Se e Ze ifm an v . M ic he ls , 21 2 S.W. 3d

58 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin

20 06 , p e t. d e nie d) ; se e als o 1 In re Zeifman , N o . 0 3 -0 6 -0 0 6 0 1 -C V, s l i p o p . at 1 -2 (T ex . Ap p . — Au s t i nNo v . 2 2 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( o ri g. pro ceed ing ) ( me m. o p. ); In re Zeifman , N o . 0 3

- 0 7

- 0 0 0 7 5

- C V , s l i p o p . a t1 ( T e x. A p p .—Au sti n Mar. 16 , 2 00 7, or ig . p ro c e e din g ) (m e mo. op .)

. We have take n judi c ia l noti c e of our fi le s f ro m th e se prior re lated proc eeding s. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 598 -CV

Cl iffor d Z e ifm an , A ppe lla nt

v. Sheryl Diane Michels and Au stin In dependent S chool District , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-06- 0029 30 , HO NORAB LE WI LLIAM E. BENDER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N

This appea l arises within a st atutory scheme intended to ensure the best intere sts of children f ollowing their

pare nts’ divorce . I t also impli cate s the principles underly ing our adver sarial sy stem, which we trust to ensure ju s t i ce an d t ruth under our law throug h the re fining of issues

a c hie ve d w he n p art ie s and the ir a ble a dv oc a te s r e c e ive the ir “ da y in c ourt ” un de r f

a ir pr oc e dure s. Ex -spouses Shery

l Mic hels and Clifford Z eifman, aided by their respe ctive l eg al teams, ar e embroiled in a controve rsy conce rning the best interests of their two children, A.A. and G.L . The ba ckg round of this controve rsy is detailed in our opi nions in prior proc eeding s that have

ari se n f ro m it in r e c e nt m on ths

. To summarize, Michels and Z eifman “ have pur sued extensive and 1In re Zeifman , No. 03-06-00601- CV, slip op. at 2. 2 In re Zeifman , No. 03-07-00075- CV, slip op. at 1. 3 In re Zeifman , No. 03-06-601- CV, slip op. at 2. W e also obser v ed that “A.A.’s 4 pare nts—not the courts or other third parties—a

re in the be st positi on, perha ps with the assistance of a c ompetent mediator, to make that deter mination in A.A.’s best interests, ther eby avoiding extensive a

nd acr imonious litigation that c ould adver sely impact A.A., their

other c hild, each othe r, and possibly

others.” 2 acr imonious l itigation over which [ elementa ry ] school A.A. should attend,” a c on fl ic t th a t e vid e ntl y 2 h a s s p r e a d

t o o t h e r i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g b o t h A

. A

. an d a s e c o n d c h i l d , G

. L. I nformed by

the har sh tenor 3 of t he li tigation and lega l expenses that, the record of these procee dings revea l, are spiraling into the hundreds of

thousands of dollars, we have pr eviously sug g ested that “ the adve rsar ial proce sses of

our cour t sy st em , ” at l east when utiliz ed in this manner, “ may not be the best mea

ns” of e ither de c idi ngwh ic h s c ho ol A .A . s ho uld a tte nd or of e ns ur ingthi s y oungc hil d’ s b e st i nte re sts

. 4 This latest appea l involves a contention by Z eifman that Mich el s an d her la wy ers soug ht to advance their intere sts by unethically

circ umvent ing the proce dural prote ctions that our adver sari al j u s tice sy stem provides him. The conduc t he alleg es is indeed disturbing . I n our Au g u s t 4 , 2 0 0 6 o p in io n in Ca u s e N o . 0 3

- 0 5

- 0 0 5 3 3

- CV , w e h e ld th a t, o n th e r e c o r d b e f o r e u s , the district court had a

bused its discretion in modify ing the compre hensive terms of the par ties’ orig inal ag ree d divorce decr ee to g ive Michels sole powe r to make e ducational de cisions on behalf of A.A. Se e Ze ifm an v . M

ic he ls , 2 12 S.W. 3d

58 2, 59 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —Au st in 200 6, pe t. d e nie d) ; id . at 59 6 (P e mbe rt on , J., c on c ur ri ng ). Duri ng the pe ri od in whic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r w a s in e ff e c t, Michels had e x erc ised her authority to w ithdraw A.A. from the Austin Independe nt School District’ s (AI SD) Br

y ker Woods Elementar

y , the s ch o ol in which the orig inal ag ree d divorce decr ee ha dMic he ls ple a de d that she “ a c kn ow le dg e s th a t on 4 Augus t 20 06 the Th ir d Co ur t of Ap pe a ls 5 issued an opinion r ever sing the decision of the trial court with r espec t to the 27 M ay 2 0 0 5 order [m o d if yin g th e o r ig in a l d iv o r c e d e c r e e to g iv e h e r s o le a u th o r it y o v e r A

