The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

The

Petersburg

and Appomattox

 Camp igns

1864–1865
CMH Pub 75–16

Cover: Artillery: Nine and Thirteen Inch Guns, Siege of Petersburg, 1864,

by W. T. Trego, 1892

(West Point Museum Collection, United States Military Academy)
by

John R. Maass

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2015

The

Petersburg

and Appomattox

 Camp igns

1864–1865

5

Introduction

Although over one hundred y years have passed since the 

start of the American Civil War, that titanic conict continues to 

matter. e forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the signicant issues involved: the existence of the 

Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. e 

war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over 

six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle. 

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American 

Civil War was no exception. e seeds of the conict were sown 

in the earliest days of the republic’s founding, primarily over the 

existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conict can 

begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the 

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to 

paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that 

was dominated by slavery and the other that sought rst to limit 

its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “half slave 

and half free,” and that could not stand. 

Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the 

soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal 

reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions 

and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring 

states’ rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic 

of being convinced that they were “worth” three of the soldiers 

on the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went 

to war to prove their manhood. is has been, and continues 

to be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but oen stay in the 

ght because of their comrades and because they do not want to 

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink 

to nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and 

minié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly and 

only culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy, 
6

the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. ese 

campaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared in 

commemoration of our national sacrices, seek to remember 

that war and honor those in the United States Army who died to 

preserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the story of 

those American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy despite 

the inherently awed nature of their cause. e Civil War was our 

greatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study and 

contemplation.

 RICHARD W. STEWART

 Chief Historian
The Petersburg and Appomattox Campaigns

1864–1865

Strategic Setting

By mid-June 1864, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, commander of all 

United States armies ghting to defeat the Confederate rebellion, 

faced a strategic dilemma at his headquarters near Cold Harbor, 

Virginia. Under his close control, the Union Army of the Potomac 

led by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade had just battled 66,000 rebels 

of General Robert E. Lee’s formidable Army of Northern Virginia 

in a bloody, month-long campaign. Beginning on 4 May, when 

Meade’s 100,000 troops had marched south across the Rapidan 

River west of Fredericksburg, the opposing armies had been in 

almost constant contact. Grant had sought to bring Lee’s army to 

battle and to destroy it with the Federals’ superior numbers, but Lee 

had dely thwarted Grant’s anking maneuvers in the battles of 

the Wilderness (5–6 May), Spotsylvania Court House (8–21 May), 

and the North Anna River (23–26 May). Aer each battle, Grant 

had attempted to outank Lee’s entrenched position by moving 

to the Union le to prevent the rebels from falling back to strong 

defenses and to force them to ght in the open. e Confederate 

commander had successfully parried each of Grant’s thrusts and 

positioned his force between the Union army and Richmond, the 

Confederate capital.

7
8 

But Grant was not 

easily discouraged. Born 

in Ohio, he had graduated 

from the United States 

Military Academy at West 

Point in 1843, and had 

served in the Mexican 

War. After that, his Army 

career took a downward 

turn, and he resigned his 

commission in 1854 amid 

accusations of chronic 

drunkenness. Later, several 

business ventures and 

attempts at farming ended 

in failure, and by 1860, he 

was working at his father’s 

tannery in Galena, Illinois. 

The outbreak of the Civil 

War saw Grant back in 

uniform, first organizing 

new state units, then as a regimental commander, and he was soon 

promoted to brigadier general. Grant’s fortunes rose rapidly, as 

he earned a second star and won impressive victories at Fort 

Donelson and Shiloh in Tennessee, at Vicksburg, Mississippi, 

and at Chattanooga, Tennessee. President Abraham Lincoln 

was impressed by Grant’s successes and secured his promotion 

to lieutenant general in March 1864. Now in command of all 

Federal armies, Grant chose to make his headquarters in the 

field with Meade’s army, which had won few victories against 

the rebels in the war’s Eastern Theater. Grant’s presence with 

the Army of the Potomac was awkward and tended to undermine Meade’s authority, but the latter kept his command until 

the war’s end. 

On 26 May, Grant had ordered Meade to move the Army 

of the Potomac southeast across the Pamunkey River for a drive 

against Richmond, and by 31 May, Federal cavalry had reached 

the crossroads hamlet of Cold Harbor, nine miles northeast of 

the Confederate capital. Already entrenched and waiting for the 

Union troops nearby were Lee’s veteran soldiers. Aer several 

ineective Federal attacks on 1 and 2 June, Grant had ordered 

General Grant

(Library of Congress)
9

Meade to launch a morning assault with all of his troops against 

the rebels’ seven-mile line of earthworks on 3 June. e result 

had been a disaster for the Northern soldiers. At a cost of roughly 

6,000 dead and wounded, the Federals could make no headway 

and ceased their attacks soon aer they were launched. In 

contrast, Lee’s army had lost no more than 1,500 men that day 

and remained behind strong eldworks, still blocking Grant’s 

path to Richmond. Nevertheless, Lee had lost over 30,000 troops 

since the Battle of the Wilderness, and those losses could not be 

easily replaced. 

Grant’s predicament was how to annihilate Lee’s army and 

capture Richmond with an army that had suffered about 55,000 

casualties since crossing the Rapidan River. In addition to these 

military considerations, Grant was mindful of certain political 

factors. His continual hammering of Lee’s army generated long 

Union casualty lists, which in turn demoralized the Northern 

populace. War-weary critics of Grant’s costly operations pointed 

out that his army was now exactly where Maj. Gen. George B. 

McClellan had brought the Army of the Potomac during his own 

campaign against Richmond in 1862—with far fewer casualties. 

A month’s fighting in Virginia under Grant’s leadership seemed 

to have brought the Union no closer to victory, resulting in a 

disheartened Northern public that might spell political trouble 

for Lincoln in the upcoming presidential election. 

Across the lines, a combination of optimism and realism 

prevailed among the Confederate soldiers and their leaders. 

Lee’s troops had inflicted massive casualties on the Federal 

invaders and had prevented them from taking Richmond, while 

other Confederate forces had simultaneously blocked Union 

offensives in the Shenandoah Valley and along the James River 

south of the rebel capital. Most of Lee’s soldiers had remained 

in good spirits and were confident of defeating the Federals. 

Yet Lee’s losses were difficult to replace given the South’s worsening manpower shortage. Moreover, his army had lost many 

experienced officers from wounds, illness, and death since the 

spring fighting had commenced, including four veteran corps 

commanders: Lt. Gens. James Longstreet, Richard S. Ewell, and 

Ambrose Powell Hill, and Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart.

The heavy casualties had revealed that the Army of 

Northern Virginia’s greatest strength lay in its commander. The 

Virginia-born Lee had enjoyed a stellar military career prior to 
10 

the Civil War, beginning with his U.S. Military Academy graduation in 1829, where he ranked second in his class. He went 

on to serve conspicuously as Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott’s chief 

engineer during the Mexican War and as superintendant of West 

Point from 1852 to 1855. Lincoln’s trusted adviser Francis P. 

Blair Sr. discussed political affairs with Lee and offered him the 

command of U.S. forces in the early days of the Civil War, but 

Lee declined, citing his duty to 

Virginia, which had seceded 

from the Union. Instead, Lee 

entered the Confederate army, 

in which his initial service 

earned him few laurels. In May 

1862, however, Lee assumed 

command of the Army of 

Northern Virginia, and began 

a brilliant career by defeating 

several larger Union armies, 

first around Richmond in the 

Seven Days Battles, followed 

by victories at Second Bull 

Run, Fredericksburg, and 

Chancellorsville. Although 

the Army of the Potomac had 

turned back Lee’s two invasions of the North at Antietam, 

Maryland, and Gettysburg, 

Pennsylvania, he remained a 

dangerous and resourceful foe 

in June 1864.

Lee did not doubt his troops’ ability to fight behind 

breastworks, but by mid-June, he grimly concluded that “something more is necessary than adhering to lines and defensive 

positions.” Having repulsed the bluecoats once again at Cold 

Harbor from behind strong defenses, he waited to see what 

the Federals’ next move would be. Lee was anxious about the 

strength of Union forces, Grant’s hammer blows, and their 

imminent threat to Richmond. “We must destroy this army 

of Grant’s before he gets to James River,” Lee observed, for “if 

he gets there it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere 

question of time.” 

General Lee 

(Library of Congress)
11

Operations

Soon aer the Federals’ failed frontal assaults at Cold Harbor 

on 3 June, Grant decided to change tactics. Rather than attacking 

Richmond directly, he opted to disrupt the rebels’ logistical network 

in Virginia in order to force Lee to abandon Richmond’s defenses 

due to a lack of supplies. Grant hoped this would allow Federal 

forces to bring Lee’s troops 

to battle in the open, where 

superior numbers would give 

the Northern army a decided 

advantage. To begin his threepronged movement to force the 

rebels to abandon their capital, 

Grant utilized a powerful 

cavalry force under the 

impetuous Maj. Gen. Philip H. 

Sheridan, “a terror to his foes,” 

as one of his peers described 

him. On 7 June, Sheridan 

rode west from Hanover with 

two divisions to damage the 

Virginia Central Railroad, 

Richmond’s main supply artery 

from Charlottesville. Sheridan 

also planned to link up with a 

small Union force under Maj. 

Gen. David Hunter, then at 

Staunton, but ran into enemy 

troopers on 11–12 June, at 

Trevilian Station on the Virginia Central twenty-ve miles east of 

Charlottesville. Aer a bloody two-day battle with most of Lee’s 

cavalry under Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, Sheridan had to abandon 

his Charlottesville raid and return to the Army of the Potomac east 

of Richmond. 

Grant’s primary thrust was an effort to deceive Lee by 

holding him in place north of the James River, while the bulk 

of the Army of the Potomac crossed the river to Virginia’s 

Southside region, marching quickly on to Petersburg, twentyfour miles south of Richmond. This lightly defended city—the 

seventh largest in the South—was the major rail hub of the 

General Sheridan 

(Library of Congress)
12 

Southern supply system in Virginia. A branch of the South 

Side Railroad ran ten miles northeast from Petersburg to City 

Point on the James River, while the Norfolk and Petersburg 

Railroad led southeast to the lower Tidewater region. The 

South Side Railroad also linked Petersburg with Lynchburg, 

about one hundred miles to the west, as well as with supply 

sources in Tennessee. The crucial Petersburg and Weldon line 

(often called the Weldon Railroad) connected Lee’s forces with 

North Carolina, particularly the port of Wilmington, where the 

road terminated. A single track, the Richmond and Petersburg 

Railroad, connected the two cities, while the rebel capital also 

received supplies via the Virginia Central and the Richmond 

and Danville Railroad. Grant surmised that the capture of 

Petersburg would cripple the Confederacy’s ability to resist 

Union forces in Virginia, and ultimately lead to Lee’s defeat.

Grant’s movement against Petersburg, however, would leave 

Washington, D.C., potentially exposed to Confederate attack, a 

scenario that had alarmed the Lincoln administration in the past. 

is decision, a Northern newspaper reporter later wrote, “involved 

considerations of a wholly dierent order from those concerned 

in the repeated turning movements which he [Grant] had made 

to dislodge Lee” in May and June. Crossing the James River meant 

the “total abandonment of that system of action which aimed . . . to 

directly defend the national capital.” Lincoln approved Grant’s plan, 

though not without misgivings for the Northern capital’s safety.

Grant included a third advance in his May plans, to be 

conducted by the Federal Army of the James under Maj. Gen. 

Benjamin F. Butler, a politically appointed general with little 

military skill or initiative. Several weeks earlier, Butler’s 35,000 

troops had landed at Bermuda Hundred, a peninsula situated 

between the James and Appomattox Rivers south of Richmond, 

where they were easily supplied by Union shipping. He also had 

troops occupy City Point. Ordered to march on Richmond while 

the Army of the Potomac faced o against Lee’s soldiers in the 

Wilderness, Butler instead had sent almost 22,000 troops against 

Petersburg. In a series of engagements with outnumbered rebel 

defenders under General P. G. T. Beauregard, Butler’s force had 

failed to take the town. He had brought all of his men back to 

Bermuda Hundred by 22 May and had them dig a north–south 

defensive line across his entire front, aer which he remained 

inactive. “Butler’s position was like a bottle,” Grant concluded, and 
13

his entrenchments “represented the cork.” In short, the hapless 

Butler could do nothing oensively. 

On 9 June, Butler again tried to capture Petersburg, this time 

with a column of 6,500 men under Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore, 

but the troops had little time to prepare for the operation. An 

assorted force of 1,000 Confederate soldiers, town militia, and 

civilian volunteers led by Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise, a former 

Virginia governor, managed to turn back the bluecoats by the 

aernoon. e Union attacks were poorly coordinated, and Butler 

missed an opportunity to capture Petersburg before Confederate 

authorities could reinforce the city’s few defenders. A thoroughly 

disgusted Butler relieved Gillmore of his command once his 

dispirited men had returned to Union lines.

CROSSING THE JAMES RIVER

Attempting to avoid detection, the Army of the Potomac 

withdrew from its long line of eldworks at Cold Harbor and moved 

south toward the James River over several dusty roads beginning 

on 12 June. Maj. Gen. William F. “Baldy” Smith’s XVIII Corps, 

part of Butler’s army but then serving with Meade, marched to 

White House on the Pamunkey River—where the men destroyed 

the large Union supply depot and rail line before boarding transport ships for a water passage to Bermuda Hundred—to reunite 

with the Army of the James. On the Union le, the V Corps under 

Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren marched south behind a cavalry 

screen, crossed the Chickahominy River, and turned west to make 

a feint toward Richmond—and to block rebel attempts to strike 

the Federals en route to the James River (Map 1). 

Aer nightfall on the twelh, Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright’s 

VI Corps and Maj. Gen. Wineld S. Hancock’s II Corps withdrew 

to a shorter line of eldworks recently erected in Meade’s rear 

before their march south. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside took 

his IX Corps on a longer route to the James to avoid congestion on 

the roads, followed by a cavalry rear guard. By 14 June, all of the 

Union corps—numbering about 115,000 men—had reached the 

James River. Hancock’s men crossed by boat at Wilcox’s Landing 

on the river, as did the V Corps. ree miles downstream, the 

rest of the army—including its wagons and artillery—began 

crossing on 15 June, on a 2,100-foot pontoon bridge constructed 

at Wyanoke Neck the previous day by the army’s engineers. “Our 

movement from Cold Harbor to the James River has been made 
A N D E R S O N

B E A U R E G A R D

A . P. H I L L

B U R N S I D E

W R I G H T

WA R R E N

H A N C O C K

S M I T H

S M I T H

S M I T H

S M I T H

BUTLER

Norfolk & Petersburg RR Petersburg & Weldon RR

South Side RR

Richmond & Petersburg RR

Pamunkey R

Chickahominy R

James R

York R

Rappahannock R

Fort Monroe

Old Cold Harbor

New Cold Harbor

Riddell’s Shop

Bermuda Hundre d

Charles Cit y

Cou rt House

Surry Cou rt House

King William

Cou rt House

New Kent

Cou rt House

King & Queen Court House

White House

Gloucester

Cou rt House Wil cox’s Landing

Wyan oke Neck

PETERSBURG

Mechanicsville

RICHMOND

Hanovertown

West Point

City Point

Yorktown

Urbana

Hampton

Williamsburg

0 15

Miles

12–16 June 1864

CROSSING THE JAMES

Confederate PositionConfederate MovementUnion PositionUnion Advance

MAP 1
15

with great celerity,” Grant proudly reported. All but a few Federal 

units had reached the south bank of the James by midnight of 16 

June, including Smith’s XVIII Corps, which had previously landed 

at Bermuda Hundred. 

