U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2009

Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism

Compiled by

Major David W. Kummer

U.S. Marine Corps

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Quantico, Virginia

2014
Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Det One: U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command Detachment, 2003–2006

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2005: Into the Fray

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Combat Service Support During Operation Iraqi Freedom

U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2002: From the Sea

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kummer, David W.

 U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001/2009 : anthology and annotated bibliography / compiled by Major David W. Kummer.

 pages cm -- (U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism)

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Afghan War, 2001---Campaigns. 2. Afghan War, 2001---Personal narratives. 3. United States. Marine Corps--History--

21st century. 4. United States. Marine Corps--History--Bibliography. 5. Afghan War, 2001---Bibliography. I. Title.

 DS371.412.K86 2014

 958.104’7450973--dc23

 2014001585

PCN 10600011000

ISBN 978-0-9911588-4-3
iii

Table of Contents

Foreword ....................................................................................................................................ix

Preface ........................................................................................................................................xi

Maps......................................................................................................................................... xiv

Part I: America’s 911 Force, 2001–02

Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan

President George W. Bush.................................................................................................5

Thunderbolts: Strike First Marine Corps Blow Against Taliban

Fred H. Allison .................................................................................................................9

Afghanistan Diary 

Corps Considerations: Lessons Learned in Phase One

Arthur P. Brill Jr. ..............................................................................................................15

Le Petit Beourge du Decotiis

(1st Platoon Defense at Kandahar)

Second Lieutenant Art G. Decotiis ...................................................................................23

A Deployment To Remember: The Navy’s Seabees in Afghanistan

Lieutenant Commander Leonard W. W. Cooke, USN......................................................29

The Embassy: Kabul

Lieutenant Colonel Brian D. Perry Sr., USA .....................................................................35
iv

Leatherneck Air on Target During Operation Anaconda

First Lieutenant Jeff Landis...............................................................................................41

Bagram Nightmares

Fred H. Allison .................................................................................................................45

Part II: Rebuilding a Nation, 2003–07

Fighting “The Other War”: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–05

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret)...............................................................59

Marine Light Attack Squadron 773 (-) Reinforced Summary of Action.........................................77

From Bridgeport to Blessing

Ed Darack.........................................................................................................................85

Operation Red Wings

Ed Darack.........................................................................................................................91

The Chai Patrols—Conducting Stability Operations in Afghanistan

Colonel James A. Hogberg................................................................................................99

Interview: Major Thomas Clinton Jr.

Combat Studies Institute ..................................................................................................111

Marines Deliver in Mountain Storm

Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie, Major Roberta L. Shea, 

and Major Christopher Phelps...........................................................................................127

Artillery “Gruntz” It Out

Captain Matthew M. Maz, First Lieutenant Jason R. Gibbs, 

First Lieutenant David W. Litkenhus, and First Lieutenant Wayne A. Wood....................135

A Mission Ends 

As Army, NATO Troops Take Over in Afghanistan, 

Marines Reflect on a Tour that “You Never Forget”

Christian Lowe.................................................................................................................141

Marines Push to Take Lead in Afghanistan

Sean D. Naylor .................................................................................................................147
v

Part III: The Buildup, 2008

A Change in Mission

Kristin Henderson ............................................................................................................155

Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: 

How Different Units Adapted to Local Conditions

A U.S. Marine Platoon in Gulistan, Farah, 2008

Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, and James A. Gavrilis............................................................169

Belated Honors for Marines in Fierce Battle

Jeanette Steele...................................................................................................................177

Cobras Strike In Afghanistan

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Afghanistan

Captain Justin M. Welan..................................................................................................181

Combined Arms in Afghanistan

Major Samuel L. Meyer ....................................................................................................189

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Afghanistan: Bridge to Marine Corps’ 

Future in Afghanistan

Sergeant Scott A. Whittington..........................................................................................197

Afghanistan Deployed Aviation Combat Element Performs Above, Beyond Expectations

Sergeant Juan D. Alfonso..................................................................................................205

Interview: Captain Robert G. Barber

Marine Corps History Division ........................................................................................211

Part IV: Marineistan, 2009 

Interview: Brigadier General Lawrence D. Nicholson

Marine Corps History Division ........................................................................................231

Marines Launch Mission in Afghanistan’s South Focused on Security and Governance

Rajiv Chandrasekaran.......................................................................................................265

“Arty” In Afghanistan—“We’re Here to Shoot”

Andrew Lubin...................................................................................................................271
vi

Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: 

How Different Units Adapted to Local Conditions

U.S. Marine Battalion Nawa, Helmand, 2009

Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, and James A. Gavrilis............................................................277

With Special Operations Marines in Afghanistan

Stewart Nusbaumer ..........................................................................................................287

Religious Leader Engagement in Southern Afghanistan

Alexs Thompson...............................................................................................................293

Female Engagement Teams: The Case for More Female Civil Affairs Marines

Master Sergeant Julia L. Watson .......................................................................................305

Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

U.S. Marine Corps Police Mentor, Now Zad District, 2009

William Rosenau ..............................................................................................................313

Victory in Afghanistan

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Carroll (Ret) and 

Chief Warrant Officer-5 Terry L. Walker (Ret).................................................................317

Remarks by the President Awarding the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Dakota Meyer

President Barack H. Obama .............................................................................................323

At Afghan Outpost, Marines Gone Rogue or Leading the Fight Against Counterinsurgency?

Rajiv Chandrasekaran.......................................................................................................331

Remarks by the President in an Address to the Nation 

on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan

President Barack H. Obama..............................................................................................337

Appendices

Appendix A

Command and Staff List ..................................................................................................347

Appendix B

Unit List ...........................................................................................................................355
vii

 Appendix C

Selected Terms and Abbreviations from Operation Enduring Freedom.............................365

Appendix D

Chronology of Events, 2001–9..........................................................................................371

Appendix E

Medal of Honor Citation ..................................................................................................385

Appendix F

Selected Sources and Annotated Bibliography...................................................................387

Index..............................................................................................................................................409

ix

Foreword

This volume presents a collection of 38 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many aspects of 

the U.S. Marine Corps’ participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2009. This work 

is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines and the 

general public until the History Division completes monographs dealing with major Marine Corps 

operations during the campaign. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look 

at selected sources that currently exist until new scholarship and archival materials become available. 

Additional support for this work came from Dr. Fred H. Allison, embedded reporter Kristin Henderson, Colonel James A. Hogberg, the Center for Naval Analyses, the Combat Studies Institute, Joint 

Force Quarterly, Leatherneck Magazine, Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps University Press, Marine 

Corps Times, Military Review, Rolling Stone, The San Diego Union-Tribune, Seapower, the United States 

Institute of Peace, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, and The Washington Post for permission to reprint 

their articles. Their cooperation made this anthology possible.

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps History

xi

Preface

From the outset, some experts doubted that the U.S. Marines Corps would play a major role in Afghanistan given the landlocked nature of the battlefield. Naval expeditionary Task Force 58 (TF-58) 

commanded by then-Brigadier General James N. Mattis silenced naysayers with the farthest ranging 

amphibious assault in Marine Corps/Navy history. In late November 2001, Mattis’ force seized what 

became Forward Operating Base Rhino, Afghanistan, from naval shipping some 400 miles away. The 

historic assault not only blazed a path for follow-on forces, it also cut off fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban 

elements and aided in the seizure of Kandahar. 

While Corps doctrine and culture advocates Marine employment as a fully integrated Marine airground task force (MAGTF), deployments to Afghanistan often reflected what former Commandant 

General Charles C. Krulak coined as the “three-block war.” Following TF-58’s deployment during 

the initial take down of the Taliban regime, the MAGTF made few appearances in Afghanistan until 

2008. Before then, subsequent Marine units often deployed as a single battalion under the command 

of the U.S. Army Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to provide security for provincial reconstruction teams. The Marine Corps also provided embedded training teams to train and mentor the fledgling Afghan National Army and Police. Aviation assets sporadically deployed to support the U.S.–led 

Coalition mostly to conduct a specific mission or to bridge a gap in capability, such as close air support 

or electronic warfare to counter the improvised explosive device threat.

From 2003 to late 2007, the national preoccupation with stabilizing Iraq focused most Marine Corps 

assets on stemming the insurgency, largely centered in the restive al-Anbar Province. As a result of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) taking over command of Afghan operations and Marine 

Corps’ commitments in Iraq, relatively few Marine units operated in Afghanistan from late 2006 to 

2007. Although Marines first advocated shifting resources from al-Anbar to southern Afghanistan in 

early 2007, the George W. Bush administration delayed the Marine proposal for fear of losing the gains 

made as a result of Army General David H. Petraeus’ “surge strategy” in Iraq. 

By late 2007, the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated to the point that it inspired Rolling Stone 

to later publish the story “How We Lost the War We Won.” In recognition of the shifting tides in both 

Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration began to transfer additional resources to Afghanistan in 

early 2008. The shift prompted senior Marines to again push for a more prominent role in the Afghan 

campaign, even proposing to take over the Afghan mission from the Army. 

In Helmand Province, close to both the Taliban’s spiritual center in Kandahar and to the Pakistani border, the Taliban created its own de facto state and defeated NATO’s repeated efforts to establish control over the area. Ironically, 1950s-era United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID) projects that had been intended to harness the Helmand River’s waters to irrigate subsistence 

crops, now fed vast poppy fields, funding not only the Taliban’s efforts against the Coalition but also 

accounting for most of the world’s illicit opium production. 
xii

From 2008 to mid-2010, the precarious situation in Afghanistan led successive U.S. administrations 

to commit more resources to counter the growing insurgency. The large-scale Marine commitment, 

however, all but ceased in 2006 when the last battalion returned home. By early 2008, 2d Battalion, 

7th Marines, deployed to Afghanistan as Task Force 2/7 to begin training, mentoring, and advising 

the Afghanistan National Police. Though its deployment was intended as a one-time commitment to 

aid the hard-pressed International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Task Force 2/7’s deployment to 

southern Afghanistan marked the beginning of the Marine Corp’s long-term presence in the region. 

ISAF’s efforts to bring the insurgency in southern Afghanistan under control launched what would 

become the first of successively larger MAGTF deployments. In March 2008, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24th MEU) arrived in Helmand Province and began a series of counterinsurgency operations during Operation Azada Wosa to defeat the Taliban and stabilize the situation. The organic 

command-and-control assets of the MEU also prompted U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command 

(MarCent) to attach additional aircraft to the MEU’s aviation combat element to support the ongoing operations of Task Force 2/7. Nearing the end of its deployment, 24th MEU’s inherent flexibility again played a key role in the Marine buildup in southern Afghanistan. The MEU was designated 

to act as interim command element and bridge for the newly designated Special-Purpose MAGTF–

Afghanistan (SPMAGTF–A). 

The SPMAGTF–A continued building a Marine presence and began to develop the situation and 

construct infrastructure for follow-on forces. In May 2009, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB) 

conducted a transfer of authority with SPMAGTF–A. The brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Lawrence D. Nicholson, vastly expanded the Marine footprint in southern Afghanistan as part of 

Operation Khanjar. Nicholson unleashed the capabilities of the MAGTF and violently ejected the Taliban from many of its previous safe havens along the Helmand River valley. 

The Marine way of war and reliance on the MAGTF did have its detractors at ISAF headquarters in 

Kabul and with some in the Barack H. Obama administration itself. A number of senior State Department officials and Army officers accused the Marines of going rogue to create their own fiefdom. Army 

units complained they did not enjoy the wide latitude that the Marines demanded. Some deemed the 

Corps’ efforts unorthodox when they engaged local mullahs (or religious leaders) in what was referred 

to as the “mullahpalooza tour.” The Marines also followed up on a highly successful program used in 

Iraq to engage Afghan women by recruiting female Marines to serve on search teams. U.S. Ambassador 

to Afghanistan Karl W. Eikenberry said at the time that “the international security force in Afghanistan 

feels as if it comprises 42 nations instead of 41 because the Marines act so independently from other 

U.S. forces.” As a result, references to Helmand Province as “Marineistan” were often heard. 

In late 2009, following extended deliberation, President Obama committed to a surge in Afghanistan to implement the counterinsurgency strategy advocated, by then U.S. commander Army General 

Stanley A. McChrystal, to tip the scales back in favor of the Coalition. The Marine shift from Iraq to 

Afghanistan, first proposed in 2007, began in earnest as Marines accounted for most of the surge. By 

mid-2010, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), commanded by Major General Richard P. Mills, 

succeeded 2d MEB as the MAGTF grew to more than 19,000 Marines. Not only did the MAGTF 

grow, but Marines also came to command the newly created Regional Command–Southwest comprised 
xiii

of Helmand and Nimroz Provinces on 14 June 2010. Marine forces continued to mount major kinetic 

operations to pressure the Taliban with a year-round assault, while extending security for the populace 

and the authority of the Afghan government. In July 2011, Marine General John R. Allen succeeded 

General Petraeus as commander of the entire multinational effort in Afghanistan when he took command of the ISAF. 

Given the unique circumstances surrounding Marine deployments, this anthology is organized into 

four parts that follows Marine Corps participation in America’s longest conflict through 2009. Source 

materials present an overview of the role of the Marine Corps in U.S./Coalition efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan. Given the spectrum of roles filled by Marines, the information generally follows 

the chronological timeline or is arranged by function. This work is not meant to be an authoritative 

history, but rather as a selected record of Marine contributions to the Afghan effort as captured by the 

media and other sources. It is intended to be used as a starting point for the general public and academic researchers. 

Major David W. Kummer

Marine Corps History Division
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Scale 1:6,900,000

International boundaryProvince (wela ̄yat) boundaryNational capitalProvince (wela ̄yat) capital

0 50 100 150 Miles

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Afghanistan has 34 provinces (wela ̄yat).

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

*Dilaram District is reported to be administered from Farah Province, 

but the Government of Afghanistan does not recognize its existence.

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803283AI (G00878) 12-08

 AFGHANISTAN

LAMBERT CONFORMAL CONIC PROJECTION; STANDARD PARALLELS 30°25’ N 37°10’ N

Administrative Divisions

Map 1. Afghanistan Provinces, 2008
Khash Rod

Chakhansur

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Nahr-e Saraj

Sangin

Now Zad

Baghran

Kang

Zaranj

Nimroz

 Province

Helmand

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Map 2: Regional Command-Southwest

Adapted from a Regional Command-Southwest map by Marine Corps History Divsion

Part I

America’s 911 Force, 2001–2
J ust weeks before the horrors of 9/11, a 

Honolulu newspaper chronicled Hawaiibased Marines training for upcoming deployments in an article titled “Marines: 

America’s 911 Force.” The U.S. Navy/Marine Corps 

team has not only earned a reputation as the nation’s quick reaction force but Congress codified 

their roles and expeditionary nature in the 1947 

National Security Act. In 1952, the 82d Congress 

further clarified the idea when it wrote,

American history, recent as well as remote, 

has fully demonstrated the vital need for 

the existence of a strong force-in-readiness. 