. A

. ’ s e d u c a ti o n a l d e c is io n s ]. Howeve r, Sheryl Michels ad v i s es t h is Court that mandate has not bee n issued with respec t to the Court of Appea ls’ ruling and that, ac cording ly , the 27 May 2005 order

is stil l valid and enf

orce able.” This proposition is incorre ct as a matter of law. See Flanary v. W ade , 113 S.W . 8, 10 (Tex. 1908) (upon is s u an c e o f a

p p e ll a te o p in io n r e v e r s in g tr ia l c o u rt’ s in ju n c ti o n , in ju n c ti o n c e a s e d to be e nf or c e a ble by c onte mpt ); se e als o I

n r e Bo ha rt , 743 F.2d 31 3 , 3 1 9 -2 1 (5th Cir. 1984); Humble Ex

ploration Co. v. W

alker , 6 4 1 S. W. 2 d

9 4 1 , 9 4 3 ( T e x. A p p . — D a ll a s 1 982, orig . proce eding ). Th is s tand ingor de r, a

pp lic a ble to “ e ve ry

div or c e su it a

nd e ve ry su it a ff e c tin g the pa

re nt- 6 c hil d r e la tio ns hip fi le d in Tr a vis County” a ft e r Janu ary 1, 20 05 , p ro hib its pa

rt ie s, “ wh ile the laws uit is pending befor e the c ourt,” fr om actions including “[d] isrupting or withdrawingthe childre n from the school or da

y -ca re f acility wher e the childre n are prese ntly enrolled, w ithout the written ag ree ment of both pare nts or an o rd er of this Court.” See Travis Co. Standing O rder Reg arding Children, Property

and C o nduct of the Par ties (Travis Co. Dist . Clerk’s F ile No. 121,012 (L ocal Rules and O rder s)) (e ffe ctive Jan. 1, 2005). Although the parties’ 1997 divorce decr ee predated the standing order , Michels alleg ed that Z eifman had made himself subject to the order by f i l i n g a c r o s s - p e t i t i o ni na

s e c o n d m o d i f i c a t i o np r o c e e d i n g s h e h a d i n i t i a t e d i n2 0 0 5 c o n c e r

n i n g G

. L. 3 requir ed t h e child to be enrolled, and e nrolled her in St. Andrews. Zeifman , 212 S.W .3d at 586. After we had rele ased our opinion but befor e mandate issued, Mic hels sued AI SD seekinginjunctive relief to preve nt the district from per mitti ng Z eifman to e nroll A.A. at B ry ker W oods or any

other AI SD s c ho ol a s th e 20 06 sc ho ol ye ar be g an. Mic he ls a lle g e d th a t pe rm itt ingsu c h e nr oll me nt w ou ld (1) violate Mic hels’s exclusive pare ntal rig hts (at least unti l the mandate in No. 05- 533-CV issued) 5 to ma k e e d u c a ti o n a l d e c is io n s o nb e h a lf o f A

. A

. an d ( 2 ) “ a c ti v e ly a s s is t[ ]

. . . an d a id [] a n d a b e t[ ] Clifford Z eifman in the violation of a val i d co u rt o rder,” a D ece mber 17, 2004, standingorder g ov e rn ingTr a vis County

fa mil y law c a se s. 6 Whil e Miche ls’s new law s u i t was direc ted at contr olling Z eifman’ s actions—and de sp ite the fa c t th a t he wa s A .A .’ s f a the r, joi nt- mana g ingc on se rv a tor , a nd her op po sin g pa

rt y in ong oing litig ation conce rning A.A.’s e ducation—Miche ls did not name Z eifman a s a par ty . Z eifmanThe publicly available State Ba

r of Te x as publications from this course state that it was 7 held betwe en August 14-17, 2006. Th is da te c or

re sp on ds to the da

y a ft e r the 20 06 State B ar Adva nc e d Famil y

L aw C ours e 8 was sche duled to end. 4 repr esents that, eve n worse, Mic hels soug ht to avoid his notice or dete ction by deliberately

filing he r laws uit on a day —M on day , Augus t 14 —o n w hic h “ She ry l and he r atto rn e y s w e re awa