General Lee learned at dawn on 13 June that the Federals at 

Cold Harbor had left his immediate front but he was uncertain 

where the bluecoats had gone. He began shifting his men south 

of the Chickahominy River to cover Richmond’s southeast 

approaches against the prospect of another of Grant’s flanking 

maneuvers. After an inconclusive engagement with mounted 

Union covering forces near Riddell’s Shop later that day, he 

surmised that Grant was headed for the James River but could 

not be sure. Meanwhile other Union operations distracted 

the Confederate commander. Both Lee and the Confederate 

War Department had been receiving urgent requests from 

Beauregard at Petersburg for more troops, along with a warning 

that he had too few men to contain Butler within Bermuda 

Hundred. Moreover, after the Battle of Cold Harbor, Lee had 

detached from his army Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge’s 

division and Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early’s Second Corps to counter 

Hunter’s threatening operations in the Shenandoah Valley. 

Consequently, the Confederates now confronted Grant’s armies 

with greatly reduced numbers. 

AN OPPORTUNITY LOST

e well-executed maneuver to bring the Army of the 

Potomac across the James River while keeping Lee unsure of his 

intentions gave Grant the initiative, but Union forces still had to 

exploit the enemy’s confusion. Grant envisioned a quick strike 

to seize Petersburg before the rebels could react and shi troops 

south from Richmond. Aer conferring with Butler at Bermuda 

Hundred on 14 June, Grant ordered him to have General Smith 

cross the Appomattox River and move south on 15 June with 

the XVIII Corps—reinforced by Federal cavalry and a division of 

U.S. Colored Troops (USCT)—to attack Petersburg. Hancock’s 

II Corps, which had already crossed the James River, would 

support Smith’s assault. Early on the eenth, Smith advanced 

toward Petersburg with 15,000 men and began his attack by 0700 

on the city’s poorly prepared eastern fortications. Called the 

Dimmock Line, the ten-mile defensive system was manned by 

just 4,000 rebels (Map 2). 
MAP 2

James R

J

a

m

e

s

R

Chickahominy R

FIRST DEEP BOTTOM

28 Jul

SECOND DEEP BOTTOM

[FUSSELL’S MILL]

16 Aug

New Market Heights

Aiken’s Landing

Deep Bottom

Drewry’s Blu

Chan’s Blu

Chestereld

Court House

Bermuda Hundred

Fair Oaks

Station

Riddell’s Shop

Richmond & Petersburg RR

Richmond & Danville RR

York River RR

N E W M A R K E T R O A D

D A R B Y T O W N R O A D

W I L L I A M S B U R G

R O A D

R I C H M O N D T U R N P I K E

C H A R L E S C I T Y R O A D

RICHMOND

Manchester

City Point

Confederate EntrenchmentsBattle

14 June–25 August 1864

RICHMOND AND PE TERSBUR G

AREA OF OPERATIONS

0 5

Miles
Appomattox R

Appomattox R

Hatcher’s Run

FORTIFICATIONS

15 Jun

JERUSALEM PLANK ROAD

22 Jun

GLOBE TAVERN

23 Jun

18–21 Aug

REAM’S STATION

22 Jun

25 Aug

FORTIFICATIONS

16–17 Jun

FORTIFICATIONS

18 Jun

ELLIOTT’S SALIENT

[THE CRATER]

30 Jul

Peebles

Dinwiddie

Court House

Armstro ng’s Mill

Burgess’ Mill

Dabney’s Sawmill

Sutherland

 Station

Poplar Springs

Churc h

t

eP

sre

r ub

W

&

g

dl e

n

o

RR

South Side RR

Norfolk & Petersburg RR

Petersburg & City Po ni t RR

B O Y D T O N P L A N K R O A D

W H I T E O A K

R O A D S Q U I R R E L L E V E L R O A D JERUSALEM PLANK ROAD

PETERSBURG

Pocahontas

Appomattox R

Appomattox R

Hatcher’s Run

FORTIFICATIONS

15 Jun

JERUSALEM PLANK ROAD

22 Jun

GLOBE TAVERN

23 Jun

18–21 Aug

REAM’S STATION

22 Jun

25 Aug

FORTIFICATIONS

16–17 Jun

FORTIFICATIONS

18 Jun

ELLIOTT’S SALIENT

[THE CRATER]

30 Jul

Peebles

Dinwiddie

Court House

Armstro ng’s Mill

Burgess’ Mill

Dabney’s Sawmill

Sutherland

 Station

Poplar Springs

Churc h

t

eP

sre

r ub

W

&

g

dl e

n

o

RR

South Side RR

Norfolk & Petersburg RR

Petersburg & City Po ni t RR

B O Y D T O N P L A N K R O A D

W H I T E O A K

R O A D S Q U I R R E L L E V E L R O A D JERUSALEM PLANK ROAD

PETERSBURG

Pocahontas
18 

e operation soon succumbed to a series of delays, as 

Smith, hesitant about charging rebel earthworks, made a lengthy 

reconnaissance of the enemy’s lines. Smith’s concern proved 

unfounded, for when he nally launched his assault at 1900, his 

men overran much of the Confederate defenses. U.S. Colored 

Troops under Brig. Gen. Edward W. Hinks captured several rebel 

batteries that evening, and one of their white ocers wrote that 

the black soldiers “behaved in such a manner as to give me great 

satisfaction and the fullest condence in the ghting qualities 

of colored troops.” Petersburg was now open to capture and “at 

the mercy of the Federal commander,” wrote Beauregard, whose 

troops retreated to a position behind Harrison’s Creek, just east 

of the city. Smith, however, halted on the outskirts, wary of 

rumored rebel reinforcements nearby. Due to uncertainty over 

his orders and costly delays in resupplying his men, Hancock was 

late in coming to Smith’s support and did not press the latter for 

a renewed advance. 

In the meantime, Beauregard’s urgent pleas for support 

finally prompted Lee to send Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke’s 

division to Petersburg on 15 June. Beauregard also stripped the 

Confederate defenses at Bermuda Hundred of troops from Maj. 

Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson’s division, and brought them south to 

oppose Smith’s advance. By now Lee recognized the imminent 

threat to the city and began to shift even more troops there. 

By the morning of 16 June, Beauregard’s defenders numbered 

about 14,000 men behind the earthworks east of the city, facing 

the Union II and XVIII Corps, as well as Burnside’s newly 

arrived IX Corps. Meade and Grant were both on the scene, 

but the Federals did not manage to launch an attack until late 

that afternoon without substantial success. “In all this we lost 

very heavily,” Grant noted. Repeated attacks by Union forces 

on 17 June—augmented by Warren’s V Corps—pushed back 

Beauregard’s defensive lines, but Lee reinforced him, and again 

the Federals suffered heavy casualties.

On the next day, a frustrated Meade ordered a general 

assault on the city from the Appomattox River to the Norfolk and 

Petersburg Railroad. “If we can engage [the enemy] before they 

are fortied we ought to whip them,” he advised the II Corps 

commander, but by dusk, the uncoordinated assaults made by 

the exhausted Union soldiers had failed. Lee had arrived earlier 

that day to assume direction of the battle, along with substantial 
19

infantry reinforcements, including A. P. Hill’s ird Corps and two 

divisions of Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson’s First Corps. 

For the Federals, the opportunity to seize Petersburg and to 

deal a crippling blow to the enemy’s logistical center was lost along 

with over 10,000 casualties since 15 June. General Smith should 

have advanced into the city on the night of the eenth, but he 

had allowed darkness and limited rebel opposition to stall his 

attack. “I believed then,” Grant later recalled, “and still believe, that 

Petersburg could have been easily captured at that time.” Instead, 

Meade ordered his Federals to dig earthworks aer the failed 18 

June attacks, beginning a grinding campaign that ultimately lasted 

ten months. e Confederates lost 4,000 men in successfully 

defending Petersburg, yet Lee had larger concerns. He had failed 

to strike a blow against the Federals on their march to the James, 

and now his army faced the prospect of defending Petersburg and 

Richmond against a superior foe. Once again the rebels had lost 

the initiative to Grant.

MANEUVERING AROUND PETERSBURG, 22 JUNE–29 JULY

Despite having squandered an opportunity to capture 

Petersburg, Grant had no intention of settling into a protracted 

siege of the city: “I have determined to try to envelope Petersburg,” 

Grant wrote to Butler. e Union II Corps—now temporarily 

led by Maj. Gen. David B. Birney in place of General Hancock, 

whose Gettysburg wound had reopened—and Wright’s VI Corps 

marched south on 22 June behind the Federal lines to Meade’s 

le ank along the Jerusalem Plank Road, which ran south from 

the city. Grant intended for the II Corps to capture and destroy 

the Weldon Railroad, about two miles west of the Jerusalem 

Plank Road. Meanwhile, Wright’s men would swing around to 

Petersburg’s northwest side to damage the South Side Railroad 

and position its le ank on the Appomattox River. e V, IX, 

and XVIII Corps remained in their trenches east of the city, as the 

army was “exhausted with forty-nine days of continued marching 

and ghting,” reported General Meade, “and absolutely requires 

rest to prevent its morale being impaired.” 

On the morning of 22 June, the II and VI Corps were aligned 

parallel to the Jerusalem Plank Road, with Birney’s men north of 

Wright’s corps. e II Corps wheeled northwest against the enemy 

works, with its right ank in contact with the entrenched V Corps 

to the east. As part of their great turning movement to reach the 
20 

Appomattox River, Wright’s troops rst proceeded directly west 

toward the Weldon Railroad, beginning in the II Corps’ le rear, 

but as Birney moved forward at 1400, the thickly wooded terrain 

caused his troops to lose contact with the VI Corps. As both corps 

advanced, a dangerous gap soon opened between them.

Given the vital importance of maintaining the supply 

lines to Lee’s army, rebel troops from Hill’s Third Corps on 

the western flank reacted quickly to the Federal miscue. 

Recognizing the widening gap between the II and VI Corps as 

they advanced, about midafternoon of 22 June, Confederates 

under Brig. Gen. William Mahone (temporarily commanding 

Anderson’s division of Hill’s Third Corps) left their Petersburg 

trenches, pushed through the gap by way of a large concealed 

ravine, and attacked Birney’s left and rear. Mahone’s charging 

rebels panicked much of Birney’s command, which, as one 

Federal wrote, “was thrown into confusion by a sharp attack of 

the enemy in great force.” Grant later described the II Corps’ 

ensuing retreat as a “stampede.” Mahone’s soldiers rounded 

up about 1,700 Union prisoners in the dense thickets before 

their attack stalled that evening in front of makeshift Union 

breastworks. Hill also ordered Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox’s 

division to attack in support of Mahone, but Wilcox could not 

bring his brigades into action due to the dense undergrowth 

that obstructed his men. That night, Hill withdrew his victorious troops to the Petersburg lines, with four captured Union 

cannons in tow.

On the following day, part of Wright’s VI Corps and a small 

force of Union cavalry reached the Weldon Railroad west of 

Globe Tavern, where they destroyed a one-quarter-mile section 

of the tracks. Hill sent General Wilcox’s division south along 

the railroad to counter the Federal advance. Late that aernoon, the Confederates struck the VI Corps’ pickets on the le 

ank, capturing 400 Federals and pushing the rest back. e 

rebel assault thoroughly confused Wright about the enemy’s 

intent and location, and led him to withdraw his bluecoats to 

their entrenchments by midnight, despite Meade’s injunction to 

“take the initiative and attack the enemy.” Hill likewise recalled 

his Southern troops to the Petersburg lines that night. Although 

Meade’s soldiers had failed to seize the vital Weldon Railroad, the 

Army of the Potomac did extend its lines to the west, and further 

threatened Lee’s supply lines.
21

Meanwhile, an Army of the Potomac cavalry division led 

by Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson, augmented by Brig. Gen. August 

V. Kautz’s mounted division from Butler’s army, le Petersburg 

on 22 June to destroy rail lines west and southwest of the city. 

If successful, the raid would leave Lee with only the Virginia 

Central Railroad to supply his army. Wilson’s 5,000 mounted 

men hit the Weldon line at Ream’s Station south of Petersburg 

and then quickly moved west along the South Side Railroad, 

following it to Burkeville and destroying sections of track as they 

proceeded. On 25 June, Kautz’s men tried to burn the Richmond 

and Danville Railroad bridge over the Staunton River forty miles 

southwest of Burkeville, but local defense forces drove them o. 

Pressed in the rear by rebel cavalry under Maj. Gen. William 

H. F. “Rooney” Lee and one hundred miles from his base near 

Petersburg, Wilson elected to return east to Union lines. On 28 

June, his troopers ran into Confederate cavalry under General 

Hampton on the Weldon Railroad at Stony Creek Station, 

about twenty-ve miles south of Petersburg. Forced northward 

to Ream’s Station and then cut o by Mahone’s rebel infantry, 

Kautz’s Cavalry coming back to camp in General Butler’s lines after 

their raid, by William Waud

(Library of Congress)
22 

Wilson and Kautz separated there on 29 June and made their 

way back to Union lines while pursued by swarming Southern 

horsemen. Back in camp by 1 July, Wilson’s force had destroyed 

sixty miles of railroad track, but at a cost of almost 1,500 casualties during the 300-mile expedition.

In early July, General Grant took stock of the recent operations of Birney and Wright along the Jerusalem Plank Road—

coupled with the Wilson-Kautz cavalry raid— and decided that 

they marked a crucial turning point in the campaign. With 

Butler’s troops “bottled up” at Bermuda Hundred north of the 

James River and Meade’s Army of the Potomac unable to make 

any headway against Lee’s defenses south of the river, Grant 

concluded that the siege of Petersburg had begun.

