PEACEW RKS

DOMESTIC BARRIERS TO DISMANTLING 

THE MILITANT INFRASTRUCTURE 

IN PAKISTAN

Stephen Tankel

[ [
Cover photo: Daniel Berehulak

The views expressed in this report are those of 

the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 89. First published 2013.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-186-0

© 2013 by the United States Institute of Peace

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report, sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace, 

examines several underexplored barriers to dismantling 

Pakistan’s militant infrastructure as a way to inform the 

understandable, but thus far ineffectual, calls for the country to do more against militancy. It is based on interviews 

conducted in Pakistan and Washington, DC, as well as on 

primary and secondary source material collected via field 

and desk-based research. 

AUTHOR’S NOTE:This report was drafted before the May 

2013 elections and updated soon after. There have been 

important developments since then, including actions 

Islamabad and Washington have taken that this report 

recommends. Specifically, the U.S. announced plans for 

a resumption of the Strategic Dialogue and the Pakistani 

government reportedly developed a new counterterrorism 

strategy. Meanwhile, the situation on the ground in Pakistan 

continues to evolve. It is almost inevitable that discrete elements of this report of will be overtaken by events. Yet the 

broader trends and the significant, endogenous obstacles to 

countering militancy and dismantling the militant infrastructure in Pakistan unfortunately are likely to remain in place for 

some time.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stephen Tankel is an assistant professor at American 

University, nonresident scholar in the South Asia program 

at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and 

author of Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkare-Taiba. He has conducted field research on conflicts 

and militancy in Algeria, Bangladesh, India, Lebanon, 

Pakistan, and the Balkans. Professor Tankel is a frequent 

media commentator and adviser to U.S. policymakers and 

practitioners regarding security challenges in South Asia 

and threats from Islamist militancy around the world.
PEACEWORKS • SEPTEMBER 2013 • NO. 89

CONTENTS

[It would be a mistake to discount the myriad domestic 

challenges facing Pakistan in terms of countering the 

militant threat or the degree to which they infl uence 

the establishment’s active support for some groups and 

tolerance of others.]

 Summary ... 3

 Introduction ... 5

 Riding the Tiger ... 6

Barriers to Action ... 18

Implications for Pakistan ... 37

 Policy Recommendations ... 41

 Conclusion ... 46

3

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

Summary

■ Pakistani concerns about threats to the state from a subset of its Islamist militants have 

been building for several years, but the military remains preoccupied with using jihadist 

proxies to achieve geopolitical aims. Many other barriers reinforce the status quo as well.

■ Perceptions about the U.S. role in the insurgency, the belief that foreign powers support 

anti-state militants, that some militants will not attack if not provoked, and that others 

have domestic as well as geopolitical utility collectively inform the security establishment’s 

strategic calculus for how it engages with militants in Pakistan.

■ Even sincere counterterrorism eff orts are hampered by capacity shortfalls and systemic 

infi rmities.

■ Political will is also lacking. Elites remain preoccupied with power and their collective 

interests.

■ Pakistan needs a national strategy to counter militancy, a legislative overhaul, improved 

coordination among counterterrorism agencies, and a coherent narrative against extremism. 

Th e recently elected civilian leadership must build its own intellectual capacity on security 

matters and fi nd the political will to act.

■ Th e election of a new civilian government in Pakistan, growing concerns about the jihadist 

threat to the state, and the planned NATO drawdown in Afghanistan mean the United 

States will need to reformulate aspects of its engagement.

■ Th e overall U.S. approach should be geared toward maintaining infl uence to maximize 

convergence on narrow security issues and exploit opportunities to reinforce positive 

structural change within Pakistan.

■ Specifi cally, the United States should revise its South Asian counterterrorism architecture, 

maintain a transactional military-to-military relationship focused on convergent interests, 

boost the capabilities and confi dence of the new civilian government, modify security 

sector assistance, and devise more realistic metrics to assess progress.

5

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

Introduction

On August 14, 2012, the sixty-fi fth anniversary of Pakistan’s independence, Chief of Army Staff

Ashfaq Parvez Kayani addressed the Azadi Parade in the drill square of the Pakistan Military 

Academy in Kakul. Th e speech is an annual rite, but the content of Kayani’s remarks was notable 

for its assessment of Pakistan’s internal instability. By this time, the jihadist insurgency that began 

germinating a decade ago had claimed tens of thousands of lives. Acknowledging a litany of ills, 

Kayani zeroed in on terrorism and extremism: these issues, he said, “present a grave challenge” to 

the country.1 Five months later, in January 2013, the Pakistan army released its latest annual Green 

Book, which included a chapter discussing Pakistan’s domestic jihadist insurgency and describing 

it as a major security threat. Th is inclusion was marketed as a fi rst and hence a sign of a heightened 

focus on internal security, creating the mistaken impression in some circles that the Pakistani 

establishment might be redefi ning its priorities toward defeating its jihadist insurgency and away 

from a focus on India.2

In reality, the Green Book does not necessarily refl ect the Pakistan army’s doctrine or its priorities.3

However, though it has not yet been released, at least one expert familiar with the new army doctrine 

suggests that it might recognize the need to focus on the internal threat to the country’s stability.4

If true, this should be interpreted as an expansion from an India-centric to a multifaceted strategy, 

but not as evidence of a shift in Pakistan’s security priorities or a sign that the country’s leaders are 

today prepared to take sustained and comprehensive action to dismantle the militant infrastructure 

on their soil.

Pakistani security policy has always been both India-centric and concerned about the internal 

integrity of the state. Th ese two priorities are viewed as mutually reinforcing. Internal cohesion is 

believed to be necessary to check Indian aggression, and thus weakness at home puts the country 

at greater risk to external threats. Simultaneously, external challenges inevitably aff ect Pakistan 

at home, and New Delhi has historically been suspected of designs to dismember Pakistan from 

within. Th us, six months after his Independence Day remarks, General Kayani made another two 

speeches in which he blamed Pakistan’s “external enemies” for “igniting the fl ames” of the jihadist 

insurgency and warned that despite the military’s focus on internal security it is “fully prepared to 

defeat an external direct threat.”5

Although no strategic shift related to the maintenance of a militant infrastructure has been made, 

threats to the state from a subset of its Islamist militants do signifi cantly infl uence state decision 

making. Civilian and military leaders appear to recognize the danger certain militants pose to the 

state and take the problem seriously. Th e country’s main political parties are not as wedded as the 

military and its Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are to a policy of maintaining proxies 

but are more anxious to make peace with anti-state militants. At the time of writing, the Pakistan 

Muslim League-N (PML-N) had formed a new government. Headed by Nawaz Sharif, it was 

intent on pursuing peace negotiations, as were other political parties, but no course for doing so had 

been charted. Th e military, which has lost much blood and treasure waging Pakistan’s own war on 

terror, opposes negotiating, at least in the short term. Some within its ranks view even pro-state 

groups as a long-term strategic liability.6

 Yet it is unclear whether the military leadership agrees on 

either the extent and nature of the internal threat or what to do about it. It is clear, however, that the 

security establishment’s preoccupation with maintaining jihadist proxies to be used for geopolitical 

purposes is still the single greatest barrier to dismantling the militant infrastructure in Pakistan.

Th is report argues that numerous underexplored endogenous barriers reinforce the status 

quo when it comes to a lack of adequate action against militancy. Th ese obstacles inform the 

segmented approach that Pakistani elites—civilian and military—take toward militant groups. 
6

PEACEWORKS 89

The security establishment continues to selectively support some militants and to counter others, 

in some cases using pro-state militants to do so. Its approach toward these groups is predicated 

on the utility they provide externally and internally, as well as on whether they threaten the state 

and the level of perceived infl uence over them. Although civilian parties are less entangled with 

militant groups, on the whole they are more reluctant than the military in confronting those who 

directly threaten the state. Politicians of various stripes are also guilty of courting militant leaders 

in pursuit of electoral gains.

How Pakistani offi cials—civilian and military—perceive jihadist threats to the state, and their 

will and capability to counter them, have signifi cant implications for the country, the region, and 

the United States. In the short term, the explosion of jihadist violence does not appear to make it 

any more likely that the Pakistani security establishment will take steps to dismantle the militant 

infrastructure. Pakistan’s support—active and passive—for some of the militant groups on its soil 

has become path dependent. Any reversal would bring signifi cant costs and is obstructed by the 

entrenchments of institutional arrangements.7

 Over the medium to long term, it is possible, though 

far from certain, that steps needed to curtail the jihadist insurgency could develop a momentum of 

their own and help create conditions for progress against militancy in Pakistan.

Much of the information that follows will be familiar to those who follow Pakistan closely. Th e 

aim is to marshal evidence to inform the understandable, but thus far ineff ectual, calls for Pakistan 

to “do more” against militancy. Th ese calls are not wrong, but they are misguided, or at least incomplete, in that they overlook various elite objectives and compulsions, myriad domestic challenges, 

and Pakistan’s strategic culture of using proxies to confront both external and internal challenges. 

A clear-eyed assessment of these obstacles is essential to formulating a realistic policy of patient, 

but fi rm, engagement and for managing possible contingencies that could ensue in the region.

Riding the Tiger

Pakistan played host to numerous militant groups during the 1990s. One way to understand 

the militant milieu at that time is to consider sectarian affi liation. Most groups belong to the 

Deobandi sect, which follows the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence.8 Th e major groups 

emerged from or were tied to the Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Assembly of Islamic Clergy, 

or JUI) as well as the robust madrassa (religious school) system associated with it. Th e largest and 

most notable of them included

• Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI);

• Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), which splintered from HuJI;9

• Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), which broke from HuM;

• Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP); and

• Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which initially formed as the militant wing of SSP before 

nominally splitting from it.

Separately, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was the biggest and most signifi cant group to emerge from 

the Ahl-e-Hadith movement, which is Salafi st in orientation.10 Strong divisions existed between 

LeT and the Deobandi outfi ts.11 Collectively, these entities are known as Punjabi militant groups, 

a moniker that derives from their being headquartered, and having their strongest support base, 

in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populated and powerful province.12 Elsewhere, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-eShariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), formed by a dissident member of Jamaat-e-Islami named Sufi 

Muhammad in 1989, was based in Malakand and had a blend of Deobandi and Wahhabi leanings.13
7

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

Another way of understanding the militant milieu at the time is to consider activities by location. 

In addition to indigenous Kashmiri groups, during the 1990s the Pakistani security apparatus also 

backed a welter of Pakistani groups against Indian security forces in Indian-administered Kashmir.14

Th ese included the Deobandi HuM, HuJI, and JeM, as well as the Ahl-e-Hadith LeT. Th e SSP and 

LeJ were engaged in sectarian attacks in Pakistan against members of the minority Shia population.15

Shia groups mobilized in response, and the country experienced escalating sectarian confl ict. After its 

formation, JeM occasionally involved itself in sectarian violence as well.16

Pakistan also supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, and after the Taliban swept to power, 

that country became a place where many of the Deobandi groups, focused primarily on Kashmir 

or sectarian violence in Pakistan, came together for operational support and training.17 TNSM 

mobilized men for the Taliban during this time and had links to some of those groups fi ghting in Kashmir as well.18 Jalaluddin Haqqani, who hails from southeastern Afghanistan and 

rose to prominence as a military commander during the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s, accepted an 

appointment in the Taliban government as minister of borders and tribes.19 Th e Haqqani network, 

though it was not known as such at the time, is Deobandi and Pashtun—like the Taliban—and 

administered its own training camps in Taliban-controlled territory.20 Th us, with the exception 

of the Ahl-e-Hadith LeT, which focused exclusively on the Kashmir front, the major Deobandi 

Punjabi groups all traced their roots back to the JUI and increased their ties to one another as 

well as to the Taliban, Haqqani network, and TNSM during the 1990s.21

Al-Qaeda Throws a Curve

Th e decision by President Pervez Musharraf’s government to assist the U.S. war against al-Qaeda 

and the Taliban after 9/11 strained the state’s relations with all of its militant proxies to varying 

degrees. Musharraf’s decision was predicated in part by the calculation that doing so was necessary 

to protect Pakistan’s Kashmir-centric militant proxies.22 Th ough the United States is not known 

to have off ered any such guarantee, it did not push Pakistan nearly as hard as possible to dismantle 

the entire militant infrastructure or even cease active support to its proxies fi ghting in Kashmir.23

Th e immediate U.S. focus was on al-Qaeda and the Taliban. America’s request regarding Pakistan’s 

other militant groups was to keep them off the Afghan battlefi eld during the U.S. counterattack. 

Despite this directive, with the exception of the Ahl-e-Hadith LeT, militants from all of the major 

Pakistani groups fl ocked to Afghanistan to fi ght alongside the Taliban, as did thousands of proTaliban Pashtun tribesmen.24 Pakistani eff orts to deter or interdict those crossing the border to 

fi ght in Afghanistan following the post-9/11 U.S. counterattack were uneven.25 At the same time, 

Pakistan sought to prevent the United States from decimating the Taliban, providing the movement’s leaders and members safe haven in Pakistan.26

As early as October 2001, militants began targeting U.S. interests in Pakistan as well as members 

of Pakistan’s Christian community. In December, JeM led an attack on India’s parliament. In response 

to U.S. pressure and to avert a possible war with India, in January 2002, Pakistan banned JeM along 

with LeT, TNSM, SSP, and the Shia militant group Tehreek-e-Jafria.27 Musharraf also rebanned LeJ, 

which had initially been banned in August 2001. In early 2002, Pakistan’s powerful ISI facilitated the 

reemergence of not only LeT and JeM under new names but also HuM, which Pakistan banned in 

November 2001 after the United States designated it a terrorist group.28 SSP also continued to be tolerated for domestic political purposes and began carrying out its militant activities under a series of new 

names.29 Some of these rebranded organizations were rebanned at various times. Others continue to 

operate legitimate aboveground organizations. Th ey are still typically referred to by their original names.
8

PEACEWORKS 89

Despite new names, the operating environment for all of Pakistan’s jihadist groups became 

more diffi cult after 2002. Fundraising, recruitment, and training were restricted to diff erent degrees 

for diff erent organizations at diff erent times, but every group was aff ected. Th e security establishment also launched intermittent and incomplete crackdowns against militant organizations. 

Overall, no consistent eff orts were made to degrade the various extant indigenous militant groups 

at the time, with one exception. Th e Musharraf regime cracked down most heavily on LeJ after 

9/11, contributing to its fragmentation and leading many LeJ members to ally with al-Qaeda.30

However, the group was able to continue in part thanks to its ability to tap into the legitimate 

organizations connected to SSP and JeM.31 In short, going after some groups more vigorously 

than others overlooked the connectivity among them, contributed to the formation of more 

malevolent splinters, and imperiled even sincere counterterrorism eff orts.

Pakistan did make notable eff orts after 9/11 to capture or kill al-Qaeda operatives and other 

foreign fi ghters, though these tapered off from 2005 onward.32 Initial eff orts included launching 

Operation Al Mizan, a military incursion into the South Waziristan agency of the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (see map 1) in 2002, following the arrival of foreign fi ghters 

fl eeing Afghanistan earlier that year.33 Resistance there was prompt.34 Pakistani security forces 

repeatedly clashed with militants in the tribal areas from 2002 onward, taking numerous casualties in the process. Th ese campaigns were underresourced and characterized by a heavy-handed 

approach that alienated the population even as they failed to enable the control of territory.35

Th ey also led to a series of failed peace deals that contributed to the Talibanization of FATA.

A Proto-Insurgency in FATA and a Principal-Agent Problem 

in the Heartland

In response to U.S. pressure as evidence mounted that al-Qaeda was regrouping and cross-border 

attacks into Afghanistan were increasing, Pakistan launched additional operations in FATA. In 

October 2003, for example, the army dispatched twenty-fi ve hundred soldiers to capture militants 

based in Bajaur and South Waziristan. Th e following March, it launched Operation Kalosha II 

to rescue Frontier Corps (FC) personnel captured during an ambush.36 As casualties mounted, 

the army pursued the fi rst of many failed peace deals, the Shakai agreement of 2004, with Nek 

Muhammad, who was a relatively unknown militant leader at the time.37 In doing so, the army 

legitimized the militants and Nek Muhammad as a force in the area, undercutting local tribal 

elders in the process. Because the agreement was signed at a Deobandi madrassa with which 

Muhammad was affi liated, locals viewed it as a tacit surrender by the army.38 Nek Muhammad 

abrogated the agreement, however, and was killed soon after by a U.S. drone strike, the fi rst in 

Pakistan and part of an agreement by American offi cials to eliminate anti-state militants in return 

for the access to airspace necessary to target al-Qaeda members hiding in the tribal areas.39

Despite the death of Nek Muhammad, a pattern of Pakistani military incursions into FATA 

followed by peace deals that empowered pro-Taliban Pashtun militants had been established. 

Th ese included a February 2005 peace agreement with Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan 

and the September 2006 Waziristan Accord in North Waziristan.40 Some analysts have speculated that the Musharraf regime was never committed to the military campaigns in FATA but 

instead viewed them as a favor to Washington.41 Th is would help explain the readiness to forge 

peace deals. However, other factors undoubtedly contributed, including fears that sustained 

campaigns with heavy losses could sow dangerous discord among the military’s rank-and-fi le, 

concerns about protecting the military’s reputation, chronic capacity shortfalls, a force structure 

not built for counterinsurgency coupled with a lack of experience with this type of warfare and 

Going after some 

groups more vigorously 

than others overlooked the 

connectivity among them.
9

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN

CHINA

INDIA

Arabian

Sea

Balochistan

Punjab

Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa

Islamabad

Capital

 Territory**

GilgitBaltistan

Azad

Federally Kashmir

Administered

Tribal Areas*

Sindh

Gilgit

Muzaffarabad 1972

Line of

Control

New Delhi

Kabul

Islamabad

Quetta

Dushanbe

Karachi

Lahore

Peshawar

0 200 400 miles

0 200 400 km

International boundary

Province-level boundary

National capital

Province-level capital

Pakistan has four provinces, one 

territory*, and one capital territory**.

The Pakistani-administered portion of the 

disputed Jammu and Kashmir region 

consists of two administrative entities: 

Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

Map 1. Pakistan Administrative Districts
10

PEACEWORKS 89

little desire to learn, and the belief that by appeasing militants in FATA the state could keep 

violence from spreading to the settled areas. In reality, these and subsequent agreements failed to 

halt militant violence and instead contributed to the spread of Talibanization throughout FATA 

and eventually into frontier areas such as Bannu, Tank, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, 

Swat, and Buner.42

Developments outside FATA contributed to the proto-insurgency brewing in Pakistan and 

strengthened the nexus between Pashtun militants, their brethren from various Punjabi groups 

who fl ed to FATA during the ensuing years, and those Afghan militants and al-Qaeda members 

who sought sanctuary there following the U.S. invasion.

In December 2003, members of the Pakistani Air Force—motivated by Maulana Masood 

Azhar, JeM’s amir—attempted to blow up President Musharraf’s motorcade. Two weeks later, a 

Jaish member, who the leadership later maintained had split from the group by this time, made a 

similar attempt not far from where the fi rst attack took place.43 Concerns about the involvement 

of low-level military personnel and police offi cers in jihadist activities contributed to a crackdown 

in which the authorities detained more than one thousand individuals and held many without 

trial.44 Some of those who escaped the crackdown remained in Punjab, but others took shelter in 

Pakistan-administered Kashmir, FATA, and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), known 

since 2009 as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (see map 2).45 Th is practice of executing mass arrests 

(and later releasing many of those detained) in tandem with eff orts to eliminate specifi c militants 

(often through extrajudicial means) constituted the extent of Pakistan’s counterterrorism eff orts 

during the early and mid-2000s.

Although it failed to commit fully to counterinsurgency eff orts in FATA or to engage in 

any meaningful counterterrorism activities in the settled areas during the early to mid-2000s, 

the Musharraf regime did rein in pro-state groups fi ghting in Kashmir and took steps to thin 

their ranks. Following the launch of the peace process with India in early 2004—known as the 

Composite Dialogue—and accompanying back-channel negotiations, militants were directed to 

wage a controlled jihad in Kashmir for which support ebbed and fl owed thereafter.46 Kashmircentric militant groups were curtailed further in response to international pressure the following 

year, and by 2006–07, militant activity declined signifi cantly on that front, thanks in large part 

to the eff orts of the Musharraf regime.47 Th e ISI reportedly paid militant leaders to temper their 

activities and keep their cadre in line and sought to confi ne many of those no longer active in 

Kashmir to their training camps.48 Th ese men were provided food, board, and in some cases a 

stipend. In other words, they were paid not to fi ght. Many were kept in reserve. Some were channeled into their respective group’s aboveground organizations, and others were steered toward 

early retirement and occasionally given assistance in fi nding a job. Positive inducements were 

coupled with threats of retribution against those militants who disobeyed the directive to reduce 

their activities in Indian-administered Kashmir.49 Th e aim was to rein in, not dismantle, militant 

groups and hold their members in reserve, either to be demobilized or reengaged depending on 

regional developments.

Attempts to rein in historically Kashmir-centric groups were juxtaposed with rising support 

for Afghan-centric proxies, most notably the Afghan Taliban of Mullah Omar and the Haqqani 

network. Rather than remain inactive, some militants from Kashmir-centric groups migrated 

toward the Afghan front via FATA, tapping into the Afghan-centric militant infrastructure that 

remained relatively untouched despite repeated military incursions.50 Th ese westward migrating 

militants linked up with pro-state groups, most notably the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani 

network but also with al-Qaeda members and other foreign fi ghters, Pashtun militants who 

These and subsequent 

agreements failed to halt 

militant violence and 

instead contributed to the 

spread of Talibanization 

throughout FATA.
11

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

Dera

Ismail

Khan

South

Waziristan

North

Waziristan

Kurram Orakzai

Khyber

Mohmand

Bajaur

Tank

Lakki

Marwat

Bannu

Karak

Hangu Kohat

Peshawar Nowshera

Charsadda

Mardan

Swabi

Haripur

Abbottabad

Mansehra

Buner Malakand

Lower

Dir

Upper

Dir

Swat

ShanglaBattagram

Kohistan

Chitral

Gilgit

Chitral

Dir

Timergara

Mastuj

Saidu

Sharif

Kalam

Dassu

Batkhela

Mansehra

Alpuri

Daggar

Battagram

Naran

Mardan

Kohat

Darra Adamkhel

Karak

Bannu

Tank

Razmak

Miranshah

Parachinar

Kulachi

Lakki

Marwat

Pezu

Wana Jandola

Dera

Ismail

Khan

Nowshera

Charsadda

Ghalanai

Khaar

Abbottabad

Murree

Haripur Swabi

Hangu

Thal

Landi Kotal

Muzaffarabad

Kabul

Islamabad

Peshawar

Jalalabad

0 50 100 miles

0 50 100 km

Federally

Administered

Tribal Areas

Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa

Map 2. KP and FATA Districts
12

PEACEWORKS 89

had been fi ghting the Pakistan military since 2002, and many of the men from various Punjabi 

groups who already had fl ed there.51 Th e destruction of portions of the training infrastructure in 

Pakistan-administered Kashmir during the 2005 South Asia earthquake and the release of those 

men jailed in the 2003–04 crackdown following the failed Musharraf assassination attempts 

increased the militant migration.52 In the process, these militants began contributing to attacks 

against the Pakistani state as well as fi ghting on the Afghan front.

Close observers assert that elements in the army and ISI continued to believe that they could 

manage militant organizations by working through leaders of extant organizations and local 

leaders in FATA to control their cadre, eliminating individual “bad apples” when this top-down 

approach failed.53 Collectively, these eff orts were ad hoc, poorly coordinated, underresourced, 

often reactive, and suggestive of a laissez-faire approach predicated on the assumption of control 

over the militant milieu.