re ” fr om a

vaca ti o n le tt e r an d p r io r c o r r e s p o n d e n c e “ th a t Cl if

f o r d ’ s a tt o r

n e y w a s o u t o f to w n a tt e n d in g the Advanc ed F amily

L aw Course in San Antonio.” 7 At 2:48 p.m. on August 14, Miche ls obtained an e x parte temporar y restra ining or der ag ainst AI SD. On the following Fr iday , Aug ust 18, Z eifman filed a petiti on in intervention, motion 8 to dismi ss, and mot ion for sanctions. Z eifman pleaded that he had a justiciable intere st in Michels’s

new lawsuit as A.A.’s fathe r and co- manag ing c onservator, and a s responde nt and counter -petitioner in t he on g oin g lit ig a tio n. Z e if man mo ve d to dis mis s Mi c he ls’ s su it a s an im pr op e r atte mpt

to circ umvent the di strict court’s jurisdiction over the divorce de cre e and this Court’s jurisdiction over “the issue of

[A.A.’s] education.” Z eifman a lso urg ed that Michels’s attempt to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction wa s inconsistent with the positi on she had taken only a few months earlier in a

se c on d mo dif

ic a tio n p ro c e e din g sh e ha d in iti a te d und e r the div or c e de c re e in 2 00 5. Spe c if ic a lly , in response to a counter -petition from Z eifman to modify the educ ational-c hoice por tions of the decr ee, Michels had f

iled a plea

to the jurisdiction asser t i n g t h at t he district cour t lacked subje ct matter jurisdiction ove r the counter -petition while the appea l of the decr ee modifications in N o. 05-533 wa s pending . The district cour t the n “ag ree [d] that it has no jurisdiction to m odify the orde r addr essing the educ ation of [A.A.] beca use of the curr ent appea l of that matter” but overrule d Michels’s pleaOr de r o n Pl e a to t he Juri sd ic tio n o f S hery l Di ane Mic he ls, Ma y 24 , 2 00 6. On

a pp e a l, 9 Z eifman points out that Michels subsequently made similar ar g uments in the district court, af ter she fi le d a pe tit ion fo r re vie w of thi s Cour t’ s judg me nt in the su

pr e me c ourt , in

re sis tin g his e ff

or ts t o enfor ce his rig hts under the or igina l divorce de cre e. 5 be c a us e it “ re ta ins jur isd ic tio n w ith re sp e c t to a ll o the r a sp e c ts o f t he pa re nt- c hil d r e latio ns hip a s to both children unde r Chapter s 155 and 156 of the T exas Family Code.” 9 Z eifman soug ht sanctions under r ule 13 of the Te x as Rules of Civil P ro cedur e, chapte rs 9 and 10 of

the civil prac tice and r emedies c ode, and the distric t co urt’s inhere nt power. He c omp la ine d ch ief

ly tha t Mi c he ls h a d f

ile d a “ fr ivo lou s a

nd g ro un dle ss” se pa

rate su it a g a ins t AI SD, rather

than see king r elief in the divorc e and custody case , to circumve nt the jurisdiction of the district court and this Court, and in a manner deliberately calc ulated to avoid his knowledg e or pa rt ic ipatio n f

or a sh or t, b ut c ri tic a l, p e ri od

of tim e . Z e if

man argue s that the se ta c tic s, c ou ple d w ith subsequent eve nts, revea l Michels’s sole desig n to ha ve been delay

. He r epre sents that he had be en schedule d to have c ustody of A.A. dur ing the wee k of August 14, that classes at Br y ker Woods wer e to beg in on Aug ust 15, and that custody was sc h ed u l ed to re turn to Michels the following wee k. Thus, Z eifman ma intains, Michels filed what pr oved to be a “one- wee k lawsuit” sol ely to preve nt hi m fro m enr oll ingA. A. duri nghis c us tod y we e k a nd to “ buy tim e ” un til c us tod

y re tur ne d to Michels the following wee k and she c ould enroll A.A. in St. Andrews.

A hea ring on Z eifman’ s intervention, motion to d is mi s s , a n d mo ti o n f o r s a n c tions was

se t on the thi rd bu sin e ss day the re a ft e r, Wed ne sd ay , Augus t 23 . O n M on da y , Augus t 21 , M ic he ls filed a rule 11 ag ree ment with A I SD, dated Aug ust 18, wher eby the district a g ree d not to permit A.A. to be enr olled at or attend B ry ker Woods “until such time as [AI SD] is presente d with a final, non-6

appea lable orde r exp ressly authorizing such e nrollment and attenda nce,” in return f

or Michels’s ag ree ment to dismi ss her pe nding suit. Michels filed a notice of non-suit on Aug ust 22 and, on the da y of the he ari ng , f

ile d a mot ion to st ri ke Zeif

man’ s in te rv e nti on . A ft e r a he ari ngin whic h o nly

argume nt w a s p re se nte d, the dis tr ic t c ourt sig ne d a n “ Or de r Con fi rm ing No ns uit ” and , b y se pa rate

or de r, g ra nte d M ic he ls’ s mo tio n to str ike int e rv e nti on , d ism iss ed as moo t Z e if man’ s mo tio n to dismiss , and denie d Z eifman’ s motion for sanctions.