FIRST BATTLE OF DEEP BOTTOM, 27–28 JULY

Despite the seemingly static nature of siege warfare, Union 

forces around Richmond and Petersburg did not abandon oensive operations. e Federals began to prepare for an assault 

against Lee’s lines east of the city, primarily in front of the Union 

center held by Burnside’s IX Corps. With Hancock back in 

command, the II Corps was dug in on Burnside’s right ank up to 

the Appomattox River, and Warren’s V Corps held the Union le, 

Union pontoon bridge on the James River at Deep Bottom

(Library of Congress)
23

south to the Jerusalem Plank Road; both were expected to support 

the main assault by Burnside. 

In order to draw Confederate troops away from the section of 

Petersburg defenses that Burnside planned to attack, Grant ordered 

the II Corps and two divisions of cavalry under Sheridan to cross 

the James River at Deep Bottom to join Butler’s Army of the James 

facing Richmond. Hancock’s men would move toward the city, 

while Sheridan dashed into the enemy capital, or failing that, strike 

the enemy’s lines of communications northwest of Richmond. “e 

plan . . . was to let the cavalry cut loose,” Grant wrote, “and destroy as 

much as they could of the Virginia Central Railroad.” In the predawn 

darkness of 27 July, Hancock and Sheridan crossed the James via a 

pontoon bridge to Deep Bottom on the river’s north bank. 

Opposing Hancock and Sheridan’s advance on Richmond 

was Anderson’s First Corps, whose troops blocked the Union 

advance along New Market Heights and Bailey’s Creek. Lee 

hurried reinforcements to Anderson from Petersburg, leaving 

only 18,000 troops to defend the city. On 28 July, Sheridan fought 

o a determined Confederate attack east of Hancock’s foot soldiers 

near Riddell’s Shop, but could not get around the enemy’s le to 

execute his planned raid. “e ghting lasted for several hours, 

resulting in considerable loss to both sides,” noted Grant, who 

did not want Hancock “to assault intrenched lines.” Hancock and 

Sheridan brought their troops back to the Petersburg front on 29 

July, without endangering Richmond, but having forced Lee to 

reduce his forces south of the James. 

THE CRATER

While Hancock and Sheridan moved against Richmond and 

the rail lines north of the James River, Meade and his subordinates prepared a major assault against Lee’s weakened defenses at 

Petersburg. In the IX Corps’ sector, the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry 

was positioned only 400 feet from the Confederate stronghold 

called Elliott’s (or Pegram’s) Salient. Recruited from a mining 

region around Scranton in 1861, the regiment’s ranks were lled 

with coal miners, and its commander, Lt. Col. Henry C. Pleasants, 

had been a professional mining and railroad engineer before the 

war. Pleasants presented a plan to dig a mine under the enemy’s 

works opposite the 48th Pennsylvania’s position and to ignite a 

huge charge of powder at the end of the tunnel. Once exploded, 

Pleasants suggested, Union troops would rush forward to breach 
24 

the rebel lines, overwhelming the startled defenders. Burnside 

favored the idea, but Meade and his sta opposed it as impractical. 

Grant, however, was intrigued and ordered the plan to proceed.

e Pennsylvanians began working on 25 June. Within four 

weeks, they had dug a 5-foot-high tunnel that stretched for 511 feet 

and ran 20 feet beneath the Confederate trenches manned by Brig. 

Gen. Stephen Elliott Jr.’s South Carolina brigade, which was dug in 

about one-quarter-mile east of the Jerusalem Plank Road. Union 

soldiers lled the end of the sha with four tons of powder, packed 

it with sandbags to force the explosion upward, and were ready 

to detonate the charge on 28 July. Although Brig. Gen. Edward 

Porter Alexander, the First Corps’ chief of artillery, suspected that 

the Federals were digging a mine and informed General Lee of his 

hunch, the Confederates failed to locate Pleasants’ tunnel. 

With the approval of Grant and Meade, General Burnside 

planned to launch his assault on Elliott’s Salient with about 15,000 

IX Corps men, many of whom had little combat experience. 

Burnside initially intended to place Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero’s 

large division of USCTs at the point of attack, followed by the IX 

Corps’ three all-white divisions, and he began working out the 

details with his subordinates accordingly. General Meade, however, 

objected to deploying the black troops in front because they were 

untested, fearing that if the Union attack failed, the army’s leaders 

would be blamed for sacricing the black division. Supported by 

Grant, he ordered Burnside to use one of his white divisions to 

lead the charge, which gave the IX Corps commander only twelve 

hours to alter his arrangements. Meade also ordered that aer 

breaching the enemy’s lines, Burnside’s troops were to “push at 

once for the crest of Cemetery Hill,” the high ground in the rebels’ 

rear that also dominated the city, rather than expand the breach 

to the right and le. Supporting the IX Corps’ attack were several 

divisions from the II, V, and XVIII Corps (now commanded by 

Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, aer Baldy Smith’s removal on 19 

July), and one division from the X Corps, Army of the James. 

Aer some delay caused by faulty fuses, about 0445 on 30 July, 

the mine exploded, blowing a huge gap in the Confederate line 

and killing or wounding hundreds of rebels. “e earth seemed 

to tremble and the next instant there was a report that seemed to 

deafen all nature,” wrote a Confederate ocer. A nearby Union 

soldier noted that the blast was “a magnicent spectacle,” in which 

a “mass of earth went up into the air, carrying with it men, guns, 
25

carriages, and timbers, and spread out like an immense cloud.” 

Burnside’s men were also stunned by the explosion, and many 

were unprepared for the dawn assault once the dust and debris had 

begun to settle. “e whole scene of the explosion struck every one 

dumb with astonishment,” a Federal ocer wrote. “e Crater,” as 

the excavation was later dubbed, measured about 25 feet deep, 150 

feet wide, and 200 feet long. 

Ten minutes aer the blast, the IX Corps troops advanced 

into and around the crater, but the assault was disjointed and 

poorly led. It was, as a Union ocer wrote, a “wretched disaster.” 

Many of the units became intermingled as curious soldiers paused 

to look into the huge hole. e incompetence and drunkenness 

of the lead division commander, Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie, who 

had made no eort to prepare his troops for the attack, only added 

to the chaos. Confused ocers and men charged into the breach 

but hesitated to press on to the high ground beyond the crater as 

planned. Instead, most of the attackers loitered in and around the 

crater, rather than move forward as ordered. “Had they done this, 

I have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have fallen,” 

Grant later wrote. Meade repeatedly ordered Burnside to push the 

attack, but no amount of prodding could restart the disorientated 

Explosion of the Mine on 30 July 1864 from a sketch by Alfred R. Waud

(Library of Congress)
26 

Federals, whose division commanders had remained far to the 

rear instead of supervising the assault.

Rebel batteries poured a deadly re into the Federals at the 

crater where Burnside’s brigades piled on each other. Enemy mortar 

shells lobbed into the crater took a lethal toll on the closely packed 

bluecoats seeking shelter there. General Lee ordered Mahone to 

counterattack with his division from the Confederate right. Two 

of Mahone’s brigades launched a powerful bayonet charge against 

Union troops in the breach about 1000. e rebels halted the IX 

Corps’ slow progress and recovered the Confederate trench lines 

around the crater in bitter hand-to-hand ghting. Many Southern 

soldiers oered no quarter to Ferrero’s black troops trapped in the 

crater. At 0945, Meade called o the attack, and all Federal units 

had withdrawn to their own lines by about 1400, having suered 

some 3,800 casualties. “It was the saddest aair I have witnessed 

in this war,” Grant wrote. Initially made the scapegoat for the 

failed attack, Burnside went on leave in mid-August and was never 

recalled to active military service. Command of the IX Corps 

devolved on Maj. Gen. John G. Parke, the corps’ chief of sta. 

FIGHTING ON THE FLANKS, AUGUST 1864

In mid-August, Grant opened a new oensive at Petersburg. 

e previous month, Lee had detached Early’s Second Corps 

and Breckinridge’s division from his army and had sent them to 

defend the Shenandoah Valley and threaten Washington, D.C. 

ese operations had compelled Grant to hurry General Wright 

and two divisions of his VI Corps to defend the U.S. capital. Lee 

also sent additional reinforcements under General Anderson to 

Early on 6 August, including Maj. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw’s First 

Corps division, an artillery battalion, and Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee’s 

cavalry division. With Lee’s forces thereby reduced, Grant decided 

to increase pressure on Richmond while Meade’s troops moved 

around the Union le, in another attempt to cut the Weldon 

Railroad south of Petersburg. “My main object,” Grant explained, 

“is to call troops from Early and from the defenses of Petersburg.”

On the night of 13–14 August, Hancock’s II Corps returned to 

Deep Bottom to threaten Richmond with 28,000 men, supported 

by General Birney’s X Corps and Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg’s 

cavalry division. Grant believed that Lee had sent three divisions 

from Richmond to reinforce Early in the Shenandoah Valley, 

but in fact only Kershaw’s division had le the capital’s defenses; 
27

consequently, the rebel forces southeast of Richmond were far 

stronger than Grant and Hancock assumed. On 16 August, the 

initial Union attacks on the Confederate le along the Darbytown 

Road near Fussell’s Mill shoved back the defenders, opening a 

gap in the Southern line. But rebel troops of Maj. Gen. Charles 

W. Field’s First Corps division counterattacked and regained 

their eldworks several hours later. On the extreme Union right, 

Confederate horsemen under Rooney Lee blocked Gregg’s Federal 

cavalry from dashing into Richmond. Facing 20,000 Confederates, 

Hancock withdrew his forces to the Petersburg lines south of the 

James River on 20 August, having lost almost 3,000 men. Many 

II Corps ocers conceded that their weary troops were “without 

any spirit” due to the cumulative eects of hard campaigning 

since May and the extreme summer heat. In the end, neither 

side had gained an advantage from the Second Battle of Deep 

Bottom. While Hancock’s advance on Richmond was thwarted by 

Confederate forces, Lee likewise was prevented from sending more 

reinforcements to the Valley, and he had to weaken the defenses of 

Petersburg to protect the Confederate capital.

While Hancock advanced on Richmond, Federal troops near 

Petersburg began another move against the Weldon Railroad. On 

18 August, General Warren marched west with his V Corps to 

Globe Tavern, a prominent two-story brick building two miles 

south of Petersburg and just east of the Weldon Railroad, which 

was now in Union hands. Although General Hill’s rebel troops 

launched several powerful attacks through 21 August against 

Warren’s entrenched position north of Globe Tavern—including 

one on the nineteenth in which almost 3,000 panicked Federals 

of Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford’s division were captured—

Hill could not drive o Warren’s men who were bolstered by IX 

Corps reinforcements. To consolidate his hold on the railroad, 

Warren extended his lines eastward to the existing Union 

trenches. e loss of the Weldon Railroad at Globe Tavern forced 

the Confederates to haul supplies by wagon on a circuitous, 

twenty-four-mile route from Stony Creek Station northward to 

Petersburg via Dinwiddie Court House. 

Grant hoped to capitalize on the V Corps’ success by 

destroying more of the Weldon Railroad. On 24 August, 6,000 

men of Hancock’s II Corps, back from Deep Bottom with no rest, 

marched several miles south of Globe Tavern to Ream’s Station. 

Shielded by Gregg’s 2,000 cavalrymen, Hancock’s column began 
28 

tearing up track. Learning of the Federals’ railroad-wrecking 

operation near Ream’s Station, Lee ordered Hill to attack the 

unsuspecting bluecoats and prevent further disruption of the 

rail line. Hill maneuvered around the Union V Corps’ position at 

Globe Tavern, and on the aernoon of 25 August, launched several 

vigorous attacks against Hancock’s position at Ream’s Station, 

which the Federals managed to repulse.

Despite taking heavy casualties, the Confederates were 

persistent. About 1730, the divisions of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth 

and Wilcox (under Heth’s overall command because General 

Hill’s illness) charged from the west and overran the weak Union 

defenses along the railroad. e rebels “came at the doublequick, with ashing bayonets, and ringing out their familiar yell,” 

wrote one Federal soldier. Meanwhile, Southern cavalry under 

General Hampton attacked the II Corps from the south. Hit from 

two sides and blasted by artillery, many of Hancock’s troops ed 

the eld. e Confederates captured about 2,100 demoralized 

Federals and nine guns. With the timely support of IX Corps 

reinforcements, Hancock withdrew the beaten remnants of his 

command to Union lines near the Jerusalem Plank Road, and 

much to the bluecoats’ relief, the victorious Confederates did not 

pursue them. 

Aer Hancock’s defeat at Ream’s Station, Grant worked to 

improve the Union Army’s defenses around Petersburg. He had a 

strong secondary line of earthworks constructed behind the front 

lines, complete with an extensive network of trenches, artillery 

emplacements, and forts. e rst and second lines stretched for 

a total of ten miles around Petersburg. Grant also strengthened 

his headquarters and the massive Union supply depot at City 

Point. e Northern logistical complex also boasted several hospitals that accommodated up to 10,000 patients, along with over a 

mile of wharfs, numerous warehouses, and a vast rail yard. As of 

September, a military railroad ran from the City Point docks to 

Warren’s V Corps posted around Globe Tavern, a fourteen-mile 

route that carried eighteen trains per day. On a typical day during 

the siege, the Union Army’s logistical apparatus at City Point 

provided the troops with 100,000 bread rations per day and the 

animals with 12,000 tons of hay while storing an ample supply of 

food. A mid-September Confederate cavalry raid led by General 

Hampton, which netted about 2,500 head of cattle from behind 

Union lines six miles east of City Point, and a well-founded fear 
29

of rebel sabotage, led Union authorities to further strengthen the 

sprawling depot.

While Union forces improved their defenses, Lee commanded 

his troops to expand Confederate earthworks to the southwest to 

protect the South Side Railroad and the Boydton Plank Road, 

crucial branches of his supply network. Rebels north of the James 

River also improved their positions—oen with slave labor—to 

defend Richmond, although Lee lacked the soldiers to adequately 

guard all sections of the Confederate lines. “Without some increase 

in strength,” Lee had written in late August, “I cannot see how 

we can escape the natural military consequences of the enemy’s 

numerical superiority.” Reinforcements for Lee’s army would be 

especially crucial because Lincoln had called for another 500,000 

volunteers on 18 July 1864.

AUTUMN OPERATIONS

Lee’s decision to extend the rebel works was a prudent one 

in that Union forces launched a new series of oensives in late 

September. Grant again sought to pressure Lee by advancing 

simultaneously north and south of the James River, using both 

the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James to prevent 

the Confederate commander from shiing troops to meet Federal 

View of the U.S. Military Railroad in front of Petersburg, by William Waud

(Library of Congress)
30

attacks. Moreover, Early’s force in the Shenandoah Valley suered 

a signicant defeat at Winchester on 19 September. e reverse 

came at the hands of General Sheridan. In August, Grant had 

sent Sheridan northward to lead the Union forces sent to protect 

Washington. Early’s defeat thus complicated Lee’s plans to thwart 

Grant’s ongoing eorts to crush the Army of Northern Virginia 

(See Map 3).