Such a force, versatile, fast moving, and 

hard-hitting . . . can prevent the growth of 

potentially large conflagrations by prompt 

and vigorous action during their incipient 

stages. The nation’s shock troops must be the 

most ready when the nation is least ready 

. . . to provide a balanced force-in-readiness 

for a naval campaign and, at the same time, 

a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances 

short of large-scale war.

In the still smoldering aftermath of the 2001 

attack on America, President George W. Bush 

summoned up the righteous fury of a nation and 

ordered the beginning of military operations against 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban on 7 October 2001. Just 

weeks later on 18 October, a section of McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornets from Marine Fighter 

Attack Squadron 251 (VMFA-251) launched from 

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and conducted 

the first U.S. Marine Corps strike mission against 

al-Qaeda and Taliban targets. On 25 November, 

elements of naval expeditionary Task Force 58 (TF58), which consisted of the 15th and 26th Marine 

Expeditionary Units (MEU) and was commanded 

by Brigadier General James N. Mattis, conducted 

an historic amphibious assault from naval shipping 

some 400 miles away to seize Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rhino 100 miles from Kandahar, Afghanistan. 

In early December, Marines began operations to 

cut off enemy escape routes to the west and south 

of Kandahar along Highway 1. On 10 December, Marines from the 26th MEU flew to Kabul 

to provide security for the long-abandoned U.S. 

embassy. Then in mid-December, with the surrender of Kandahar to anti-Taliban forces, Marines 

moved in to secure Kandahar International Airport for follow-on forces and to provide detention 

facilities for captured enemy fighters. 

In early March 2002, Marine helicopters from 

the 13th MEU deployed to an expeditionary airfield in Bagram, Afghanistan. The aviation task 

force, primarily from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM-165), began operating 

in support of Task Force Mountain. In addition 

to Marine fixed-wing aircraft on board naval shipping, the rotary-wing task force provided close air 

support (CAS) for U.S Army soldiers and Special 

Forces detachments engaged with al-Qaeda and 

the Taliban during Operation Anaconda. 

Following the fall of the Taliban regime and 

battles against al-Qaeda fleeing to the relative 

safety of nearby Pakistani tribal areas, Afghanistan became fairly quiet. The MEUs redeployed 

but Marine aviation continued to play a part in 

military operations in Afghanistan. Marine aerial 

refueling squadron detachments provided support 

for both the initial assault into Afghanistan and 

also Operation Anaconda in early 2002. Marine 

air control detachments operated in Afghanistan and surrounding nations to help coordinate the ongoing aerial campaign. Marine strike 

aircraft also flew missions to support Coalition 

ground forces. For several months beginning in 

2
3

May 2002, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212 

(VMFA-212) flew missions over Afghanistan from 

its base in Kuwait. Later, Marine All-Weather 

Fighter Attack Squadron 121 (VMFA[AW]-121) 

deployed to Manas, Kyrgyzstan, and flew more 

than 900 combat sorties in support of the Coalition. The Marine Corps continued to demonstrate 

its flexibility when Marine Attack Squadron 513 

(VMA-513) deployed to the expeditionary air base 

at Bagram. The squadron’s McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier’s offered vertical/short takeoff 

and landing (V/STOL) capability that allowed it 

to operate close to the fight, unlike other tactical 

aircraft that required significant upgrades to existing runways and facilities. 

Along with the 2011 publication of Colonel 

Nathan S. Lowrey’s official monograph, U.S. 

Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2002, the following articles provide a chronological overview of the 

larger events in which Marines participated and 

highlight the successes of U.S. Navy and Marine 

Corps forces.

Photo courtesy of LCpl Andrew Williams 

BGen Terry G. Robling, commanding general, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, talks to Marine Attack Squadron 513 at Bagram 

Air Base in Afghanistan.
4

A New York City firefighter looks up at what remains of the South 

Tower of the World Trade Center after its collapse during the 

11 September 2001 terrorist attack. 

Photo courtesy of PH2 Jim Watson, USN
Address to the Nation 

on Operations 

in Afghanistan

by President George W. Bush

The Treaty Room of the White House

Washington, DC

7 October 2001

Good afternoon. On my orders, the United States 

military has begun strikes against al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the 

Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to 

attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.

We are joined in this operation by our staunch 

friend, Great Britain. Other close friends, including Canada, Australia, Germany, and France, have 

pledged forces as the operation unfolds. More than 

40 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, 

and across Asia have granted air transit or landing 

rights. Many more have shared intelligence. We 

are supported by the collective will of the world.

More than two weeks ago, I gave Taliban leaders 

a series of clear and specific demands: close terrorist 

training camps; hand over leaders of the al-Qaeda 

network; and return all foreign nationals, including American citizens, unjustly detained in your 

country. None of these demands were met. And 

now the Taliban will pay a price. By destroying 

camps and disrupting communications, we will 

make it more difficult for the terror network to 

5
6

train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans.

Initially, the terrorists may burrow deeper into 

caves and other entrenched hiding places. Our military action is also designed to clear the way for 

sustained, comprehensive, and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice. 

At the same time, the oppressed people of 

Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, 

we’ll also drop food, medicine, and supplies to the 

starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan.

The United States of America is a friend to the 

Afghan people, and we are the friends of almost a 

billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith. 

The United States of America is an enemy of those 

who aid terrorists and of the barbaric criminals 

who profane a great religion by committing murder in its name.

This military action is a part of our campaign 

against terrorism, another front in a war that has 

already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets, and the 

arrests of known terrorists by law enforcement 

agents in 38 countries. Given the nature and reach 

of our enemies, we will win this conflict by the 

patient accumulation of successes, by meeting a 

series of challenges with determination and will 

and purpose. 

Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. 

In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any 

government sponsors the outlaws and killers of 

innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers themselves. And they will take that lonely 

path at their own peril.

I’m speaking to you today from the Treaty 

Room of the White House, a place where American 

presidents have worked for peace. We’re a peaceful 

nation. Yet, as we have learned, so suddenly and 

so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of 

sudden terror. In the face of today’s new threat, 

the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those 

who threaten it.

We did not ask for this mission, but we will 

fulfill it. The name of today’s military operation 

is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our 

precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free 

from fear.

I know many Americans feel fear today. And 

our government is taking strong precautions. All 

law enforcement and intelligence agencies are 

working aggressively around America, around 

the world, and around the clock. At my request, 

many governors have activated the National Guard 

to strengthen airport security. We have called up 

Reserves to reinforce our military capability and 

strengthen the protection of our homeland.

In the months ahead, our patience will be one 

of our strengths, patience with the long waits 

that will result from tighter security; patience and 

understanding that it will take time to achieve our 

goals; patience in all the sacrifices that may come.

Today, those sacrifices are being made by members of our Armed Forces who now defend us so 

far from home, and by their proud and worried 

families. A commander-in-chief sends America’s 

sons and daughters into a battle in a foreign land 

only after the greatest care and a lot of prayer. We 

ask a lot of those who wear our uniform. We ask 

them to leave their loved ones, to travel great distances, to risk injury, even to be prepared to make 

the ultimate sacrifice of their lives. They are dedicated, they are honorable; they represent the best 

of our country. And we are grateful.

To all the men and women in our military—

every sailor, every soldier, every airman, every 

coastguardsman, every Marine—I say this: your 

mission is defined; your objectives are clear; your 
7

goal is just. You have my full confidence, and you 

will have every tool you need to carry out your duty.

I recently received a touching letter that says 

a lot about the state of America in these difficult 

times—a letter from a fourth-grade girl, with a 

father in the military: “As much as I don’t want 

my Dad to fight,” she wrote, “I’m willing to give 

him to you.”

This is a precious gift, the greatest she could 

give. This young girl knows what America is all 

about. Since September 11, an entire generation of 

young Americans has gained new understanding 

of the value of freedom, and its cost in duty and 

in sacrifice.

The battle is now joined on many fronts. We 

will not waver; we will not tire; we will not falter; 

and we will not fail. Peace and freedom will prevail.

Thank you. May God continue to bless America.

Note

Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001–

2008, 75–77, http://georgewbush-whitehouse

.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/

Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf.
8

Carrier-based aircraft from VMFA-251 scored the first hits 

on al-Qaeda and Taliban targets for the Marine Corps in 

the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Photo courtesy of LtCol Mark G. Mykleby
Thunderbolts: Strike 

First Marine Corps 

Blow Against Taliban

by Fred H. Allison

Leatherneck, November 2002

Shortly after midnight on Oct. 17, 2001, 150 

miles off the coast of Pakistan in the Arabian Sea, 

an American aircraft carrier turned into the wind 

to launch aircraft. A U.S. flag was hoisted up the 

ship’s halyard. It stirred, and then it began to pop 

and snap in the stiff breeze. Sailors and Marines 

stopped their prelaunch work on the flight deck to 

watch the flag go up. Others gathered on catwalks 

and observation points. All eyes, some moist with 

emotion, watched the flag that once had flown over 

the tallest buildings in New York—the twin towers 

of the World Trade Center. The flag had been recovered from the wreck and rubble left from Sept. 

11 and delivered to the carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) as she passed the Azores on the 

way to the Arabian Sea.

Four planes, two F-14 Tomcats and two F/A-18 

Hornets, stood ready to launch. Catapults tensed, 

the jets’ engines spooled up, their noses dipped, 

full afterburner and long tails of yellow and white 

fire blazed; quick salutes and a thunderous second 

later they were thrust into the blackness. For a 

few seconds, the fighters were visible; they turned 

north—toward al-Qaeda country.

So occurred the first mission launched from 

Theodore Roosevelt during Operation Enduring 

9
10

Freedom (OEF). The F-14s were Navy fighters 

from Fighter Squadron (VF) 102; the F/A-18s 

were Marines from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 251. This mission, flown by squadron 

commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Ray C. 

Damm and wingman Captain Simon M. Doran, 

represented the first Marine Corps strike against 

terrorism in OEF.

Based out of Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, SC, VMFA-251, the Thunderbolts (T-bolts 

for short) had begun workups with Theodore Roosevelt’s (TR’s) Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1) the 

previous February. On Sept. 11, 2001, everyone 

was counting down the few remaining days before 

deploying on a six-month cruise. There were eight 

left. The television was on in the squadron Ready 

Room when the airliners slammed into the World 

Trade Center and Pentagon. Marines gathered 

around to watch the events of that disastrously 

momentous day unfold. The upcoming cruise 

now had entirely different implications.

That evening, LtCol Damm gathered his squadron together for an all-hands meeting in the hangar. He was reassuring at first, trying to put the 

day’s events into perspective, then as his talk concluded, those events welled-up inside him, and he 

exhorted his men, “If this isn’t enough to get you 

focused on your job and motivated to do everything right . . . if today’s events don’t make you 

angry, then nothing will!”

There was no doubt they were motivated and 

not just to do their jobs correctly. There was something else that the Marines in VMFA-251 all hoped: 

that they could participate in America’s retribution against the forces of terrorism.

And they did. The Thunderbolts not only 

Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy 

An F/A-18 Hornet from the VMFA-251 “Thunderbolts” launches from the flight deck of USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 

71). The Thunderbolts were part of Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1) deployed with the nuclear powered aircraft carrier in 

support of Operation Enduring Freedom from the Arabian Sea.
11

delivered the Marine Corps’ first blows against 

terrorism, but they did it in superb fashion. They 

set a new flight-time record for a Marine F/A-18 

squadron, flying 1,285 hours in November 2001. 

During the course of combat operations against 

the Taliban in OEF, they flew 3,596 combat hours 

in 754 sorties, during which 445,000 pounds of 

bombs were dropped on agents of terrorism in 

Afghanistan.

TR herself set a new record for the number of 

consecutive days at sea for an aircraft carrier—159. 

Despite the demanding and intense operational 

tempo, there were no mishaps in VMFA-251, nor 

indeed among any of TR’s air units, a rare occurrence during any six-month cruise, much less one 

in which combat operations predominated. It was 

indeed a history-making cruise.

Operations in OEF were demanding, especially 

in the early days when the battle against the Taliban hung in the balance. Upon arriving on station in the Arabian Sea, TR, being the “junior” 

carrier (USS Carl Vinson [CVN 70] had preceded 

her), went to the “night page.” That meant that 

she would launch her combat missions at night.

The ship’s [skipper], Capt Richard O’Hanlon, 

USN, made the bold decision to put the entire 

ship on a night schedule, in a sense turning night 

into day and day into night. The entire ship’s crew 

started its day at 1800, worked through the night 

and slept during the day—except for the night 

crew, who worked through the day. This, as a 

result, turned out to be a big factor in alleviating 

flight-crew fatigue.

For the Marines maintaining the aircraft, loading the ordnance, and otherwise performing the 

squadron’s business, morale remained high during 

the long and stressful periods of combat operations. 

They worked 12-hour shifts at a minimum. Often 

their days stretched to 15 to 16 hours. They did 

not quit until fully combat-capable aircraft were 

available for the next day’s missions. For them, 

there was a distinct purpose in the work.

As Gunnery Sergeant Robert L. Peak III, the 

quality-assurance chief, asserted, they were “doing 

the nation’s business,” and although not actually 

flying the missions, they identified with each sortie 

launched. Maintenance controller Staff Sergeant 

Willie J. Timms Jr. noted: “When you stand there 

on the cat, and that guy’s in full afterburner, so 

heavy, just loaded down with all this ordnance, and 

he’s at full afterburner, your heart swells because 

you know payback is coming.”

The squadron never missed an opportunity to 

“pay back” al-Qaeda. Every assigned combat sortie was flown. No missions were dropped because 

of aircraft nonavailability or for any other reason.

During the peak combat period, from October through December 2001, days off were few 

and far between. One stretch lasted more than 

30 days without a break. Combat flight operations were conducted on Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year’s, and the Marine Corps birthday. 

The birthday was duly commemorated. A squadron formation was held that “evening” (actually 

midafternoon) in the hangar deck after flight operations secured, followed by a special dinner and a 

cake-cutting ceremony.

This birthday was more special than others 

to some of the pilots, like the squadron executive 

officer, LtCol Thomas S. “T. C.” Clark, and Capt 

Frederick L. Lewis, who flew missions that day. 

They dropped 2,000-pound joint direct attack 

munitions on Taliban targets and still got back 

in time for the celebration. As the XO [executive 

officer] put it, “What better way to celebrate? I got 

to bomb terrorists and eat Marine Corps birthday 

cake all in one day.”

For the Marines maintaining the aircraft and 

loading ordnance, OEF was like previous wars in 

which Marines endured long hours and sweat to 
12

ensure squadron pilots had aircraft to fly against 

the enemy. For the pilots it was unique. It linked 

the primitive with the precise. Small U.S. and 

Coalition units melded into Afghan opposition 

(anti-Taliban) forces to direct air strikes against the 

Taliban. Horses and camels were often the mode 

of transport for friendly forces. Indeed, during one 

air strike, the forward air controller (FAC) told 

LtCol Damm’s flight: “Any vehicle you see, blow 

it up, because the good guys are all on horses.”