Z e if man b ri ng s tw o is su e s, c on te nd ing that the dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d its dis c re tio n in striking his interve ntion and in denying his sanc tions mot ion. We ag ree that the district court a bused its dis c re tio n in

str iki ng Z e if

man’ s inte rv e nti on . F ur

the rm or e , be c a

us e thi s r uli ngwa s und isp ute dly a p r e d ic a te f

o r th e d is tr ic t c o u r

t’ s r u li n g o nZ e if

ma n ’ s s an c ti o n s mo ti o n , w e r e ma n d Z e if ma n’s sanctions motion for furthe r proc eeding s.

As this Court has previously observe d, the right of interve ntion is ul timately rooted in equity

. Highlands Ins. Co. v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. , 794 S.W .2d 600, 601 (T ex . Ap p .—Austin 1990, no pet.) (“ The rig ht of intervention is an e quitable rig ht. I t does not depend upon a rule or statute for its e x istence.” ). This rig ht is recog nized in rule 60 of the Te x as R u l e s o f C i v i l P ro ce d

u re , wh i ch p ro v i d es t h at “[ a] n y p ar t y m ay i n t erv en e b y

fi l i n g a p l ea d i n g, subject to beingstricken by t h e co u rt for suf ficient c ause on the motion of any party .” Te x. R. C iv. P. 6 0; see H ighlands Ins. Co. , 794 S.W .2d at 601-02. Sufficient ca

use exists for striking an intervention when a would-be inter

venor f ace d with a mot ion to strike cannot demonstrate a j usticiable intere st in the lawsuit. Mende z v. Brewer , 62 6 S. W.2 d 4 98 , 4 99 -5 00 (T e x. 19 82 ); see Law Offices of W indle Turle

y, P.C. v. Ghiasinejad ,7

109 S.W .3d 68, 70 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2003, no pet.); Mc Cor d v . W att s , 777 S.W .2d 809, 812 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

19 89 , n o w ri t) . T his jus tic ia bl e inte re st m ay

be e ith e r l e g a l or

e qu ita ble in nature b u t m u s t b e prese nt and not mere ly remote or

conting ent. Mende

z , 626 S.W .2d at 499; Mc Cor d , 7 77 S.W. 2d

a t 81 1- 12 (“ An int e rv e no r mus t show so me pr e se nt l e g a l or e qu ita ble int e re st in t he su bje c t matt e r wh ic h mak e s it pr op e r fo r h im t o p art ic ipate in t he pr oc e e din g s. ” ). Th is i nte re st is “ana logous to that essential for a par ty to maintain or defe nd an ac tion.” Mc Cor d , 777 S.W .2d at 81 1- 12 (c iti ng 1 M c Do na ld, Te xas C ivi l Pr a c tic e § 3 .4 7 ( 19 81 e d. )) ; se e als o La w O ffi c es o f W ind le Turley , 1 09 S.W. 3d

a t 70 (“ A p art

y ha s a jus tic ia ble int eres t in a law su it, and thu s a ri g ht t o intervene , when his intere sts will be affe cted by the litigation.”) . Whether an inter venor posse sses a present j usticiable i ntere st is deter mined, in the first instance, by the fa cts alleg ed in the petition in in t er v en t i o n, which “a lso should be construed a long w ith the alleg ations of fa ct set for th in the pleading s of the other

parties.” Mc Cor

d , 777 S.W .2d at 812. W h i l e t h e d et ermination of whe t h er a j u s t i ci ab l e i n t er es tex i s t s b as edo nt h e p l ea d i n gs would appea

r to prese nt a pure question of law, cf. Texas Park s & W ildlif e De pt. v. Miranda , 13 3 S. W.3 d 2 17 , 2 26 -2 7 (T e x. 20 04 ), the ult imate de te rm inatio n of wh e the r a n in te rv e nti on

sh ou ld be struck, e ven if a

justiciable interest is shown, has longbeen he ld to be vested in th e sound discretion of the trial court. Mende z , 626 S.W .2d at 499 (“It is settled law that a motion to strike an int e rv e nti on is a dd

re sse d to the so un d d isc re tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt .” ); Law Off

ices of W indle Turley , 10 9 S. W.3 d at 70 ; Mc Cor d , 777 S.W .2d at 812. We acc ording ly revie w a trial court’ s decision on a motion to strike an interve ntion for abuse of discre tion. See I n re Lu mb erme ns Mut. Cas. Co. , 184 S.W .3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2006) (citing Guaranty Fed. Sav . Bank v . Horseshoe O perating Co. ,8

79 3 S. W.2 d 6 52 , 6 57 (T e x. 19 90 ))

. An a bu se of dis c re tio n d e no te s “ a c t[in g ] wit ho ut r e fe re nc e to g uiding r ules or princ iples; in other words . . . the a ct was a rbitrar y or unre aso nable.” W

orford v. Stamper , 801 S.W .2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990).