On the night of 28–29 September, Butler sent an assault 

force across the James River from Bermuda Hundred to Deep 

Bottom via a pontoon bridge. e force consisted of Birney’s X 

Corps, a division of U.S. Colored Troops from Ord’s XVIII Corps, 

and Kautz’s cavalry division. e units moved north to attack 

strong Confederate positions on New Market Heights. “Under 

a terric re of musketry,” the Union attackers, spearheaded by 

a small brigade of black troops, captured the enemy’s works on 

the second attempt, aer the 2,000 Confederate defenders under 

Brig. Gen. John Gregg had withdrawn eastward in the face of 

superior numbers. “It was a deadly hailstorm of bullets sweeping 

men down as hail-stones sweep the leaves from trees,” wrote Sgt. 

Maj. Christian Fleetwood of the 4th USCT, “It was sheer madness.” 

For heroism in the Battle of New Market Heights, twelve USCT 

soldiers received the Medal of Honor, the rst black soldiers to be 

awarded a United States military decoration. 

Meanwhile, the rest of Ord’s XVIII Corps crossed the James 

River on a pontoon bridge at Aiken’s Landing, a short distance 

upstream from Deep Bottom, and began to advance northward 

to the le of the X Corps. By 0700, Ord’s men had attacked and 

captured the rebel works at Fort Harrison, part of the outer line 

of Richmond’s defenses, suering signicant casualties in the 

process. At the same time, Birney’s troops moved northwest from 

New Market Heights and assaulted the Confederate trenches north 

of Fort Harrison. e X Corps units were eventually repulsed at 

Forts Gilmer and Gregg with heavy losses, especially among the 

USCTs, some of whom the rebels killed aer they had surrendered. 

General Ord was severely wounded during the ghting around 

Fort Harrison and remained out of action for over two months. 

Just as Grant had intended, Lee had to shi forces from 

Petersburg’s defenses to counter Butler’s operations against 

Richmond north of the James River. e Confederate commander 

transferred the divisions of Hoke and Field to Chan’s farm, 

opposite Fort Harrison, which the rebels intended to recapture. On 
30 September, the Confederates attacked the fort with 9,000 men 

as Lee watched nearby, but they could not dislodge the Federals 

from their stronghold, losing 1,200 men in “a furious storm of 

bullets” from the Union defenses. 

While Butler’s divisions repulsed the enemy assault at Fort 

Harrison, Meade initiated his operations south of Petersburg 

early on 30 September. Warren’s V Corps marched west from near 

Globe Tavern, supported by two divisions of Parke’s IX Corps and 

Gregg’s cavalry division—a total of 20,000 men. His objective was 

to turn the Confederate right ank just west of Poplar Springs 

Church and gain the vital Boydton Plank Road, from which the 

Union columns could then strike the South Side Railroad. Warren’s 

men captured part of the weakly held rebel lines along the Squirrel 

Level Road near Peeble’s farm in a “magnicent charge,” then 

paused to regroup, as Parke advanced the IX Corps cautiously on 

Warren’s le. 

Confederate General Hill, in command of Petersburg’s 

defenses while Lee was north of the James River, reacted quickly 

to the V Corps’ success. From the rebel works defending the road, 

he sent troops under Generals Heth and Wilcox to contest the 

31

Attempt of the rebels to recapture Fort Harrison, by William Waud

(Library of Congress)
NEW MARKET HEIGHTS

29 Sep FORT HARRISON

29–30 Sep

FORT GILMER

30 Sep

DARBYTOWN ROAD

7 Oct

NEW MARKET ROAD

7 Oct

FAIR OAKS

27 Oct

James R

J

a

m

e

s

R

App

Chickahominy R

Aiken’s Landing

Deep Bottom

Drewry’s Blu

Chan’s Blu

Bermuda Hundred

Chester 	eld

Court House

Riddell’s Shop

Fussell’s Mill

Richmond & Petersburg RR

Richmond & Danville RR

York River RR

D A R B Y T O W N R O A D

W I L L I A M S B U R G

R O A D

C H A R L E S C I T Y R O A D

R I C H M O N D T U R N P I K E

RICHMOND

Manchester

City Point

Union EntrenchmentsConfederate EntrenchmentsBattle

28 September–28 October 1864

RICHMOND AND PE TERSBUR G

AREA OF OPERATIONS

0 5

Miles

MAP 3

NEW MARKET HEIGHTS

29 Sep FORT HARRISON

29–30 Sep

FORT GILMER

30 Sep

DARBYTOWN ROAD

7 Oct

NEW MARKET ROAD

7 Oct

FAIR OAKS

27 Oct

James R

J

a

m

e

s

R

App

Chickahominy R

Aiken’s Landing

Deep Bottom

Drewry’s Blu

Chan’s Blu

Bermuda Hundred

Chester 	eld

Court House

Riddell’s Shop

Fussell’s Mill

Richmond & Petersburg RR

Richmond & Danville RR

York River RR

D A R B Y T O W N R O A D

W I L L I A M S B U R G

R O A D

C H A R L E S C I T Y R O A D

R I C H M O N D T U R N P I K E

RICHMOND

Manchester

City Point

Union EntrenchmentsConfederate EntrenchmentsBattle

28 September–28 October 1864

RICHMOND AND PE TERSBUR G

AREA OF OPERATIONS

0 5

Miles
BURGESS’ MILL

27 Oct

PEEBLE’S FARM

30 Sep–2 Oct

Appomattox R

Hatcher’s Run

ppomattox R

Poplar Springs

Churc h

Dinwiddie

Court House

Armstron g’s Mill

Dabney’s Sawmill

Sutherland

 Station

Ream’s Station

Globe Tavern

eP

et

bsr

gr u

W

&

dl e

n

o

RR

South Side RR

Norfolk & Petersburg RR

Petersburg & City Po ni t RR

. U

M

. S

ili

r

at

R

y

R

B O Y D T O N P L A N K R O A D

W H I T E O A K

R O A D S Q U I R R E L L E V E L R O A D

JERUSALEM PLANK R O A D

PETERSBURG

Pocahontas
34 

Union advance. Late on 30 September, Heth’s men routed Brig. 

Gen. Robert B. Potter’s IX Corps division and took 1,300 prisoners 

on the Jones farm near the Boydton Plank Road. At the Pegram 

farm, Potter rallied most of his panicked troops, formed a line, and 

advanced his eld artillery, which stopped the oncoming rebels. 

e next day, Warren repulsed another attack by Hill’s men at 

Peeble’s farm, and on 2 October, he had part of his troops advance 

one mile toward the road. Here they entrenched as far west as 

Pegram’s farm, joining their new eldworks to the existing defensive lines at the Globe Tavern to the east. e Confederate forti-

cations opposite them were “very formidable,” and it “was not 

deemed advisable to attack,” wrote a Northern reporter. Warren 

had failed to reach his objective, the Boydton Plank Road, but the 

extension of the Federal siege lines—at the cost of 3,000 men—

further stretched Lee’s already thin ranks.

 While General Hill directed the Confederate operations to 

counter Warren’s attempt to take the Boydton Plank Road, Lee 

looked for an opportunity to strike at Butler’s positions north 

of the James, particularly at Fort Harrison, which the rebels had 

been unable to retake on 30 September. Lee planned an attack on 

the far right ank of the Union lines, to be made by the divisions 

of Hoke and Field on 7 October. e Confederate foot soldiers 

routed the Federal cavalry on the Darbytown Road and captured 

eight cannons, but the Union X Corps repulsed a subsequent 

assault launched by Field’s troops on the New Market Road to the 

The Battle of Darbytown Road, by William Waud

(Library of Congress)
35

south. Frustrated that Hoke had failed to properly support Fields’ 

assault, Lee called o further attacks and withdrew his soldiers 

into Richmond’s defensive works, having suered about 1,300 

casualties. e Battle of the Darbytown and New Market Roads 

proved to be Lee’s last oensive eort against the Federals north 

of the James River. e ghting also cost Lee yet another excellent combat commander, General Gregg, killed while leading the 

Texas brigade. 

Twelve days later, on 19 October, Sheridan won a dramatic 

victory over Early at Cedar Creek. Sheridan’s success in the 

Shenandoah Valley encouraged the Union. At Meade’s suggestion, 

Grant once again planned to pressure Lee’s lines on both sides of 

the James with simultaneous operations in late October. Butler’s 

troops would move toward Richmond north of the river to distract 

Lee, while part of Meade’s forces marched west to strike the 

Boydton Plank Road and South Side Railroad beyond the rebels’ 

right ank at Petersburg. Grant did not want Butler to make a fullscale assault on Richmond’s extensive fortications, but rather to 

demonstrate against the rebels and, if possible, turn their le ank. 

Grant thus expected Butler’s oensive to hold rebel troops north of 

the river while Union troops moved west of Petersburg.

On a rainy 27 October, Butler sent the X Corps down the 

Darbytown and Charles City roads toward Richmond. The 

corps was now under Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, who replaced 

Birney after the latter had died of malaria earlier that month. 

Butler also ordered the XVIII Corps, led by his former chief 

engineer, Brig. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, north to Fair Oaks on 

the Williamsburg Road, the site of a battle during the 1862 

Peninsula Campaign. The Confederate defenders north of the 

James were commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, an experienced corps commander now back with Lee’s army after a 

long recuperation from a serious wound suffered at the Battle of 

the Wilderness. Longstreet moved most of his men to counter 

Weitzel’s advance after Terry’s troops had merely demonstrated 

along the Darbytown Road. Near Fair Oaks, Weitzel attacked 

with only two of his seven brigades and was repulsed by Field’s 

rebel division with the “terrific fire of a solid line of infantry,” 

wrote Longstreet. By the end of the fighting, Field’s victorious 

men rounded up 600 Federal prisoners.

e Union high command’s objectives for the upcoming 

Petersburg operation were more ambitious than Butler’s had been. 
36 

Once again, the main target was the Boydton Plank Road, as 

Grant continued to direct Union operations against Lee’s logistical 

network. On the morning of 27 October, General Hancock pulled 

two of his II Corps divisions out of the Federal trench lines east of 

Petersburg to advance against the rebel right ank on the Boydton 

Plank Road. e II Corps was aided by the V and IX Corps’ diversionary attacks on the rebel lines to the north, while Gregg’s Union 

cavalrymen protected the II Corps’ le—or southern—ank and 

rear as the foot soldiers moved toward Burgess’ Mill on Hatcher’s 

Run, the western end of the Confederate line. Hancock’s assault 

force numbered over 30,000 troops. 

On the Union right, Parke’s IX Corps troops encountered 

strong enemy eldworks, and by 0900 his attempt to break 

through Lee’s lines had failed. On the Federal le, however, 

Hancock’s II Corps column had crossed Hatcher’s Run by 1200 

and reached the Boydton Plank Road near Burgess’ Mill, at the 

intersection with White Oak Road. At this crossroads, Hancock 

halted his weary troops. Meade realized that a mile of dense 

woodland now separated the II Corps and Warren’s V Corps in 

the center of the Union line. In response to Meade’s warning, 

Warren tried to ll the gap with Crawford’s division but lacked 

the troops to do so. Meade and Grant therefore ordered Hancock 

to remain on the plank road until noon of the following day, and 

then to withdraw east to the main Union line. is le Hancock 

and Gregg isolated west of Hatcher’s Run and vulnerable to a 

Confederate attack. 

Even as Union forces tried to turn the Confederate right 

ank, the rebel defenders there attempted to exploit the opportunity beyond Hatcher’s Run. Illness once more compelled 

General Hill to relinquish command of the Confederate right 

to General Heth, his senior division commander. Heth’s force 

consisted of his own four-brigade division and two brigades 

of Wilcox’s division, as well as one cavalry brigade, all located 

north of Hancock’s position. Hill also sent Mahone’s division 

from Petersburg to bolster the rebel right, while cavalry under 

Hampton and Rooney Lee lurked to the west and southwest of 

the exposed II Corps.

 About 1630, Mahone’s division and an attached brigade 

crossed Hatcher’s Run with about 5,000 men and attacked the II 

Corps’ right ank, much to the surprise of Hancock and his men. 

At rst, panic gripped some Federal regiments, and they ed 
37

into the tangled forest, but 

then Hancock counterattacked and drove Mahone’s 

three brigades back across 

the stream. “e enemy 

became panic-stricken 

and gave way,” reported a 

Union ocer at the scene. 

Hampton’s Confederate 

cavalry also pressured the 

II Corps from the west, but 

could make no headway 

against the Yankee infantry. 

Hancock later received 

permission from Grant to 

retreat from his vulnerable 

position that night, and by 

0100 on 28 October, his 

exhausted men rejoined 

the other Union corps 

around Armstrong’s Mill. 

“e attempt [to seize the Boydton Plank Road] was a failure,” 

Grant wrote. He therefore “ordered the troops to withdraw, and 

they were all back in their former positions the next day.” In the 

Battle of the Boydton Plank Road, the Federals sustained over 

1,700 casualties, mostly from the II Corps, compared with 1,300 

fallen rebels. 

A comparative lull occurred aer the action, known variously as the Battle of Hatcher’s Run and the Battle of Burgess’ 

Mill. Aer Wright’s VI Corps returned from the Shenandoah, 

Grant decided to make another push. On 7 December, he sent 

Warren with 22,000 infantry from the V Corps and a II Corps 

division as well as 4,200 cavalry under Gregg to strike the 

Weldon Railroad. By the next day they were wrecking track as 

far south as Jarratt’s Station, about thirty miles from Petersburg. 

Once aware of this expedition, Lee ordered Hampton’s cavalry to 

pursue it, and then sent infantry under General Hill in support. 

On 9 December, the rebel troopers stopped Warren’s progress at 

Hicksford, where they prevented the Federals from destroying 

a key railroad bridge across the Meherrin River. Pelted by sleet 

and freezing rain, the Federals marched back to Petersburg by 

General Hancock

(Library of Congress)
38

11 December, burning and looting as they went, having wrecked 

sixteen miles of track.

During the winter months, most of the Union and Confederate 

troops remained hunkered down in their cold, wet trenches. 