The Insurgency Erupts

Pakistan’s failed military incursions and subsequent peace agreements emboldened pro-Taliban 

militants, and by 2006, the insurgency against the state was accelerating swiftly.54

In July 2007, Pakistani security forces launched an assault against the Lal Masjid (Red 

Mosque) in Islamabad and the two madaris (plural of madrassa) attached to it. Th e Lal Masjid 

had been a well-established ISI asset, and one of its madaris, Jamia Faridia, historically attracted 

students from NWFP and FATA, many of who were sympathetic to militancy.55 Th e Ghazi 

brothers who led the mosque and madaris had issued an edict in 2004 that military personnel 

killed fi ghting in FATA were not martyrs and had been arrested that year for stockpiling weapons 

and planning terrorist attacks in Pakistan.56 In January 2007, they demanded that sharia (Islamic 

law) be imposed in Pakistan, and Taliban-inspired vigilante groups connected to the mosque 

began roaming around Islamabad to impose their notion of Islamic morality.57

As the provocations mounted, the Musharraf regime sought to avoid direct action, instead 

standing back while religious parties, such as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), tried to 

negotiate a settlement. Negotiations went on for several months, during which time the vigilante campaign continued.58 In June 2007, madrassa students kidnapped nine people from a clinic, 

including six Chinese women and one Chinese man.59 Th e hostages were released in late June, 

but the situation led Beijing to bring immense pressure on the Pakistani government.60 It is 

unclear whether that pressure led President Musharraf to deploy paramilitary Rangers around the 

complex or if he later used it as a pretext for taking action.61 Th ey laid siege but did not launch a 

raid. Instead, National Assembly members from religious parties continued attempting to negotiate while the Rangers maintained low-level fi ring to exert pressure.62 More than one thousand 

students surrendered in the days that followed. Militants from JeM, HuJI, and LeT holed up in 

the complex were caught trying to escape at that time as well.63 Many more from these and other 

groups remained in the complex.64 Th e siege was having some success, but negotiations remained 

stalled. On July 8, three Chinese men were killed in Peshawar. Pakistan appears to have come 

under enormous pressure to act. Musharraf issued one last warning on July 9 to no avail. A day 

later the assault began.

Th e operation was a military success but had severe ramifi cations. Many militants, including 

some belonging to pro-state groups who had yet to consider participation in an anti-Pakistan jihad, 

considered this yet another betrayal. Th e raid turned a primarily FATA-based proto-insurgency 

into a full-blown insurgency that soon threatened to envelop the country. It also transformed 

the debate for Pakistan’s religious parties, some of which had struggled with how closely to 
13

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

embrace the Ghazi brothers’ exhortations toward vigilante Islamism. With one dead and the 

other under arrest, the religious parties were free to embrace them as martyrs.65 In so doing, 

they threw rhetorical fuel on the jihadist fi re that soon engulfed parts of the country.

Some estimates suggest as many as fi ve thousand students from Punjabi madaris headed to 

Waziristan in the aftermath of the raid to join the militants already at war with the state.66 By 

this time, the Talibanization began in South Waziristan in 2004 had spread to other agencies in 

FATA. Militants were emerging in frontier areas as well. Many of these men who shared the aim 

of establishing “local spheres of sharia” in their respective areas of infl uence offi cially united in 

December 2007 to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban.67 Th e TTP 

quickly became the face of the insurgency but never cohered into a homogenous entity with fi rm 

command and control. It became instead an umbrella organization for militants indigenous to 

KP and FATA as well for the splinter factions and freelancers from established Punjabi groups 

that provided the crucial capability to project power into Pakistan’s heartland and its capital.68

Al-Qaeda provided ideological as well as operational support for the insurgency in Pakistan, and 

over time some Pakistani militants joined al-Qaeda’s ranks directly.69

Confronting the Threat

In November 2007, President Musharraf resigned his command as chief of Army Staff , making 

way for General Kayani. Until then, Pakistan made no sustained eff ort in the areas of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. On the one hand, the internal security threat had not yet 

manifested. On the other, these lackluster eff orts created conditions for that threat to mature. 

Upon assuming his command, Kayani took steps to increase the army’s “ownership of and 

commitment to Pakistan’s internal security duties.”70 In 2008 and 2009, the security establishment started making more sustained counterinsurgency and counterterrorism eff orts against 

anti-state militants inside and outside FATA.

Pakistani military forces were fi ghting in all seven tribal agencies by 2008, and the 

TTP was in partial or total control of many areas of FATA, as well as portions of KP. 

Th e Swat Valley in Malakand was the most notable of the settled areas that fell to 

Talibanization. Th e military launched multiple off ensives in Swat as part of Operation 

Rah-e-Haq (Path of Truth).71 A third phase of the operation ended with a peace agreement with TNSM and the Swat Taliban, institutionalizing sharia in Malakand Division and 

the Kohistan district of Hazara Division.72 Emboldened, they, along with other militants 

operating there, began to occupy areas of Swat before expanding to the districts of Shangla 

and Buner. Th e proximity of these districts to Islamabad helped catalyze Pakistani public 

opinion against these militants and paved the way for a major military off ensive. Pakistan 

launched Operation Rah-e-Rast in May 2009, successfully routing many militants and pushing others into FATA or across the border into Afghanistan. It then launched another 

major campaign against the TTP in South Waziristan—Operation Rah-e-Nijat—the 

following month. Th e army sent seven combat brigades to support this operation, which 

suceeded in killing, capturing, or dispersing a signifi cant number of militants based in South 

Waziristan.73 Once again, many more fl ed to other tribal agencies or to Afghanistan.

Overall, approximately seventy-four thousand regular Pakistani Army troops were involved 

in the various operations conducted in FATA and KP.74 Despite failing to dismantle the militant 

infrastructure in the region, Pakistani security forces cleared some key villages, secured signifi cant 

lines of communication, and weakened the TTP infrastructure in various areas, most notably 

Bajaur, Swat, and South Waziristan.75 Th ese campaigns led to the capture or killing of Pakistani 

Some estimates suggest 

as many as fi ve thousand 

students from Punjabi 

madaris headed to 

Waziristan in the aftermath 

of the raid to join the 

militants already at war 

with the state.
14

PEACEWORKS 89

militants involved in plotting, supporting, and executing attacks against both the state and some 

foreign fi ghters.76 Although Pakistani offi cials are loath to admit it publicly, American drone 

strikes killed a number of notable anti-state militants.77 Although these strikes primarily targeted those threatening the U.S. homeland or coalition forces in Afghanistan, they also reduced 

the freedom of movement and access to resources for some anti-state militants, disrupting their 

operational tempo in the process.78 At the same time, given the perception that Pakistan allowed 

and enabled the strikes, they undoubtedly fueled recruitment as well.

Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities had improved by the time it launched Operations 

Rah-e-Rast (Swat) and Rah-e-Nijat (South Waziristan) in 2009.79 Years of experience operating 

in FATA coupled with training assistance and capacity building provided by the United States 

meant Pakistan’s security forces were better prepared to clear and hold territory.80 However, some 

anti-state militants inevitably seep through, some pro-state militants given safe passage inevitably turn on the state, and some of the civilians who are displaced become more open to militant 

recruitment. More signifi cantly, the Pakistani state has not been able to govern the territory it 

liberates and tackle the myriad political, socioeconomic, and cultural risk factors that contribute to 

militancy, making it diffi cult to consolidate gains. Th e cumulative result has been to bog down a 

sizeable number of troops and to displace anti-state militants who later return or begin launching 

attacks elsewhere.

Operations Rah-e-Rast and Rah-e-Nijat correlated with a spike in high-profi le terrorist 

attacks against sensitive targets in cities such as Islamabad, Lahore, and Rawalpindi intended 

to impose costs on the state in response to the military incursions into FATA. At this stage, 

counterinsurgency eff orts in FATA and parts of KP were poorly coordinated with the unsophisticated counterterrorism eff orts in the rest of Pakistan.

In theory, civilian intelligence agencies and law enforcement were responsible for the 

counterterrorism eff orts. Th e Intelligence Bureau (IB) is Pakistan’s main domestic intelligence 

agency and technically the one tasked with internal security. Th e federal government also 

established the Special Investigation Group as a counterterrorism unit in 2003 to undertake 

joint investigations with provincial police departments for off ences punishable under Pakistan’s 

1997 Anti-Terrorism Act.81 In reality, the ISI’s counterterrorism wing, ISI-CT, was taking the 

lead on these issues and continues to do so today.82 It can, however, be undercut by ISI-S, which 

is responsible for managing liaison relations with Pakistan’s militant proxies. Both entities are 

known to curtail eff orts by law enforcement and civilian intelligence agencies either to protect 

militant assets or their own turf.83 Some sources also suggest that Pakistani army intelligence, 

which is distinct from the ISI, has even deeper ties to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani 

network. It too could undercut other actors.84 Coordination improved toward the end of the last 

decade, relatively speaking.85 Th e security services collectively began focusing less on individual 

militants and more on the linkages, cooperation, and quid pro quo among the various networks 

responsible for attacks in Pakistan.86 In some instances, ISI-CT as well as civilian intelligence 

agencies and law enforcement also enjoyed greater latitude.87 However, overall coordination 

remained ad hoc, and counterterrorism eff orts still centered on preventing specifi c attacks or 

destroying discrete networks as opposed to permanently dismantling militant groups.

Under Musharraf, Pakistan had reined in its India-centric proxies but did so with no intention of dismantling them and nowhere to channel them. In contrast to Musharraf, who pushed to 

advance the peace process with India, Kayani took a “tough, matter-of-fact line” on Pakistan’s 

neighbor to the east.88 In one respect, this stance was deemed a necessary corrective to the policies 

of the Musharraf regime, which the army leadership believed had conceded too much by reducing 

Under Musharraf, 

Pakistan had reined in its 

India-centric proxies but 

did so with no intention 

of dismantling them and 

nowhere to channel them. 
15

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

support for the Kashmir jihad without securing a political payoff in return. However, it also appears 

to have been part of a broader attempt to appease pro-state militants previously focused on India, 

some of who had become involved in attacks at home. Th e military and ISI also engaged some 

of these India-centric groups, most notably LeT, to arrest anti-state violence by former members 

and freelancers in their ranks who began contributing to the insurgency in Pakistan following the 

de-escalation of support for the Kashmir jihad.

Leaders from JeM and LeT’s aboveground wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), claim that they were 

provided additional resources to keep current members in line and induce former members who 

might be assisting anti-state militants either purposefully or inadvertently to return to the fold.89 Th e 

aim may have been to gather information from these former members, monitor them, and control 

their activities to the highest degree possible.90 ISI offi cers also reportedly goaded LeT leaders to 

reindoctrinate former and current members against launching attacks in Pakistan, and local clerics 

were encouraged to deliver the message that jihad in Pakistan was haram (forbidden).91 Similar 

eff orts, according to one of their number, were undertaken with JeM.92 When forced to rein in LeT 

further following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the ISI facilitated a pathway for increased presence in 

Afghanistan, where the group’s fi ghters began appearing in greater numbers in late 2009 and early 

2010.93 In short, when it appeared that some militants from India-centric pro-state groups were 

getting out of line, the response was to engage those groups to rectify the problem. Moreover, no 

evidence in the open source indicates whether these eff orts were successful.

Th e military also has attempted to use the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network on numerous 

occasions to temper the TTP and reorient its focus toward Afghanistan.94 For example, in February 

2009, leaders from the Haqqani network helped create the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen (SIM). 

Th is umbrella group consisted of Afghan and Pakistani militants, including those involved in 

anti-state violence. Mullah Omar publicly reiterated his instructions that SIM, like all militant 

entities, focus on fi ghting in Afghanistan rather than attacking Pakistan.95 It is generally believed 

that initiatives such as these were undertaken at the ISI’s behest.96 Th e Pakistani military also made 

eff orts to prevail on other FATA-based militants to withhold support from those actors attacking 

Pakistan and remain focused on Afghanistan. In exchange, these entities were not targeted during 

military campaigns in FATA.97 Th e TTP was and remains a decentralized entity with many factions 

operating under its umbrella; the security services also attempted to exploit and exacerbate 

existing fi ssures by negotiating with diff erent factions at diff erent times.98

Ongoing violence, which spiked during the election seasons, suggests that eff orts to reorient violence externally were unsuccessful. Moreover, the dynamism of the militant milieu and 

protean nature of the entities within it complicate genuine counterinsurgency (COIN) and 

counterterrorism (CT) eff orts.

Blurring Militant Boundaries

Since 2002, the number of militant focal points has increased and blurred. Afghanistan became 

a focal point for every major militant outfi t as well as a host of smaller networks and splinter 

groups. India received attention primarily from LeT, though its perceived malevolent involvement 

in Afghanistan also contributed to the integration of these two focal points. Sectarian attacks 

increased from the mid-2000s onward and fused with the insurgency in Pakistan because of both 

the overrepresentation of LeJ members in anti-state violence and the historical connections that 

some TTP commanders had to SSP and LeJ.99 In addition to prior organizational affi nity, revolutionary and sectarian militants complemented one another operationally. Th ose associated with 

SSP and LeJ exploited Talibanization in FATA and KP for safe haven, and in turn, their sectarian 
16

PEACEWORKS 89

attacks became “an extension of the TTP war against cities.”100 By 2008, what had begun as a 

reaction to military eff orts in FATA and state crackdowns against select militants had coalesced 

into a revolutionary jihad to topple the apostate government in Islamabad and institute an extreme 

interpretation of Islamic law throughout the country. Th is jihad became a new focus of activity, and 

whether to participate in it has become the single greatest dividing line for militants.101 Although 

a bifurcation exists at the organizational level, where groups are either pro- or anti-state, many of 

these actors collaborate at the ground level.

Th e intensifying integration of the militant milieu created ideological confusion and greater 

opportunities for collaboration in anti-state violence and increased the potential for people to 

drift across the line dividing pro- and anti-state actors. It has led to bottom-up pressure on leaders 

of pro-state groups, all of which are experiencing factionalism, freelancing, and attrition among 

members to varying degrees. Eff orts by pro-state leaders to undercut the revolutionary ideology 

motivating anti-state militants can cost them credibility with their cadre. Moreover, hawks and 

doves exist in every organization, and hawks in pro-state groups sometimes sanction anti-state 

activities. Similarly, personal connections formed through training or fi ghting together can lead 

to ad hoc support at the line level. Because militant organizations have several faces—one for the 

Pakistani military and ISI, one for internal members, one for others within the militant milieu, and 

often one for the public—it can be diffi cult to identify sanctioned from unsanctioned activities. 

Despite the fact that the TTP claims credit for attacks, for a single attack one group might provide 

money; a second, logistics; a third, reconnaissance; a fourth, a vehicle; a fi fth, explosives; and a sixth, 

a bomber.102 Th is understandably confuses and complicates any counterterrorism response.103

Connections among pro- and anti-state militant groups also mean that the latter can leverage 

the territory, infrastructure, and manpower belonging to the former, as well as the religious parties 

associated with them to support the insurgency in Pakistan. In the settled areas, these connections 

enable anti-state militants to leverage mosques and madaris associated with establishment groups. 

As a result, anti-state militants have a way to recruit within the system, which can be particularly 

important when they need additional militants quickly or to regenerate a cell.104 Mosques and 

madaris associated with establishment groups also function as hideouts, transit points, staging 

grounds, and storage depots for attacks against Pakistan.105 Individuals in these pro-state organizations may provide assistance—knowingly or unknowingly—with transportation, money, food, 

or even reconnaissance. Many attacks that take place in Punjab, for example, involve at least some 

measure of coordination with current of former members of tolerated organizations, such as SSP, 

JeM, and in some cases even LeT.106

Interaction and integration is even more common in FATA, where pro- and anti-state 

groups collaborate, and individuals sometimes move back and forth between the two. For example, the Haqqani network is an essential enabler for the TTP as well as for a host of smaller 

anti-state entities (including many Punjabi group splinters) and al-Qaeda.107 Although it has 

worked to limit any public association with the insurgency in Pakistan, it actively benefi ts from 

TTP manpower. In return, the Haqqani network acts as a “platform for operational development 

and force projection” for segments of the TTP and other anti-state entities.108 Th is includes providing access to training, expertise, resources, and the prestige that comes from participating in 

certain operations in Afghanistan.109 Moreover, the Haqqani network has been al-Qaeda’s main 

enabler in the region for more than two decades. Al-Qaeda’s resiliency and, until recently, ability 

to project power transnationally is arguably owed more to this assistance than to that proff ered 

by any other local ally. Pakistani military and ISI leaders undoubtedly are aware of these dynamics and seek to control the Haqqani network the same way they have numerous other assets, 

A revolutionary jihad 

to topple the apostate 

government in Islamabad...

became a new focus of 

activity, and whether to 

participate in it has become 

the single greatest dividing 

line for militants.
17

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

providing resources on the one hand and arresting some of their commanders and limiting 

their capacity to operate on the other.110 Th eir ability to do so, however, is limited by the need to 

maintain the Haqqani network as an asset in Afghanistan and in FATA as well as by the fear of 

what a real crackdown would entail. Similar dynamics are at play with lesser-known FATA-based 

outfi ts that have struck nonaggression pacts with the military.

Finally, although offi cial protection given to establishment groups despite their contributions 

to anti-state violence is driven by a desire to safeguard so-called strategic assets, individuals from 

intelligence services may provide unsanctioned support to various militants as well. Giving line 

offi cers operational latitude provides the ISI with plausible deniability but also creates scenarios in 

which these men may protect or support their assets out of loyalty, ideological inclinations, their 

interpretation of policy or sense of what serves Pakistan’s interests, or simply the desire to protect 

their turf. At times this can include tipping off suspects, arranging their release in the event of 

arrest by the police, or withholding information necessary to locate them to begin with.111 Th e 

Pakistani military remains nationalist rather than Islamist, but Islamist sympathies do exist among 

some of its members, and jihadist infi ltration has occurred. Some soldiers and ISI offi cers have 

also joined jihadist groups after retiring or taken early retirement to do so.112 Some of them later 

contributed to attacks in Pakistan.113

No End in Sight

At the time of writing, militants had reorganized in the wake of military campaigns in Swat 

and South Waziristan and the counterterrorism eff orts throughout Pakistan that accompanied them.114 Many fi ghters fl ed to Afghanistan or to other tribal agencies, primarily North 

Waziristan. Th e Pakistan military is said to have prepared a North Waziristan operation. It is 

unlikely to be launched, however, until the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network vacate their 

sanctuaries there, though the offi cial reason for delay is a search for consensus in the polity on 

whether and how to proceed with an incursion. In addition to dispersing across the border or 

within the tribal areas, militants also fl ed to South Punjab, upper Sindh, and Karachi.115 Karachi 

has long served as a sanctuary and organizational hub, but in 2011, it emerged as a new target 

for jihadist violence.116

Th e TTP and its associates have shown no willingness to part with their maximalist agenda, 

including the withdrawal of Pakistani military forces from FATA and adjacent territories and the 

right to impose sharia in those areas with the eventual aim of imposing it throughout the country. 

Almost twenty-seven hundred people were killed in more than eleven hundred acts of political 

violence in Pakistan between January and April 2013. Casualties from jihadist violence constitute a 

signifi cant number of those killed.117 Th is violence included another round of mass terrorist attacks 

against the Shia in Pakistan. In addition, the TTP launched a withering series of attacks against 

the Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in the run-up to the elections, singling them out for their “secular doctrine” and because they were “responsible” for the incursions into FATA.118 Anti-state militants have launched 

a spate of attacks throughout Pakistan since the elections. Whether this is part of a strategy by the 

TTP and its allies to position themselves for peace negotiations with the government is unclear, 

but at the time of writing, they certainly appear to have the initiative.

Looking ahead to 2014 and beyond, it is unlikely that sectarian violence or the revolutionary jihad against Pakistan will abate regardless of what happens in Afghanistan, where 

the TTP and other anti-state insurgents already operate. Th e withdrawal of U.S. and NATO 

Almost twenty-seven 

hundred people were killed 

in more than eleven hundred 

acts of political violence in 

Pakistan between January 

and April 2013.
18

PEACEWORKS 89

forces coupled with the possibility of an escalating confl ict that draws in regional actors, 

a resurgent Afghan Taliban, or even a status quo insurgency create the conditions in which 

anti-state militants could take greater advantage of cross-border sanctuaries in Afghanistan 

to attack Pakistan. Whether they will do so remains to be seen. How much control Afghan 

Taliban leaders have over their own foot soldiers, much less those attached to the Pakistani 

Taliban, is in question. Th at portions of the two unite against Pakistan is cause for concern. 

Depending on the scale of the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan, such a move could have an 

atomizing impact on the militant milieu in Pakistan. It could, for example, rob the movement of some of its critical mass as well as the some of the legitimacy, or at least propaganda 

value, that comes from waging jihad against foreign forces that are positioned as anti-Islamic 

infi del occupiers. However, it also might undercut Pakistani eff orts to rein in or hold in reserve some proxies while managing the militant milieu in a way that keeps internal violence 

from escalating further. Notably, Pakistan’s outreach to former Northern Alliance members in 

Afghanistan and, more recently, willingness to help facilitate talks between the United States 

and Afghan Taliban stem partly from concerns about the impact of the U.S. and NATO drawdown on its internal security. At the same time, the security establishment also worries that an 

Afghan Taliban march to power would invite a massive infl ux of Indian assistance to the former 

Northern Alliance.

Looking to the east, despite an increased focus on Afghanistan, groups like LeT have yet to abandon the Kashmir cause or the jihad against India more broadly.119 Th e Kashmir front is torpid and 

regenerating it would be diffi cult, though recent events including several militant attacks and crossborder fi ring suggests attempts by groups including LeT to do just that.120 Kashmir is unlikely to see 

any violence like the type it experienced through the middle of the last decade. Newly elected Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif has indicated his intention to promote ties with India. Th is is to 

be commended and encouraged. Th e army and ISI have kept LeT from launching any major attacks 

against India since Mumbai in 2008, but the group is allowed to maintain low-level activities and 

is unlikely to be dismantled as long as major geopolitical disputes with New Delhi remain. Indeed, 

modestly improved diplomatic and economic relations with New Delhi have not precluded Pakistan’s ongoing development of tactical nuclear weapons intended to deter the type of Indian invasion 

that might result from another spectacular terrorist attack by Pakistan-supported militant groups. 

As long as Pakistan maintains militant proxies, any Indo-Pakistani rapprochement will remain incomplete and at risk of disruption by such an attack. Moreover, Afghanistan has been a pressure 

release valve for India-centric militants, and some, including LeT, are likely to remain focused there. 

However, if the Kashmir confl ict proves impossible to regenerate and Pakistan continues to keep 

pro-state militants from launching major attacks in India, frustration is a possibility. Some militants 

might decommission or pursue nonviolent activism. Others might join the insurgency in Pakistan.

Even given best-case scenarios geopolitically, Pakistan will continue to face signifi cant militant 

challenges. Endogenous barriers to countering that threat, much less dismantling the militant 

infrastructure, already exist.

Barriers to Action

It is important to distinguish between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism eff orts against Islamist militants intended to decrease violence in Pakistan and the commitment to dismantle fully 

the entire militant edifi ce. Th e eff orts are extant but inadequate. Th e commitment is absent. It 

would be understandable to assume that as the internal costs of militancy rise, in part owing to the 

inadequacy of COIN and CT eff orts, Pakistan’s readiness to demobilize all of the jihadist groups 

The army and ISI have kept 

LeT from launching any 

major attacks against India 

since Mumbai in 2008, 

but the group is allowed 

to maintain low-level 

activities and is unlikely 

to be dismantled.
19

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

on its soil would likewise increase. In reality, obstacles to COIN and CT eff orts against anti-state 

militants actually contribute to the security establishment’s obstinacy when it comes to decisive 

and sustained action to dismantle the militant infrastructure. Simultaneously, attempts to preserve 

some pro-state groups create conditions that impede action against anti-state groups. Internal 

obstacles thwart even sincere counterterrorism eff orts and further discourage elites from taking 

steps to disarm and demobilize permanently pro-state proxies. Domestic barriers can be grouped 

as follows: perceptual and strategic, structural, and political. Th is section examines each in turn and 

also assesses the manner in which obstacles of one variety aff ect others.

Collectively, these obstacles inform Pakistan’s triage approach, in which groups that have not 

declared war against the state are supported or ignored and those posing an imminent threat are 

targeted, albeit inconsistently. Th is approach is predicated on the assumption that Pakistan faces 

two choices—tolerate some militants or take on every group at once—and fails to account either 

for integration among militants or the long-term threats that pro-state actors might pose. Although Pakistan’s approach is indicative of unimaginative thinking and a convenient talking point 

for those in the security establishment who wish to preserve certain groups, it would be a mistake 

to discount the myriad domestic challenges facing Pakistan in terms of countering the militant 

threat or the degree to which they infl uence the establishment’s active support for some groups 

and tolerance of others.

Perceptual and Strategic Barriers

U.S. offi cials recognize correctly a divergence of strategic interests with Pakistan over its support 

for nonstate proxies. However, assumptions regarding why this is the case have proved inaccurate or incomplete. Th e fi rst assumption is that Pakistan would cease patronizing proxies once 

faced with its own jihadist insurgency. Th e second is that its decision to continue supporting 

Islamist militants is driven solely by geopolitical calculation. Th is assumption overlooks the 

establishment’s domestic compulsions vis-à-vis security and the way in which they intersect 

with foreign policy. Both assumptions are also based on the faulty premise that the Pakistani 

security establishment has the same low tolerance for terrorist violence within its borders as the 

United States does. In reality, it appears that the civilian government and security establishment 

are prepared to accept a persistent level of violence in the hopes of avoiding a confl agration 

and as long as the groups receiving state support—active or passive—have utility either abroad 

or at home. At the heart of this segmented approach is the perception that when it comes to 

pro-state militants, “If we don’t hit them, they won’t hit us.” However, additional perceptions 

inform a cost-benefi t calculus that impedes comprehensive and sustained action against all 

militants in Pakistan.