Du ri ng or a l a rg ument, Mi chel s co nced ed t hat Zeifm an had sh ow n a jus tic ia ble int e re st in her suit ag ainst AI SD, at l east at its inception. Ze ifman’s justiciable inter est is obvious from the fac e of his petition, if not from Michels’s own pe tition. M ichels’s suit soug ht to prevent Z eifman from enr olling A.A. in B ry ker W oods or ot her AI SD schools. Both Z eifman a nd Michels pleade d that Z e if man is A. A. ’s fa

the r. Z e if man p le a de d th a t he was jo in t ma na g ingc on se rv a tor ; Mi c he ls reque sted the district court to take judicial notice of the file in their divorce case , which demonstrated Z e if man’ s jo int

mana g ingc on se rv a tor sh ip. B oth Z e if man and Mic he ls re c ounte d th e his tor y of the ir litigation conc erningwher e A.A. should attend elementa ry school, in c lu d in g

th e opinion of this court

re ve rs ingthe dis tr ic t court ’s or de r g ra nti ng Mic he ls sol e c on tr ol o ve r A .A .’ s e du c a tio na l de c isi on s. Michels furthe r alleg ed that she a nd Z eifman ha d eac h filed additional motions to modi fy the divorce decr ee a nd wer e cur

rently litigating these issues. Even if Z eifman demonstrated a justiciable interest in he r suit, Miche ls contends, he has not demonstrate d that the distri ct court abused its discretion in striking his interve ntion. She relies on the proposition that “[i] t is only an abuse of the trial court’ s discretion to strike a pe tition in intervention if the intervenor : (1) could have broug ht the same a ction, or any part of it, in its own name; (2) the i nterve ntion would not complicate the case by excessively

multipl ying the issues; and (3 ) t he int e rv e nti on

is a lmo st essen tia l to e ff e c tiv e ly pr ote c t th e int e rv e no r’ s in te re st. ” Mic he ls derive s these princ iples from the Te x as Suprem e C o u rt ’s dec ision in Guaranty Fede ral

.9

See 79 3 S. W.2 d at 65 7; see also Inte rmarque Auto Prod., Inc . v. Fe ldman , 21 S.W

. 3 d 5 4 4, 549 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2000, no pet.). Applying he r cha rac terization of the Guaranty Fede ral ho ldi ng , M ic he ls c on te nd s th a t “ Z e if man c ou ld n ot have br ou g ht the same a c tio n ag a ins t th e Au sti n I ndepende nt School District that [ she] filed,” which she depicts as seekingto protect he r per sonal rig hts as a par ent to solely

control A.A.’ s educational decisions (which she could continue to enf orce , in her view , until this Court’s mandate issued in the previously pending litigation) and rig hts unique to her unde r the Tr avis County standing o rd er . Michels adds that Z eifman’ s suit would have “complicated” he r ca se by i n t er j ectingissues—specific ally , a motion to dism iss and a motion for sanctions—that wer e not raised by the orig inal parties. She further emphasizes that Z eifman did not make a rec ord of the district c ourt’s proc eeding s, nor re quest finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, requiringus to assume that the di strict court found all fac tual issues in support of any leg al g round t h at could have supported its order

. See F eldman v. M

arks , 9 6 0 S. W. 2 d 6 1 3 , 6 1 4 ( T e x. 1996); Land v. AT & S Transp., Inc. , 947 S.W .2d 665, 668 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ denied).

