[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-11085

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cr-00199-PGB-GJK-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

ROSS EDWARD PAULSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(October 27, 2016)

Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

Case: 16-11085 Date Filed: 10/27/2016 Page: 1 of 5 
2

PER CURIAM: 

Ross Edward Paulson appeals his 240-month sentence, imposed after he 

pleaded guilty to one count of coercion and enticement of a minor, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). On appeal, Paulson argues that his sentence, which was 120 

months above the guideline range, was substantively unreasonable because it was 

more severe than necessary to achieve the statutory goals identified in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2). Paulson specifically argues that the district court’s sentencing 

decision was “flawed” in three ways: (1) the court failed to find that Paulson’s 

conduct was outside the “heartland” of typical child-enticement cases and therefore 

rejected the guideline sentence chiefly because of its general policy disagreement 

with the Sentencing Guidelines; (2) the court improperly used the statutory 

sentencing range, rather than the Guidelines, as its “lodestone” for sentencing; and 

(3) the court improperly justified its upward variance by rejecting mitigating 

factors raised by Paulson rather than by properly weighing the § 3553(a) factors. 

We see no reversible errors.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence—whether inside or 

outside the applicable guideline range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard of review. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591, 

169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden 

Case: 16-11085 Date Filed: 10/27/2016 Page: 2 of 5 
3

of showing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of the record and the 

§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).

“The review for substantive unreasonableness involves examining the 

totality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the statutory factors 

in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 

F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). That an imposed sentence is well below the 

statutory maximum is indicative of reasonableness. United States v. McKinley, 

732 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2013).

The district court’s sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the need 

for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to promote respect for 

the law, the need for adequate deterrence, the need to protect the public, and the 

need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical 

care, or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court should 

also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the guideline 

range, pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. 

Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). 

We afford deference to the district court in determining whether the 

§ 3553(a) factors justify a variance and the extent of that variance. United States v. 

Case: 16-11085 Date Filed: 10/27/2016 Page: 3 of 5 
4

Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009). A district court’s decision to impose 

a sentence outside the applicable guideline range is entitled the greatest respect 

when the court finds a particular case to be outside the “heartland” of typical cases 

to which the Sentencing Commission intended the Guidelines to apply. 

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109, 128 S. Ct. 558, 574–75, 169 L. Ed. 

2d 481 (2007). Alternatively, when the district court varies based solely on its 

view that the guideline range fails adequately to reflect the § 3553(a) factors even 

in a “mine-run case,” a “closer review” may be appropriate. Id. We will vacate a 

sentence because of a variance “only if we are left with the definite and firm 

conviction that the district judge committed a clear error of judgment in weighing 

the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Brown, 772 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 

2014) (quotation and alteration omitted).

Paulson has failed to meet his burden of showing that his sentence was 

unreasonable in the light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. See Tome, 611 

F.3d at 1378. The district court’s decision to impose an above-guideline sentence 

was not based solely on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Guidelines and 

is therefore not subject to some “closer review” under Kimbrough. See 552 U.S. at 

109, 128 S. Ct. at 574–75. The district court did not use the statutory sentencing 

range as its “lodestone” for sentencing, nor did it improperly justify its upward 

variance by rejecting mitigating factors raised by Paulson. The district court gave 

due consideration to the guideline range and clearly stated its reasons for imposing 

Case: 16-11085 Date Filed: 10/27/2016 Page: 4 of 5 
5

the upward variance; they were sufficiently compelling to support the variance 

here. See Brown, 772 F.3d at 1268. The court explicitly noted the importance of 

weighing the statutory factors and engaged in a detailed discussion of several of 

those factors, including the seriousness of the offense, the need for deterrence, the 

need to protect the public from future harm, and Paulson’s need for correctional 

treatment. In concluding that those factors justified an upward variance, the court 

considered the specific, individualized facts from Paulson’s case, including 

Paulson’s descriptions of the disturbing acts he wanted to perform, his desire to 

engage in those acts over “a few visits,” that he was given an opportunity to 

change his mind, and that he appeared with sex toys and outfits he intended to use 

in performing the disturbing acts he described. 

Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the § 3553(a) factors support 

Paulson’s sentence. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Moreover, that Paulson’s 20-

year sentence, though well above the guideline sentence, is significantly less than 

the statutory maximum penalty of life imprisonment further indicates its 

substantive reasonableness. See McKinley, 732 F.3d at 1299. Accordingly, we 

affirm Paulson’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 16-11085 Date Filed: 10/27/2016 Page: 5 of 5