FATA and the Heartland

Militants control territory throughout FATA, but their physical center of gravity is in North 

Waziristan. Th e primary barrier to any off ensive there is the presence of the Haqqanis, which 

has signifi cant geopolitical utility for Pakistan in Afghanistan. Th us, it is possible the military 

could launch an incursion into North Waziristan post-2014, though there is cause for pessimism 

in terms of the insurgency in Afghanistan ending and thus the Haqqani network outliving its 

usefulness. Beyond this signifi cant barrier, though, are other endogenous ones.

Military and civilian offi cials alike worry about the capability of FATA-based militants to 

work with and through militants with connections outside the tribal areas to strike the heartland, 

which served as a coercive mechanism that forestalled military off ensives in the past. Military 

Groups that have not 

declared war against the 

state are supported or 

ignored and those posing an 

imminent threat are targeted, 

albeit inconsistently. 
20

PEACEWORKS 89

and especially civilian offi cials also worry about the societal consequences beyond the immediate 

fear of terrorist attacks or military losses. Th e state is currently in dire economic straits and previous military incursions in FATA had signifi cant humanitarian implications, creating thousands 

of internally displaced persons.121 Another military off ensive would likely have similar fi scal and 

human consequences at a time when the state is ill prepared to cope with them.

Perceptions about FATA and KP inform security concerns. Pakistanis outside those 

areas, including many elites within the security establishment, have historically demonstrated a 

readiness to accept Talibanization to avoid retaliatory violence and provided the Talibanization 

did not aff ect their lives—hence the preference for appeasement in the form of the peace deals 

off ered to various militant factions.122 Th e popular narrative in the “settled areas” of Pakistan 

that FATA is an “uncivilized area” in which militancy is an inherent cultural characteristic 

infl uences this calculus.123 Aversion to military action, both within the security establishment 

and among the general public, changed in the months after the Swat Taliban were videotaped 

fl ogging a young woman and then invaded Buner not long after, signing yet another peace 

deal. Th ese events signaled that Talibanization was encroaching too far beyond the frontier, 

engendering greater support for military action: 53 percent of the those polled backed the use 

of the Pakistani military for such an operation.124

However, support for military action ebbed as time passed. By 2012, the percentage of those 

in favor of the Pakistani army operating against militants in FATA and KP had dropped to 32 

percent.125 Even as recently as April 2013, amid the TTP’s withering assault during election season 

and at a time when 49 percent of the country rated the Taliban as a serious threat, only 35 percent 

favored military action, and 29 percent opposed it.126 Public support is critical to the political will 

of civilian politicians and the military leadership to remain engaged in military operations. Like 

elected offi cials in most places, politicians worry about displeasing the body politic. In November 

2012, amid another round of debate over whether and when the military should launch an 

incursion into North Waziristan, Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari questioned whether the 

public was prepared for the inevitable retaliatory attacks in many other parts of the country.127

Th e newly elected PML-N government and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which formed 

the government in KP, appear even more averse to direct confrontation and instead favor peace 

negotiations with the TTP. Th e military has increased its resolve to combat anti-state militants but 

remains sensitive to its standing among the population and to the impact of unpopular or unsuccessful operations on morale.128 Th ese internal concerns weaken the incentive for action and are 

unlikely to disappear entirely regardless of how the situation plays out in Afghanistan.

Regarding action outside FATA, civilian and military elites fear that a crackdown on militant 

networks and organizations could result in a series of standoff s along the lines of the Lal Masjid, 

followed by a spate of terrorist attacks. Th ere is a sense, not unfounded, that civilian law enforcement is ill-equipped to manage the fallout. Deploying the army is hardly the solution, however. 

First, it is not equipped to confront urban terrorism. Paramilitary forces such as the Rangers have 

been deployed in Karachi but have had only limited success containing violence and are not a 

long-term solution. Moreover, groups such as LeT and SSP enjoy their strongest base in Punjab. 

Th e military’s ranks draw heavily from that province, and thus some soldiers have friendship or 

familial ties to members of militant outfi ts.129 Sympathies for some of these organizations exist 

among some within the police force as well, which further complicates any response.130

Fears of retaliatory attacks are compounded by concerns about the potential societal instability that could result from cracking down on groups with robust aboveground operations, such as 

Maymar trust—a charity formally known as the Al-Rashid Trust and connected to various Deo-
21

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

bandi militant groups—or LeT’s aboveground wing, JuD.131 Curtailing a group’s military operations 

does not per se demand shutting down its above-ground social welfare activities, though serious 

questions can be raised about the capability of either the federal or any of the provincial governments 

to eff ectively assume control of these operations and administer or oversee them eff ectively. Moreover, even limited crackdowns could have social consequences that contribute to paralysis among 

offi cials. Although no militant group enjoys high approval ratings in Pakistan overall, some like 

LeT (through JuD) and SSP have penetrated pockets of the population.132 As a result, though their 

support is not broad, they do have suasion in certain areas.133 Offi cials worry about the ability of 

militant organizations, working in tandem with aboveground religious parties, to incite societal 

disruptions and encourage even more general lawlessness. Th at these groups are engaged in social 

welfare activities contributes to the perception in some quarters that they are positive, or at least 

benign, actors the state should not provoke. When addressing barriers stemming from these social 

welfare activities, one cannot ignore the state’s role in helping foster support for some of these groups, 

especially JuD, in part to provide another reason for resisting pressure to take action against them.134

“This Is Not Our War”

A popular narrative that compounds uncertainty over military action in FATA specifi cally and 

against anti-state militants across the country generally is that Pakistan is fi ghting America’s war or, 

at least, facing an insurgency because of its support for that war.135 Th e PML-N made this its offi cial 

position, including in its election manifesto the claim that Pakistan’s militants were emboldened as 

a result of both the U.S. invasion of and continued presence in Afghanistan and former President 

Musharraf’s authoritarian rule.136 Individually, military offi cials, civilian politicians, and others close 

to the establishment complain that splinter groups emerged and turned on the state after 9/11 as 

a result of crackdowns undertaken in response to U.S. pressure. One ISI offi cer asserted, “Pakistan 

banned these organizations under pressure from the U.S. and this was a mistake. At the time, these 

people were in the system. Now they are outside the system.”137 Th is complaint is coterminous with 

one that the United States pressured Pakistan to launch military incursions into FATA that in turn 

catalyzed the insurgency there. Today, the United States is viewed exhorting Pakistan to increase its 

military eff orts in FATA while attempting to negotiate with the Taliban in Afghanistan. From 

Pakistan’s perspective, this does not leave space to negotiate a political solution. Notably, this 

assumes the TTP-led insurgency can be resolved through negotiations in tandem with an end to 

the American military presence in Afghanistan and presumably to drone strikes as well.

General Kayani asserted unequivocally in several high-profi le speeches that Pakistan is at war 

with terrorism.138 Th is may be part of an eff ort to push back against these perceptions or at least 

move beyond them and rally the country behind the need to counter the militant threat. However, 

if this is an uphill climb for the military, the diffi culty is largely one of its own making. General 

Kayani’s lament that “certain quarters still want to remain embroiled in the debate concerning the 

causes of this war and who imposed it on us” overlooks the fact that the military helped to fuel that 

debate to begin with. It plays a signifi cant role in shaping public opinion, relying on connected 

commentators to exert signifi cant infl uence, and then using public opinion to buff er against U.S. 

demands to do more about the militants on Pakistan’s soil.139 Moreover, it also continues to send 

mixed messages about the nature of the threat.

Th ese eff orts have boomeranged to block the military’s eff orts at times. Following Islamabad’s long-delayed 2012 decision to reopen NATO supply lines, closed in the aftermath of 

the November 2011 Salala incident in which U.S. military strikes killed twenty-four Pakistani 

That these groups are 

engaged in social welfare 

activities contributes to 

the perception in some 

quarters that they are 

positive, or at least 

benign, actors the state 

should not provoke.
22

PEACEWORKS 89

soldiers, militants threatened to attack supply convoys and Pakistani military installations. 

Rather than push back, political leaders and security pundits close to the security establishment 

joined the chorus of voices complaining, “Th is is not our war.”140 Some retired military offi cials 

went further, sounding like “outright apologists” for those threatening such attacks. One retired 

general declared that the militants planning such assaults might have felt justifi ed under sharia 

in attacking military installations.141

Militants exploit the narrative of America’s war for their own ends. For example, during 

Operation Zalzala, launched in South Waziristan in 2008, for example, militants reportedly told 

members of the local population that the army was composed of non-Muslims and was waging 

war on behalf of the United States.142 More recently, when the state banned Ahle Sunnah Wal 

Jamaat, the latest incarnation of the SSP, its leader Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi 

claimed that “American and pro-American elements are afraid of the Difa [referring to Difa-ePakistan or the Defense of Pakistan Council of which SSP is a part] and have orchestrated this 

ban. In essence, whoever enforces the ban is enforcing their [America’s] will on Pakistan.”143

A Foreign Hand

Th e ability to mobilize comprehensive and sustained action against militancy is also hampered by 

the fact that many Pakistanis—including some within the security establishment—have internalized 

conspiracy theories about Indian, American, Afghan, and (for good measure) Israeli support for militants attacking Pakistan. For example, General Kayani still nurtures this narrative even as he positions 

war against anti-state militants as Pakistan’s own. In his Martyr’s Day speech, the general alluded 

to foreign support: “Th e nefarious designs of our enemy, may it be internal or external, will never 

succeed and we shall eventually prevail.” He made a bolder claim minutes later: “Our external 

enemies are busy in igniting the fl ames of this fi re.”144 Because a long-standing military imperative 

holds that soldiers must know against whom and for what they are fi ghting, this perception makes 

countering anti-state militants more diffi cult. It also elevates the importance of pro-state militant 

groups to Pakistan’s security. Th ey become more than simply a bulwark against Indian hegemony 

and American expansionist designs in the region: Th ey also become an essential counter to an 

Indian-American-Afghan-sponsored proxy war in Pakistan.

Several explanations account for the susceptibility to the narrative that foreign powers 

were behind terrorist attacks in Pakistan. First is a general disbelief that Pakistani Muslims 

could be involved in attacking their own people—and if they are, then a “foreign hand” must be 

manipulating them. Second, this disbelief dovetails with both a propensity to blame outsiders for 

Pakistan’s travails and a general appetite for conspiracy theories. Th ird, the narrative of a foreign 

hand was fundamental to getting Pakistani forces to fi ght in FATA.145 Waging war against one’s 

countrymen is never easy and particularly so for Pakistani soldiers, who are taught that their country 

is a “fortress of Islam and [that] its enemies are also enemies of Islam.” Th ese beliefs are useful for 

fi ghting against Hindu India but hinder eff orts against fellow citizens who “claim to have a fi rmer 

commitment to Islam than the Army.”146 Instead, Pakistani soldiers were told that they were 

fi ghting Indian and American agents.147 Many in the military absorbed this narrative and then 

fed it back into the population, which gave it even greater credence. Fourth, civilian politicians, 

establishment pundits, and other elites serially repeat this trope to the media. In some instances, 

the narrative can be chalked up to the inclination to blame outsiders for Pakistan’s problems. In 

others, it is a way of inoculating the security establishment or civilian government against the 

blowback from war within Pakistan’s borders. Politicians also label their opponents as agents of 

India, Israel, and America to score political points.148
23

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

Th is is not merely a rhetorical device for public consumption. President Zardari reportedly 

expressed concerns privately to American interlocutors about U.S. involvement in attacks against 

Pakistan.149 Suspicions of a foreign hand also appear to cloud investigations and operations further 

down the organizational chart, despite the lack of any evidence. For example, one of the militants 

involved in the Sri Lankan cricket team bus attack in 2010 admitted to investigators that the 

main objective of the operation was to pressure the government to release arrested LeJ militants, 

including Akram Lahore and Malik Ishaq. Yet the interrogation report found that the “involvement of some foreign Intelligence Agency cannot be ruled out,” an assessment based solely on the 

fact that the militants had enough money to purchase three cars, three rickshaws, and weapons for 

the operation.150

No signifi cant open-source evidence indicates Indian support for anti-state Islamist militants, but India’s presence in Afghanistan, where it has opened four consulates in addition to its 

embassy, has stoked suspicion. Specifi cally, it is an article of faith among many in the Pakistani 

security establishment that India uses Afghan consulates to equip anti-state Islamist militants, 

including the TTP.151 Meanwhile, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been waging a low-level 

border war since the end of the last decade, and anti-state militants displaced by incursions 

into FATA and the Swat Valley have regrouped in eastern Afghanistan.152 From there, they 

launch cross-border raids into Pakistan. Th ese actors appear to benefi t at least from benign 

neglect by the Afghan security forces, though Pakistan alleges they receive active support from 

Afghanistan’s intelligence agency.153

U.S. forces withdrew from the Korangal Valley in mid-2010, turning an already troubled 

region into a militant safe haven for Afghan-centric and Pakistan-centric militants. Pakistani 

offi cials equate the situation, inaccurately, to the safe haven in FATA and ask rhetorically 

why Pakistan should be expected to rid North Waziristan of the militants based there if the 

United States cannot do so across the border. Some of those willing to concede that their 

focus is on combating anti-state militant groups argue in turn that the United States is focused 

on Afghanistan-focused groups. Th is equates apples with oranges. From a U.S. perspective, 

aggressively targeting the Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan would require reorienting resources 

currently deployed against Afghan-focused insurgents, a number of whom operate with Pakistani 

support, at a time when the United States is racing to make progress in advance of the impending 

2014 drawdown. Th e TTP and its allies are indeed not a priority, and the United States is certainly 

not prepared to redeploy to the Korangal Valley. It will, however, certainly take action against 

Pakistan-focused actors in Afghanistan when the opportunity presents itself. Moreover, the 

United States is not actively supporting those actors based in Afghanistan or abetting their 

cross-border raids, whereas Pakistan is supporting the Haqqanis, the Afghan Taliban, and other 

pro-state groups.154 Nevertheless, the incorrect perception exists that the United States supports 

cross-border TTP strikes.155

When All You Have Is a Hammer

Th e security establishment is rightly concerned that after 2014 the TTP and its allies could 

benefi t further from safe haven in Afghanistan and that this situation could be all the worse 

if relations with Kabul deteriorate. Alternatively, if the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network 

succeed in arrogating more power in Afghanistan after 2014 than even Pakistan would like, they 

could back the TTP against their former hosts. In the eyes of many security offi cials in Pakistan, 

either scenario makes preserving ties with pro-state militants a safe bet at present, especially as 

some of these militants increasingly off er internal utility alongside their historically external 
24

PEACEWORKS 89

utility.156 Th e Pakistani military and ISI have only so many tools in the toolkit and thus have 

developed a strategic culture of reliance on nonstate proxies.

Th e Haqqani network and Afghan Taliban act as diplomatic interfaces with the TTP. Th is 

includes interceding on specifi c issues as well as providing private and sometimes public guidance 

favorable to Pakistan’s interests.157 Th e Haqqani network, in particular, has played this diplomatic 

liaison role by helping the military to “manage hostilities, gain access to TTP leaders, and try to 

shape the direction and priorities of militant groups in the FATA, especially those waging jihad 

against Islamabad.”158 Its leaders reportedly helped mediate a number of the cease-fi re agreements 

and peace deals between the military and TTP commanders in North and South Waziristan. Th ey 

were also instrumental in securing the release of Pakistan’s former ambassador to Afghanistan, 

Tariq Azizuddin, whom TTP militants kidnapped in 2008.159 To do so, Pakistan paid a $2.5 

million ransom to Baitullah Mehsud and released a number of TTP militants as well as two 

high-ranking members of the Afghan Taliban.160 Such exchanges benefi t not only the military 

and the TTP but also the Haqqani network, whose commanders leverage their ties to both sides 

to maintain their infl uence.161

LeT has carried out a propaganda campaign against al-Qaeda and the TTP—despite cooperating with both at the operational level in Afghanistan—demonizing them for launching 

attacks in Pakistan.162 Th e Pakistani security services also use pro-state groups, such as LeT, to 

gather intelligence on these actors and, at times, to neutralize them.163 Similarly, during Operation 

Zalzala, the Taliban commander Mullah Nazir was given covert support to attack Uzbek militants 

who enjoyed the protection of his rival Baitullah Mehsud.164 Th ese eff orts are part of a broader 

bid to regain control over the militant infrastructure rather than to dismantle it, and they inform 

Pakistan’s ongoing support for certain pro-state actors.

Finally, the state’s ability to sustain proxy wars for multiple decades has depended in large part 

on its ability to market them as jihad.165 Because the government publicly disavows support for 

militancy abroad, pro-state leaders tell their cadre to disregard offi cial messaging. As a result, even 

pro-state militants have been conditioned to look to their leaders, rather than the government, as 

the legitimate arbiters of what is and is not off limits. Th is increases the state’s reliance on these 

leaders, and the clerics they follow, to defi ne the parameters of jihad. In short, it increases their 

ideological and operational value.

To be sure, the geopolitical utility some groups off er is the most compelling reason why 

Pakistan continues to provide them with active support, including money and materials; assistance 

with training, operations, and logistics; organizational assistance; ideological direction (where possible); 

and, of course, sanctuary; as well as other protection from external enemies (for example, intelligence 

sharing).166 However, decisions about which groups to patronize with such support and which to 

target as part of the security establishment’s triage policy are heavily infl uenced by whether a group is 

attacking the Pakistani state directly, as well as by the level of situational awareness of and infl uence 

on it. Providing active support is an important way to maintain infl uence over those pro-state militant groups that, as an organizational policy, eschew attacks against the state home. Th us, concerns 

among those within the security establishment are signifi cant that the cessation of active support 

would lead to decreased infl uence over pro-state groups and a likely concomitant rise in anti-state 

violence. In some cases, such support is also perceived to be necessary to enable pro-state groups 

to beat back anti-state challenges. For example, for several years al-Qaeda has been attempting to 

poach LeT members, compete for its recruits, and co-opt its anti-India platform.167 In addition 

to the other purposes served, state support for LeT is also a way of attempting to provide it with 

the strength to beat back this challenge. It is also potentially a way to channel some of those who are 

Concerns among 

those within the 

security establishment 

are signifi cant that the 

cessation of active support 

would lead to decreased 

infl uence over pro-state 

groups and a likely 

concomitant rise in 

anti-state violence.
25

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

attracted to militancy into a pro-state, rather than an anti-state, entity. Ending passive support would 

be even more diffi cult. It is defi ned here as knowingly allowing a militant group to raise funds, recruit, 

receive support from other actors within the country, or otherwise operate without interference.168

Were the Pakistani security establishment to end passive support for militant groups, it would be 

tantamount to a sincere and sustained crackdown against them, a Herculean undertaking that almost 

inevitably would engender blowback as described above.

Th is is not to suggest that Pakistan should not end passive or active support but rather to identify 

some of the variables that infl uence why it has not. Th is rationale is also informed by myriad structural 

barriers that militate against eff ective COIN and CT eff orts. Collectively, such eff orts inform and are 

informed by elite political calculations that act as a further barrier to action.

Political Barriers

Any eff ort to combat militancy must entail not only the strategic calculation and necessary resources 

to do so but also political will. Th is means that politicians and military leaders must overcome a 

culture of solipsistic infi ghting. As observed in a Dawn editorial published in early 2012,

Incredibly, there is no apparent effort to deal with these existential [militant] threats, 

despite almost daily appeals to those who matter. The reason for the absence of collective 

national effort to face these challenges is that those who can make a difference are preoccupied with their own personal or institutional battle for survival or for supremacy. The 

ruling political parties are too busy with matters relating to their survival in office and fresh 

mandate for the next five years, to pay attention to other matters. The political parties not 

in office are dedicated only to ousting those in office. The military spends considerable 

time and energy on maintaining its pre-eminence in state affairs.169

Indeed, while the military deserves some credit for allowing the democratic process to 

advance, this move was part of an implicit quid pro quo arrangement: Th e previous government was 

allowed to complete its term, but the military retained control over policies it considered vital to its 

interests. Th is highlights the fact that alongside the competition that ensues—between the civilian 

government and the military, between the federal and provincial governments, and among the various 

political parties—is a form of elite negotiation that enables all of these actors to protect their overall 

interests.170 In other words, the military and civilians compete over power even as they protect overall elite interests by limiting those able to engage in said competition to their own narrow circle.171

With regard to the politics of militancy, this contributes to benign neglect and deliberate inaction as 

well as to the outright use of certain militant entities as political proxies. It is important to note before 

proceeding that civilian politicians are not entangled with militant groups to nearly the same extent 

as the security establishment. Th eir actions, at least in some cases, appear to be the result of attempts 

to accommodate groups whose existence they cannot control because security policy remains the 

purview of the military. However, civilian politicians are not blameless and, in some instances, engage 

extremists and militants to serve their own purposes; this engagement therefore cannot be laid 

entirely at the feet of the security establishment.

If We Don’t Hit Them...the Political Version

Preserving its preeminence requires the military to maintain internal cohesion among the 

rank-and-fi le and to protect its reputation with the populace. Whereas military leaders will 

admit their concerns about the threats from blowback to Pakistan’s internal security and the 

ability to mobilize resources to avoid such an outcome (strategic reasons for inaction), they 

are less up front about how blowback could damage the military’s “self-created and selfperpetuated image inside Pakistan as the only viable institution.”172 Th ey also do not dwell too 
26

PEACEWORKS 89

publicly on the impact on morale, but that issue remains an important motivator.173 Previous 

peace deals were struck in part to spare the military losses that negatively aff ect troop morale 

and damage its prestige.174 Nevertheless, the military has taken a hard line against anti-state 

militants, arguing against negotiations unless the TTP disarms and accepts the writ of the 

state, which the military must know both are nonstarters.

Increasingly, however, politicians are the ones arguing for peace talks. In an apparent bid 

to temper violence during election season, politicians of various stripes attempted to open 

negotiations with the TTP before the election season despite the fact that its leaders evinced 

no sign of being ready to accept Pakistan’s constitution or to budge on their maximalist agenda.175

Th ose talks failed to materialize after the TTP withdrew its off er and began targeting the ANP, 

PPP, and MQM, singling them out for their “secular doctrine” and because they were “responsible” for the incursions into FATA.176 Th e TTP was not above targeting individual candidates 

from religious parties if they did not toe the line, for example, executing an attack against 

one JUI-F politician who had supported the PPP and ANP government that had launched 

operations against it.177

Th e TTP is not strong enough to capture power through a decisive military victory, and its 

campaign of violence during the elections served several objectives. First, it appears to have been 

an attempt to infl uence the outcome of the elections in favor of the right-of-center parties 

perceived to be more willing to support a religiously regressive agenda. Second, it likely was 

intended to send a strong signal to all civilian politicians that supporting any decision to 

confront the movement directly has lethal consequences. Finally, the sheer capability to carry 

out successive attacks and possibly infl uence the outcome of a national election enhanced the 

TTP’s power and defl ated that of the state.178

Notably, the other main parties, PML-N and Imran Khan’s PTI, both of which took a softer 

line against the TTP and courted right-wing voters, maintained a deafening silence as violence 

against their political opponents mounted.179 Th e barrage of attacks made campaigning diffi cult 

for all of those targeted. Th e ANP, in particular, was nearly “knocked . . . off the electoral map” 

in Pakistan’s northwest, where it historically has been the dominant party.180 Th e PML-N won 

a majority of seats in the elections, and the PTI did well enough in KP to form the government 

there. Both have continued to argue for negotiations since taking offi ce. Th is is not to suggest 

the TTP’s campaign of violence tipped the election, especially at the federal level. A host of 

factors, unrelated to militancy, explain the PML-N victory.