Michels misconstrues the Gu aran ty Fe de ra l holding in seve ra l way s. I n that case , the Texas Supreme Court first held that a trial court a

bused its discretion in striking a n intervention sua sponte, as r

ule 60 presumptively permitted an inter vention unless a motion to strike was filed. 793 S.W .2d at 657 (c iting Te x . R. Civ. P . 60). The supr eme c ourt went on to obser ve:

Fur thermore , under Rule 60, a person o r en t i t y

has the rig ht to intervene if the intervenor

could have broug ht the same a ction, or any part ther eof, in his own name , o r , i f t h e a c t i o n h a d b e e nb r o u g h ta g a i n s t h i m , h e w o u l d

b e a b l e t o d e f e a tr e c o v e r

y, or some par

t thereof . The intere st asserted by the interve nor may b e leg al or equitable. Althoug h the trial cour t has broad discr etion in determining whether an int e rv e nti on

sh ou ld b e str ic ke n, it i s an a bu se of dis c re tio n to st ri ke a

ple a in intervention if (1) the interve nor mee ts the abo v e t es t, (2) the inter vention will notLumbermens M utual involved the appe llate interve ntion of an insurer afte r i ts insured, for 10 wh om i t had pa id the a

pp e a l bo nd , a

ba nd on e d p ote nti a lly

dis po sit ive iss ue s im

pa c tin g c la ims wi thi n the scope of cove rag e. S

e e I n r e Lu m b e rm e n s M

utual , 1 8 4 S.W .3d 718, 720-21 (Te x . 2006). The supreme c ourt d et er m i n ed that the insurer had invoked “ the equitable doc trine” of virtual repr esentation, and then considered “othe r fa ctors [that] may weig h ag ainst allowing intervention a ft e r f ina l ju dg me nt h a s b e e n r e nd e re d, inc ludin g t he len gth of tim e the ins ur e r h a d k

no wn of its interest in the case befor e attempting to intervene , the extent of prejudice the exist ing pa rties may su ff e r f ro m th e wo uld -b e int erve no r’ s d e lay , th e e xten t of pr e jud ic e to t

he wo uld -b e int e rv e no r i f int e rv e nti on is de nie d, and the e xiste nc e of

unus ua l c ir c ums tanc e s mi lit a tin g fo r o r a g a ins t a deter mination that the application is timely .” Id . at 726. The supr eme court held t hat t he court of appea ls abused its discretion in ref using to a llow the intervention. Id . at 729.

10 complicate the case by

an excessive multiplication o f t h e issues, and ( 3) the int e rv e nti on

is a lmo st e sse nti a l to e ff

e c tiv e ly pr ote c t th e int e rv e no r’ s in te re st.

Id . ( int e rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) . T he su pr e me c ourt

he ld t hat th e se c on dit ion s w e re me t in that c a se and that, ac cording ly , the dis trict court ha d abused its discre tion in st riking the intervention. Id. at 757-58.

Whil e Gu aran ty

Fe de ra l does identify

a set of equitable conditions under which the striking of

an interve ntion would b e an abuse of discre tion, it does not, contrary to Michels’s

asser tion, establish the “only ” or e x clusive circ umstances in whic h t hat would be so. See In re Lumberm ens Mutual , 1 84 S.W. 3d a t 72 2- 29 (b a se d o n b a lanc ingof dif fe re nt e qu ita

ble considerations, concluding that court of a ppeals ha d abused its discre tion in barring intervention on

a pp e a l) ; see also In re Es ta te of Y or k , 951 S.W .2d 122, 126 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, 10 no pet.) (“ [W ]e questio n wh et h er t he g ener al rule of Guaranty Fede ral , w hic h a llo ws so me discretion to strike the inter vention, even a

pplies to a probate proce eding in which intere sted parties attempt to assert c laims which will otherwise be adjudicate d ag ainst them in their absenc e.”)

.We th u s re j ec t Michels’s contention that “[a] proper inter vention require s that the 11 intervenor

be see king some sort of af firmative r elief f

rom the cour

t.” 11 F u rth e r mo r e , M ic h e ls b o th

mi s s tate s th e f

ir s t e le me n t o f

the Gu a r anty Fede ral fr a me wo rk and mis a

pp lie s it. Th is e le me nt is n ot l imi te d to wh e the r t he wo uld -b e int e rv e no r “ c ou ld have br ou g ht t

he same a c tio n, or

any pa rt of it, in i ts o wn

name ,” a s Mi c hel s st ate s, bu t a lso is

satis fi e d “ if

the a c tio n h a d b e e n b ro ug ht a g a ins t hi m, h e wo uld be a ble to de fe a t re c ov e ry , or

so me part ther eof.” Moreove r, the first ele ment of the Guaranty Fede ral framework is not as re strictive 11

a s Mi c he ls s ug g e sts : The re quirement [for interve ntion] has been stated, not exhaustively , to demand that “the intervenor’ s interest . . . be suc h, that if the orig inal action had ne ver be en commence d, and he ha d first broug ht i t as the sole plaintiff, he would have be en e nti tle d to re c ov e r i n h is ow n name to the e xten t a t le a st of a pa rt of the re lie f s ou g ht; or if the action had f

