces to travel north and

northwest along Highway 8, then leave Highway 8 and

navigate the eastern outskirts of the city via Ambush

Alley and the two eastern bridges. Once over the Saddam

Canal, those Marine forces could then turn west, intersect

with Highway 7, and travel north in the direction of alKut and their next objectives. By seizing and holding

these bridges, Task Force Tarawa would allow 1st Marine

Division to preserve its momentum and combat power

for the bigger Ughts closer to Baghdad. Re desired goal

was that the main supply route would be secured, the Vow

of logistical support to 1st Marine Division would be

unhindered, and that Task Force Tarawa would be poised

for follow-on combat operations against the enemy

farther north.25

Intelligence told Brigadier General Natonski and his

staS that Nasiriyah was held by the 11th Division of the

Iraqi army and paramilitaries (Saddam Fedayeen and

Ba’ath party militia). Re Saddam Fedayeen were

fanatically loyal to the Hussein regime, though poorly

equipped and trained for conventional warfare. Rey

were known as thugs and henchmen who murderously

repressed disaSected elements within the regime and

threatened or shot Iraqi army soldiers who were

unwilling to Ught. Re Ba’ath Party Militia were similarly

organized and played a similar role.26

American intelligence was aware of the presence of

these paramilitaries but generally underestimated their

willingness to Ught. One intelligence estimate predicted

that the paramilitaries would don their civilian attire and

leave the city as American forces approached. Indeed,

there had been little Iraqi resistance to that point. Some

have speculated that the Iraqis had been caught oS guard

by the Coalition invasion due to the lack of a prolonged

air assault like that conducted in the initial phase of

Operation Desert Storm in 1991. By the time Task Force

Tarawa reached Nasiriyah several days later, however,

the Iraqis had had time to organize a defense.

Additionally, the ambush of an Army maintenance

convoy in the city hours before the Marines’ arrival in

Nasiriyah would alert and embolden the Iraqi forces

defending the city. It also turned out that there were

other Iraqi forces in the area besides the 11th Division,

Fedayeen, and Ba’ath militia. Elements of the 51st

Mechanized Infantry Division, some Republican Guard

forces, and the Al Quds Division (local militia loyal to

Saddam Hussein’s regime) were also in the area. Re

result was that Task Force Tarawa encountered far

tougher resistance at Nasiriyah than anyone on the

Coalition side had foreseen.27

Despite higher headquarters’ lack of emphasis on

paramilitaries, there is evidence that some oTcers at

lower levels expected that those enemy formations were

precisely the ones that would oSer the most resistance.

Lieutenant Colonel Brent Dunahoe, commander of 3d

Battalion, 2d Marines, and his operations oTcer, Major

Daniel T. CanUeld Jr., reasoned that those organizations

would lose the most from the overthrow of Saddam

6 Battle of An-Nasiriyah
23 March - 2 April 2003 7

Hussein’s regime. In his “Commander’s Intent” statement

given to his battalion the night before crossing the line of

departure in Kuwait and marching toward Nasiriyah,

Dunahoe announced that he saw “the enemy’s main

source of strength in . . . An Nasiriyah as the organized

militias and paramilitary forces, such as the Ba’ath Party

Militia, the Saddam Fedayeen, and others loyal to

Saddam. . . . Rey have the most to lose in a regime

change.” Dunahoe predicted that these forces were likely

to employ “obstacles, ambush, the employment of

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or asymmetrical

attacks.” Dunahoe’s prognostication, except for the use of

weapons of mass destruction, proved accurate.28

By the time Task Force Tarawa crossed the line of

departure, it was still unclear whether its Marines would

have to Ught within the city of Nasiriyah itself. Between

15 and 17 March, the plan was revised yet again, and the

seizure of the eastern bridges and “Ambush Alley”

corridor was changed to a “be prepared to” mission that

would only be executed “if the conditions were right,” as

one major put it.29

Task Force Tarawa crossed the line of departure on 21

March and executed four breaching lanes in V Corps’

sector. By 1300 on 22 March, it had traveled 150

kilometers to a position north of Jalibah AirUeld and east

of the intersection of Highways 1 and 8.* To this point,

the most vexing obstacle in Task Force Tarawa’s advance

had been neither the terrain nor the enemy, but the

constricted battlespace. Re V Corps needed the main

north-south road in the sector, so Task Force Tarawa

advanced literally cross-country. Re Marines actually

made far better time than they would have had they been

allowed to use the main road, which was literally bumper

to bumper with Army refueler trucks. It would have been

impassable for Task Force Tarawa.30

Despite these diTculties, the Coalition advance was

ahead of its timetable. During the aWernoon of the 22d,

elements of Task Force Tarawa received light and

inaccurate indirect Ure. Counterbattery radar located the

targets, and the artillery of 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,

responded with two batteries Uring a total of 24 dualpurpose improved conventional munitions.** Meanwhile,

2d Battalion, 8th Marines, took 50 enemy prisoners of war

who surrendered themselves and their weapons. On the

evening of the 22d, Brigadier General Natonski received

MEF Fragmentary Order 17, which directed Task Force

Tarawa to secure Jalibah AirUeld and conduct a relief in

place with elements of 3d Infantry Division at the Highway

1 bridge no later than 0500 the next morning, 23 March.

Also, the task force was to “be prepared” to secure the

bridges on the eastern side of Nasiriyah, with an anticipated

time of approximately 1000 the same day. Re MEF’s

Fragmentary Order 17 further informed Natonski and his

staS that 3d Infantry Division had “defeated the 11th

Infantry Division,” and that the 51st Mechanized Infantry

Division had been defeated as well. Ris news conUrmed

in the task force leaders’ minds the impression that

Nasiriyah would not be an overly diTcult Ught.31

Rat night, RCT-2 commander Colonel Ronald Bailey

received word to attend an orders group at the Task Force

Tarawa command post. By the time the meeting ended at

around midnight, he had verbal orders for 23 March.

Later he received them in written form: Urst, execute the

relief in place at the Highway 1 bridge no later than 0430;

second, conduct an attack no later than 0700 to seize the

eastern bridges of Nasiriyah and secure them no later

than 1000.32

Task Force Tarawa had advanced as far it was

authorized by this point and was ahead of its schedule.

Since the timetable had been accelerated, however,

elements of RCT-2 were beginning to feel the strain. Re

pushed deadlines, constricted battlespace and maneuver

room, clogged roads, lack of sleep, and need to refuel all

put pressure on Colonel Bailey and RCT-2. Bailey asked

for three things: more time, intelligence, and fuel. At this

point, most Marines in RCT-2 had gone 24 hours with

virtually no sleep. Perhaps more critically, because

“lowboy” transport trucks had not arrived to carry the

tanks in the cross-country march to Jalibah, fuel was

extremely low, especially for the tanks. Brigadier General

Natonski, however, could not allow Bailey more time

because of the pressure to advance that was coming down

from higher headquarters. Rough his Marines needed

rest, Bailey recalled being told, “Hey, I guess we’ll be going

on adrenaline.”33 Nor could the Task Force Tarawa staS

give him any detailed intelligence information, other than

to expect nothing more than small-arms Ure. Rere was

also no deUnite information on refueling, though

refuelers arrived several hours later. Bailey needed to get

his Company C, 2d LAR Battalion, and 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, to the Highway 1 bridge, 80 kilometers away. He

suddenly felt like he had been put under tremendous

pressure but consciously told himself, “okay, [we’ve] got a

mission, let’s go for it.”34

* In this study, all times are given in local Baghdad, or “Charlie” time,

even though many of the sources use times from the “Zulu” time zone.

** Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) refers to

a family of artillery projectiles (including the M483A1, M80, and M864

rounds designed for 155mm howitzers) that are particularly deadly.

They are designed to explode above the target and release grenade-like

submunitions that are effective against both armor and personnel.
In the interest of saving time, Colonel Bailey and his

staS decided to forego a meeting with his battalion

commanders and instead passed the word to them by

radio. Re 2d Force Reconnaissance Company, led by

Lieutenant Colonel James E. Reilly, dashed ahead to make

liaison with the Army’s 3d Brigade Combat Team (3d

BCT) of the 3d Infantry Division at the Highway 1 bridge.

Shortly aWerward, Colonel Bailey and Company C, 2d

LAR Battalion, took oS on a “hell-for-leather” ride to the

bridge as well, with 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, following

about an hour later. With the northbound lane clogged

by hundreds of Army vehicles and at a virtual standstill,

Bailey led the convoy northward in the dark, with no

lights, oWen in the southbound lane into what would have

been oncoming traTc. At one point, they traveled for

some distance oS-road. Sleep-deprived Marine drivers

had to dodge stalled Army vehicles and halted convoys

that had been leW parked in the travel lanes with no

Vashers on. Several Marines on Bailey’s staS began

referring to the route as “Mr. Toad’s Wild Ride” aWer an

amusement park ride and video game popular at the

time.35

Bailey and elements of 2d Force Reconnaissance

Company reached the Army position at the bridge

sometime around 0230. At 0430, Company C, 2d LAR

Battalion, assisted and guided in by the reconnaissance

company, relieved the Army tank company of the 3d

Brigade Combat Team that held the Highway 1 bridge.*36

Meanwhile, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, was having

diTculty weaving its way through stalled Army convoys.

At approximately 0100, the Marines veered to the right

and slowed down to pass a convoy stalled on the leW side

of the road. One Humvee failed to adjust and crashed into

the back of a parked Army truck. Re driver, Sergeant

Nicolas M. Hodson, was killed, and the three

passengers—First Lieutenant Dustin P. Ferrell, Lance

Corporal Shawn T. Eshelman, and Lance Corporal Bret

R. Westerlink—were seriously injured and evacuated by

helicopter. As a result of the congestion on the highway,

8 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Map illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

* The command chronology for the 2d Marines says the relief in place was

complete at 0300. Task Force Tarawa’s “Chronicle of the Combat Actions

at An Nasiriyah” notes that it was complete at 0430, “one half hour ahead

of schedule.” This time matches with the recollection of LtCol Reilly. LtCol

James E. Reilly and SFC Thomas Smith intvw with Col Reed R.

Bonadonna, 13Apr03 (Marine Corps Historical Center, Quantico, VA).
the battalion’s movement was delayed by roughly four

hours. Nevertheless, shortly aWer 0700, the battalion

established its assigned blocking positions along Highway

8, east of the Highway 1 bridge and facing east.37

Rough RCT-2 elements were able to accomplish the

relief in place on the Highway 1 bridge on time without

enemy-inVicted casualties, there were several cases of

enemy contact. While clearing the western side of the

bridge, the Marines of Company C, 2d LAR Battalion,

captured numerous arms and ammunition caches and

later shot two Iraqi soldiers who were probing their

defensive position. Later that night, elements of 2d Force

Reconnaissance Company were moving from the

intersection of Highways 1 and 8 eastward along Highway

8 toward Nasiriyah. As they neared a power plant,

Lieutenant Colonel Reilly and his reconnaissance

Marines received Ure from enemy small arms, light

machine guns, rockets, and mortars. Re Marines killed

approximately 20 to 30 Iraqi soldiers while suSering no

casualties. As they returned toward the bridge, traveling

westward, Reilly and his Marines found and destroyed

two trucks carrying armed men and also navigated a

recently emplaced obstacle that had not been there earlier.

Apparently, the Iraqis had intended to box in and destroy

the patrol, ambushing it at the power plant on the eastern

side of the box and blocking its escape to the west with

obstacles and Ure. But they had been too slow in putting

together their trap.38

As Lieutenant Colonel Reilly and his troops proceeded

back to Highway 1, they encountered the Marines of

Lieutenant Colonel Dunahoe’s 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,

occupying their assigned blocking position Uve

kilometers east of the intersection of Highways 1 and 8.

Reilly and Dunahoe exchanged intelligence and

information that aided Dunahoe’s battalion in an

engagement later that evening.39

Rroughout the day of 23 March, 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, consolidated its positions, sent out patrols, and

acquired much-needed fuel and rations. At approximately

2000, two vehicles approached the checkpoint of Company

L, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. Six individuals dismounted,

and Marines looking through night vision sights believed

that the men were carrying riVes. However, because of the

presence of U.S. Special Forces, Free Iraqi Forces, and

possibly other “friendlies” in the area, the Marines of

Company L, under Captain Gerald R. Romas, did not Ure.

Moments later, however, mortar rounds began to land near

Companies I and K and creep closer to the Marines. Rere

was momentary confusion over whether the rounds were

enemy Ure or the result of a “danger-close” mission Ured by

friendly forces in support of the riVe companies. As leaders

conUrmed that the mortar Ure was enemy-directed,

Marines from Company L engaged one of the vehicles with

a Raytheon/Lockheed FGM-148 Javelin antitank missile at

a range of 600 meters. Re Javelin missile destroyed the

vehicle, and Marines engaged the other vehicle with a .50-

caliber sniper riVe. Re battalion used 81mm illumination

rounds to attempt to locate the hostile mortars, and the

battalion air oTcer, Captain Harold W. Qualkinbush, called

upon a section of two Bell AH-1W Cobra helicopters to

reconnoiter the area. Using its infrared sights, the Cobras

located two abandoned mortar tubes still radiating infrared

energy about 1,500 meters east of the battalion and just

north of the Euphrates River. As soon as the sound of the

Cobras’ rotor blades Ulled the night air, the Iraqi

mortarmen scattered, and the mortars ceased Uring.

Marines later found two abandoned vehicles with more

than 140 riVes, 9 machine guns, 8 rockets, ammunition,

and other supplies. Rey destroyed them all with

demolition charges.40

23 March—Into the City

While 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and the light armored

reconnaissance company were eSecting the relief in place

on the Highway 1 bridge, the rest of RCT-2 was

attempting to refuel and preparing to resume its march

north to seize the bridges on the eastern side of Nasiriyah.

Prior to MEF Fragmentary Order 17, the requirement to

seize the eastern bridges was only a “be prepared to”

mission. Task Force Tarawa had done extensive planning

for this anticipated mission. However, there was some

thought among the battalion commanders and brigade

staS that if these bridges and the city were strongly held,

then RCT-2 would just secure Jalibah AirUeld and make

sure that the Highway 1 route was open for 1st Marine

Division to pass through. As Brigadier General Natonski

recalled, “our intent was never to get involved in the

urban area.” Re last thing he wanted to do was “get

bogged down” in a house-to-house Ught.41 Even if there

was only light resistance, the plan was to take only the

easternmost bridges rather than directly entering the

more built-up area around the western bridges and the

route that went straight into the heart of the city.

Commanders throughout RCT-2 understood that a

house-to-house urban Ught was not desired. As

Lieutenant Colonel Rickey Grabowski recalled, if “the

enemy situation in Nasiriyah was more permissive vice

nonpermissive . . . there was a good chance we could go

up there to seize the bridges in order to open that Route

7.” As it turned out, “the night before the attack, we got

the word that we were going to push to go seize the

23 March - 2 April 2003 9
bridges. . . . I’m not certain what . . . the intel[ligence] at

the higher level was, whether it was permissive or

nonpermissive, but we got the order to continue in the

morning to seize those bridges.”42

In the early hours of 23 March, the Marines still

anticipated only light resistance in Nasiriyah. Moreover, it

seems clear that when the mission to seize the eastern

bridges was changed from a “be prepared to” to an

“execute” mission, this news did not reach all the

commanders in the regimental combat team. Units

including 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, and other elements were moving north toward

the bridges by 0300, with 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, in the

lead. Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski, commander of 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, was one who had not gotten the

word, believing that the only stated mission was to defend

Highway 1. As the morning progressed, however, and as

1st Battalion, 2d Marines, and other RCT-2 elements began

to make enemy contact, an even greater sense of urgency

was imparted from senior commanders to Brigadier

General Natonski and then to the regiment and the

battalions. Natonski was told that within “several hours” of

his task force taking the bridges that 1st Marine Division

would be coming through. Grabowski recalled that “it

wasn’t until we got up to our Urst engagement, which was

southeast of the city, where we received medium machinegun Ure and we were also receiving artillery and mortar Ure

that we were basically . . . told that hey, they needed the

bridges because we had two regimental combat teams that

were going to pass through that day.”43

Just before 0600, Colonel Bailey ordered Lieutenant

Colonel Grabowski’s 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, to move

north from its assigned position at the 20 northing line to

the 22 northing to make room for the emplacement of

the artillery of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines.44

Grabowski’s battalion was in the lead because it was the

battalion that had mechanized assets—its Marines were

mounted on tracks, and it had the tank company attached

to it. Behind 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, and initially

behind the artillery, was Lieutenant Colonel Royal

Mortenson’s 2d Battalion.

Re lead element for 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, was

Combined Anti-Armor Team 1. Each battalion formed a

Combined Anti-Armor Platoon from elements of its

Weapons Company. Rese “CAAT” platoons were ad hoc,

task-organized elements that included vehicle-mounted

heavy machine gun and anti-armor assets. Typically, each

CAAT platoon included eight “TOW vehicles” (Humvees

specially designed to mount the Hughes M220 TubeLaunched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided Missiles);

seven Humvees mounted with either .50-caliber machine

guns or MK19 grenade launchers; and one FGM-148

Javelin missile section with eight missile systems. Rese

combined anti-armor platoons were divided into two

sections, CAAT Team One and CAAT Team Two.45 In 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, the combined anti-armor platoon

commander was First Lieutenant Brian S. Letendre, who

also personally led CAAT Team Two. Letendre’s CAAT

Team One was led by StaS Sergeant Troy F. Schielein.

Next in the line of march for 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,

was Team Tank, consisting of two platoons of tanks and

one platoon of track-mounted infantry from Company

B. Ren came the Forward Command Post, 81mm

mortar platoon, Team Mech (two platoons of trackmounted infantry from Company B and one platoon of

tanks), Company A (track-mounted), and Company C

(track-mounted). Bringing up the rear of the column

were the Main Command Post, logistics trains, and

Combined Anti-Armor Team 2.46

Besides the Humvees belonging to Combined AntiArmor Team 1, the vanguard of the regimental combat

team was the tank company led by Major William

Peeples, the city planner and former logistics oTcer from

Indiana, and Gunnery Sergeant Randy L. Howard, a

tanker and veteran of the Urst Gulf War. Most oTcers in

the regimental combat team and Task Force Tarawa staS

understood the value of tanks in urban terrain. By the

end of the day, they would never forget it.