At the time of writing, the parties had yet to come to the table, and it was unclear how the 

strategy would develop. It is worth noting, however, that as opposition parties during the PPP’s 

time in offi ce, the PML-N and PTI had no incentive to improve the situation and instead appear 

to have calculated that they could benefi t from turning a blind eye to the dangers of militancy.181

For example, in a bid to reorient attacks away from Punjab in 2010, Shahbaz Sharif, the chief 

minister of that province and brother of PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif, exhorted the TTP to 

abstain from launching attacks there:

Gen Musharraf planned a bloodbath of innocent Muslims at the behest of others only to 

prolong his rule, but we in the PML-N opposed his policies and rejected dictation from 

abroad [a reference to the U.S.] and if the [Pakistani] Taliban are also fighting for the same 

cause then they should not carry out acts of terror in Punjab.182

Th e PPP is hardly blameless. It led the only civilian government to sign a peace deal with 

anti-state militants (in 2008 in Swat). Although PPP leaders often engaged in tough rhetoric 

thereafter, in general they failed to back this up with action. Instead, they focused their energies 
27

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

on staying in offi ce. Th is speaks to a larger issue. Th e security establishment’s policy of selectivity 

with regard to militants, the lethal capabilities of anti-state militants, and the political infl uence some of their number have created gray areas for civilian authorities. Fearing professional 

retaliation from the military and ISI or physical attacks by militants, many civilian authorities 

choose to do nothing. During its term, the PPP often avoided responsibility on security issues 

both to avoid challenging the military, which can destabilize elected governments that challenge 

its preferred policies at home or abroad, and to escape blame for any backlash that might ensue 

from aggressive action against militancy.

Militant Pawnbrokers

Th e permissive environment militants enjoy has enabled some of them to arrogate political 

power, which reinforces the cycle because it raises the cost of action against them and means 

that they can provide greater political utility to the military and to civilian politicians.

A military-mullah-militant nexus has existed for several decades in Pakistan. During this time, 

the Pakistani military has used religious and political parties connected, directly or indirectly, with 

various militant outfi ts. Th e Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) is the most recent manifestation of 

the phenomenon. A coalition of more than forty political-religious parties, some of whose leaders 

either have ties to or head militant groups, the DPC quickly came to be seen after its formation as 

a stalking horse for the security establishment.183 It undercut certain civilian offi cials, highlighted 

foreign policy issues the military did not wish to speak openly about, and polarized other issues 

indirectly for bargaining purposes with other nation-states, most notably India and America.184

Consolidating leaders from various militant groups onto a single political platform amplifi es their 

voice but also may be a way for the security establishment to increase infl uence over other aspects 

of their behavior. Moreover, the opportunity to infl uence political discourse also may provide an 

incentive to some militant leaders, such as Hafi z Saeed, to keep their cadres in line.185

As some militant groups have arrogated power via their aboveground organizations, they 

have increased both their utility to elected offi cials and the costs to elected offi cials of crossing 

them. At the same time, the decentralization of politics has made it more diffi cult for the major 

parties to win an outright majority on their own. Reliance on local powerbrokers and smaller 

parties has thus become more necessary. Politicians seeking to turn out voters or put down local 

challenges have courted militants leaders, especially those from SSP and JuD, and have shown a 

readiness to make deals with them in return.186 Th ey also appeal to militant leaders for endorsements or other assistance delivering vote banks and have been known to appear at public events 

with some of these leaders to secure such help.187

Pakistan’s major parties are all guilty of seeking support from Islamist organizations tied to 

militant groups to secure seats in parliament, but the PML-N in particular has been criticized 

for courting extremist organizations such as the SSP and JuD in order to make electoral gains.188

Notably, some of its supporters have a higher tolerance for such entities. According to a May 

2013 Pew poll, 23 percent view the Taliban and al-Qaeda positively and 40 percent hold favorable opinions of LeT. In contrast, only 11 percent of the Pakistani populace view the Taliban 

favorably, 13 percent have a favorable opinion of al-Qaeda, and 24 percent give LeT a positive 

rating.189 Although the party is more religiously conservative than the PPP, it is not a religious 

party. Rather, its courtship of these voters appears to have been part of a pragmatic approach to 

win as many votes in as many districts as possible in a fi rst-past-the-post system. At the same 

time, Nawaz Sharif is to be commended for his pledge to improve ties with India and his interest 

Fearing professional 

retaliation from the military 

and ISI or physical attacks 

by militants, many civilian 

authorities choose to 

do nothing.
28

PEACEWORKS 89

in rectifying the civil-military imbalance. It is unclear whether he will be able to actualize these 

objectives, but it is notable that an attempt to do so could put him on a collision course with some 

of the same extremist organizations the PML-N is accused of courting.

Militant Hats in the Ring

Sami ul-Haq, who leads a religious party with long-standing ties to militancy, worried publicly 

that the TTP’s campaign of violence during election season could lead to sympathy votes for 

the secular parties being targeted or suppress the vote at a time when these entities, which had 

formed the previous government, were unpopular.190 Such concerns turned out to be misplaced. 

However, the point is that such criticism did not impugn the legitimacy of the TTP’s campaign 

of violence but rather highlighted the potential for it to result in unintended consequences that 

would rob the religious parties of an opportunity to advance their agenda through politics and 

to benefi t from the resources that come with being in power.

Th e participation in elections of candidates from religious parties with ties to militancy is not 

new. Increasingly, however, members of banned organizations and those accused of terrorism 

also contest elections themselves. According to one report, more than one hundred members of 

the SSP contested elections across Pakistan in May 2013.191 According to another report, the 

Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) allowed fi fty-fi ve candidates from ten sectarian groups, 

including SSP and LeJ, to contest elections in Punjab province, despite their being listed on the 

4th Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act.192 Most were not expected to prevail, and many did 

not, but it is impossible to deny that militants have become a voice in the political discourse. Th is 

theoretically could create conditions for some of them to transition away from militancy and into 

mainstream politics. In reality, groups like the SSP have not yet been forced to choose between 

participation in politics and in militancy.

Structural Barriers

In the mid-2000s, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Aff airs, which was charged with providing assistance to Pakistan’s law enforcement 

and judicial system, characterized the systems as “hollow ... with limited resources and poor training 

... [and adversely aff ected by] interagency competition.”193 Th is assessment remains true today.

Plenty of ink has been spilled on Pakistan’s capacity shortfalls, and therefore this section only 

briefl y highlights some of those most signifi cant to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. It 

delves more deeply into systematic obstacles that result from inadequate government and legal 

structures, the politicization of civilian law enforcement, and the informal competition among 

various actors in the federal and provincial governments, the military, and the intelligence services. 

Most states in South Asia face similar structural defi ciencies, meaning Pakistan is hardly unique 

in confronting these challenges. But the country’s precarious condition overall and the dynamic 

nature of the jihadist threat makes the costs of the shortcomings disproportionately higher for 

Pakistan than for other countries in South Asia.

Capacity Shortfalls

Total American foreign military sales (FMS) agreements with Pakistan amounted to $5.4 billion 

for FY2002 through FY2010, the United States providing almost half that amount in foreign 

military fi nancing (FMF) grants used to purchase U.S. military equipment for long-term modernization eff orts.194 Islamabad, according to the departments of Defense and State, has used 
29

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

The Case of SSP and LeJ

As sectarian violence escalated during the 1990s, the PML-N government cracked down on 

SSP and its militant offshoot LeJ, seriously degrading their networks.1

 Although the Musharraf 

regime escalated support for Kashmir-centric groups after taking power in 1999, it continued 

the PML-N government’s assault on LeJ, banning it in August 2001.2

 Pakistan protected most 

of its militant groups after 9/11 but did crack down hard on LeJ, driving many of the group’s 

members to turn against the state. However, for domestic political reasons, SSP was allowed 

to continue operating, enabling LeJ to tap into its infrastructure to regenerate. Its members 

rebuilt their networks across Pakistan, with strongholds in North Waziristan, Karachi, and 

Balochistan, as well as parts of Punjab.3

 They are now at the forefront of terrorist attacks in 

Pakistan, especially against members of the Shia community.

Some speak of a controlled versus an uncontrolled LeJ, the former headed by Malik Ishaq 

in Punjab and the latter operating from North Waziristan and known as LeJ al-Alami (International). 

However, experts familiar with the group perceive this to be a false dichotomy.4

Malik Ishaq was accused of thirty-fi ve cases of murder, including the assassination of an 

Iranian diplomat in 1997. An antiterrorism court (ATC) sentenced him to death, but the 

Supreme Court overturned that sentence and closed the case in 2011. By that time, the ATC 

judge who issued the initial sentence had escaped the country, and many of the witnesses to 

the crime, including a senior police offi cer, had been murdered.5

 Ishaq was acquitted of murder 

charges in the other cases as well because of lack of evidence, in many cases because witnesses either died or refused to testify.6

While still in prison, Ishaq was twice employed by the military to negotiate with militants—once during the Lal Masjid incident and once when anti-state elements attacked the 

military’s general headquarters and took hostages. This has fueled speculation that the security 

establishment might have helped to engineer his release. However, reports also circulated that 

Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, the current chief of SSP, met Ishaq at the request of 

Shahbaz Sharif, the younger brother of Nawaz Sharif and chief minister of Punjab province, to 

offer him a conditional release provided he refrain from militant activities.7

Whether military or political offi cials interceded on his behalf or Ishaq’s release was a 

simple result of witness intimidation and inadequacies in the judicial system is unclear. It is 

clear, however, that his release and subsequent sectarian sermons coincided with another 

escalation in the terrorist campaign by LeJ against the Shia.8

LeJ executed a spate of attacks against members of Pakistan’s Hazara community, especially 

in Balochistan, in the wake of Ishaq’s release. The group claimed credit for these attacks and even 

circulated an open letter stating that “our successful jihad against the Hazaras in Pakistan and, 

in particular, in Quetta, is ongoing and will continue in the future.”9

 Much of this is driven by 

sectarian enmity, though it is notable that in Afghanistan the Hazaras are historically an enemy 

of the Taliban.

Rumors persist about Pakistani military support for LeJ militants in Balochistan to degrade 

the separatist insurgency in that province. There is no evidence of an institutionalized policy, 

however, and the military has denied these charges vociferously.10 It is possible some offi cers 

overlook or abet LeJ activities because they are seen as targeting enemies of the state.11

Rumors also persist that external powers, including Saudi Arabia, are helping fund a 

sectarian proxy war along the lines of what occurred during the 1990s. This too is impossible to 

confi rm, but even if it were true, the actors involved are endogenous to Pakistan.

Amid speculation about tacit support from some individuals in the military for LeJ’s activities 

in Balochistan, civilian politicians are also accused of culpability. The SSP, which is part of the DPC, 

reportedly engaged in seat adjustments with the PML-N in Punjab for the elections, meaning that 

in some cases the two parties agreed to not fi eld candidates against one another.12 This agreement is in addition to courting SSP leaders, such as Ahmed Ludhianvi, for endorsements and 

assistance delivering vote banks.13 Once again, the PML-N is not the only mainstream political 

party to engage in such activities, but it is viewed as one of the bigger offenders in this regard.14

Beyond vote-bank politics, the PML-N was reluctant to crack down on the Punjab-based 

leadership for fear of triggering a wave of terrorist attacks in a province where it needed to (and 

did) win big in the elections. In short, the same PML-N that led the charge against the SSP and 

LeJ in the 1990s courted, and in some cases cooperated, with the same entities.
30

PEACEWORKS 89

more than half of its FMF to purchase weapons used for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Th rough coalition support funds (CSF), Pakistan has also received additional fi xed-wing 

and rotary aircraft as well as billions of dollars in reimbursements. More fi xed-wing and rotary 

aircraft, vehicles, and assorted kit, including body armor and night vision devices, were provided 

via Section 1206 (global train and equip) funds, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, and the 

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund.195 Some of these weapons and materials have a 

narrow COIN/CT use. Others have a dual use. Critics contend that Pakistan diverted some to 

augment its conventional capabilities against India. Money, of course, is also fungible.

Th e use of U.S. funds to train and equip the Frontier Corps increased after 2007 when the 

insurgency fully erupted in Pakistan. U.S. Special Operations Command also provided training for 

Notes

1. The Crime Investigation Department of the Punjab police at the provincial level and IB at the federal level led the crackdown. 

2. Regarding the escalation for Kashmir-centric groups, see Tankel, Storming the World Stage, p. 63.

3. Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, interview with author, 

Pakistan, July 2011; Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s ‘Strategic’ Backwaters,” Express Tribune, February 20, 

2013. In Balochistan, LeJ is believed to be based in Mastung, a town south of Quetta.

4. Tariq Pervez, former director general of the Federal Investigative Agency and currently director of 

the Initiative for Public Security, Pakistan, July 2010; Amir Mir, journalist with The News, Pakistan, July 

2011. The language “controlled” and “uncontrolled” is from Ayesha Siddiqa, who shares the assessment that this is a false dichotomy. Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s ‘Strategic’ Backwaters.”

5. Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Strategic Backwaters.”

6. Amir Mir, “Blood Flows Freely in Pakistan,” Asia Times, October 5, 2011.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army Says It Has No Links with LJ,” Dawn, February 21, 2013.

11. Declan Walsh, “Explosion in Crowded Market Kills Dozens in Pakistan,” New York Times, February 

16, 2013.

12. Amir Mir, “Punjab govt may not act against LeJ PML -N has seat adjustments with defunct SSP,” 

The News, February 22, 2013.

13. The most commonly cited joint appearance entailed Rana Sanaullah from PML-N, when he was 

the Punjabi law minister, participating in an SSP rally and publicly seeking the endorsement of SSP 

leader Ahmed Ludhianvi. The two traveled to Jhang together in an offi cial government vehicle with 

police escort to campaign in February 2010 ahead of the March by-election for the provincial assembly. Sanaullah argued to the author that encouraging such men to involve themselves in elections 

is better than seeing them head to North Waziristan but acknowledged that he campaigned with 

Ahmed Ludhianvi because SSP had a vast vote-bank. Sanaullah, interview by author; see also Shafi q 

Awan, “The Cost of Jhang By-Poll,” Daily Times, March 10, 2010.

14. According to several JuD offi cials with whom I spoke, politicians from the PPP and PML-N have 

sought their organization’s support. The central secretary general of SSP averred that during the 2008 

elections almost all the major political parties, including the PPP, PML -N, ANP, PML Q, and the JUI, had 

sought his party’s support in the four provinces of the country. On this claim, see Mir, “Punjab govt 

may not act.” For additional reports along these lines, see Taha Siddiqui, “Pakistan Elections: Who 

are the Main Candidates for Prime Minister?”Christian Science Monitor, April 17, 2013; Declan Walsh, 

“Extremists Pursue Mainstream in Pakistan Election,” New York Times, May 5, 2013.
31

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

various Pakistani forces, though its trainers have been evicted repeatedly in the wake of shocks to 

the relationship. Pakistan expressed eagerness for counterinsurgency hardware, including armored 

personnel carriers, night-vision goggles, more sophisticated surveillance and communication 

equipment, laser target designators, laser-guided munitions, and attack and utility helicopters.196

In response, it received more equipment suited to unconventional combat. However, many analysts 

assert that in the past the military used U.S. security assistance to bolster its conventional (that is, 

India-centric) capabilities at the expense of augmenting its counterinsurgency capacity.197

Th e army’s past unwillingness to develop an offi cial counterinsurgency doctrine contributed 

to a repeatedly heavy-handed approach reliant on punishment strategies that further undercut 

short-term gains.198 For example, in Operation Zalzala launched in 2008 in South Waziristan, 

Pakistani forces destroyed more than four thousand houses in one month and displaced approximately two hundred thousand people.199 Th e same year Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur caused a 

similar displacement, driving local residents to other parts of Pakistan as well as across the border 

into Afghanistan. Additionally, the military has repeatedly applied collective punishment under 

the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a colonial-era structure that governs FATA.200

Years of experience operating in FATA, coupled with training assistance and capacity building 

provided by the United States, has helped Pakistan improve its counterinsurgency capabilities. 

Th is was apparent by the end of the last decade when Pakistan launched the aforementioned 

operations Rah-e-Rast (Swat) and Rah-e-Nijat (South Waziristan) in 2009–10.

However, even when security forces have successfully cleared and held territory, the federal and 

provincial bureaucracies have proved unable to provide development and other aid or adequately 

assist internally displaced persons. Th is reinforces the military’s reliance on scorched-earth policies 

that alienate the local population.201 As one Pakistani defense analyst observed, “Th e army is stretching itself too much because there is no civilian eff ort. But wherever the army goes, it makes the 

civilians irrelevant and so they cannot make the eff ort.”202 Unless Pakistan better governs the territory 

it liberates and tackles the myriad political, socioeconomic, and cultural risk factors that contribute to 

militancy, consolidating gains will be diffi cult. If they are not consolidated, security forces will remain 

bogged down in those areas of FATA and KP they do control, unable to move on to those they do 

not. Manpower problems are exacerbated by the army’s paramount focus on its eastern border with 

India. Th e army has shown a readiness to redeploy soldiers to FATA when necessary, but the 

durability of its commitment or capacity to do so indefi nitely is questionable.

Nationwide, a well-defi ned counterterrorism strategy, which is lacking at present, would establish 

a clearer role for the police in maintaining internal security.203 Th e police and civilian intelligence 

agencies are theoretically better suited to combating terrorism than the military and ISI.204 However, 

resource constraints are crippling, including in terms of sheer manpower. For example, the fi ftyfi ve-thousand-member police force for KP equates to one policeman for every 350 km2.

205 Th is is 

despite the fact that U.S. assistance for law enforcement historically was geared disproportionately 

toward agencies operating there and in FATA. Th e funding is not insignifi cant, but it is not enough 

to address the woeful shortages among Pakistani law enforcement.206 It also pales in comparison 

with security assistance steered toward the military, which notably has sought to limit U.S. assistance 

to Pakistani law enforcement and involvement with police reform.207 Yet even if U.S. security sector 

assistance were to increase and fl ow unencumbered, foreign aid can do only so much.208

Numerous Pakistani police offi cers have died battling terrorism in service to their country and 

the communities they serve. Many others, however, do not want to do counterterrorism duty, in 

part because it can be more dangerous and less lucrative in terms of aff ording opportunities for 

corruption. Nor do they wish to attend local training programs because doing so may connote 

Resource constraints are 

crippling, including in terms 

of sheer manpower.
32

PEACEWORKS 89

that an offi cer is not essential for day-to-day operations.209 Most police remain poorly trained, 

especially when it comes to collecting evidence and forensic analysis. Th e police often fail to secure 

crime scenes properly and to follow custodial protocols for collected evidence, though progress 

in both areas has been made over the past decade. Forensic capabilities have improved thanks in 

part to foreign assistance and the eagerness of some Pakistani police offi cers to receive it, but these 

eff orts remain rudimentary. Moreover, crime scenes can be spoiled before the police even arrive 

because the intelligence agencies (IB, MI, and ISI) often take charge even though they are not 

tasked with investigations. Th ese entities are not sensitive about preserving crime scenes and 

collecting forensic evidence, which hampers police investigations as well as criminal prosecutions.210 However, as noted, police offi cers often fail to collect and preserve evidence appropriately 

as well. Meanwhile, the police typically investigate cases without guidance from prosecutors, who 

are also subject to poor working conditions. Th ey often lack offi ces, let alone legal resources such as 

an archive of previous rulings, and at times have experienced signifi cant salary delays.211

Pakistan’s parliament recently passed the Investigation for Fair Trial Bill, granting the government the right to eavesdrop on the electronic communications of suspected terrorists and outlining the process, including the need for judicial warrants, for doing so. Th is measure allows the 

ISI, the three military service intelligence agencies, the IB, and the police to tap phone calls, text 

messages, emails, and other Internet communication. Such surveillance is now also admissible in 

court.212 However, although the legal right exists, not all police departments have the necessary technology. Some also lack the capability to track a militant through his mobile phone or even to retrieve 

deleted data from recovered mobile phones. Th ey are similarly at a loss with recovered computers that 

often contain troves of data that go undiscovered.213 Th e IB can trace and monitor calls. In terms of 

technological tools and the expertise to use those tools, however, the IB still lags far behind the ISI, 

on which it is sometimes forced to rely for assistance.214 Th e police and civilian intelligence agencies 

also lack access to other technologies and the skills to use them.215 For example, police departments 

do not have software to conduct data analysis or enough personnel with experience in information 

technology forensics.216 Th e United States has been reticent to proff er too much in the way of technical 

kit to civilian law enforcement and intelligence.217 First, because spending priorities have been dictated 

primarily by a continued focus on Afghanistan and FATA, and second, because of concerns about 

enabling reliance on technical tools that could be used for harassment.218

Pakistan’s inability to pay for necessary improvements does not help. However, the absence of 

police reform should not be tied too closely to state resources. Broader systemic defi ciencies exist. 

Th e police are not only underresourced, underpaid, poorly trained, and poorly managed.219 Th ey 

are also overpoliticized and consistently perceived to be the most corrupt institution in the country, 

according to Transparency International’s National Corruption Perception Survey.220 Before turning to an investigation of these defi ciencies, however, it is important to note that some enterprising 

members of the Police Service of Pakistan, many of whom have served in UN police missions or 

studied in U.S. and European universities, are seeking to off set capacity shortfalls by improving 

police-community relations. Th is approach is consistent with eff orts by other police forces around 

the world engaged in stability operations.221

Systemic Deficiencies

Th e current police structure was created under British colonial rule and modeled on the Royal 

Irish Constabulary, whose focus was to control the population, not to protect or serve it. Th e 

Police Act of 1861 that put this structure in place was superseded by the Police Order 2002 

(hereafter, the Order), which sought to rectify “the misuse of authority, the arbitrary use of power, 
33

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

political interference in police operations and administration, the lack of service orientation, 

corruption, misbehavior, and the ineff ective command and control of the police forces.”222

To do so, it created public safety commissions at the district, provincial, and national levels to 

replace political control with institutional control of the police. Th e aim was to provide operational 

autonomy and thus liberate the police from political interference and to make the police accountable 

to external institutions.223

However, although promulgated in 2002, ten years later the Order has yet to be implemented 

fully. Th e Musharraf regime and its political allies stripped it of many progressive reforms, passing 

amendments that ensured the institutionalization of political interference with the police, which 

accelerated under civilian regimes in the 1990s, remained extant.224 Th is interference begins with 

the hiring process. For example, according to the inspector general of the Sindh police, more 

than 40 percent of Karachi’s police force was recruited for political reasons.225 Staffi ng issues are 

also politicized. Although additional revenue would help with hiring more offi cers, one reason 

departments are understaff ed is because many offi cers are detailed for political rather than police 

duties. At their most benign, these include special security assignments such as protecting or 

otherwise assisting government offi cials. However, as Afzal Ali Shigri, a former director general 

of the National Police Bureau, explained in an essay on police corruption and accountability,

In the name of political expediency, successive Pakistani governments have used the police 

as a tool to suppress political opposition, while military rulers have used the police to stifle 

dissent....Command-level officers are often chosen on the basis of their willingness to 

comply with illegal orders, flout the law, or harass political opponents.226

Th e IB, which has had a separate CT wing since 9/11, and the Federal Investigative Agency 

(FIA), which established the Special Investigation Group to investigate terrorism cases, have also 

been susceptible to politicization and manipulation. Th e IB is tasked for domestic intelligence and 

should play a central role in the country’s counterterrorism eff orts. Th e agency can be eff ective as 

evidenced by its successes against organized crime in Karachi during the 1990s. As with the police, 

though, the IB has been used for political surveillance and as an instrument of censorship.227 Th e 

agency as a whole has been sidelined thanks to ineff ective leadership and years of misuse as a political 

instrument. Under elected civilian governments, either a serving police offi cer or retired military offi -

cer may be appointed as the IB director. During military rule, though, the position was almost always 

given to a serving army offi cer. Th is reduced the IB’s independence from the military and hence its 

effi cacy under civilian rule.228 Th us, the IB was a powerful and eff ective player during the Musharraf 

regime when Brigadier Ijaz Shah, who was close to President Musharraf, helmed the agency. Th ose 

installed by the civilian government after 2008, however, have been overshadowed by the military 

intelligence services. Th is naturally reduces the IB’s eff ectiveness, which is further hindered by a lack 

of suffi cient resources, entrenched professionalism, and morale.229

Various politicians have misused the FIA since its creation in 1975. Th is practice increased 

during the 1990s, and the civilian government “defanged” the FIA in 1997.230 Th e Musharraf 

regime marginalized it further by establishing the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), whose 

role as an accountability mechanism was a direct challenge to the FIA.231 Although some functions 

transferred to the NAB have since been restored to the FIA following the election of a civilian 

government in 2008, it has yet to recover. By the end of the 2000s, the FIA had become a way station 

for a series of offi cials, some corrupt, who were installed and replaced at the whim of their political 

patrons.232 Overall, it has had thirty directors since it was established in 1974.

Th e corruption and politicization of law enforcement and civilian agencies naturally mars the 

prosecution of suspected criminals and terrorists.233 Th e Order offi cially transferred administrative 

control of prosecution powers from the police to law departments in all of the provinces. SeparatThe FIA had become a 

way station for a series 

of offi cials, some corrupt, 

who were installed and 

replaced at the whim of their 

political patrons....It has had 

thirty directors since it was 

established in 1974.
34

PEACEWORKS 89

ing prosecution from the police force was intended to give prosecutors supervisory powers over 

police investigations. However, this supervision rarely occurs in reality. Prosecutors are typically 

only brought to a case after an arrest has been made and the detainee is coming up for trial. Th e 

resultant lack of coordination that persists between the police and prosecutors seriously hinders 

the pursuit of convictions in terrorism-related cases.234 Further, poor training, corruption, politicization, and the capacity shortfalls discussed earlier translate into errors and omissions during the 

registration of cases, the falsifi cation of evidence, and the use of torture during interrogations. Th is 

understandably reduces the rate of successful prosecutions. Technical defi ciencies in the law itself 

compound the problem.

Th eoretically, most militants arrested for involvement in terrorist activities in Pakistan should 

be booked under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 and tried in the antiterrorism courts that legislation established and imbued with special powers. In early March 2013, the National Assembly 

approved the Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) bill 2013 with the aim of making the existing 

laws more stringent. Some of the changes are positive, such as the expansion of the term terrorism 

to include the use or threat of force against “a foreign government or population or an international organization,” and the broadening of the term terrorist organization to include any group 

owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a terrorist organization or one acting on its behalf. 

Th e new act also allowed for previous bans of militant groups to carry over to successor groups that 

reestablish themselves under new names. Likely motivated by Pakistan’s addition to the Financial 

Action Task Force blacklist, lawmakers also expanded violations regarding terrorist fi nancing, the 

defi nitions of money and property, and the writ of the authorities to seize them. Notably, they also 

made it a violation of the act to fail to take action in this last regard.235

It remains to be seen whether or how the act will be enforced, and it’s notable that the law 

may need to be reauthorized under the present government. Pakistan has never had a problem 

detaining or arresting those involved in militancy or closing and seizing property, be it a camp or 

offi ce, or taking short-term steps to infringe on fundraising. Th e issue has been convicting and 

incarcerating those arrested, keeping offi ces and camps closed, and maintaining consistent pressure on terrorist fi nancing. Moreover, a number of proscribed organizations continue to operate 

despite being legally banned in Pakistan. Indeed, interlocutors sometimes refer to these entities as 

“the banned groups” when discussing their still-robust activities. Th us, although such adjustments 

are benefi cial to the degree that they create better legal conditions for action, enforcement will 

continue to be the key challenge. Meanwhile, signifi cant infi rmities within the judicial regime 

remain unresolved.

Th e Anti-Terrorism Act does not contain safeguards to prevent authorities from abusing 

its special provisions.236 As a result, it is frequently misused. According to one count, more than 

four thousand antiterrorism cases were brought to court nationally from 2005 to 2011. A large 

majority of these were suspects with no clear ties to a terrorist organization or indications of 

terrorist intent, leading many of them to be dismissed.237 Th is taxes judicial machinery designed 

to prosecute cases relating to terrorism.238 It remains to be seen whether the newly expanded 

defi nition of terrorism and terrorists and terrorist organizations makes it more or less likely that 

antiterrorism courts are used to try those involved in kidnapping, murder, or other sensational acts 

of violence that do not constitute terrorist attacks. Again, the issues of interpretation and enforcement will be paramount. Separately, although possession and use of explosives are mentioned in 

the Anti-Terrorism Act, they are governed primarily under the 1884 Explosives Act, which has a 

low conviction rate when those explosives are used in terrorist attacks.239
35

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

Suspects tried in antiterrorism courts are also often acquitted because the judicial system is 

not capable of handling cases where prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial and forensic 

evidence as opposed to an eyewitness account.240 Yet witnesses are reluctant to testify, for good 

reason. Th e Anti-Terrorism Act allows for the protection of witnesses, judges, and prosecutors, but 

the language remains theoretical and ad hoc.241 A proper program must be put in place to provide 

the witness anonymity during the investigative phase and enable victim protection through voice 

and face distortion during trial proceedings.242 Pakistan also lacks a witness protection program 

to ensure safety beyond the confi nes of the courtroom. Th us, it is not surprising that witnesses 

often refuse to testify or become hostile to the prosecution’s case. Notably, Pakistan also lacks an 

adequate protection program for judges and prosecutors. Finally, many countries have realigned 

their organizational and legal structures since 9/11 to enable intelligence agencies tasked with 

domestic collection to present evidence in court. In Pakistan, the primary agency mandated to 

collect intelligence domestically and should be playing a greater internal security role—the IB—

cannot do so. Th is further impedes convictions. It also cuts into the argument that the IB should 

displace the ISI as the national intelligence agency responsible for counterterrorism.243

Yet the ISI is not constitutionally mandated to act as a law enforcement body and does not 

operate with any sense of legal culpability. According to Babar Sattar, an expert on the Pakistani 

legal system, the predominant role of the ISI and the military more broadly in performing internal 

security duties “largely explains the lack of convictions in terror cases.”244 ISI agents often take 

important pieces of evidence, corrupting them and the chain of custody in the process, such that 

evidence is inadmissible if a case ever gets to court. Th e ISI also commonly detains suspected 

terrorists, often to prevent an attack or extract information from them, despite having no legal 

powers of arrest. After detainees have been interrogated, and typically tortured, they are foisted 

on the police and prosecuting attorneys, who must try to make a case in court despite having no 

admissible evidence or no prior involvement in the case.245

Th e cumulative result is a paltry conviction rate, even for those militants Pakistan wants to 

take off the streets. According to one estimate, the highest conviction rate between 2005 and 

2011 for terrorism cases was 28 percent, with an annual average for those cases of barely more 

than 18 percent. When one assesses this within the context of the total number of cases sent to an 

antiterrorism court, the chances of conviction drop to roughly 14 percent. Th e average acquittal 

rate is more than double that, approximately 36 percent.246 Meanwhile, the Anti-Terrorism Act 

of 1997 does not even apply in FATA or to its residents—even if they are arrested elsewhere. 

Instead, they face justice under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, a draconian and idiosyncratic 

legal structure in which corruption is rampant.247

Poor coordination among various intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and civilian and 

military offi cials further hamper eff orts to counter militancy. ISI-CT is the ISI bureau responsible for counterterrorism eff orts in Pakistan. Because it was formed at the behest of the United 

States and funded with CIA money, however, it is perceived as an externally sponsored orphan 

within the security establishment. Th e assignment of a major general to oversee ISI-CT masks 

its weak and subordinate position within ISI-C, the wing responsible for liaising with foreign 

intelligence services. In reality, it has a limited mandate that clashes with the service’s more powerful External Security Wing (ISI-S), which is responsible for directing intelligence and security 

operations outside Pakistan and in this capacity manages the militant portfolio. As a result, in 

general, ISI-CT has been constrained and repeatedly undercut by ISI-S from its inception.248 As 

one former U.S. intelligence offi cial observed in terms of the diff erent approaches taken by ISI-S 

According to one estimate, 

the highest conviction rate 

between 2005 and 2011 

for terrorism cases was 

28 percent, with an annual 

average for those cases of 

barely more than 18 percent. 
36

PEACEWORKS 89

and ISI-C, some view the ISI as a hindrance to counterterrorism eff orts and others see it as committed to those eff orts, whereas “It’s actually both at the same time, and that’s the problem.”249

Cooperation, and even communication, among the various intelligence services and local 

law enforcement is also lacking.250 According to one former civilian CT offi cial, “the police, 

IB, FIA, ISI—each has a wealth of info, but if you ask them to brief you on the nature of 

terrorism then each will tell you something diff erent.”251 Th at many police are deputed to 

the IB can facilitate reasonable coordination between that agency and the various provincial 

police departments.252 However, some police offi cials complain that intelligence sharing 

remains lacking.253 At the same time, coordination between the IB and ISI is paltry.254 IB 

offi cers complain that intelligence sharing with the military and ISI is one way.255 In short, the 

ISI has the best intelligence but is the least likely to share it and sometimes actively undercuts 

civilian operations.256 Another former civilian CT offi cial put it bluntly: “Th e police and the 

IB, their mandate is decided by the ISI. Th is is what you can, cannot do. Th is is what you can, 

cannot have.”257

Lack of coordination in general, and specifi cally the ISI’s role in scotching intelligence sharing, is partly a result of the agency’s operational interests in preserving certain militant proxies. 

As one police offi cer lamented, “We’re familiar with the cells, but we’d prefer to go after the top 

leaders and then the cells [would] matter less, but [we] are restricted from doing so by the ISI 

and because some leaders head front organizations that the ISI protects.”258 However, the absence of interagency cooperation also occurs in a political culture where organizational dysfunction and bureaucratic turf wars are the norm. Political infi ghting between the political parties 

plays out at the federal and provincial levels and often compromises cooperation between them. 

For example, in 2010, a planned crackdown on militants in Punjab was torpedoed by political 

infi ghting between the government and the opposition.259

Th e quickly diminished status of Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Authority 

(NACTA)—launched in 2009 to coordinate CT eff orts—exemplifi es both the ISI’s unwillingness to cede power and the civilian competition for any leftover scraps. Initially NACTA was 

slated to operate under the prime minister’s offi ce and to be responsible for receiving, collating, 

and coordinating intelligence among the ISI, IB, FIA, and provincial authorities, as well as 

for preparing and coordinating a national CT strategy. Within this scope of action, NACTA 

would also conduct research and analysis, establish a national database of terrorists, and liaise 

with international entities, such as the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Tariq 

Pervez, a well-regarded former police offi cer and head of the FIA, was its fi rst director general. 

His reputation enabled him to elicit a degree of buy-in but could not overcome an institutional 

bias against intelligence sharing and a lack of military support. Although an ISI representative 

turned up for meetings, according to one observer of the process at the time, the ISI as an institution resolutely refused to share the intelligence NACTA needed to accomplish its mission.260

Civilian wrangling created additional hurdles. Th e interior minister at the time, Rehman 

Malik, engaged in a political power play and arranged for NACTA to be put under his ministry’s authority rather than the prime minister’s as initially intended. Th is made it all the more 

diffi cult to oblige the various intelligence services to cooperate. Th e IB reports to the prime 

minister’s offi ce and was reluctant to answer to an entity operating under the Interior Ministry’s 

authority.261 Th e ISI used this as an excuse for its recalcitrance, which in reality stemmed from 

an unwillingness to share intelligence with an agency that had civilian oversight.262 Amidst 

these bureaucratic hurdles, Pervez ultimately resigned in 2010 after he failed to persuade Pakistan’s civilian leadership to place NACTA under the prime minister’s offi ce.

The absence of interagency 

cooperation occurs in a

political culture where 

organizational dysfunction 

and bureaucratic turf 

wars are the norm.
37

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

Parliament fi nally passed legislation establishing NACTA in early 2013, naming the 

prime minister to chair its board of governors, which will include the heads of all civilian and 

military law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as the four provincial chief 

ministers.263 Th e interior minister will chair an executive committee that implements decisions 

taken by the board of governors.264 Th e legislation allows for a national coordinator, deputy 

national coordinator, and dedicated staff to undertake research, coordinate intelligence sharing and issue threat assessments, develop and implement action plans, and—perhaps most 

importantly—craft national counterterrorism and counterextremism strategies.265 Th e formal 

establishment of NACTA is an important step forward, though it remains to be seen whether 

it will function as eff ectively in practice as is intended on paper.

Implications for Pakistan

AUTHOR’S NOTE: Since this report went to press, the new PML-N government has drafted the 

National Counter Terrorism and Extremism Policy 2013. Th e draft policy had yet to be unveiled publicly 

at the time this report went to press. It reportedly addresses a number of the defi ciencies identifi ed in this 

report and promotes wide-ranging reforms deemed necessary to dismantle all terrorist organizations and 

networks in Pakistan. Th e precise nature many of these reforms will take and, more importantly, whether 

the government will be able to execute them remain unknown at this time. Th e introduction of such a policy 

is nevertheless a signifi cant and seemingly positive event.

Pakistan is confronting a host of crises, and most Pakistanis are not directly aff ected by 

militancy. Instead they face a dismal economy, food or water scarcity, electricity shortages and 

failing infrastructure, lack of adequate educational and employment opportunities, and lack of 

eff ective governance at the local, provincial, and national levels. However, a substantial number 

of Pakistanis are aff ected directly by militancy, and many more are indirectly aff ected. In a 

recent survey, more than 90 percent described terrorism as a major problem.266 It is impossible to 

ignore the toll the jihadist insurgency alone is taking on Pakistan, much less when one considers 

it in concert with these myriad other problems and a second insurgency in Balochistan waged 

by separatists there. Barring a cataclysmic event and despite these negative trends, extreme cases 

such as fragmentation, the breakaway of discontented provinces, or total state failure are unlikely 

in the near- to medium-term. Instead, Pakistan is likely to continue muddling through, though 

as one scholar observed, there are several kinds of muddling through, and if current trends 

continue, the country could face “more extreme and unpleasant futures.”267

Attacks by anti-state militants distract from Pakistan’s pressing problems, accelerating 

its downward trajectory. Counterintuitively, this raises the perceived costs of dismantling 

pro-state groups. Yet deferring action on these groups not only thwarts eff ective COIN/

CT eff orts, it also provides space for them to distort sensible domestic and foreign policies. 

Pakistan’s triage approach constrains its policy options, further locking the establishment into 

a reactive rather than a forward-leaning position, making it more diffi cult for the country to 

face either its geopolitical or its domestic challenges.

Th e cumulative creeping expansion of jihadist infl uence also contributes to an identity 

crisis that threatens to corrode Pakistan’s cohesion. Sectarian violence cuts particularly deep 

in this regard and threatens to draw in perpetrators who presently have no involvement in 

militancy. It strikes a sensitive nerve within the military, whose members value their institution’s nonsectarian identity. Some understandably worry about the impact of ongoing sectarian 

violence on that identity.
38

PEACEWORKS 89

Pakistan needs a national strategy to counter militancy; a legislative overhaul; better coordination among the ISI, IB, provincial police, and various other agencies involved in counterterrorism; 

and a coherent narrative against extremism. Ideally, the civilian government would take the lead 

in all of these areas. In reality, the Pakistani military still uses civilian defi ciencies to rationalize 

continued ownership over Pakistan’s internal security and foreign policies. At the same time, 

political leaders have too readily ceded control in this space and shown little initiative to tackle 

the insurgency facing Pakistan. Th e completion of its term by the PPP, the passage of amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act, Prime Minister Sharif’s stated ambition to deepen Pakistan’s 

rapprochement with India and apparent intention to address the civil-military imbalance, and the 

public recognition by military leaders of the internal security threat suggests a window for some 

improvement.

Building Civilian Leadership Capacity

Th e civilian government has made strides toward institutionalizing democracy and has begun 

involving itself in security policy. Despite fl irting with various militant entities, Pakistan’s major 

political parties do not have nearly the attachment to these groups that the army and ISI do. 

Th eir continued ascendance is therefore an important development. It is also one that should 

be accompanied by increased capability and confi dence to formulate security policy. Th e more 

credibility civilian offi cials have when it comes to this sphere, the more compelled the military 

may be to allow them to participate. Civilians have not tested the limits of their supremacy 

because of fear, lack of capability, and constant campaigning.

Eff ective civilian control over Pakistan’s foreign and defense policies will not be achieved 

quickly or easily, but the newly elected government must test its supremacy to advance that 

process. At the time of writing, Prime Minister Sharif sent strong signals that he intends to do 

just that. To succeed, his government must build intellectual and organizational capacity in this 

regard. Th e prime minister’s decision not to appoint a foreign or defense minister and instead keep 

these portfolios for himself is troublesome on two counts. To begin with, even if done with the 

best of intentions, this undercuts the long-term institution building eff ort needed. Additionally, 

transformation of the type the prime minister seems intent to pursue—on India, Afghanistan, and 

in the area of civil military relations—requires full-time managers who share his energy and vision, 

which, as one scholar noted, is “light years” ahead of the bureaucracy.268

Taking greater ownership over security matters also requires the capability to formulate 

policy, which for the civilian government means putting in place an “eff ective mechanism for 

developing a national security system.”269 For historical reasons, the major civilian parties sometimes appear averse to reforming the National Security Council. Th e Defence Committee of the 

Cabinet (DCC) is a viable alternative, but signifi cant reforms would be necessary to enable it to 

play the appropriate role.270

First, regularly scheduled meetings must be held. Th e DCC met sporadically during the 

previous government’s term, averaging only two meetings per year over fi ve years. However, even 

these numbers are misleading, given that most meetings occurred in response to a crisis.271 For 

the DCC to be eff ective, meetings must occur on a regularly scheduled basis, whether weekly, 

biweekly, or even monthly. Second, the DCC would benefi t greatly from a permanent secretariat 

that met separately from DCC principals, helped formulate policy options for these principles, 

and assisted with coordinating the execution of policy. Even in its few meetings, the DCC made 

important decisions on issues ranging from coordination between the federal and provincial 

governments and the establishment of a national crime database.272 However, there was no 
39

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

follow-up. A dedicated staff with a secretary directly answerable to the prime minister could assist 

in outlining a plan to act on high-level decisions and then help shepherd their execution.

Th e intelligence agencies also need oversight, and Pakistan could benefi t if the National 

Assembly and Senate created committees for this purpose. Members of Parliament and the committees that currently exist would benefi t from greater staff capacity as well. Finally, the National 

Assembly approved a bill giving NACTA constitutional cover, but that bill was not transmitted 

to the Senate in a timely fashion, and so the PML-N government will have to reinitiate the 

process.273 It should do so without delay. Moreover, NACTA must be equipped with the necessary fi nancial, staffi ng, and technical resources it needs to fulfi ll its mandate. Th is is particularly 

true in terms of its ability to conduct research and analysis, as well as to act as a clearing house 

for intelligence, if it is to be a truly coordinating authority.

Security Is Not Divisible

Absent the decision to discard completely the rule of law and undertake an overwhelmingly extrajudicial and militarized counterterrorism policy, Pakistan cannot counter the militant threat simply 

by improving narrow counterterrorism or counterinsurgency capabilities. An eff ective response 

requires a functioning police force, civilian intelligence apparatus, and judiciary. At present, it is 

impossible for any of these groups to become profi cient in terms of the role they are meant to 

play without undertaking systematic reforms that address underlying structural issues. Doing so 

requires the intellectual wherewithal and political will to revise existing statutes.

A comprehensive list of reforms is beyond the scope of this report, though many are obvious from 

the examination of the structural barriers to countering militancy. It is also worth highlighting that 

the Asia Society issued a report in the summer of 2012 that outlined many prudent steps to reforming law enforcement and the judicial regime.274 A number of these steps involve capacity building 

and thus will require the civilian government to institute the reforms necessary to collect taxes.

Th ese reforms will mean little if they exist only on paper. In many instances, the law is the 

problem. But in other cases, the issue is enforcement. Improvements on this front will take time, 

but that is no reason to put off a necessary legislative overhaul. For the rule of law to work, 

the laws must be in place. Legislation can strengthen the structures necessary to make progress 

against militancy and provide the authorities with the tools do so, while also creating path dependency that helps speed up and maintain the process. Ultimately, much of this comes down to 

the will of those in power—civilian and military—to promote the rule of law as opposed to the 

“law of the ruler.”275

Formulating and Coordinating a Security Strategy

It has been obvious for some time that Pakistan must develop formal strategies for counterterrorism and countering extremism that account for all militants on its soil. NACTA should 

have responsibility for these functions. Th is will mean little if the strategies are not enforced. 

Th e fi rst step, though, is creating them and, in doing so, forcing decisions about whether and 

how to deal with groups whose policy is not to attack the state as well as combating those 

that are.

Any counterterrorism strategy would need to formally assign responsibilities to the army, 

ISI-CT, IB, FIA, police, and other offi cial entities for the various facets of gathering intelligence, capturing or killing those militants who threaten the state, and protecting targets 

of terrorist attacks.276 Outlining a way through which to pair governance and development 

eff orts with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism eff orts is also necessary. Any strategy 
40

PEACEWORKS 89

would need to codify how intelligence sharing and coordination among the various authorities 

responsible for counterterrorism will occur. A formal counterterrorist strategy would also 

provide a mechanism for clarifying how Pakistan intends to augment existing, but inchoate, 

deradicalization eff orts.277

Deradicalization eff orts and the need for a broader plan to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) militants are captive to broader issues. First, the Pakistani military does not want to 

disarm, demobilize, or reintegrate members of pro-state groups. So any public eff ort to conduct 

DDR will be obvious for those who are not included. Second, questions persist about what 

Pakistan could off er pro-state leaders to ameliorate that eff ect and induce disarmament and 

demobilization. For several years, some interlocutors from and close to the security establishment 

have insisted privately that at some point these actors will need to be brought into the mainstream, 

either as political parties or as pressure groups. However, to date, no group has been forced to 

choose between infl uencing Pakistan’s political discourse and engaging in terrorism. Ultimately, 

this path only works if groups are forced to make a choice. If they are, unpalatable as it may be, 

this avenue cannot be dismissed and should be explored. Th ird, and relatedly, is the issue of negotiations with the TTP where the newly elected government and military appear divided.

As discussed, the PML-N and PTI, which now lead the federal government and provincial 

government in KP respectively, both favor initiating talks. Th e military is opposed. Th e unwillingness 

of TTP leaders to part with their maximalist agenda should raise concerns about opening negotiations 

with them. Insurgencies often end with a political settlement. However, previous peace deals 

have not only failed but also yielded more space to militants challenging the writ of the state. 

Unless the state is prepared to cede ground, however, the TTP will need to be weakened for 

negotiations to eventuate in a lasting solution. At the same time, the state might consider codifying deals in geographic areas where it has success. It also should develop a plan for disarming, 

demobilizing, and reintegrating fi ghters that can be implemented whenever a political solution 

is reached.

Developing a counternarrative is fundamental to any strategy for countering violent extremism; a broader threat that includes attacks experts would not qualify as terrorism. Th e need 

to articulate a vision of Islam’s place in society, the content of that debate, and its impact on 

everything from legislation to school curriculum is beyond the scope of this report. It is worth 

highlighting, however, that any successful counter narrative invariably would include a public defense of all Pakistani citizens’ regardless of their sectarian affi liation. As General Kayani 

asserted in the summer of 2012, extremism amounts to attempting to impose one’s opinion on 

others, and terrorism is doing so using a gun. “If this is the correct defi nition of extremism and 

terrorism,” Kayani said, “then the war against it is our own war, and a just war too.”278 Building 

on these themes could provide Pakistani leaders with a powerful mantra, but to be successful, 

such a narrative would need to be wielded consistently and faithfully applied to all militant 

groups on Pakistan’s soil. It is also worth noting that shelving the “foreign hand” talking point 

publicly as well as privately would be an important step forward. Additionally, the state should 

not shy away from highlighting the religious ignorance and fi nancial opportunism that characterizes many of the militants on its soil.

Finally, Pakistan is only likely to make serious progress against all of the militants on its 

soil if its civilian and military elites are united in the objective of doing so. Th e War Directive, 

for example, outlines the military’s force structure, war objectives, and capabilities needed 

to achieve those objectives. It is intended to be a live document but has not been updated 

despite the advent of the jihadist insurgency Pakistan now confronts. Updating it to refl ect the 
41

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

country’s internal security challenges and outlining a way to address them would indicate a more 

comprehensive shift than has yet occurred. Th is document results from collaboration between 

the civilian government and Joint Chiefs as well as in-depth discussion by the military services 

regarding how to evolve defense strategy. As such, updating it would also signify a degree of 

coherence between the civilian government and the military that so far has been lacking.

Pakistan has already paid a high price for its attempts to counter some of the militants on its 

soil. Th e costs of sustained action against all of them could raise the costs even more in the short 

term and numerous reforms would be needed, some more easily made than others, to enable 

such eff orts. Th is makes fi nding the political will necessary for progress all the more diffi cult, 

and all the more essential. In the long run, the costs of inaction or half measures are almost certain to be higher. As one high-ranking offi cial lamented, “We keep taking short cuts and getting 

the wrong results, thinking the next time we will get the right one.”279

Policy Recommendations

AUTHOR’S NOTE: Th is report recommended the resumption of the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic 

Dialogue. In late July, U.S. secretary of state John Kerry made his fi rst, long-awaited, and much 

delayed visit to Pakistan and announced it would resume. 

Pakistan is unlikely to implode, despite what doomsayers might believe. However, its security 

situation remains precarious, and the status quo—a robust militant infrastructure over which 

the army and ISI have only partial infl uence and situational awareness—means continued risk 

of both an attack by Pakistan-based militants against U.S. interests in South Asia or the U.S. 

homeland and of a crisis internally, with India or perhaps even with Afghanistan. Were any of 

these to occur, it would have signifi cant implications for the United States. Even the constant 

looming of a crisis is a drag on U.S. priorities in the region and beyond. Th e U.S. relationship 

with Pakistan is multifaceted and should not be defi ned exclusively by Pakistan’s posture toward 

Islamist militants. Th e entirety of U.S. policy toward Pakistan is beyond the scope of this report.

Th e focus here is on Islamist militancy and especially the domestic barriers to action 

against it. Th is report explores these endogenous obstacles not because they trump the geopolitical utility some groups off er but because they are often underexplored. It should be 

clear that the two are interconnected. Pakistan does not support some militants in spite of 

its domestic jihadist insurgency. Rather the perceptions of the internal jihadist threat and its 

ability to counter them inform Pakistan’s calculus for supporting some groups and neglecting 

to deal with others.

U.S. policymakers have twisted themselves in knots trying to convince or compel the Pakistani 

security establishment to dismantle the militant infrastructure on its soil. Attempts to transition 

from a transactional to a strategic partnership raised unrealistic expectations for progress given the 

volatile environment, which became obvious when Pakistan’s ongoing support for militant proxies, 

on one side, and U.S. actions including the Raymond Davis episode, bin Laden raid, and Salala 

incident, on the other, contributed to the annus horribilis of 2011.

It is therefore understandable that some should look for signs of hope that Pakistan’s 

expansion of its security aperture to include internal threats constitutes a policy shift. Th ose 

who are tired of being burned refuse to entertain the notion that any evolution is possible and 

that the bilateral relationship will crater again. Discerning Pakistan’s intentions is diffi cult. It 

is not a unitary actor and a range of opinions about how to handle the militant milieu exist 

even within the security establishment.

U.S. policymakers have 

twisted themselves in 

knots trying to convince 

or compel the Pakistani 

security establishment 

to dismantle the militant 

infrastructure on its soil.
42

PEACEWORKS 89

Th e United States should avoid mistaking tactical Pakistani decisions for signs of a strategic 

shift. At the same time, policymakers must be open to the possibility that under the right conditions tactical moves could develop momentum toward meaningful change. For example, when 

the Musharraf regime began reining in India-centric groups fi ghting in Kashmir, it kept them 

in reserve for possible redeployment in that theater. Recent attacks across the Line of Control 

suggest that still may be the case, but Pakistan’s decision to rein in its proxies created space 

for Kashmir to pacify, and reigniting the jihad there could prove diffi cult. Similarly, it would 

be signifi cant if Pakistan created a national security policy that included a signifi cant internal 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism component as well as delineated objectives for dealing 

with the jihadist threat.

However, the fundamentals of militant-state interaction are unlikely to change radically in 

the near term. Th e United States should refocus its eff orts on facilitating the creation of internal 

conditions for action against militancy that could fructify down the road, not on attempting to 

force strategic steps that Pakistan is not yet ready or able to take on. U.S. ambitions, and hence 

its eff orts, on this front must be humble as well. Creating the internal conditions for sustainable 

progress against militancy is contingent upon Pakistan remedying its signifi cant structural and 

systemic infi rmities, many of which are outlined in this report. Th ese are some of the areas in 

which Pakistani leaders—civilian and military—must “do more,” and the United States should 

encourage, enable, and compel them to take action. Washington can facilitate or choose not to 

facilitate a spectrum of positive or negative outcomes at the bilateral and international levels. 

However, there is only so much Washington can do to infl uence Pakistan decision makers, and 

so it must plan, engage, and provide assistance accordingly.

Th e United States never demanded transformation, but any such window has closed. It 

also never exhibited the patience and fortitude necessary for fostering strategic change. When 

tough choices have to be made, Washington’s priority has been killing al-Qaeda and countering 

Pakistan-based insurgents fi ghting in Afghanistan. Th e latter is becoming less of a priority as the 

United States prepares to draw down, but Washington remains intent on making as much 

progress as possible on both fronts in the interim. Th is makes sense. Th e United States invaded 

Afghanistan and reforged its relationship with Pakistan expressly to destroy the central al-Qaeda 

organization. Finishing that job is important. However, with the drawdown looming, al-Qaeda 

Central weakened, and the bilateral relationship with Pakistan improving, Washington must begin 

reorienting its policies to enable a level of sustained and focused engagement. Its overall approach 

should be geared toward maximizing tactical convergence on narrow security issues and remaining 

prepared to engage in crisis management should the need arise, while also exploiting opportunities to 

reinforce positive structural change within Pakistan when possible.

Revise the U.S. counterterrorism architecture for South Asia in line with the decreasing 

threat from al-Qaeda and growing potential for regional attacks against U.S. interests and 

regional instability after 2014.

Al-Qaeda Central’s capability to strike the homeland is severely degraded. It cannot be 

ignored, nor can other Pakistani actors with the capabilities or intent to launch transnational 

attacks. However, the greater direct threat is that of attacks against U.S. or other Western interests 

in the region by Pakistani groups acting unilaterally or in concert with one another or al-Qaeda 

Central.280 Ongoing and possibly increased regional instability resulting from the insurgency in 

Pakistan, the potential durability of cross-border jihadist violence between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the agitation from India-centric groups for escalating attacks to the east are more 

abstract but could have signifi cant ramifi cations for the United States as well.
43

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

Targeting and resource allocation must be realigned away from al-Qaeda Central, especially 

intelligence offi cers and analysts whose expertise will be essential to identifying emerging and 

evolving jihadist threats in the region.

In terms of intelligence collection and analysis, the United States should seek to expand 

cooperation with Pakistan to include a greater focus on anti-state entities such as the TTP 

and sectarian groups. Th ese pose the most immediate danger to Pakistan but could threaten 

the United States as well and, thus, present the best opportunity for operational convergence. 

Barring a resurgent al-Qaeda, the drawdown could create space for Washington to increase 

pressure on Pakistan to identify, arrest, and extradite any Westerners training or attempting to 

train with LeT. Because Washington should not expect signifi cantly expanded cooperation vis-àvis LeT, U.S. authorities should continue to focus on counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence 

sharing with Afghan-istan, India, and Bangladesh, as well as allies in the Gulf, to confront terrorist 

networks in Pakistan’s near abroad.

In terms of targeting, the residual U.S. force in Afghanistan should continue to focus primarily 

on actors that pose a transnational or regional threat to U.S. interests or a qualitatively signifi cant 

threat to the Afghan government. However, the presence of anti-Pakistan militants in Afghanistan and the possibility for escalating cross-border jihadist violence means that U.S. and NATO 

offi cials will need to contend with whether to target them as well. Doing so could help reduce 

the threat to Pakistan’s internal stability and possibly help defuse regional tensions. Th ere is no 

guarantee such a payoff would accrue. More tangibly, it might provide a means for transactional 

targeting—that is, the United States removes anti-Pakistani militants from the Afghan battlefi eld 

in exchange for assistance capturing, killing, or otherwise curtailing militants of signifi cant concern 

to the United States in Pakistan. Th is would mean sparing scant resources and requiring a buy-in 

from the host government in Kabul, but it should at least factor in the broader U.S. defense and 

foreign policy planning in the lead-up to 2014.

President Obama has pledged to continue using drone strikes against high value al-Qaeda 

targets and forces massing to support attacks on coalition forces through the end of 2014 and 

left open the possibility to continue using unmanned strikes in the region thereafter.281 Prime 

Minister Sharif has declared an end to the policy of publicly opposing and privately condoning 

drone strikes.282 Th e United States should not abandon the option of drone strikes but should 

restrict their use to identifi able targets whose death will have a signifi cant qualitative impact on 

the direct threat to American lives. With the exception of a select group of obvious high value 

al-Qaeda targets, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, all strikes should be executed in coordination 

with U.S. diplomats in Pakistan attuned to their aff ect on the broader political and security 

environment. Washington should be able to make its case to the Pakistani public for each and 

every strike it conducts.

Take steps to boost the capabilities and confi dence of the new civilian government and improve 

understanding of the security threat at the local, provincial, and federal levels.

Washington tried to encourage civilian growth following the end of the Musharraf regime. 

Th ese eff orts did not produce the intended outcomes, primarily because of pushback from the 

military, disinterest on the part of civilian offi cials, and impatience in Washington, where the focus 

remained narrowly scoped on eliminating al-Qaeda and salvaging Afghanistan. With al-Qaeda 

seriously degraded, U.S. troops drawing down in Afghanistan, and a newly elected government 

taking offi ce in Pakistan, the time may be ripe for another attempt. Prime Minister Sharif has 

stated his desire to deepen Pakistan’s rapprochement with India and appears intent on addressing 
44

PEACEWORKS 89

the civil-military imbalance. However, he has also come out strongly against U.S. drone strikes 

and is in favor of negotiating with the TTP, and his party has exhibited a willingness to accommodate groups like SSP and JuD in Punjab. Th us, any approaches must be managed carefully.

Washington should resume the Strategic Dialogue with the new civilian government to 

address Pakistan’s security priorities. For that process to be benefi cial, the United States must 

decide what it needs most from the relationship. Any vision for the relationship must be 

grounded in achievable objectives and the costs the United States is prepared to bear in pursuit 

of those objectives. Th is vision should include how to avoid being thrown off by the short-term 

crises that are almost certain to eventuate.

Th e United States should also seek other ways to boost the capabilities of civilian offi cials 

to play a role in security matters. For example, it might continue to fund projects such as the 

Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services, assist with the creation of a permanent secretariat 

for the DCC, invest in NACTA, and encourage as well as support eff orts to create intelligence 

oversight committees in Parliament.283 In those areas where direct U.S. assistance could impair 

the effi cacy of such institutions, Washington should encourage others to invest in them. Building 

civilian capacity to write laws and off ering to facilitate technical assistance in this area is particularly important given the need to reform the legal regime as outlined in this report.

Spread security sector assistance more evenly throughout the country, redirect it to include 

areas where Pakistan has demonstrated profi ciency or a pressing need, and calibrate it based 

on Pakistan’s progress addressing its myriad structural defi ciencies.

Pakistan’s civilian security sector, defi ned here as its criminal justice sector and civilian 

intelligence agencies, is hampered by serious systemic infi rmities. Th ese weaknesses limit the 

positive aff ect of security sector assistance. Despite the pressing need, the United States cannot be 

expected to consider signifi cant funding increases unless and until these are addressed. However, 

current assistance could be modestly realigned.

U.S. security sector assistance has been dedicated primarily to stabilization eff orts and secondarily to improving bilateral cooperation on law enforcement. A disproportionate amount of 

assistance has gone to KP and FATA, according to U.S. offi cials, and most of it is used for infrastructure and equipment to enhance operational capabilities on the ground. Th e FY2014 budget 

request for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, which distributes much of 

the security sector assistance, also earmarks limited funds used to strengthen Pakistan’s criminal 

justice sector by training police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections offi cials. Th e request lists a 

plethora of training programs.284 U.S. offi cials confi rm that limited technical assistance, such as 

providing database software and training, is also being provided to a small number of cities. Th is 

aid is in addition to a small amount of antiterrorism assistance.285

According to U.S. offi cials, a signifi cant portion of funding will remain dedicated to Pakistan’s frontier and used for equipment and infrastructure assistance. Stabilization eff orts remain 

important. Law enforcement must be able to hold territory that the military has cleared, and 

ideally, any response to threats should begin with local police action and only escalate to military 

action if necessary. However, the ability of militants to project power outside the frontier and 

into the heartland of Pakistan is a signifi cant barrier to actions against them. Th e current allocation of resources leaves only a modest amount of money for a wide range of eff orts outside 

the frontier.

U.S. policymakers should consider several questions regarding the apportionment of security 

sector assistance. First, is Washington leveraging the full extent of its nonmonetary capabilities in 
45

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

providing assistance for stabilization eff orts in the frontier? And can Pakistan enhance infrastructure and purchase nonspecialty equipment using its own tax revenue? Th e answers might inform 

a decision to distribute assistance more evenly throughout the country. Second, given the myriad 

defi ciencies in Pakistan’s criminal justice system, is spreading an already small amount of money 

across an array of eff orts (worthwhile though each may be) the most sensible way to apportion 

assistance? Might the United States have a greater impact by acting as a force multiplier in fewer 

functional areas where Pakistan is already demonstrating profi ciency or has a discrete and pressing need?286 In short, U.S. policymakers should consider expanding security sector assistance 

geographically and scoping it more narrowly in terms of functional areas.

Washington should also make supporting NACTA a priority. Th e new PML-N government 

envisions NACTA as the cornerstone of its counterterrorism eff orts, but it has yet to create an 

implementation plan for NACTA. Washington should seek ways to assist with developing such 

a plan, including arranging technical assistance by and exchanges with the U.S. NCTC. NACTA 

will require resources as well, and Washington should augment or reorient assistance to provide 

such support. In addition, it should consider providing technical and monetary support for the 

creation of fusion centers in key Pakistani cities to encourage interagency cooperation.

Separately, assistance that necessitates in-country training can be hampered by visa delays, a 

constraint many U.S. offi cials recognize. One approach is pursuing assistance that requires a minimum 

number of trainers, but trade-off s must be made in terms of Pakistan’s needs and demonstrated profi -

ciency. If trainers must be sent, then deploying the same people rather than repeatedly cycling in new 

trainers could reduce visa delays. Washington might also consider increasing eff orts to improve police 

academy training and curriculum as a means by which to indigenize at least some of the eff ort.

Finally, the United States might consider replicating the Entrepreneurship Program, which 

provides matching funds for business development, on a small scale for security sector assistance. 

Providing small matching grants to provincial police departments for indigenous projects, such as 

infrastructure enhancements, could build cooperation, encourage buy-in, and help Washington 

get a little more bang for its buck.287

Maintain a military-to-military relationship and make military assistance transactional—

that is, provided in return for assistance or progress in clearly identifi ed areas, or focused on 

areas of convergence. 288

Attempts to pit the military against the civilian government or otherwise isolate it are likely 

to fail and, in the process, reduce U.S. infl uence in Pakistan. History also illustrates that inducements in the form of lavish assistance are unlikely to lead the military to sever its ties with pro-state 

militant groups. Th at does not mean, though, that the continued provision of limited and carefully 

scoped military assistance is without benefi t. First, Pakistan faces a domestic jihadist insurgency 

that could have a destabilizing aff ect on the country.289 Some of the anti-state actors attacking Pakistan also threaten the United States, providing an area of convergence. Second, although military 

aid does not bring the level of leverage Washington might want, it still provides infl uence that the 

United States otherwise would not have.290 Th ird, and relatedly, exchange and U.S.-based training 

programs are an important way to foster an ongoing military-to-military relationship.

Most assistance should remain conditional, but a more sophisticated and transparent set of 

benchmarks is needed. Under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009, 

the secretary of state is required to certify that Pakistan is cooperating with the United States on 

issues such as counterterrorism and nonproliferation but can cite national security provisions to 

waive this certifi cation requirement. Th is renders the process almost meaningless.
46

PEACEWORKS 89

Four fl aws exist: First, counterterrorism benchmarks outlined in the EPPA are unrealistic 

because they do not account for the range of options in terms of Pakistan’s behavior, the likely 

transient nature of the actions it can take, the complexity of challenges facing the country, or the 

vagaries of military and ISI situational awareness of and infl uence over diff erent groups.291 Second, 

funds requested may focus heavily on counterterrorism assistance, but counterterrorism is often 

broadly defi ned, weapons can have a dual-use, and metrics to ensure proper use are sometimes 

lacking.292 Th ird, military assistance used to achieve transactional objectives do not always align 

with the outlined benchmarks. Fourth, specifi c assistance is not always tied to specifi c objectives or 

metrics. A more sensible approach might be to create three separate streams.

Th e fi rst stream would not be conditional and would be used for funding training and 

exchange programs. A second would be used for transactional purposes and provide assistance 

in exchange for deliverables important to the United States and which is conditional on the secretary of state’s certifi cation of broad cooperation.293 A third stream would both provide 

counterterrorism assistance through a narrower scope and channeled toward areas where progress 

is measurable, an area where Pakistan has a discrete and pressing need and, preferably, an area 

where Pakistan already has demonstrated profi ciency—thus enabling the United States to act as a 

force multiplier.294 U.S. policymakers, in consultation with the intelligence community and outside 

experts, should develop a transparent set of metrics for more realistic and realizable short-term, 

tactical, but verifi able action on counterterrorism against anti-state and pro-state groups to inform 

this third stream.

Formulate a plan for how to respond if Pakistan does attempt to transition some pro-state 

militants toward politics.

Unpalatable though it might be, the creation of a glide path, by which some groups and their 

aboveground organizations transition to legitimate political and religious parties, might be part 

of the process were Pakistan’s leaders to attempt dismantling the militant infrastructure. However, 

the aim must be involvement in politics as part of a real transition away from militancy and not 

simply the election of members from an armed faction to Parliament. As of 2013, there are no 

indications that the involvement of militant leaders in politics is part of any organized plan to 

demobilize their organizations. U.S. policymakers should voice quiet disapproval of the state’s 

allowing militant leaders to participate in politics without having to give up the gun.

Were Pakistani offi cials to present a plan by which a glide path was created from militancy 

to mainstream religious, social, and political involvement, Washington should be prepared to 

consider off ering support. Given the initial risks involved in such a course, it is likely that any 

such plan might be covert in development. In that event, U.S. assistance would need to be as well. 

Th is might include inducements to Pakistan, coordinated messaging for how to respond to the 

mainstreaming of militant leaders, and acting as an intermediary with New Delhi and Kabul, 

especially given that militant splinter groups might increase the tempo of attacks to spoil any 

process to mainstream their organizations. At the same time, planners in Washington would be 

wise to think through how this process could impact Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policies, 

what this would mean for U.S. equities in the region, and how to navigate accordingly.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s newly elected government has sent promising signals about rectifying the civil-military imbalance and pursuing better relations with the country’s neighbors. Th e security establishment is becoming attuned to the internal security threat from Islamist militancy. Pakistan’s 
47

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

rulers, however, lack clarity on how to combat the threat. Th e unity of eff ort necessary will prove 

elusive as long as powerful elements in the Pakistan military and ISI are committed to the use 

of militant Islamist proxies for strategic purposes. As this report illustrates, though this practice 

remains the single greatest barrier to stabilizing the internal front, it is far from the only barrier. 

Th e myriad obstacles to countering militancy have become self-reinforcing. Breaking the cycle 

could take at least a generation. Th e United States will need to practice patience while preparing 

for the many contingencies that could result. Pakistan’s leaders would serve their people best by 

exhibiting greater urgency in countering the internal militant threat and creating the conditions 

for dismantling the militant infrastructure on their soil.
48

PEACEWORKS 89

Notes

1. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, “COAS Speech Azadi Parade – 2012,” Inter Services Public Relations Press 

Release, August 14, 2012.

2. “Pakistan Army Sees ‘internal threats’ as Greatest Security Risk,” Dawn, January 2, 2013.

3. I am grateful to Shuja Nawaz for his insights on the process through which the Green Book is formulated.

4. Daniel Sagalyn, “Kabul’s Unlikely New Ally,” Foreign Policy, May 1, 2013

5. Quote blaming external enemies from General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, “COAS Address on the Eve of Yaume-Shuhadda – 2013,” Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, April 30, 2013. Quote warning the military 

is prepared to respond to external threats from General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, “Chief of Army Staff Addresses 

President’s Parade,” Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, April 20, 2013.

6. For some of those who have commanded troops in the FATA, the only good jihadi is a dead jihadi.

7. For more on path dependence, see Margaret Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in 

Comparative and Historical Analysis,” in Comparative Politics, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. 

Zuckerman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

8. Adherents to Barelvi Islam also follow the Hanafi school of thought. They historically constituted the largest 

Sunni bloc, but no reliable recent census data is available to confirm if this remains the case or to determine 

their percentage of the population relative to other schools of thought within Sunni Islam. 

9. The two briefly reunited to form Harkat-ul-Ansar (Movement of Partisans or HuA) and then separated again.

10. Salafis adhere to a strict interpretation of the Quran and Hadith and reject the various schools of Islamic 

jurisprudence and the learned men who interpreted them. They believe Muslims must return to a pure form of 

Islam and advocate emulating the Prophet and his Companions in all areas of life.

11. C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qaeda and Other Organizations,” 

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2004); Stephen Tankel, Storming the World Stage: The Story 

of Lashkar-e-Taiba (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2011), pp. 108–10; Mariam Abou Zahab, “I Shall be Waiting 

for You at the Door of Paradise: The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba,” in The Practice of War, ed. 

Aparna Rao, Michael Bollig, and Monika Böck (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), p. 142.

12. This is not an exhaustive list and accounts only for the largest groups extant prior to 9/11. Numerous smaller 

groups existed as well, as did front organizations and splinter groups in the Kashmir theatre. Nevertheless, 

before 9/11, these entities constituted the major Punjabi organizations.

13. Joshua White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier

(Arlington, VA: Institute for Global Engagement, 2008), p. 35.

14. This was in addition to support for indigenous Kashmiri groups, most notably Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Numerous 

works have detailed the involvement of indigenous and Pakistani militants in the Kashmir conflict and Pakistan’s 

support for them. See, for example, Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 2003); Alexander Evans, “The Kashmir Insurgency: As Bad As It Gets,” Small Wars and 

Insurgencies 11, no. 1 (Spring 2000); Alexandar Evans,“Kashmir: The Past Ten Years,” Asian Affairs 30, no. 1 (1999); 

Šumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Šumit Ganguly, Conflict 

Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Šumit Ganguly and 

Paul Kapur, “The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia,” International Security 37, no. 1 

(Summer 2012); Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, 2005); Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam

(New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007); Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (Brooklyn, NY: 

Melville House, 2009); Amir Mir, The True Face of Jihadis (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004); Mohammad Amir 

Rana, Jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2002); Tankel, Storming the World Stage.

15. For in-depth examinations of the rise of sectarian militant groups, see, for example, S.V.R Nasr, “Islam, The 

State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan” in Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation, ed. 

Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Zed Books, 2004); Mariam Abou Zahab, “The Regional Dimension of 

Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation; Khaled Ahmed, Sectarian War: 

Pakistan’s Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

16. Mariam Abou Zahab, “Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban: The Jihadi-Sectarian Nexus,” in Contextualising Jihadi 

Thought, ed. Jeevan Deol and Zaheer Kazmi (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2011), p. 370.

17. This included training in territory under Taliban control, where the ISI moved camps for those Deobandi groups 

focused on Kashmir once the Taliban came to power, and contributing cadre to fight alongside Taliban soldiers 

against the Northern Alliance. In addition to training in Taliban-controlled territory and providing foot soldiers 

for the movement, some Deobandi militant leaders served in the Taliban administration and others had offices 

in Kandahar. Notably, the Ahl-e-Hadith LeT relocated its primary training infrastructure from Afghanistan to 

Pakistan-administered Kashmir, neighboring Mansehra, and elsewhere in Pakistan after the Taliban took 

power. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final 

Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 

157; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (Oxford: Pan Books, 2000) p. 92; Tankel, Storming the World Stage, pp. 106–10; 

Zahab, “The Regional Dimension,” pp. 120–21.
49

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

18. Before contributing to the Taliban’s efforts, TNSM fomented an insurrection in Malakand Division in a bid 

to institute sharia there in 1994. The Pakistan military squashed the uprising after which Sufi Mohammad 

turned his attention to supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (New 

York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 465.

19. Don Rassler and Vahid Brown, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa’ida (West Point, NY: Combating 

Terrorism Center, 2011), p. 37.

20. The appellation was first used in 2006. Ibid., p. 1, n. 2.

21. Thousands of students from Deobandi madaris (often tied to JUI) in Pakistan, many of who belonged to various 

Pashtun tribes that straddled the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, took leave to fight on behalf of the Taliban. 

Rashid, Taliban, pp. 90–91.

22. President Pervez Musharraf, “President [sic] Address to the Nation,” September 19, 2001, http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2006/07/13/address-19-september-2001/.

23. Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,” Report no. 57 

(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, September 2006).

24. Pakistan jailed TNSM leader Sufi Muhammad for sending thousands of volunteers across the border to fight 

the U.S. invasion but also allowed many of these and other volunteers to flood into Afghanistan.

25. Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda (New York: Three 

Rivers Press, 2005), p. 305.

26. After 9/11, the ISI advised Mullah Mohammad Omar, head of the Taliban government, to find a safe haven 

and later provided him one in Pakistan. Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, ed. Alex Strick van 

Linschoten and Felix Kuehn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 152.

27. “Pakistani Television Airs Musharraf’s Taped Address,” CNN, January 12, 2002; “Pakistani President Bans 

Islamic Militant Groups,” CNN, January 12, 2002. On the influence of U.S. pressure and Pakistan’s desire 

to avoid war with India on the decision to institute the bans, see Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 115; 

Nayak and Krepon, “US Crisis Management.”

28. LeT became Pasban-e-Ahl-e-Hadith, and its aboveground wing Markaz-al-Dawa-wal-Irshad became 

Jamaat-ul-Dawa. Jaish-e-Mohammed renamed itself Khuddam ul-Islam. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen changed its 

name to Jamiat ul-Ansar. On ISI encouragement to reconstitute themselves under new names, see, for example, 

Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos (London: Penguin, 2008), p. 147.

29. Today SSP is known as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, which was banned in March 2012 but continues to 

operate. 

30. Ashley J. Tellis, Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance (Washington, DC: 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008); Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban 

Network,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 4, April 2009; Mohammad Amir Rana, “Structural Violence,” Dawn, January 

14, 2012; Huma Yusuf, “Sectarian Scourge,” Dawn, January 30, 2012.

31. Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network.”

32. Peter Bergen, Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad (New York: Random House, 

2012), Kindle edition, loc. 1040–1045. Regarding the decline, see Seth Jones, “The Future of al-Qa’ida,” 

Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation and Trade, Washington, DC, May 24, 2011. 

33. Although several top al-Qaeda operatives were captured in Pakistan’s cities in the first few years following 9/11, 

many of its lower ranks, as well as those who had trained in its camps, sought sanctuary in South Waziristan. 

On al-Qaeda’s arrival in South Waziristan, see Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars (London: Penguin, 2011), p. 175.

34. See M. Ilyas Khan, “Descent into Anarchy,” The Herald, March 2004; Zahid Ali Khan, Military Operations in 

FATA and PATA: Implications for Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2012).

35. For more on Pakistan’s early efforts in FATA, see Khan, Military Operations; Seth G. Jones and C. Christine 

Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).

36. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, pp. 47–48.

37. The Shakai agreement stipulated that the military would release captured militants, pay compensation to 

Pakistani tribesman for property damaged during the incursion, and also provide militants with money to 

repay their debts to al-Qaeda. In return, local militants agreed to stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan 

and to register foreign fighters. Locals denied the existence of the last clause and argued that they had not 

agreed to register all foreigners with the government. Seth G. Jones, Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al 

Qa’ida since 9/11 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012), Kindle edition, loc. 4197–4200.

38. Iqbal Khattak, “I Did Not Surrender to the Military, Said Nek Mohammad,” Friday Times, April 30–May 6, 

2004; Rahimullah Yusufzai interview with Frontline on Nek Mohammad, October 3, 2006. 

39. Mark Mazzetti, “A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood,” New York Times, April 6, 2013.

40. The terms of the North Waziristan Accord included an agreement by militants to cease attacks against the Afghan 

and Pakistani governments, stop killing pro-Pakistan tribal chiefs, and abstain from imposing a Taliban lifestyle 

on the local population. Militants did not obey these provisions.
50

PEACEWORKS 89

41. C. Christine Fair, “Why the Pakistan Army Is Here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance” International 

Affairs 87, no. 3 (May 2011).

42. C. Christine Fair, “Pakistan’s Own War On Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks,” Journal of International 

Affairs 63, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009).

43. Amir Mir, Talibanization of Pakistan: From 9/11 to 26/11 (New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2009), p. 110.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.; Zahab, “Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban,” pp. 373–74.

46. Tankel, Storming the World Stage, p. 128; on Back Channel negotiations, see Steve Coll, “The Back Channel: 

India and Pakistan’s Secret Kashmir Talks,” New Yorker, March 2, 2009.

47. Improved Indian counterinsurgency efforts, fencing along the Line of Control, and a reduced appetite for 

conflict in Indian-administered Kashmir contributed as well.

48. Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, p. 306; Mohammad Amir Rana, The Seeds of Terrorism

(London: New Millennium, 2005), p. 283; Tankel, Storming the World Stage, p. 128.

49. Tankel, Storming the World Stage, pp. 177–80; Intikhab Amir, ‘The Waiting Game,’ Herald, August 2006.

50. Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network.”

51. Ibid.; Zahab, “Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban,” pp. 373–74; Tankel, Storming the World Stage, p. 197; on Taliban 

recruitment of Pakistani fighters, see also Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalishnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban 

Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2007), pp. 34–35.

52. Most headed to Waziristan, but the sectarian groups also had a presence in Lower Kurram and Orakzai. LeT began 

reclaiming a foothold in Bajaur and Mohmand, where it had historical connections. On the sectarian groups, see 

Zahab, “Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban,” pp. 373–74. On LeT, see Tankel, Storming the World Stage, p. 197.

53. Rana Jawad, Islamabad bureau chief for Geo TV, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; Amir Mir, journalist 

with The News, interview by author, Lahore, Pakistan, July 2011; Tariq Pervez, former director general of the FIA 

and current director of the Initiative for Public Security, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; former LeT 

member, interview by author, Lahore, July 2011.

54. Imtiaz Gul, The Al Qaeda Connection: The Taliban and Terror in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas (New Delhi: Penguin, 

2009), p. 12; Nasreen Ghufran, “Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West 

Frontier Province of Pakistan” Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (November/December 2009): 1092–114; Fair, “Pakistan’s 

Own War On Terror.”

55. Hassan Abbas, “The Road to Lal Masjid and Its Aftermath,” Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 14 (July 19, 2007); 

Manjeet Pardesi, “The Battle for the Soul of Pakistan at Islamabad’s Red Mosque,” in Treading on Hallowed 

Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces, ed. C. Christine Fair and Šumit Ganguly (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 97.

56. The Ghazi brothers were released after the Minister for Religious Affairs Ijaz ul-Haq (General Zia ul-Haq’s son) 

intervened on their behalf. Pardesi, “The Battle for the Soul,” p. 98

57. Pardesi, “The Battle for the Soul,” p. 99.

58. Joshua White, “Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan: Religious Party Responses to the Lal Masjid Crisis,” Current 

Trends in Islamist Ideology 7 (2008).

59. “Hardline Pakistanis Students Kidnap Chinese Women,” ABC News, June 23, 2007.

60. “Lal Masjid cleric free Chinese,” Dawn, June 24, 2007.

61. In a November address regarding the raid that ensued, President Musharraf specifically discussed the impact 

of the hostage situation on Pakistan’s alliance with China. “President Pervez Musharraf’s address to the 

Nation,” November 3, 2007.

62. Pardesi, “The Battle for the Soul,” p. 100; White, “Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan.”

63. One of the Ghazi brothers was caught trying to escape wearing a burqa. Pardesi, “The Battle for the Soul,” p. 

103; Syed Irfan Raza, “1,100 Students Surrender,” Dawn, July 5, 2007; Mohammad Asghar and Munawer 

Azeem, “Late-Night Round,” Dawn, July 6, 2007; “Who Are These Militants?” Dawn, July 9, 2007.

64. Zahid Hussain, “The Battle for the Soul of Pakistan,” Newsline, July 2007.

65. White, “Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan.”

66. Zahab, “Pakistan and Punjabi Taliban,” p. 380.

67. Fair, “Pakistan’s Own War on Terror.”

68. First senior police official for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author, Bahawalpur, July 2011; Abbas, 

“Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network”; Zahab, “Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban,” p. 377.

69. Prominent examples include Ilyas Kashmiri and Badr Mansoor.

70. Fair, “Why the Pakistan Army is Here to Stay.”

71. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 66.

72. A copy of the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009 can be found at “Text of Pakistan’s Shari’ah Law 2009,” BBC 

Monitoring South Asia, April 14, 2009.
51

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

73. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, pp. 67, 73–74.

74. Ibid., p. 68.

75. Ibid., pp. 65–74.

76. Pakistan Security Report 2010 (Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January 2011), p. 27.

77. Notable Pakistani militants killed by U.S. drone strikes include the first TTP amir Baitullah Mehsud; leader 

of the 313 Brigade and al-Qaeda operational commander Ilyas Kashmiri; Badr Mansoor, who served as a key 

interface between al-Qaeda and other anti-state militant leaders; LeJ senior leader, Qari Mohammad Zafar; 

and TTP commander Mullah Dadullah.

78. Officer responsible for Research and Analysis within the Counterterrorism Division of the Punjab Police, 

interview by author, Lahore, July 2011; see also Pakistan Security Report 2010, pp. 3, 22; Paul Cruickshank, 

“The Militant Pipeline: Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West” (Washington, DC: 

New American Foundation, July 6, 2011). 

79. Pakistan launched Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur agency in 2008 as well.

80. For more on Pakistan’s improved capabilities, see, for example, Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgencey in Pakistan.

81. The IB is responsible for disseminating intelligence to law enforcement entities across the country. Because it has 

no formal arrest powers, the IB provides information to and makes requests from the various provincial police 

departments to arrest or detain suspects. Each provincial police department includes a criminal investigation 

department and counter terrorism branch focused on antiterrorism operations, investigation of terrorism cases, and 

intelligence collection relating to terrorism. Asad Jamal, “Police Organizations in Pakistan” (Lahore: Human 

Rights Commission of Pakistan and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Joint Report, May 2010).

82. The ISI created a CT wing at the behest of the United States, which sought an ISI entity that American and 

allied intelligence services could work with. In addition to creating a new wing with no institutional history of 

supporting militant proxies, this effort was intended to provide a partner that would adhere to human rights 

norms and as such make international cooperation easier.

83. For more on poor intelligence coordination, see, for example, Hassan Abbas, ed., Stabilizing Pakistan Through 

Police Reform (Washington, DC: Asia Society, 2012).

84. Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth (New York: 

Penguin Group, April 2013), Kindle edition, p. 170.

85. For example, ISI officers began working more closely with the local police in Lahore following an attack on a local 

ISI office and police training center in 2009. This led to the dismantling of at least one terrorist network that had 

established numerous ammunitions depots in the Lahore area. Hassan Abbas, “Executive Summary and Report 

Findings,” in Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform, p. 14. In other cases, IB or provincial police passed along 

information to the Pakistani military or ISI concerning FATA-based actors that enabled action there. First IB 

officer, interview by author; second IB officer, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; senior official with the 

Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author.

86. This included giving more attention to infiltrating these networks as well as mosques and madaris affiliated 

with anti-state activities (often using pro-state militants as informers), harassing their members where possible, 

and either eliminating them extrajudicially or holding them indefinitely when deemed necessary. Javed, interview by author; Sanaullah, interview by author; first IB officer, interview by author; senior official with the 

Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author; officer responsible for research and analysis 

within the Counterterrorism Division of the Punjab Police, interview by author; first senior police official for 

the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author; second senior police official for the Bahawalpur Region, interview 

by author.

87. Hasan Askari, Pakistani political and defense analyst, interview by author, Lahore, July 2011; Imtiaz Gul, 

executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; 

Jawad, interview by author; Shaukat Javed, former inspector general of the Punjab police, interview by author, 

Lahore, July 2011; Rana Sanaullah, Punjab provincial law minister, interview by author, Lahore, July 2011; ISI 

official, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; First IB officer, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; 

officer responsible for research and analysis within the Counterterrorism Division of the Punjab Police, interview by author; senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author, Lahore, 

July 2011; first senior police official for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author; second senior police official 

for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author, Bahawalpur, July 2011. 

88. Cyril Almeida, “Kayani Spells Out Threat Posed by India Doctrine,” Dawn, February 4, 2010.

89. First JuD official, interview by author; second JuD official, interview by author; former LeT member, interview by author; JeM official, interview by author; Hassan Abbas, a professor at the U.S. National Defense 

University, independently gathered similar information from the security services; Hassan Abbas, presentation 

at “Extremism in South Asia: The Case of Lashkar-e-Taiba,” October 12, 2011

90. Mir, interview by author; Abbas presentation at “Extremism in South Asia”; Western intelligence official, 

interview by author, Washington, DC, October 2011.

91. Mir, interview by author; first JuD official, interview by author; former LeT member, interview by author.

92. JeM official, interview by author.
52

PEACEWORKS 89

93. Mir, interview by author; former LeT member, interview by author; Western intelligence official, interview by 

author. U.S. officials have affirmed this information during briefings provided to them by the author. 

94. Alleged calls by Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Afghan Taliban amir, to stop attacks in Pakistan at a time 

when his movement was exploring confidence-building negotiations with the U.S. exacerbated disagreements over whether to reduce violence. After months of relative calm, however, attacks began increasing 

once again in Pakistan’s northwest in spring 2012. “Pakistani Taliban in Talks to Heal Rift: Sources” Express 

Tribune, March 8, 2012; on the use of the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network to temper the TTP and 

reorient its focus toward Afghanistan, see also Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: The 

Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 (London: Hurst and Co., 2013), p. 160.

95. Brown and Rassler, p. 160.

96. Ibid., 161.

97. For example, during Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009–10), Pakistan brokered deals with Mullah Nazir’s group in 

South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan in which both were asked to refuse sanctuary or 

safe passage to TTP militants in exchange for aid and a cease-fire agreement. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency 

in Pakistan, p. 73. 

98. Mohammad Amir Rana, “Structural Violence,” Dawn, January 15, 2012; Christopher Anzalone, “The TTP’s 

hybrid insurgency,” AfPak Channel, November 23, 2011; Jeffrey Dressler, “The TTP Tango,” AfPak 

Channel, December 12, 2011; “Peace Negotiations: Ousted TTP Deputy Chief Favors Talks with Govt,” 

Reuters, March 7, 2012; “Pakistan Welcomes Ouster of Taleban Deputy,” Associated Press, March 6, 2012.

99. Hakimullah Mehsud, the present TTP amir, was previously its leader in Orakzai, where a tribal leader affiliated with SSP first raised a Taliban force using the name Tehrik-e-Taliban in 1999. His relative Qari Hussain 

Mehsud (known as Ustad-e-Fedayin, or trainer of the suicide-bombers) was a member of the SSP and LeJ 

before joining the TTP. The former TTP commander in Darra Adam Khel, Tariq Afridi, was another former 

SSP member. He was also affiliated with LeJ, which helped it to become one of the most active groups in D.A. 

Khel, a strategic location on the highway connecting Peshawar with Karachi, on which NATO supply convoys 

headed into Afghanistan via Torkham travel. It also provided a jumping off point for SSP, LeJ, and JeM militants to participate in operations in Upper Orakzai, where some militants fled following the advent of incursions into South Waziristan in 2004. For a rich discussion of the sectarian influence on the insurgency in 

Pakistan, see Zahab, “Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban.”

100. Ibid., p. 376.

101. Most militants remained preoccupied with local and regional factors, but al-Qaeda’s global jihadist ideology, 

which entails striking U.S. and allied targets wherever they may be found, also influenced the militant environment. Pakistani groups, most notably LeT and the TTP, have engaged in or attempted out-of-area attacks 

against the U.S. and its Western allies.

102. JeM official, interview by author; second JuD official, interview by author; Mir, interview by author.

103. Adding to the confusion, groups, networks, and cells also use random names for attacks, often conjured up 

specifically to divert attention or sow confusion. This practice has local historical roots in Kashmir, where 

most of the jihadist organizations employed a plethora of aliases at the group or sub-group level to confuse the 

Indian security forces in Kashmir as well as to avoid retribution from the population. In some instances, they 

also did it to shield certain activities from their ISI handlers, a rationale that remains today.

104. For example, LeJ’s ability to regroup following the harsh post-9/11 crackdown was owed in large part to its 

ability to tap into Deobandi madaris and mosques associated with SSP as well as JUI for recruitment. Since 

regenerating, it has maintained a significant on-the-ground structure in the settled areas and continued to use 

its access to these madaris for support purposes and talent spotting. JeM splinters in FATA are also known to 

call upon their former colleagues in the settled areas to send small numbers of fresh recruits from JeM madaris 

or recruitment networks. See, for example, Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network.”

105. For example, in one instance, militants connected to the TTP used the Madrasa Usmania Shadan Lund in 

Multan as a place to store weapons and ammunition in advance of a failed attack on a government office 

building. At least two militants involved in this plot also were involved in the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket 

team bus, for which the Madrasa Usmania Shadan Lund was again used as a storage depot for weapons later 

transported to Lahore. “Attack on Sri Lankan Cricket Team at Lahore,” Police Report, Case FIR no. 252, 

March 3, 2009, author in possession of hard copy; “Interrogation of Amanullah (aka Asadullah, aka Kashif),” 

undated police report, undated, author in possession of hard copy.

106. Javed, interview by author; Mir, interview by author; senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism 

Division, interview by author; officer responsible for Research and Analysis within the Counterterrorism Division 

of the Punjab Police, interview by author; first senior police official for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author; 

“Interrogation of Amanullah”; Imtiaz Ali, “Karachi Becoming a Taliban Safe Haven?” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 1 

(January 2010). Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network”; Zahab, “Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban,” p. 377.

107. For more on this dichotomy, see Rassler and Brown, Haqqani Nexus.

108. Ibid., p. 46.

109. Ibid., p. 47; “Attack on Sri Lankan Cricket Team at Lahore.” 
53

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

110. For example, see “Pakistan Releases 3 Relatives of Fugitive Taliban Commander Under Swap Deal,” Frontier 

Post, November 14, 2007.

111. Javed, interview by author; first IB officer, interview by author; second IB officer, interview by author; senior 

official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author.

112. See, for example, Tankel, Storming the World Stage, pp. 61, 130–31.

113. Military personnel were involved in at least one of the assassination plots against former president Musharraf 

in 2003. Ibid., pp. 130–31. Mir, Talibanization of Pakistan, p. 110. More recently, Syed Saleem Shahzad, the 

late Pakistani journalist, asserted shortly before his death that the 2011 attack on Pakistan Naval Station 

Mehran was carried out after naval intelligence refused to release members of the navy arrested because of their 

links to al-Qaeda. Navy officials later recommended court-martial for three officers allegedly involved in the 

attack. Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda had Warned of Pakistan Strike,” Asia Times, May 27, 2011; “Three 

Officials Face Court-Martial over PNS Mehran Base Attack,” Dawn, May 21, 2012.

114. On contrast between North and South Waziristan, see, for example, Zahid Hussain, “Tale of Two 

Waziristans,” Dawn, July 2, 2013.

115. Anti-state elements are believed to have begun flowing into Karachi in greater numbers as a result of the military 

operations in the Waziristan and Swat regions as well as to seek shelter from U.S. drone strikes. Amir Mir, 

“Karachi Taken Hostage by 25 Jihadi Groups,” The News, November 5, 2012. 

116. Karachi witnessed a surge in sectarian violence beginning in 2009. This was primarily Sunni-Shia violence, 

but slashes between the Deobandi and Barelvi sects of Sunni Islam also increased. Huma Yusuf, “Conflict 

Dynamics in Karachi” (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2012), pp. 4, 17

117. Sumera Khan, “Political violence claims 2,670 lives: Report,” The Express Tribune, May 7, 2013.

118. Tahir Khan, “Deadly Mandate: Liberal Parties Targeted for Their Ideology, Says TTP,” The Express Tribune, 

April 29, 2013.

119. See, for example, Stephen Tankel, “Pakistani Militants Plan Their Own Pivot East,” War on the Rocks, July 9, 2013.

120. See for example, “India Says Pakistan ‘Beheaded’ Kashmir Soldier,” BBC, January 9, 2013; Zainab Akhter, 

“Kashmir: Protests and the Return of the Fidayeen,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, March 25, 2013.

121. One of the few mitigating factors is the rate of private charitable donations. Pakistan’s are among the highest 

in the world at roughly 5 percent of GDP. “Poverty: Always With Us,” The Economist, February 11, 2012.

122. Fair, “Pakistan’s Own War on Terror”; “Pakistan Public Opinion Survey: July 15–August 7, 2009,” The 

International Republican Institute, October 1, 2009.

123. Fair, “Pakistan’s Own War on Terror”; Myra MacDonald, “‘Living Under Drones’–the Anti-drone Campaign 

Can Do Damage Too,” Reuters, October 3, 2012.

124. Pew Research Center, “On Eve of Elections, a Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan,” May 7, 2013.

125. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.: 74% Call America an 

Enemy,” June 27, 2012. The International Republican Institute put support for fighting the Taliban in Swat as high 

as 69 percent by June 2009 (International Republican Institute, “Pakistan Public Opinion Survey: July 15–August 

7, 2009,” October 1, 2009).

126. Pew Research Center, “On Eve of Elections.”

127. Zahid Hussain, “An Inexplicable Delay,” Dawn, November 6, 2012.

128. Fair, “Pakistan’s Own War on Terror”; Cyril Almeida, “The Two North Waziristans,” Dawn, August 19, 2012.

129. Tankel, Storming the World Stage, p. 61, 130. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and 

America’s War on Terror (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), p. 214.

130. Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network.”

131. Mohammad Amir Rana, “The Case of JuD,” Dawn, March 25, 2012.

132. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Pakistan Public Opinion”; Fair, “Pakistan’s Own War on Terror.”

133. For example, several local journalists and politicians pointed out that criminal elements attempted land grabs in 

parts of Punjab and Sindh provinces in the wake of the 2010 floods. Rather than contact local law enforcement, 

in certain instances the victims reached out to JuD because it was deemed more responsive and more powerful 

than the police.

134. Tankel, Storming the World Stage, p. 138; C. Christine Fair, “Protecting the Homeland Against Mumbai-Style 

Attacks and the Threat from Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Hearing, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 

Homeland Security, Subcomittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, June 12, 2013.

135. During the same time period that public support rose for military incursions, those who thought Pakistan 

should cooperate with the United States declined from 37 to 18 percent, and those who thought it should not 

went from 61 to 80 percent (International Republican Institute, “Pakistan Public Opinion Survey”).

136. Pakistan Muslim League (N), “National Agenda for Real Change: Manifesto 2013,” January 5, 2013.

137. ISI officer, interview by author.

138. See, for example, Kayani, “COAS Speech Azadi Parade—2012”; Kayani, “COAS Address.”

139. Fair, “Why the Pakistan Army Is Here to Stay.”
54

PEACEWORKS 89

140. Hussain, “Conspiratorial Paranoia.”

141. Ibid.

142. See, for example, Iqbal Khattak, “Army in Waziristan Better Equipped, More Relaxed,” Daily Times, May 21, 

2008.

143. Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Pakistan Bans Ahle Sunnah Wal Jamaat Islamist Group,” BBC News, March 9, 2012.

144. Kayani, “COAS Address on the Eve of Yaum-e-Shuhadda—2013.”

145. Similar tropes are deployed regarding separatists in Balochistan, where it is an article of faith that Indian 

intelligence is supporting the insurgency. 

146. Feisal H. Naqvi, “The Silence of the Faujis,” Express Tribune, August 28, 2012.

147. See, for example, Hussain, “Conspiratorial Paranoia.” 

148. For example, see Khaled Ahmed, “Our Pathology of Fear,” The Express Tribune, November 24, 2012.

149. Bob Woodword, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), p. 116.

150. “Attack on Sri Lankan Cricket Team at Lahore,” Police Report, Case FIR No. 252, March 3, 2009, author in 

possession of hard copy; “Interrogation of Amanullah (aka Asadullah, aka Kashif)” Police Report, undated, 

author in possession of hard copy.

151. It is an article of faith among the Pakistani security establishment that India supports Baloch separatists as well.

152. Each side has lobbed artillery shells at the other, with both typically claiming such actions are in response to a 

corresponding provocation or to cross-border militant traffic.

153. See, for example, Zia Khan and Naveed Hussain, “Border Incursions: Suspicions Grow About Afghan Support 

for TTP,” The Express Tribune, September 11, 2011; Fakhar Rehman, “Pakistan Intelligence Agency Claims 

Afghanistan Supports Taliban Splinter Groups,” NBCNews.com, March 27, 2013; Stephen Tankel, “The 

Militant Groups Next Door,” Foreign Policy, April 24, 2013.

154. On Pakistan’s ongoing support for insurgents fighting against the United States in Afghanistan, see, for 

example, Brown and Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad; Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalishnikov and Laptop; Ahmed 

Rashid, Descent into Chaos.

155. These tensions played out when American military and intelligence officials confirmed Mullah Fazlullah, the 

Swat Taliban leader, was operating from Northeast Afghanistan. One of their number said he was a “otherside-of-the-border problem.” A spokesman for the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul countered 

this explanation, saying Fazlullah “remains a person of interest” and that Coalition forces would attempt to take 

him out if they received actionable intelligence. Dana Priest, “Pakistani Militants Hiding in Afghanistan,” 

Washington Post, November 6, 2012. 

156. Most proxies have been deployed externally, but there are historical instances of their use internally as well, and 

this practice appears to be accelerating. For example, Jamaat-e-Islami was used against separatists in East 

Pakistan prior to and during the civil war that led to its independence as Bangladesh and the Zia regime offered 

early support to SSP to beat back a perceived Shia challenge to state authority.

157. The network’s ability to play this role stems in part from the fact that it is an important conduit for many TTP 

fighters to the jihad in Afghanistan. Ironically, the same group Pakistan relies on to influence the landscape in 

FATA is also responsible for enabling al-Qaeda, the TTP, and a host of other anti-state militants operating 

from North Waziristan, a phenomenon discussed in detail in the ensuing section. Rassler and Brown, The 

Haqqani Nexus, pp. 2, 10.

158. Brown and Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad, p. 159.

159. Ibid.

160. Mullah Obaidullah Akhund was one of the Afghan Taliban members released and was third in command 

behind Mullah Omar and his deputy. He was also the most senior Afghan Taliban leader the Pakistani 

authorities had captured after 9/11. Ibid., p. 160.

161. Rassler and Brown, The Haqqani Nexus, p. 48.

162. LeT has published books and produced a number of audio cassettes criticizing al-Qaeda and the TTP and 

labeling their members apostates, a message that its leaders also deliver during sermons. Its leaders assert that 

accusing another Muslim of apostasy, as al-Qaeda and the TTP have done to the Pakistani authorities, is a 

dangerous practice and that if there is any reason to doubt the accusation than the accuser has sinned gravely. 

To defend the Pakistani state’s cooperation with America, LeT leaders and clerics argue that cooperating with 

non-Muslims for worldly profit (in this case foreign aid) makes a Muslim misguided, but not an apostate. 

Indeed, Muslims are only apostates if they actively fight against other Muslims, and LeT leaders argue that 

operations in the Tribal Areas do not count because this is done to protect the Pakistani population. Further, 

they aver that those who murder Muslims instead of fighting the true enemy—that is, Christians, Jews, and 

Hindus—are apostates. Second JuD official, interview by author; sermon by LeT cleric Mubashir Ahmad 

Rabbani, “The Schism of Excommunication,” undated. Al-Qaeda refuted points from “The Schism of 

Excommunication” in the book titled Knowledgeable Judgment on the Mujrites of the (Present) Age. See also C. 

Christine Fair, “Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State,” Survival 53, no. 4 (2011).
55

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

163. There is speculation that Punjab provincial authorities have financed JeM for security purposes, though 

whether this amounted to countering anti-state militants, helping keeping law and order, serving political 

interests, or simply paying off the group to remain quiescent is unclear. Mir, interview by author; Ayesha 

Siddiqa, Pakistani security analyst, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; Marvi Sirmed, columnist for The 

Daily Times, interview by author, Pakistan, July 2011; Arif Jamal, presentation at the NDU-sponsored conference “Extremism in South Asia: The case of Lashkar-e-Taiba,” October 12, 2011; Tankel, Storming the World 

Stage, pp. 196, 200–01.

164. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 57.

165. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” Asia Policy, no. 11 (January 2011).

166. Dan Byman, Deadly Connections (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 59.

167. In 2010, al-Qaeda took credit for a joint LeT-Indian Mujahideen attack against the German Bakery in Pune, 

India, and its threats against India have increased since then. On al-Qaeda’s claims and threats against India, 

see Praveen Swami, “Why Pakistan is Desperate for Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Friendship,” Firstpost, June 21, 2013; 

on LeT-Indian Mujahideen responsibility for the 2010 Pune blast, see Santosh Sonawane, “Bilal Trained in 

Pak to Make Explosives: Cop,” Times of India, October 18, 2012; Asseem Shaikh, “Was Mirza Himayat Baig 

in Aurangabad When Blast Happened?” Times of India, October 21, 2012.

168. Dan Byman, “Passive Sponsors of Terrorism,” Survival 47, no. 4 (December 2005).

169. “National Paralysis,” Dawn, January 8, 2012.

170. Saeed Shafqat, “Praetorians and the People,” in Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State, ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2012), Kindle edition, chap. 6. 

171. Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Modernity: Between Military and Militancy,” The Friday Times, March 9–15, 2012.

172. Almeida, “The Two North Waziristans.”

173. Fair, “Why the Pakistan Army Is Here to Stay.”

174. See, for example, Almeida, “The Two North Waziristans.” 

175. Two sessions of the All Parties Conference (APC), the first called by the ANP and the second organized by 

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam chief Malauna Fazlur Rehman, endorsed dialogue. All of the major parties attended 

each APC and came out in favor of talks. As one Pakistani analyst noted, however, the ANP was motivated 

to call for talks because it realized that the state could not or would not protect it. JUI-F, on the other hand, 

is a religious party that embraces many elements of the TTP ideological agenda but views political participation as a means of achieving them. Its motivations to call for talks were therefore different. Regarding the 

APC session, see “APC Backs Talks with Taliban to Establish Peace in Pakistan,” Geo News, February 14, 

2013; “APC Supports Grand Jirga for Promoting Peace in FATA, KP,” Geo News, February 28, 2013; on the 

distinction between ANP and JUI-F motivations see, Ejaz Haider, “TTP Strategy and Our Naiveté,” The 

Express Tribune, April 30, 2013.

176. Khan, “Deadly Mandate.”

177. Hussain Afzal, “Taliban say their target was Munir Orakzai: JUI-F rally attacked in Kurram; 19 dead,” Dawn, 

May 7, 2013.

178. On power deflation as a terrorist strategy, see, for example, Peter Neumann and M.L.R. Smith, The Strategy 

of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 41.

179. Zahid Hussain, “A Deafening Silence,” Dawn, April 23, 2013.

180. Salman Masood, “Pakistani Party Leader Looks Forward, as Claims of Vote-Rigging Swirl,” New York Times, 

May 12, 2013.

181. Naqvi, “The Silence of the Faujis.”

182. “CM Shahbaz wants Taliban to Spare Punjab,” Dawn, March 15, 2010; on PML-N attempts to reorient 

anti-state violence, see also “Into the Heartland: Extremists Are Growing Stronger in Settled Areas of 

Pakistan,” The Economist, June 3, 2010. 

183. Hafiz Saeed—leader of LeT and its aboveground JuD—and Maulana Samiul Haq—leader of JUI-S and often 

referred to as the Father of the Taliban—co-chair the DPC. Other leaders include Ahmed Ludhianvi, head of 

SSP; Abdur Rehman Makki and Amir Hamza, both of LeT/JuD though the latter has launched his own front 

group; and Hamid Gul, the former DG ISI and outspoken supporter of Pakistani jihadism. Ahmed 

Ludhianvi’s presence on the DPC and public posture vis-à-vis the army is notable. He is on record asserting 

that “the army is the largest institution of this country, so it holds a lot of importance for us and we are willing 

to fight for them.” Yet he heads the latest incarnation of the SSP, now known as Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat, 

which has fed insurgency against the state. Taha Siddiqui, “Difa-e-Pakistan Part 2/2: Who is Aiding the 

Jihadis’ Resurgence?” Express Tribune, February 12, 2012.

184. Ibid; Matthew Green, “Mullahs, Militants and Military – Pakistan’s Shadowy Coalition,” Financial Times, 

January 23, 2012.

185. LeT/JuD has been attempting to become an important player in Pakistan’s political landscape, launching mass 

protests against international issues, such as the Danish cartoons, and domestic ones, such as Pakistan’s 
56

PEACEWORKS 89

women’s protection bill. In addition to playing a leading role on the Difa-i-Pakistan Council, some of its 

members have run for office, albeit not on the JuD line. First JuD official, interview by author; Green, 

“Mullahs, Militants and Military”; Myra MacDonald, “Difa-e-Pakistan: What We Know and Do Not Want 

to Hear,” Reuters, February 16, 2012; Muhammad Amir Rana, “The Case of JuD,” Dawn, March 25, 2012.

186. At times this has included freeing imprisoned militants to secure electoral victories. See, for example, Zahab, 

“Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban,” p. 382.

187. The most commonly cited joint appearance entailed Rana Sanaullah from PML-N, when he was the Punjabi law 

minister, participating in an SSP rally and publicly seeking the endorsement of SSP leader Ahmed Ludhianvi. The 

two traveled to Jhang together in an official government vehicle with police escort to campaign there in February 

2010 ahead of the March by-election for the provincial assembly. Sanaullah argued to the author that encouraging 

such men to involve themselves in elections is better than seeing them head to North Waziristan but acknowledged 

that he campaigned with Ahmed Ludhianvi because SSP had a vast vote-bank. Sanaullah, interview by author; see 

also Shafiq Awan, “The Cost of Jhang By-Poll,” Daily Times, March 10, 2010. 

188. According to several JuD officials with whom the author spoke, politicians from the PPP and PML-N have sought 

their organization’s support. The central secretary general of SSP averred that during the 2008 elections almost all 

the major political parties, including the PPP, PML-N, ANP, PMLQ , and the JUI, had sought his party’s support 

in the four provinces of the country. On this claim, see Amir Mir, “Punjab govt may not act against LeJ PMLN 

has seat adjustments with defunct SSP,” The News, February 22, 2013. For additional reports along these lines, see 

Siddiqui, “Pakistan elections”; Declan Walsh, “Extremists Pursue Mainstream in Pakistan Election,” New York 

Times, May 5, 2013. For additional reports on PML-N courtship of militant groups, see Hussain, “A Deafening 

Silence”; Amir Mir, “Punjab govt may not act”; Walsh, “Extremists Pursue Mainstream”; Omar Waraich, “Nawaz 

Sharif’s Return to Power Brings Pakistan’s Challenges in Focus,” Time, May 12, 2013.

189. Pew Research Center, “On Eve of Elections, a Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan,” May 7, 2013.

190. Tahir Khan, “Maulana Samiul Haq says voting a religious obligation,” Express Tribune, May 1, 2013.

191. Walsh, “Extremists Pursue Mainstream.”

192. Amir Mir, “55 Charged Terrorists Allowed to Contest Polls,” The News, April 24, 2013.

193. C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2006), p. 47.

194. Sales of F-16 combat aircraft and related equipment accounted for more than half of FMS agreements, and 

these were among the few items paid for entirely by Pakistan. Additional F-16 combat aircraft and T-37 military trainer jets were transferred as excess defense articles.

195. Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” CRS Report R41856, updated 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 4, 2012), pp. 12–18.

196. Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” CRS Report R41856 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 7, 2011), p. 14.

197. More than half of the approximately $2.1 billion the United States provided to Pakistan in the form of foreign 

military financing in fiscal years 2002 through 2010 was used to purchase weapons systems of limited use for 

counterterrorism such as maritime patrol aircraft and update kits for F-16 combat aircraft. The Pakistan Air 

Force has used F-16s to “soften up” targets in advance of and to provide air support during military incursions in 

FATA, but it is an imperfect weapons system for the job. Epstein and Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign 

Assistance,” pp. 14–15.

198. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 36.

199. Zulfiqar Ali, “Over 4,000 Houses Destroyed in Waziristan Operation: Report,” Dawn, November 8, 2008; 

Iqbal Khattak, “Deserted Town Shows Human Cost of Operation Zalzala,” Daily Times, May 20, 2008.

200. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 61.

201. Ibid., p. xv.

202. Askari, interview by author.

203. Regarding the lack of a clear role for law enforcement, see, for example, Abbas, “Executive Summary and 

Report Findings.”

204. For example, see Hasan Abbas, ed., “Reforming Pakistan’s Police,” Asia Report no. 157 (Washington, DC: 

International Crisis Group, July 14, 2008); Hasan Abbas, Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial 

for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Policy and 

Understanding, April 2009).

205. Jamal, “Police Organizations in Pakistan.”

206. Abbas, “Executive Summary and Report Findings,” p. 14.

207. U.S. official with Department of Justice, interview by author, Washington, DC, May 2011; U.S. diplomat, 

interview by author, Pakistan, July 2011. Briefings with U.S. officials in spring 2013 reconfirmed this assessment.

208. The United Kingdom’s Department of International Development also significantly increased funding and 

support for police reform in Pakistan.
57

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

209. Senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author.

210. Ibid.

211. Babar Sattar, Pakistani lawyer and political analyst, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; U.S. 

Department of Justice, briefing for author, Washington, DC, June 2011; see also Yusuf, Conflict Dynamics in 

Karachi, p. 24.

212. Nadir Hassan, “A Legal Framework for Fighting Terrorism,” The Express Tribune, February 28, 2013; Qamar 

Zaman, “Tracking Terror Suspects: Security Agencies Win Eavesdropping Powers,” The Express Tribune, 

December 21, 2012.

213. Sohail Habib Tajik, “Technology and Law Enforcement,” in Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform, p. 75.

214. First IB officer, interview by author; second IB officer, interview by author; Hassan Abbas, “Creating a Secret 

Service and Reforming the Intelligence Bureau,” in Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform, p. 80.

215. Abbas, “Executive Summary and Report Findings,” p. 12.

216. Tajik, “Technology and Law Enforcement,” p. 75.

217. U.S. Department of Justice, briefing for author; “Working Group on Pakistani Counterterrorism Efforts,” hosted 

by the Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, July 12, 2011; senior official with the Punjab Police 

Counterterrorism Division, interview by author; officer responsible for research and analysis within the 

Counterterrorism Division of the Punjab Police, interview by author; first senior police official for the Bahawalpur 

Region, interview by author; second senior police official for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author. 

218. Briefing by U.S. security officials.

219. Robert M. Perito and Tariq Parvez, “Empowering the Pakistan Police,” USIP Special Report 332 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, May 2013).

220. Transparency International Pakistan website, National Corruption Perception Survey - TI Pakistan 2009, www.

transparency.org.pk/documents/NCPS%202009/NCPS%202009%20%20Report.pdf. 

221. Perito and Parvez, “Empowering the Pakistan Police”; Abbas, Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform.

222. Tariq Khosa, “Agenda for Reform,” in Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform, pp. 31–32.

223. Ibid.

224. Ibid. For a more detailed analysis of the failings of the 2002 police order and its subsequent amendments, see 

Sanjay Patil, Feudal Forces: Reform Delayed (New Delhi: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2008), 

chap. 4. 

225. Yusuf, Conflict Dynamics in Karachi, p. 22

226. Afzal Ali Shigri, “Police Corruption and Accountability,” in Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform, pp. 

24–27.

227. See Abbas, “Creating a Secret Service,” p. 79; Asad Jamal, Police Organizations in Pakistan (Human Rights 

Commission of Pakistan and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Joint Report, May 2010).

228. Abbas, “Creating a Secret Service,” p. 79

229. Ibid.

230. V. Balachandran, “Police Investigation Bedevils Police in India, Pakistan,” The Guardian, December 6, 2012.

231. Iftikhar Ahmed, “The Federal Investigation Agency,” in Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform, p. 101.

232. Between 2009 and 2012, the FIA went through six directors general, meaning that each served an average 

tenure of six months. Ibid., p. 102.

233. Shigri, “Police Corruption and Accountability,” p. 24.

234. “Working Group on Pakistani Counterterrorism Efforts”; Sattar, interview by author; Hasan Asad Alvi, 

“Police and Counterterrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,” in Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform, p. 111.

235. A Bill Further to Amend the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997.

236. For more on the Anti-Terrorism Act see, Charles H, Kennedy, “The Creation and Development of Pakistan’s 

Anti-Terrorism Regime, 1997–2002,” in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, ed. Satu Limaye, Mohan 

Malik, and Robert G. Wirsing (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), pp. 387–412.

237. Zulfiqar Hameed, “Antiterrorism Law,” in Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform, pp. 51–52.

238. Ibid. 

239. Ibid.

240. See, for example, Murtaza Haider, “Sectarian Killers Thrive Under Legal System,” Dawn, February 29, 2012.

241. A Bill Further to Amend the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997.

242. Hameed, “Antiterrorism Law,” p. 54.

243. Sanaullah, interview by author; second IB officer, interview by author; “Working Group on Pakistani 

Counterterrorism Efforts.” 

244. Babar Sattar, “The 65-Year-Old Itch,” The News, February 25, 2012.
58

PEACEWORKS 89

245. The IB and Military Intelligence engage in this practice as well, though not to the same degree as the ISI.

246. Hameed, “Antiterrorism Law,” pp. 51–52.

247. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. xvi.

248. I am grateful to Dr. Thomas Lynch for his insights into these dynamics. The term externally sponsored orphan is his.

249. Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, p. 169. 

250. Abbas, “Creating a Secret Service,” p. 80.

251. Javed, interview by author.

252. Second IB officer, interview by author; senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author.

253. Officer responsible for research and analysis within the Counterterrorism Division of the Punjab Police, interview by author. 

Senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author; Working Group on Pakistani 

Counterterrorism Efforts.

254. See, for example, Khawar Ghumman, “Nisar Keen to Make Counter-Terror Body Functional,” Dawn, June 20, 2013.

255. Second IB officer, interview by author.

256. In addition to its officers’ intimate knowledge of many militant groups in Pakistan, the ISI is the only intelligence agency able 

to operate effectively in FATA and thus the only one with a national picture of terrorism. 

257. Former high-ranking official in Pakistan’s security services, interview by author.

258. Senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author.

259. Arif Jamal, “Half-hearted Security Operations in Punjab Do Little to Restrain Taliban Attacks,” Jamestown Terrorism 

Monitor 8, no. 31 (August 5, 2010).

260. I am grateful to Dr. Thomas Lynch for sharing this insight.

261. The IB has detailed agents to NACTA, but the latter remains a weak body incapable of playing the type of coordinating role

intended.

262. First IB officer, interview by author; Javed, interview by author. 

263. A Bill to Establish National Counter Terrorism Authority in Pakistan.

264. Ibid.

265. Ibid.

266. Pew Research Center, “On Eve of Elections.”

267. Stephen P. Cohen, “Pakistan: Arrival and Departure,” in The Future of Pakistan, ed. Stephen Cohen (Washington, DC: 

Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

268. Moeed Yusuf, “Foreign Policy Challenges,” Dawn, June 10, 2013.

269. “Performance of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet: Civil-Military Relations,” PILDAT Citizens Monitoring Report 

(Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, March 2012).

270. The DCC is chaired by prime minister and includes the ministers of defence, foreign affairs, and finance. Other officials who 

have attended in the past include the secretaries from these three ministries as well as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and the chiefs of Army Staff, Air Staff, and Naval Staff. Including the directors general of the ISI and IB, along with the 

executive director of NACTA, is sensible as well. 

271. “Performance of the Defence Committee.”

272. Ibid.

273. Ghumman, “Nisar Keen to Make Counter-Terror Body Functional.”

274. To these one might add reforming the legal regime to enable the IB to present evidence in court as well as directing additional 

financing toward the realization of a functional National Criminal Database and the improvement of intelligence analysis by 

local law enforcement and civilian intelligence agencies. For the full list of recommendations see, Stabilizing Pakistan Through 

Police Reform.

275. Khosa, “Agenda for Reform,” p. 29.

276. This might include formalizing a “ladder of escalation,” the term one scholar used to outline a response to threats in the

frontier that begins with local police action and only escalates to paramilitary and then military action if previous efforts prove 

insufficient. Joshua White, “Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan’s Frontier,” Brookings Counterinsurgency 

and Pakistan Paper Series, no. 2, June 25, 2009.

277. It is encouraging that various actors and organizations in Pakistan’s civil society have already begun working on deradicalization. Some efforts, such as those aimed at militants captured during the Swat campaign, are supported by the state. In July 

2011, Pakistan hosted a seminar in Swat on deradicalization. The following month the DCC considered a deradicalization 

plan. However, no such plan was forthcoming, and little in the way of follow-up is evident. When formulating a plan, 

Pakistan would be well served to consider bringing in international experts to provide advice. The UK offered to facilitate 

such an exchange in the mid-2000s, but Pakistan showed minimal interest.

278. Kayani, “COAS Speech Azadi Parade—2012.”

279. Sanaullah, interview by author, Lahore, July 28, 2011.
59

Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

280. Anti-state militants can be expected to continue to include U.S. and Western interests in Pakistan in their 

target sets. India-centric groups, most notably LeT, along with the LeT-affiliated Indian Mujahideen could 

target U.S. or Western interests in India.

281. “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” May 23, 2013, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/

2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.

282. Sajjad Ashraf, “Pakistan sets sights on drones,” Asia Times, June 13, 2013.

283. The Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services was created by Pakistan’s parliament with the help of the 

United Sates Agency for International Developement to provide research and capacity building services for 

parliamentarians and parliamentary functionaries. To function effectively, NACTA requires assistance with 

capacity building in terms of both research and analysis and training for its staff. 

284. These include law enforcement training focused on organizational and leadership development, criminal 

investigation and crime scene management, instructor development, and police academy management; and 

prosecutorial and judicial training on trial advocacy skills, counterterrorism prosecutions, professional ethics, 

and case load management; and correctional training on prison management and proper classification and 

housing of prisoners. U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 1: Department of State 

Operations, Fiscal Year 2014 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, released April 25, 2013), www.

state.gov/documents/organization/207266.pdf.

285. Antiterrorism assistance is offered through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related 

(NADR) Programs and the Bureau of Counterterrorism.

286. For example, there is a clear and pressing need for a witness protection program, and this could offer a high 

profile, high impact area for assistance. 

287. The inspector general of police in each province could be encouraged to solicit proposals internally and to 

partner with U.S. officials when deciding which to fund.

288. The U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group has already agreed to pare down military-to-military collaboration, and U.S. Congress recently zeroed out funding for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. 

Other funding programs—including FMF, NADR, and the International Military Education and Training 

(IMET)—remain in place. In addition to funds from various programs for training programs, the administration requested $350 million in FMF for FY2013, of which a portion would be used to “complement other 

security-related activities such as counterterrorism and [Pakistan’s] own defense capabilities, and $19.3 million 

NADR funds to assist Pakistan with counterterrorism and “countering” WMD. See Epstein and Kronstadt, 

“Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” 2012.

289. Pakistan has indicated an eagerness for more counterinsurgency hardware. This reportedly includes armored personnel carriers, laser target designators, laser-guided munitions, more night vision goggles and surveillance gear, 

more sophisticated surveillance and communications equipment, and more attack and utility helicopters. Ibid.

290. Short-term curtailments of military assistance have had limited tactical success, and it is impossible for 

Washington to temporarily suspend something it is not giving.

291. For example, benchmarks such as closing Murdike or dismantling the training apparatus in areas under 

state control are unrealistic in the short term. It is also in the interest of the Pakistani military to obscure 

not only its control over certain groups but also a lack of control over them. Thus it is difficult to know 

whether Pakistan’s failings stem from a lack of intent, a lack of capability, or the fear of blowback that 

might stem from various actions.

292. For FY2013, the administration requested $350 million in FMF, of which a portion would be used to “complement other security-related activities such as counterterrorism and [Pakistan’s] own defense capabilities,” and 

$19.3 million NADR funds to assist Pakistan with counterterrorism and “countering” WMD. See Epstein and 

Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” 2012.

293. Most assistance should be overt, but reality dictates that some may need to be covert, in which case those 

elements of the certification would not be made public.

294. For example, the United States provided significant but low-profile assistance in the form of transport helicopters, parts for helicopter gunships, infantry equipment, and intelligence and surveillance video sharing from 

American UAVs in 2009 during the military’s incursion into South Waziristan. See Epstein and Kronstadt, 

“Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” 2012.

 5

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Chairman of the Board: J. Robinson West

Vice Chairman: George E. Moose

President: Jim Marshall

Executive Vice President: Kristin Lord

Chief Financial Officer: Michael Graham

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • 

George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George 

Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant 

to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. 

Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and 

Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, 

American University • Stephen J. Hadley, Principal, RiceHadleyGates, 

LLC, Washington, D.C. • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy 

Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. Khan, 

President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, Nev. • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, N.Y. • Jeremy 

A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Judy 

Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Kathleen Hicks, Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. 

Army; President, National Defense University • Jim Marshall, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
2 Looking for Justice UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE • 2301 CONSTITUTION AVE. NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20037 • USIP.ORG 

Serious concerns exist in Pakistan about threats to the 

state from a subset of its Islamist militants, but the military’s 

preoccupation with using jihadist proxies to achieve geopolitical aims remains. Although this is the greatest barrier to 

dismantling the militant infrastructure in Pakistan, it is not the 

only one. Numerous barriers reinforce the status quo when it 

comes to action against militancy and inform the segmented 

approach Pakistani elites—both civilian and military—take as 

they approach various militant groups. 

Related Links 

■ Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism by Amil Khan (Special Report, 

March 2013)

■ Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy edited by 

I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (USIP Press, 2011)

■ Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan by Izhar Hunzai (Special Report, 

January 2013)

■ Conflict Dynamics in Karachi by Huma Yusuf (Peaceworks, October 2012)

■ Fixing Pakistan’s Civil-Military Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation by 

Moeed Yusuf (Peace Brief, May 2012)

■ Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces? by Shuja Nawaz (Special Report, 

November 2011)

■ Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of 

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite by Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf, and Salman 

Zaidi (Peace Brief, July 2011)

■ Will the Long March to Democracy in Pakistan Finally Succeed? by Sheila 

Fruman (Peaceworks, July 2011)

PEACEWORKS • SEPTEMBER 2013 • NO. 89