Because of a superior logistical network, the Federal soldiers 

generally ate better and wore warmer clothing than their Southern 

counterparts. At the end of 1864, Union forces in the Richmond–

Petersburg theater numbered about 120,000 men. President 

Lincoln’s re-election on 8 November meant that the North would 

ght on. Although the Confederate government sent emissaries 

to negotiate peace with the Lincoln administration in January 

1865, these eorts came to naught, as did a second attempt by the 

South to broker an armistice aboard the River Queen at Hampton 

Roads on 3 February, attended by Lincoln and Confederate Vice 

President Alexander H. Stephens. 

Meanwhile, Grant’s armies underwent several significant leadership changes. General Hancock went on leave in 

November due to his unhealed Gettysburg wound, and would 

not return to the Army of the Potomac. In his place, Meade’s 

capable chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, 

assumed command of the II Corps. In December, the X and 

XVIII Corps were discontinued. The white divisions of the 

two organizations composed the new XXIV Corps under Maj. 

Gen. John Gibbon, and the black divisions became the XXV 

Corps under Weitzel, recently promoted to major general. In 

December, General Butler directed an unsuccessful campaign 

against Fort Fisher, near Wilmington, North Carolina. On 7 

January 1865, Grant removed Butler from command of the 

Army of the James and replaced him with General Ord, now 

recovered from his Fort Harrison wound. 

Within the Confederate army, food was scarce, pay was in 

arrears, and despondent men deserted by the thousands. Lee kept 

the remaining troops busy improving the thirty-seven miles of 

trenches around Petersburg and Richmond, but all their hard work 

could not disguise the fact that, by the end of January 1865, the 

Federals outnumbered his ragged army of 70,000 men by almost 

two to one. Recognizing the South’s manpower shortage, on 13 

March Confederate President Jeerson Davis signed into law an act 

allowing enlistments of black soldiers, if they had been emancipated 

by their masters. Few blacks enlisted, however, and the measure was 

ineectual in bolstering the strength of the rebel armies.
SUTHERLAND STATION

2 Apr

WHITE OAK ROAD

31 Mar

BURGESS’ MILL

2 Apr

DABNEY’S SAW MILL

6 Feb

FORT MAHONE

2 Apr VI CORPS ASSAULT

2 Apr

FORT GREGG

2 Apr

FORT STEDMAN

25 Mar

HATCHER’S RUN

5 Feb

25 Mar

FIVE FORKS

30 Mar

1 Apr

DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE

31 Mar

Appomattox R

Hatcher’s Run

l e W

od

&

n

t

eP

sre

r

ub

RR

g

South Side RR

Norfolk & Petersburg RR

U S.

M

.

il

ti

r a y

RR PETERSBURG

Pocahontas

Poplar Springs

Churc h

Armstron g’s Mill

Globe Tavern

B O Y D T O N P L A N K R O A D

S Q U I R R E L L E V E L R O A D JERUSALEM PLANK RO A D W H I T E O A K R O A D

V A U G H A N R O A D

Union EntrenchmentsConfederate EntrenchmentsBattle

5 February–2 April 1865

PETERSBUR G

AREA OF OPERATIONS

0 5

Miles

MAP 4
40 

Lee kept Longstreet and his First Corps north of the 

Appomattox River, including Field’s and Maj. Gen. George E. 

Pickett’s divisions. Kershaw’s division returned to Longstreet 

in late November 1864 from campaigning with Early in the 

Shenandoah Valley. Kershaw was followed by the Army of 

Northern Virginia’s Second Corps, which reached Petersburg in 

December, although Early himself remained in the Valley with a 

small force. Lee placed Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon in command 

of the Second Corps in Early’s absence. General Hill still led 

the army’s ird Corps on the right ank west of Petersburg, 

and General Ewell commanded Richmond’s defensive force. 

Lee created a Fourth Corps in the fall, which he placed under 

General Anderson, but it consisted of only one division aer Lee 

was compelled to send General Hoke’s troops to North Carolina 

in late December to meet the Union threat to Fort Fisher. In 

January 1865, Lee also transferred one division of cavalry to 

South Carolina, and he reluctantly sent his cavalry commander, 

General Hampton, along with it. ese sorely missed detachments would never return to the Army of Northern Virginia.

THE BATTLE OF HATCHER’S RUN

In February 1865, Grant renewed his eort to cut the 

Confederate supply routes into the city. Warren’s foray against the 

Weldon Railroad in December had failed to prevent the rebels 

from using it and the Boydton Plank Road to transport supplies. 

At Grant’s behest, Meade attempted to capture the road and the 

South Side Railroad with a 34,000-man strike force. On 5 February, 

Gregg’s cavalry division rode west to attack the enemy’s wagons 

moving on the Boydton Plank Road near Dinwiddie Court House 

and the Confederate right ank at Burgess’ Mill. To prevent any 

danger to the cavalry from Hill’s rebel infantry, Meade moved 

Warren’s V Corps south of Hatcher’s Run and sent it west on the 

Vaughan Road. At the same time, two II Corps divisions marched 

west from Globe Tavern on the north bank of Hatcher’s Run to 

cover the V Corps’ right—or northern—ank. e II Corps troops 

ran into the breastworks of Heth’s rebel division in front of the 

Boydton Plank Road, halted, and then dug in near Armstrong’s 

Mill, at a key crossing of Hatcher’s Run (See Map 4). 

About 1600, the divisions of Heth and Brig. Gen. Clement A. 

Evans (of Gordon’s Second Corps) le the Petersburg trench lines 

and attacked Humphreys’ II Corps bluecoats through the tangled 
41

woods from the north, but were repulsed three times. at night, 

the V Corps moved closer to Humphreys’ position by Armstrong’s 

Mill, as did Gregg’s troopers, who could nd only eighteen 

Confederate supply wagons on the Boydton Plank Road to destroy.

On the aernoon of 6 February, Crawford’s and Brig. Gen. 

Romeyn B. Ayres’ V Corps divisions collided with the advancing 

Confederate divisions of Brig. Gen. John Pegram (Second Corps) 

and Mahone (ird Corps) at Dabney’s Saw Mill, on the south 

side of Hatcher’s Run. During the back-and-forth ghting around 

the mill and in the surrounding woods, Pegram was killed, but 

the Federals could make no further headway against the 14,000 

Southern defenders, and many demoralized Union soldiers ed 

the eld. “e musketry re on both sides was for a time as terrible 

as any of the war,” noted a veteran reporter who witnessed the 

battle. at night, the temperature plummeted, and snow and sleet 

fell on the soldiers, adding to their misery. On 7 February, aer 

some inconclusive ghting, Meade ordered the Federals to dig in 

and extend their lines from Armstrong’s Mill four miles eastward 

to integrate the newly dug eldworks with the existing defenses. 

Although Meade had failed to gain the South Side Railroad, Union 

troops now stood only three miles from that important objective.

THE TIGHTENING NOOSE

Although Lee’s lines of communications to the west were 

still intact, he recognized the dire situation his army faced. As 

5th Corps, 7th of February, by Alfred R. Waud

(Library of Congress)
42 

the Union lines stretched farther west, the rebels could lengthen 

their own defenses only with diculty, and in some sections 

of the trenches, Confederate soldiers already stood een 

feet apart. A lack of supplies and rampant desertion remained 

critical problems, as did the deteriorating strategic situation. 

Union forces under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman had captured 

Savannah, Georgia, in December 1864, and in January 1865, Fort 

Fisher fell to a second Federal expeditionary force under General 

Terry, closing Wilmington, the South’s last remaining seaport. 

Wilmington itself fell to Terry’s command on 22 February. 

Meanwhile, Sherman’s 60,000 troops reached Columbia, the 

capital of South Carolina, on 17 February, and by the next 

morning, much of the city lay in ashes. A 15,000-man force led 

by Maj. Gen. John M. Schoeld threatened inland North Carolina 

from New Bern, near the coast. Lee knew that Union success in 

the Carolinas would spell doom for his own diminishing army in 

Virginia, which relied on the lower South to provide food, fodder, 

and war materiel. He wished to “unite our armies, as separately 

they do not seem able to make head against the enemy.” Lee also 

warned Confederate President Davis that “it may be necessary 

to abandon our cities” due to Sherman’s advance and Grant’s 

increasing pressure on Petersburg and Richmond.

On 6 February, Davis appointed Lee general in chief  of 

all Confederate forces, although the general’s ability to direct the 

rebel armies by that time was limited. Two weeks later, at Lee’s 

request, the Confederate War Department appointed General 

Joseph E. Johnston to lead all rebel troops in the Carolinas, 

primarily to prevent Sherman from uniting with Schoeld and 

Terry, and then marching northward to join Grant. Lee and Davis 

knew that if Sherman’s army group combined with Federal forces 

in Virginia all would be lost. Lee began to consider abandoning 

Petersburg and uniting with Johnston’s army to defeat Sherman 

and Grant separately.

In early March, however, Lee received the distressing news that 

Sheridan had crushed Early in the upper Shenandoah Valley, cutting 

o one of the rebels’ major supply sources, and freeing an additional 

20,000 Federal troops for action at Richmond and Petersburg. Since 

the Davis administration refused to consider a political settlement 

that did not grant Confederate independence—rendering a negotiated end to the war highly improbable—Lee decided to attempt a 

breakout against Grant’s formidable siege lines. In the meantime, he 
43

warned Davis that the fall of the Confederate capital was growing 

more likely with each passing day.

ATTACK ON FORT STEDMAN

For several weeks in March, Lee conferred with General 

Gordon, the Second Corps commander, about the possibility 

of an assault on Union lines. Lee hoped that if part of his army 

captured a section of Meade’s fortications Grant would constrict 

his lengthy siege lines around Petersburg, which might enable 

Lee to defend the city with fewer men. If so, Lee could then send 

some troops to unite with Johnson’s army and defeat Sherman. 

e need for an assault at Petersburg was made more pressing by 

the junction of Sherman’s army group with Schoeld’s 30,000-man 

force (now including Terry’s corps) at Goldsboro, North Carolina, 

Interior of Fort Stedman

(Library of Congress)
44 

on 23 March, along with signs that Grant intended to strike Lee’s 

right ank.

Gordon recommended that a Confederate assault be made 

against Fort Stedman, located 150 yards from the rebel lines 

between the crater and the Appomattox River. e three-quartersacre fort stood within the IX Corps’ sector and was badly deteriorated owing to its constant exposure to Confederate re. e fort 

was vulnerable to attack, having no bastions and just four cannons. 

It also stood close to the City Point Railroad, the capture of which 

would put the Confederates in a position to threaten the main 

Union supply depot and Grant’s headquarters. Lee assumed that 

Grant would then shi troops from his le to counter the rebel 

threat, which was Lee’s main objective. Gordon maintained that 

such a blow would cripple the Union army around the city, “or 

at least . . . disable it temporarily, enabling us to withdraw from 

Petersburg in safety and join Johnston in North Carolina.” 

To increase the chances of success, Lee ordered Gordon 

to command the eort, spearheaded by his own Second Corps 

troops, and reinforced by several brigades from Anderson’s and 

Hill’s corps, as well as one brigade of cavalry. From north of the 

James, Pickett’s division of Longstreet’s corps was also included in 

the attack plan, but Lee was doubtful that Pickett’s men could reach 

the point of the attack in time to be of service. Gordon planned to 

launch his surprise assault before dawn, and aer capturing Fort 

Stedman and its supporting batteries, have his infantry expand 

the attack north and south along the Union line, while the cavalry 

wreaked havoc in the Federal rear.

Gordon’s well-planned operation began at 0400 on 25 March, 

quickly overrunning Fort Stedman and capturing the anking 

batteries as well, “aer a brief but gallant resistance,” a Union ocer 

reported. But the Union defenders soon recovered from the shock 

of the onslaught, and several adjacent Federal batteries began to 

pound the Confederates with a deadly crossre. In the meantime, 

Gordon’s attack started to unravel. e expected rebel cavalry never 

materialized, some of Gordon’s infantry units became disoriented 

while negotiating the labyrinthine Union trenches in the darkness, 

and many hungry rebels found the abandoned Federal rations too 

tempting to ignore. As a result, Gordon’s attack ground to a halt as the 

Confederates collided with determined IX Corps infantry. Realizing 

that the earthworks beyond Fort Stedman “could only be taken at 

great sacrice,” Lee authorized Gordon to pull his men back to the 
45

main rebel line at 0800. Rather than risk being shot in the back during 

the retreat, hundreds of Confederates surrendered to the Federals. 

Gordon’s attack on Fort Stedman resulted in about 2,700 Southern 

casualties, while the Union IX Corps lost 1,044. “It was a desperate 

military gamble,” one of Grant’s sta ocers concluded, “with very 

few chances of winning.” Suspecting that Lee had weakened his right 

ank in order to make the assault, Union II and VI Corps troops 

attacked that aernoon along Hatcher’s Run, netting another 800 

rebel prisoners, while incurring heavy losses of their own. 

FINAL BATTLES AROUND PETERSBURG

Lee’s last oensive had failed and had cost him almost onetenth of his force defending Petersburg. Moreover, it was a crushing 

blow to Southern morale. Lee’s men had “lost hope of nal success, 

and the men were not willing to risk their lives in a hopeless 

endeavor,” concluded one Confederate ocer at Petersburg. e 

day aer the attack on Fort Stedman, the Southern commander 

warned President Davis that it would now “be impossible to 

prevent a junction between Grant and Sherman,” and he advised 

against his army remaining at Richmond and Petersburg until the 

arrival of Sherman’s army group. Lee knew—as did Grant—that 

his 60,000 troops could not remain in place if the Federals cut the 

South Side Railroad near Hatcher’s Run. But Lee needed time to 

prepare his army for the eort to join Johnston’s small force in 

North Carolina. e Confederate crisis was exacerbated by the 

arrival in late March of General Sheridan and his Union cavalry 

corps from the Shenandoah Valley. e Federal mobile strike 

force, Lee understood, would soon spell trouble for his vulnerable 

right ank and the supply lines it protected. 

On 27 March, Grant met with Sherman at his City Point 

headquarters, the latter having just arrived by steamship from 

North Carolina. at evening, the two generals called on 

President Lincoln, who had sailed down from Washington, and 

on the following day, they were joined by Rear Adm. David D. 

Porter, commander of the U.S. Navy’s North Atlantic Blockading 

Squadron. During the meeting, the Northern leaders discussed 

military strategy and Lincoln’s plans for restoring the nation once 

the rebellion was crushed and the Southern armed forces had 

surrendered. e president favored a conciliatory approach—“I 

want submission and no more bloodshed,” he rmly stated. Lincoln 

hoped another battle could be avoided, and when the time came, 
46 

he urged the generals to give the surrendering Confederates “the 

most liberal and honorable of terms.” Sherman soon returned to 

his command in North Carolina, where he would pursue Johnston’s 

heavily outnumbered army. Grant, meanwhile, prepared to launch 

what he hoped would be his last campaign against Lee. 