About 13 kilometers south of Nasiriyah, Major Peeples’s

tank column began receiving small-arms and indirect Ure

as it passed between two houses. Additionally,

challenging terrain made the tanks’ overwatch advance

10 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Photo by LCpl Gordon A. Rouse

Marines in Nasiriyah mounted on a High Mobility Multi-Wheeled

Vehicle (Humvee) designed for the M220 TOW missile launcher and also

mounted with a Fabrique Nationale M240G 7.62mm machine gun.
technique diTcult. One tank bogged down in swampy

ground and had to be pulled out by a retriever. Re rest of

the column was taking Ure, pausing to engage enemy

targets, and calling in mortar Ure and artillery support

from 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, which had two batteries

Uring by 0700.47

Shortly aWer getting all of his tanks back on the road,

Major Peeples observed a smoking and damaged Humvee

headed south in his direction. In the vehicle were three

soldiers, including Captain Troy K. King, U.S. Army,

commander of the 507th Maintenance Company, attached

to a MIM-104 Patriot missile battery. Having been

traveling for approximately 36 hours, the company had

mistakenly veered oS Highway 8 and then turned toward

the city into enemy-held territory. It had entered the city,

crossed the Euphrates and the Saddam Canal, turned west

on Route 7, reversed course, passed to the east of the

eastern Saddam Canal bridge that it had crossed earlier,

reversed course again, and Unally turned south to retrace

its steps through Ambush Alley. As it was traveling south,

it ran a gauntlet of Ure from the Saddam Canal to well

south of the Euphrates River bridge. Re shaken captain

told Peeples that he had taken casualties and that much of

the rest of his company was pinned down to the north in

need of rescue and medical assistance.

Peeples decided to take his entire company north to

assist the ambushed soldiers and informed personnel at

the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, command post. Along the

way, Team Tank, Combined Anti-Armor Team 1, and two

tracked vehicles from Company A ran into Iraqi resistance

and destroyed some enemy artillery, one tank, and some

antiaircraW weapons. With the help of two AH-1 Cobra

helicopter gunships that were on their way south to Basra

and another supporting attack by a pair of Boeing F/A-18

Hornet jets, Peeples and his men were able to rescue 10

stranded soldiers of the 507th, including four who were

wounded. Some members of the 507th had already been

killed. Others were captured, including Private First Class

Jessica D. Lynch, whose story would soon attract

international attention.48

Major Peeples’s company’s rescue of the 507th had

burned up time and, more importantly, fuel. He therefore

had to take his tanks back to the rear of the column to be

refueled. Re pump on the refueler was broken, so each

tank had to be “gravity-fed,” a process that took about 15

minutes per vehicle. For the rest of the march into

Nasiriyah, then, the RCT-2 column would not be led by

Team Tank, as Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski and his

staS had planned, although a platoon of partially refueled

tanks later did return to the head of the column.49

At some point in the midst of these events, Brigadier

General Natonski arrived near the head of the regimental

combat team’s column in a helicopter. Colonel Bailey had

also returned from the position of the 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, near the Highway 1 bridge to the west. Natonski

attempted to enhance his situational awareness and was

concerned about the apparent delay. He too encountered

Captain King of the lost convoy and was dismayed and

astounded at his story. Re fate of the 507th conUrmed to

him the need to seize the vital bridges leading into and

out of Nasiriyah as quickly as possible, and Colonel Bailey

agreed. Since the Iraqis now knew that American forces

were in the area, they might try to destroy those bridges.

Rere were also indications that more soldiers of the

23 March - 2 April 2003 11

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

An M1A1 Abrams tank belonging to Company A, 8th Tank Battalion, and a FMC AAV-7A1 Amphibious Assault Vehicle attached to Company

C, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, were among the first units to traverse “Ambush Alley” on 23 March.
12 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

507th were still stranded in the city. Natonski pulled

Grabowski aside and said, “Rickey, you have to do

whatever you can to Und those missing soldiers. Rey

would do it for us, and we need to do it for them.” As

Natonski was leaving, Bailey looked directly at Grabowski

and asked if he needed anything. Grabowski replied

Urmly, “Sir, we will get the bridges.”50

Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski’s battalion resumed the

march north around 0800 with a renewed sense of urgency.

With Team Tank in the rear being refueled, and with

signiUcant resistance expected ahead, it traveled two

companies abreast. On the right was Team Mech

(Company B, track-mounted), minus the tank platoon,

which was also refueling. On the leW were the three trackmounted platoons of Company C. Company A and the rest

of the regimental combat team followed behind as before.51

About three kilometers south of the city, the battalion

approached a bridge that spanned a railway underpass. To

cross it, the battalion redeployed into column formation,

with Team Mech in the lead, followed by Company C. At

that point, StaS Sergeant Troy Schielein, leader of

Combined Anti-Armor Team 1, reported seven to nine

Soviet-style enemy tanks in the underpass to his front,

along with 40 to 50 dismounted infantry. Some of the tanks

had no engines and were eSectively only “stationary

pillboxes.”52 Others were mobile and attempting to use the

bridge itself for cover. Walking among his vehicles, StaS

Sergeant Schielein identiUed targets and directed the Ure of

his TOW and Javelin missiles. He later credited Corporal

Joshua C. McCall with destroying Uve tanks and Sergeant

Edward Palacios Jr. with destroying three. Many of the

enemy tanks, because they were so low in the underpass,

could not elevate their tubes enough to engage the Marines

at the bridge. Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski had already

sent his executive oTcer, Major JeSrey D. Tuggle, to the

refueling point to Und out what was taking so long to refuel

the tanks. Shortly aWer Tuggle’s arrival, Major Peeples sent

one platoon, partially refueled, back into the Ught.53

Re refueled tank platoon belonging to Team Mech

roared back to the head of the column as Team Mech led

the battalion into the city, followed by Lieutenant Colonel

Grabowski’s command group, Company A, and then

Company C. Grabowski intended for Team Mech to cross

the southeastern bridge, then turn right and Vank out to

the east. Continuing straight down the road aWer crossing

the bridge would have taken them right into Ambush Alley.

In case of heavy resistance, Grabowski’s plan was for

Company B or Team Mech to cross the bridge, turn right,

and head north again, traveling along a route parallel to

and to the east of Ambush Alley. Company A, close behind,

would secure the bridge by setting up a perimeter and

checking for explosives. Company C would follow in trace

of Team Mech. Team Mech would then establish a base of

Ure southeast of the Saddam Canal bridge, which would

support Company C as it secured that crossing.54

It was a solid plan, but it was at this point that things

began to go wrong for 1st Battalion, 2d Marines. So far the

battalion had overcome every obstacle. Re rescue of the

507th had caused delays, as had the shortage of fuel. Smallarms Ure, indirect Ure, and enemy tanks had also

temporarily slowed the advance, but the Marines had

surmounted each of these situations without sustaining

further American casualties. Friction and the fog of war,

however, were about to take their toll. As Team Mech

crossed the bridge at about 1230, it began to take smallarms Ure and poorly directed rocket Ure. Re lead

elements—tanks that were buttoned up and therefore had

poor visibility—missed the Urst turn to the right. Rey

managed to make the second turn and to travel a few

hundred meters east. Re entire company then began to

Photo by Eric Feferberg, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

As Marines of Task Force Tarawa advance into combat in Nasiriyah

on 23 March 2003, a sign “welcomes” them to the city.

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

Marines move into Nasiriyah on a FMC AAV-7A1 Amphibious

Assault Vehicle on 23 March 2003. This picture was taken south of the

southeastern bridge.
turn northward as planned and fan out into a relatively

open Ueld. Re terrain looked passable, but the initial

appearance was deceptive. Just below a 6- to 12-inch crust

was a thick, gooey layer of silt and sewage several feet deep.

Re Urst tank suddenly sank to its axles. Soon other tracks

and Humvees got stuck as well. Team Mech continued to

take Ure as its Marines tried to extricate the stuck vehicles

and make their way to the Saddam Canal bridge.55

To make the situation worse, Team Mech and Lieutenant

Colonel Grabowski, who was with the company, lost

virtually all communications. Rere was too much chatter

on the radio nets, and the buildings in the city, as well as

high-tension power lines, disrupted line-of-sight

communications. Re artillery liaison oTcer had no

communications with the artillery; the battalion air oTcer,

Captain A. J. Greene, had almost no communications; and

Grabowski was desperately trying to reach Captain Daniel

J. Wittnam, the commander of Company C.* He wanted to

tell him not to follow him as previously planned.

Advancing across the eastern salt Vats to bypass Ambush

Alley was clearly not going to work and would only slow

the battalion’s momentum. Eventually, Team Mech’s

forward air controller, Captain Dennis A. Santare, was able

to get air support from AH-1 Cobra helicopters to suppress

the Ure being directed at the Marines from Vat rooWops

around them. Re enemy Ughters were using “shoot and

scoot” tactics—brieVy exposing themselves on a rooWop, in

a window, or a doorway long enough to Ure, then darting

23 March - 2 April 2003 13

NIMA CADRG 1:15K TLM/1994

* Some participants later noted that elements of 1st Battalion, 2d

Marine, had degraded communications ability well before reaching the

Euphrates bridge, in some cases even before crossing the line of

departure. See comments by Hawkins and Barry in LtCol Donald S.

Hawkins, Maj Craig H. Streeter, Maj Matthew R. Shenberger, and

GySgt Kevin Barry intvw with Fred Allison, 13Oct06 (Marine Corps

Historical Center, Quantico, VA), transcript, p. 12.
14 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

for cover or to another building. Later, however, the

presence of the Cobras overhead made that tactic less and

less possible. Movement exposed them to the helicopters’

observation and Ure. Re Cobras helped Marines on the

ground identify targets and locate Iraqi Ughters that they

could not see themselves.56

Shortly aWer Company B, or Team Mech, crossed the

Euphrates bridge, Company A followed. Ris company,

commanded by Captain Michael A. Brooks, also received

light incoming Ure, which soon increased a great deal.

Brooks’s Marines returned Ure and set up a perimeter

around the northern side of the bridge.

As Captain Wittnam, commander of Company C,

crossed the southeastern bridge, he could see that

Company A was taking Ure but that it had established a

perimeter around the bridgehead. However, there was no

sign of Company B (Team Mech) or the battalion

commander. Wittnam could neither see them nor hear

Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski trying to reach him on the

radio. Wittnam concluded that Company B must have

proceeded straight down the road to the Unal objective—

the Saddam Canal bridge. He decided to do the same, to

dash down Ambush Alley for the bridge, which, it turned

out, was exactly what Grabowski now wanted him to do.

Wittnam’s decision was logical based on the commander’s

intent he had received, as his main objective was to secure

the Saddam Canal bridge.57

Rough Grabowski still had not managed to get

through to Wittnam’s Company C, he was again able to

contact his executive oTcer, Major Tuggle. He told him to

go to the refueling site and personally order the

remaining tanks to the city right away. Major Peeples had

already sent one platoon north to help Team Mech, and

his last Uve tanks were still being refueled. Upon receiving

Grabowski’s order through Major Tuggle, Peeples

discontinued refueling with his last tanks only partially

Ulled and began moving north. One of his Uve tanks

broke down almost immediately. Just aWer crossing the

railroad bridge south of the city, his four remaining tanks

encountered six Iraqi tanks and destroyed three. Peeples’s

tanks continued on toward the Euphrates bridge. Seeing

that the Company A Marines were dismounted and

receiving and returning Ure, Peeples halted his tank,

dismounted, and asked Captain Brooks what he needed.

Re tank company commander deployed his tanks

according to Brooks’s requests, and together the tankinfantry team began to designate and destroy enemy

targets. Brooks’s Marines continued to take heavy Ure, but

not a single man in Company A was seriously wounded.

With the presence and Ure of the tanks, the Iraqi Ure

immediately began to slacken. Cobra helicopters

provided much-needed support as well.58

<e Ordeal of Charlie Company—<e

Eastern Saddam Canal Bridge

Company C continued past Company A at the bridge

and raced through Ambush Alley taking heavy smallarms and rocket Ure from the front, leW, and right. Iraqi

Ughters in civilian clothes emerged out of seemingly every

window and doorway to Ure riVes and rockets. Some ran

into the street with rockets to Ure at point-blank range.

Some of the rockets glanced oS the sides of the tracks,

while others hit and did not detonate, as if they had not

been properly armed before being Ured.59

Re response of Company C’s Marines and the

amphibious assault vehicle drivers with them corresponded

exactly to their training. First, the Marines’ return Ure was

accurate and heavy. Marines in every track in Company C

responded with riVes, .50-caliber machine guns, and 40mm

grenades from MK19 grenade launchers, sometimes Uring

at the cyclic rate. Rey inVicted heavy casualties. Re Iraqi

soldiers who had waylaid the 507th Maintenance Company

only hours before found the response of a mechanized

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez
Marine riVe company was far diSerent. Re soldiers of the

507th had fought back bravely but had only been able to

respond with sporadic Ure from a few riVes and one M249

squad automatic weapon. Re Marines’ response was much

heavier, better directed, and more deadly. Another

signiUcant factor was that the company’s vehicles neither

bunched up nor got too separated from one another,

maintaining an interval of 50 to 250 meters between each

track or Humvee. Re convoy never lost its momentum and

proceeded through the kill zone as rapidly as possible.

Roughly halfway through the gauntlet between the two

bridges, one of the tracks of 3d Platoon was hit by a

rocket, and Uve Marines were wounded, some critically.

Commanding the vehicle was First Lieutenant Michael S.

Seely, a former sergeant who had earned the Purple Heart

and Bronze Star in the Urst Gulf War. Seely saw that he

had wounded aboard and that part of the right side of the

track had caught Ure. He knew, however, that it would be

fatal either to dismount or stop. Once he realized that the

track still had some power leW, he commanded the driver,

Sergeant Michael E. Bitz, to “push, push, push” and “get us

the hell out of here.” Re damaged track sped toward the

Saddam Canal bridge without taking further casualties.60

Every vehicle of Company C reached the Saddam Canal

bridge and continued north for several hundred meters.

Captain Wittnam and his platoon commanders began

parking their tracks in a “herringbone” formation and

dismounting to form a perimeter that was elongated from

north to south, with the lead track and the last one

separated by at least a kilometer. Re Marines of

Company C had established a bridgehead without the

planned supporting Ure from Company B, but their

situation was extremely perilous. Wittnam did have all

the organic Urepower (that which was inherent to the

unit) belonging to a Marine riVe company, as well as the

.50-caliber machine guns and MK19 grenade launchers

on his tracks. Other than that, though, Company C was

on its own and had ventured into the teeth of the defenses

of the 23d Brigade of the 11th Infantry Division.

Captain Wittnam’s Marines were taking machine-gun,

rocket, recoilless riVe, and mortar Ure from the north, east,

and west. Heavy Ure was also coming from the Martyr’s

District, a military complex to the company’s southwest

that was on the southern bank of the Saddam Canal.

Wittnam had no forward air controller to call in air

support. He had a 60mm mortar platoon, but he could not

23 March - 2 April 2003 15

Photo by LCpl Bryan J. Nealy

An aerial view of Nasiriyah, looking southwest from the north side of the Saddam Canal, crossed by 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, on 23 March

2003. The buildings in the center of the photo, to the right (west) of the southern end of the bridge, made up the “Martyr’s District,” a

neighborhood occupied by large numbers of fedayeen fighters.
get radio contact with either the battalion’s 81mm mortars

or with the artillery of 1st Battalion, 10th Marines. Nor

could he establish eSective communications with his

battalion commander to advise him of his situation.

Sometime around 1300, the two had established contact

long enough for Wittnam to communicate that he had

secured the Saddam Canal bridge. Lieutenant Colonel

Grabowski was elated. Immediately aWer this, however,

Grabowski and Wittnam lost communications again.

Worse, few besides Grabowski had heard Wittnam’s

report, and those who did were all colocated with him and

had little or no radio contact with Company B. Rat

company’s commander, Captain Timothy A. Newland,

and his forward air controller, Captain Santare, continued

to believe that Company B was still the forward element of

the battalion, thinking that no Marines were north of the

Saddam Canal.61

Company C returned Ure with all its organic weapons.

Occasionally the company commander; the artillery

forward observer, Second Lieutenant Frederick E.

Pokorney Jr.; and the mortar platoon commander, First

Lieutenant James “Ben” Reid, got atop the elevated roadway

in the center of the position to gain situational awareness

and identify targets. Reid’s mortarmen were able to deliver

eSective Ure for awhile. Pokorney at long last established

contact with the artillery, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,

and called in a Ure mission. Shortly aWerward, however,

Iraqi mortar rounds began crashing into Company C’s

position, killing Pokorney and killing and wounding

several mortarmen. Marines on the leW side of the road

began to advance westward toward the enemy, employing

Ure and maneuver while using small drainage canals and

ditches for cover. Rey too soon began to receive accurate

mortar Ure, although much of the blast from the rounds

was absorbed by the soggy ground around them. One track

was loaded with casualties and sent back south (although

no one seems to know who gave this order). It dashed back

down Ambush Alley, through Company A’s position at the

southeastern bridge, safely delivered the wounded to the

battalion aid station, and then returned to Company A’s

position. Re loading of wounded Marines into tracked

vehicles continued, as that was the only way to evacuate

them. Re volume of Ure Company C was receiving made

evacuation by helicopters impossible.62

While Company C was desperately holding on north

of the Canal, Company B Marines continued working

their way north through streets and alleys to the eastern

Saddam Canal bridge. Advancing northward on foot and

in soW-skinned vehicles, they were in the midst of the

urban Ught they had hoped to avoid. Behind them, the

AAV-7 and tank personnel were doing all they could to

extract their mired vehicles, occasionally getting others

stuck in the process.