The rules of engagement kept the F/A-18s at 

high altitudes. However, sophisticated targeting 

devices linked with laser- and global positioning 

system–guided bombs ensured that pilots could 

put a 500-pound bomb in the backseat of a sport 

utility vehicle stuffed with Taliban stooges running 

down a dirt highway at night in Afghanistan from 

more than 20,000 feet, and they did frequently.

Despite its uniqueness, OEF put a premium 

on skills Marine F/A-18 pilots hold in spades—

ground attack and close air support. The pilots 

remained flexible. Few of the targets they struck 

were prebriefed. Instead, they were directed to 

targets after they got in-country then ground forward air controllers or airborne controllers (FACAs) directed the air strikes.

Sometimes the pilots themselves directed the 

air strikes. Major Brantley A. “Junk” Bond’s flight, 

working with a ground FAC, found some juicy 

targets—Taliban tanks and armored personnel 

carriers (APCs). The FAC could not see everything the pilots overhead could, so he passed control of the strike to Bond. Bond was glad to get it. 

He planted a 500-pound bomb about 20 meters 

in front of one tank, so close that it caused the 

round in the tank’s main gun to fire. The explosion flushed numerous other tanks and APCs out 

of their hiding places.

With many targets now available, other aircraft were called in and directed by Bond onto 

the terrorists, whose tanks and vehicles scrambled 

to escape. It was an orchestra of frenzied destruction as fighter after fighter checked in with Bond, 

who used his forward-looking infrared system to 

direct laser energy onto a doomed tank or APC. 

The laser, in turn, guided a GBU [smart] bomb 

on its appointed mission of dispatching terrorists 

into the waiting arms of Allah. Before it was over, 

about 15 armored vehicles had been destroyed.

For Marines in aviation units, there is no greater 

sense of accomplishment than utilizing the aircraft 

they fly and maintain on behalf of their ground 

brethren. The T-bolts gained this satisfaction during their cruise aboard TR. The early strikes, before 

the Marines went ashore, could be characterized 

as “beach preparatory” strikes. A large percentage 

of the early missions flown were on terrorist targets around Kandahar, a town later assaulted by 

Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(Special Operations Capable [SOC]).

When it was learned that the Marines were 

going into Camp Rhino, the T-bolt pilots wanted 

to be there to support them. As Maj Bond noted, 

“The ante got pushed up. There was no doubt in 

anybody’s mind that they [the pilots] would do 

whatever it took them to do to support those guys 

if they needed it or wanted it.” This held true for 

the troops maintaining the aircraft. SSgt Edwin 

T. Clemons, noncommissioned officer in charge 

of the squadron electric shop, asserted that when 

they heard the Marines were going in, the Marines 

in his shop were well aware of the importance of 

having capable jets. “We wanted to make sure that 

when a forward air controller said he needed an 

aircraft, we had one there for them.”

LtCol Damm went to the CVW-1 commanding 

officer, Capt Steve Voetsch, USN, and requested 

that VMFA-251 be on the first mission in support 

of the assault. His request was granted.

Some of the T-bolt pilots personally knew 
13

FACs with the battalion landing teams, having 

served with them previously at The Basic School 

or in aviation units. Having pilots act as FACs is 

a uniquely Marine Corps aspect of its air-ground 

team. It facilitates good air support.

Two T-bolt pilots, Capt Simon “Simple” Doran 

and Capt Michael R. “Joey” Coletta, were reacquainted by radio with an old friend, Capt Michael 

“Neck” Bryan, who served as a FAC with 15th 

MEU (SOC), as they collaborated on the destruction of a Taliban convoy headed for the Marines’ 

blocking positions set up between Camp Rhino 

and Kandahar.

After there was nothing left of the threat except 

mangled metal, smoke, and bits of flesh, it was, 

“Hey, Neck, this is Joey. I thought I recognized 

your voice!”

“Hello, Joey and Simple, great to have you 

guys around!”

The common background with ground officers 

and extensive training with Marine ground units 

made operations in support of ground Marines 

comfortable. It was like “Here’s the team; let’s go 

for the big win,” noted Capt Peter J. “Psi” Guerrant, or as another T-bolt put it, “like putting on a 

comfortable pair of sweats.” Fortunately, the ground 

Marines faced little opposition from the terrorists, 

and most of CVW-1’s missions in support of the 

Marines were as an extra set of eyes scanning the 

desert from high above.

The 2001–2 cruise of Theodore Roosevelt was a 

history-making cruise. The Marine fighter squadron aboard made a significant contribution to the 

success of that cruise. It was a demanding deployment, but one that the Marines in VMFA-251 will 

never forget or regret making. It was good to be 

“part of the Big Stick” as one of the T-bolts stated.

LtCol Damm put Operation Enduring Freedom 

into personal perspective: “This was the cruise I 

always wanted to be on.”

The Marines in VMFA-251 felt fortunate and 

honored to have been in the right place at the right 

time to deliver the first blows by the Marine Corps 

in the war on terrorism, blows that were followed 

by many others. There is no doubt that the T-bolts 

made the most of this unique opportunity.

Note

Leatherneck, November 2002, 28–31. Reprinted 

by permission. Copyright Leatherneck Magazine.

About the Author

Dr. Fred Allison, a retired Marine Reserve major, 

is an oral historian and archivist in the Oral and 

Visual History Section of the Reference Branch in 

Quantico, Virginia.
14

A bullet-riddled tower supports guards over the desert landing strip code-named “Rhino” on 2 December 2001. The 

strip is a forward operating base strategically located inside 

Afghanistan. 

Photo courtesy of PH1 Greg Messier, USN
Afghanistan Diary

Corps Considerations: 

Lessons Learned 

in Phase One

by Arthur P. Brill Jr.

Seapower, April 2002

The insertion of Marines into Afghanistan’s Rigestan Desert [between Helmand and Kandahar Provinces] last November from ships 441 miles away 

represents the new wave of amphibious warfare. 

The beach is no longer the objective. Instead, Marines, supported by devastating air power, will hit 

the enemy “where they ain’t.” Today, a force of selfsustaining U.S. Marines can land almost anywhere 

in the world from the sea and stay indefinitely.

The critics were in full bloom prior to U.S. 

forces going 11,000 miles to battle the al-Qaeda 

terrorist network and its Taliban hosts. There were 

strong misgivings about Afghanistan’s forbidding 

geography, the approach of winter, the unstable 

warring factions in Afghanistan, and the defeats 

suffered there in the past by both Great Britain 

and the Soviet Union.

“Afghanistan was one of our most severe access 

challenges,” said LtGen Emil R. Bedard, deputy 

commandant for plans, policy, and operations at 

Marine headquarters (HQMC). “This was from 

the sea and beyond.”

15
16

Landlocked Afghanistan represented an im–

posing obstacle to the Navy/Marine Corps team. 

With the nearest Taliban target 400 miles from 

the North Arabian Sea, few experts expected 

Marine boots to touch Afghan turf. The airlift task facing the Navy and Marine Corps was 

roughly equivalent to carrying troops from Boston, MA, and landing and resupplying them in 

Washington, DC.

“The land battle starts out at sea and goes 

inland 400 miles if we have to,” Gen James L. 

Jones told Sea Power in 1996, prior to becoming 

Marine commandant.

MEUs: “Being There”

Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) have practiced 

long-range inserts from Navy ships for years, using the Corps’ “legacy” CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters. Primarily a raiding force, a MEU can 

perform 20 to 30 special missions, many of them 

long range. Since the Gulf War, MEUs have executed numerous rescue, humanitarian, and peacekeeping operations.

In a daring hush-hush mission in 1991, Marines 

launched from 500 miles at sea to evacuate threatened U.S. embassy personnel in Mogadishu, Somalia. In 1995, Marines conducted a classic TRAP 

(tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel) mission to rescue Air Force Capt Scott F. O’Grady, 

who had been shot down in Bosnia, 90 miles from 

the U.S. amphibious ships operating in the Adriatic Sea. Navy and Marine officials later said the 

O’Grady rescue was possible only because “we 

were there”—i.e., forward-deployed and already 

in theater.

The same reasoning already applied to Afghanistan—“If one wants to tango, it helps to be in the 

dance hall.” Thanks to already being forwarddeployed aboard Navy ships, two MEUs, approximately 4,400 combat-ready Marines, were poised 

off Pakistan when [Army] Gen Tommy R. Franks, 

commander of the U.S. Central Command, sent 

them into action.

“The Marine Corps was committed because 

we were there,” said BrigGen Robert C. Dickerson Jr., director of logistics, plans, and policies, 

and head of the Strategic Mobility Division at 

HQMC. Navy amphibious ships today are able 

to take Marines to “any clime and place”—along 

with the MEU’s vast stocks of equipment, vehicles, food, water, petroleum, ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts.

Agility and Flexibility

Experts believe the demand for amphibious ships 

will increase in the years ahead. Assuming that 

other sovereign nations, even “friendly” nations, 

“will give you basing rights in the future is a bad 

assumption,” said Col Ronald J. Johnson, a current operations officer at HQMC.

Regional U.S. CINCs (commanders in chief) 

value the forward-deployed MEUs, but it is rare 

when two MEUs are able to link up in a combat 

theater, as they did last fall. The 15th MEU sailed 

from California on a Gulf deployment before 11 

September. It arrived off Pakistan in October with 

its 2,200 Marines aboard the three ships of the 

USS Peleliu [LHA 5] Amphibious Ready Group 

(ARG). The 26th MEU, sailing from North Carolina on a Mediterranean deployment days after 

the terrorist attack, was diverted through the Suez 

Canal and joined the 15th MEU in November.

Although motivating, the 11 September attack 

had zero impact on the planning and training 

of the Marines who fought in Afghanistan. The 

ARG ships were manned and stocked before the 

terrorists struck. Fortunately, Marines train the 

way they expect to fight. “People think we should 

operate differently since 11 September. We don’t 

see it that way,” said Bedard. “We have to be a very 
17

agile, flexible expeditionary force to react to any 

kind of contingency.”

Marines operated in many areas and significantly influenced the action in Afghanistan during Phase One of the war against international 

terrorism. Following are some of the highlights:

U.S. Air War Begins

7 October 2001: The United States struck Afghanistan only 27 days after the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center buildings. Two 

Marine F/A-18C Hornets from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 (VMFA-251), deployed 

aboard the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS 

Theodore Roosevelt [CVN 71], were part of a fourplane attack that launched the ship’s participation 

in the air war.1

Another Marine Hornet squadron, VMFA314, deployed aboard the nuclear-powered aircraft 

carrier USS John C. Stennis [CVN 74], also participated in the around-the-clock attacks. Franks 

said that 50 percent of the 20,000 U.S. sorties over 

Afghanistan were carrier based.

Marines Move Into Pakistan

Also on 7 October, the 15th MEU secretly inserted 350 Marines and several helicopters to provide 

internal security for an airfield near Jacobabad in 

south central Pakistan. Initially, Pakistani soldiers, 

who guarded the outer perimeter, quelled the civilian demonstrations against the U.S. presence. 

Although the protests subsided, the U.S. presence 

in Pakistan was still sensitive, forcing U.S. pilots 

to fly at night.

[The] Jacobabad airfield served as the staging area for search-and-rescue missions in southern Afghanistan, and as a temporary base for the 

six workhorse Marine KC-130 Hercules refueling 

aircraft that supported the MEUs. Marines conducted a TRAP mission from Jacobabad to pull 

out an Army Special Operations Forces MH-60 

helicopter and crew that had crashed not far from 

the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.

Marine Corps Harriers

The Marine Corps receives more and more of its 

punch and mobility from Marine air. All components of the Marine aviation community contributed to the successful outcome. The performance 

of the AV-8B Harriers is representative [of that]. 

During a visit to the combat area in late October, 

Jones asked why the Marine Harriers weren’t flying combat missions. They were quickly added to 

the daily air tasking order. Each MEU launched up 

to two four-plane Harrier strikes a day. The pilots 

flew 300 to 500 miles one-way on “airborne alert 

close air support” missions that lasted from four 

to six hours or more. Circling at 30,000 feet in a 

“sanctuary” from enemy missiles, they conserved 

fuel until called on to bomb trench lines, buildings, and even convoys (of enemy Toyota SUVs). 

The Harriers fired mostly “dumb” or laser-guided 500-pound bombs.

“The pilots flew an exceptional [number] of 

hours,” said LtCol John Scott Walsh, a Harrier 

expert at HQMC. Last December, the MEUs’ 

two six-plane Harrier detachments flew a total of 

1,100 hours. On a six-month deployment, each 

detachment normally flies 700 hours. The Harriers operated primarily off the ARG flagships, but 

starting in late December were flying a number of 

missions from Kandahar [International] Airport.

Because of engine problems, there were no Harriers operating with the forward-deployed MEUs 

a year earlier. Last December, though, the Corps 

had four MEUs at sea with their Harriers aboard 

the ARG ships. The engines ran well, and the 

Harrier readiness rates were high. “We are happy 

with the Harrier performance and with what’s 

coming up,” said Walsh. “Deploying Harriers 
18

now are equipped with the Litening II targeting 

pod, which gives them an advanced capability. 

In 2003, they will be receiving the JDAM [Joint 

Direct Attack Munition].”

A Marine Corps First

ViceAdm Charles W. Moore Jr., then Fifth Fleet 

commander and commander of naval forces for the 

U.S. Central Command, formed an expeditionary task force for the two ARGs/MEUs operating 

in his theater. He named BrigGen James N. Mattis the commander of Task Force 58. In that post, 

according to a USMC spokesman, Mattis became 

the first Marine to head two Navy ARGs. Mattis’s 

assignment reflects the long awaited Navy/Marine 

“supported supporting” doctrine that went into effect last year. When Marines sail on Navy ships, 

they support the Navy commander. The roles are 

reversed, though, when the Marines plan and conduct missions ashore. Mattis and his staff moved 

aboard the [USS] Peleliu [LHA 5] last October and 

immediately started to plan the intricate landing 

of Marines in Afghanistan.

The Marines Have Landed

On 25 November 2001, Marines flew 441 miles 

at night to secure a desert airstrip and to establish Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rhino, 

Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy 

Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) extend a winch from a light armored vehicle to pull another vehicle out of soft sand during a patrol east of Kandahar City on 10 December 2001.
19

where Marines were in good position to influence events in Kandahar, then under Taliban 

control. “Nothing of this scale had been done 

before. We had no overland routes for resupply,” said Johnson. “Marines have talked about 

ship-to-objective maneuver the last few years. 

This is it.”

Prior to the desert landing, the 15th MEU had 

pre-staged a reinforced rifle company in Jacobabad. 

The MEU’s heavy equipment, including light 

armored vehicles (LAVs) and Humvees, were 

offloaded and staged at Pasni, a port in southern 

Pakistan. Senior officials say that Pakistan’s support to the Navy and Marines cannot be overstated.

It took more than three hours for the six CH53s, carrying a reinforced rifle company, to reach 

Rhino. They flew directly from the Peleliu and 

were refueled enroute by Marine KC-130s. The 

AH-1W Super Cobra2

 and UH-IN Huey helicopters accompanying them were refueled at Shamsi, 

also in Pakistan. Thirty minutes after Rhino was 

secured, four KC-130s landed on the dirt strip with 

the rifle company from Jacobabad, along with five 

interim fast-attack vehicles.