irst been br oug ht ag ainst him, he would have be en able to defe at a r e c o v e r y , in p art a t l east.” Thesta te me nt, a u se ful gu ide , d oe s n ot r e ac h a ll situati ons. I t does not cover , for e x ample, the case in which the interve nor-de fenda nt could not have be en sued dire ctly , y et a judgme nt for plaintiff may lead to an a ction over a g ainst the intervenor or otherw ise seriously

prejudice the interve nor, and the intervenor ’s interve ntion is nece ssary to assure proper defe nse of the claim. Nor does it me e t the sit

uatio n in whic h th e int e rv e no r a sse rt s a c la im a dv e rs e to b oth

pa rt ie s, though in spe cial cir cumstance s such an inter vention may

be prope r . . . . 1 Roy W. M cD o n ald & Elaine A. G raf ton Carlson, Texas Civi l Practice § 5.80, at 967-68 (2 d e d. 20 04 ) (c itatio ns omi tte d) (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Citi ng thi s c omm e nta ry wi th a pp ro va l, w e he ld in McCord that w hil e a

c hil d’ s g ra

nd pa re nts in t hat c a se c ou ld n ot h a ve ini tiate d a n o ri ginal su it

a ff e c tin g the pa

re nt- c hil d r e latio ns hip , th e y did po sse ss a jus tic ia ble int e re st i n t

h e i r gr a n d c h i l d ’s be st interests that could support interve ntion in the divorce a nd custod y s u i t initiated by the child’s pare nts. Mc Cor

d , 7 77 S.W. 2d

a t 81 1- 13 ; se e als o J

e nk ins v . En te rg

yCor p ., 187 S.W .3d 785, 797W e fi n d i t i n t er es t i n g t h at M i ch el s wo u l d d ec ry Zei fm an ’s i n t erv en t i o nas “c o mp l i ca t i n g” 12 thei r l i t i gat ion by

“multiplication” of issues wher e she ha s done pre cisely that by fore g oing the pa rt ie s’ on g oin g pr oc e e din g s und e r t he div or c e de c re e and

fi lin g a re la te d b ut s e pa

rate laws uit (lea ding to a

separ ate a

ppeal) , ensnar ing a

third party in her domestic dispute, y et oddly not naming Z e if man a s a pa rt y in t hat se pa rate pr oc e e din g—w ho , s he a c kn ow le dg e d a t or a l argume nt, c le arl y had a j u s t i ci ab l e interest. I f interve ntion is ul timately an equitable conce pt, Highlands Ins. Co. v. Lumberman’

s Mut. Cas. Co. , 7 94 S.W. 2d 60 0, 60 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 90 , n o p e t.) , M ic he ls arguably would be estopped from arg uing that Z eifman’ s intervention would have complicated or excessively

multipl ied the issues in litigation. 12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denie d) (“Eve n wher e an intervenor has not or could not have b e e n s u e d d ir e c tl y , if a ju d g me n t f o r th e p la in ti f

f ma y le a d to an a c ti o n a g a in s t th e in te r v e n o r or oth e rw ise se ri ou sly

pr e jud ic e the int e rv e no r, the int e rv e nti on is n e c e ssa

ry to a ssu re a pr op e r d e fe ns e

a g a ins t th e c la im. ” ). We c on c lud e that e ve n if Z e if man c ou ld n ot a sse rt

pr e c ise ly the same c la ims

or de fe ns e s a s Mic he ls an d A I SD, he po sse sse d a jus tic ia ble int e re st i n th e su it, and wa s p ote nti a lly prejudice d by

it, in a manner that satisfies the equitable considerations unde rlying the first eleme nt of the Gu aran ty

Fe de ra l analy sis. W e likewise r ejec t Michels’s contenti o n s that Z eifman’ s intervention to protec t his interests and join issue with Mic hels would “complicate” the litigation or “e x ce s s i v el y

multipl y ” the issues re lative to the bene fits his participation would yield. Mc Cor d , 777 S.W .2d at 812 (trial c ourt had discr etion to determ i n e that g randpa rents’ inter

vention “may enhanc e [its] ability

to ad j u d i ca t e wh at is in the best interest of the child.”). The district cour t 12 would have a

bused its discretion in striking his interve ntion on these g rounds. Mic he ls u lti mate ly

re lie s o n th e fa c t th a t sh e su bs e qu e ntl y

no n- su ite d h e r c la ims ag ainst AI SD, sug g esting that this tactic ex tinguished any justiciable interest Ze ifman m ight have possessed in the ac tion at its i nception, see Potash Corp . of Saskatchewan, Inc . v. Manc ias , 94 2 S. W.2 d 6 1, 63 -6 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 97 , n o w ri t) , o r o the rw ise div e ste d h im o f h is13

rig ht to intervene. Miche ls overlooks the fa ct that Z eifman f iled his intervention on Au g ust 18, wh ile sh e did

no t f ile he r n on -s uit

un til the fo llo wi ng we e k. As of the tim e of Mic he ls’ s n on -s uit , Z eifman, a s w e h a v e d e te r mi n e d , w a s a p r o p e r p arty