When Task Force Tarawa went into combat, each of its

riVe battalions had one air oTcer attached to the battalion

headquarters and two forward air controllers, so that two

of the three riVe companies had their own forward air

controller. When 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, went into

battle, Company A’s forward air controller was Captain

James Jones. Company B was assigned Captain Santare

(call sign “Mouth”). Company C, as the last company in

the column, did not have its own forward air controller.

Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski’s battalion air oTcer was

Captain Greene.

As the battalion advanced up the highway toward

Nasiriyah throughout the morning, Captain Santare had

been busy coordinating Cobra attacks against targets

identiUed by Company B. Rese Cobra strikes continued

as Company B crossed the Euphrates bridge, turned east,

and began moving north toward the Saddam Canal, with

Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski’s command vehicle several

blocks away. Poor communications aSected Santare and

Greene as much as anyone in Nasiriyah. For most of this

time, Greene had virtually no working radios and was

eSectively out of the battle. He therefore passed control to

the two company forward air controllers, allowing them

to direct their own air attacks at the company level.

Santare, meanwhile, had good communications with the

AH-1 Cobra helicopters, but his communications with

ground components outside of Company B were tenuous

at best.63

Captain Santare and the Company B commander,

Captain Newland, still believed that Company B was the

most forward element of the regimental combat team.

Rey continued in this belief even aWer Wittnam was able

to report to Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski that he had

crossed the Saddam Canal bridge because, as indicated

earlier, no one in Company B had heard that transmission.

Neither had the air oTcer, Captain Greene, who was no

longer located with Grabowski. What Newland, Santare,

and Greene did know was that Company B was receiving

a tremendous volume of Ure from north of the Saddam

Canal. In fact, Newland had already told Santare that as

soon as he could get support from A-10 Runderbolt

aircraW, he wanted him to start running missions north

of the Saddam Canal. For an instant, Santare and Greene

managed to establish radio contact. Greene told Santare,

“Mouth, I need you to get on guard and get any air

support you can get!”64 Santare understood that the

situation was dire; the “guard” frequency was normally

used only for Vight emergencies.65

16 Battle of An-Nasiriyah
23 March - 2 April 2003 17

Santare got on his radio and announced, “On guard, on

guard, this is Mouth in the vicinity of Nasiriyah. We have

troops in contact and need immediate air support.”66

Within seconds, Uxed-wing aircraW began checking in

with Santare. Santare waited for a Navy or Marine jet with

an airborne forward air controller to answer, but none

did. Instead, he began working with two A-10s from the

Pennsylvania Air National Guard, “Gyrate-73” and

“Gyrate-74.” Circling high over the battleUeld and

communicating with Santare, the Air Force jets attempted

to get a Ux on his position in Nasiriyah east of Ambush

Alley and identify targets.67

Re A-10s identiUed vehicular targets north of the

Saddam Canal’s eastern bridge and passed the locations to

Captain Santare. Santare in turn veriUed with Captain

Newland that Company B was still the forward-most

friendly unit. Santare’s problem now was that he could see

neither the A-10s nor the targets that they were identifying

to him. Both the pilots and Santare did see the smoke

coming from a burning vehicle on the highway north of the

Saddam Canal bridge and used that as a reference point.

None of them knew that the vehicle was actually the

destroyed track that had transported First Lieutenant Seely

and his other Marines from Company C.68

Re preferred type of air control that Captain Santare

would have liked to use was Type I close air support

[CAS], in which the forward air controller can see both

the attacking aircraW and the target. Re next preferred

method was Type II close air support, where the forward

air controller either cannot see the aircraW or the target,

or when the attacking aircraW cannot acquire the target

prior to release or launch of the weapon. Santare’s

situation was even more uncertain, and he ended up

using Type III close air support, which is when the

controller can observe neither the target nor the aircraW.

Re battalion operations order then in eSect prohibited

the use of Type III CAS without the clearance of the

battalion commander. With a good visual of either the

aircraWs’ intended targets or of the A-10s themselves,

Captain Santare authorized Gyrate-73 and Gyrate-74 to

attack anything north of the Saddam Canal. Based on

how poor communications had been, Santare believed

that it would take a very long time for himself or Captain

Newland to reach Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski—if he

could be reached at all. Air support is a “use it or lose it”

asset and cannot be kept on hold forever. Moreover,

Company B was in the middle of an ambush and taking

heavy Ure. Based on the overall commander’s intent,

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

Marines shield an injured comrade while pinned down in a firefight in Nasiriyah on 23 March 2003. Numerous Task Force Tarawa Marines were

wounded, but none killed, between 24 March and the end of the battle.
18 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

therefore, Santare felt that the best thing to do would be

to authorize the A-10 attacks. He later explained that “I

felt that if I did not act, Marines would die.”69

Meanwhile, Company C was still under Ure from the

23d Brigade’s mortars, artillery, rockets, and small arms.

On their own initiative, some small unit leaders began

loading more wounded Marines onto tracks so they could

be evacuated back down Ambush Alley to the southern

bridge. Other Marines who had been methodically

advancing by Ure and movement to the west began

returning to the highway in the vicinity of where some of

the tracks were positioned.

It is unclear why Marines were returning to the

highway, or who ordered this action. First Lieutenant

Seely, Company C’s 3d Platoon commander, remembered

only that Marines on the AAVs on the highway began

waving and shouting to him and his Marines to come to

them. He asked what was going on, only to be told “We’re

loading up.” Before he could make sense of the situation,

the A-10s began their straUng runs on Company C.

Second Lieutenant Scott M. Swantner, too, was unsure

who gave these orders. He later surmised that it was

“multiple people giving multiple orders.” Re company

executive oTcer, First Lieutenant Eric A. Meador, and 3d

Platoon platoon sergeant StaS Sergeant Anthony J.

Pompos thought that they would be headed north when

they boarded the vehicles. Re company Urst sergeant,

First Sergeant Jose G. Henao, also did not know who

ordered the AAVs to head south.70

First Lieutenant Seely had just returned to the highway

and was trying to discover why Marines were returning

there when the Urst A-10 straUng run occurred.* At that

moment, one Marine was struck in the chest and killed,

and at least four other Marines were wounded. Seely had

been strafed by A-10s in Desert Storm. He knew

immediately what had happened; the sound of 30mm

rounds hitting the deck followed immediately by that of

the armament itself was unforgettable and unmistakable

to him. He yelled to Second Lieutenant Swantner, the 1st

Platoon Commander, to Ure pyrotechnics. Within

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

Marines of Task Force Tarawa search the hulk of a destroyed AAV-7A1 “track” in Nasiriyah in late March 2003. This vehicle, attached to 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, was destroyed while traversing “Ambush Alley.”

* Apparently, earlier the A-10s had dropped several MK82 bombs.

“U.S. Central Command Investigation of Suspected Friendly Fire

Incident Near Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 03,” Capt Dennis A. Santare

testimony, p. H-33; Tab A-H, p. 20.
seconds, Swantner popped two red star clusters, the signal

to cease-Ure. Seely yelled to nearby Marines for a radio,

hoping for a chance to call oS the attack, and also helped

other Marines load the wounded onto the tracks. While

Marines were struggling with this task, the A-10s made

several more straUng runs.71

Soon a convoy of four Company C tracks loaded with

dead and wounded Marines began speeding south. As the

vehicles crossed back over the Saddam Canal bridge and

progressed down Ambush Alley, they were hit again by

rockets. Re A-10s also attacked them with AGM-65

Maverick air-to-surface missiles. Re A-10 pilots, seeing

armored vehicles moving south, believed they were part

of an enemy armored column and reported them to

Captain Santare. Because intelligence reports had warned

of an Iraqi armored column headed south, Santare

authorized the aircraW to attack them.72

At one point, Captain Santare, who was moving west

with the rest of Company B toward the Saddam Canal

bridge, thought he saw Humvees in front of him. He

radioed the A-10s to abort the mission while he again

attempted to verify with other oTcers that Company B

was the lead element of the regimental combat team.

Informed by Captain Newland that was still the case, he

cleared the A-10s for further runs.73 Only two of the four

tracks made it back to Company A’s position at the

southeastern bridge. In all, Company C had 18 Marines

killed, between 14 to 19 wounded, 5 tracks destroyed, and

2 damaged so badly that they were abandoned. Given the

fog of war, it is diTcult to know which of these losses

were directly attributable to friendly Ure, enemy Ure, or a

combination of both.*74

23 March - 2 April 2003 19

* There is some confusion over how many Marines from Company C

and its attached elements were wounded, but not killed, on 23

March. The Final Report of the CentCom investigation says that 19

Marines from Company C were wounded. Elsewhere in the

CentCom investigation, an “Executive Summary” of the findings

gives the figure of 17. The battalion’s narrative summary claims that

a total of 15 Marines were wounded, including Marines attached to

Company C from the AAV Company and LAAD section. Perhaps

the most authoritative figure comes from Company C’s own

command chronology, which lists 14 Marines by name and the

platoon or attachment to which each belonged.

Company C Casualties on 23 March at Nasiriyah

Alengthy investigation by U.S. Central Command was unable to determine conclusively how much of the damage

and loss of life was the result of Air Force A-10 Ure and how much resulted from enemy rockets. (A few Marines

attacked south of the canal thought they were hit by mortars, not rockets.) For instance, in the most catastrophic event,

vehicle C208 was destroyed by a terriUc explosion, killing all nine Marines riding in the back. Some of these Marines

had already been wounded north of the canal. Re others were riding on the track aWer volunteering to load wounded

comrades on it while under Ure themselves. Based on an analysis of the wreckage and the human remains, the

investigators could only conclude that C208 had been struck both by enemy rockets and American aircraW.

Re Investigating Board concluded that of the 18 Marines from Company C killed on 23 March, 8 were deUnitely

killed by enemy Ure. It further stated that of the remaining 10, forensic evidence and the mixture of intense Ure received

made it impossible to tell how many were killed by enemy Ure and how many by friendly Ure. Ris document stated that

17 Marines were wounded. Of those, 15 received wounds from a combination of friendly and enemy Ure, and two from

sources “which the Board cannot determine.”* Ris addendum in itself was a revision of an earlier set of conclusions,

which had originally attributed more of the casualties to friendly Ure.

Marines who were present on the ground would likely disagree with these Undings. Reir subsequent testimony

and interviews indicate that several Marines were deUnitely wounded or killed at the precise instant that an A-10 straUng

run or AGM-65 Maverick strike occurred on their position. At least eight Marines testiUed that they saw this occur.75

As for the seven destroyed or abandoned tracks, the investigation was only able to determine that two of the vehicles

were positively destroyed by friendly Ure.76

* “U.S. Central Command Investigation of Suspected Friendly Fire Incident Near Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 03,” Memorandum for

USCENTCOM/CS, “Addendum to Friendly Fire Investigation Board,” p. A-4. This addendum was in itself a revision of an earlier set of

conclusions of the Board, which had originally attributed more of the casualties to friendly fire. This addendum contradicts statements in

Tab A-H, Final Report, p. 11, such as “The first pass of the A-10 killed the Marine with which the 1stSgt had been conversing just minutes

before, and after the A-10’s second pass, all 3 Marines at the mortar position lay dead on the ground.”
Once the survivors of the convoy arrived at Company

A’s position, the wounded were evacuated to the battalion

rear. Re unwounded survivors would eventually return

to their company’s position with Company A once

Captain Brooks led the entire group north to the Saddam

Canal bridge. Additionally, nearly a dozen other Marines

who escaped the destroyed tracks had taken shelter in a

building on the west side of Ambush Alley. Rey held out

for hours until Major Peeples, and then Gunnery

Sergeant Jason K. Doran and Lieutenant Letendre, led

two forays into the city to retrieve them.77

North of the bridge, Captain Wittnam was leW with two

lieutenants and roughly half of his company. First

Lieutenant Seely eventually found a radio with a 10-foot

whip antenna and managed to reach the battalion Ure

support coordinator on the battalion tactical net and

inform him that Company C was being attacked by

friendly aircraW. Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski and his

Ure support coordinator could not reach Captain Santare

but apparently managed to reach the headquarters of

RCT-2. Santare received word somehow and passed the

“abort” signal to the A-10 pilots. Within a few minutes of

Seely’s report, the attacks ceased.78

20 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Re1ections on the A-10 Friendly Fire Incident

Everyone involved in the A-10 friendly Ure incident and the investigation that followed attempted to make sense of what

happened. Many tried to draw some “lessons learned.” Marines on the ground initially were angry with the pilots for failing

to recognize the distinctive outline of a U.S. Marine Corps AAV-7 assault amphibian vehicle. At one point, one of the pilots

recognized white pickup trucks and “cab over” Vatbed trucks, but he later failed to recognize other targets as Marine Corps AAV7s. For others, the incident reinforced their distrust of any pilots who were not from the Marine Corps or Navy.

Although these sentiments were understandable, they may or may not be valid. Re A-10s were receiving heavy antiaircraW Ure

and had to attack from a high altitude, making target recognition diTcult during most of their time Vying above the target area. Rus,

they had to rely primarily on the forward air controller, who cleared them to attack any target north of the Saddam Canal and then

cleared them to attack what was thought to be an enemy armored column south of the canal moving south. Another event that

exacerbated the severity of the incident but did not cause it was the pilots’ failure to recognize several Vares launched by Company

C’s Marines to signal the command to “cease Ure.” Rose Vares, however, easily could have been mistaken for tracers.79

Rere were many other contributing factors, including the need to depart from the battalion’s original attack plan in the city

and the urban terrain that precluded visibility of friendly units and impaired communications with them. Because of poor

communications, when the forward air controller made several attempts to verify that his unit was the lead trace of friendly

units, he had to rely on another oTcer located near him who had no more information than he did. It also would have been

helpful if every company had had its own forward air controller; Company C did not. Additionally, instructions from higher

headquarters precluded the use of American Vags and orange air panels on vehicles.80

Finally, there was no preplanned air support for the attack into Nasiriyah. Re city itself was a restricted Ure area prior to

the attack, and no one wanted to risk harming civilians if the Iraqis were expected to retreat or capitulate quickly anyway. Task

Force Tarawa was not the I MEF’s focus of eSort and did not have priority of Ures. However, there were numerous targets north

of the canal that could have been attacked earlier; instead, forward air controllers with 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, had to improvise

and scramble throughout the day to provide air support.

Re Central Command Friendly Fire Incident Investigation logically concluded that the cause of the incident was the forward

air controller’s violation of a standing order not to use Type III close air support without approval from higher headquarters. If he

had contacted the battalion commander, he would have known that friendly forces were north of the Saddam Canal. Even if he failed

to make contact with the battalion commander but still adhered to the standing order, the incident would not have occurred.81

Few believed that the incident reVected poorly on the character or professionalism of Captain Dennis A. Santare. Re Friendly

Fire Investigation Board at U.S. Central Command observed that Santare “performed admirably and with bravery” for days aWer

the incident until recalled for oTcial questioning. Moreover, based on Santare’s “awareness of the battle space, he was acting in

what he perceived to be in the best interest of saving lives of his fellow Marines.” Still, it was “indisputable,” the board concluded,

that Santare’s violation of a standing order was the direct cause of the tragic friendly Ure incident.82

One lesson from the incident is that ground forces must remain extremely cautious about using Type III close air support.

SpeciUcally, in a situation in which there are signiUcant communications problems, they should not employ Type III close air

support at all, regardless of commander’s intent or perceived intent. Re incident is also a reminder of the importance of target

identiUcation. Ris point, too, is related to the danger of using Type III close air support since part of the deUnition of Type III

close air support gives “blanket” weapons release clearance to aircraW without positive target identiUcation.
23 March—Securing the Eastern Bridges

Back at the southeastern bridge, Captain Brooks of

Company A, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, was wondering

when he would be released to go help Company C at the

Saddam Canal bridge. Brooks was growing frustrated,

knowing that he was needed at the Saddam Canal bridge

and believing, based on prior conversations and informal

planning back at Camp Shoup, that a physical relief in

place was supposed to occur. According to prior planning

and discussions, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, was supposed

to conduct a relief in place with Company A, 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, at the southeastern bridge.

Although 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, did reach the

southeastern bridge on the aWernoon of the 23d, an actual

relief in place never occurred.

What happened instead is that Company C’s executive

oTcer, First Lieutenant Eric Meador, Unally reached

Company A’s position aWer surviving the run down

Ambush Alley and A-10 strikes and told Captain Brooks

that Company A was needed north of the canal. Brooks

knew that he was supposed to hold the southern bridge

until relieved, but Major Peeples dashed up Ambush

Alley with two of the four tanks to help Company C.83

Apparently, elements of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,

namely Company F, had actually reached the southern

end of the bridge before Captain Brooks leW the northern

end to go to the Saddam Canal bridge. Re oTcial

“Chronicle of Actions of Task Force Tarawa” records that

2d Battalion, 8th Marines, “relieved” 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, at the southern bridge at 1403.84 However,

Brooks, on the northern end of the bridge, was not aware

of Company F’s presence on the southern end. As late as

1530, Brooks was trying to contact his superiors and

wondering where his relief was. Around 1530, he was able

to establish contact with the battalion assistant operations

oTcer, Captain Joel D. Hernley, and asked impatiently

when he was going to be relieved so that he could move

north to support Company C. Hernley responded that he

had just communicated with 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,

and that they were at the bridge. Brooks looked at the

bridge span and saw that it was empty. He asked Hernley

to Und out if and when 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, was

actually coming. Without a clear answer, Brooks decided

that it was time to leave the Euphrates bridge and make a

dash up Ambush Alley to assist Company C on the north

side of the canal. Informing Hernley of his decision, he

ordered all of his Marines, the 81mm mortars that had

arrived to support him, the squad from the Combined

Anti-Armor Team platoon, and the two remaining tanks

to mount up. According to Brooks, his orders to the

Marines with him were to “suppress any enemy that you

see, make best possible speed, and don’t stop until you

push to Charlie Company’s position.” He recalled that “I

looked at my GPS (Global Positioning System)

aWerwards, and it recorded that we were going about 43

miles an hour in the AAVs, which is pretty darn fast. . . .