Although the well-planned maneuver was carried out flawlessly on that clear night, it was a risky 

operation. “We held our breath,” Johnson recalls. 

“As you know, things can happen.” To help minimize the possibility of some of those “things” actually happening, Navy SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) teams 

of special operations forces paved the way for the 

Marine landings at Kandahar by conducting covert 

reconnaissance missions several days in advance.

The Rhino Buildup

Once FOB Rhino was secured, a continual buildup of personnel and supplies took place, with the 

KC-130s and Air Force C-17s doing the heavy lifting. Rhino was the target of the highly publicized 

Ranger parachute mission in early October 2001. 

The Rangers departed soon after searching the area, 

though. When Franks later decided to put more 

pressure on the Taliban, he sent in the Marines.

The Marine Corps shapes its forces prior to each 

mission. Although leaving their tanks, amphibious tractors, and artillery tubes aboard ship (the 

artillery personnel were used as infantry), the 

Marines soon had a formidable force ashore with 

a high “tooth-to-tail” ratio. The small number of 

support personnel at Rhino, including women, 

also grabbed rifles when needed and helped man 

whatever positions needed reinforcement. Except 

for headquarters people, Marines lived in their foxholes. When visitors saw how the Marines lived, 

the Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees (being held 

at Rhino and Kandahar) received less sympathy.

On the third day of Rhino operations, a USAF 

C-17, carrying 125 Navy Seabees and their heavy 

equipment, made the first combat landing ever 

on Rhino’s dirt airstrip. “The Seabees had a critical mission in caring for the airfield surface,” said 

Dickerson.

The brown hills, the weather, and the barren 

terrain all were similar to those at the Marine training base in Twentynine Palms, CA, where warm 

days and chilly nights are the norm. The Rhino 

Marines will long remember the chocolate-colored 

desert dust that quickly climbed to a height of 50 

feet when an aircraft would land, and then gradually settle on every building, vehicle, and human 

being in the area. The Corps is concerned about 

the long-term effect of the dust on Marine aircraft.

Beans, Bullets, and Band-Aids—Rhino was 

a “bare base” situation, meaning the Marines 

were forced to bring in (by air) everything they 

needed. With his sea base 441 miles away, Mattis 

wanted a heavy medical capability, including an 

extra shock trauma team. He built up a seven-day 

stockpile ashore that was constantly replenished 

(and later was repositioned to the Kandahar 
20

[International] Airport). Prior to the start of 

[Operation] Desert Storm the Corps had built up 

a similar but immensely larger six-month stockpile, which the troops called the “iron mountain.” When the 120-hour ground campaign was 

over, the supplies were returned to CONUS [the 

continental United States].

The ability of Marines to sustain themselves 

ashore is a major bonus when a regional CINC 

needs combat-ready forces. Marines not only 

arrive in the combat theater with their own aircraft, they also can be sustained by their amphibious ships for at least 15 days.

“Marines could have stayed in Afghanistan 

indefinitely. We were tied in to many distribution 

pipelines,” said Dickerson. “When Marines redeploy on the ships, we reconstitute their initial sustainment so they can perform another mission.”

Unlike the Army, which has assigned much of 

its combat support structure to its Reserve components (or put it under contract), the Marines 

made a conscious decision to keep their combat support in the active forces. The active-duty 

Marine Corps, in fact, “owns” 33 percent of the 

Defense Department’s active ground combat service support units.

The Marine Corps did not have to mobilize 

to go to Afghanistan, nor use its maritime prepositioning force (MPF). Each of its three MPF 

squadrons carries enough supplies and equipment to sustain 15,000 Marines for 30 days. “We 

support MEUs 10,000 miles away from their 

home ports. It’s how we do business,” said Dickerson. “If we see a critical need, we push it out 

there. If the MEU needs something, they reach 

back.”

Task Force Sledgehammer

In early December, the Marines at Rhino were ordered to seal off Route 1 [Highway 1], a beltway-type 

road that circles [the interior of] Afghanistan, to 

the west and south of Kandahar. At that time, one 

vehicle per minute was using the road. To carry 

out the mission, Task Force Sledgehammer, which 

consisted of 22 LAVs and heavily armored Humvees from the two MEUs, was formed.

Protected by Marine air, the task force moved 

about 90 miles from Rhino. The Marines established a well-guarded patrol base and at night sent 

out interdiction patrols in various directions. The 

media called them “hunter-killer” teams. After one 

engagement, when Marines destroyed 7 enemy 

vehicles and killed 40 personnel, traffic virtually 

stopped on Route 1 [Highway 1].

Kandahar Airfield Secured

On 20 December, Mattis was ordered to secure the 

Kandahar [International] Airport, 10 miles southwest of that city. After coordinating his mission 

with the governor of Kandahar, he moved Task 

Force Sledgehammer to a position in close proximity to the anti-Taliban forces outside the city. 

Covered by friendly air, the Marines made a night 

mechanized movement through Kandahar and secured the airfield.

Up to that point, the 15th MEU had done 

most of the Corps’ work ashore. Once the Marines 

were in Kandahar, the 26th MEU started arriving via KC-130s and took over the airstrip. The 

15th MEU then closed Rhino and returned to 

its ships prepared to take on another mission. At 

peak strength, the Marines had about 2,200 people ashore.

Shortly before Christmas, 80 infantry Marines 

from the 26th MEU flew into Kabul to secure the 

U.S. embassy there. The embassy reopened shortly 

thereafter and is now guarded by 88 Marines from 

the Corps’ new antiterrorist (AT) brigade—the 

AT brigade’s first engagement since its formation last fall.
21

USMC and SOCOM

Last fall, Jones signed an agreement developed to 

bring the Marines and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) closer in their planning, doctrine, and field operations. “We will train, share 

ideas, and do things together,” said Bedard.

The real-world relationship between SOCOM 

and the Marines began in Afghanistan. Before 

being relieved by the Army and redeploying to their 

ARG ships in February, the 26th MEU at Kandahar worked closely with U.S. special operations 

personnel in a support role. While a 25-Marine 

reaction force and a CH-53 stood by, 50 Marines 

accompanied special forces to the rugged Zhawar 

Kili cave complex in a planned 12-hour operation 

that actually took several days. The primary mission of the Marines was to provide security. “We 

will do more work in concert with the special operations community,” Johnson predicted.

Bottom Line Summary

The operations in Afghanistan are guaranteed a 

special place in Marine Corps history as the Corps’ 

first major combat mission of the twenty-first century. The performance of the two MEUs opened 

more than a few eyes, and—after promising new 

ships and weapons systems enter the Corps’ hardware inventory later this decade—future Marines 

will be even better equipped and more mobile. Experts say that, if it had been available, the MV22 

tiltrotor Osprey could have accomplished twice 

the mission in Afghanistan in half the time. “We 

could have used the Osprey, or something like it,” 

Franks said.

In retrospect, it seems that the Marines had 

been planning and training for years as if they 

knew Afghanistan was coming. “This is a piece 

of cake,” said LtGen Gary S. McKissock, deputy 

commandant for installations and logistics, shortly 

after the Marines landed. “We do this all the time.”

Notes

Seapower, April 2002, 75–79. Reprinted with permission from Seapower, the official publication of 

the Navy League of the United States.

1. This occurred on 18 October and was the first U.S. 

Marine Corps aerial strike in OEF.

2. The official name of the AH-1W is Sea Cobra, but 

is popularly known as the Super Cobra, which will 

be used throughout this document.

About the Author

In addition to writing for Seapower and Leatherneck, 

retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel Arthur P. Brill 

Jr. writes on national security issues for defense 

publications. Colonel Brill commanded an infantry 

company in Vietnam and retired from active duty 

as the Corps’ press spokesman. He was also the 

media spokesman in key positions for the Carter 

and Reagan administrations.
22

Marines from the 26th MEU(SOC) take up defensive positions at the Kandahar International Airport on 10 January 

2002 after shots were fired near the northern perimeter as an 

illumination grenade is seen in the background. The gunfire erupted shortly after a Boeing C-17 Globemaster transport plane containing 20 al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees 

took off from the U.S. military base in southern Afghanistan. The Marines responded to the small-arms fire with 

M16 rifles and machine guns while two Marine Cobra helicopters canvassed the area. 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Thomas M. Corcoran
Le Petit Beourge 

du Decotiis

(1st Platoon Defense 

at Kandahar)

by Second Lieutenant Art G. Decotiis

Marine Corps Gazette, July 2002

Initially shorthanded, 1st Platoon established and 

manned their sector of the defensive perimeter. 

Due to a series of bumped flights and delays, 1st 

Platoon arrived in two waves over a span of three 

days. First Platoon brought up the tail end of Kilo 

Company’s flow into Kandahar International Airport. The first Marines to arrive from the platoon 

were tasked with manning the newly established 

detainee camp, therefore leaving the platoon shorthanded as we occupied our defensive sector in a 

small adobe-structured village. My company commander ordained me the village mayor.

Upon the arrival of the rest of the platoon, we 

conducted a leader’s reconnaissance with the company commander. First Platoon was the final element of the company to occupy the defense. We 

were tied in on the right flank of the company sector in a small village on the southwest edge of the 

runway. A 200-meter gap separated the far right 

flank of the village and the runway. We were to 

be tied in with a light armored vehicle that was 

located another 200 meters away on the opposite 

23
24

side of the runway. The span between the two 

positions was marred with plane wreckage and 

dead space. Our frontage looked much the same.

While conducting the leader’s reconnaissance of 

the village, several weapons and munitions caches 

were discovered. We requested that a Marine explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team, along with 

combat engineers, physically inspect the entire 

village for live ordnance and mines. Due to the 

severity of the mine situation, it was extremely difficult to establish our new defense in a traditional 

manner. Upon a brief evaluation of the sector, we 

identified those positions we would occupy, and 

EOD went to work making sure they were useable. Once the initial positions were deemed safe, 

we began the occupation by strong-pointing the 

village, primarily on either flank, along with an 

observation post (OP) on the roof that would be 

manned by our Javelin (FGM-148 maneuverable, 

fire-and-forget [antitank missile]) gunners.

As stated earlier, the platoon was severely undermanned due to our obligations at the detainee 

camp. We initially occupied the village with only 

13 Marines, including the headquarters element. 

Since our first day in, the defense was rapidly coming to a close, we decided to postpone the initial 

fortification of the new positions until morning. 

The adobe structures would provide adequate cover 

and concealment for the night. Two four-man posts 

were established at the flanks of the village. They 

would maintain 50 percent security throughout 

the night. Since the positions, or “posts” as we 

referred to them, were for the most part indoors 

and separated, communications between the posts 

and the platoon command post (CP) was a primary concern. The platoon CP was nearly collocated with Post 1 and a field phone was wired to 

the OP and Post 3 on the far left flank. Before 

nightfall, a hasty signal plan was established, and 

exact grid coordinates were disseminated to the 

company fire support team (FiST). The platoon 

sergeant, SSgt Joel Morgan, was sure to make liaison with the light armored reconnaissance [vehicle] to our right and pass on our exact location to 

the adjacent unit.

After a fairly quiet night, we began fortifying 

the established positions at first light. We initially 

concentrated on fortifying the flank positions. The 

OP was lightly fortified and camouflaged. The few 

Marines we had on deck worked hard in preparing the positions with what little resources they 

had available to them. Overhead cover was manufactured out of old doors where needed. Window 

screens were used to fill exterior openings in order 

to prevent grenades from entering, and old Soviet 

parachutes were used to camouflage exposed sandbags. I was consistently impressed by the Marines’ 

ingenuity in fortifying the positions.

Once the primary positions were completed, 

we began preparing for the rest of the platoon’s 

arrival. We established several new positions and 

began planning how each would be manned once 

the others arrived. At daybreak, when the company relaxed its posture to 25 percent, all hands 

not standing watch would assist in fortifying the 

new positions. The platoon guide, Sgt Shane 

Reed, created a schematic that included a complete fire plan sketch, a detailed drawing of the village, all established and proposed positions, and a 

detailed, by name breakdown of who would man 

each post. As the Army began its slow takeover 

of the detainee camp, 1st Platoon Marines were 

able to occupy the village incrementally over the 

course of a week. As a fire team would be pushed 

to the perimeter, they would simply move into the 

already established four-man posts.

Once approximately half the platoon had made 

it to the perimeter, the priority of work was turned 

to creating supplementary and alternate positions. 

Small, fortified positions were established along 
25

the roofline of the village. Reinforcement and 

reaction drills were conducted and refined. A rear 

security post was established due to our concern 

over unseen tunnels or entry points to the rear of 

our village, while also keeping an eye out for any 

stray detainees. This post consisted of rovers along 

with a gate guard and proved valuable in maintaining positive control over our sector by deterring unwanted sightseers and souvenir hunters 

that frequented the village at an alarming rate.

Once the positions were up to par, squad leaders mandated at least two hours worth of position 

improvement each day. Team leaders ensured that 

each Marine’s firing position came complete with 

its own fire plan sketch and a list of target reference 

points (TRPs). These TRPs were made standard 

throughout each post and proved very effective 

when reporting activity forward of our position. 

Any potential activity would be reported directly 

to the CP and to the Javelin gunners on the roof so 

Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy 

At the U.S. Marine Corps Base in Kandahar, Afghanistan, LCpl Chris Cassa from India Company, 26th MEU(SOC), positions his weapon as he gears up for the evening watch, defending and maintaining security of the base perimeter. 
26

that they could provide better visual identification 

with their command launch unit (CLU) sight. Cpls 

Nathan Gilham and Brad Ostergard, along with 

the CLU, were invaluable assets to the platoon in 

their ability to more clearly identify vehicles and 

activity in our sector. They were very helpful in 

diffusing many potential friendly fire incidents, 

especially considering the heavy volume of uncoordinated friendly activity forward of the lines.

Combat engineers began setting in concertina 

[wire], trip flares, and obstacles to our frontage, 

covering any likely avenues of approach. This was a 

slow process considering the mine and unexploded 

ordnance threat. The revetments [embankments], 

400 meters to our direct front, impaired our field 

of view greatly while posing good concealment for 

potential infiltrators. The engineers made use of 

what little wire that was available in an attempt to 

force any potential attacker into our field of view. 

The company FiST leader and artillery forward 

observer visually identified for us where exactly 

on-call targets were located and plotted new targets that corresponded with the chokepoints created by the engineers. Scorpion sensors were also 

placed in front of our position.

When the entire platoon was finally present, we 

were able to implement a sleep rotation. Post 2 was 

stood down and adopted as the rest/react position. 

Each four-man team was rotated through Post 2 

until all Marines were afforded at least one full 

night’s rest. Other posts were stood down whenever the platoon was required to give up Marines 

for various missions or working parties. The primary flank posts were manned throughout our 

stay in the village as well as the javelin position.

Lessons Learned

Many of the lessons learned were a product of trial and error. Whatever problems we encountered 

throughout the night were quickly remedied the 

following morning. For example, we were forced 

to designate universal TRPs throughout the platoon after a night of confusing SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) reports and 

movement sightings. These TRPs enabled our javelin gunners to quickly decipher where to focus 

their CLU, thereby producing faster and more accurate situation reports to be passed on to higher 

authority. Small unit leaders were able to more effectively laterally communicate with one another, 

thus maintaining strict fire discipline.

Another problem we encountered involved 

somewhat incomplete coordination between supporting units. The battalion sensor control and 

management platoon technicians notified me 

that two sensors were placed forward of our position, but I was not given detailed information 

as to the exact locations and capabilities. One 

night we received a call notifying us that one of 

the sensors had been tripped in front of our position. We had a general idea of where they were 

located, but there was no way of knowing which 

sensor was tripped, hence we were not sure where 

to focus our attention. Upon receiving the exact 

grid locations of each [sensor], we discovered that 

the three potential enemy personnel that tripped 

the sensor were uncomfortably close to our position. Amidst the flood of information and coordination requirements, I neglected to pursue more 

detailed information regarding the sensors. From 

this I learned that, if time permits, all aspects of 

coordination between units must be as thorough 

as possible in order to make maximum use of the 

assets we have available.

I feel the most important lesson learned was that 

common sense decisions, based on the situation at 

hand, produced the best results. School-taught techniques and procedures are indeed helpful in laying 

the foundation, but strict adherence to rigid interpretation of a field manual is not always the most 
27

tactically sound approach. Although easier said than 

done, we must be willing to try new and possibly 

unorthodox tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

Furthermore, the platoon’s small unit leaders—

squad leaders and team leaders—can be trusted to 

make tactical and organizational decisions within 

their scope of control and base these decisions on 

what works best for their particular unit while still 

carrying out the commander’s intent. When the 

time was available, I could always count on 1st 

Platoon Marines to come up with more efficient 

and innovative ways to accomplish the mission.

Note

Marine Corps Gazette, July 2002, 36–38. Reprinted by permission. Copyright Marine Corps Gazette.

About the Author

Then–Second Lieutenant Art Decotiis was 1st Platoon Commander, Company K, 3d Battalion, 6th 

Marines, during the U.S. Marine seizure and defense of Kandahar International Airport.
28

In mid-January 2002, U.S. Navy Seabees assigned to Naval 

Mobile Construction Battalion 133 build a short-term holding facility for al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees in Kandahar. 

Photo courtesy of PH1 Ted Banks, USN
A Deployment To 

Remember: The Navy’s 

Seabees in Afghanistan

by Lieutenant Commander Leonard 

W. W. Cooke, USN

Seapower, October 2002

On 5 September 2001, the advance party of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 133 

left the battalion’s homeport in Gulfport, Mississippi, to begin a seven-month deployment to its 

main body site in Guam and a dozen or so “detachment” sites around the world. What had originally been planned as a “typical” Seabee deployment, 

though, changed suddenly and tragically less than 

a week later—specifically, on 11 September 2001.

Nonetheless, during the first several weeks of 

the deployment, NMCB-133 worked on the peacetime construction projects previously scheduled. 

Planning efforts for potential missions in support 

of the war on terrorism also started though, and 

received high priority attention from the battalion’s leadership and the Third Naval Construction Brigade in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii—which is 

responsible for the planning and coordination of 

all Seabee efforts in the Pacific and Central Command areas of responsibility.

In mid-November, one of those potential missions began to take solid shape, and the approximately 450 members of the battalion in Guam 

29
30

(including about 75 reservists called to active 

duty from the battalion’s reserve augment unit in 

the New York/New England area) started preparations to launch a mission in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Task Force 58 (TF-58) 

had been directed to establish a forward operating base in Afghanistan to build up U.S. combat 

power in the area and, later, conduct combat operations against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda 

forces. The Seabees of NMCB-133 were directed 

to proceed to the area to serve as the contingency 

engineers for TF-58.

The mission was simply stated, but vague 

when it came to the hard data needed for detailed 

planning: repair and maintain a dirt runway at 

Forward Operating Base Rhino, then move to 

Kandahar to perform rapid runway repair at the 

Coalition-bombed international airport and perform other contingency construction as required. 

Responding to the TF-58 tasking, NMCB-133 

prepared to proceed in two stages. The first stage 

would put 200,000 pounds of equipment, tools, 

and material[s] and 27 personnel on the ground 

at Rhino. The second stage would put more gear 

and another 120 personnel at Kandahar—after it 

was taken by TF-58.

Although 200,000 pounds sounds like a lot 

of equipment, it is not nearly enough to make 

Seabees feel comfortable about being responsible 

for more than 6,000 feet of dirt runway at a site 

that is being punished nightly by combat-loaded 

[Boeing] C-17 [Globemaster III] and [Lockheed] 

C-130 [Hercules] transport aircraft. A single piece 

of heavy equipment, such as a grader, can weigh 

30,000 pounds or more.

All routine construction on Guam stopped as 

the entire battalion pitched in to make the 150-person air detachment and all of its gear ready for its 

mission. All of the Navy’s NMCBs have standing 

89-person air detachments capable of launching 

anywhere in the world in 48 hours, but this mission would require a detailed task-tailoring of that 

group. Numerous hard decisions had to be made 

to determine which people would go.

Because only 200,000 pounds of equipment—

including spare parts and fuel—would be brought 

in during the first stage of operations, it would have 

to be in the best shape possible. Additional mission-specific training was conducted. Intelligence 

was gathered and analyzed. In short, although 

only 150 personnel would actually be deployed 

to Afghanistan, the efforts of the entire battalion 

were critical to the mission.

The Third Naval Construction Brigade called 

on 27 November. Two [Lockheed] C-5 Galaxy 

transports would arrive at Andersen Air Force 

Base at the north end of Guam that evening to 

take the first group of NMCB-133 personnel to 

an undisclosed area in theater, where they would 

transload onto C-17s for the flight to Rhino. The 

sense of urgency that had pervaded Camp Covington, the Seabee camp on Guam, ratcheted up 

another notch. The other members of the battalion who played such a critical role in getting the 

first group ready to go lined the road leaving the 

Seabee camp and gave an emotional send-off to 

the first 27 Seabees going into action in Operation Enduring Freedom.

The flight into Rhino itself was an intense one. 

According to the U.S. Air Force personnel on 

the flight, this was not just the first time a C-17 

would be landing at Rhino. It was the first time a 

C-17 was going to be used on any expeditionary 

airfield, anywhere in the world, in a true combat 

environment. The plane landed after nightfall; 

for security reasons, all fixed-wing operations at 

Rhino were carried out at night. Twenty-one of 

the 27 Seabees assigned were on that first sortie 

and were still moving their gear off the runway 

when the second sortie and the rest of the Seabee 
31

gear and personnel for the first stage of operations 

landed. The dust storm caused by the second C-17 

gave the first indication of just how difficult it was 

going to be to maintain the runway.

By the end of the first night, all 27 Seabees and 

their gear were in the compound. At first light, 

the heavy equipment rolled onto the runway and 

began repairing the damage caused by three nights 

of sorties on a dry lakebed that had not had any 

previous maintenance. It became apparent the 

next night, when the nose gear of a C-130 Hercules became stuck in a pile of accumulated dust and 

dirt, how critical the NMCB mission would be to 

eventual U.S. Coalition combat success. The Seabees used a small bulldozer to clear a path, after 

which more Seabees and other personnel worked 

on their hands and knees under the C-130 to free 

its wheels. If they had not been able to do so—or 

if, for any other reason, the runway could not be 

kept open—the U.S. forces at Rhino, 400 miles 

from the nearest water, would be cut off from their 

logistics lifeline.

The Seabees worked 24 hours a day, repaired 

the runway nonstop during daylight hours and 

bringing their heavy equipment onto the runway 

between sorties at night to keep the runway operational. They provided their own security for the 

airfield work crews. Several times, security alerts 

signaled a potential threat to the TF-58 forces.

When the crews were not on the runway or on 

security duty, they made whatever improvements 

they could to the compound—building four-hole 

burnout heads, for example, to improve the sanitation conditions. They also built better fighting 

positions for the Marines of the 15th MEU (Marine 

Expeditionary Unit) on the perimeter, improved 

the reliability of the base’s generators and electrical 

distribution system, developed dust-control measures for the air combat element helicopters, and 

did whatever else was asked of them.

The main focus of their attention though—

always—was the runway. Senior Chief Petty Officer 

John [P.] Lemmond developed a runway stabilization process in which earth with a light moist clay 

content (taken from about four feet below the surface) was laid in six-inch lifts, watered, and rolled 

to improve the durability of the landing, braking, 

and turning areas on the runway. That method 

of maintaining the runway allowed operations 

to continue at Rhino for nearly six weeks, well 

past the originally projected time the dirt runway would be used.

The move to Kandahar came in the middle of 

December, when TF-58 and the Coalition partners began carrying the fight to the enemy. Restrictions on the strategic lift available, combined with 

the need for speed in the operation, meant that 

the full remainder of the air detachment gear and 

personnel left behind in Guam would not be able 

to move into theater en masse. Instead, graders, 

loaders, and bulldozers prestaged in Bahrain were 

flown up into the area, and personnel from NMCB133 in both Guam and Bahrain were moved forward. At the peak of activity, a group of about 50 

Seabees were performing runway maintenance 

and other missions simultaneously at both Rhino 

and Kandahar.

Initially, a small reconnaissance team of Seabees accompanied the advance elements of the 

26th MEU into Kandahar to assess the condition 

of the runway there. As the focus of effort began 

to shift from Rhino to Kandahar, additional personnel and equipment were moved in as needed. 

The crater damage caused by Coalition bombing was severe but not devastating. With expeditious field repairs, it was determined the Seabees 

could open the runway for C-130 and C-17 flights 

within 48 hours. After that initial requirement was 

met—with temporary, compacted-earth expedient repairs—the Seabees systematically started 
32

repairing all craters in the runways, taxiways, and 

aprons to make the airfield capable of handling 

the aircraft load necessary to maintain operations.

Two more tasks were given to the Seabees in 

late December. The first was to build a short-term 

holding facility (STHF) to house Taliban and alQaeda detainees. The second was to upgrade the 

runway temporary repairs to permanent repairs so 

that other types of aircraft, including the [Lockheed] C-141 [Starlifter], needed to transport the 

detainees from Afghanistan to the U.S. naval base 

in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, would be able to use 

the airfield at Kandahar. Once again, restrictions 

on the strategic airlift available forced the Seabees to make do with forces already in-theater, 

supplemented by just a few more individuals with 

the special skills needed to carry out this important mission.

These two tasks brought another problem to 

the forefront. The lack of Class IV construction 

material[s] needed for the concrete repairs to the 

runway—and of the lumber, fencing, and other 

materials necessary to construct the STHF—posed 

a significant impediment to success.

A series of small solutions were used to overcome 

the problem. Naval Central Command engineers 

in Bahrain made local purchases of key materials for C-130 transport to Kandahar, a local contracting agent from Central Command made cash 

purchases for what little material was available in 

Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy 

Navy Seabees LCdr Leonard W. W. Cooke (center left) and Lt Joel Sensenig (center right) of NMCB-133 survey metal matting used to construct a helicopter pad with Marines of the 15th MEU at a strategically located Marine operating base outside Kandahar on 2 December 2001.
33

town, the TF-58 logistics personnel moved more 

material into the theater, and the Seabees themselves devised a number of creative solutions to 

overcome some of the material shortfalls.

Chief Petty Officer [Anthony] Williams, for 

example, directed a high-priority scavenging operation to find anything that might help. Guard 

towers were built on top of vehicles and container 

storage boxes to give them extra height, trees were 

felled that could be used as raw lumber, engineering stakes were used in lieu of reinforcing steel for 

the repairs to the concrete runway, and old Soviet, 

Czech, and Chinese equipment was resurrected 

from the airport’s junkyards to expand the equipment inventory available to the Seabees.

As at Rhino, the Seabees also performed a variety 

of other contingency engineering tasks to improve 

the overall effectiveness of TF-58 and Coalition 

personnel. They redeveloped several well sites to 

ensure a larger supply of water, leveled obstructions to improve fields of fire, built fuel and ammo 

berms, shored up and/or realigned fighting positions, and completed huge amounts of site preparation to accommodate the rapid buildup of U.S. 

and Coalition forces.

NMCB-133’s mission ended when the Seabees 

had completed the STHF, made the permanent 

repairs to the Kandahar runway, closed Rhino, 

and performed a wide variety of other contingency 

engineering tasks. When TF-58 turned the Kandahar base over to elements of the U.S. Army’s 101st 

Airborne Division, the Seabees left Afghanistan.

Throughout the operation, the “can do” spirit of 

the Seabees never faltered. Their ability to integrate 

with the Marines of TF-58, to adapt to constantly 

changing working as well as combat conditions 

and requirements, to almost literally “make something out of nothing,” to keep a constant focus on 

the mission before them, and to always remember 

why they were there were the keys to their success. 

In addition to the original mission in Guam, the 

members of NMCB-133 also were building the 

detainee facility in Cuba and carrying out other 

construction tasking at more than 15 sites around 

the globe—all in the course of one memorable 

seven-month deployment.

In April 2002, NMCB-133 wrapped up its 

deployment and returned to Gulfport with a 

deep sense of satisfaction for a job well done. All 

of those involved knew why they had done what 

they had done, and how important the battalion’s 

mission had been to the freedom and way of life 

the United States represents. If anyone were to ask 

if they would do it again, there would be no hesitation and no doubt about their answer: Seabees 

“can do,” and would.

Note

Seapower, October 2002, 55–57. Reprinted with 

permission from Seapower, the official publication 

of the Navy League of the United States.

About the Author

Lieutenant Commander Leonard W. W. “Len” 

Cooke, USN, was the officer in charge of Naval 

Mobile Construction Battalion 133 Air Detachment, which deployed to Afghanistan in late 2001 

in support of Task Force 58. 
34

A Marine from the 26th MEU stands guard at Post 1 as 

depicted by Marine Corps combat artist SSgt Michael D. 

Fay in early 2002. 

Courtesy of National Museum of the Marine Corps, Art Collection 
The Embassy: Kabul

by Lieutenant Colonel Brian D. Perry Sr., 

USA

Marine Corps Gazette, December 2002

The metallic click of a round being slammed into 

the chamber of the security man’s M16 forced me 

back to reality. I had been lost in thought. How 

long? I was not sure. The view from the speeding 

armored Jeep was hypnotizing. The thick, dirty 

windows dulled the sun’s reflection off the snowcaps, but it could not dim the excitement I felt. 

The scene hurrying by captivated me—the view 

beautiful, the mines next to the road, deadly. We 

made our advance on Kabul. The lead vehicle set 

the pace. I could just make out the sun-baked mud 

buildings along the road ahead. We prepared our 

weapons for battle. We were quickly approaching the city.

