2005 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-23-2005

Butt v. Atty Gen USA

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-4360

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-4360

 

KHALID MAHMOOD BUTT, A29 760 955;

SIDRAD KHALID, A29 760 957;

ALI KHALID, A29 760 959;

AYISHA JABEEN, A29 760 956;

WAQAR KHALID, A29 760 958;

SADIA KHALID, A29 760 960,

Petitioners

v.

*ALBERTO GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent

*Substituted pursuant to Rule 43c, F.R.A.P.

 

On Petition for Review of an Order of

The Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA Nos. A29-760-955, A29-760-956,

A29-760-957, A29-760-958
2

A29-760-959, A29-760-960)

 

Argued March 10, 2005

Before: ROTH and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

SHAPIRO ,** District Judge

(Opinion filed: November 23, 2005)

John J. Seehousen, Esquire (Argued)

1530 Chestnut Street, Suite 606

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Petitioners

Peter D. Keisler

 Assistant Attorney General

David V. Bernal

 Assistant Director

Andrew C. MacLachlan, Esquire (Argued)

Office of Immigration Litigation

United States Department of Justice

P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

 

** Honorable Norma L. Shapiro, Senior District Judge

for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
 Although there are multiple petitioners in this case, our 1

discussion references only Butt. The other petitioners are Butt’s

wife and children, whose claims for asylum are derivative of his.

3

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Khalid Mahmood Butt petitions for review of the

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying

his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The 1

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) presiding over Butt’s case denied

these claims based on his determination that Butt was not

credible, and that decision was affirmed without opinion by the

BIA. Because the IJ’s credibility determination is not supported

by substantial evidence in the record, we grant the petition.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Butt is a native and citizen of Pakistan. From 1969 to

1970, he worked full time in his father’s dry cleaning business.

Subsequently, he worked there only part-time so that he could

also work for the Pakistan People’s Party (“PPP”), a political

party. His involvement in that organization increased over time,
4

and in 1971 he began working for the PPP full time. Butt

testified before the IJ that he did not receive compensation from

the PPP, but his family was sufficiently well off to allow him to

continue to work only for the party. Butt was the General

Secretary of his local PPP ward from 1980 to 1990. From 1984

to 1996, he was also a “Counselor,” which appears to be an

elected position within the PPP.

Butt testified that, as General Secretary, he collected dues

for the PPP and held party meetings at his home. He stated that

the PPP existed to help local people solve their problems and

that it wanted “everyone [to] . . . have a right to speak.” Butt

attempted to assist people within his ward with issues such as

obtaining water facilities and health care. He also helped people

who had problems with the police.

In the 1980s, Pakistan was under military rule, and Butt

testified that he was arrested twice during this time—in

1987—and charged with being a troublemaker. According to

Butt, the police told him on both occasions that they did not like

the PPP and that he should stop his activities on behalf of the

party. Each time Butt was released after a couple hours.

Elections were held in Pakistan in 1989, after the

governing general died, and the PPP gained power in the

country. However, its government dissolved on August 6, 1990.

Butt testified that he was again arrested on August 31, 1990 and

detained until September 7, 1990. He stated that he was not
5

given food or water for two days and that he was beaten at least

twice a day, sometimes with a leather strap. Butt related his

treatment while detained as follows: “They hung me upside

down and beat me. They stripped me and beat me . . . . And

they beat me up so brutally that my leg and my back [were] so

hurt and still my leg and my back do[] not function properly.”

Butt stated that he could not walk for some time after he was

released.

Butt and his wife testified that Butt was treated by a

doctor (Dr. Sasjad) from September 10, 1990 to October 15,

1990 for his injuries and that his treatment took place at home.

At his hearing, Butt introduced a doctor’s note regarding this

time period that reads: “Certified that I have examined and

treated Mr. Khalid Mahmood Butt . . . . He reported at my clinic

with multiple bruises on both legs and back. He remained under

my treatment . . . 10-9-90 to 15-10-90.” When asked about this

note, Butt testified that he did not remember going to the clinic,

but because he was unconscious when he was brought home

after his release from detention, he may have been taken to the

clinic for treatment at that time without having been aware of it.