We took Ure the whole way through, but we made it

through without losing a . . . single man.”85 Sometime

around 1600, Brooks crossed the Saddam Canal bridge

and into Company C’s position.86

23 March - 2 April 2003 21

0e Relief at the Euphrates Bridge

The operations oTcer of RCT-2, Major Andrew R.Kennedy, said that he was unaware at the time that a

physical link-up between 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, and

2d Battalion, 8th Marines, had not taken place at the

southeastern bridge. He believed that events transpired

the way they did “because we were branching from the

Frag[mentary] O[rder] at that point and so it wasn’t

immediately clear that it would be executed precisely the

way it had been planned.”87 Originally, once 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, relieved 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, at the

southeastern bridge, the sector for 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, was to become Ambush Alley. Because of the

unexpected heavy resistance in the city, however, it did

not make sense to have a dismounted force (2d Battalion,

8th Marines) trying to occupy Ambush Alley physically

when it could protect the route just as well with artillery

and direct Ures from its position south of the bridge. In

fact, Lieutenant Colonel Royal P. Mortenson of 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, believed that by dominating the

northern bank of the Euphrates by Ure from the southern

side, he had eSectively relieved Company A and freed it to

take its combat power to the north.88 Additionally, the

expanse of the southern bridge itself, especially the apex,

was the most dangerous part of the sector of 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, and it made sense not to put Marines on it.

Rus, the course of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, was

probably the correct one, but Captain Brooks of Company

A was not aware of it and spent some time wondering

when his relief would arrive. Brooks also made the right

call in going north to help Company C.*

* Company F’s command chronology (section 2, p. II-2) states

that some of its Marines crossed over the southern bridge; seeing

no one from 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, they returned to the

southern side. This must have occurred some time after

Company F reached the southern side and after Captain Brooks

departed the northern side. It is difficult to explain how the

Marines of Company F could have crossed the bridge and not

have noticed A Company’s AAVs and the tanks with them.
Once Company A crossed the Saddam Canal bridge,

Iraqi resistance north of the canal “just evaporated,” in

Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski’s words.89 It became clear

later that the arrival of Company A north of the canal

(Company B would also arrive shortly) convinced Iraqi

forces there that the Marines were not going to quit or

withdraw. Re Ught for the Saddam Canal bridge was over

for the day.90

While 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, had been slugging it

out in Nasiriyah and north of the Euphrates, 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, the next battalion in the regiment’s column,

had been advancing toward the southeastern bridge,

clearing resistance that had been bypassed by 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, as it drove north. Earlier,

Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski had been able to reach the

RCT-2 commander, Colonel Ronald Bailey, and request

that 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, immediately relieve his

own Company A at the southeastern bridge. Grabowski

explained that he was taking casualties at the Saddam

Canal bridge and needed to reinforce Company C there.

Bailey passed the word to Lieutenant Colonel Royal

Mortenson, commander of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines.

However, it took a few hours for Mortenson’s Marines to

get there since they were taking Ure and trying to clear

buildings and pockets of resistance.91

Mounted in seven-ton trucks, elements of 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, proceeded to dismount points south of the

southeastern bridge—“as close as possible,” Mortenson

recalled, “because there was a certain sense of urgency” to

relieve Company A so that they could move north.92

Company F reached the southern bridge sometime

around 1400.93 Shortly aWerward, Company G arrived on

its right Vank, and Company E would soon come up on

its leW. Meanwhile, the battalion had been reinforced by

a company of LAV-25s (light armored vehicles) from

Lieutenant Colonel Eddie S. Ray’s 2d LAR Battalion. Re

2d Battalion, 8th Marines, was receiving moderate,

inaccurate small-arms, sniper, and mortar Ure at this

point. Its Marines began to dominate the northern side

of the bridge with its own Ure, and some of them were

temporarily placed on the apex of the bridge, but, as

explained above, did not link up with Company A on the

north side of the bridge.94

Re artillerymen of 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, had

had a busy day as well. Initially they were to be emplaced

and ready to Ure by 0700, and they had two batteries

Uring by about that time. Re battalion “leapfrogged” its

batteries forward during the day to continue to provide

support for 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, and 2d Battalion,

8th Marines. At one point, Battery B received mortar Ure

22 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Photo by LCpl Bryan J. Nealy

An aerial view of the southeastern bridge over the Euphrates River in Nasiriyah, looking from northeast to southwest. Note the relatively thick

vegetation along a portion of the southern side of the river. The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and elements of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, operated in

this sector of the city.
and conducted an emergency displacement. Re battalion

found one technique in particular that enhanced the

timeliness and eSectiveness of its Ures. Rroughout the

day, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Glenn

Starnes, monitored the tactical nets of 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, and RCT-2 in an attempt to enhance his own

situational awareness. Ris helped the battalion anticipate

the approximate locations of targets and the kinds of

missions that the infantry would need even before they

called for them. By the end of 23 March, 1st Battalion,

10th Marines, along with the addition of Battery I, 3d

Battalion, 10th Marines, on loan from 1st Battalion, 11th

Marines, had Ured numerous immediate suppression

missions with rocket-assisted projectiles, Ure for eSect

missions with M483A1 DPICM projectiles, and

numerous counterbattery missions. Re battalion’s Ures

destroyed at least Uve Iraqi tanks and one artillery battery

and silenced numerous enemy artillery and mortar

positions with its counterbattery Ures. Brigadier General

Richard Natonski noted in his personal journal that night

that the artillery had provided “superb counterbattery

support.”95 By the end of the day, however, the battalion

found itself running low on conventional M107 highexplosive projectiles, a problem that would plague the

artillery throughout the battle of Nasiriyah. Re shortage

of high-explosive ammunition was largely due to the

reluctance to use the more deadly DPICM projectiles in

an urban environment, which would have caused more

civilian casualties.96

Re Ught for Nasiriyah on 23 March had turned out

to be far tougher than anyone in Task Force Tarawa, or

indeed the Marine Expeditionary Force, had expected.

Inadequate intelligence had deUnitely played a role in

the early part of the Ught. Nearly everyone had expected

resistance to be light. According to intelligence provided

to Brigadier General Natonski from I MEF, the Army

had “defeated” the 11th Infantry Division in the vicinity

of Nasiriyah, and intelligence sources had predicted that

Iraqi forces remaining in the city would quickly

surrender or withdraw. Re on-order mission to secure

the eastern bridges was therefore envisioned to occur

against little or no resistance.97 However, the 11th

Infantry Division was far from defeated, and other units,

including elements of the 51st Mechanized Infantry

Division, Fedayeen, and Ba’ath militia, were also present

and ready to Ught.98 It later turned out that, far from

being ready to withdraw, the Iraqis had selected

Nasiriyah as one of the places where they would make a

determined Ught. As Natonski noted several months

later, “I don’t think we read the Iraqis right.”99

It later became apparent that the engagement with the

507th Maintenance Company in the early morning hours

had emboldened the Iraqis and made them think they

could defeat the Americans. Ris information came out in

a tactical discussion between Lieutenant Colonel

Grabowski and the captured executive oTcer of the 23d

Brigade. Re Iraqi oTcer conUded to Grabowski that, as

a result of the encounter with the 507th, the Fedayeen

were encouraged to resist harder, and even some tribal

elders decided they “might as well be on the winning

team.”100 Re regular Iraqi Army soldiers also fought with

greater conUdence. Later, when a second Marine riVe

company reinforced with tanks crossed the Saddam

Canal bridge, the Iraqi related, the 23d Brigade was

convinced that it could not stop the Marines in that sector

of the battleUeld.101

Other factors had contributed to friction and the fog of

war and ultimately resulted in Marine casualties.

Unexpectedly impassable terrain on the eastern outskirts

of the city; poor communications due to high-tension

power lines and excessive radio traTc on tactical nets; and

nearly unavoidable diTculties in refueling the tanks had all

created great diTculty for the task force. By the end of the

day, Brigadier General Natonski was unsure how many

casualties he had suSered. Due to double-reporting, he was

told that there may have been as many as 50 dead

Marines.102 Actually, 18 Marines had been killed.

What he did know was that his Marines had been in “a

tough Ught.”103 He also knew that the close air support,

artillery support, and unexpected help from 2d LAR

Battalion had literally been lifesavers. Re presence of the

tanks had also been critical. His battalion commanders

were pleased with the performance of their company

commanders and lieutenants, as well as with their troops.

Small unit leaders from the company to the Ure team level

had made diTcult decisions under extreme pressure and

had held their units together. Rere had been plenty of

heroism, including Marines risking or even giving their

lives to rescue their wounded comrades, with others

exposing themselves to Ure in order to locate targets and

lead their subordinates, and two forays into Ambush

Alley to recover Company C Marines stranded in the city

aWer the A-10 strikes south of the canal. “We had the two

bridges in our possession,” Natonski recalled. “We had

accomplished our mission and in the process rescued [a

number of] soldiers.”*104

23 March - 2 April 2003 23

* Natonski believed at one point that Task Force Tarawa had rescued

16 soldiers. However, it was later confirmed that the Marines had

rescued 10, as Natonski’s own subsequent comments indicate.
Rere were also some lessons learned. Re most painful

of them involved close air support. ESorts to provide

much-needed close air support to the Marines of

Company C north of the Saddam Canal had resulted in

the deaths of several Marines due to poor

communications, inadequate situational awareness, and

the lack of direct observation of targets. Re Marines also

learned what kind of Ughting to expect from their enemy.

It appeared that the most signiUcant source of enemy

resistance might not be the uniformed Iraqi Army

Ughting with conventional tactics, but soldiers who

changed into civilian clothes and paramilitaries who took

advantage of American rules of engagement, American

respect for the Geneva Convention, and American

reluctance to harm civilians. Rey pushed women and

children into the street to confuse the Marines, or even

used them as shields. OWen Iraqi Ughters waved white

Vags and then Ured on the Marines a moment later. Rese

tactics created diTculty for the Marines, but aWer that

Urst day, they now knew what to expect. Rey would still

attempt to follow the rules of engagement, but they would

no longer be taken by surprise.106

24 March—Expanding the Perimeter

During the night of 23-24 March, planning was

directed toward three main goals: resupply 1st Battalion,

2d Marines, north of the Saddam Canal; use 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, to expand the bridgehead at the

southeastern bridge, with the aim to eventually secure the

eastern northbound approach to the river; and develop

Ure plans for indirect Ures to suppress remaining

resistance along Ambush Alley. As Major Andrew R.

Kennedy said, planners and commanders considered this

approach preferable to going “house to house, kicking

down doors and throwing hand grenades.”107 It did not

seem to make sense to send either Lieutenant Colonel

Mortenson’s or Lieutenant Colonel Brent Dunahoe’s

Marines dismounted into the heart of the city to engage

in a house-to-house Ught.

24 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Army-Marine Relations

While the ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company and capture of the American soldiers attracted international

attention, a less-noticed result of the aSair was the appreciation by Army personnel for the Marines who unhesitatingly

advanced to rescue the stranded soldiers of the 507th. AWer the Army concluded an oTcial investigation of the aSair, the

U.S. Army Chief of StaS, General Eric K. Shinseki, wrote a personal thank-you to the Commandant of the Marine Corps,

General Michael W. Hagee:

United States Army

Chief of StaS

June 10, 2003

General Michael W. Hagee

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

2 Navy Annex

Washington, DC 20380-1775

Dear Mike,

I just received a brieUng from my staS concerning the 23 March attack on elements of the 507th Maintenance Company

and 3d Forward Support Battalion (FSB), by Iraqi forces at An Nasiriyah. Prominent among the Undings was the immediate

and unhesitating response of the Marines of Task Force Tarawa to the 507th’s call for assistance.

As you may know, thirty-three Soldiers from the 507th and 3d FSB found themselves unwittingly in An Nasiriyah and

under attack. Our Soldiers fought through a series of ambushes as they attempted to get out of the city. Re Commander of

the 507th and Uve soldiers met forward elements of Task Force Tarawa just south of the city. Re Marines responded

immediately, without hesitation, and in fact rescued ten Soldiers.

Please extend my deepest appreciation to the Marines who answered that call for help from Soldiers in diTculty—it was

noble in the immediacy of response. I know that Marines died in battle that day in An Nasiriyah, joining those Soldiers who

had shed blood there just hours before. May God bless each one of them and their families.

With warmest regards, and sincere gratitude,

Eric K. Shinseki

General, United States Army105
In the early morning hours north of the Saddam Canal,

Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski placed Major Peeples’s

tank company along the canal facing south toward the

city. Grabowski’s 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, fought oS an

enemy counterattack with close air support and artillery.

Re riVe companies, along with the previously attached

elements of 2d LAR Battalion and four tanks, moved

north to the “T” intersection north of the eastern Saddam

Canal bridge in order to further secure the route north.

Re battalion consolidated around the intersection and

captured the Iraqi 23d Brigade headquarters. Ren,

around 1200, Company A attacked west to capture the

“western T” intersection just north of the northwestern

bridge over the Saddam Canal. AWer a brief UreUght, the

company secured the intersection and later established

control over the northwestern bridge itself. Re elements

of the LAR Battalion and four tanks supported Company

A in its attack.

Re Marines at the western “T” had to react quickly

against Iraqi vehicles—oWen distinctive orange-andwhite taxi cabs—that were used to transport Iraqi Ughters

or to probe the Marines’ positions. Despite warning

markers that were set up, some of these vehicles recklessly

rushed the Marines’ positions and were destroyed. Many

of the Iraqis killed were wearing civilian clothes. Most of

them were found with weapons or identiUcation cards

that showed them to be combatants, but occasionally

women and children were found who had been traveling

with the men. Captain Brooks had his Marines erect

barriers so that they could more oWen stop the vehicles

23 March - 2 April 2003 25

NIMA CADRG 1:15K TLM/1994
without shooting, though some of the Marines were upset

by thoughts of the civilians they had unavoidably killed.

Meanwhile, Marines throughout the battalion received

sporadic to moderate small-arms, mortar, and artillery

Ure during most of the day from all directions. Re Ure

came from a mixture of Fedayeen militia and uniformed

Iraqi soldiers, mortars, and artillery. One measure of the

intensity of the Ughting for 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, was

the number of times they requested organic indirect Ure

support. A squad leader in the battalion’s 81mm mortar

platoon recorded that his squad alone Ured 412 rounds

during the day in response to calls for Ure from the riVe

companies, tanks, and LAV-25s.108

Probably the company that had the most diTcult time

over these next few days was Company C. Re company

was shorthanded due to the loss of 7 tracks, 18 dead, and

14 wounded on 23 March. In addition to the

psychological impact of these losses, many Marines had

had their personal gear lost or destroyed due to the

destruction of the tracks. Some were worried about facing

a possible chemical attack when they no longer had

protective masks. Still, the company held together and

continued to perform well, and Marines shared their gear

and equipment with their comrades.109

Not only was 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, able to expand

and consolidate American presence north of the canal,

the battalion also received vital logistical support. Boeing

CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters brought supplies and

evacuated friendly, civilian, and enemy casualties. Re

battalion’s Marines processed 148 detainees and enemy

prisoners. Most importantly, a convoy of soW-skinned

vehicles, escorted by 2d LAR, brought vital supplies. To

protect the convoy, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, Ured a

series, “Code Red,” along the length of Ambush Alley,

keeping artillery rounds impacting several hundred

meters in front of the convoy. Re idea was to have enemy

Ughters ducking for cover and recovering from the

concussion just as the convoy sped by. Re convoy arrived

around 1500 without incident or casualties. By 1700, all of

2d LAR Battalion passed forward of Company A, the lead

company of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, becoming the Urst

Coalition battalion to traverse through the length of

Nasiriyah and past the western “T” north of the city. By

the end of the day, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, had suSered

one man wounded.110

South of the Euphrates, the mission on 24 March was to

expand the southern bridgehead and prepare for the

forward passage of lines by RCT-1 of the 1st Marine

Division. On the 24th, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,

performed the bulk of the work in this regard. During the

night, the Marines had shot at and killed numerous Iraqis

approaching their position on foot or in vehicles. Some

had attempted to come across a footbridge that ran

parallel to and east of the main bridge over the Euphrates.

OWen the light armored vehicles attached to the battalion

delivered deadly Ure across the river. Iraqi soldiers and

militiamen continually moved about on foot and in

vehicles, apparently thinking they were concealed by

darkness. However, the thermal sights on the light

armored vehicles made the Iraqis as visible as if it were

broad daylight. Again and again, accurate and deadly Ure

erupted from the darkness south of the river and poured

into the Iraqis on the other side from hundreds of meters

away.111 Re same was true of snipers attached to

Companies E and F, who eliminated numerous targets

during the night. One sniper killed two Iraqi combatants

with a single .50-caliber round. Re men were attempting

to use a woman and a child as a shield as they walked

along the north bank of the Euphrates and tried to point

out American positions. Re sniper bided his time until

he got just the right shot and killed both men without

injuring the woman or the child. During the battle of

Nasiriyah, the Scout-Sniper Platoon of 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, had at least 34 kills.112

During the morning hours, Iraqi probes of the Marine

positions continued. Company F took 15 to 20 Iraqi

soldiers into custody at the southeastern bridge. Re

Iraqis had approached from the north, and a few were

wounded. Also that morning, an Iraqi man approached

Company G from the southeast. Several hundred meters

away in that direction, there was a group of buildings that

made up a hospital complex called the Tykar Hospital.

Re Iraqi man told the Marines of Company G, and then

Captain Timothy R. Dremann of Company F, that he was

a doctor. He claimed that the buildings, on which

26 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

Marines guard Iraqi prisoners of war in Nasiriyah on 26 March 2003.
Marines had seen sandbag emplacements on the roof,

were indeed part of a hospital complex. He said the

hospital was only being used to treat sick and wounded

people and implored the Marines not to Ure on it.

Additionally, he stated that he supported the U.S. cause.

Finally he informed the Marines that there were four

wounded Americans in the hospital, whom the Marines

suspected might be survivors from the Army’s 507th

Maintenance Company. Company G sent a squad-sized

patrol toward the hospital. Re closer the patrol got to the

complex, the more it looked like a military facility rather

than a medical one. Re squad withdrew, with Company

G commander Captain Brian A. Ross announcing that

more than a squad would be needed to sweep and clear

the complex. In fact, it turned out that the Iraqi “doctor”

was an Iraqi army oTcer, and the hospital was

functioning as an enemy operations base, storage facility,

and Ughting position.113

Around 1700, Companies F and G began moving east

and southeast, respectively, to expand the battalion

perimeter. Company G, on the right, had been reinforced

by two elements of the combined anti-armor platoon and

a human exploitation team and had been ordered to

conduct a cordon-and-search operation on the hospital

complex. Before the Marines reached the complex,

however, they began taking Ure from some buildings on

its southern Vank. Re Ure was heavy and was the most

signiUcant resistance the battalion had faced up to that

point. Company F was also receiving indirect Ure and

direct Ure from the hospital to the southeast, and from

north of the river.

Re Marines responded aggressively with mortars,

artillery, and organic weapons of every caliber. AWer 15

minutes of overwhelming Ure, Company G sent its 3d

Platoon to sweep the buildings from which the company

had received Ure. Re platoon found one enemy body, one

captured riVe, and several blood trails. Company F,

meanwhile, sent its 2d Platoon into part of the hospital

complex. As dark was approaching, however, Lieutenant

Colonel Mortenson decided that his hold on the hospital

was too tenuous to occupy overnight. Rere was not

enough time to complete the cordon and search and to

consolidate possession of the complex. He withdrew his

Marines from the buildings, kept them under observation

with scout-snipers, and sealed them oS with indirect Ure.

Around nightfall, some 80 individuals emerged from the

complex and surrendered to the Marines aWer having

been told to do so by a U.S. Army psychological

23 March - 2 April 2003 27

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

Marines of Task Force Tarawa guard Iraqi prisoners of war in Nasiriyah on 26 March 2003. Many Iraqi men who fought the Marines in

Nasiriyah did so in civilian clothes, including members of the regular Iraqi army.
operations team and interpreter.114 Among them were an

Iraqi general and a major wearing civilian clothes. In all,

the Marines of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, had suSered

four wounded from indirect Ure, all of them belonging to

Company F.115

Re Marines of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, had made

progress in consolidating their hold south of the

southeastern bridge and had seriously damaged enemy

forces. On the other hand, it had become clear to

Colonel Ronald Bailey and Brigadier General Richard

Natonski that Task Force Tarawa needed more combat

power around the eastern bridges. For the time being,

that help had to come from its own 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, led by Lieutenant Colonel Dunahoe. Late on

the night of the 23d, Dunahoe received the order to

reinforce 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, from the south, on

the eastern side of Nasiriyah. At Urst, the RCT had given

thought to sending 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, north of

the city to reinforce 1st Battalion, 2d Marines. Ris

aggressive plan would have strengthened the battalion

that had suSered the most that day. However, it also

would have placed two battalions at the outer limit of

the task force’s ability to provide Ure support and

logistical help.

Lieutenant Colonel Dunahoe and his operations oTcer,

Major Daniel CanUeld, had already begun planning for

this operation, but the more they thought about it, the

more they felt it was unwise. Dunahoe visited Colonel

Bailey while CanUeld spoke with the RCT operations

oTcer, Major Kennedy. Many oTcers felt it more prudent

to establish a strong base in the south, ensuring that the

regimental combat team’s line of supply would not be cut

oS. It also seemed risky to send a truck-mounted

battalion into the heart of the city only a day aWer a

mechanized battalion supported by tanks had had a

diTcult time advancing through it. Moreover, 3d

Battalion would be conducting a forward passage of lines

with 2d Battalion and a linkup with 1st Battalion at night,

increasing the likelihood of fratricide. CanUeld thought

that 3d Battalion would be much more useful in the

southern part of the city, most of which had not been

secured. Re 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, seemed conUdent

of its ability to hold and expand its positions north of the

canal as long as it received supplies. By the time Dunahoe

reached Bailey’s headquarters, Bailey had already begun

reconsidering the plan. Shortly aWer CanUeld’s meeting

with Kennedy, CanUeld received word that 3d Battalion

would not execute the plan aWer all.116

Instead, Lieutenant Colonel Dunahoe’s 3d Battalion,

2d Marines, received new orders to occupy assault

positions 9 to 15 kilometers south of the city. Ris

movement began at 0500, and by Urst light, the

companies occupied their assault positions. Reir next

tasks were to relieve Company E, 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, south of the southeastern bridge, occupy the

western side of the road, and clear westward. Over the

course of the day, members of the battalion staS made a

reconnaissance and spent time coordinating with the

key staS of RCT-2. Meanwhile, the rest of the 3d

Battalion, 2d Marines, refueled and conducted precombat checks. Re battalion did not receive the

“execute” order until around 0100 on the 25th and began

its attack later that day.117

Much had been accomplished on 24 March. By the

end of the day, Lieutenant Colonel Ray’s 2d LAR

Battalion had made it through Ambush Alley and past

Company A’s position on Highway 7, becoming the Urst

battalion-sized elements of 1st Marine Division to pass

through Nasiriyah. Later, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,

Ured a mission with long-range rocket-assisted

projectiles in support of 2d LAR as it fought northwest

of Company A. Late that night, or in the early morning

hours of the 25th, the Urst infantry battalion of RCT-1

pushed through the city. Not a single Marine was

wounded or killed between the two eastern bridges aWer

the 23d. Task Force Tarawa was solidifying its grip on

the main supply route running through Nasiriyah, and

on the outskirts of the city itself. Re forward passage of

lines had occurred, and the Urst part of Task Force

Tarawa’s mission had been accomplished.118

28 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

Marines prepare to assault a walled compound in Nasiriyah. Marines

of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, and 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, secured

scores of such structures in the southern sector of the city.
25-26 March—Tightening the Grip

Earlier on 24 March, Task Force Tarawa had received

instructions from higher headquarters that would guide

its activities over the following days. Fragmentary Order

023-03 from Lieutenant General James Conway directed

the task force to consolidate in the vicinity of Nasiriyah

and “protect highways 1 and 7 routes in zone in order to

support throughput of follow-on personnel and

equipment.” Conway and his staS agreed with the

thinking of Brigadier General Natonski and planners

within the regimental combat team that the task force

should not engage in house-to-house urban Ughting,

advising that “activity in the built-up area of [Nasiriyah]

should be limited to only that area required to ensure the

security of soW-skinned vehicle convoys moving along

Highways 1 and 7.”119 Rese orders shaped the work of

Task Force Tarawa on the 25th.

By 1500 on 25 March, the companies of 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, began to occupy their positions astride Highway

7 oriented west and south. Company K established contact

with Company E, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, and anchored

its right Vank along the southern bank of the Euphrates.

Company L was on Company K’s leW, oriented west, and

Company I held the southernmost Vank, anchored along

Route 8. Rus, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, made up one half

of a semicircle oriented south from the southern side of

the southeastern bridge. Re riVe companies of 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, formed the eastern side of the

semicircle. Re terrain on the western side of the

semicircle, in the sector of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, was

decidedly diSerent from anything its Marines had yet seen

in Iraq. Rey found themselves in the midst of palm trees

and thick vegetation, and the ground was muddy from a

driving rain that had begun that aWernoon. It felt more

like being in a jungle than a desert.120

While the riVe companies of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,

were establishing their positions west and south of the

southeastern bridge, a bizarre incident occurred in the

battalion rear, about 10 kilometers to the south. Five

buses arrived in the position of the advance logistics

operations center and main command post. Rey were

loaded with military-aged Iraqi males who claimed to

have been with the 51st Mechanized Division that had

23 March - 2 April 2003 29

Map illustration by Vincent J. Martinez
surrendered in Basra and were now on their way home.

Rey were unarmed, but all had large sums of Iraqi

money. Personnel from the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,

detained more than 120 of these men and processed them

as prisoners to ensure that they did not reenter the city

and become part of the enemy resistance. Intelligence

later determined that these men were intended to fall in

on the many caches of weapons and ammunition that the

Marines were Unding throughout the city.121

About the time that the riVe companies of 3d Battalion,

2d Marines, were establishing their positions south of the

city, a terriUc sandstorm blew into the Nasiriyah area.

While 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, battled these conditions

west of the highway leading into the eastern side of the

city, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, did the same on the

eastern side as it worked to expand its control eastward.

Re unit historian for Company G called 25 March “the

day of the sandstorms.”122 Marines at the Task Force

Tarawa and RCT-2 command posts struggled to keep

their tents from collapsing and blowing away. Sand caked

eyes, ears, and weaponry. At times, visibility was less than

Uve meters. Within a few hours, the sandstorm was

reinforced by a torrential downpour that continued until

aWer midnight. Soaked to the bone, the artillerymen of

1st Battalion, 10th Marines, continued to man their

howitzers while the infantrymen carried out their tasks

and occupied Ughting holes that Ulled with water. Re

Company E unit historian wrote that “many of the

Marines slept in puddles of water and mud that night.”123

While the elements attacked the Marines, the men of

2d Battalion, 8th Marines, attacked the enemy to expand

the battalion’s control of the southern party of the city.

Company E, before the arrival 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,

had cleared several buildings to its west, including a

military compound. Company F moved east, clearing

nine houses to its front. In one of them, the Marines

found U.S. Army uniforms from the missing soldiers of

the 507th. Acting on the intelligence that there may be

American captives still in the hospital, Lieutenant

Colonel Royal Mortenson ordered Company F to attack

it. Supported by mortars from Company G’s mortar

section, Company F seized the compound. Five Marines

were wounded in the assault. Inside the complex,

Company F found a tank, hundreds of assault weapons,

thousands of rounds of ammunition, hundreds of

chemical protective suits, and two American military Vak

jackets adjusted to Ut women, one bearing the name

“Lynch.” Two female soldiers, Private First Class Lori A.

Piestewa and Private First Class Jessica D. Lynch, had

been held at the compound. Piestewa died there, and

Lynch, unknown to the Marines, had been moved by the

Iraqis earlier in the battle to the Saddam Hospital in the

western part of the city north of the Euphrates.124

AWer Company F secured the hospital, Mortenson

ordered it to return to the bridge. It sealed oS the

compound during the night with indirect Ures and

observation by the battalion’s Scout Sniper Team 2. Re

objective was not so much to occupy the hospital

physically as it was to deny its use to the Iraqis in their

attempt to disrupt traTc along the highway and

southeastern bridge. During the night, the scout-snipers

observed an enemy patrol approaching the hospital and

called artillery Ures down on them.125

As 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, expanded their perimeter

eastward, the Marines of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,

transitioned as quickly as possible from occupying their

assault positions to expanding westward. Reir

battlespace was bounded on the north by the Euphrates

River, on the south by Highway 8, and stretched westward

all the way to Highway 1. Ris area made up the southern

and western section of the city, encompassing industrial

30 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

Marines battled dust storms, torrential rain, and thick mud in Nasiriyah. This

Marine carries an M16A2 service rifle and wears recently issued knee pads.
districts, medium-density residential neighborhoods, and

some plots of farmland. Again, the asymmetrical nature

of the enemy threat proved a challenge. Re area was full

of civilians, and mingling among them were deserters

from the 11th Infantry Division, elements of the Ba’ath

Party militia, and Fedayeen militia. Much of the incoming

Ure received was coming from the west and from north of

the river; this could be dealt with by the battalion’s

organic assets and artillery from 1st Battalion, 10th

Marines. However, some of the Ure came from small

pockets of resistance that were within the sectors of

adjacent units, making it diTcult to counter them with

direct Ure or to coordinate indirect Ure.

Lieutenant Colonel Brent Dunahoe and the Marines of

his battalion developed several techniques over the next

few days to deal with these challenges. Rey patrolled

aggressively, entering residences to deny havens to enemy

Ughters. Rey used counterbattery radar and artillery to

neutralize enemy mortars. Re battalion’s oTcers, with

the help of skilled Marine pilots, also found innovative

ways to use air support. Dunahoe and his battalion also

maximized the use of scout-sniper teams to gather

information and attrit enemy forces, as well as human

exploitation teams to gather information on enemy

positions that could be used in the next day’s operations.

During the early evening hours of the 25th, Companies K

and L advanced 200 to 300 meters in the midst of

sandstorms, heavy rain, and enemy Ure to a small canal

that ran from north to south. Meanwhile, the battalion

staS began planning for the next day’s operations, using

information that the human exploitation teams had

already gathered by interrogating civilians and enemy

prisoners. Rese eSorts produced invaluable information

on enemy positions and Ba’ath Party headquarters.126

For 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, the main event of the

25th was the forward passage of lines by RCT-1 of 1st

Marine Division. Re lead battalion of RCT-1, 1st

Battalion, 4th Marines, laid down heavy suppressive Ure

as it traveled through the darkness up Ambush Alley and

ceased Uring as it crossed the Saddam Canal bridge. RCT2 and RCT-1 had carefully planned and coordinated the

procedures for the passage of lines, to include position

markings. However, as 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, began

approaching the positions of 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,

some began Uring again, sending thousands of smallarms rounds toward Company B, 1st Battalion, 2d

23 March - 2 April 2003 31

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

Marines of Task Force Tarawa search buildings in Nasiriyah for enemy combatants, arms, munitions, and intelligence information.
Marines, from a range of less than 200 meters. Lieutenant

Colonel Rickey Grabowski sent word for every vehicle in

his battalion to mark its position with chemical lights and

then personally stopped the head of the convoy. However,

this was not before one Marine attached to Company B

was wounded by the Ure.*127

For the next several days, a familiar pattern prevailed

for 1st Battalion, 2d Marines. Company A continued to

guard the western “T” intersection and northwestern

bridge to prevent enemy Ughters from using that route to

reinforce the Nasiriyah garrison. Company B and

Company C continued to man the “T” intersection due

north of the Saddam Canal bridge, Company B blocking

toward the east, and Company C to the north. OWen

Fedayeen militia attempted to probe their positions. Each

night, Marine artillery pounded enemy targets in the city.

During daylight hours, Iraqi soldiers dressed in civilian

attire attempted to escape the city and ran into Company

A’s checkpoint. Over the next nine days, the company

took and processed 126 enemy prisoners. Re Marines of

1st Battalion, 2d Marines, conducted patrols, cordonand-search operations, established roadblocks, and

executed limited objective attacks. Meanwhile, the

battalion was also already conducting civil aSairs

programs. Re Marines distributed food and water,

provided medical care, coordinated repairs on the city’s

water treatment and sewage plants, and identiUed key

leaders in the community.128

On 26 March, high winds and dust clouds continued

to aSect operations. Helicopters could not Vy for most of

the day due to the dust storm; only Uxed-wing air support

was available. By this time, Task Force Tarawa had Urm

control of three of the four bridges in Nasiriyah.

Traversing the length of Ambush Alley was no longer a

serious problem. Re Marines, however, did not control

the southwestern bridge. Brigadier General Natonski did

not have the forces available to seize it, nor to go into the

heart of the city north of the Euphrates and clear each

block. He and his Marines were still trying to expand

control north of the Saddam Canal and south of the

Euphrates.129

Rus, throughout 26 and 27 March, 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, and 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, continued to

32 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Photo by LCpl Bryan J. Nealy

Marines of Task Force Tarawa distribute food to citizens of Nasiriyah. The Marines were conducting humanitarian operations like the one

pictured above as early as 26 March.

* Other officers besides Lieutenant Colonel Grabowski exposed

themselves to fire in an attempt to stop the potential fratricide,

including Company B’s forward air controller, Captain Santare.
expand their perimeters. Fighting house to house, they

captured and killed numerous Fedayeen and Ba’ath

militia and seized or destroyed large quantities of enemy

arms, munitions, documents, maps, and other

intelligence information. Reir successes yielded valuable

information that guided tactical planning for operations

for the next day. Much of the intelligence included details

of enemy activity or headquarters in a particular

building. Based on that detailed information, Marines

could target particular residences or public buildings for

“house calls.”130 For example, the Marines of 3d Battalion,

2d Marines, seized a Ba’ath Party headquarters on 26

March, and over the next few days captured more highlevel headquarters, a general and a colonel in the Iraqi

army, and maps and documents revealing locations of

other headquarters, military facilities, and personnel.

Re Ba’ath Party headquarters had a room rigged to act

as an interrogation chamber. It also had a terrain model

showing enemy positions throughout the city; a census of

everyone living in the city, along with addresses; and

discarded weapons and U.S. Army uniforms. Human

exploitation teams began to conclude, correctly as it

turned out, that U.S. Army prisoners had been in the

building and subsequently had been moved to an Iraqi

hospital north of the Euphrates. Meanwhile, the terrain

model and captured documents helped the battalion staS

plan for the next day’s attacks.131

Due to the sandstorm, the infantrymen oWen had to

rely on mortars and artillery rather than aircraW for Ure

support. Company F cleared the hospital complex for a

second time on 26 March, this time with the help of an

artillery preparation from 1st Battalion, 10th Marines.

Instead of withdrawing, Company F’s Marines continued

eastward and cleared 12 more buildings. Company G

advanced as well and tied its leW Vank in with Company

F’s right. Company E, having been relieved from its

original position west of the highway, attacked to the

southwest and tied in with Company G’s right.132

Re air assets were not completely out of the battle.