I was looking forward to seeing the chargé 

d’affaires. She was a retired foreign service officer 

called back to duty. I knew of her. We all did. She 

took on some of the most difficult assignments of 

any foreign service officer, man or woman. Her 

assignment before retiring was as the U.S. consul 

in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It was a dark and forlorn place for women, a place where she was never 

expected to make a mark but instead rose up to 

become an icon to American and Saudi women 

for her temperament and spirit. She went further 

by earning the begrudging respect of the city’s 

male dominated society. She knew no fear and 

never faltered. While there, she was promoted to 

35
36

colonel in the Army Reserve—a place at the top 

of the military ladder.

The driver of our vehicle increased his alertness. 

He sat taller in his seat. Hands gripped the steering wheel tight. One hand relaxed and moved to 

his side. I watched him slip the 9mm weapon from 

its holster. “Better to have it next to me, ready,” he 

said. He tucked the gun against his leg. His hand 

went quickly back to the steering wheel. “We have 

the pistols ready in case someone approaches the 

vehicles at close range,” he said matter-of-factly. 

I could see that the “long guns” were of no use 

in the close quarters of the armored Cherokee. I, 

too, repositioned my weapon and held it ready.

Men, women, and children crowded the first 

“roundabout.” Speeding yellow taxis demanded the 

right of way with shrill horns. Lumbering trucks 

bullied their way into the circle. Donkeys pulling creaking, old wooded carts bringing Afghan 

families to market added to the seemingly endless bottleneck. Children’s faces exhibited awe 

over the sights. Women in bright blue burkas were 

covered from head to toe. An old man’s dry and 

cracked face was mostly hidden behind long gray 

whiskers, his inattentive maneuvers adding to the 

disarray of the traffic pattern. Other carts were 

loaded with wood from skinny trees for burning 

for heat. The peppery smell of the city completed 

the picture unfolding around me. The air conditioner vents permitted the assortment of Middle 

Eastern aromas mixed with vehicle emissions to 

penetrate our compartment.

We kept moving, at times, more slowly. Stopping, even for a moment, would make us easy 

targets. I watched pedestrians carry their Russianmade machine guns, apparently unmindful that 

the war was over. To them there would never be 

peace here. Our vehicle armor would stop a rifle 

bullet. But the security people knew that the threat 

was real. It could come from a suicide bomber who 

was dedicated to a terrible cause or just wanting to 

collect the price on our heads—on every American’s head. A hand grenade or rocket-propelled 

grenade would cut the vehicle open like a tin can.

The first vehicle pushed its way through the 

crowded avenue. He was driving too fast. There 

was danger in getting into an accident or a worstcase scenario—running over and killing an Afghan 

national. I had the most terrible thought—striking and killing a child jumping out for a closer 

look at the American saviors. “Slow down,” I yelled 

into the radio. There was no response. Our vehicle slowed, but the lead one did not.

A donkey cart burdened with firewood strayed 

into our lane. Our vehicle quickly moved to the 

center lane. We could not make it around him; both 

sides were crowded with pedestrians. We lost sight 

of the lead Jeep. I looked in the side view mirror. 

Three vehicles spread out behind us determined 

to get around us, or block us in. I could not be 

sure. We came to a tire-squealing stop. The cart 

blocked our forward view. The security men in 

the rear seat brought their M16s up. Their hands 

were steady on the door handle, ready to make 

their move. People stared at us. No one smiled. 

We were sitting ducks. Time seemed to stand still. 

There was no place to go. I could hear my own 

breathing. Was this a trap?

The minutes clicked on. It seemed like an eternity before the cart’s driver employed a long switch 

to turn the donkey toward the road’s edge. The 

cart lumbered along to the right.

As quickly as we were hemmed in and ready to 

fight, our way now was clear. We relaxed and put 

our weapons down out of view. We exited the circle a quarter of the way around. One more roundabout to contend with before reaching the embassy. 

There would be no stopping this time. We were 

prepared to blast our way through.

Now the roadway was mostly clear of foot traffic. 
37

Finally we could make out the lead Jeep. We sped 

up and forced our vehicle between it and a tailgating taxi. We heard the taxi’s high-pitched yelp. Its 

driver flashed its headlights in irritation and then 

rocketed past us. We slowed when we neared our 

destination. The radio cracked with directions to 

bypass the embassy and then double back. Take a 

good look around for anything suspicious.

The massive steel doors of the embassy gates 

were secured shut. Concertina wire circled above. 

There would be no entry here. A few yards away, 

a makeshift vehicle entrance opened into the 

field adjacent to the embassy proper. From there, 

we would snake our way through to the embassy 

under constant observation by the watchful eyes 

(and crew-served weapons) of the U.S. Marine 

security force. We pulled into the driveway. An 

Afghan man stood at the entranceway. His illfitting suit was that of a Third World businessman. 

He wanted to look like a Westerner. His job was 

to act as a liaison between the locals who sought 

entry and to wave through those with official 

business. He worked for the Americans. He was 

charged with maintaining the compound when the 

Americans departed. One night, a mob attacked. 

They killed the few animals he kept and brutally 

beat him before jailing him. He had been imprisoned by the Taliban as a traitor. Now he was free. 

America was his adopted country. He took it to 

heart when he was told that the embassy grounds 

were American soil. His smile and wave were to 

welcome us home. He signaled to another similarly 

Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy 

Marines of Task Force India, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade Antiterrorism (4th MEB AT), relax on an Air Force C-130 

Hercules on 5 July 2002. The 4th MEB Marines are en-route to the American embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.
38

clad man, his brother, to pull the tire puncture strip 

out of the driveway, allowing our vehicles to pass.

A pretty 20-something woman looked out of 

place in her European-style dress. Tightly against 

her breast, she clutched a clipboard. She was his 

daughter. She kept track of the cars entering the 

compound. She grew up listening to stories of the 

kind Americans, of loyalty and pride. She wanted so 

much to understand that which her father took for 

granted. She gave us a shy smile, then turned away.

We reported our arrival to the first Marine we 

came to. He eyed our military identification cards 

closely. We surrendered them, and in their place 

we were provided plastic visitor badges. The agent 

we were transporting sat quietly in the back seat. 

They were expecting him. Our two-vehicle caravan worked its way to the embassy grounds. We 

halted at the main entrance. The Great Seal of the 

United States presided over the building’s facade. 

A grouping of sandbags held a bright red Marine 

guidon in the proper leaning position. It identified 

the unit of the embassy guards, a proud bunch. 

We left one man with the vehicles, while the rest 

of us moved up the steps to the lobby. 

We ignored the “clear your weapon” barrel. 

A sign boldly informed us that loaded weapons 

were not allowed into the building. The barrel was 

partially filled with sand. Everyone was supposed 

to point their weapons into it while clearing the 

breech. It was passed with a sneer by our security 

personnel. They mumbled about never unloading 

their weapons. I hesitated for a moment but did 

not clear my weapon either.

We moved into the building. Broken glass littered the marble floor. Bullet holes and jaggededged windowpanes exposed the lobby to the 

bitter weather. The position behind the bulletproof guard post was left unattended. The heavy 

plastic protective window had been smashed. The 

culprit’s tool, a rusting metal bar, remained where 

the fiendish Taliban thug had left it against a wall 

only a few feet away.

Our attention was drawn to a neatly folded 

American flag on display. It last flew on 30 January 1989. A note in longhand on lined paper read:

Marines, take care of it. For those of us that 

were here, it means a lot. For those of you 

who enter Kabul, it could mean a lot to you. 

Semper Fi. We Kabul Marines endured as 

I’m sure you will. Think of us as needed.

For a moment, we surveyed the activity. Muscular Marines in full battle gear, weapons at the 

ready, lugged over full trash bags toward the rear 

of the building. Dirt was swept into small piles. 

The floor was gray and filthy.

“Hello,” a grandmotherly voice, out of place 

here, echoed from one of the hallways. A diminutive lady, dressed in a light-colored blouse and long 

dark skirt moved confidently through the burly 

men to where we stood—the chargé d’affaires. We 

introduced ourselves. The agent only nodded. She 

told him that he would have to bunk in his office 

at the embassy. There was no place for him in the 

bunker. He did not seem to mind. She offered us 

a tour of the embassy. She was proud of the work 

being done here. She spoke with exhilaration. This 

was where she belonged, she confided.

When U.S. officials returned to the 14-acre 

compound after the fall of Kabul, they found 

many of the rooms untouched since the day the 

last Marine departed. The outbuildings were damaged on 26 September when a mob climbed the 

walls and set two cars on fire. The caretaker tried 

to stop them. She called him a hero. I could hear 

the emotion in her voice as she told of the thousands of Afghan protesters who turned a Taliban march to the abandoned American embassy 

in Kabul into a frenzied attack. She told us that 
39

they were chanting Osama bin Laden’s name and 

waving white flags of Islam as they torched the 

compound, burned American flags, and hacked 

at the mothballed chancery building with an ax. 

Her voice cracked as she described the group of 

turbaned, black-clad Taliban men who wrenched 

the Great Seal of the United States off the main 

embassy building with steel cables and hammers, 

while others danced ecstatically and shouted 

“Long live Osama” and “Death to America.”

She was quiet for a moment. Then she went 

on. She described the scene when the doors were 

reopened as “like going back in time.” Coated in 

12 years of dust, a half-smoked cigar still lay in 

the ashtray on the ambassador’s desk and a half 

drunk bottle of California red wine stood on a 

table nearby. “We need to get the building ready 

for the official reopening,” she informed us. “Only 

a month away, only a month away. . . . Her words 

trailed off. They revealed her thoughts. There was 

so much to do. She also had to worry about force 

protection—for her it meant keeping the American flag flying proudly.

She was the senior State Department person in 

Afghanistan. A modest woman who lived among 

battle-hardened Marines in the filth and stench 

of the abandoned old building. She was accustomed to hardship. Her soft complexion and 

grandmotherly warm smile could not hide her 

determination to see this mission through. She 

was a volunteer. Already retired from the foreign 

service, she asked, then begged, to take over the 

monumental task of representing the U.S. government in a war zone. Why her? Because she 

would represent the American people’s resolve. 

She continued speaking, but I no longer listened 

as intently. I watched her. With a graceful wave 

of her hand, she replaced an errant tuft of brown 

hair loosed from her sensible headband. She was 

tough, yet feminine. “Well, gentlemen,” she spoke 

to the small crowd now encircling her, “Things 

to do. If you will excuse me?” The men parted, 

shifting self-consciously on their feet, to let her 

by. Her warm smile and her sure step made us 

all feel proud.

Once outside we stood for a silent moment and 

saluted the American flag fully unfurled in the 

cold Afghan wind. No one spoke the words, but 

we realized a common bond between us. Active 

duty, reserve, and civilians were one now. What 

we were fighting for became crystal clear. We were 

proud to be Americans. Our time had come.

Note

Marine Corps Gazette, December 2002, 34–36. 

Reprinted by permission. Copyright Marine Corps 

Gazette.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Brian D. Perry Sr., USA, was 

J-4, Joint Task Force Bowie in Afghanistan. His 

article describes his journey through Kabul to the 

U.S. embassy, which had been closed for the previous 12 years.
40

Aviation Ordnance Chief GySgt Marc A. Senecal of Marine 

Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (Rein) watches Bell 

AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters prepare to launch from the 

flight deck of the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) in support of Operation Anaconda on 4 March 2002. 

Photo courtesy of Nathan J. Ferbert
Leatherneck Air 

on Target During 

Operation Anaconda

by First Lieutenant Jeff Landis

Leatherneck, June 2002

When the most intense battle in the war on terror erupted in Afghanistan, Marines were called 

into action [on] 3 March [2002] to do what they 

do best: provide a quick and deadly response. This 

time they did it with Marine air.

Marine helicopter pilots, aircrewmen, and support personnel from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [13th MEU 

(SOC)] provided the muscle and quick reaction 

force required to launch air assaults on enemy 

troops and gun positions in Khowst and eastern 

Afghanistan’s Shah-e-kot Valley near Gardez, 4–26 

March, thus providing support for Coalition forces 

fighting on the ground. Leatherneck helicopters 

launched more than 400 combat sorties.

In less than 24 hours after receiving the call, 

the 13th MEU (SOC) and Amphibious Squadron 3 aboard ships of the USS Bonhomme Richard

(LHD 6) Amphibious Ready Group left the coast 

of Oman and sailed full steam through the Indian 

Ocean to the Northern Arabian Sea. From there, 

they launched missions requiring their aircraft to 

fly 800 miles inland the following morning.

The U.S. Central Command directed 13th 

MEU (SOC) to provide five [Bell] AH-1W Super 

Cobra1

 and three [Sikorsky] CH-53E Super Stallion 

41
42

helicopters and [Lockheed] KC-130 Hercules cargo/

refueler aircraft to support the Coalition Forces 

Land Component Command-Forward for Operation Anaconda. Additionally, the MEU provided 

daily [McDonnell Douglas] AV-8B Harrier combat sorties in support of the Coalition Forces Air 

Component Commander.

Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel 

Gregg A. Sturdevant, commanding officer of 

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (Rein), 

the 80-plus member detachment of Task Force 

165 [TF-165] performed close air support, airborne reconnaissance, logistics support, and a myriad of other tasks for Coalition Joint Task Force 

[CJTF]–Mountain, headed by the U.S. Army’s 10th 

Mountain Division, with elements from the 101st 

Airborne Division and special operations forces.

Marine Super Cobras conducted daily combat 

sorties to flush out al-Qaeda and Taliban forces 

in the mountainous regions of eastern Afghanistan. Three Marine CH-53Es, originally scheduled to provide logistics and refueling capabilities 

to Cobras on the long flight from the amphibious 

assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard to Bagram, 

Afghanistan, brought a new dimension in support 

of combat operations.

Super Stallion CH-53Es proved to be the most 

flexible assets on station. Super Stallion pilots flew 

191 combat sorties and 257 hours, providing tactical refueling to every type of rotary-wing asset in 

Afghanistan. They flew combat support missions 

hauling supplies, ordnance and water, inserted U.S. 

and Coalition special operations forces, moved utility and all-terrain vehicles, and operated tactical 

forward arming and refueling points.

“We knew we would have some involvement in 

this operation because of the sheer distance inland,” 

said CH-53E pilot Captain R. Brian “Chimpy” 

Fanning. “I think we brought more to the fight 

than people realized. We performed a variety of 

missions . . . on short notice. All this was a credit 

to the maintenance crews who worked miracles 

day and night even in the freezing cold to keep 

the aircraft maintained and combat-ready. They 

are the unsung heroes of this operation.”

According to Captain Leaf H. “Grenade” 

Wade, assistant air officer for 13th MEU (SOC) 

and liaison officer for the TF-165 detachment: 

Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy 

Ordnance technicians from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (Rein) load missiles onto an AH-1W Super Cobra 

helicopter on 4 March 2002. A little more than an hour later, the Super Cobra and its two pilots launched from the flight 

deck of the USS Bonhomme Richard to support Operation Anaconda.
43

“Our planning cycle is very short, and we could 

react to a number of different missions on short 

notice. . . . Sometimes the tasks would change 

four or five times in a day, and I think the flexibility in being able to plan and adapt and make 

it work on a short timeline was a huge success.”