. M ic h e ls ’ s n o n - s u it th u s c o u ld n o t d e f

e a t or rende r moot his claims for sanc tions and for attorney ’s fe es under rule of c ivil procedure 13, and sections 9 and 10 of

the civil prac tice and r emedies c ode. Allstate Ins. C o . v. He llman , 159 S.W .3d 640, 642-43 (Te x . 2005) (whe re me rits of UDJA claim were rende red moot, claim for attorney ’s fe es “‘ breathes life’ into this appea l and pre vents it from b ei n g m o o t .”) ( quoting Camerena v . Texas Emplo ym ent Comm’n , 7 54 S.W. 2d 14 9, 15 1 ( Te x. 19 88 )) ; TriM Erectors, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructor s , I n c. , 788 S.W .2d 906, 907-08 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

19 90 , w ri t de nie d) ; see Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 62 (“ Any dis mis sa l pu

rs ua nt t o th is r ule shall not prejudice the rig ht of an adver se party to be hear d on a pending claim for a ffirmative relief

or excuse the pay

ment of all costs taxed by the cler k. A dismiss al under this rule shall have no e ffe ct on any motion for sanctions, attorney ’s fee s or other costs pending at the time of dismissal . . . .”).

For these re asons, we hold that the district c ourt abused its d i s cretion in striki ng Z ei f ma n ’ s in te r v e n ti o n , a c c o r d in g ly

s u s ta in Z e if ma n ’ s f ir s t i s s u e , an d

r e v e r s e th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’s striking of

the interve ntion. During oral argument, Michels conce ded that the district cour t’s order de nying sanc tio ns wa s ne c e ssa ri ly pr e dic a te d u

po n it s o rd e r s tr iki ngZ e if man’ s in te rv e nti on . T hu s,

we a lso re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r d e nyingsa nc tio ns and

re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. Reg ardingsanctions, rule 13 of the Te xa s Ru le s of Civil P roce dure a llows a trial cour t t o i mp o s e s an ct i o n s aga i n s tan at t o rn ey , a re p re s en t ed p ar t y , o r bo t h , wh o fi l e gro u n d l es s p l ea d i n gs b r o u g h ti nb a d

f a i t h o r b r o u g h tf

o r t h e p u r p o s e o f h ar a s s m e n t

. T e x . R

. C i v . P

. 1 3

. A d d i t i o n a l l y,We note that Z eifman did not obta in a repor ter’s r ecor d below, nor r equests finding s of 13 fac t a nd conclusions of law. As Michels observe s, such device s enable an appe llate cour t to review a tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g s to awa rd (o r n ot a wa rd ) s anc tio ns . 14 c ha pte r 1 0 o f t

he Civ il Pr a c tic e s and Re me die s Cod e a llo ws a tr ia l c ourt

to i mpo se sa

nc tio ns a g a ins t

a pe rs on , p art

y , o r b oth fo r a dv anc ingfr ivo lou s p le a din g s o r m oti on s. Te x. Civ . Prac. & Re m. Code Ann. §§ 10.001(1) , .004(a) (West 2002). I n light of our obser vation that Michels’s conduc t as alleg ed by

Z eifman “ is indeed di sturbing,” the di strict court on remand should ca ref ully consider the fa cts known by

Mich el s at t he time she filed suit ag ainst AI SD when dete rmining w hether sanctions ar e appr opriate. See Law Offices of W indle Turley, P.C. v. Frenc h , 164 S.W .3d 487, 490- 94 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 200 5, no pe t.) (u ph old ingsanc tio ns or de r whe re law f ir m f ile d s uit a g a ins t fo rm e r c lie nts fo r i mpr op e r p ur po se ); Martin v. Zieba , No . 03-03-00584- CV, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 3742, at *9-*13 (Te x . App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) ( m em . op.) (upholding

sanc tio ns or de r wh e re hu sb and fi le d ple a din g s in c hil d c us tod y c a se fo r imp ro pe r p ur

po se ); se e als o Low v . H e nr y , 50 Tex. S up. J . 606, 2007 Tex. L EXI S 320, *6-*17 (Tex. Apr. 20, 2007). 13

____________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Reverse d and Remande d Filed: May

11, 2007