Captain Gerald T. Finnegan Jr., a forward air controller

with 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, noted that oWen helicopters

could “sneak up under” the sandstorm. Even during the

sandstorm, visibility in the nondesert grassy areas close

to the Euphrates River could be as much as 300 or 400

meters if there was daylight and if the helicopters were

Vying low enough to be under the dust cloud. Re forward

air controllers and air oTcer for 3d Battalion, Captain

Harold Qualkinbush, found a way to conduct Type III

close air support with Uxed-wing aircraW on the nights of

the 26th and 27th. Lieutenant Colonel Dunahoe had

authorized the use of Type III support without his direct

approval as long as each mission was cleared by the air

oTcer or battalion Ure support coordinator. Qualkinbush

had a laptop computer with digital imagery and a satellite

picture of the city. He had targets supplied to him from

the battalion’s scout-sniper teams and human exploitation

teams. Rus, while he did not have direct line-of-sight

observation to his targets, he did have indirect, or virtual,

observation. His forward air controllers communicated

with the aircraWs as they Vew overhead and Ured their

ordnance. One of the enemy targets destroyed in this way

was the 11th Infantry Division headquarters, only 600

meters away, from which elements of the battalion were

taking indirect Ure. Rus Type III close air support worked

for 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, unlike the case of 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, a few days before. With the 3d

Battalion, there was solid communication between the

forward air controllers and the air oTcer. Moreover,

Captain Qualkinbush had far better targeting information

than Captain Santare had enjoyed, and at least had the

advantage of indirect, or virtual, observation of the target.*

Qualkinbush and his forward air controllers also used

Type II support.133

23 March - 2 April 2003 33

Photo by Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

This wall map was found in a Ba’ath Party headquarters in the

southern sector of Nasiriyah. It clearly identifies Iraqi defensive sectors

throughout the city.

* Though one interview suggested that this use of Type III CAS

occurred on 26 and 27 March, the command chronology of 3d

Battalion, 2d Marines (part III), indicated that it may have actually

occurred on 27 and 28 March. Capt Gerald J. Finnegan Jr. telephone

intvw with LtCol Rod Andrew Jr., 10Sept08.
Still, poor weather conditions leW artillery the

supporting arm of choice on 26 March, making it a busy

and memorable day for 1st Battalion, 10th Marines. AWer

supporting Company F’s attack on the hospital complex,

the artillerymen Ured numerous counterUre missions

generated by counterbattery radar, as well as calls for Ure

against enemy Fedayeen, artillery, and a refueling station.

Re targets were located all over Nasiriyah. As the

battalion’s command chronology summarized, by dusk,

the battalion had engaged seven enemy artillery batteries;

an ammunition dump with four enemy howitzers; a

refueling point with armored personnel carriers and

trucks; a convoy with infantry; and a BM21 multiple

rocket launcher, resulting in destruction of 44 tubes of

artillery, more than 25 vehicles, several buildings, a

military complex, a refueling site, and an estimated 400

enemy casualties.134

But the work of the artillerymen was not over.

Rroughout the day, intelligence reports had been

coming down from I MEF headquarters (originally

generated by human sources and signals intelligence) of

a large assembly of enemy Ughters gathering in an open

area near the railway station south of the southwestern

bridge. Initial reports estimated that there were more

than 1,000 irregular Iraqi soldiers assembled; a later

estimate gave the Ugure of 2,000. Intelligence indicated

that their intent was to launch a major counterattack and

seize control of the southeastern bridge. Rese reports

seemed to correspond with counterbattery radar

detections in that area throughout the day. Finally it was

determined that the reports were credible and a real

threat. Air support was unavailable due to the continuing

high winds, blowing sand, and low visibility. Rerefore,

1st Battalion, 10th Marines, received the mission and

Ured a “battalion” volley of dual-purpose improved

conventional munitions at the target. Due to the spread of

ammunition on the batteries’ gun lines and to the fact that

only four of Battery A’s guns could reach the target, the

battalion actually Ured 105 rounds of dual-purpose

improved conventional munitions and 30 high-explosive

rounds with variable time fuzes. It was diTcult to get a

precise battle damage assessment from this mission, but

the eSects were apparently dramatic. Brigadier General

Natonski believed that the barrage “broke the back” of the

counterattack that the enemy was trying to launch on the

night of the 26th.135

Not all of the enemy Ughters were at the railroad station,

however. Rus, while the massive Ure mission of 1st

Battalion, 10th Marines, probably ruined enemy plans for

a major coordinated counterattack, there were smaller

engagements throughout the night south of the Euphrates.

Elements of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines; 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines; 2d Combat Engineer Battalion; 2d LAR

Battalion; Battery B, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines; and the

RCT-2 command post all reported enemy contact.136

Re most notable action occurred at the main

command post of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines. Around

sundown (approximately 2030), several Ure-team sized

elements began attacking the command post. Eventually,

it was receiving impacts from small arms, rockets,

machine guns, and mortars. Clerks, drivers, radio

operators, and others ran to the berms to defend the

perimeter. Re battalion executive oTcer, Major Julian D.

Alford, relayed a “danger close” immediate suppression

mission through his commander, Lieutenant Colonel

Royal Mortenson, who in turn was able to contact

Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Starnes of 1st Battalion, 10th

Marines, on the regimental tactical net. About this time,

the bulk of Captain Gregory L. Grunwald’s Company C,

2d LAR Battalion, was approaching the area. Re lead

platoon of Grunwald’s column had moved very close to

the command post of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines. Re

column was returning from north of the Saddam Canal

and was moving south to link up with a Marine wing

support squadron convoy to escort it back north through

Ambush Alley. Just as it had crossed over the

southeastern bridge, it had entered terrain held by 3d

Battalion, 2d Marines. Ren it had to traverse an area not

controlled by friendly forces and probably occupied by

the enemy before reentering friendly lines near the

command post of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines.137

Re regimental Ure support coordinator and Major

Alford had a good idea of all friendly locations but

quickly determined that the armor on the LAV-25s would

protect the platoon from eSects of the danger close

mission about to be Ured in support of the command post

of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines. Doubtless unaware of all the

details of the situation, however, the platoon commander

of the lead LAR platoon sent a “check Uring” message in

response to the Urst artillery round. Eventually, the LAR

platoon was ordered to disengage and move away to allow

1st Battalion, 10th Marines, to continue Uring the

immediate suppression. Alford called the Unal immediate

suppression mission within 100 meters of the command

post. It was approved by Lieutenant Colonel Mortenson

and Ured by 1st Battalion, 10th Marines. Despite it being

a danger close mission Ured at night, there were no

friendly casualties, and the enemy was silenced.138

Sometime during this engagement (it is diTcult to

determine exactly when from various accounts), the lead

LAR platoon and the command post of 2d Battalion, 8th

34 Battle of An-Nasiriyah
Marines, began Uring on each other. Re platoon may

have been slightly disoriented and unaware of the

command post’s location. On the other hand, it might be

that Marines at the command post, aware of a report of an

enemy armored vehicle (BTR-60) nearby, saw a LAV-25,

mistook it for Iraqi, and Ured on it.139 Eventually, it

became clear that a friendly Ure situation was occurring,

and oTcers, initially led by Captain Grunwald, were able

to implement a cease-Ure. Re light armored

reconnaissance platoon perhaps inVicted more material

damage on the command post than the enemy did. By the

time the Marines ceased Uring at each other, the LAV-25’s

23 March - 2 April 2003 35

Map illustration by Vincent J. Martinez
36 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

small arms and 25mm guns had destroyed four vehicles

(a wrecker and three medium tactical vehicles) and

damaged Uve Humvees. Rirty Marines in the general

area of the command post of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,

were wounded, although some of those were certainly

wounded by enemy Ure. It will never be entirely certain

what happened during this episode. What is clear is that

the engagement was a sober reminder of the diTculties in

Ughting on a nonlinear battleUeld against an

asymmetrical enemy using guerrilla tactics and at night.

As an oTcer from 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, summarized,

when the LAR Marines came over the southeastern

bridge, they were executing a “rearward passage of lines

through us, in the dark, then into enemy-controlled areas,

and then into friendly area again.”140 Determining friend

from foe is diTcult enough at night or on a nonlinear

battleUeld. With all of these elements in place at once, it

is notable that such incidents did not occur more oWen.141

27 March-2 April—Consolidation and

Rescue: “<e Bad Guys Have Le= the City”

By the morning of 27 March, Task Force Tarawa had

kept the eastern bridges and eastern passage through

Nasiriyah open for 48 hours. Ris accomplishment had

enabled the 1st Marine Division to continue its drive

toward Baghdad as planned, ready to Ught the Baghdad

and Al Nida Republican Guard divisions and divert

attention away from the Coalition’s main eSort, 3d

Infantry Division of V Corps. Clearly though, Nasiriyah

was still a potential threat to the rear of Coalition forces

and to its supply lines. Re Iraqis still retained a strong

presence in the city, and Task Force Tarawa was not large

enough to remove this threat on its own.142

Few had anticipated the Iraqi Army, Fedayeen militia

and Ba’ath Party Ughters having such a formidable force

in the area or making such a determined defense. Re

Marines of Task Force Tarawa, with the help of close air

support, had managed to kill and capture hundreds of

enemy Ughters and inVict massive damage on Iraqi

regular army forces. Still, the enemy had been able to

inUltrate large numbers of Saddam Fedayeen, Ba’ath Party

Militia, and regular army forces into the city by foot and

in civilian vehicles. Captured documents gathered on 24

March showed that in the days just before the battle, the

Iraqis had been able to move the 504th Infantry Brigade of

the 34th Infantry Division from northeastern Iraq into

Nasiriyah. On 19 March, that brigade consisted of more

than 2,000 soldiers, which reinforced the units that

Coalition intelligence had already known to be in the city,

as well as elements of the 51st Mechanized Infantry

Division Ultering back from Basrah. Lieutenant Colonel

Grabowski’s interview with a captured oTcer of the 23d

Brigade revealed that there were 500 to 800 Fedayeen

Ughters in the city when the battle began. Rough the

enemy had been unable to hold the bridges or prevent the

Vow of Coalition forces and supplies through the eastern

side of Nasiriyah, the Marines anticipated that they would

continue to use guerrilla tactics to “attrite and slow the

advance of Coalition Forces.” Task Force Tarawa’s

intelligence summary from 27 March predicted that the

enemy would “continue to intimidate the local population

to prevent support for Coalition Forces. Iraqi

paramilitary forces will continue to utilize no-strike

infrastructure such as hospitals and public buildings to

avoid the targeting of their command and control and to

show the population they can withstand Coalition

attacks.”143 Brigadier General Natonski needed more

combat power available to him if he was to establish

unchallenged Coalition control of Nasiriyah and

eliminate the threat to the rear of V Corps and I MEF.144

Re I MEF commander, Lieutenant General James

Conway, seems to have recognized this need as early as

the second day of the battle. On the aWernoon of 24

March, Conway and Brigadier General John F. Kelly,

assistant division commander of 1st Marine Division, had

visited Natonski, Colonel Bailey, and Lieutenant Colonel

Mortenson at the position of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,

just south of the Euphrates River bridge. As generals

Conway and Natonski discussed the situation, 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, came under heavy indirect Ure.

Artillery rounds began snapping some high-tension

power lines overhead, creating a fearful racket. As

Natonski remembered it, “all hell broke loose.”145

Conway’s sergeant major, driver, and personal security

guard joined the lines of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, on

the eastern side of the highway as Conway and Natonski

continued to confer. Natonski believed that it was that

aWernoon when Conway realized that Task Force Tarawa

would need help securing Nasiriyah. It would be days,

however, before Conway could get it to them.146

At a meeting on the 27th, however, Brigadier General

Natonski learned that soon his mission, battlespace, and

forces available would all expand. Task Force Tarawa’s

battlespace was extended to the south, east, and west to

allow it to isolate Nasiriyah and stop the Vow of enemy

reinforcements into the city. Re task force was also tasked

with advancing into the city itself to eliminate Fedayeen

and Ba’ath Party cells. To help Natonski accomplish this

mission, I MEF would designate Task Force Tarawa the

focus of main eSort, give it priority of Ures, and give it

tactical control of 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Re oTcial fragmentary

order expanding Natonski’s battlespace was published on

27 March. On the 28th, another fragmentary order (I

MEF FragO 040-03) gave the task force its new missions

and ordered it to be prepared to assume tactical control

of the 15th and 24th MEUs.147

Re 15th MEU did not arrive until 29 March and began

patrolling on the 31st.148 Re commanding oTcer and

operations oTcer of 24th MEU arrived at Task Force

Tarawa’s command post on 1 April. When the 15th MEU

did arrive, Brigadier General Natonski gave it the task of

securing the southwestern entrances to the city in the

vicinity of the southwestern bridge, or, as Natonksi called

it, “the Unal entranceway.”149 Over the course of the

previous week, intelligence had indicated that a hotbed

of Fedayeen and Ba’ath activity was in the city of Suq ash

Shuyukh, southeast of Nasiriyah. Re enemy was sending

reinforcements from this city into Nasiriyah from the

east, while others came from the south into the western

side of the city. Task Force Tarawa needed to isolate the

city to keep them out.150

During this period, the task force received excellent

support from Special Operations Forces from Task Force

20, including U.S. Army Special Forces and U.S. Navy Sea

Air Land Teams (SEALs). Rese were working in Task

Force Tarawa’s area of operations and reported to it. Rere

was a reconnaissance operations center colocated with the

Task Force Tarawa command post. Ris group had teams

penetrating into the heart of the city, interrogating

civilians, and locating buildings in the city that were Ba’ath

or Fedayeen positions. Once these were identiUed, they

were attacked with precision joint direct attack munitions

and AC-130 strikes delivered by U.S. Air Forces Special

Operations Command. Another Navy SEAL team was

performing the same task in Suq ash Shuyukh. In both

cities, Coalition forces were using these special operations

teams and precision air strikes to eliminate key leadership

targets with minimal or no collateral damage to civilian

structures nearby. Re Marines also established more

roadblocks to prevent inUltration of enemy forces. Re 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, had already accomplished this on

the northern side of the city, but now it was done on the

eastern side as well.151

Meanwhile, the infantry battalions continued to patrol

aggressively east and west of the bridge crossings, sweeping

their sectors clean of enemy Ughters and weapons and

seizing documents from Fedayeen and Ba’ath Party facilities.

On 27 March, for example, a scout-sniper team from 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, crossed just over the Euphrates River

near the bridge and searched a building where suspicious

activity had been observed. It proved to be a Ba’ath Party

headquarters with a great deal of intelligence, including

maps and graphics identifying the locations of enemy

strongpoints and headquarters buildings. All the while,

Marines also continued to distribute beans, rice, and water

to the inhabitants of Nasiriyah and to do what they could to

facilitate the city’s reconstruction.152

By 27 March, the battle had changed in a way that

inVuenced the operations of Lieutenant Colonel Starnes’s

artillery battalion. Most of the Iraqis’ indirect Ure threat

had been eliminated. Rerefore, instead of dispersing the

batteries and individual howitzers, Starnes consolidated

them into a triangular Urebase, making them less

vulnerable to the threat of small teams of enemy soldiers

inUltrating the perimeter. Combat engineer assets allowed

the vehicles and howitzers of 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,

to be “bermed in” within raised earthworks for

protection. Re artillerymen named the compound

“Firebase Pokorney” for First Lieutenant Fred Pokorney,

their forward observer killed north of the Saddam Canal

on the 23d while calling in a Ure mission for Company C,

1st Battalion, 2d Marines.153

Battery B temporarily converted into provisional

infantry. Regimental Combat Team 2 sought to strengthen

its hold on the Highway 1 bridge to the west, which was

still vital to the 1st Marine Division’s supply line. Re

infantry battalions did not have any Marines to spare for

this mission, so Lieutenant Colonel Starnes volunteered the

services of Battery B. Along with four of its howitzers dug

in around the bridge and deployed for direct Ure, Battery B

made up the core of Task Force Rex, commanded by the

executive oTcer of 1st Battalion, 10th Marines. Joining the

artillerymen were Company A, 2d Reconnaissance

23 March - 2 April 2003 37

Official Marine Corps Photo

BGen Richard F. Natonski in Task Force Tarawa combat operations

center in Nasiriyah.
Battalion; a detachment of combat engineers; and a light

armored reconnaissance platoon. As much of Task Force

Rex was dug in underneath the bridge, it soon acquired the

nickname Task Force Troll. Re fact that 1st Battalion, 10th

Marines, was able to take four guns out of action reVected

that it was receiving far fewer missions than it had

previously, and that the infantrymen of RCT-2 were now

able to eliminate most of the resistance they encountered

without artillery support.154

On 29 March, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, launched an

assault on a four-story, reinforced military compound

that the battalion’s oTcers had nicknamed “the citadel.”

Intelligence indicated that the building was the

headquarters for the enemy’s 11th Infantry Division.

When planning for the attack commenced on 28 March,

Company K, commanded by Captain Edward J. Healey

Jr., was designated as the main eSort, and plans were

made for a heavy artillery preparation prior to the assault.

However, a scout-sniper team that Lieutenant Colonel

Dunahoe had sent into the area late on the 27th later

determined that there was a great deal of civilian traTc in

and around the compound. In an eSort to avoid civilian

casualties, Dunahoe cancelled plans for the artillery

barrage and instead directed Company K to launch a

surprise predawn assault. Companies I and L prepared to

act as supporting elements. Company K moved into its

assault position under cover of darkness and began its

attack at 0530. Re Marines captured, killed, or wounded

a handful of Iraqi soldiers while suSering no casualties.

Within the compound, they found massive quantities of

ammunition, including 1,000 rockets, 1 million small

arms rounds, mines, tank rounds, and chemical warfare

defense equipment. Explosive ordnance experts later

estimated that more than 25,000 metric tons of munitions

and explosives were stored within the compound.155 One

oTcer remembered that the stockpile was enough to Ull

a large basketball coliseum. Re scout-sniper team’s

report of civilian traTc in the area and the decision not to

use artillery on the compound had been fortuitous, as a

large artillery bombardment would have almost certainly

set oS secondary explosions with catastrophic results for

Marines and civilians in the vicinity.156

Re Marines seized the compound so quickly and

eTciently that when dawn broke, few enemy oTcers

seemed to know that the attack had occurred. Many Iraqi

Army personnel drove or walked to work in the

compound as usual that morning, not realizing until they

were captured that the compound was in Marine hands.