The Super Cobra and Harrier pilots also dictated 

combat success. Cobra pilots flew an average of 40 

combat missions each, 217 total sorties, and 380 

hours. They fired a total of 28 tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-command data link [Raytheon 

BGM-71] (TOW) guided missiles; 42 [Lockheed 

Martin AGM-114] Hellfire missiles; 450 2.75-inch 

rockets; and 9,300 rounds of 20mm high-explosive, incendiary rounds on al-Qaeda cave complexes and mortar positions. Harrier pilots flew 

148 sorties and 331 hours total, including some 

in January, and dropped 32 GBU-12 500-pound 

bombs and two MK-82 bombs.

“We flew the first Harrier sortie off the ship, 

and it felt a lot different than training when we 

removed all of our squadron patches and name 

tapes, and grabbed a pistol and rounds to take 

with us,” said Captain Joshua L. “Spud” Luck.

“When I felt the 500-pound bombs drop off 

my wing one at a time and I watched them impact 

the target area, it was almost surreal. From 18,000 

feet, it’s pretty impersonal.

“However, the personal side of it was seeing 

what happened on September 11, and having an 

impact on preventing anything like that from happening in the future. I am proud to be a part of 

this,” Luck said.

According to military reports, much of the 

heaviest fighting during Operation Anaconda took 

place in the mountains 10,000 feet or more above 

sea level. The Cobra pilots provided aerial reconnaissance and put steel on targets while combing 

the mountains.

“I volunteered for this, and I was hoping I 

would get into the fight somehow,” said Captain 

Christopher W. “Harm” Roe. “We happened to get 

the first mission out and attacked a mortar position with TOW missiles. We also located a hidesite and made a few passes with 20mm guns and 

fired flechette rockets.

“Part of it for me was revenge. I watched the 

buildings collapse live [and] in person,” said Roe, 

who was home in New York on leave during 9/11. 

“I think it was easy [in air missions] to take the 

human dimension out of it, because they were firing at us trying to take us out of the air. It was 

either us or them.”

“We worked well with [keeping] our eyes on 

target,” said Captain Bruce W. “Jo Jo” Laughlin. “With an obscured target, you have to work 

together to stay focused. . . . It was a life-altering 

experience for me as a Marine and a pilot.”

With all of the integrated aviation assets, including KC-130 Hercules aircraft providing daily 

logistics runs for fuel and supplies as well as aerial 

refueling, the flexibility of the 13th MEU (SOC) 

proved valuable to the battles in Afghanistan. On 

26 March, the detachment’s support to CJTFMountain was ended, and the flexible, capable and 

expeditionary force rejoined 13th MEU (SOC) 

ready for exercises or more combat operations in 

the Central Command theater of operations.

Notes

Leatherneck, June 2002, 20–21. Reprinted with 

permission. Copyright Leatherneck Magazine.

1. The official name of the AH-1W is Sea Cobra, but 

is popularly known as the Super Cobra, which will 

be used throughout this document.

About the Author

First Lieutenant Jeff Landis was the public affairs 

officer attached to the 13th MEU(SOC).
44

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harriers from the Flying Nightmares—Marine Attack Squadron 513—line the expeditionary airfield at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. 

Photo courtesy of Maj Michael V. Franzak
Bagram Nightmares

by Fred H. Allison 

U.S. Marine Corps History Division

Bagram Air Base today [2009] is one of the world’s 

busiest in support of the Coalition’s war against the 

Taliban. In the early days of what was then called 

the War on Terrorism, eight years ago, Bagram was 

the northern front, an outpost in a dangerous and 

hostile land. It is isolated and austere, wind-swept 

and foreboding. Situated on a plateau, its elevation 

is almost 5,000 feet above sea level. Shot-up and 

gutted Russian MiGs were reminders that it had 

once been a Soviet air base. Shortly after 9/11, in 

the earliest days of Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF), the Northern Alliance and Taliban battled 

for its control, literally on the base. Mortars and 

rockets ravaged its buildings, runway, taxiways, 

and ramps. Once liberated by Coalition forces, 

gutsy Lockheed C-130 Hercules pilots began flying in and out, hauling troops and supplies. The 

decimated airport conditions, however, would not 

allow tactical jets to operate safely from Bagram.

Strike jets, therefore, had to fly a long way to get 

over the Afghanistan battlefields and provide air 

support for Coalition troops. Except for the Kyrgyz Republic to the north, no nation on Afghanistan’s perimeter hosted American aircraft. Early 

in the operation, U.S. Air Force bombers staged 

from Navy Support Facility Diego Garcia (2,500 

miles) or [Whiteman Air Force Base,] Missouri 

(7,250 miles), to provide air support. At the same 

time, Navy/Marine Corps aircraft, which flew 

the preponderance of OEF missions, flew from 

45
46

carriers 700 miles away in the Arabian Sea or from 

bases in Krygyzistan, which were also hundreds of 

miles distant. With the possibility of war in Iraq 

looming, even these limited aviation assets might 

not be available in the future. Air Force General 

T. Michael Moseley, combined forces air component commander (CFACC) for OEF, asked the 

Marine Corps in mid-2002 if Harriers could fly 

from Bagram.

The McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier’s vertical/short takeoff and landing capability meant 

that it did not require a sophisticated airfield on 

which to operate. Bagram was basically an Army 

helicopter base. Its runway had no arresting gear 

and, unlike other tactical jets, the Harrier required 

none. A squadron of strike jets based in-country 

could provide near the same air coverage as a much 

larger force of aircraft based hundreds of miles away. 

If Harriers could fly from Bagram they, like the 

Air Force’s Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt 

IIs, which by mid-2002 were flying from Bagram, 

would be “inside the fight.” They could provide a 

quick response to calls for air support and better 

integrate with the troops they were supporting, 

which were also headquartered at Bagram.1

 An 

important aspect of Moseley’s request for Harriers 

was that they were equipped with AN/AAQ-28(V) 

Litening targeting pods. This system, developed 

by the Rafael Corporation of Israel and comanufactured with Northrop Grumman, represented 

a generational step forward in precision weapons 

delivery and—of great significance for Afghanistan—could gather intelligence data. Air National 

Guard F-16s had first fielded them in 1999, and 

employed them in combat in Operation Southern Watch in 2000.2

 The Litening pod’s capability and utility was recognized by Marines, and 

by 2001 Marine Harrier squadrons were training 

with them in Yuma, Arizona.

In the summer of 2002, the Marines directed 

Lieutenant Colonel James A. “Grouper” Dixon, 

the commanding officer of a Yuma, Arizona-based 

Harrier squadron, Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 

513—the Flying Nightmares—to conduct a site 

survey of Bagram Air Base to determine its suitability for AV-8B operations. When Dixon and his 

party arrived at Bagram in the middle of night, 

it was pitch dark, “the darkest place” he had ever 

been. The next day, they began the survey. Dixon 

focused on the runway and ramp surfaces. They 

were terrible. Overall, the runway was crumbling 

with holes in the paving, some more than two feet 

across and six inches deep. Initial construction by 

the Soviet Union was substandard. The wooden 

expansion joints had rotted away and the concrete slabs were buckled and crumbling, creating 

a genuine threat to an aircraft engine that might 

easily ingest a chunk of debris. Known as foreign 

object damage (FOD), this can cripple an aircraft 

as surely as an enemy bullet. While the runway 

was being repaired, in the near term it meant that 

even less runway would be available. Indeed, half 

of the runway’s width was closed for repairs while 

the other half remained in its decimated state.

There were other concerns. Night operations 

would be required but, because of the enemy threat, 

the base would be blacked out. Harrier pilots were 

adept at night combat flying and practiced it regularly, but they expected to return to a base or ship 

that had lights to aid landing. Mines were numerous, many visible just off the concrete. Logistics 

was another issue. Forward-based Harriers were 

meant to operate as part of a Marine air-ground 

task force. A Bagram-based Harrier squadron 

would be the only one for hundreds of miles, isolated and far from any Marine-specific logistics 

support. Bagram’s high elevation and thinner air 

would degrade the Harriers’ performance and reduce 

ordnance loads. This was particularly significant 

because the AV-8Bs did not normally carry a big 
47

load. The mountains and weather around Bagram 

created gusty and unpredictable wind conditions 

that was a further hazard to Harriers operating at 

slow speed around the airfield.

Upon return to the United States, Dixon consulted with aircraft engine experts on the FOD 

problem. He was told that the Harrier’s engine 

would not suck up a “Rice Krispie if it is not disturbed.” An advantage the Harrier has is that the 

nose gear is behind its engine intake, so it would not 

throw up rocks to be ingested. The FOD danger 

came from debris kicked up by another aircraft’s 

exhaust. Amended taxi and takeoff procedures and 

“tail pipe awareness” would minimize the FOD 

hazard to engines. But the concrete debris still represented a significant threat to Harrier tires and 

general aircraft safety. 

Although a vertical landing could not be used, 

the Harrier’s vectored thrust capability would allow 

for short take offs and landings with a decent load 

of ordnance. This tactic would also minimize the 

enemy ground fire threat since they would not be 

hovering while landing and taking off. 

So, while the Harriers could operate from 

Bagram, it was not going to be easy; the high elevation, gusty conditions, increased FOD hazards, 

enemy threats, and minimal lighting conditions 

ensured that. Dixon’s squadron was young, few of 

his pilots or noncommissioned officers had been 

to war. Nevertheless, he believed they were up to 

the challenge. He reported his findings to higher 

command.

In August 2002, he got the word that VMA513(-) would deploy to Afghanistan in October. 

They had about six weeks to prepare. Night airfield 

operations were practiced at a blacked-out Laguna 

Army Airfield west of Yuma. They hung external 

fuel tanks on their jets to simulate the diminished 

performance expected at Bagram’s high elevation. 

A squadron mechanic adapted a helicopter infrared 

lens light cover for use on the Harriers’ landing 

light. It allowed the light to be used and seen by 

the pilots wearing night-vision goggles (NVGs), 

and unseen by others without NVGs. It increased 

visibility from 500 to 3,500 feet.

Tactical training was not so problematic. The 

squadron had trained extensively in offensive air 

support, which would be the predominate mission 

in Afghanistan. It is the mother’s milk of tactical 

flying for Harrier pilots. An important difference 

though was that, in Afghanistan, their air strikes 

would be controlled by U.S. Air Force joint tactical air controllers (JTACs) instead of Marine forward air controllers (FACs). The Nightmare pilots 

practiced close air support missions with JTACs 

at the Goldwater Range at Davis-Monthan Air 

Force Base, Tucson, Arizona. The JTACs were 

enlisted men, while Marine FACs were officers 

and aviators. Trust and reliability was built into 

the Marine pilot/FAC relationship, their shared 

backgrounds and military cultures streamlined 

communication in the challenging task of putting 

ordnance on targets very close to the good guys. 

The predeployment training served to instill confidence in the JTACs.

Living and Working in Bagram

Although the base at Bagram was inhabited by a 

sizeable Army and Coalition force, the Marines 

were required to build their own camp and workspaces. So, as the squadron pilots trained to fly and 

fight out of the base, an advance party, commanded by First Lieutenant Ryan P. Flanagan, composed 

of Marines Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) 

373, -374, and -474 and Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 (MALS-13) flew a month early into Bagram to build the camp. These Marines 

had a scant two weeks to prepare. Nevertheless, 

there was no shortage of volunteers, “everybody 

wanted to go.”
48

The advance party—40 Marines with about 

five Lockheed C-5 Galaxy loads worth of gear—

arrived at Bagram in the middle of the night. The 

belly of the transport was blacked out as the Air 

Force transport banked hard into its spiraling, tactical landing approach. The Marines were in full 

combat gear with their personal weapons “locked 

and loaded.” After landing, they stepped out into 

Bagram’s windy, raw cold blackness. Building a 

base camp, or “tent city,” fit easily within the capability of the wing support squadrons, which had 

the ability to build substantial expeditionary airfields if required. Nevertheless, the Bagram experience was daunting.

The next morning, the Marines saw their 

campsite—little but frames of tents stuck in 

“shin deep moon dust” and mines. The unexploded ordnance had to be removed before camp 

construction. At the end of a month of 16-hour 

days, they had erected 30 strongback tents, each 

a home for eight Marines, laid gravel, built showers and a laundry, wired the camp for electricity 

and communications, constructed bunkers and 

installed gates. With no internal plumbing or 

sewage, water had to be hauled in and, after use, 

the gray water was hauled out. Later they built a 

chapel, recreational facilities, a sand pit for martial arts training, a weight room/gym, bouldering wall, and volleyball and basketball courts. 

When a donated fiberglass above-ground swimming pool arrived, they installed that as well.3

Once the squadron moved in, the camp was 

dubbed Teufel Hunden—Devil Dog. In its center 

sat a 9/11 memorial of miniature twin towers that 

listed the names of fallen Marines in Afghanistan 

on a concrete pentagonal base with an outline of 

the state of Pennsylvania carved in the cement. A 

flagpole was set in the middle, where the American flag was raised and lowered daily.

The Marines rarely had interaction with Afghan 

civilians, although some worked on base, hauling off the gray water and doing light construction work. Afghanis traveled for hours to sell their 

wares, including antique firearms, jewelry, tapestries, and furs, at a Friday bazaar. Throughout 

their deployment, the VMA-513 Marines continued a time-honored tradition of promoting goodwill with the locals, especially the children. They 

visited Afghan children in the hospital; some were 

malnourished, others were victims of mines sown 

during the Soviet occupation. At Christmas, the 

Marines conducted a “Toys for Tots” campaign 

for Afghan children in surrounding villages. The 

donated toys—enough to fill two five-ton trucks—

came from the United States.

With only six jets to support a demanding flight 

schedule and a long tether for replacement parts 

and other maintenance support, squadron success 

hinged on aircraft maintenance. The MWSS and 

MALS-13 Marines made Bagram Harrier-friendly. 

They built a high-power turn-up ramp for engine 

maintenance and operated a motorized sweeper that 

had been transported from the United States to 

clean the base’s rugged surfaces. These precautions 

combined with the pilots’ caution in taxiing, takeoff, and landing procedures neutralized the FOD 

hazard. This was evident in that not one engine 

was lost to FOD during their year-long Afghanistan deployment.4

 This was an impressive record 

in light of the regularity of FODs at much cleaner 

continental U.S. bases.

Logistics to support the Harrier squadron in 

Afghanistan had been a major concern. To facilitate expeditionary aircraft maintenance, VMA513 brought a Marine Corps–developed Remote 

Expeditionary Support Package (RESP)—a minimaintenance department pack-up van loaded for 

rapid deployment—that provided a robust maintenance capability and a large degree of self-sufficiency despite the austere setting. The squadron 
49

received some support from Army units on base 

and, although the parts supply line extended back 

to their base at Yuma, parts arrived in a timely 

manner, most within five days, and were delivered 

primarily by commercial carriers and Air Force 

transports. Their high aircraft availability rate was 

supported by the decision to bring only one variant of AV-8B, the night attack model, instead of 

including the radar version. This simplified parts 

supply and enhanced commonality especially for 

cannibalizing parts if the situation demanded.5

Marine mechanics endured the wind, dust, cold, 

heat, and darkness of Bagram. Security requirements demanded that they work “lights out” at 

night. To accomplish this, they wore night-vision 

goggles and used covert lighting unless they were 

in the clamshell hangar erected by the Air Force. 