Butt testified that, after this incident, his friends, family,

and the PPP advised him that his life was in danger and that he

and his family should leave the country. He stated that he and

his family went into hiding at a friend’s house until they left

Pakistan for the United States in November 1990. According to

Butt, the PPP arranged for their visas and passports. 
 As a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 2

No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), the INS has since ceased to

exist as an agency within the Department of Justice, and its

enforcement functions have been transferred to Bureau of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement within the Department

of Homeland Security.

 It is unclear from the record why the INS waited to issue 3

these Notices to Appear until the Butt family had been in this

country for almost eight years longer than the period authorized

6

Butt also testified that he was being “framed” for

“another [criminal] case” right before he left Pakistan. A

criminal information naming Butt, among others, as a member

of the PPP was introduced as documentary evidence at his

hearing before the IJ. Butt stated that he had not seen the actual

document before he left Pakistan but that he knew about it at

that time. According to his testimony, some of the other people

named in the document were arrested and eventually released.

Butt and his family arrived in the United States in

November 1990 on non-immigrant visitor visas that authorized

them to stay in this country until May 1, 1991. He applied for

asylum on May 21, 1991, claiming that he feared persecution if

returned to Pakistan on account of his work with the PPP.

Butt’s wife and children filed derivative asylum applications.

The Immigration & Naturalization Service (“INS”) in 1999 2

issued the family Notices to Appear for staying in the United

States beyond the period authorized by their visas, and the Butt 3
by their visas. During the intervening time period, the PPP

regained power in Pakistan from 1993 to 1996. Butt and his

wife testified that they nevertheless did not return to Pakistan

during that time because they were told by family and friends

that it was not safe for them to go back. Butt was also afraid

that the criminal information against him was still open.

 Because Butt does not assert that the denial of CAT relief 4

was in error, we deem that claim waived. See Lie v. Ashcroft,

7

family conceded removability. At this time, Butt renewed his

application for asylum and withholding of removal. 

Butt appeared at a hearing before the IJ on his asylum,

withholding of removal, and CAT claims in July 2001, and the

IJ issued a written decision denying those claims in October

2001. The discrepancies between the testimony of Butt and his

wife and the documentary evidence that had been submitted

caused the IJ to “conclude that the respondents have deliberately

lied to the court.” Specifically, the IJ identified the “crucial

part” of the Butts’ testimony as their statements regarding the

events leading to Mr. Butt’s “incarceration and mistreatment and

his examination and care by a physician afterwards.” He found

that the Butts’ testimony on these issues could not be reconciled

with the letter from Mr. Butt’s doctor. 

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion in

October 2003. Butt’s petition for review of that decision is now

before us.4
396 F.3d 530, 532 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that petitioner

waived any argument relating to the denial of her CAT claim by

not presenting it in her brief).

8

II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we have jurisdiction to hear a

petition for review from a final order of the BIA. When the BIA

affirms an IJ without opinion, “we review the IJ’s opinion and

scrutinize its reasoning.” Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 282

(3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In asylum cases, we must uphold the agency’s factual findings

if they are supported by substantial evidence. Singh-Kaur v.

Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2004). That is, the denial

of asylum can be reversed “only if the evidence presented by

[the Petitioner] was such that a reasonable factfinder would have

to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.” INS

v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); see also Abdille v.

Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483–84 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he

[agency]’s finding must be upheld unless the evidence not only

supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”). Adverse

credibility determinations, like other factual findings in

immigration proceedings, are reviewed under the substantial

evidence standard. Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 131 (3d

Cir. 2003). 