Major CanUeld remembered that an Iraqi oTcer walking

toward the complex with his briefcase and a cup of coSee

got to within a few yards of the building before realizing

that American weapons were pointed at him. He

immediately raised his hands in surrender. Captain

Healey’s Company K Marines killed two armed enemy

soldiers as they attempted to enter the compound in a

pickup truck shortly aWer the compound was secured.157

Meanwhile, Marine scout-snipers in the complex engaged

several Saddam Fedayeen militia maneuvering against the

complex, killing one of them at a range of 550 meters and

another at 750 meters.158

On 31 March, 15th MEU began securing its assigned

sector around the southwestern bridge. It was also during

this period that an Iraqi lawyer walked over the

southwestern bridge, approached the lines of Company

I, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, under the command of First

Lieutenant J. Todd Widman, and provided fascinating

information. “Mohammed” gave the battalion’s human

exploitation team intelligence about the Fedayeen and

their locations. Later he also stated that a wounded

American soldier named Jessica was in the Saddam

Hospital, a complex on the western side of the city a few

hundred meters north of the southwestern bridge.

Mohammed claimed that the soldier had been tortured.*

When requested, Mohammed agreed to go back to the

hospital and ascertain Private First Class Lynch’s exact

location within the structure. While his wife and daughter

remained with the Marines, he walked back over the

bridge that night and returned with more detailed

information. Mohammed’s wife had worked as a nurse in

38 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Photo courtesy of Col Paul B. Dunahoe

The “citadel” building south of the Euphrates, shortly after its capture

by Company K, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. Sniper teams were posted

on the roof. Col Ronald J. Johnson, G-3 operations officer of Task Force

Tarawa, looks through a sniper scope. LtCol Paul B. Dunahoe,

commanding officer of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, holds binoculars. On

the far right is Sgt Christopher M. Sharon, the 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, scout-sniper team chief.

* Lynch herself later denied any recollections of torture or physical

abuse while in captivity.
23 March - 2 April 2003 39

the hospital, and she helped produce sketches of the

building Voor plan and surrounding grounds.159

By 31 March, Task Force 20 had set up its command

post within the Task Force Tarawa command post, and

together the two organizations planned an operation to

rescue Private First Class Lynch and any other Americans

who might be at the hospital. Re operation would take

place on the night of 1 April. Instead of special operations

forces supporting Task Force Tarawa, Task Force Tarawa

would become the supporting eSort for Task Force 20’s

rescue operation. To support the rescue, 15th MEU

would launch a diversionary attack on the southwestern

bridge. Artillery and air assets would also create a

diversion by striking Ba’ath facilities just south of the

hospital. Re 3d Marine AircraW Wing supplied the

helicopter support for Rangers who were to land west of

the hospital and provide security and establish an

emergency landing site. Re 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,

contributed tanks and assault amphibian vehicles as a

quick reaction force located at the northwestern bridge

that could be sent forward quickly in case anything went

wrong. Re 2d Force Reconnaissance Company provided

survey of the rescue site, covering Ure with sniper

overwatch, terminal guidance into the Rangers’ landing

zone, and a medium tactical vehicle with a .50-caliber

machine gun for the ground assault portion of the

operation.

Re Rangers landed at midnight on 1 April, and Navy

SEALs entered the hospital about the same time. Within 20

to 25 minutes of their arrival, Private First Class Lynch was

on a helicopter and Vying away from the Saddam Hospital.

AWer several hours, the Rangers located and evacuated the

NIMA CADRG 1:15K TLM/1994
body of one Marine killed in Ambush Alley and the bodies

of the missing members of the 507th Maintenance

Company. Every American killed at Nasiriyah went home.

Re rescue and recovery operation by Task Force 20 and

Task Force Tarawa was a textbook operation in terms of

joint planning and execution among numerous arms and

branches of service. Every objective was accomplished, and

there were no friendly casualties.160

Re next day, 2 April, Brigadier General Natonski

considered declaring Nasiriyah secure. Before doing so, he

rode over all four bridges and along roads and streets

throughout the city. He visited the Saddam Hospital, saw

Lynch’s former room, and talked to the hospital staS. He

noticed ordinary citizens outside their houses conducting

their daily business and saw Coalition forces attempting to

address their immediate needs. Rere would still be minor

incidents aWer April 2, but Natonski concluded on that day

that all main enemy headquarters had been eliminated and,

for the most part, the “bad guys had leW the city.”161

Rere was no time for the Marines of Task Force

Tarawa to relax aWer their victory. Brigadier General

Natonski tasked 15th MEU with holding onto Nasiriyah

with a robust civil aSairs program. Occasionally these

Marines had to skirmish with isolated pockets of

resistance in the city, but most of their work involved

helping to rebuild and return life to normal for the people

of Nasiriyah. Re 24th MEU moved north up Highway 7

to secure Qalat Sikar airUeld. RCT-2 advanced up

Highway 1 to secure ad-Diwaniyah, an-Numaniyah, alHillah, and ultimately al-Amaraha and al-Kut. All of

these operations were designed to provide security for the

main supply routes and protect the Vow of supplies as 1st

Marine Division continued its march toward Baghdad.

Re war continued, and there was plenty of danger ahead,

but Nasiriyah was the toughest battle that the Marines of

Task Force Tarawa would Ught.162

Epilogue

Nasiriyah was a deUning battle of the 2003 Iraq

campaign in many ways. Coalition forces discovered

much about their enemy and his tactics; they learned

many important tactical and operational lessons; and the

Iraqi Army commanders realized that it would be

virtually impossible to stop determined U.S. Marines.

Some of the things the Marines learned about the Iraqis

were of immediate tactical and operational importance.

Re Marines could expect the enemy to use dummy

positions, such as hulks of tanks, and to place them in

front of buildings to create pillboxes. Re enemy was apt

to use hospitals, mosques, and schools as arms caches and

defensive positions, taking advantage of the Americans’

determination not to violate international laws of war and

reluctance to harm civilians. Also in violation of the

Geneva Convention, most Iraqi soldiers did not Ught in

uniform, but rather were in civilian clothes. Re primary

mission of the Fedayeen and other paramilitary forces, in

fact, was to blend in with the civilian population, use

members of it as human shields, and seek to stiSen

resistance by the population and regular army forces

against Coalition forces.

Against these Iraqi tactics, human intelligence,

particularly from special operations forces and human

exploitation teams, was extremely useful and helpful. Re

battle certainly proved the value of tanks in urban terrain

and validated the eSectiveness of snipers in urban combat

as well. Scout-sniper teams not only accounted for dozens

of enemy casualties but also gathered extensive

intelligence by means of observation, capture of enemy

personnel, and contact with Iraqi civilians. Artillery also

40 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Department of Defense Video Frame Capture

PFC Jessica D. Lynch, USA, shortly after her rescue by U.S. forces from

the Saddam Hospital in Nasiriyah on the night of 1-2 April 2003.

Photo Joe Raedle, courtesy of Maj William P. Peeples

Marines speak with Iraqi citizens in Nasiriyah on 31 March 2003.

Conversations such as these built rapport with the people and often

generated information.
played a vital role, particularly when weather conditions

precluded or hampered the use of aircraW. Additionally,

the battle provided an example of how quickly an artillery

battery could transition into the role of a provisional riVe

company, as in the case of Task Force Rex.163

Air support, both Uxed-wing, and rotary, was also

critical. AH-1W Cobra helicopters, in particular, were

very eSective in the urban environment. Rey controlled

the rooWops, which proved vital in Nasiriyah, a city Ulled

with buildings with Vat roofs from which the enemy tried

to Ure on Coalition forces. Re Cobras oWen played an

important role in observation and were able to destroy

enemy armored vehicles, artillery, and mortars with their

own Ure. Reir very presence oWen boosted the morale of

Marines on the ground and simultaneously had the

opposite eSect on the enemy. Sometimes the sound of

their rotors suppressed enemy Ure and sent Iraqi soldiers

or militiamen scrambling for cover, an eSect that forward

air controllers called “suppression by noise.” Generally,

the Cobras were able to avoid deadly eSects from enemy

ground Ure. Iraqi rockets were a minimal threat as long as

the Cobras made “runs” at a speed of 60 knots or more,

Uring as they went. Only when hovering in a stationary

position were the helicopters seriously vulnerable to

enemy Ure.164

Clearly one diTculty encountered in Nasiriyah was that

of “friendly Ure.” Re most serious case was the A-10

incident discussed previously, but there were also two

incidents between Marine ground units—one during the

RCT-1 passage of lines north of the city, and another

between the light armored reconnaissance company and

the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, command post south of

the Euphrates. Even with the new “Blue Force Tracker”

technology, the fog of war and occasionally the

inUltration tactics of the enemy made it diTcult to

prevent these incidents entirely, particularly at night.

Nasiriyah set the tone for much of the rest of the Iraq

war when it came to establishing a rapport with the

civilian population. Most residents of the city were Shiites

and not particularly loyal to the Saddam Hussein regime.

Because of a strong military and paramilitary presence in

the city, however, they were reluctant to embrace the

Americans until it was safe to do so. In many cases, that

occurred immediately once the people realized the

Marines were in the city to stay. For example, only

minutes aWer Company B Marines killed two Republican

Guard oTcers east of Ambush Alley, civilians rushed into

the street with tears of joy, with children crying “thank

you” and spitting on the bodies of the dead oTcers.165

Others risked their own safety to let the Marines know

the whereabouts of captured Americans. Re Marines

began distributing humanitarian aid and working to help

rebuild the city within a day or two of entering it. Civil

aSairs operations became extremely important, and

Nasiriyah became a model for how to conduct them.

Another thing that went right at Nasiriyah was the

eSectiveness of joint planning and execution. Special

operations forces from other services worked with Task

Force Tarawa headquarters and provided excellent

support. Re Lynch recovery operation, in particular, was

a textbook example of diverse American forces eSectively

integrating their capabilities. U.S. Army Special Forces

and Rangers, U.S. Navy SEALs, U.S. Air Force Special

Operations, and U.S. Marine infantry, armor, artillery, air,

and intelligence assets all worked together and

accomplished the mission with Vawless execution.

Understandably and appropriately, Marine leaders gave

much thought to what could have been done diSerently

or better at Nasiriyah, particularly considering the

relatively high casualty toll. No clear conclusions have

emerged, other than that good intelligence was lacking

before the battle. Several oTcers have pointed to the lack

of shaping the battleUeld by Ure before entering the city.

23 March - 2 April 2003 41

Photo by LCpl Christopher G. Graham

A Marine from Task Force Tarawa assists a displaced child in

Nasiriyah in late March 2003.
Rere were no artillery preparations and no air attacks on

the city before RCT-2 stormed across the bridges. Yet

there were several good reasons for this. First, intelligence

estimates seemed to indicate that it would be

unnecessary. Second, without more detailed intelligence

on speciUc enemy locations, there was no way to use air

attacks or artillery on the city without inVicting

signiUcant damage to the city and loss of life on innocent

civilians. Doing so would have been counterproductive

and perhaps endangered American lives in the long run.

Rere had also been no reconnaissance of the city

before the Marines charged into it. Re pace of the

campaign and the sense of urgency placed on the seizure

of the bridges probably contributed to this omission.

Additionally, intelligence sources and planners at higher

levels felt sure resistance in the city would be light.

Others have questioned whether it was necessary to seize

the eastern Nasiriyah bridges at all. Initially, oTcers

throughout RCT-2 understood that they would bypass the

city if they found signiUcant resistance. From the

perspective of Lieutenant General James Conway and

higher headquarters, however, there was no question that

what Task Force Tarawa did at Nasiriyah had to be done.

Re I MEF and V Corps needed another route to Baghdad

besides Highway 1, both to accommodate the traTc Vow

and to achieve greater dispersion in defense against

weapons of mass destruction. Besides, if Nasiriyah was not

secured, it would have been a threat to the Highway 1 route

itself and to the rear of Coalition forces. Also, RCT-1

needed to secure an airUeld on Highway 7 so that a British

follow-on brigade would have a means of aerial supply.166

Other Marines have wondered why it was necessary to

push so hard into the city once it became clear that the

Iraqis were there in force and intended to Ught. Why not

prep the route into the city with artillery and air support

and wait for the tanks to be completely refueled? Ris

debate oWen revolves around Brigadier General Natonski’s

decision to push rapidly into the city and his order to his

regimental and battalion commanders to hasten their

advance on the morning of 23 March. Again, there are

several justiUcations for the course that was taken. Task

Force Tarawa’s rapid, relentless drive into the city on 23

March matched the tone of the entire Coalition campaign,

which emphasized the use of speed and aggressiveness to

attain security and victory. Natonski knew that 1st Marine

Division was right behind his task force, and he did not

want any delay in seizing the bridges to slow the advance of

the rest of I MEF. Re unexpected developments with the

507th Maintenance Company also had much to do with

Natonski’s decision. Once that occurred, he believed that

his task force had lost the advantage of tactical surprise,

possibly inducing the Iraqis to destroy the bridges to deny

their use to the Americans. Re best way to overcome this

setback and reduce the possibility of blown bridges,

Natonski felt, was with speed and aggressiveness. Indeed,

captured Iraqi oTcers later confessed that they were

“shocked” at the aggressiveness of the Marines. One said

that “his Ughters were very conUdent initially . . . but

became dispirited when the Marines kept coming at

them.”167 Finally, and just as importantly, there were

wounded and missing Americans in the city. Natonski and

other Marines felt an obligation to help.

Without question, the Marines of Task Force Tarawa

upheld their Corps’ legacy of valor and professionalism at

Nasiriyah. Marines continually risked their lives to save

others who were wounded or stranded in enemycontrolled parts of the city. When the battle north of the

Euphrates devolved into three separate company-level

Ughts, small-unit leadership, a hallmark of the Corps, took

over. Junior oTcers and noncommissioned oTcers set the

example and held their units together through the

confusion of combat and shock of heavy casualties. Rey

made diTcult decisions under Ure and refused to quit or

withdraw until they had accomplished their missions.

Rere were numerous cases of Marines continuing to

perform their duties with determination even aWer they

were wounded. Individual Marines throughout Task Force

Tarawa battled heat, driving rain, fatigue, sandstorms, fear,

confusion, and a numerous and resourceful enemy—and

performed gallantly. Rey steadfastly performed their

duty, and performed it well, signiUcantly facilitating the

Coalition march toward Baghdad.

42 Battle of An-Nasiriyah

Photo by Cpl Mace M. Gratz

Marines of Task Force Tarawa assist displaced citizens in Nasiriyah in

late March 2003.
Notes

1. Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond:

Je U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War

(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 2, 67.

2. Col Reed R. Bonadonna, “Desert Legion: With Task

Force Tarawa in Operation Iraqi Freedom” (typescript,

Marine Corps Historical Center [MCHC], Quantico,

VA), 8.

3. BGen Richard F. Natonski intvw with LtCol David

Watters, 6Mar04 (MCHC), hereaWer Natonski intvw,

6Mar04.

4. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; LtGen Natonski intvw with

Col Patricia D. Saint, LtCol Rod Andrew Jr., and

MGySgt Robert A. Yarnall, 19Dec07 (MCHC), hereaWer

Natonski intvw, 19Dec07.

5. Col Ronald L. Bailey intvw with Maj JeSery R. Riley,

4May and 10May06 (MCHC), transcript, 2-3, 8-9.

6. Richard S. Lowry, Marines in the Garden of Eden: Je

True Story of Seven Bloody Days in Iraq (New York:

Berkley Publishing, 2006), 3-4.

7. Bonadonna, 12; Lowry, 30.

8. Bailey intvw, 9; Natonski intvw, 6Mar04. Re description

of Mortenson as “articulate and charismatic” comes

from Col Bonadonna’s observations in Bonadonna, 12.

9. Bonadonna, 12; see also Lowry, 4.

10. Bailey intvw, 10.

11. Bonadonna, 13; Lowry, 4.

12. Bonadonna, 13.

13. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

14. Ibid.; A Co 8th Tank Bn ComdC, 1 Jan03-31Dec04,

Section 2, p. 6. All command chronologies cited in this

work can be found at the Gray Research Center (GRC),

Quantico, VA.

15. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; 2d MEB ComdC 1Jan30Jun03, Section 2, p. 1.

16. LtCol Royal P. Mortenson intvw with Col Reed R.

Bonadonna, 2Mar03 (MCHC) hereaWer Mortenson

intvw, 2Mar03.

17. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; 2d MEB ComdC, Section 2, p. 1.

18. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

19. 1st Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun03, Section 2; 2d Bn,

8th Mar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun03, Section 2, 2-1; A 8th

Tanks, ComdC, Section 2, p. 6.

20. Natonski intvw 6Mar04; Mortenson intvw, 2Mar03; 3d

Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun03, Part 2; Lowry, 32.

21. 2d MEB ComdC, Section 2, p. 2.

22. 2d MEB ComdC, Section 2, pp. 2-3; Natonski intvw,

6Mar04.

23. Natonksi intvw, 6Mar04.

24. Maj Karl C. Rohr, “Fighting Rrough the Fog of War:

Overcoming the Friction Points and Succeeding in

Combat,” Marine Corps Gazette Online

(http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2006/

06rohr.html). Maj Rohr was the battalion Fire Support

Coordinator and CO of Weapons Company, 1st Bn, 2d

Mar, in the battle of an-Nasiriyah.

25. Ibid; Natonski intvws, 6Mar04 and 17Dec07; 2d MEB

ComdC, section 2, pp. 2-3; Bonadonna, 23.

26. Col Gregory Fontenot, LtCol E. J. Degen, and LtCol

David Tohn, On Point: Je United States Army in

Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis: Naval Institute

Press, 2005), 101; Reynolds, 43-44, 84; Lowry, 43, 97.