Although Sherman had urged Grant to postpone an attack on 

Lee’s lines until his Federal forces in North Carolina could reach 

Petersburg, Grant feared the possibility that “Lee should get away 

some night before I was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push 

into North Carolina to join with Johnston.” e Union general in chief 

accordingly readied his forces for renewed operations against Lee’s 

army. Several days before Gordon’s attack on Fort Stedman, Grant 

had ordered his army and corps commanders to be ready to move 

on 29 March. General Ord was to shi 16,000 men from his Army 

of the James to the far le of the Union defenses south of Petersburg, 

leaving 14,000 troops under General Weitzel at Bermuda Hundred 

and Deep Bottom. Parke’s IX Corps and Wright’s VI Corps remained 

in the lines before Petersburg with about 35,000 troops, prepared to 

punch through the rebel defenses if weakened by Lee to meet the 

threat on his right. Grant ordered Humphrey’s II Corps and Warren’s 

V Corps “to get into a position from which we could strike the South 

Side Railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad” west of Petersburg 

The Peacemakers (detail), by George Peter Alexander Healy (The White House Historical Association)
47

once Ord’s troops had replaced them in the trenches. While Warren’s 

and Humphreys’ infantry crossed Hatcher’s Run and advanced on 

the Confederate right ank, Sheridan and his 13,000 troopers were 

to seize a strategic road junction on Lee’s far western ank called Five 

Forks, and then strike Lee’s remaining supply lines in the enemy’s rear. 

General Meade accompanied the 35,000 soldiers of the II and 

V Corps, hoping to be present when they captured the Boydton 

Plank Road, one of the Confederates’ few remaining supply 

routes to Petersburg. Sheridan, meanwhile, began his movement 

in a heavy rain on 29 March. He started from near Globe Tavern 

and rode southwest to Dinwiddie Court House, arriving there 

at 1700. e next day, Sheridan advanced some of his troopers 

north toward Five Forks over muddy roads, but they fell back to 

Dinwiddie Court House in the face of sti resistance from rebel 

cavalry. Warned of the new threat to his right, Lee had posted 

a force at Five Forks consisting of Pickett’s 5,000-man infantry 

division and 5,500 troopers under his nephew, Fitzhugh Lee. 

With the major turning movement well underway, Grant 

decided to modify the Union forces’ objectives. He ordered Sheridan 

to make Lee’s army his main focus. “I do not want you . . . to cut 

loose and go aer the enemy’s [rail]roads at present,” Grant told 

Sheridan, but instead, “in the morning, push around the enemy, if 

you can, and get on his right rear.” To bolster Sheridan’s mounted 

force for the oensive, Grant placed the V Corps under the cavalryman’s orders, although Sheridan had requested the VI Corps, which 

he had commanded in the recent Shenandoah Valley Campaign. 

e next day, Warren’s rain-soaked V Corps approached the 

Confederate position along White Oak Road, an east-west route 

from Burgess’ Mill to Five Forks, along which Anderson’s Fourth 

Corps had established a line of eldworks. Aer initially pushing 

back rebel forces south of the road, Warren’s advancing troops 

passed through heavily wooded terrain, where Bushrod Johnson’s 

Confederate division struck them hard on the le ank. Many 

of the Federal units dissolved in chaos. “Brigade aer brigade 

broke,” recalled a Union ocer, and “that strange impulse termed 

a ‘panic’ took eect and the retreat became a rout.” Later, fresh V 

Corps troops managed to take back much of the lost ground and 

push Johnson’s rebels back to the White Oak Road, but the heavy 

ghting delayed Warren’s junction with Sheridan. 

While the battle raged near the White Oak Road, Sheridan 

was hard-pressed to hold on to Dinwiddie Court House against the 
48

onslaught from Pickett’s foot soldiers and Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry. 

But Brig. Gen. George A. Custer’s division of Union troopers, 

armed with Spencer repeating carbines, poured out “such a shower 

of lead that nothing could stand up against it,” and then launched 

a dismounted charge, which thwarted the rebels’ advance toward 

the courthouse.

Once Pickett learned that V Corps troops had moved nearby, 

he returned north to Five Forks early on the morning of 1 April. 

Pickett’s men dug in there along the White Oak Road. ey were 

supported by Rooney Lee’s cavalry and several batteries of artillery. Lee ordered Pickett to hold the crossroads “at all hazards,” as 

the loss of the key intersection on the extreme Confederate right 

would enable Sheridan’s cavalry to seize the South Side Railroad 

three miles to the north, cutting Lee’s last supply line.

On 1 April, Sheridan moved his cavalry and the V Corps 

north from Dinwiddie Court House toward Five Forks, and he was 

“exceedingly anxious to attack at once.” Upon nearing the junction, 

he dismounted his cavalry and sent them forward to pin down 

Pickett’s forces in his front, and then directed Warren to begin 

his infantry attack on the rebel position from the Union right—

or eastern—ank. Slowed by muddy roads and heavily wooded 

terrain, Warren’s attack began shortly aer 1600—a lengthy delay 

that would ultimately cost him his command. But when the Federals 

struck, they struck hard. Ayres’ V Corps division hammered the 

enemy’s le ank with overwhelming force, the attacking bluecoats urged on by Sheridan, who rode at the front of Warren’s 

surging line. Advancing undetected through tangled woods, 

Crawford’s and Brig. Gen. Charles Grin’s divisions outanked 

Pickett’s line and secured Ford’s Road in the Confederate rear, 

giving them a clear path to the South Side Railroad. In the ensuing 

rout, the victorious V Corps troops rounded up thousands of rebel 

prisoners, while the remaining Confederates ed northwest, away 

from Petersburg. 

By 1830, Pickett’s shattered command was in full retreat. 

“e cowardly ran, the timid were dumbfounded, the brave, alone, 

could not withstand the vastly superior force of the enemy,” wrote 

one wounded rebel. Sheridan’s success was due in part to Pickett’s 

absence from the eld during most of the battle. He had been 

enjoying a shad bake with Fitzhugh Lee two miles north of Five 

Forks when the ghting began and arrived on the battleeld too 

late to aect the outcome.
Map of the Battle of Five Forks

(Library of Congress)
50 

Although victorious, Sheridan was enraged at Warren for 

what the cavalryman regarded as inexcusable slowness in carrying 

out his orders. With Grant’s authorization, he relieved Warren of 

command and replaced him with General Grin, the V Corps’ 

senior division commander. e Battle of Five Forks cost the 

Confederates roughly 3,000 casualties compared with the Federals’ 

830 losses.

With Sheridan’s victory, the rebel lines at Petersburg were 

broken on the right, and the South Side Railroad could no longer 

be defended. Worse yet, Lee’s best escape route to Johnston’s army 

was now blocked. To meet this crisis, Lee ordered Longstreet to 

hurry to Petersburg with one of his divisions from Richmond. 

e rebels also abandoned three miles of entrenchments on their 

western ank, lacking the soldiers to occupy the positions. Lee 

knew that he had to shore up his right ank at Petersburg to buy 

enough time for his army’s withdrawal from the two besieged 

cities.

Upon hearing the news of the Union victory at Five Forks, 

Grant ordered an assault on the rebel lines around Petersburg 

for the morning of 2 April, to be preceded by a three-hour artillery bombardment the night before. From their positions around 

Fort Sedgwick on the Jerusalem Turnpike, IX Corps units surged 

north at 0430 to hit Gordon’s Second Corps Confederates. 

In obedience to orders, General Parke directed the assault, 

though he had little condence in the operation’s success. e 

ghting was erce in the maze of trenches and rie pits south of 

Petersburg, particularly around Fort Mahone, but the stubborn 

enemy defenders managed to turn back the Federal onslaught by 

midaernoon. 

Also on 2 April, about 0445, Wright’s VI Corps attacked the 

thinly defended rebel earthworks of A. P. Hill’s corps “with the 

utmost gallantry and determination” from positions facing Fort 

Welch and Fort Gregg, west of Globe Tavern and the Weldon 

Railroad. Wright had deployed his 14,000 troops in columns 

close to the rebel trenches, and within thirty minutes, the densely 

packed Union formations punched a gaping hole in Lee’s thin 

lines, allowing thousands of VI Corps soldiers to race toward the 

Boydton Plank Road and the South Side Railroad while the rebel 

defenders ed or surrendered. “It was a hard fought battle,” wrote 

one Massachusetts soldier, “but it brought brilliant success, though 

with a terrible cost.”
51

In the aermath of their success, Wright’s troops were thoroughly disorganized, having suered some 2,200 casualties in the 

assault. Many Federals reached the Boydton Plank Road, while 

others advanced to the long-sought-aer South Side Railroad. Most 

of Wright’s troops, however, wheeled le aer they had breached 

the enemy lines. en they rushed along the rear of the rebel positions toward Burgess’ Mill, “sweeping everything before them,” 

Grant later reported. With help from the II Corps, they succeeded 

in prying Heth’s troops out of their trenches along Hatcher’s Run 

and pursued them northward for two miles to Sutherland Station 

on the South Side Railroad. Here four Confederate brigades made 

a stand against Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles’ II Corps division, 

but they were routed by a Union ank attack and forced to ee 

northwest to the Appomattox River, the Federals capturing 1,000 

of the rebels. Miles’ troops were too disorganized and exhausted 

to pursue the eeing enemy, but the South Side Railroad, Lee’s last 

supply line, was now rmly in Union control.

THE FALL OF RICHMOND

e Confederate high command recognized the danger that 

Wright’s breakthrough presented, and Lee and Longstreet could 

Breastworks of the Confederate Fort Mahone

(Library of Congress)
52 

clearly see the advancing Federal formations from Lee’s headquarters west of Petersburg. e Union juggernaut had thrown back 

ve Southern brigades and had taken four miles of defensive line 

stretching from the western outskirts of the city to Hatcher’s Run. 

In the mêlée that followed, General Hill rashly rode along the 

Boydton Plank Road to assess the situation and was killed by a 

Union soldier from the VI Corps. To shore up his position, Lee 

gathered troops west of the city in defenses along Indian Town 

Creek, with two small rebel forts—Gregg and Whitworth—situated 

in advance of the line. He hoped to use these earthen defenses 

to stall the Union attack and enable his hard-pressed soldiers to 

withdraw from Petersburg later that day. Knowing that the fall of 

the Confederate capital was at hand, on the morning of 2 April, 

Lee notied Confederate Secretary of War John C. Breckinridge 

and President Davis that Petersburg and Richmond would have to 

be evacuated by nightfall. “It is absolutely necessary that we should 

abandon our position tonight, or run the risk of being cut o in the 

morning,” Lee glumly advised his civilian superiors.

Lee was correct to anticipate an attack on the Indian Town 

Creek line. Aer Wright’s corps had overrun Hill’s entrenched 

troops at dawn on 2 April, Gibbon’s relatively fresh XXIV Corps 

from the Army of the James moved north into the breach, and 

at 1300, launched an attack against the last Confederate line 

astride the Boydton Plank Road. e outnumbered Southern 

defenders of Fort Gregg mounted a stout defense against Gibbon’s 

onrushing Yankees, but the fort was overwhelmed aer what one 

Confederate called a “desperate hand-to-hand conict.” General 

Grant, who witnessed Gibbon’s attack, immediately ordered all 

Union commands to assault Lee’s weakened positions. Grant’s 

attack order even included the II and VI Corps, who had to hurry 

back to Petersburg from Hatcher’s Run. Lee thwarted further 

Union penetrations of his lines with a 4,600-man reinforcement 

from Longstreet’s First Corps, which had made a rapid march 

from Richmond and had taken position east of the two fallen forts. 

Lee now hoped to hold on to the city until nightfall, when he could 

extricate his much-reduced forces and move west. 

While Federal troops from the Army of the Potomac and 

the Army of the James battled the main Confederate army at 

Petersburg, rebels in Anderson’s corps, Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry, and 

the infantry divisions of Heth, Pickett, and Johnson were cut o 

from their comrades in gray by the II and VI Corps troops west 
53

of the city. By midaernoon, these Confederate formations under 

Anderson’s overall command moved northwest on the south side 

of the Appomattox River toward an eventual junction with Lee, 

closely pursued by Union cavalry.

Having advised the civilian authorities to evacuate Richmond, 

Lee began to withdraw the rest of his army from the two cities on 

the evening of 2 April. “It will be a dicult operation,” Lee wrote, 

“but I hope not impracticable.” e immediate objective of the 

Army of Northern Virginia was to reach Amelia Court House on 

the Richmond and Danville Railroad, thirty-six miles northwest 

of Petersburg. ere, Lee was informed, food and other supplies 

would be waiting for his retreating army, which would then 

march south to join General Johnston’s forces in North Carolina. 

Taking most of their eld artillery and hundreds of wagons with 

them, Longstreet and Gordon withdrew from the Petersburg 

lines and crossed the Appomattox River, heading west toward 

Amelia. Mahone’s forces guarding the Richmond and Petersburg 

Railroad at Bermuda Hundred also retreated west, as did Ewell’s 

two divisions defending Richmond, much of which was burned by 

Confederate authorities and looters during the evacuation.

Early on the morning of 3 April, Union troops crossed the 

deserted rebel earthworks and entered Petersburg, while twentyodd miles to the north, Richmond mayor Joseph C. Mayo surrendered the city to Union forces under General Weitzel. Aer almost 

four years of devastating civil war, U.S. forces at last occupied the 

rebel capital and main logistical hub. at evening, Lincoln telegraphed his congratulations to Grant from City Point: “Allow me 

to tender to you and all with you the nation’s grateful thanks.” On 4 

April, Lincoln and his son Tad entered Richmond, and were recognized by many former slaves, who jubilantly greeted the president. 

“No electric wire could have carried the news of the President’s 

arrival sooner than it was circulated through Richmond,” wrote 

Admiral Porter, who accompanied Lincoln, “ey all wanted to 

shake hands with Mr. Lincoln or his coat tail or even to kneel down 

and kiss his boots!” Lincoln’s party toured Jeerson Davis’ ocial 

residence, the Virginia state capitol, and a former military prison. 

RETREAT TO THE WEST

In order to shorten the marching columns, Lee’s forces made 

their way west to Amelia Court House by several routes. e army’s 

wagon train took the most northerly route via Powhatan Court 
54 

House, while most of the troops crossed the Appomattox River at 

Goode’s Bridge, and then reached Amelia on 4 April. ey were 

joined by Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry and the infantry divisions under 

Anderson that had been cut o from Petersburg aer the battles 

of Five Forks and Sutherland Station. During Anderson’s retreat, 

elements of Custer’s Union cavalry division struck the rear of the 

Confederate column at Namozine Church south of the Appomattox 

River on 3 April, but the rebels were able to continue their hasty 

retreat. During the pursuit, “hundreds and hundreds of prisoners, 

armed and unarmed, fell into our hands,” Sheridan noted (Map 5). 