III. Discussion
In his brief, Butt also contended that the BIA erred in 5

affirming the IJ’s decision in his case without an opinion

because the IJ’s decision was erroneous. However, at oral

argument, Butt’s counsel abandoned this argument in light of

our decision in Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en

banc), in which we held that the issuance of an affirmance

without opinion was proper even though we proceeded to

determine that the case should be remanded for the IJ to explain

9

The Attorney General and his delegates may grant asylum

to any alien who qualifies as a refugee under the Immigration &

Nationality Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A refugee is

an alien who is “unable or unwilling” to return to his or her

country of origin “because of persecution or a well-founded fear

of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). “Aliens have the burden of

supporting their asylum claims through credible testimony.”

Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). “Testimony,

by itself, is sufficient to meet this burden, if ‘credible.’” Id.

(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)). To establish eligibility for

asylum, an applicant must demonstrate past persecution by

substantial evidence or a well-founded fear of persecution that

is both subjectively and objectively reasonable. Lukwago v.

Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 177 (3d Cir. 2003). 

Butt’s principal argument before us is that the IJ’s

adverse credibility finding was not supported by the record.5
further the reasoning underlying her adverse credibility

determination. Id. at 245, 251.

The Government urges us to ignore this argument, 6

contending that Butt failed to exhaust it by not raising it before

the BIA and that our Court therefore does not have jurisdiction

to consider it. According to the Government, “in his opening

brief to this Court[,] Mr. Butt suggests for the first time that

there is no contradiction between the testimony and the doctor’s

memo.” Gov’t Br. at 18. As the Government itself

acknowledges, however, Butt’s argument to the BIA was that

the IJ’s adverse credibility finding suffered from an

“overreliance on a detail . . . principally relating to where some

of the medical services were rendered.” Gov’t Br. at 14

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We believe that

the Government’s contention that this argument was not

sufficient to preserve the argument Butt raises before us is, at

best, a hyper-technical reading of his brief to the BIA, and thus

we reject it.

10

Specifically, he contends that the finding was based solely on

the IJ’s erroneous interpretation of the doctor’s note regarding

his treatment and that, if the note is interpreted correctly, the

finding cannot be upheld. Butt further argues that, if the IJ’s 6

credibility determination is overturned, the record compels the

conclusion that he is eligible for asylum.

A. The IJ’s Interpretation of the Doctor’s Note
11

We must afford the IJ’s adverse credibility finding

“substantial deference so long as the findings are supported by

sufficient cogent reasons.” Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d

275, 278 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1998)

(“An immigration judge who rejects a witness’s positive

testimony because in his or her judgment it lacks credibility

should offer a specific, cogent reason for his or her disbelief.”)

(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). In

this case, the determination that Butt was not credible was based

on what the IJ perceived as a contradiction between Butt’s

testimony and the doctor’s note that he submitted as

corroborating evidence. The IJ stated: 

If the oral testimony is accurate and

[Butt,] after being mistreated

seriously, received medical

attention at home only, why, the

court must ask itself, does the

doctor’s letter explain[] that

treatment was given to [Butt] for a

period of 35 days at the doctor’s

clinic. Not only does the doctor’s

record state the period, by

specifically pointing out the days of

his admission and discharge, but it

also provides a feeling of

seriousness with respect to both the
12

condition [Butt] was [in] before

admission and the type of diagnosis

and treatment given . . . . Plain

language interpretation . . . conveys

a message that [Butt] was examined

and treated by the writer, at the

clinic for 35 days . . . . Assuming a

reasonable explanation had been

given, and assuming the court

would believe the seriousness of

these injuries, I could probably

understand his forgetting that he

was treated at the clinic rather than

at home . . . . But how does one

explain that his wife also forgot

such an important fact and

distinction?

The IJ’s decision thus makes clear that he read the

doctor’s note to mean that Butt had been treated at the clinic

itself for thirty-five days. However, we believe that the plain

language of the note does not support that conclusion. As stated

earlier, the note states that Butt “reported at my [the doctor’s]

clinic with multiple bruises on both legs and back. He remained

under my treatment . . . 10-9-90 to 15-10-90.” 

A commonsense interpretation of this statement is that

Butt (1) went to the doctor’s clinic for treatment of his injuries
13

and (2) then received further treatment from the same doctor for

a period of thirty-five days. Just because Butt “remained under

[his doctor’s] treatment” after reporting at the clinic does not, in

everyday usage, mean that he remained under his doctor’s

treatment at the clinic. People often say that they have remained

under a particular doctor’s care for a certain period of time. If

these types of statements actually had the meaning the IJ

attributed to the doctor’s similar statement here, a pediatrician

who commented that a newborn had been brought for treatment

at his or her office and remained under his or her care until age

eighteen would be stating that the child continuously received

care at the pediatrician’s office for eighteen years. This

interpretation of the pediatrician’s comment is nonsensical and

is certainly not how the statement would be understood if made

during the course of a normal conversation. 

Our example is extreme, but it illustrates our critical

concern with the IJ’s interpretation of the note. Although the IJ

characterized his reading of the note as based on its “plain

language,” he did not consider the everyday usage of the phrase

“remained under his doctor’s care.” Instead, the IJ read into the

note an additional statement that Butt remained under the

doctor’s care “at the clinic.” The IJ stated that, if the doctor’s

note could not be reconciled with the “crucial part” of Butt’s

and his wife’s testimony regarding his treatment, Butt’s case

would “collapse[] as a pyramid of cards.” Not only does this

simile stretch to excess, it risks a “turnaround is fair play”

response. See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 251 (3d Cir. 2003)
 The IJ characterized Butt’s explanation that he may have 7

been taken to the clinic while unconscious as not being

“reasonable.” As quoted earlier, the IJ went on to state that,

14

(en banc) (stating that an IJ’s “reasoning process appear[ed] to

break down as the IJ, repeatedly, [drew] an unreasonable

conclusion from a fact susceptible to differing interpretations”

and that such an “aggregation of empty rationales . . . devolve[d]

into an unsupported finding of adverse credibility”). 

The IJ saw the contradiction he perceived between the

text of the note and Butt’s testimony as evidence that Butt had

made “a deliberate effort . . . to mislead th[e] Court.” This

conclusion cannot stand once we use the straightforward

meaning of the note—that Butt was treated for bruises on his

legs and back at the clinic and then generally remained under the

care of the same doctor for over a month (not necessarily at the

clinic). That reading is consistent with Butt’s testimony that: (1)

he was beaten so “that [his] leg and [his] back [were] . . . hurt

and . . . [did] not function properly”; (2) he was under the care

of Dr. Sajsad, the author of the note, from September 10, 1990

to October 15, 1990; and (3) his treatment took place at home,

but that “there could be one possibility that I was almost

unconscious when they brought be home. Probably they took

me to his clinic and then he treated me.” (Butt did not remember

the details “because [his] situation was extremely worse at that

time.” ) Accordingly, contrary to the IJ’s conclusion, the note 7
[ a ]ss um i n g a re a s o n a b l e

explanation had been given, and

assuming the court would believe

the seriousness of these injuries, I

could probably understand his

forgetting that he was treated at the

clinic rather than at home. His

poor physical condition . . . could

under those circumstances account

for the discrepancy. But how does

one explain that his wife also forgot

such an important fact and

distinction?

In asking this question, the IJ ignores that, in her testimony,

Butt’s wife gave an explanation as to why she did not remember

that her husband had been treated at the clinic, stating that, inter

alia, she “did not know” whether Butt “went there [to the

doctor’s office] or not but [she thought] all treatment was given

at home . . . .” Thus, Butt’s wife did not unequivocally testify

that her husband was only treated at home. It may be that the IJ

did not credit Butt’s wife’s explanation, but he did not give any

indication in his decision as to whether that was the case. In

addition, the distinction between the testimony of both Butt and

his wife that they could not remember whether he had been

taken to the clinic, and the doctor’s statement that Butt reported

to the clinic, becomes much less dramatic when the doctor’s

note is understood to refer to only one clinic visit rather than to

an entire month of care at the clinic.

15

can be reconciled with Butt’s testimony. And, as there is no
 The IJ’s conclusion that the doctor’s note did not dissipate 8

the cloud he believed hung over Butt’s other evidence would be

untenable even if we agreed with the IJ’s determination that

there was a contradiction between the note and Butt’s testimony.

That conclusion rested on the IJ’s crediting of what he believed

the doctor had written—that Butt had reported to the clinic and

stayed there for thirty-five days—and not crediting Butt’s

testimony that he was treated (at least principally) at home for

that period. The IJ’s decision repeatedly stated that Butt was

lying and deliberately misleading the Court. If the IJ viewed the

testimony as unreliable and the note as reliable, how then could

he conclude that the note itself contributed to the “cloud”

hanging over the evidence? Thus, we believe that the IJ’s

statement that it did is illogical when viewed in conjunction with

16

contradiction between that testimony and the plain language of

the note, there is correspondingly no support for the IJ’s

conclusion that Butt lied to the Immigration Court.

The IJ also determined that “[t]he doctor’s letter or note

[was] crucial to the reliability [he could] attribute to [Butt]’s

other documents” and that, apparently because of the purported

contradiction between the note and the testimony, “[t]he cloud

that hangs over [Butt]’s evidence has not been dissipated.”

Again, when the commonsense reading of the doctor’s note is

used, it is consistent with Butt’s testimony and therefore cannot

be viewed as casting (or contributing to) a “cloud” over the

other evidence submitted by him in support of his asylum

application. Thus, the alleged contradiction between the note 8
the rest of his decision and, as such, does not fall into the

category of a “specific cogent” reason as required by, inter alia,

Reynoso-Lopez to support the adverse credibility determination.

17

and the testimony, based as it is on the strained inferences of the

IJ rather than on commonly understood usage, does not provide

a sound basis for his adverse credibility determination. See Dia,

353 F.3d at 251 (holding that adverse credibility determination

was not supported by substantial evidence when, inter alia, “the

conclusions of the IJ [were] more puzzling than plausible, more

curious than commonsense”). 

B. Other Reasons for the Adverse Credibility

Determination

Once the IJ’s conclusions regarding the relationship

between the doctor’s note and Butt’s testimony are unraveled,

we are left with only two other reasons advanced by the IJ in

support of the adverse credibility determination: (1) his generic

critique of the proffered testimony, which he described as “thin”

and “extremely vague”; and (2) his view of the other documents

submitted by Butt as “equally flimsy in that neither is verified or

authenticated.” As stated earlier, we afford an IJ’s adverse

credibility determination substantial deference if it is supported

by “specific, cogent reasons.” Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 278

(internal quotations marks and citation omitted). These

statements, which were secondary to the IJ’s determination that

the note and testimony conflicted as a basis for the adverse
 We note that this is particularly true in this case, where the 9

record contains testimony that is fairly well developed as well as

documents that appear to support that testimony (including

evidence of Butt’s membership in the PPP, the criminal

information that Butt claimed prompted him to flee Pakistan,

and the doctor’s note stating the places in which Butt was

injured and the length of his treatment). We recognize that the

fact-finder is generally in the best position to judge credibility

and may have insights that cannot be gleaned from the cold

record. If this is the case, however, we do not think it

unreasonable to require the IJ to provide specific, cogent

explanations of why apparently sound testimony was rejected.

As we stated in Dia, “requir[ing] sound reasoning [from the IJ]

breathes life into [the substantial evidence] standard.” 353 F.3d

at 251. We cannot say that this requirement is satisfied when

there is no explanation given for the IJ’s disbelief of Butt’s

testimony other than his erroneous interpretation of the doctor’s

note and his statement that the testimony did not “impress” him.

18

credibility determination, are simply too general and conclusory

to provide a basis for us to uphold his determination. They do

not give any insight into why the IJ thought the testimony was

vague or why there was reason to question the authenticity of

the documents Butt submitted. Without such an explanation, we

are unable to ascertain whether the IJ’s adverse credibility

determination was supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g.,

9

Dia, 353 F.3d at 252 (stating that “[a]bsent a reason such as

implausibility or inconsistency based in the record . . .[,] the IJ

should not have summarily dismissed [the petitioner]’s
 The Government notes other inconsistencies in the 10

record—such as the precise date Butt may have been taken to

the clinic—that it believes support the IJ’s adverse credibility

determination. See Gov’t Br. at 15–16 nn. 5–7. However, the

IJ did not rely on any of these other alleged inconsistencies in

making his adverse credibility determination. Moreover, we

emphasize here, as we have previously, that “[g]enerally, minor

inconsistencies and minor admissions that reveal nothing about

19

testimony on [a particular] point”); Mulanga, 349 F.3d at

137–38 (holding that an IJ’s disbelief of an alien’s testimony

was “unsound” when the only foundation the IJ articulated for

that belief was that the testimony lacked “common sense”). 

In this context, we are compelled to conclude that the IJ’s

adverse credibility determination was erroneous. We also note

that, once the doctor’s note is given its plain language meaning,

it is, as stated above, reconcilable with Butt’s testimony,

removing the only inconsistency the IJ pointed to in his decision.

The IJ himself stated that, without the contradiction he

perceived, “[t]he testimony presented was thin . . . but it would

have survived a certain degree of consistency . . . .” If

consistency is crucial to credibility, as we think it is, we do not

see how the record in this case can support an adverse credibility

determination. However, in keeping with Supreme Court and

our precedent, we give the IJ an opportunity to revisit the

credibility issue on remand (without regard to his prior adverse

credibility determination). See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 10
an asylum applicant’s fear for his safety are not an adequate

basis for an adverse credibility finding.” Gao, 299 F.3d at 272

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Dia,

353 F.3d at 278 (McKee, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part) (“It can not be overstated that ‘[c]aution is required [in

making credibility determinations] because of the numerous

factors that might make it difficult for an alien to articulate

his/her circumstances with the degree of consistency one might

expect from someone who is neither burdened with the language

difficulties, nor haunted by the traumatic memories, that may

hamper communication’ between a government agent and a

petitioner.” (quoting Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 476 (3d

Cir. 2003))).

20

(2002) (per curiam) (appellate courts should, upon reversing a

decision of the BIA, remand the case to the agency for further

proceedings except in rare circumstances); Dia, 353 F.3d at 260

(“concluding . . . that because of the lack of substantial evidence

to support the adverse credibility determination, we will remand

in order for the agency to further explain or supplement the

record”); Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 411 (3d Cir.

2003) (reversing BIA’s adverse credibility determination and

stating that, in keeping with Ventura, “[w]e [would] not assess

[the petitioner]’s entitlement to relief based on the record as we

have required it to be modified by this opinion because the

agency should have the opportunity to do so”).
21

V. Conclusion

Although we must afford substantial deference to an

adverse credibility finding, we are forced to conclude that even

under that standard the IJ’s credibility determination here does

not pass muster. The contradiction the IJ saw between the

doctor’s note and Butt’s testimony was created by the IJ’s own

strained interpretation of the note. In the law, as in all things,

common sense must be our guide. Yet the IJ failed even to

consider the everyday usage of the term “under a doctor’s care”

in concluding that Butt lied about where he received treatment

for his injuries. This flaw colored the whole of the IJ’s analysis,

which was grounded in his incorrect interpretation of the note,

and the only arguably independent reasons the IJ gave for

finding Butt incredible were too general for us to ascertain

whether they were supported by substantial evidence. 

For these reasons, the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s

decision. Although Butt asks us also to rule in his favor on the

merits of his asylum claim, we decline his invitation in order to

allow the agency the opportunity to review the substance of that

claim. We therefore remand this case to the BIA with

instructions to remand it to the IJ for reconsideration of his

decision and a ruling on Butt’s asylum and withholding of

removal claims without reference to the prior adverse credibility
 In connection with Butt’s asylum claim, we note that Butt’s 11

longstanding membership in the PPP—a minority party for most

of the time he was affiliated with it, in conjunction with his

arrests and beating that resulted in severe injuries (the general

nature of which were corroborated by the doctor’s note)—seem

on their surface to make out a textbook case of persecution on

account of political opinion.

22

finding.11