27. 2d MEB ComdC, Supporting Documents, disk 1, “TF

Tarawa—Battle of Nasiriyah”; see also Col Glenn T.

Starnes intvw with Col Reed R. Bonadonna, 7May03

(MCHC).

28. Col Paul B. Dunahoe phone intvws with LtCol Rod

Andrew Jr., 27Aug08 and 17Sept08; “Commander’s

Intent, Line of Departure to An Nasiriyah,” 20Mar03,

copies in possession of Col Dunahoe and Col Andrew.

29 Rohr.

30. Task Force Tarawa, “Chronicle of the Combat Actions

at Nasiriyah, 22 March-2 April 2003,” entry for 22

March (hereaWer “Chronicle,” [entry date]), in 2d MEB

Comd C, Supporting Documents, disk 1.

31. “Chronicle,” 22 March; Natonski intvw, 6Mar04. I MEF

FRAGO 017-03, 21 March 03, 1.A, 1.B, in “Chronicle,”

22 Mar.

32. “Chronicle,” 22March; 2d Mar ComdC, Section 2, pp.

19-22 Mar; Bailey intvw, 34.

33. Bailey intvw, 36.

34. Ibid. See also 31-35; Maj Andrew R. Kennedy, intvw

with Col Reed R. Bonadonna, 7May03 (MCHC), 3-5.

35. Kennedy intvw, 5; Maj Doug Feiring, “Iraqi Freedom

Diary” (http://www.iraqi-freedom-diary.com/relief-inplace.html).

36. Kennedy intvw, 5; Bailey intvw, 38.

37. 3d Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2.

38. LtCol James E. Reilly and SFC Romas Smith intvw

with Col Reed R. Bonadonna, 13Apr03 (MCHC).

23 March - 2 April 2003 43
39. Col Paul B. Dunahoe, notes on draW manuscript,

18Feb09, author’s possession.

40. 3d Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2; Capt Gerald J. Finnegan

Jr. telephone intvw with LtCol Rod Andrew Jr.,

10Sept08; Lowry, 277.

41. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

42. LtCol Rickey L. Grabowski intvw with Col Reed R.

Bonadonna, 6Apr03 (MCHC), 2.

43. Ibid. See also Lowry, 117-18, 149; Natonski intvw,

6Mar04; Bonadonna, 31 n.#5, 32-34.

44. RCT-2 Narrative Summary, “Chronicle,” 23 March.

45. 3d Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2, Weapons Company; see

also Lowry, 84.

46. 1st Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Section 2

47. Grabowski intvw, 3; “Chronicle,” 23 March; 1st Bn 10th

Mar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun03; Bailey intvw, 44; Maj

William P. Peeples and 1stSgt Roger D. Huddleston

intvw with Col Reed R. Bonadonna, 1May03 (MCHC)

hereaWer Peeples intvw; LtCol Donald S. Hawkins, Maj

Craig H. Streeter, Maj Matthew R. Shenberger, and

GySgt Kevin Barry intvw with Fred Allison, 13Oct06

(MCHC), transcript, 11 (hereaWer Hawkins intvw).

48. Peeples intvw.

49. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; Peeples intvw; Company A,

8th Tanks Bn, ComdC, Section 2, p. 7; Hawkins intvw,

13-19, 26-31; Lowry, 130-41.

50. Quotes from Bonadonna, 34. Bonadonna’s source was

comments made on an earlier draW of his manuscript

by LtCol Grabowski (ibid., 128 n. xviii-xix); Bailey

intvw, 39, 44; Natonski intvws, 6Mar04 and 17Dec07.

51. Grabowski intvw, 4; 1st Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, section 2;

SSgt Troy F. Schielein intvw with Col Reed R.

Bonadonna, 29Apr03 (MCHC).

52. Grabowski intvw, 5.

53. Ibid; Schielein intvw; Peeples intvw.

54. Grabowski intvw, 5-6; Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

55. “Chronicle,” 23 March; Natonski intvw, 6Mar04;

Grabowski intvw, 6-7; Huddleston comments in Peeples

intvw; Lowry, 174-78.

56. Grabowski intvw, 7; Lowry, 178-79; Hawkins intvw, 16;

Huddleston in Peeples intvw; “U.S. Central Command

Investigation of Suspected Friendly Fire Incident Near

Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 03,” Capt A. J. Greene

testimony, p. J-107-08 (hereaWer CentComm

Investigation).

57. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; Lowry, 187.

58. Peeples intvw; Maj Michael A. Brooks Jr. intvw with Col

Reed R. Bonadonna, 4Apr03 (MCHC), transcript, 11;

Hawkins intvw, 66-67.

59. 1stLt Michael S. Seely intvw with Col Reed R.

Bonadonna, 4May03 (MCHC), transcript, 6-10; 2dLt

Scott M. Swantner intvw with Col Reed R. Bonadonna

2May03 (MCHC); Lowry, 187-92.

60. Seely intvw, 9-11; Swantner intvw; Lowry, 187-95.

61. Grabowski intvw, 7; Lowry, 190, 204-8; CentCom

Investigation, Testimony of Commander, Bravo

Company, pp. J-141, J-147; Capt Dennis A. Santare

testimony, Tab H.

62. Seely intvw, 16; Lowry, 205-12; Bonadonna, 48-49; CentCom

investigation, Grabowski testimony, pp. J-67, J-72.

63. CentCom investigation, Grabowski testimony, p. J-63;

Greene testimony, pp. J-106-109, 111; Santare

testimony, pp. H-29-31.

64. CentCom investigation, Santare testimony, p. H-31.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. H-32.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., pp. H-32-33; CentCom investigation, Final

Report, 10; Lowry, 199.

69. CentCom investigation, pp. H-22, H-31-33 (quote on

H-33).

70. Seely intvw, 18; CentCom investigation, 1stSgt Jose G.

Henao testimony, p. J-212; Swantner intvw; SSgt

Anthony J. Pompos intvw with Col Reed R. Bonadonna,

5May03 (MCHC); Bonadonna, 51, 53.

71. Seely intvw, 18-20; Swantner intvw.; Lowry, 214.

72. CentCom investigation, Grabowski testimony, pp. J-67-

68; Capt Daniel J. Wittnam testimony, p. J-160;

Hawkins intvw, 73.

73. CentCom investigation, Santare testimony, p. H-33; Tab

A-H, Final Report, 10.

74. CentCom investigation, Tab A-H, Final Report, 10.

75. Swantner and Seely intvws, and their testimony in

CentCom Investigation, Tab J; testimony of other

Company C Marines in pp. J-211, J-231-32, J-238-39, J254, J-259, J-271, J-276, A-E-3, A-F-24, A-F-32.

76. CentCom investigation, Tab A-H, Final Report, 12; 1st

Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Section 2.

77. Peeples intvw; Lowry, 259-62.

78. Seely intvw, 22; CentCom investigation, Grabowski

testimony, pp. J-70-71; Santare testimony, p. H-33.

44 Battle of An-Nasiriyah
79. Seely intvw, 32; CentCom investigation, Tab A-H-3,

Final Report, 10.

80. LtGen Richard F. Natonski, notes on draW manuscript,

14Feb09, author’s possession.

81. CentCom investigation, Tab A-H-3, Final Report, 27.

82. Ibid.

83. Kennedy intvw, 18-19; Brooks intvw, 15-17; Peeples

intvw; Grabowski intvw, 8; Bonadonna, 60.

84. “Chronicle,” 23 March.

85. Brooks intvw, 19-20.

86. LtCol Grabowski remembers that Company A arrived

at the northern bridge sometime around 1600 or 1700;

Brooks remembers 1600. Grabowski intvw, 24; Brooks

intvw, 17, 20.

87. Kennedy intvw, 18.

88. LtCol Royal P. Mortenson, intvw with Col Reed R.

Bonadonna, 28Mar03 (MCHC); hereaWer Mortenson

intvw, 28Mar03.

89. Grabowski intvw, 13.

90. “Chronicle,” 23 March, records that 1st Bn, 2d Mar

reported the Saddam Canal bridge secure at 1128 Zulu,

1428 local time. Company C was still engaged in a

vicious UreUght at that time and had still not been

reinforced by other elements of the battalion.

91. Bailey intvw, 50-51; 2d Bn, 8th Mar ComdC, pp. II-1, II-2.

92. Mortenson intvw, 28Mar03.

93. “Chronicle,” 23 March.

94. Mortenson intvw, 28Mar03, Kennedy intvw, p. 16.

95. “Chronicle,” CG’s Personal Journal, 23 March.

96. 1st Bn, 10th Mar ComdC; Starnes intvw.

97. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; Kennedy intvw, 11-12;

CentComm investigation, Grabowski testimony, p. J-81.

98. Natonski intvw, 17Dec07.

99. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; Kennedy intvw, 11-12.

100. LtCol Grabowski’s in-depth interview with the captured

executive oTcer of the 23d Brigade revealed that the

defeat of the 507th Maintenance Company had

“emboldened” the Iraqis (see Grabowski intvw, 21;

CentCom investigation, Grabowski testimony, p. J-84).

101. Ibid.

102. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.; LtGen Richard F. Natonski, notes on draW

manuscript, 14Feb09, author’s possession.

105. Gen Eric K. Shinseki to Gen Michael W. Hagee, 10 June

2003, copies in possession of the author and LtGen

Richard F. Natonski.

106. Brooks intvw, 8-9; CentCom investigation, Grabowski

testimony, p. J-81; Schielein intvw; Bonadonna, 45

(based on interview with SSgt Lonnie O. Parker).

107. Kennedy intvw, 20.

108. 1st Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Section 2; Brooks intvw, 25-29;

Schielein intvw; Bonadonna, 67.

109. 1st Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Section 2; Natonski intvw,

6Mar04; Bonadonna, 67.

110. “Chronicle,” 24 March; 1st Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Section

2; 1st Bn,10th Mar ComdC.

111. Lowry, 274.

112. 2d Bn, 8th Mar ComdC, Scout-Sniper Platoon

Chronology, Item 5, p. 5; Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

113. 2d Bn, 8th Mar ComdC, Section 2, p. II-2, and Item 4,

pp. 1-2; Bonadonna, 69; Lowry, 284-85; Natonski intvw,

6Mar04.

114. LtGen Natonski, comments on draW manuscript,

14Feb09, author’s possession.

115. 2d Bn, 8th Mar ComdC, Section 2; Mortenson intvw,

28Mar03.

116. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; Kennedy intvw, 19-20; LtCol

Daniel T. CanUeld phone intvw with LtCol Rod Andrew

Jr., 3Sept08; Dunahoe intvw, 17Sept08.

117. 3d Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2.

118. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; “Chronicle,” 24 March.

119. I MEF FRAGO 023-3 in “Chronicle,” 24 March.

120. 3d Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2; CanUeld intvw; Lowry,

328.

121. Ibid., Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

122. 2d Bn, 8th Mar ComdC, Item 4, p. 2.

123. Ibid., Item 2, p. 4; 1st Bn, 10th Mar ComdC;

“Chronicle,” CG’s Personal Journal, 25 March. Re

comment on visibility during the dust storm comes

from an article written anonymously by a Marine

colonel and Urst sergeant from Task Force Tarawa and

published on www.urbanoperations.com. It is also

found in 2d MEB ComdC, Supporting Documents, disk

1, “Lessons Learned;” hereaWer “Lessons Learned.”

124. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; 2d Bn 8th Mar ComdC, item

3, p. 3, and p. II-3; Mortenson intvw, 28Mar03.

23 March - 2 April 2003 45
125. Mortenson intvw, 28Mar03; 2d Bn 8th Mar ComdC,

item 3, p. 3, item 5, p. 7.

126. 3d Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2; CanUeld intvw;

Dunahoe intvw, 27Aug08.

127. 1st Bn 2d Mar ComdC, Section 2, and Company B,

Section 2; Lowry, 316; Bonadonna, 73.

128. 1st Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Section 2; see also ibid., Alpha

Company, Section 2.

129. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; “Chronicle,” CG’s Personal

Journal, 26 March.

130. 3d Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2, Lima Company section.

131. 3d Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2; CanUeld intvw;

Dunahoe intvw, 27Aug08.

132. 3d Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2; 2d MEB ComdC,

Section 2, p. 5; 2d Bn, 8th Mar ComdC, item 2, p. 4,

item 3, p. 3-4, item 4, p. 3.

133. Finnegan intvw; CanUeld intvw; Dunahoe intvw,

17Sept08.

134. 1st Bn, 10th Mar ComdC.

135. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; Kennedy intvw, 22;

“Chronicle,” 26 March; 1st Bn, 10th Mar ComdC;

Starnes intvw.

136. “Chronicle,” 26 March; 1st Bn, 10th Marines ComdC.

137. Kennedy intvw, 22-23; Starnes intvw; CanUeld intvw.

138. 1st Bn, 10th Marines ComdC; Starnes intvw.

139. Kennedy intvw, 24-25.

140. CanUeld intvw.

141. 2d Bn, 8th Marines ComdC, part 2; Kennedy intvw, 23-

26. Maj Kennedy interviewed numerous Marines about

the incident that night and the following day. See also

Bonadonna’s narrative, 79-84, which is based on Col

Bonadonna’s interviews with Capt Grunwald;

Grunwald’s Urst sergeant, 1stSgt Michael Sprague; Maj

Alford, and Capt Eric Quehl, who was at the CP with

elements of his Company A, 2d Combat Engineers. Maj

Julian D. Alford intvw with Col Reed R. Bonadonna,

28Mar03 (MCHC); Capt Eric R. Quehl intvw with Col

Bonadonna, 4Apr03 (MCHC).

142. “Chronicle,” excerpt of MEF FRAGO 035-03, 27 March;

Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

143. Quotes from “Chronicle,” TF Tarawa INTSUM, 27

March.

144. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; CentCom investigation,

Grabowski testimony, p. J-85.

145. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

146. Ibid.

147. “Chronicle,” 27, 28 March.

148. Ibid., 29, 31 March.

149. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

150. Ibid; “Chronicle,” INTSUM for 27 and 29 March, I MEF

FRAGO 040-03, 28 March; “Chronicle,” 1 April.

151. Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; “Chronicle,” 30, 31 March.

152. 2d Mar ComdC, 2d Bn, 8th Marines ComdC, p. II-4.

153. 1st Bn, 10th Marines ComdC; Starnes intvw.

154. Ibid.

155. Col Paul B. Dunahoe, comments on draW manuscript,

9Feb09, author’s possession.

156. 3d Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2; Dunahoe intvws,

27Aug08 and 17Sept08; CanUeld intvw; 1st Lt. John D.

Bolt, Sgt Christopher M. Sharon, and Cpl Brandon D.

Maston intvw with Col Reed R. Bonadonna, 10Apr03

(MCHC), transcript, 6-11; hereaWer Bolt intvw.

157. Col Paul B. Dunahoe, comments on draW manuscript,

9Feb09, author’s possession.

158. Ibid.

159. Lowry, 362, 366, 368-69; Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; 3d

Bn, 2d Mar ComdC, Part 2, S-2 Intelligence.

160. Reilly intvw; Natonski intvw, 6Mar04; 1st Bn, 2d Mar

ComdC.

161. “Chronicle,” CG’s Personal Journal, 2 April; Natonski

intvw, 6Mar04.

162. “Chronicle;” 2 April; Natonski intvw, 6Mar04.

163. “Lessons Learned;” 2d Bn, 8th Mar ComdC; 3d Bn,

2dMar ComdC; 1stLt John D. Bolt, “Summary of

Actions of Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon

(STA) 3/2 During Operation Iraqi Freedom,” in

possession of Col Paul B. Dunahoe.

164. Finnegan intvw; Hawkins intvw.

165. Schielein intvw.

166. Bing West and MGen Ray L. Smith, Je March Up:

Taking Baghdad with the First Marine Division (New

York: Bantam Books, 2003), 41.

167. Reynolds, 81.

46 Battle of An-Nasiriyah
23 March - 2 April 2003 47
Back Cover: The logotype reproduced on the back cover has as its major element the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the

United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points, the

device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.
About the Author and Acknowledgments

Colonel John R. “Rod” Andrew Jr. is professor of history at Clemson University. He earned his doctorate in

history from the University of Georgia in 1997 and has published two scholarly historical monographs. He was a

Marine artillery oTcer in Operation Desert Storm and has served nearly four years as an active-duty oTcer and

more than 18 years in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Author Acknowledgments: Re bulk of the participant interviews used in this study were conducted by Colonel

Reed R. Bonadonna, who was imbedded as a Ueld historian with Task Force Tarawa during and aWer the anNasiriyah operation. Colonel Bonadonna also produced a manuscript that has not been published, but which was

helpful to this author.

In addition to the many participants who contributed their insights through the interviews cited in the notes,

some also made helpful comments on draWs of this manuscript. Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski and

Colonel Paul B. “Brent” Dunahoe oSered outstanding assistance in this regard, as well as providing source

documents and illustrations that the author otherwise would not have found. Re author also beneUted greatly

from interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Daniel T. CanUeld and Captain Gerald J. Finnegan Jr., who served under

Dunahoe as oTcers in 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, during the 2003 Iraq campaign. Dunahoe and Major William P.

Peeples contributed photographs.

Re author also wishes to thank numerous individuals at Marine Corps History Division for their assistance,

advice, and professionalism. Mr. Charles D. Melson, Chief Historian, oSered excellent advice and guidance on

earlier draWs of this work. Colonel Patricia D. Saint arranged an interview with Lieutenant General Natonski and

shared information and resources that applied to this project as well as to hers. Mr. Kenneth H. Williams, Mr.

Anthony R. Taglianetti, and Mr. Vincent J. Martinez were very helpful, knowledgeable, and patient in their

respective roles as editor, oral historian, and graphic designer. Lieutenant Colonels JeSrey R. Riley and David A.

BenhoS and Dr. Nathan S. Lowrey provided administrative support, advice, and encouragement.

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC

2009

PCN 10600000700

A U.S. Marine observes destruction in the city of Nasiriyah, April 2003.

Photo by LCpl Bryan J. Nealy