In the meantime, the Confederates arriving at Amelia Court 

House received a severe shock. Although Lee had directed that proviHIGH BRIDGE 6 Apr

CUMBERLAND CHURCH 7 Apr

APPOMATTOX

STATION 8 Apr

APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE 9 Apr

SAILOR’S CREEK

6 Apr

M E A D E

O R D S H E R I D A N G R I F F IN

Appomattox R

Appomattox R

South Side RR

Richmond & Danvi l le RR

New Hope

Churc h

Prince Edward

Court House

Prospec t

Station

R ice’s

Station

Holt’s Corner

Farmville

New Store

Jetersville

Paineville

Burkeville

Confederate Retreat

Union Movement

Battle

2–9 April 1865

A Sketch based on Plate LXXVI, Number 5, of

The Ocial Militar y Atlas of the Civil War

PURSUIT T O APPOM A T TOX

MAP 5

HIGH BRIDGE 6 Apr

CUMBERLAND CHURCH 7 Apr

APPOMATTOX

STATION 8 Apr

APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE 9 Apr

SAILOR’S CREEK

6 Apr

M E A D E

O R D S H E R I D A N G R I F F IN

Appomattox R

Appomattox R

South Side RR

Richmond & Danvi l le RR

New Hope

Churc h

Prince Edward

Court House

Prospec t

Station

R ice’s

Station

Holt’s Corner

Farmville

New Store

Jetersville

Paineville

Burkeville

Confederate Retreat

Union Movement

Battle

2–9 April 1865

A Sketch based on Plate LXXVI, Number 5, of

The Ocial Militar y Atlas of the Civil War

PURSUIT T O APPOM A T TOX
55

sions for his army be sent there, his sta found only train cars loaded 

with ammunition, not the rations they had expected and that Lee’s 

famished troops sorely needed. In fact, millions of rations intended for 

Lee’s army were not shipped and still lay in warehouses at Lynchburg 

and Danville, and Greensboro, North Carolina; nor did the 350,000 

rations from Richmond arrive as Lee expected. e army’s commissary ocers had no choice but to forage on the surrounding countryside, but this expedient met with little success, given the sparsely 

settled region they were passing through. Meanwhile, discipline 

began to break down, and desertions increased. One rebel noted 

that some soldiers “wandered o in search of food,” while others 

“followed the example of the [Confederate] government and ed.” As 

NAMOZINE CHURCH 3 Apr

FORT

MAHONE

2 Apr SUTHERLAND STATION 2 Apr

BURGESS’ MILL 2 Apr

VI CORPS ASSAULT 2 Apr

FORT GREGG 2 Apr

M A H O N EM A H O N E

L O N G S T R E E T

Supply Wagons

A N D E R S O N

E W E L L

O R D

PARKE

M E A D E S H E R I D A N

Appomattox R

James R

South Side RR

Richmond & Danville RR

Petersburg & Weldon RR

Richmond & Petersburg RR 

Amelia Cou rt House

Chester e ld

Cou rt House

D inwiddie Court House

Five Forks

Globe Tavern

Goode’s Bridge

Bermuda Hundred

City

 Point

RICHMOND

Manchester

PETERSBURG

NAMOZINE CHURCH 3 Apr

FORT

MAHONE

2 Apr SUTHERLAND STATION 2 Apr

BURGESS’ MILL 2 Apr

VI CORPS ASSAULT 2 Apr

FORT GREGG 2 Apr

M A H O N EM A H O N E

L O N G S T R E E T

Supply Wagons

A N D E R S O N

E W E L L

O R D

PARKE

M E A D E S H E R I D A N

Appomattox R

James R

South Side RR

Richmond & Danville RR

Petersburg & Weldon RR

Richmond & Petersburg RR 

Amelia Cou rt House

Chester e ld

Cou rt House

D inwiddie Court House

Five Forks

Globe Tavern

Goode’s Bridge

Bermuda Hundred

City

 Point

RICHMOND

Manchester

PETERSBURG
56 

Lee well knew, the precious time spent gathering provisions allowed 

the pursuing Federals to draw ever closer to his waiting army. e 

Confederate commander telegraphed commissaries in Danville to 

send all rations by rail to Jetersville eight miles southwest of Amelia 

Court House, and he planned to march there on the following day 

while en route to Danville. Moreover, Ewell’s troops from Richmond 

were slow to reach Amelia, as were the army’s wagons, which further 

delayed Lee’s progress.

Before entering Petersburg on 3 April, Grant had ordered 

Union forces to pursue Lee south of the Appomattox River. 

General Ord’s Army of the James moved west along the South Side 

Railroad, followed by Parke’s IX Corps, heading for the important 

rail junction of Burkeville, a y-mile march. Aer meeting with 

Lincoln briey at Petersburg, Grant accompanied this column, 

heading west to Sutherland Station on the night of the third. 

Between this column and the river, Meade led the II, V, and VI 

Corps of the Army of the Potomac, with Sheridan’s two cavalry 

divisions in the van. Roughly 80,000 Federals chased Lee’s eeing 

army. “e pursuit had now become swi, unagging, relentless,” 

one of Grant’s sta noted. e bluecoats sought to remain south 

of Lee’s retreating columns to prevent the enemy’s link up with 

Johnston in North Carolina. “We did not want to follow [Lee],” 

Grant explained, “we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him o.”

Sheridan’s cavalry and Grin’s V Corps infantry reached 

Jetersville on 4 April and dug in across the railroad south of town. 

Grant ordered Meade to reinforce Sheridan with the rest of his 

army, while to the south, Ord and Parke continued their westward 

march to Burkeville, with the IX Corps repairing the South Side 

Railroad and guarding the supply wagons.

On 5 April, Sheridan sent out a brigade of cavalry under Brig. 

Gen. Henry E. Davies Jr. to the north in search of the enemy. Davies’ 

men destroyed a train of 200 rebel supply wagons at Paineville, 

ten miles northwest of Amelia Court House, before returning to 

Jetersville, pursued by most of Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry. at aernoon, Lee’s army continued its southwesterly march from Amelia 

Court House, but stopped short of Jetersville when Sheridan’s 

cavalry came into view. Much to the Confederates’ disappointment, Sheridan’s mounted force was soon strengthened by arriving 

II and VI Corps infantry units.

Sheridan believed that Lee would move west, now that the 

road to Danville was blocked. Meade, however, thought that Lee 
57

would concentrate at Amelia Court House, and began preparing 

to advance against the rebels from the east and south. Adamant in 

his convictions, Sheridan sent a message to Grant, imploring him to 

come to Jetersville. Before setting out to nd Sheridan and Meade, 

Grant “gave Ord directions to continue his march to Burkeville and 

there intrench himself for the night.” e next morning, Ord was 

to move farther west “to cut o all the roads between there and 

Farmville,” which was located een miles to the northwest on Lee’s 

probable route of march. Riding with a small escort, Grant arrived at 

Jetersville late on 5 April, and conferred with Meade and Sheridan. 

All agreed to an advance against Lee from Jetersville in the morning.

THE BATTLE OF SAILOR’S CREEK

General Lee, of course, developed his own plans that night. 

Rather than assail the enemy’s entrenched line blocking the road 

to Jetersville, he decided to move his army beyond Sheridan’s le 

ank toward Farmville, about twenty miles to the west, where he 

expected to nd rations. Marching toward Rice’s Station on the 

South Side Railroad, Longstreet led both the Confederate First 

and ird Corps, with the troops of Anderson, Ewell, and Gordon 

following him on a single road. At times the rear of Lee’s column 

came within sight of the Union pursuers, “in this great race, neck 

Attack on the Rear Guard, Amelia Court House, by Alfred R. Waud

(Library of Congress)
58 

and neck,” as a Federal ocer described it. Although Longstreet’s 

command and three divisions of Hill’s former corps reached Rice’s 

Station early on 6 April, the rest of Lee’s army had to fend o 

repeated attacks from Sheridan’s aggressive Federal cavalry units 

that morning. When Confederate troops in the rear of the column 

failed to arrive at Rice’s Station, Lee grew concerned for their safety.

e Confederate commander had good reason to worry. On 

the morning of 6 April, Sheridan’s cavalrymen rode west from 

Jetersville on a route parallel to Lee’s, several miles to the south. 

Meade’s three infantry corps found that the enemy had departed 

the Amelia Court House area the previous night, so the II, V, and 

VI Corps turned west in pursuit. Near a crossroads called Holt’s 

Corner, Union cavalry attacked Anderson’s corps in what Grant 

described as “a severe engagement.” Although repulsed, the bluecoats forced Anderson to halt his march and deploy for battle. 

Sheridan exploited the situation by rushing mounted units into 

the gap that had formed between Anderson’s stationary line and 

Longstreet’s marching column, thereby cutting o Anderson’s 

command from the Confederate main body.

Behind Anderson, Ewell feared for the safety of Lee’s wagon 

train, given the ongoing Union cavalry attacks and the Federal 

infantry closing in on the rear of the column. At Holt’s Corner, 

he directed the wagons to use the Jamestown Road north of Rice’s 

The Surrender of Ewell’s Corps at Sailor’s Creek, by Alfred R. Waud

(Library of Congress)
59

Station Road, the Confederates’ main retreat route. Gordon’s 

Second Corps troops followed the wagons, with Humphreys’ II 

Corps Federals in close pursuit. Meanwhile, on the main road, 

Ewell took up a defensive position on the west bank of Sailor’s 

Creek, with Anderson’s corps on the road ahead of him to the west. 

Wright’s VI Corps soldiers soon reached the east bank of the creek, 

confronting Ewell’s rebels.

Aer a half-hour cannonade by massed Union artillery, 

at 1800 on 6 April, Wright’s 7,000 infantrymen attacked Ewell’s 

command across a ooded Sailor’s Creek from their positions 

near the Hillsman farm. e Union attackers overcame sti enemy 

resistance and overwhelmed both of Ewell’s anks, capturing 

3,400 eeing rebels, including Ewell, Kershaw, and Maj. Gen. 

George Washington Custis Lee, the Confederate commander’s 

eldest son. e situation on Anderson’s front proved no better. e 

three Federal cavalry divisions under Custer, Maj. Gen. George 

Crook, and Brig. Gen. omas C. Devin struck hard, scattering 

Pickett’s and Johnson’s troops along the rebel center and le ank 

on Rice’s Station Road. About 2,600 of Anderson’s men were killed, 

wounded, or captured during the rout. “My God,” Lee exclaimed 

in anguish as he watched his soldiers running from the eld, “has 

the army dissolved?”

While Ewell’s and Anderson’s commands disintegrated, two 

miles to the north, Humphreys’ Federals caught up with Gordon’s 

corps and the Confederate supply wagons on the Lockett farm. A 

bottleneck had formed there, as Lee’s slow-moving wagon train 

crossed two narrow bridges over Sailor’s Creek. In the meantime, 

Gordon’s men deployed on a ridge to the east to hold o Union 

pursuit until the wagons could get across. Attacking with two divisions of the VI Corps, Humphreys forced the rebels o the high 

ground and across the creek, capturing hundreds of wagons along 

with about 2,000 of Gordon’s troops. In the ghting along Sailor’s 

Creek, Lee lost almost 8,000 men, a crippling blow to an already 

depleted army.

MARCHING TO APPOMATTOX

Late on 6 April, aer Longstreet’s men had brushed o 

an attack at Rice’s Station by troops of Gibbon’s XXIV Corps, 

Lee began moving his army to Farmville, where a stockpile of 

provisions awaited. Longstreet’s troops marched south of the 

Appomattox River, while General Mahone, now commanding 
60 

the remnant of Anderson’s corps, and the survivors of Gordon’s 

Second Corps marched to Farmville along the South Side Railroad 

via High Bridge on the Appomattox, several miles east of town. 

Measuring 2,500 feet long, the railroad bridge rested on twentyone brick piers. Below it, a more modest wooden wagon bridge 

spanned the river. On 6 April, a small Union force from Ord’s Army 

of the James attempted to capture the bridge but was defeated by 

Southern cavalry and lost 800 men captured. e next day, the 

Confederate rear guard burned a section of the railroad bridge to 

delay pursuing Union forces, but were driven o by Federal troops 

of Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow’s II Corps division before they 

could destroy the wagon bridge. Resuming the westward retreat, 

most of Lee’s army reached the vicinity of Farmville on 7 April. 

Lee hoped to buy time to rest and feed his weary and diminishing army by placing the Appomattox River between his troops 

and the pursuing Federals, but Grant continued to push his lieutenHigh Bridge crossing the Appomattox, near Farmville, on South Side Railroad

(Library of Congress)
61

ants to close up on the retreating rebels and cut them o from the 

west. “To bring Lee’s army to a stand was now the supreme object 

of every ocer, high or low, and of every soldier in the ranks,” a 

II Corps ocer wrote. To the south, Grin’s V Corps and two of 

Sheridan’s cavalry divisions marched on 7 April to Prince Edward 

Court House, and then pressed on toward Prospect Station on 

the South Side Railroad west of Farmville, to prevent Lee from 

making a sudden dash into North Carolina. North of Sheridan and 

Grin, but still below the Appomattox River, General Ord pushed 

his Army of the James from Farmville along the rail line toward 

Prospect Station. At Prince Edward Court House, Sheridan learned 

that “seven trains of provisions and forage were at Appomattox,” a 

station on the South Side Railroad about twenty-ve miles to the 

west. e Union cavalryman informed Grant that he “determined 

to start at once and capture them, and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before Lee’s army could secure them.” 

At Farmville on 7 April, the Federal II and VI Corps pressed 

Lee’s hungry soldiers, and Crook’s cavalry division attacked 

Confederate supply wagons lled with provisions. Some Southern 

troops reached the town, only to discover that approaching Union 

forces now prevented them from drawing their desperately needed 

rations. In danger of being surrounded, the Confederates had to 

move north across the river, burning the bridges behind them. No 

sooner had the Southern soldiers crossed than they had to face 

more pursuing bluecoats coming from the east.

Advancing from the High Bridge area, about 1400, Humphreys’ 

II Corps troops encountered most of Lee’s infantry entrenched 

on elevated ground at Cumberland Church, three miles north of 

Farmville. Humphreys attacked the enemy position twice from 

the east and north, and nearly turned the rebels’ le ank under 

Mahone, but the Southern troops, supported by artillery, repulsed 

the Federal assaults. Union VI Corps reinforcements from Farmville 

could not be brought up in time for Humphreys to dislodge the 

rebels before dark, due to the damaged bridges over the Appomattox 

River. e ghting at Cumberland Church cost the Federals 655 

casualties, including Brig. Gen. omas Smyth, a II Corps division 

commander who fell mortally wounded and died two days later—

the last Union general killed in the war. e Confederate losses 

numbered about 255. 

