* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate recor d, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. Se e Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered su bmitted without oral argument. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 12 2002 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DERMICO DEON WRIGHT, Petitioner - Apellant, vs. REGINALD HINES, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 01-5209 (D.C. No. 99-CV-561-C) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , McKAY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner-Appellant Dermico Deon Wright, an inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowi ng him to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Mr. Wright has failed to make “a s ubstantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we deny- 2 -

his request and dismiss the appeal. Mr. Wright was convicted by a jury of unlawful deli very of a controlled drug after one previous conviction and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. His conviction resulted from an informant purchasin g $60 worth of crack cocaine from him at a local crack house. The informant, An gela Cullom was a convicted felon working for the Tulsa Police Department in or der to gain a dismissal of new charges that would have resulted in substantial pri son time. On direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”), Mr. Wright raised two claims: (1) the trial court committed reversible error in overruling Mr. Wright’s motion for a directed verdict based on a lack of su fficient evidence, and (2) the prosecutor improperly vouched for the State’s witne ss again committing reversible error. In a summary opinion, the OCCA a ffirmed the judgment and
sentence. Mr. Wright filed a petition for a writ of habeas c orpus in federal district court raising the same two claims that the OCCA den ied: (1) denial of a motion for a directed verdict was reversible error due to a lack of sufficient evidence, and (2) the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument we re unduly prejudicial and thus Mr. Wright was wrongly convicted. The district cou rt considered these claims and denied his petition. Mr. Wright again raises the same two issues before this court on appeal.- 3 -

Both claims were presented to the OCCA and denied b y that court in a summary opinion. As such, a writ of habeas corpus may issu e only if the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was c ontrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Fe deral law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resultedin a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in li ght of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1)– (2); Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). Further, the fact that th e OCCA denied relief to Mr. Wright in a summary opinion has no effect on the de ference we owe to the state court’s result. See Aycox v. Lytle , 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Wright’s first claim was that denial of a motio n for a directed verdict was reversible error. According to Mr. Wright, his conviction was based on insufficient evidence. In evaluating a sufficiencyof evidence claim, the Supreme Court held that it is not for the court to inquire whether it believes the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but wh ether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could conclude that each element of the charged crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). This court has not yet determined whether, under the Antiterrorism and Eff ective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), it reviews the state court’s sufficiency -of-the-evidence determination- 4 -

as a legal issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or afactual finding under § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). In this case we would reachthe same result under either standard. See Romano v. Gibson , 239 F.3d 1156, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , —U.S.—, —, 122 S.Ct. 624, 628, (2001). In addition to Ms. Cullom’s testimony about the dru g purchase, both the prosecutor and defense counsel delved into Ms. Cull om’s checkered past. Testimony of two police officers and a chemist was introduced. Evidence of each of the elements of the crime was presented. Mr. Wr ight complains that the State did not offer any corroborating witnesses for Ms. C ullom’s testimony that he was the one who sold the crack (e.g., the other persons who were alleged to be present in the house when the crack was purchased). The ab sence of corroborating testimony was brought to the jury’s attention by Mr . Wright’s attorney. Under these circumstances, viewing the evidence in the li ght most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact weighing the credibility o f witnesses could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a rea sonable doubt. The OCCA therefore reasonably denied Mr. Wright’s claim for relief based on insufficiency of the evidence. Turning to Mr. Wright’s second claim, in order to g rant habeas corpus relief for prosecutorial misconduct, the behavior m ust have been so egregious as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Donnellyv. DeChristoforo , 416 U.S.- 5 -

637, 642-648 (1974). In this case, the prosecutor’ s alleged improper remarks about Ms. Cullom’s credibility were only made durin g the rebuttal portion of closing argument and only after defense counsel sou ght to put her credibility at issue. Assuming, without deciding, that the remark s were improper, they do not rise to a level that would render the entire trial unfair, nor would they be likely to so bias the jury as to make it likely that a differ ent verdict would have resulted absent those remarks. Because neither of Mr. Wright’s claims suffice to m ake a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, we D ENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge