New Perspectives in Policing V E R I TAS

HARVARD Kennedy School

Program in Criminal Justice

Policy and Management National Institute of Justice

Executive Session on Policing and 

Public Safety

This is one in a series of papers that will be 

published as a result of the Executive Session on 

Policing and Public Safety. 

Harvard’s Executive Sessions are a convening 

of individuals of independent standing who take 

joint responsibility for rethinking and improving 

society’s responses to an issue. Members 

are selected based on their experiences, their 

reputation for thoughtfulness and their potential 

for helping to disseminate the work of the Session. 

In the early 1980s, an Executive Session on Policing 

helped resolve many law enforcement issues of 

the day. It produced a number of papers and 

concepts that revolutionized policing. Thirty 

years later, law enforcement has changed and 

NIJ and the Harvard Kennedy School are again 

collaborating to help resolve law enforcement 

issues of the day. 

Learn more about the Executive Session on 

Policing and Public Safety at: 

www.NIJ.gov, keywords “Executive Session 

Policing”

www.hks.harvard.edu, keywords “Executive 

Session Policing”

Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing

Malcolm K. Sparrow, Ph.D.

SEPTEMBER 2014

Introduction

The boundary between public and private policing 

is messy and complex. Police executives deal 

with some aspect of it almost every day. Private 

investments in security continue to expand and 

public/private partnerships of myriad types 

proliferate, even as budgets for public policing 

stall or decline. 

This paper provides police executives an 

opportunity to explore the critical issues that arise 

at this boundary. The analysis here starts with a 

number of assumptions: First, that it is no longer 

possible for public police to ignore the extent and 

pervasiveness of private policing arrangements. 

Second, that being in some general sense “for” or 

“against” private security is not helpful, as such 

views are inadequately nuanced or sophisticated 

given the variety of issues at stake. Third, that the 

interests of private parties will rarely, if ever, be 

fully aligned with public interests. Fourth, that it 

is not sufficient for public police agencies simply 

to deal with the private security arrangements 

that exist today; rather, public police have a role 

to play in influencing future arrangements and in 
Cite this paper as: Sparrow, Malcolm K., Ph.D. Managing the Boundary 

Between Public and Private Policing. New Perspectives in Policing Bulletin.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 

2014. NCJ 247182.

2 | New Perspectives in Policing

by corporations as security officers, by a retail 

establishment as store detectives, by a private 

university as members of the university’s own 

police department,1 or by the owners of other 

commercial premises (e.g., shopping malls) 

as guards or patrols. 

• Non-specialist Employees in Private or Notfor-Profit Organizations. Employees with 

more general duties who are nevertheless 

asked to pay attention to security issues 

(e.g., store clerks watching out for shoplifters, 

airline flight crews observing passengers for 

suspicious behaviors). 

• Public Police. Circumstances in which public 

police are paid by private clients for specific 

services. In some situations, the officers are 

off duty or working overtime for a private 

purchaser (as with paid police details). In 

other cases, police officers are on duty but 

committed to a specific policing operation 

paid for at the agency level by a private client 

(e.g., policing a major sporting event).

Bayley and Shearing’s NIJ-commissioned study 

(2001) described the plethora of structural 

permutations that were emerging around the 

world at the boundary between public and private 

policing.2 They reported that the distinguishing 

features of the reconstruction of policing were 

“(a) the separation of those who authorize policing 

from those who do it and (b) the transference of 

both functions away from government.”3

Many types of structure are now familiar. We 

see information-sharing networks straddling 

making sure those arrangements serve the public 

interest. 

For the purposes of this discussion, private 

policing is broadly construed and means the 

provision of security or policing services other 

than by public servants in the normal course of 

their public duties. 

The clients for private policing may therefore be 

public (as with neighborhood patrols) or private 

(as when corporations contract with private 

security firms or employ their own security 

guards).

The providers of private policing may include:

• Volunteers. Private individuals acting as 

unpaid volunteers (e.g., neighborhood watch).

• Commercial Security-Related Enterprises. 

For-profit commercial enterprises that 

provide some aspect of security/policing 

services (e.g., security companies, hired 

guards, hired neighborhood patrols, private 

investigators, alarm companies).

• Specialist Employees in Private or Notfor-Profit Organizations. Employees who 

have specialist policing, security or riskmanagement roles within organizations 

whose core mission is something other than 

security. These personnel may be employed 
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 3

the public and private sectors. We see subsets of 

public policing functions being contracted out 

to private industry. We see public police officers 

working for private clients under a variety of 

different arrangements. We see not-for-profit 

associations forming, with membership from 

public and private organizations, allied around 

some common security-related purpose. Public 

police also cooperate on a daily basis with 

security guards and patrols operating in privately 

owned or quasi-public spaces, such as shopping 

malls, industrial complexes, private universities 

or gated residential areas. Also — this is not so 

new, but nevertheless at the boundary of public/

private policing — police routinely rely on private 

individuals, co-opted as confidential informants, 

to assist in their investigations.

Given the range of different structures, putting 

together reliable statistics on the overall “size” 

of private policing seems an almost impossible 

task, as any estimate will depend heavily on the 

definition of what is covered. One European study 

(2013)4 estimates an overall European ratio of 

31.11 private securit y personnel per 10,000 

inhabitants — only slightly lower than the public 

police ratio at 36.28 per 10,000 inhabitants. In the 

United States, the number of private security guards 

overtook the number of uniformed public law 

enforcement officers in the early 1980s, exceeded 

it by 50 percent by the late 1990s,5 and is now 

projected to grow from roughly 1 million in 2010 

to 1.2 million by 2020.6 In Australia, the number of 

private security personnel outnumbered public 

police by 2006, and now the ratio could be as high 

as 2:1.7 In Israel, the ratio was between 2:1 and 3:1 

20 years ago. Sklansky (2011) and others remark 

how difficult it is to generate valid estimates for the 

scale of private policing, and for a variety of reasons: 

Private police are hard to count, their organizations 

have a tendency toward secrecy, statistics tend to 

undercount employees who have some security 

functions, and calculations omit altogether the 

increasingly ubiquitous practice of public police 

engaging in private duty.8

Background

Skillful management of the relationships between 

public and private policing constitutes a core 

competency for police executives. Realizing this 

and accepting it, however, has taken the policing 

profession a good long while, and the route followed 

to arrive at this point varies by country. 

In the United Kingdom, public police for decades 

steadfastly resisted any association with private 

security. Adam White (2010)9

 provides a detailed 

history of private security in Britain from 1945 

onward and reveals the decades-long obdurate 

refusal by the Home Office to recognize the industry. 

The emerging industry itself — comprising mostly 

large firms that provide guards and security patrols 

for commercial premises — wanted desperately 

to be reg ulated. Reg ulat ion would signal 

recognition and approval and might even provide 

governmental quality assurance for established 

firms, which they could use as a marketable stamp 

of approval. Establishing standards for qualification 

and conduct would help keep irresponsible or 

incompetent players out of the market, thereby 

enhancing the credibility and reputation of the 

established firms.
4 | New Perspectives in Policing

But t he Br it ish gover n ment perceived 

commercial interests and private involvement 

as a threat to the essential “stateness” of security

provision — a belief deeply embedded in 

British culture, as in the cultures of Canada and 

Australia.10 The concept of “stateness” reflects 

the view that only state (civic) institutions can 

be trusted to provide security while judiciously 

balancing the multiple and often conflicting 

rights of different groups or individuals. Any 

form of government recognition for the private 

industry could compromise or distort the public 

policing mission; and the government, even 

by playing the role of regulator, would be seen 

as taking responsibility for the conduct of an 

industry whose motivations and competence it 

regarded as inherently untrustworthy.

Things changed significantly during the Thatcher 

era (1979-1990).11 Thatcherism emphasized 

t he role of free markets and advocated 

privatization of state functions. A belief in 

the merits of privatization required a higher 

level of appreciation for the capabilities of the 

commercial sector and a greater degree of trust 

in the ability of competitive markets to sort out 

the good from the bad.

The “New Labour” philosophy12 (1994-2010), 

espoused by Prime Ministers Tony Blair and 

Gordon Brown, carried forward many of the 

themes of Thatcherism, which endorsed market 

economics, deregulation and privatization. 

Public/private partnerships became all the rage 

as mechanisms for efficient and effective delivery 

of public services, and so it became natural for 

government to embrace private security as 

partners in the fight against crime. 

Thus ended the British government’s reluctance 

to engage constructively with the private security 

industry. For the London Olympics in 2012, the 

contract with G4S, at the time the world’s largest 

international security corporation, was so 

extensive that the “bungling” of the contract — 

when it became clear that G4S could not provide 

enough guards — became an international 

spectacle and led to the resignation of G4S Chief 

Executive Nick Buckles.13

According to White, the United States was 

never so concerned with “stateness” and always 

displayed a greater appreciation for the role of 

commercial enterprise. 

... in the USA private security companies are 

able to act as ordinary commercial organizations selling ordinary commodities —

their activities do not seem to be structured by state-centric expectations about 

how security ought to be delivered ....

... deeply embedded capitalist free-market 

ideology [...] seems to permeate most 

aspects of American life, including the 

domestic security sector. This ideological 

persuasion means that market signals in 

the American domestic security sector are 

not bound up with moral and normative 

considerations as they are in many other 

countries.14
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 5

Greater cultural acceptance of private policing 

does not mean, of course, that concerns do not 

arise. Concerns arise in the writings of legal, 

constitutional and democratic theorists seeking 

to clarify what societal aspirations the United 

States should hold, even if its history is different. 

Concerns arise as a result of failures, scandals and 

abuses in the industry, each instance of which 

provides another opportunity to appreciate the 

risks associated with private policing. Concerns 

arise when new technologies in the hands of 

private actors affect civil liberties or privacy in 

ways that ordinary citizens had not anticipated 

or imagined. Concerns arise as private policing 

continues to grow apace, becoming ubiquitous 

and touching the lives of ordinary citizens on a 

daily basis.15

Concerns that have arisen, and which have 

been discussed in the literature, include the 

unnecessary use of force, abuses of power, denial 

of access to public spaces, dishonest business 

practices, unequal access to security provision 

and weak accountability mechanisms for private 

agents. 

Nevertheless, as Elizabeth Joh (2006) explains, 

prevailing official attitudes in the United 

States have portrayed such problems not as 

“fundamental faults inherent to private policing, 

but technical issues amenable to improved 

regulation.”16 Many of these criticisms, after all, 

are often directed at public police agencies also. 

But Joh, in her examination of private policing, 

expresses surprise at the superficial nature of the 

attention that concerns about private policing 

have received:

What is striking, however, is that even in 

embryonic form, these concerns hardly 

register in discussions about partnerships, 

which ... are typically presented with 

unalloyed enthusiasm.17

Other commentators point to subtle problems 

that relate very specifically to the character of 

private policing. Gary Marx, as long ago as 1987, 

pointed out the importance of revolving door

effects: 

The [private security] industry, particularly 

at the more professional and leadership 

levels, is composed of thousands of former 

military, national security, and domestic 

police agents for whom public service was 

a revolving door. Some federal agents leave 

when they face mandatory retirement at age 

55. Many local police retire at a relatively 

early age after 20 years of service. However, 

limited mobility opportunities and more 

lucrative private-sector offers attract many 

others long before retirement.

These agents were schooled and experienced 

in the latest control techniques while 

working for government, but are now much 

less subject to its control. They may also 

maintain their informal ties to those still 

in public policing. An insurance company 

executive, in explaining the rationale 

behind hiring former police officers for 

investigative work, notes that if the latter 

cannot gain direct access to the needed 

information, “there are their friends.” This 
6 | New Perspectives in Policing

“opens up the doors for us so we can work 

both sides of the street.”18

Marx referenced organizations such as the 

Association of Federal Investigators, the 

Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, 

the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, 

and the International Association of Chiefs of 

Police. He stated that such organizations may 

create “formal and informal networks that 

serve to integrate those in public and private 

enforcement,”19 and questions whether former 

government agents employed in an investigative 

capacity by private firms (whom one might 

normally expect to be better skilled and more 

publicly oriented than those with no public-sector 

experience) should in fact face greater restrictions 

and registration requirements as a result of the 

specialist knowledge and access they acquired 

through public service. They might know how 

to hide improper investigative techniques from 

discovery by public authorities. They might retain 

high levels of expertise in surveillance. Their “old 

boy networks” might provide improper access to 

information and intelligence. 

At the leadership levels, private security firms 

may hire senior ex-FBI or Secret Service agents 

or former police chiefs as directors or as other 

senior executives. In part, no doubt, it is their 

skills and experience that these private firms 

value. But such appointments also serve to cloak 

the for-profit enterprise with a veneer of publicspiritedness as well as providing strong personal 

links into the law enforcement establishment.

Marx (1987) and more recently Sklansky (1999)20

have examined another set of concerns related 

to the fact that private police agents, being 

constitutionally classed as citizens (unless 

officially deputized), can legally do things that 

public police cannot.21 For example, there is no 

constitutional protection against unreasonable 

search and seizure by private citizens. There 

is no requirement for private security agents 

to issue Miranda warnings. There are no 

exclusionary rules for evidence obtained through 

unauthorized searches or questioning conducted 

by private agents. These factors might heighten 

anxiety about private agents who could be 

highly skilled (such as ex-government agents) 

but subject to less stringent legal constraints and 

less effective oversight than their public service 

counterparts.

We might also worry, but in a rather different way, 

about private security agents who are untrained, 

unqualified, or unprofessional, or those who 

use unethical practices or excessive force. The 

affront to civilized society that the behavior of 

such agents provides may be less subtle and more 

visible to ordinary citizens. Law enforcement 

officials often complain about private police as 

“untrained, unprofessional, unregulated and 

unaccountable police wannabes that simply get 

in the way of ‘real police work’.”22

Marx also raised concerns about the extensive 

deployment of police details for private clients:

During off-duty hours public police may 

serve as private police. ... In many big city 

departments such employment is a jealously 
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 7

protected perquisite. Some departments 

in effect run private businesses out of 

headquarters. While operating on behalf 

of private interests they have all the powers 

of sworn agents and may even drive official 

patrol cars.23

Within the United States at least, such concerns —

subtle or otherwise — have never been sufficient 

to make any serious dent in the general 

enthusiasm for commercial private security. The 

industry grew rapidly beginning in the late 1960s. 

“Partnership” was established as the basis for 

interactions between public and private policing 

beginning in the 1970s. 

Ethical issues raised are treated as peripheral 

concerns in the United States. The primary 

motivation is to control crime, now generally 

recognized as too extensive and complex to be 

dealt with by public police alone.24 Governments 

have moved “beyond passive acceptance to active 

encouragement,” trusting that, for the sake of 

getting some more help, they can overcome the 

problems associated with the profit motive in 

commercial security.25

Recent terrorist incidents illustrate and 

emphasi ze t he i mpor ta nce of sec u r it y 

collaboration across the public/private sector 

divide. Joh (2006) notes increased emphasis 

on public/private partnerships in the post-9/11 

world, with contributions of private security 

guards regarded as essential components of 

critical national infrastructure protection.26

In the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings 

in 2013, investigators made extensive and very 

public use of video surveillance tapes provided 

by commercial entities (as well as photographs 

and video provided by members of the public) to 

identify and track suspects.27

I n 1976, a repor t on pr iv ate pol ic i ng 

commissioned by t he Law Enforcement 

Assistance Administration declared “the sheer 

magnitude of crime in our society prevents 

the criminal justice system by itself from 

adequately controlling and preventing crime.”28

Since then, Joh observes, the notion that 

private security could serve as “equal partners

with the public police in the co-production of 

security, rather than simply as subordinates 

providing a complementary service” has gained 

prominence.29 One could interpret this shift as 

reflecting a maturing of the ideals of community 

policing, wherein the police and the public 

(including private firms) work collaboratively to 

set the security and crime-control agenda and 

then to carry it out.

Bayley and Shearing (2001) also point to a more 

complex range of partnership arrangements 

that go beyond the outsourcing of specific police 

functions:

T he cha nge i n pol ici ng ca n not be 

understood in customary terms. It is 

often mischaracterized, for example, as 

“privatization.” Because the distinction 

between public and private domains 

becomes problematic in the new policing, 

the more appropriate description for what 

is occurring is “multilateralization.”30
8 | New Perspectives in Policing

The Law Commission of Canada, in a 2013 report, 

likewise signals a deeper kind of symbiotic and 

networked set of relationships: 

In the last several decades, we have seen 

the extraordinary growth of the private 

security sector, offering a wide range of 

services. However, it is not simply the case 

that private security is filling a void left by 

the public police. Today, it is more accurate 

to suggest that policing is carried out by a 

network of public police and private security 

that is often overlapping, complimentary 

[sic] and mutually supportive. Within 

this context, it is increasingly difficult to 

distinguish between public and private 

responsibilities.31

So private policing is here to stay, “warts and 

all.” It just needs to be managed. As Bayley and 

Shearing (2001) conclude:

It is important for governments to continue 

to safeguard justice, equity, and quality 

of service in the current restructuring of 

policing. To safeguard the public interest 

in policing, governments must develop the 

capacity to regulate, audit and facilitate the 

restructuring of policing.32

Values at Stake

A body of literature discusses the pros and cons 

of a variety of private policing arrangements, and 

recounts the shifting attitudes of public police 

toward private security over time. Academic 

literature has focused slightly more on the 

cons, with particular emphasis on threats to 

democratic governance, procedural protections, 

civil liberties and human rights.33 By contrast, 

government inquiries and reports seem to accept 

the rise of private policing as inevitable and focus 

more on how public police should best exploit and 

manage the partnership opportunities presented.

Much of the debate as to whether, why, and how 

much society should worry about any specific 

private policing arrangement has focused on a 

finite number of core issues. It would take too long 

to trace these issues through all of the relevant 

literature, so this paper does not take on that 

task. I simply assert the claim (which others may 

dispute) that the major issues summarized in 

the table (presented as five categories of benefits 

to be derived from engagement with private 

policing, and seven categories of risks) cover the 

vast majority of such debate. Of the seven types 

of risk, the first five represent threats to society 

at large, and the last two represent risks that 

more specifically affect public police and police 

agencies.

Notice that number 3 on the “Benefits” side 

(Greater Equality in Protection) and number 5 on 

the “Risks” side (Greater Inequality in Protection) 

both refer to the issue of equity in access to 

security and the resulting effects on the level 

of protection for the poor and vulnerable. That 

argument can be made either way. Most often 

in the literature, however, growth in private 

policing is perceived as increasing inequity and 

thereby harming the poor. For example, a 2009 

report commissioned by the International Peace 

Research Institute in Norway observes: 
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 9

 Potential Benefits and Risks of Public/Private Police Partnerships 

Grounds for Support and Engagement (the Benefits) Grounds for Skepticism and Concern (the Risks)

1. Increased Effectiveness Through Public/Private 

Partnerships. Collaboration between the public and private 

sectors enhances performance by sharing complementary skills, 

knowledge and resources. Partnerships facilitate information 

exchange and provide access to broader networks. All parties can 

benefit from properly functioning partnership arrangements.

1. Lack of Accountability. Private police are not subject to the 

same formal and legal systems of accountability that govern 

public police agencies. Nevertheless, they may carry weapons, 

use force, detain suspects and intrude on the privacy and rights 

of individuals. They may discover crimes and choose not to 

inform public authorities. The exercise of policing powers without 

commensurate accountability is inherently dangerous to society.

2. Alignment With the Ideals of Community Policing. 

Community policing is essentially collaborative and involves 

sacrificing a purely “professional agenda” in favor of one 

negotiated with the community. The community, which includes 

businesses, should be able to participate in setting the crimecontrol agenda and should be encouraged to participate in carrying 

it out.

2. Threats to Civil Liberties. Many restrictions on the conduct 

of public police do not apply to private police (unless formally 

deputized by public agencies). For example, confessions extracted 

by private police without Miranda warnings and evidence obtained 

through unlawful searches conducted by private agents are not 

subject to exclusionary rules.

3. Greater Equality in Protection. The ability of the better off 

to protect themselves by purchasing private protection at their 

own expense allows the public police to concentrate their efforts 

on poorer and more vulnerable segments of the community. The 

overall effect, therefore, is to raise the floor in terms of levels of 

protection for the most vulnerable.

3. Loss of “Stateness.” Policing services and security operations 

require judicious balancing of the multiple and often conflicting 

rights of different groups or individuals. Therefore, only state 

(“civic”) institutions can be trusted to reflect the broad societal 

values required to carry out such functions. The particular interests 

of private clients and the for-profit motivations of commercial 

providers will inevitably distort the public agenda to some extent.*

4. Access to Specialized Skills and Technical Resources. The 

private sector can provide the public police with highly skilled 

and technical specialists that the public sector could not routinely 

employ. Collaboration with the private sector thus makes highly 

skilled and specialist resources available for public purposes.

4. Threats to Public Safety. Private police, who are not as welltrained as public police, may display poor judgment or overreact 

to situations, thus endangering public safety. Citizens may be 

confused about the status or rights of uniformed security personnel 

and may therefore act in ways that create danger for themselves 

or others. 

5. Efficiencies Through Contracting Out. Government operations 

should seek to exploit the efficiencies of private-sector 

competitive markets by contracting out any components of their 

operations that can be clearly specified and carved out, and for 

which competitive markets exist.

5. Greater Inequality in Protection. The growth of private security 

exacerbates inequality regarding citizens’ access to protection. 

Citizens will get the level of protection they can pay for. Those 

who are better off, and are able to purchase or enhance their own 

security, will reduce their commitment to public policing. Funding 

and support for public policing will suffer, which will ultimately 

result in lower levels of protection for the poorer and more 

vulnerable segments of society.

6. Reputational Concerns. Inadequate performance or improper 

conduct by private security personnel may produce reputational 

or litigation risk for public police if the public police have formally 

recognized, qualified, trained, contracted, or in some other way 

recognized or validated the operations of private operators. Such 

operators should therefore be kept at arm’s length.

7. Threats to Police Jobs. Increased availability of lower skilled 

and lower paid security jobs, coupled with the contracting out of 

some police tasks to the private sector, may undermine job security 

and limit career prospects for public police. Competition from the 

private sector is inherently unfair because of their tolerance for 

lower training standards and access to cheaper labor.

*The term “stateness” has been used by other commentators as an umbrella term to cover a broader range of public-interest concerns. Several of these concerns, 

including loss of equity in public security and loss of public accountability, appear as separate items on this list. This paper will hereafter use the “stateness” 

term to focus more narrowly on the importance of judicious balancing of competing interests and values.
10 | New Perspectives in Policing

One of the ironies of private security 

is that it is least affordable by the very 

neighbourhoods that tend to need it the 

most. ... [Private security thus] serves the 

interests of wealthy and ruling elites. ...

Privatized enclaves are in a sense an 

abandonment of the public realm in 

security. They represent a ‘secession of the 

successful’ from the rest of society.34

Four Scenarios

The Executive Session group discussed the subject 

of private security at our June 2013 meeting at 

Harvard, using hypothetical scenarios specially 

prepared to serve as the basis for discussion. These 

four hypotheticals illustrate common dilemmas 

and challenges that confront police executives, 

while avoiding the potential embarrassment that 

could arise from naming any particular police 

department or private organization. The chiefs 

of police present said that these hypotheticals 

were each perfectly plausible. In fact, several were 

eager to recount (under the Session’s conditions 

of confidentiality) equivalent or similar situations 

from their own experience. It also became clear, 

as the discussion proceeded, that each scenario 

raised a different combination of benefits and 

risks to be recognized and managed.

These four scenarios are presented here, each 

on a single page. The set of four is also available 

as a stand-alone document35 (without any 

commentary) for use in a training environment. 

Using these hypotheticals as a basis for classroom 

discussion would provide police executives an 

opportunity to think through the benefits and 

risks that accompany various types of public/

private engagement, and to practice using the 

specific decision sequence they would need to 

use in a real-life operational setting when similar 

situations arise. Such exercises might enhance or 

speed up issue recognition and diagnostic skills. 

To speed up the analysis, an instructor may 

choose to provide students a copy of the table 

(which represents a summary listing of issues 

culled from the literature) to prime them 

regarding the various benefits and risks to look 

for. Alternatively, participants could be left to 

work out for themselves, from scratch, what the 

relevant concerns might be.

Decision Sequence

Public police examining any private policing 

arrangement, existing or proposed (and no matter 

how complex), might follow these basic steps:

Step 1. First, work out the potential benefits 

for the public. In particular, be clear where the 

interests of the private parties involved actually 

align with, and therefore could be expected to 

advance, the public interest. Look for the benefits 

listed in the table. Does the scheme bring more 

players, more technical expertise or increased 

resources to existing public purposes?

Step 2. Work out what the accompanying risks 

or threats are for the public. Look for the types of 

risk listed in the table. Be specific about the ways 

in which public interests and private interests 

diverge. Expect to discover that public/private 

alignment of interests can vary considerably 
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 11

on different matters, even in the context of one 

specific partnership. Alignment can be good on 

some issues and bad on others at the same time, 

even between the same organizations.

Step 3. Work out what could be done through the 

actions or influence of public police (as well as 

through possible enhancements to regulation, 

oversight or accountability) to mitigate the 

specific risks identified in step 2.

Step 4. Weigh the benefits and risks, forming an 

opinion on whether the scheme, on balance, can 

be defended and promoted as being in the public 

interest.

Step 5. If it can, clarify the lines of argument that 

should be used to support the overall scheme 

as well as the actions required by public police 

to mitigate the accompanying risks. If it cannot, 

clarify the lines of argument that public police 

should use to oppose or resist it.

There is nothing particularly novel in this 

decision sequence, but it might help provide 

some structure for police executives when they 

are thinking through complex situations of this 

type. (This five-step template could readily be 

used as “study questions” for group discussion 

of the hypothetical scenarios in a training 

environment.) 

Note that this analytic sequence does not provide 

the kind of bright line that some officials wish to 

draw — a line that would neatly separate those 

functions that must always be public from those 

that can be private. The idea that public and 

private security provisions are already deeply 

intertwined and interdependent makes discovery 

or specification of such a line seem implausible. 

Rather, this analytic route uses a different bright 

line — identifying, for any proposed interaction, 

the issues on which public and private interests 

will be well aligned; at the same time, carefully 

identifying the other issues where public and 

private interests will naturally be at odds. 

Deriving the benefits of alignment while dealing 

with areas of potential conflict goes right to the 

heart of the challenge of managing partnerships 

effectively.
12 | New Perspectives in Policing

DISCUSSION OF SCENARIO 1: ELITE HOSTAGE RESCUE UNIT 

In the Executive Session discussion of scenario 1, the 

police chief officers present were troubled mostly by 

the issue of accountability, especially in relation to 

the use of potentially deadly force. If a public police 

agency deployed a private firm, the public agency 

would remain accountable for the operations of 

that firm. In complex and dangerous situations, it 

seems unlikely that the public agency could exercise 

effective command over the military unit. The need 

to exercise effective control would be particularly 

acute in this case because use-of-force doctrines differ 

markedly between military operations and civilian 

law enforcement. Military units are more oriented 

toward the use of decisive force against enemies and 

less toward apprehending violators and achieving 

peaceful resolution. The police chiefs at the Executive 

Session were quite uncomfortable with the prospect 

of being accountable for something they felt they 

could not adequately control.

SCENARIO 1 ELITE HOSTAGE RESCUE UNIT 

You are chief of police in a major U.S. city. The 

country’s military budgets are shrinking, and many 

military units withdrawn from Afghanistan face 

demobilization. Members of an elite special-forces 

unit, formerly based in your jurisdiction, have set up a 

new commercial venture offering a range of security 

services. The company, SafeConduct, has established 

its headquarters adjacent to a local airstrip and 

operates two executive jets and two helicopters. It 

offers executive hostage rescue and security services 

for major international companies, working mostly 

abroad. 

However, the company always has at least one “team” 

at home (i.e., not deployed abroad). The CEO of 

SafeConduct offers to provide armed containment 

and hostage rescue services for your department on a 

“time and materials” basis. Fees would be charged only 

upon deployment, and there would be no costs to the 

city for training or for maintaining readiness.

Readiness, he promises, is not an issue. SafeConduct 

could guarantee a team on site anywhere within 

your jurisdiction within 3 hours of notification. The 

company would provide its own communications 

system and would, for every deployment, provide a 

unit commander to act as liaison with police Incident 

Command. 

All of its unit members have extensive operational 

experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere and are 

proud that they have not “lost a hostage” in their past 

10 deployments.

Your own hostage rescue unit (a subunit within your 

SWAT team) spends two days per month training for 

this role, but has been deployed for hostage situations 

only four times in the past three years. (SWAT is 

deployed more often, of course, to deal with a broader 

range of incidents involving armed, or potentially 

armed, offenders.) None of the officers currently 

assigned to the hostage rescue unit has been involved 

in more than two actual hostage rescue operations.

A deal with SafeConduct would save the city 

substantial costs involved in training and maintaining 

your own hostage rescue capability. SafeConduct 

teams would participate in training exercises as 

required (likewise, on a time and materials basis). 

SafeConduct’s CEO explains that he is prepared to offer 

these very favorable terms because, given the nature 

of the work his company does, he views good working 

relationships with law enforcement and security 

agencies as a critical strategic asset.

The CEO hands you a recent press clipping from 

England, which describes the four “tough tests” that 

the British Labour Party recently proposed for deciding 

which aspects of police work should be contracted 

out.36 Any deal with private contractors should 

(1) represent value for money, (2) ensure security, 

(3) be transparent and accountable, and (4) foster 

public trust in the police service. He says he is confident 

that this proposal easily passes all four tests, especially 

considering the experience and skills of SafeConduct’s 

personnel and the favorable financial terms he is 

offering.
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 13

This scenario also raises questions regarding which 

parts of the policing function can reasonably be 

contracted out. The four criteria proposed by the 

British Labour Party are certainly relevant, but not 

sufficiently demanding. In contracting out policing 

functions, we also have to worry about “stateness.” 

Contracting out clearly definable tasks (such as 

servicing vehicles, monitoring alarm systems, or 

manning turnstiles at a sporting event) seems quite 

different from contracting out tasks that require 

careful balancing of competing interests, the exercise 

of judgment in determining the public interest,

 or the use of force against citizens. Having private 

contractors perform carefully circumscribed guard 

duties seems more obviously acceptable than having 

them deal with domestic violence calls or attend to 

neighborhood disputes.

Public agencies should contract out only those 

functions that pass all of the following tests:37

a. The services to be purchased are clearly definable 

and separable from other duties of the public 

agency.

b. Unambiguous performance standards can be set, 

and the public agency has contract oversight staff 

qualified and capable of monitoring and enforcing 

those standards.

c. A series of graduated sanctions can be applied 

to the contractor, through contract provisions, 

to correct any instances of poor performance. 

(This avoids the “all or nothing” trap when the 

agency’s only recourse is to take the difficult step of 

canceling a contract.)

d. An efficient and competitive market exists for the 

services being purchased. (This guarantees value 

for money and prevents the agency from being 

stuck with an underperforming provider due to a 

lack of viable alternatives.)

e. The market price for the services is lower than the 

cost to the agency of providing the services itself.

f. “Stateness” is not an issue, as the service does 

not require the use of complex judgments about 

competing interests or the use of force against 

citizens.

g. Profit motives, coupled with the contract pricing 

structure, will not produce perverse incentives. 

(If such distortions seem likely, then item b 

above becomes of paramount importance in 

counteracting biased incentives.)

SafeConduct’s proposal fails to satisfy conditions b, d, 

and f. If SafeConduct’s elite unit is better trained and 

more experienced than agency personnel, it seems 

unlikely that clear performance standards could be 

established and maintained, especially during a highintensity operation. In the absence of a competitive 

market, once the agency has disbanded its own 

hostage rescue unit, it may become too dependent 

on the one available supplier. Also, for the reasons 

discussed above, public police executives will not be 

comfortable being held accountable for something 

they cannot sufficiently control.

From the table, the most relevant risks for this 

scenario are (1) Lack of Accountability and (3) Loss 

of “Stateness.” The proposal could also pose risk 

(4) Threats to Public Safety, given the differences 

between military and civilian use-of-force doctrines. 

The proposal brings benefits too, as it might produce 

(1) Increased Effectiveness Through Public/Private 

Partnerships, (4) Access to Specialized Skills and 

Technical Resources, and (5) Efficiencies Through 

Contracting Out. 

Participants in the Executive Session discussion, even 

while they were unwilling to accept the proposal 

as offered, were eager to find a way to realize these 

benefits. (As one police chief commented, “I wouldn’t 

kick this one to the curb.”) They discussed possible 

variations of the proposal, such as buying training 

from SafeConduct and renting technical equipment, 

while ensuring that the use of force in operational 

settings remained the preserve of public police 

officers. 

Given the infrequent nature of hostage situations and 

the highly specialized nature of the related training, 

participants were also keen to realize efficiencies 

of scale. To do that, they wanted to explore other 

mechanisms, such as the creation of regional 

consortia, shared services models spanning multiple 

jurisdictions, or even buying specialist services from a 

bigger police department close by — all mechanisms 

that would preserve the essential “stateness” when it 

came to the use of deadly force.
14 | New Perspectives in Policing

DISCUSSION OF SCENARIO 2: NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH 

The second scenario illustrates many of the 

dangers associated with vigilantism and aggressive 

neighborhood watch patrols. The literature on private 

policing and security clearly alerts us to these dangers. 

In a 2013 article called “Watching the Watchers: The 

Growing Privatization of Criminal Law Enforcement 

and the Need for Limits on Neighborhood Watch 

Associations,” Sharon Finegan warns that 

“... neighborhood watch members wield significant 

authority, but they lack the training and limitations 

to which police are subject.”38 Finegan proposes 

statutory controls that would limit the ability of 

neighborhood watch members to confront suspects, 

mandate training, and expand exclusionary rules 

to bar the admission of evidence seized illegally by 

private citizens engaged in law enforcement activities. 

SCENARIO 2 NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH 

You are chief of police in a major U.S. city. The 

population of the city is racially diverse, but largely 

segregated at the neighborhood level. Your 

Community Outreach Program collaborates on a 

formal and frequent basis with 27 Neighborhood 

Watch Associations (NHWAs), which your Program 

Officers helped establish.

Your deputy chief, who is African-American, 

has an 11-year-old son, Jason. Jason has told his 

dad that he and all the other black kids in the 

Montvale neighborhood no longer dare walk 

through Compton — a predominantly white 

neighborhood — on their way to and from school. 

The quickest route from Montvale to the (newly 

integrated) school lies through three pedestrian 

walkways that pass underneath the highway 

separating the two neighborhoods. The Compton 

NHWA patrols apparently set up checkpoints close to 

these walkways and question any kids who pass by, 

sometimes asking them to open up their backpacks. 

The Compton NHWA patrols openly carry weapons. 

The state has a “stand your ground” law. There have 

been no reports of violence or of the Compton patrols 

actually using physical force. But, clearly, the Montvale 

schoolchildren are intimidated, and many have chosen 

to use longer routes to school, adding at least 15 

minutes to their journey each way.

Your senior management team has discussed the 

situation. Your general counsel advises that the 

neighborhood patrols, provided they do not use 

physical force, are merely acting as private citizens and 

have not committed any offense. Also, they cannot be 

held accountable should their patrol patterns suggest 

racial bias because they are not public police and have 

not been formally deputized. Counsel advises the only 

legal remedy lies in civil lawsuits. 

The captain in charge of the Community Outreach 

Program has discussed the situation with the 

Compton NHWA coordinator, who denies any racial 

bias and reports that focusing on schoolchildren 

passing through has eliminated a significant rash of 

late-afternoon domestic burglaries in the Compton 

neighborhood. Your Compstat director confirms this 

was a growing problem and that it evaporated over 

recent weeks.

In the wake of the Treyvon Martin tragedy, 20 of your 

27 NHWAs have voluntarily agreed to stop carrying 

any weapons and to strictly limit their activities to an 

“observe and report” role. Your Deputy has suggested 

an urgent policy change, whereby the department 

would officially and publicly dissociate itself from any 

NHWAs that choose not to adopt this restriction.

While you are considering your options, you also learn 

from your public relations officer that the Montvale 

NHWA, incensed by the intimidation and humiliation 

their children have suffered, and who also openly carry 

weapons, are considering escorting their children 

through Compton in the mornings and afternoons. 

The city’s major newspapers want to know how your 

department plans to deal with the deteriorating 

situation.
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 15

But using regulation as the mechanism for protecting 

civil liberties might be fraught with difficulties, even if 

such legislation could ever pass. Neighborhood watch 

is often conducted by volunteers, many of them selfappointed or belonging to loosely formed informal 

networks. An “association” might not actually exist 

in any formal sense and would therefore be hard to 

control through regulatory oversight. Moreover, the 

introduction of stringent requirements might deter 

many volunteers. Hence, the only controls generally 

available might indeed be those pertaining to the 

conduct of ordinary citizens. 

Finegan also points out that the procedural rules 

and law used to limit racial profiling by police do not 

extend to private security companies nor to ordinary 

citizens. Companies may train their staff to be 

unbiased, but such training is most unlikely to reach 

neighborhood watch groups. 

Burdened by (and perhaps unaware of) their 

own individual biases, coupled with the 

lack of procedural safeguards or training, 

neighborhood watch members may act on their 

biases and target individual suspects on the 

basis of race or ethnicity. ... 

While more and more private actors are 

performing the tasks previously associated with 

police officers, constitutional safeguards have 

not been extended to the conduct of private 

actors.39

In the scenario, several risks are clearly apparent. The 

relevant ones from the table are:

1. Lack of Accountability. As the police 

department’s general counsel observes, the only 

forms of legal accountability — those pertaining to 

private citizens — are not adequate for governing 

the behavior of the neighborhood patrols.

2. Threats to Civil Liberties. Armed patrols 

searching backpacks and intimidating 

schoolchildren to the point where they will choose 

circuitous detours rather than risk an encounter is 

clearly not acceptable.

3. Loss of “Stateness.” We clearly cannot trust the 

neighborhood watch volunteers in Compton to 

balance the multiple and conflicting rights of 

different groups or individuals. They are totally 

focused on the security concerns of their own 

community and pay little heed to others’ rights or 

the importance of any broader public tranquility.

4. Threats to Public Safety. The situation is 

deteriorating, and the treatment of the Montvale 

children by Compton patrols is producing genuine 

hostility between communities and could even 

lead to conflict between armed groups.

5. Reputational Concerns. The police department, 

by virtue of its working collaboration with the 

neighborhood watch groups, becomes at least in 

part responsible for their conduct.

It is evident that this situation scores very heavily 

on the “Risk” side, triggering five of the seven 

major categories of concern. But it also shows some 

potential benefits, which may include increased 

effectiveness in crime control (Benefits: (1) Increased 

Effectiveness Through Public/Private Partnerships) 

and engagement of the community in setting the 

agenda and achieving results (Benefits: (2) Alignment 

With the Ideals of Community Policing).

Clearly, in this scenario the risks outweigh the benefits. 

But that does not necessarily mean that the police 

should automatically dissociate themselves from any 

patrol groups whose tactics seem unacceptable. They 

should not (like the general counsel) throw up their 

hands and say “we have no legal way to control them.” 

The police, by virtue of their relationship with these 

groups, can exert influence over them and use that 

influence to re-establish public priorities. 

Police might emphasize with these groups, and with 

the broader public, that protecting life and liberty

takes precedence over protecting property, and that 

to get any support from the police department, a 

group formed to protect a neighborhood should 

also take responsibility for preserving safety and 

protecting civil liberties within their neighborhood 

and for anyone passing through it. Otherwise, that 

group’s mission is inherently unbalanced and not 

sufficiently public. The police might even make it 

clear that they will intervene whenever the actions 

of a neighborhood watch group elevate one 

neighborhood’s concerns at the expense of a broader 

and more balanced public agenda, or endanger public 

safety through the exercise of poor judgment. 
16 | New Perspectives in Policing

DISCUSSION OF SCENARIO 3: STATE SAFETY ASSOCIATION 

On its face, the proposal to create a State Safety 

Association may score some points in the “Benefits” 

column: (1) Increased Effectiveness Through Public/

Private Partnerships, (2) Alignment With the Ideals 

of Community Policing, and possibly (4) Access to 

Specialized Skills and Technical Resources. 

The specific benefits of the proposal are all rather 

obvious: better training for private security personnel, 

substantial financial support for a public training 

facility, enhanced information and intelligence sharing 

across the public/private divide, and the prospect 

of enhanced effectiveness through operational 

collaboration between public police and members of 

the association.

SCENARIO 3 STATE SAFETY ASSOCIATION

You are chief of a U.S. state police department. The 

Governor’s chief of staff calls to ask your opinion of a 

proposal that has been presented to the Governor by a 

consortium comprising three large security companies 

that, between them, share 80 percent of the private 

security industry revenues for the whole state. They 

propose to establish a State Safety Association as 

a vehicle for enhanced collaboration between the 

private security industry and public police. The 

Governor believes in the value and effectiveness of 

public/private partnerships and has championed their 

use in many areas of public policy.

Under the plan, members of the proposed State Safety 

Association would be able to:

● Send selected employees to various courses 

offered by the State Police Academy and have them 

certified by the academy as proficient in the relevant 

subjects.

● Publicly display the phrase “Member of the State 

Safety Association” on their insignia, documents 

and websites.

● Develop a deeper collaboration with the state 

police and other local police agencies in the form of 

threat-based intelligence-sharing networks.

Each company would pay a substantial annual fixedfee subscription in the form of unrestricted revenue 

for your academy. Each would also pay variable fees 

per student/course attended by its staff, with fees set 

high enough to be an attractive financial proposition 

for the state. All the details, of course, remain open to 

negotiation.

All three members of the consortium have recruited 

retired senior police officers to sit on their governing 

boards or hold executive-level positions. The largest 

company hired your predecessor (former chief of 

state police), whom you know well, as its CEO. All 

three companies profess their commitment to public 

safety and their desire to make major and high-quality 

contributions to public security.

When the idea first surfaced, police unions were 

vehemently opposed. In a public statement, the 

Patrolman’s Association President declared, 

“Corruption is defined as the abuse of public resources 

for private gain. Using the resources and staff of the 

State Police Academy to advantage private for-profit 

commercial companies fits the bill exactly. Such a deal 

would be blatantly corrupt.”

Noting union opposition, the consortium members 

then offered to include the provision that each 

member company within the association would be 

obliged to offer paid details for off-duty state police 

officers at an aggregate level not to fall below 5,000 

hours per year per company. “This would be valuable,” 

a consortium spokesman said, “to guarantee the 

quality and depth of the relationship. The presence 

of public police officers on company projects will 

enhance the professionalism of our own staff and keep 

us focused on critical public purposes.”

The Governor is eager to understand your views. 

Several other security companies have complained to 

the state’s Commerce Department that this scheme 

would disadvantage smaller and newer players within 

the security industry and constitutes anti-competitive 

trade practice by the “big three.” 
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 17

However, the proposition described threatens to 

seriously muddy the waters between public and 

private interests, and thereby presents some serious 

and rather subtle threats to the “stateness” of security 

provision (Risks: (3) Loss of Stateness). 

All the risks associated with “revolving door” 

situations (discussed above) are evident. Public 

police executives might find their loyalties to old 

colleagues (now in corporate roles) in conflict with 

their public responsibilities. They may have trouble 

saying “no” when they should. Some police officials, 

contemplating their future prospects and potentially 

lucrative career options, might be tempted to grant 

favors or simply get too close to the commercial 

companies’ for-profit agendas. 

This scenario also serves to remind police executives 

that large corporations are sophisticated when it 

comes to strategy. As one of the participants in the 

Executive Session commented, 

... you can deal with the neighborhood 

watches ... you may be even able to deal with 

the business improvement districts and the 

universities you’ve got, but can you deal with 

these multi-billion dollar companies that are 

going to come in and offer you deals, and all 

the rest of it, and you really think you’re still in 

control?

Forming an association of the “big three” established 

firms and creating a substantial financial hurdle for 

entry (the requirement to provide an unrestricted 

subsidy to the police college) could well be designed 

as an anti-competitive strategy, a way of marginalizing 

or creating a disadvantage for newer and smaller 

companies. The use of insignia that signal the 

government’s blessing creates significant reputational 

risk for those public agencies and public officials 

involved (Risks: (6) Reputational Concerns). 

The union first cries foul, worried that private agents 

given the same training as public police could no 

longer be denigrated as poorly trained substitutes 

for real police (Risks: (7) Threats to Police Jobs). The 

union at first seizes the moral high ground (“this 

is corruption”), but is then placated when the 

corporations offer a bribe in the form a lucrative 

package of paid details for public police officers.

Perhaps the most worrying aspect of this proposal is 

that there seems to be no way out of the arrangement, 

no available exit. The corporations would have it so. 

The police college will become dependent on the 

corporate funding stream. The revolving door will 

keep turning. The lines between public and private 

purposes will become increasingly blurred. Also, when 

an important decision looms that finally reveals the 

misalignment between public and private interests, 

the public decision-makers may find themselves 

compromised, too deep in the muddied waters to be 

able to extract themselves and pursue a clear public 

agenda. This is how corruption in the public sector 

often begins.

Clarity regarding public policing purposes demands 

some reasonable distance between public and 

commercial agendas. It seems just fine, highly 

desirable in fact, for public agencies to engage with 

private organizations through partnerships governed 

by suitably crafted frameworks and protocols. But 

public police who become inextricably intertwined 

with commerce, as with this proposal, would seem to 

be asking for trouble in the long term.
18 | New Perspectives in Policing

DISCUSSION OF SCENARIO 4: PRIVATE UNIVERSITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

The fourth scenario provides a clear reminder that 

public and private interests can be well aligned with 

respect to some issues and very poorly aligned (even 

diametrically opposed) with respect to others. What 

that means, in practice, is that a specific public/private 

relationship (in this case, the relationship between the 

public police agency and the private university police 

department) might provide opportunities for fruitful 

collaboration (Benefits: (1) Increased Effectiveness 

Through Public/Private Partnerships and (2) Alignment 

With the Ideals of Community Policing) at the same 

time as it may endanger the public interest when 

nonaligned public and private agendas become 

entangled (Risks: (3) Loss of “Stateness”). 

This occurs often in other regulatory domains, where 

a regulated industry’s incentives align with public 

purposes in some areas but not in others. In civil 

aviation, for example, business interests and public 

interests align extremely closely on flight safety issues. 

A major plane crash is not only a human tragedy; it is 

SCENARIO 4 PRIVATE UNIVERSITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 

You are chief of police in a major city on the West Coast 

of the United States. The campus of a private university 

lies entirely within your city limits. The chief of the 

university police department (UPD) answers directly to 

the university’s general counsel, who answers directly 

to the university president. The relationship between 

your department and the UPD has always been 

excellent.

Street robberies in the vicinity of the campus have 

increased significantly over the past three years. Many 

victims are university students. Attacks, many of them 

involving a weapon, have occurred both on and off 

campus. Students are routinely advised not to resist 

and to give up their possessions if confronted. Most of 

them do so, and robberies have involved few injuries 

and no fatalities. However, in one assault that occurred 

off campus, two female Chinese students were badly 

beaten with tire irons and are now hospitalized with 

serious injuries. Detectives have suggested that these 

particular students might not have understood what 

their attackers were asking for.

Your public relations officer has been fielding media 

inquiries about this particular attack. She asks for 

your advice because she has now been asked by her 

counterpart at the UPD to play down — or preferably 

not mention at all — that the victims were students at 

the university. The UPD press officer has stressed that 

there was really no link between the crime and the 

fact that these were university students, given the offcampus location where the attack occurred. 

Your public relations officer shows you the latest annual 

Clery Act40 report from the university. An appendix 

shows figures that clearly reveal an escalating trend 

in robberies and reported rapes over the past three 

years. But the text of the report fails to mention those 

phenomena and presents a reassuring picture of a 

safe environment with declining overall crime rates. 

Your public relations officer also shows you a recent 

article from a student-run newspaper, prompted by 

the trend in the rape figures. Student reporters had 

interviewed the university’s general counsel, who 

said rates remained very low compared with national 

averages and that he believed the rise in the complaint 

rate was a direct result of a campaign run last year 

by the Student Welfare and Advisory Services, which 

encouraged sexual assault victims to come forward to 

university authorities.

Apparently, the university’s admissions office has been 

getting more and more inquiries about campus safety 

from college advisors at feeder schools. Also, with 

the local economy in the doldrums, the university 

has been aggressively pursuing foreign enrollments, 

particularly from Asia, and would not want any 

publicity that directly linked the university with this 

recent and particularly vicious attack or with the 

escalating pattern of assaults and robberies in the 

vicinity. The college has just mailed its annual batch 

of admission offers and wants to avoid any adverse 

publicity, especially publicity that might reach China. 

Such adverse publicity could lower the yield41 on their 

offers.
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 19

also a business catastrophe. Airlines, if held culpable 

for a crash, often end up going out of business, are 

taken over, or at least have to change their name. The 

business costs of a safety failure are enormous. Hence 

we see quite naturally, on safety issues, a rather close 

and collaborative working partnership between 

regulators and the regulated.

But what about consumer protection issues for airline 

passengers? Should we trust the airlines’ private 

incentives with respect to practices such as aggressive 

ticket pricing, gouging consumers with excessive or 

unexpected baggage fees, imprisoning them too long 

in planes on the tarmac, endangering their long-term 

health by providing inadequate leg room42 or making 

it impossible or inconvenient for them to use their 

frequent flyer miles? On these and other consumer 

protection issues, the more the airlines can get away 

with, the more profitable they become.43

Similarly, in banking regulation, the nature of the 

relationship between regulators and the regulated 

varies by the type of risk. Prudential regulation

(ensuring the solvency of financial institutions) serves 

the long-term interests of the banks as well as the 

stability of the overall financial system. By contrast, on 

consumer protection issues (e.g., cheating customers, 

deceptive marketing, imposing excessive fees) the 

relationship is more naturally adversarial, as public 

and commercial interests diverge.

Considering the nature of the relationship between 

public and private police, Joh (2006) puts this 

beautifully: 

... private police neither work under the direction 

of the public police, nor cooperate fully even 

when the public police would wish them to. 

Instead, private police managers cooperate 

with the public police when doing so serves 

their interests or, more specifically, their clients’ 

interests. Thus, passive non-cooperation is 

also an important aspect of the relationship 

between the two groups.44

When scenario 4 was discussed at the Executive 

Session, several of the police chiefs present guessed 

that this scenario had been fashioned based on 

the conduct of specific universities within their 

jurisdictions. In other words, the general features of 

this story (putting aside the precise details) seemed 

commonplace.

I would argue that the tensions described in this 

scenario will always be commonplace, simply because 

they are perfectly natural and therefore predictable. 

They still have to be managed, of course.

On issues of safety, both on and off campus, the 

interests of public police and the private interests of 

the university are almost perfectly aligned. Less crime 

is good for everybody, and public police and university 

police will therefore work quite well together toward 

that end. If they do disagree on crime control, the 

disagreements will more likely be about the suitability 

of means than about the desirability of ends.45

But what about transparency regarding levels of 

crime? Here the interests diverge markedly. The 

public interest demands full and free disclosure, 

without any bias or editorial framing, so that members 

of the public — including students and prospective 

students — can know the risks, adjust their actions 

accordingly, and properly assess the performance of 

relevant policing agencies (both public and private).

But the university, particularly when trying to attract 

students, has a natural and strong interest in painting 

a rosy picture. University police may therefore be 

tempted to downplay, de-emphasize or even mask 

reality. That explains the need for federal legislation 

(the Clery Act, 1990) that governs the frequency 

and nature of disclosures regarding crimes on or 

near university campuses and involving university 

students. Regulation was not necessary to make 

the university care about safety, but regulation was 

required to make them care about transparency.

The lesson for public police is clear. You don’t have one

relationship with any private policing organization; 

you have different relationships with them on different 

issues. On some matters they are your natural ally, and 

interactions will be cordial and cooperative. On other 

issues, you must treat their motivations with suspicion, 

expect to see something less than full disclosure, and 

be prepared to intervene when they adopt tactics 

that endanger public safety, threaten civil liberties, or 

pursue private interests at the expense of the broader 

public good. There will always be some issues where 

their interests are diametrically opposed to the public 

interest. Public police need to be adept at recognizing 

those areas, be prepared to enforce compliance with 

regulatory requirements, and take it upon themselves 

to act in a way that will rebalance the public agenda. 
20 | New Perspectives in Policing

Conclusion

Private security and private policing have 

become inescapable. It is no longer useful for 

public police to hang on to their own regrets 

about these trends, bemoan their loss of market 

share, or pretend that public/private partnerships 

cannot be useful. There are too many reasons to 

embrace the idea that private contributions can 

and should contribute to public purposes.

But that does not mean that the risks associated 

with private policing can be ignored. Grounds for 

concern remain. Our conclusion must surely be 

that each one of these grounds for concern, and 

in each situation in which they arise, represents 

work to be done by public police. The police 

profession should treat these concerns as policy 

and operational challenges to be managed rather 

than as grounds for disengagement.

As public police engage in partnerships and 

networked relationships involving private 

and not-for-profit organizations, they become 

less the deliverers of security and more the 

orchestrators of security provision. Public police 

need to understand clearly the motivations and 

capabilities of each contributor, develop an 

understanding of the whole system and what it 

provides, and do their utmost to make sure that 

overall provision of security squares with their 

public purpose.

As one Executive Session participant put it:

... public leadership requires you to be able 

to lead and manage public functions, both 

with the operational capacity you’ve got and 

with the wider operational capacity you 

need. That’s the test of public leadership ...

if you keep wanting to only do policing 

through people who report to you, who you 

can discipline, and you can hire and fire, 

we’re dead, we’re never going to get the job 

done.

Taking responsibility for the overall provision 

includes taking responsibility for the distribution 

of protection across society. It is the responsibility 

of public police to monitor the quality of security 

in different neighborhoods, to find out who is 

well protected and who is not, and to find a way 

to address the deficits.

It is also the responsibility of public police to look 

ahead — to pay attention not just to the parts 

of traditional police function that they might 

lose, but also be prepared to explore new areas 

that public police have mostly left to the private 

sector. Law enforcement has engaged relatively 

little with identity fraud, financial fraud, health 

care fraud, other white collar crime and Internetbased crimes. Security threats, familiar and 

unfamiliar, will surely demand an expanded 

repertoire of collaborative arrangements.

It is my hope that this paper provides a clear 

framework that police executives can use to 

examine their interactions with private policing 

and to determine more readily how to maximize 

the benefits to society while minimizing the 

associated risks. 
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 21

Endnotes

1. The police departments in many state-run

(i.e., public) university systems have the same 

authority and training standards as public police 

and are accountable to public officials. Police 

departments in many private university settings 

answer directly to university administrators and 

are not formally accountable to any public official.

2. Bayley, David H., and Clifford D. Shearing, 

The New Structure of Policing: Description, 

Conceptualization, and Research Agenda, 

Monograph, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Justice, National Institute of Justice, NCJ 187083, 

July 2001.

3. Ibid., vii.

4. van Steden, Ronald, and Jaap de Waard, “Acting 

Like Chameleons: On the McDonaldization of 

Private Security,” Security Journal 26 (2013): 294-

309, published online, May 13, 2013, see table 1, 

which provides a country-by-country breakdown.

5. Sklansky, David A., “Private Policing and 

Human Rights,” Law & Ethics of Human Rights 

5 (1) (2011): 111-136, 114.

6. Stein, Chris, “As Cities Lay Off Police, Frustrated 

Neighborhoods Turn to Private Cops,” Christian 

Science Monitor (April 5, 2013).

7. Sarre, Rick, and Tim Prenzler, Private Security 

and Public Interest: Exploring Private Security 

Trends and Directions for Reform in the New 

Era of Plural Policing, Report, Canberra, ACT: 

Australian Research Council, LP0669518, April 

2011: 5, 14.

8. Sklansky, “Private Policing and Human Rights,” 

116.

9. White, Adam, The Politics of Private Security: 

Regulation, Reform and Re-Legitimation, 

Basingstoke, England: Palgrave McMillan, 2010.

10. Ibid., 181-182.

11. Margaret Thatcher was leader of the 

Conservative Party in the U.K. from 1975 to 1990 

and Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990.

12. The “New Labour” philosophy was used as the 

British Labour Party’s campaign platform from 

1994 onward. With Tony Blair and Gordon Brown 

as Prime Ministers, the Labour Party held power 

from 1997 to 2010.

13. Chan, Szu Ping, and agencies, “Timeline: 

How G4S’s Bungled Olympics Security Contract 

Unfolded,” Daily Telegraph, May 21, 2014. Available 

online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/

newsbysector/supportservices/10070425/

Timeline-how-G4Ss-bungled-Olympics-securitycontract-unfolded.html.

14. White, The Politics of Private Security: 

Regulation, Reform and Re-Legitimation, 182.

15. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects the 

number of private security guards to grow by 

19 percent from 1 million to 1.2 million by 2020. 

“Private Security Industry Poised for Highest 
22 | New Perspectives in Policing

Growth Rate in Nine Years,” PRWeb, March 14, 

2012. Available online: http://www.prweb.com/

releases/2012/3/prweb9277026.htm.

16. Joh, Elizabeth E., “The Forgotten Threat: 

Private Policing and the State,” Indiana Journal 

of Global Legal Studies 13 (2) (2006): 357-389, 377.

17. Ibid., 388.

18. Marx, Gary T., “The Interweaving of Public and 

Private Police Undercover Work,” in C. Shearing 

and P. Stenning, Private Policing, Newbury Park, 

California: Sage Publications, 1987. Quotes 

attributed to Ghezzi, S., “A Private Network of 

Social Control: Insurance Investigation Units,” 

Social Problems 30 (5) (1983): 521-531.

19. Marx, “The Interweaving of Public and Private 

Police Undercover Work,” 5.

20. Ibid., 7.

21. For a comprehensive study of the legal and 

constitutional issues surrounding the conduct 

of private police and various approaches to 

regulating their behavior, see Sklansky, David 

A., “The Private Police,” UCLA Law Review 46 (4) 

(1999): 1165-1287, 1245-1246.

22. van Buuren, Jelle, and Monica den Boer, 

A Report on the Ethical Issues Raised by the 

Increasing Role of Private Security Professionals 

in Security Analysis and Provision, Oslo, Norway: 

International Peace Research Institute, December 

2009, 51, citing Schneider, S., in “Privatizing 

Economic Crime Enforcement: Exploring the 

Role of Private Sector Investigative Agencies in 

Combating Money Laundering,” Policing and 

Society 16 (3) (2006): 285-312, 305.

23. Marx, at note 9.

24. van Buuren and den Boer, A Report on the 

Ethical Issues Raised by the Increasing Role of 

Private Security Professionals in Security Analysis 

and Provision, 51. 

25. Ibid., 51.

26. Joh, “The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing 

and the State,” 388.

27. The same is true of the London Tube bombings 

in 2005.

28. U.S. National Advisor y Committee on 

Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report of 

the Task Force on Private Security, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1976, 18.

29. Joh, Elizabeth E., “The Paradox of Private 

Policing,” UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper 

Series, University of California, Davis: School of 

Law, Research Paper 23, January 2009, 69.

30. Bayley and Shearing, The New Structure of 

Policing: Description, Conceptualization, and 

Research Agenda, vii.

31. Canadian discussion of the public/private 

interface has used terms such as “plural policing” 

and “the safety and security web” to describe 

collaborative contributions to a safe environment. 

See Law Commission of Canada, In Search of 

Security: The Future of Policing in Canada, Ottawa, 
Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing | 23

Ontario, Canada: Law Commission of Canada, 

2013, xiii.

32. Bayley and Shearing, The New Structure of 

Policing: Description, Conceptualization, and 

Research Agenda, viii.

33. Sklansky provides a seminal discussion of 

the underlying legal issues. See Sklansky, David 

A., “The Private Police,” UCLA Law Review 46 (4) 

(1999): 1165-1287, 1245-1246. For a discussion 

of the role that the language of human rights 

might play in discussions of private policing, see 

Sklansky, David A., “Private Policing and Human 

Rights,” Law & Ethics of Human Rights 5 (1) (2011): 

111-136. 

34. van Buuren and den Boer, A Report on the 

Ethical Issues Raised by the Increasing Role of 

Private Security Professionals in Security Analysis 

and Provision, 31-32.

35. A single pdf f ile containing all four 

hypotheticals is downloadable from the

Program in Criminal Justice website: http://

w w w.hks.harvard.edu/programs/criminal

justice/research-publications/executivesessions/executive-session-on-policing-andpublic-safety-2008-2014/publications.

36. Ross, Tim, “Rush to Hire Private Companies 

for Public Policing ‘Will be Halted,’” The Telegraph, 

October 3, 2012. 

37. For detailed analysis of the factors influencing 

privatization decisions, see Donahue, John D., 

The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private 

Means, New York: Basic Books, 1989. Also, 

Waldersee, Robert, and Michael Nest, “Corruption 

Risks in NSW Government Procurement: The 

Risk Management Challenge,” Keeping Good 

Companies 64 (4) (May 2012): 207-211. This list 

is the author’s own compilation, derived from 

a variety of sources and discussions on publicsector integrity and risk management.

38. Finegan, Sharon, “Watching the Watchers: 

The Growing Privatization of Criminal Law 

Enforcement and the Need for Limits on 

Neighborhood Watch Associations,” University 

of Massachusetts Law Review 8 (1) (2013): 88-134. 

39. Ibid., 125, 130.

40. The Clery Act (1990) requires colleges and 

universities to publicly disclose campus crime 

rates on an annual basis and specifies precisely 

which crime types must be reported.

41. The proportion of students offered admission 

who subsequently accept the offer.

42. Cramped conditions on long flights exacerbate 

the risk of deep-vein thrombosis.

43. Reputational concerns, for reputable airlines, 

act to some degree (and only in competitive 

markets) to realign public and private interests 

with respect to consumer protection issues.

44. Joh, “The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing 

and the State,” 386.

45. Disagreements about means often arise 

because the university is inclined to provide 

a protect ive a nd somewhat per m issive 
24 | New Perspectives in Policing

environment for students, and even tolerate 

or manage offending without recourse to 

law enforcement. University police can find 

themselves complicit in concealing offenses from 

the attention of public police agencies. 

References

Bayley, David H., and Clifford D. Shearing. 

The New Structure of Policing: Description, 

Conceptualization, and Research Agenda. 

Monograph. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Justice, National Institute of Justice, NCJ 187083, 

July 2001.

Joh, Elizabeth E. “The Forgotten Threat: Private 

Policing and the State.” Indiana Journal of Global 

Legal Studies 13 (2) (2006): 357-389.

Marx, Gary T. “The Interweaving of Public and 

Private Police Undercover Work,” in C. Shearing 

and P. Stenning, Private Policing. Newbury Park, 

California: Sage Publications, 1987. 

Sklansky, David A. “The Private Police.” UCLA 

Law Review 46 (4) (1999): 1165-1287.

Sklansky, David A. “Private Policing and Human 

Rights.” Law & Ethics of Human Rights 5 (1) (2011): 

111-136.

White, Adam. The Politics of Private Security: 

Regulation, Reform and Re-Legitimation. 

Basingstoke, England: Palgrave McMillan, 2010.

Author Note

Malcolm K. Sparrow is professor of the Practice 

of Public Management at the John F. Kennedy 

School of Government at Harvard University. This 

bulletin was written for the Executive Session on 

Policing and Public Safety at the school. 

The author acknowledges the valuable support 

of Anthony Bator in providing a literature search 

and research assistance. He also acknowledges 

the helpful feedback and suggestions of David 

Bayley, Christine Cole, Ed Davis, Thom Feucht 

and Darrel Stephens, based on earlier drafts.



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Members of the Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety

Chief Edward Flynn, Milwaukee 

Police Department

Colonel Rick Fuentes, Superintendent, New Jersey State Police

District Attorney George Gascón, San 

Francisco District Attorney’s Office 

Mr. Gil Kerlikowske, Director, Office of 

National Drug Control Policy

Professor John H. Laub, Distinguished 

University Professor, Department of 

Criminology and Criminal Justice, College of 

Behavioral and Social Sciences, University 

of Maryland, and former Director of the 

National Institute of Justice

Chief Susan Manheimer, San Mateo 

Police Department 

Superintendent Garry McCarthy, Chicago 

Police Department

Professor Tracey Meares, Walton Hale 

Hamilton Professor of Law, Yale Law School 

Dr. Bernard K. Melekian, Director, Office 

of Community Oriented Policing Services 

(retired), United States Department of 

Justice

Ms. Sue Rahr, Director, Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission

Commissioner Charles Ramsey,

Philadelphia Police Department

Professor Greg Ridgeway, Associate 

Professor of Criminology, University of 

Pennsylvania, and former Acting Director, 

National Institute of Justice

Professor David Sklansky, Yosef 

Osheawich Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law 

Mr. Sean Smoot, Director and Chief Legal Counsel, Police Benevolent and Protective 

Association of Illinois

Professor Malcolm Sparrow, Professor 

of Practice of Public Management, John F. 

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 

University

Mr. Darrel Stephens, Executive Director, 

Major Cities Chiefs Association

Mr. Christopher Stone, President, Open Society Foundations

Mr. Richard Van Houten, President, Fort 

Worth Police Officers Association

Lieutenant Paul M. Weber, Los Angeles 

Police Department

Professor David Weisburd, Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law and Criminal Justice, 

Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University; 

and Distinguished Professor, Department 

of Criminology, Law and Society, George 

Mason University

Dr. Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, 

Police Executive Research Forum

Commissioner Anthony Batts, Baltimore 

Police Department

Professor David Bayley, Distinguished Professor (Emeritus), School of Criminal 

Justice, State University of New York at 

Albany

Professor Anthony Braga, Senior Research 

Fellow, Program in Criminal Justice Policy 

and Management, John F. Kennedy School 

of Government, Harvard University; and 

Don M. Gottfredson Professor of EvidenceBased Criminology, School of Criminal 

Justice, Rutgers University

Chief Jane Castor, Tampa Police Department

Ms. Christine Cole (Facilitator), Executive Director, Program in Criminal Justice Policy 

and Management, John F. Kennedy School 

of Government, Harvard University

Commissioner Edward Davis, Boston 

Police Department (retired)

Chief Michael Davis, Director, Public Safety 

Division, Northeastern University

Mr. Ronald Davis, Director, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, 

United States Department of Justice

Ms. Madeline deLone, Executive Director, 

The Innocence Project

Dr. Richard Dudley, Clinical and Forensic 

Psychiatrist

Learn more about the Executive Session at: 

www.NIJ.gov, keywords “Executive Session Policing”

www.hks.harvard.edu, keywords “Executive Session Policing”

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