Lee’s veterans continued their retreat at midnight, with many 

of the soldiers dropping out of the column from hunger, exhaustion, 
62 

and despair. e once indomitable Army of Northern Virginia, 

Grant recalled, “was rapidly crumbling.” Longstreet likewise noted 

that “the troops of our broken columns were troubled and faint of 

heart,” while many of the rebels’ mules and horses were too weak 

to pull wagons and cannons. Lee planned to resupply his men at 

Appomattox Station and then proceed west about twenty miles 

to Campbell Court House (present-day Rustburg), located eleven 

miles south of Lynchburg. From there, the Southern commander 

would proceed to Danville, another sixty miles to the south, en 

route to Johnston’s army in North Carolina.

Prior to leaving Cumberland Church, Lee received a 

message from Grant late on the night of 7 April, in which the 

Union commanding general called on Lee to surrender his 

army and avoid “any further eusion of blood.” In reply, Lee 

requested Grant’s terms of capitulation, though he denied the 

“hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of 

Northern Virginia.” at night, Lee withdrew his army from 

the Cumberland Church line and headed west on several roads 

toward Appomattox Station via New Store, briey halting at the 

latter point on the morning of 8 April. From New Store, Lee’s army 

marched in a single column on the Richmond-Lynchburg Stage 

Road, with Gordon’s command in the advance and Longstreet’s 

force bringing up the rear. 

Wright’s and Humphreys’ Federal corps under Meade 

followed close on Lee’s heels north of the Appomattox River. 

Grant, who was “suering very severely with a sick headache,” 

accompanied Meade’s column. Meanwhile, south of the river, 

Sheridan continued to push toward Appomattox Station with 

his troopers, followed by Ord’s Army of the James and Grin’s V 

Corps. Moving “with alacrity and without any straggling,” Grant 

reported, Sheridan’s cavalry reached their destination on the aernoon of 8 April. Soon aer their arrival, Custer’s division managed 

to capture four supply trains, along with twenty-ve guns, aer 

driving away the surprised Confederate defenders. More importantly, a strong force of Union cavalry now blocked Lee’s access to 

his supplies and the main road west.

On 8 April, Grant replied to Lee’s note of the previous night. 

He informed the Confederate commander that with regard to 

terms, “there is but one condition I would insist upon—namely, 

that the men and ocers surrendered shall be disqualied for 

taking up arms against the Government of the United States until 
63

properly exchanged.” Grant also advised Lee of his willingness to 

meet “at any point agreeable to you.”

e rest of the day saw the two belligerents continue moving 

west toward Appomattox Station, but with little ghting along the 

way. Lee’s men arrived around the village of Appomattox Court 

House, ve miles east of the rail depot. Late that night, Grant 

received a letter from Lee, in which the latter stated that he did 

“not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender 

of this army.” Nevertheless, Lee did seek to bring an end to the 

ghting, and he suggested that they meet the following day at 1000 

to discuss “the restoration of peace.” Grant and his sta thought 

that Lee had changed his tune, and now sought a political settlement that stopped short of outright surrender. Perhaps Lee hoped 

to buy time in order to reach Johnston in North Carolina. ese 

considerations mattered little to Grant, however, for he lacked the 

authority to conduct peace negotiations with Lee. More importantly, the Union general in chief also knew that he had the rebels 

all but cornered at Appomattox.

Aer a sleepless night, Grant began Palm Sunday, 9 April, 

by writing a reply to Lee, advising his Confederate counterpart 

that because he could not negotiate a peace, the proposed 1000 

meeting “could lead to no good.” e Union commander reiterated his desire to end hostilities, and he reminded Lee that “by the 

South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event.” Even as Grant wrote, Union forces were hastening the 

end of the war. While Sheridan blocked Lee’s path to Appomattox 

Station and the desperately needed supply stores there, Ord and 

Grin were hurrying to support the Union cavalryman. Grant 

and his sta le Meade’s camp at New Store and rode south to 

join Sheridan’s cavalry across the river, while two corps of infantry 

under Wright and Humphreys continued to press the rear of Lee’s 

rapidly shrinking column. 

On the morning of 9 April, Lee made one last attempt to break 

through the Union forces encircling his army. e Federals’ capture 

of Appomattox Station meant that Lee would have to continue 

moving west to obtain supplies, and that Sheridan’s troopers had 

to be pushed o the Stage Road. At 0750, Gordon’s infantry and 

2,400 rebel horsemen attacked Union cavalry units just west of 

Appomattox Court House in a sweeping advance to the southwest. 

At rst, Gordon’s attack succeeded in driving back the Federal 

troopers and opening the road, but infantry reinforcements from 
64 

the V, XXIV, and XXV Corps, supported by Custer’s and Devin’s 

cavalry divisions, drove the attackers back toward the village. 

Some Confederate cavalry units under Fitzhugh Lee escaped to 

Lynchburg, but the rest of Lee’s army was now surrounded. “ere 

is nothing le for me to do but go and see General Grant,” Lee told 

his sta upon hearing of Gordon’s repulse.

Having crossed to the south side of the Appomattox River 

at Cutbank Ford, Grant received a letter from General Lee just 

before 1200 requesting an interview to discuss surrender terms. 

Grant notied Lee that he would “push forward to the front for the 

purpose of meeting you.” Generals Gordon and Sheridan, meanwhile, arranged a cease-re, despite the pugnacious Sheridan’s 

eagerness to attack Lee and force his “absolute surrender by 

capture.” When apprised of the cease-re, Meade likewise halted 

the ghting along his lines near New Hope Church, about two 

miles east of Appomattox Court House. 

THE SURRENDER

As the guns fell silent along the tense battle lines, Lee and Grant 

headed to Appomattox Court House. e Confederate commander 

arrived there rst, and Grant le the choice of meeting place to him. 

Waiting under an apple tree on the edge of the village, Lee sent his 

aide, Lt. Col. Charles Marshall, to look for a suitable location, and 

Marshall settled on the large brick house of Wilmer McLean. Oddly 

enough, McLean had moved to Appomattox in 1863 to escape the 

conict. His former home stood along Bull Run near Manassas, 

which also happened to be the site of two major battles.

Lee arrived at the McLean house around 1300. Clad in his 

full dress uniform, he was accompanied only by Colonel Marshall. 

Grant—his headache now gone, apparently cured by Lee’s earlier 

message seeking surrender terms—arrived at McLean’s home a 

half hour later along with several of his sta and general ocers, 

including Ord, Sheridan, and Capt. Robert T. Lincoln, the president’s eldest son. e Union commander did not have time to 

retrieve his dress uniform, so he appeared without a sword and 

wearing his eld uniform, spattered with mud.

Aer some small talk about their service in the Mexican War, 

the two generals began to discuss the details of Lee’s surrender. 

Grant proposed lenient terms for Lee’s soldiers, who would be 

paroled and sent to their homes, “not to be disturbed by United 

States authorities so long as they observe their paroles.” He allowed 
65

ocers to keep their side arms, horses, and personal property. 

Upon Lee’s request, Grant also permitted Confederate enlisted 

men to keep their personally owned mules and horses, which they 

would need for planting a crop that spring. e Union commander 

also promised to supply Lee’s famished army with 25,000 rations, 

the bulk of which came from Confederate supplies captured at 

Appomattox Station. Grant put these terms into writing and both 

commanders agreed to designate subordinates to supervise the 

surrender and parole procedures. e meeting ended at 1500. 

Lee rode solemnly back to his headquarters in the woods near 

Longstreet’s camp north of the Appomattox River, while Grant 

paused to telegraph the momentous news to Secretary of War 

Edwin M. Stanton. e Union commander le for City Point and 

Washington the next day, aer an hour-long conversation with Lee 

between the opposing lines. 

Upon hearing of Lee’s capitulation, most of the Federal troops 

erupted in celebration. “Men shouted until they could shout no 

longer,” a New York ocer recalled, and Union artillery batteries 

red thunderous salvos in honor of the occasion. General Meade 

himself rode along the lines shouting, “It’s all over, boys! Lee’s surrendered!” Out of respect for the defeated enemy troops, however, Grant 

McLean House, Appomattox Court House, Virginia

(Library of Congress)
66 

quickly banned these joyous demonstrations as inappropriate. e 

general in chief told his sta that “the best sign of rejoicing aer the 

victory will be to abstain from all demonstrations in the eld.” 

Within the rebel camps, men reacted to the war’s end with a 

mixture of relief, sadness, and disbelief. “My disappointment was 

great,” wrote a Southern cannoneer. “All this sacrice of life—all 

this suering had been for nothing, I thought. I sat down and 

wept.” e next day, Lee issued a nal order to his army, “General 

Order No. 9,” praising his troops for “four years of arduous service, 

marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude.” e general “did 

not see how a surrender could have been avoided,” he informed 

President Davis three days aer the capitulation, given the lack of 

“subsistence for man or horse,” and a dwindling army lled with 

“worn and exhausted” soldiers. 

Grant ordered Union forces to move to Burkeville, retaining 

only a cavalry contingent and the V and XXIV Corps at 

Appomattox Court House to oversee the enemy’s surrender. On 

the morning of 12 April, just over 28,000 ocers and men of 

the Army of Northern Virginia, led by General Gordon’s Second 

Corps, stacked arms and colors in a eld near the courthouse, 

and then headed home with parole slips granting them safe 

passage. Although some 175,000 Confederate troops remained 

in the eld, Grant rightly perceived that Lee’s surrender marked 

the end of the bloody four-year struggle between the North and 

the South. “e war is over,” he told his sta ocers shortly aer 

leaving the McLean house on 9 April, and “the Rebels are our 

countrymen again.” 

Analysis

e Union Army’s ten-month struggle to capture Petersburg, 

the Confederacy’s key supply hub in the Eastern eater, ended 

in victory following General Lee’s decision to abandon that city 

and Richmond in early April 1865. Although commonly referred 

to as a siege, General Grant’s campaign to take the rebel capital 

and logistical center was more a series of operations intended 

to force Lee to abandon his defenses and ght a culminating 

battle in the open. A traditional siege involves surrounding 

a foe’s defenses and cutting o his access to supplies and reinforcements. e Confederates at Richmond and Petersburg were 
67

neither surrounded nor cut o from their supplies, and Federal 

operations sought to pry the defenders out of their earthworks 

rather than contain them there.

Much was made by Southern partisans aer the war—and 

by historians since—about the disparity in numbers between the 

two armies from the opening of the Petersburg Campaign in June 

1864 to Lee’s surrender in April 1865. In his farewell message 

to his troops, Lee wrote that his army was “compelled to yield 

to [the] overwhelming numbers and resources” of the Federals. 

Aer the war, Lee’s former adjutant, Col. Walter Taylor, stated that 

Grant’s forces were more than double the size of Lee’s. In truth, 

the two belligerents were more closely matched. In early 1865, Lee 

had a peak strength of roughly 75,000 men under his immediate 

command, whereas the opposing Federal forces numbered about 

120,000 soldiers. During the pursuit to Appomattox, Lee’s army 

had to face only 80,000 bluecoats.

Although superior Union numbers was one factor in Lee’s 

defeat, Federal success also stemmed from Grant’s persistent 

operations against Lee’s anks, a powerful mounted force under 

General Sheridan that overtook Lee aer the fall of Petersburg, 

and an inadequate Confederate logistical system. With a few 

conspicuous exceptions, Grant eschewed massed frontal assaults 

against the Southerners’ imposing Petersburg defenses. Rather, he 

attacked the enemy’s supply lines with cavalry raids and infantry 

expeditions, while repeatedly feinting on Richmond to draw o 

troops from Petersburg, his actual objective. Although slow and 

costly at times, the Federals’ gradual extension of their lines to the 

west ultimately led to the capture of Lee’s critical supply routes. 

Union operations also thinned the enemy’s defenses to the point 

that the nal Federal attacks at Five Forks on 1 April and on Lee’s 

right at Petersburg the next day quickly overwhelmed the insuf-

cient Confederate forces there.

Lee’s evacuation of his fortications on 2 April and his subsequent eort to reach both Johnston’s army and several waiting 

supply stores was an attempt to concentrate Southern forces 

in a desperate bid to defeat the combined armies of Grant and 

Sherman. Grant’s nal campaign succeeded because Sheridan’s 

hard-driving cavalry was able to intercept Lee’s retreating column 

at Appomattox while Meade’s infantry maintained its relentless 

pursuit from the rear. As a result, Lee had no choice but to yield 

on 9 April and obtain the best terms he could from Grant, a 
68 

general known for demanding the “unconditional surrender” of 

his beaten enemies.

Despite Grant’s uncompromising reputation and intense 

pressure from the radical Republican faction in Congress to punish 

the South for the crime of rebellion, the Union commander oered 

lenient terms to the defeated enemy soldiers camped around 

Appomattox Court House. Apparently most of the rebels were 

surprised by Grant’s magnanimity. Lee felt that the terms would 

“do much toward conciliating our people,” while a Confederate 

artilleryman called them “generous, considerate, and unlooked 

for.” Recognizing that the war was all but over, Grant—with 

Lincoln’s approval—acted on principals of reconciliation rather 

than retribution, and thus eased the dicult path for the North 

and the South to reunite aer the guns fell silent.
69

The Author

John R. Maass is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of 

Military History. He received a B.A. in history from Washington 

and Lee University, an M.A. in history from the University of 

North Carolina-Greensboro, and a Ph.D. in early American history 

from the Ohio State University. He is the author of e French and 

Indian War in North Carolina: e Spreading Flames of War, and 

Defending a New Nation, 1783-1811.

71

Further Readings

Calkins, Chris M. e Appomattox Campaign: March 29–April 9, 

1865. Conshohocken, Pa.: Combined Books, 1997.

Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 2 Vol. New York: 

Charles L.Webster and Company, 1885.

Greene, A. Wilson. Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion: e 

Final Battles of the Petersburg Campaign. Mason City, Iowa: 

Savas Publishing, 2000.

Marvel, William. Lee’s Last Retreat: e Flight to Appomattox. 

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

Slotkin, Richard. No Quarter: e Battle of the Crater, 1864. New 

York: Random House, 2009.

Trudeau, Noah Andre. e Last Citadel: Petersburg, Virginia, June 

1864–April 1865. Boston: Little, Brown, 1991.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the Civil War, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War 

series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History 

(www.history.army.mil).
PIN : 104654–000

The

Civil

War Sesquicentennial