The maintenance crews worked long hours, 12-hour 

shifts, with a day off a distinct rarity. They did 

not mind since there was little else to do. Colonel 

Dixon attested to the Marines’ role in the success 

of the Bagram deployment through their “internal fortitude . . . working 12 on and 12 off, hot 

weather, cold weather, rain, sleet, snow or shine. 

These Marines can give, and give, and give, and 

don’t ask for much in return.” Marine mechanics produced a mission-capable aircraft availability rate of 83 percent for the year’s deployment. 

Photo by LCpl Andrew Z. Williams 

Marines with VMA-513 play basketball on their time off at Bagram Air Base.
50

No sortie was lost as a result of factors over which 

they had control.

Initially, the deployment was to be only six 

months. About the time they should have been 

heading home, the war in Iraq started. They had 

been given notice two months earlier, around 

Christmas, that they would be extended for another 

six months. Up until then, they had been counting down the days. Dixon dreaded breaking the 

news to the squadron. Jokingly he said, “I made 

everybody turn in their weapons” before announcing the change. “A year in Bagram was quite an 

experience.”

Bagram sat in the middle of hostile territory, yet 

there was little actual fighting, although rockets or 

small-arms fire occasionally arced in. Complacency 

and boredom threatened morale. Some Marines 

half joking called it “Operation Forgotten Freedom.” The Air Force rotated their Bagram A-10 

squadrons in and out on a regular basis; about 

seven different A-10 units came and went while 

the Flying Nightmares were there. Indeed many 

Marines who went to Iraq and fought in Operation Iraqi Freedom I were home before VMA-513.

The outside threat kept them trapped on base. 

Unlike being on an aircraft carrier, as one pilot 

remarked, “this carrier never pulls into port.” After 

the squadron’s deployment was extended, Colonel 

Dixon implemented a rotational rest and recuperation program. All Marines had the opportunity 

Photo by LCpl Andrew Z. Williams 

An AV-8B Harrier jet from VMA-513 sits on the ramp at Bagram Air Base.
51

to take a 10-day leave from Bagram. To pass the 

time when not working, which they did incessantly, the Marines focused on physical training. 

They became used to running with their M16s. 

A Bagram marathon was held and documented 

in Runner’s World magazine. The Internet, email, 

and movies were also available. Most important 

for morale, VMA-513 received visits from Commandant General Michael W. Hagee and Lieutenant General Earl B. Hailston, commanding 

general of Marine Forces Pacific. Each stressed 

the significance of this deployment.

Flying and Fighting in Bagram

Making a globe-spanning flight from their base at 

Yuma, the squadron arrived on 15 October and 

began flying missions within 48 hours. It deployed 

with only six aircraft as the limited ramp conditions at Bagram did not allow for a full squadron. 

Over the next 12 months, the 13 Nightmare pilots 

flew almost 3,800 combat hours in 1,250 sorties—

almost twice as much as what a 16-plane Harrier 

squadron normally flew in a year.

Deployed in the middle of a combat arena, all 

the flight time was “red ink”—combat time—

since the enemy was just outside the perimeter.6

On an early combat mission, as Colonel Dixon taxied for take-off in pre-dawn darkness, he watched 

machine gun tracers spew into the sky off the 

end of the runway as local warlords settled differences. Almost half of their missions were at night. 

When darkness settled, there was little light-pollution from large cities as would be the case in 

the United States. From the ground, it was eerie 

to watch operations around the field. One could 

hear Harriers taxiing, landing, or taking off but 

not see them. From a pilot’s perspective, approaching the field to land at night, they saw the town 

all lit up and in the “dark abyss” next to it sat the 

runway, “somewhere.”

The flying was extremely demanding. Radar to 

provide guidance into the field was limited and, 

due to the enemy threat that required tactical runway approaches, no slow, straight-ins. Afghanistan had little infrastructure to support aviation, 

such as navigation stations, radar facilities, maps, 

weather forecasting, air traffic control, or other 

airfields where a pilot could land in an emergency 

or when bad weather shut down home base. Once 

the war began in Iraq, the Air Force AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft was 

not available for command and control. The Iraq 

War also took most of the airborne tankers. This 

shortened missions, lightened ordnance loads, 

and took away the safety hedge of having more 

airborne fuel available if unexpected conditions 

arose. Pilots flew constantly, evaluating the situation and weighing it against their few options.

Afghanistan served as a preview of how the 

war on terror would be fought. It was a war where 

searching for an elusive and shadowy enemy was 

a central tactic and “intelligence was the primary 

U.S. weapon.”7

 For this fight, the Harrier proved 

to be of great value, mainly because Marine pilots 

train extensively in close air support and are genetically wired to support troops on the ground. 

They also had the technology to provide superb 

real-time intelligence information to the ground 

warriors: “a moving map display linked to global 

positioning linked to the Litening pod.” The Litening pod allowed for a magnified, precise, and 

detailed examination of the terrain. Communicating this information to the ground troops 

significantly enhanced their situational awareness. 

As an example, a Nightmare pilot was able to spot 

a man digging alongside a road at a range of 5.5 

miles through the Litening pod. The pilot was 

able to warn the convoy of the suspicious activity.8

Employing ordnance was the exception. The 

squadron dropped 17 bombs, fired 2 rockets, and 
52

expended almost 2,000 rounds of 25mm ammunition. In most cases, presence was all that was 

required. The Harrier is a relatively loud aircraft 

and its noise is intimidating. One of the special 

operations troops stated that “Afghans, when they 

hear an airplane overhead that scares the s——t 

out of them, they won’t pull stuff when they know 

airplanes are overhead.” Another soldier who lived 

and fought out of an isolated fire base to the north 

in the Hindu Kush mountains declared, “The only 

nights that they slept well were the nights they 

heard the Harriers flying overhead.”

Based close to the fight at Bagram and flying a fast jet, the Flying Nightmares responded 

quickly to air support requests. They were able to 

cover two vulnerability periods every 24 hours, 

each lasting at least 90 minutes or up to 5 hours 

if tankers were available. They flew in two-plane 

sections and employed hunter-killer tactics. The 

lead aircraft, the hunter, carried the Litening pod, 

which the pilot used to locate and designate targets. Precise weapon delivery was critical because, 

in counterinsurgency, collateral damage has to be 

minimized to protect civilians. The Litening pod 

helped locate the target and, because of its infrared 

marker—finger of death—which could be seen by 

pilots and the JTACS using night-vision devices, 

positive target identification could be obtained. 

One U.S. Army special operations officer based 

at Jalabad stated:

[The Nightmares] did everything we asked 

them to do and more. They would take the time 

to really look for the bad guys. They would also 

tell us about bad guys beyond the range where we 

were looking. They talked us through things, we 

really felt that the Harriers knew what they were 

doing. I feel that [they] appreciate what we’re up 

against on the ground. 

Two Flying Nightmare pilots, Major Michael V. 

Franzak and Captain Michael D. Trapp, received 

the Distinguished Flying Cross for providing gamechanging close air support to Coalition troops in 

dire circumstances. Army General Dan K. McNeill, 

commander of all Coalition forces in Afghanistan 

at the time, received “constant” favorable reports 

on VMA-513’s performance.

In sum, the deployment of VMA-513 to Bagram 

proved a success and exhibited the Harrier’s abilities and the flexibility inherent in Marine aviation. It deployed rapidly to an expeditionary 

environment, at extreme distance from Marine 

Corps logistics depots. The Flying Nightmares 

then maintained a high operational tempo in an 

austere setting for an entire year. They provided 

valuable reconnaissance, intelligence, and fire support for Coalition ground forces. In so doing, they 

validated the capability and utility of the Litening 

targeting pod. The deployment also breathed new 

life into the controversial Harrier itself; indeed, the 

success of VMA-513’s Bagram deployment took 

the wind out of the sails of a late 2003 Los Angeles Times story that attacked the Harrier’s safety 

record. The Marine Corps general at the helm of 

Marine aviation, Major General James F. Amos, 

regarded the Nightmare’s Bagram deployment as 

singularly important for “saving the AV-8B.” The 

Flying Nightmares’ 2002–3 Bagram deployment 

pioneered the way for subsequent deployments of 

Harriers to Afghanistan by the Marine Corps and 

the Royal Air Force.

The U.S. Marine Corps is proud of its expeditionary nature—to be fast, austere, innovative, and 

lethal in any clime and place. The Flying Nightmares modeled these attributes in their Bagram 

deployment.

Notes

An edited version of the article was posted at 

http://www.sldinfo.com/our-history-and-lessons

-learned-corner-new-bagram-nightmares-part-one/. 
The original version is printed here by permission 

of the author.

1. The A-10 was able to fly from Bagram as it was a 

rugged jet, its engines were mounted high so the 

threat of its engine ingesting a chunk of debris from 

the blasted and crumbling runway was reduced. It 

also was able to operate from shortened runways 

because it landed and took off at slower speeds.

2. David P. Anderson, ANG History Office, email to 

author, 3 August 2009, author files, History Division, Quantico, Virginia.

3. VMA-513 PowerPoint brief, 2003, Reference Section, History Division, Quantico, Virginia.

4. There was one engine damaged by internal FOD, 

a piece of the aircraft itself was ingested.

5. Cannibalizing refers to the practice of taking a part 

from one aircraft and using it on another.

6. Combat flights are entered in a pilot’s log book in 

red ink.

7. Don Chipman, “Air Power and the Battle for Mazare Sharif,” Air Power History, Spring 2006, 44.

8. Dixon intvw.

About the Author

Dr. Fred Allison, a retired Marine Reserve major, 

is an oral historian and archivist in the Oral and 

Visual History Section of the Reference Branch in 

Quantico, Virginia.

53
54
Part II

Rebuilding a Nation, 2003–7
56

The beginning of 2003 saw 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade AntiTerrorism (4th MEB [AT]) provide 

the sourcing for Task Force Kabul/

Marine Security Force Kabul. The MEB supplied 

one company from its AT battalion (3d Battalion, 8th Marines) on a rotating basis until 2005 

for the U.S. embassy. In late 2003, the U.S. Marines also began to deploy infantry battalions to 

Afghanistan, the first of which was 2d Battalion, 

8th Marines. These units deployed singly to augment Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180) 

and its successor CJTF-76. Missions initially involved maintaining local security around Bagram 

airfield within a 10-kilometer radius. In addition, 

the battalion served as the local quick reaction force 

and conducted numerous cordon-and-knock operations in surrounding provinces. From 2005 to 

mid-2006, Marine Corps infantry battalions also 

served as the core of Task Force Koa, which operated in the vicinity of Jalalabad. In addition, they 

also aided the local provincial reconstruction team. 

Battalion operations picked up significantly in 

2005. The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, conducted a 

series of operations in eastern Afghanistan, especially the Korengal Valley in Kunar Province. The 

series of four-phased operations consisted of planning and shaping, insertion, cordon and knock/

search, targeted civil-military operations/information operations, and sustained stability operations 

to promote the legitimacy of the Afghan government, spoil anti-Coalition activities, and promote 

reconciliation with the government. 

During the summer and fall of 2005, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, continued to conduct operations 

to improve security and stabilize the local government in Kunar Province. Most notable of these 

was Operation Red Wings to capture insurgent 

cell leader Ahmad Shah. Without its supporting 

arms, battalions relied on joint force integration to 

conduct operations. However, during Red Wings, 

friction integrating Special Forces and the battalion led the special operations task force to take 

over planning and command and control of the 

opening phases. Tragically, shortly after its insertion, a U.S. Navy SEAL fireteam was ambushed 

by Ahmad Shah’s fighters. Three of the 4 SEALs 

were killed, and a rescue helicopter with 16 aboard 

was shot down trying to rescue the team. 

Aviation units deployed in similar fashion to 

that of the infantry battalion model. Individual 

squadrons or detachments deployed independent 

of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), 

but did take some supporting detachments for 

maintenance and airfield support. Generally, they 

were requested to fill specific missions or capability gaps, such as close air support from an expeditionary airfield or to counter improvised explosive 

devices. Reserve units from the 4th Marine Aircraft 

Wing (4th MAW) also featured heavily throughout much of the period. 

Marine Corps support for the Afghan effort 

also saw the introduction of embedded training teams (ETT). These generally consisted of 

16 Marines who provided training and advisory 

assistance to Afghan National Police (ANP) and 

Afghan National Army (ANA) units. Over time, 

the Marine ETT detachments rose from three 

deployed in 2005 to seven by early 2008. The 

ETT typically consisted of one corps-level and 

six battalion-level teams to train and mentor the 

ANA. 

Following the opening stages of Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF), the Marine Corps generally did not deploy as a MAGTF. However, in 

2004, the unstable situation in central Afghanistan and anticipated spring offensive by the Taliban and other anti-Coalition militias prompted 

deployment of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(22d MEU) to Oruzgan Province. Once ashore, 
57

it became CJTF-180’s main effort for Operation 

Mountain Storm. The MEU’s organic commandand-control and logistical apparatus enabled it to 

take on additional joint attachments, including 

an Army battalion and Special Forces operational 

detachment A-teams. In a series of linked operations, the extended campaign not only demonstrated the robust capabilities and flexibility of the 

MAGTF, but it also preempted enemy actions and 

helped set the conditions for successful Afghani 

voter registration and national-level elections.

The following selections cover the atypical 

deployments that generally represented the period 

when most U.S. assets were deployed to Iraq 

following the campaign to topple the Afghan Taliban regime. As the effort to rebuild a war-torn 

Afghanistan began, however, the Taliban and 

various other actors reorganized to challenge the 

Coalition effort. By 2006, the strain of two simultaneous conflicts prompted the Marine Corps to 

dramatically reduce its presence in Afghanistan. 

By 2007, however, a resurgent Taliban and the successful counterinsurgency strategy implemented in 

Iraq prompted senior Marines to push for a shift 

from Iraq back to Afghanistan. The George W. 

Bush administration ultimately rejected the proposal in early December 2007 to protect the fragile gains made in Iraq.

Official Department of Defense photo, courtesy of MC1 Chad J. McNeeley, USN

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Adm Michael G. Mullen arrives in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on 6 October 2007 

to visit U.S. forces assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Team 236.
58

Marines with Company E, 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, host an economic and development shura. 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Scott A. Whittington
Fighting 

“The Other War”:

Counterinsurgency 

Strategy in Afghanistan, 

2003–5

by Lieutenant General David W. Barno, 

USA (Ret)

Military Review, September–October 2007

Afghanistan in mid-2003 was at a point of transition—a strategic fork in the road. Major combat 

operations had ended in 2001, devolving into a 

long-term pursuit of Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants, and humanitarian support was beginning 

to enlarge the nascent reconstruction effort; but 

Taliban-related activity was increasing in the south 

and east of the country, while heavily armed militias continued to dominate many areas. Politically, 

however, optimism across the nation was almost 

tangible. Plans were underway for a nationwide 

loya jirga (grand council) to draft a new constitution, an effort to begin the democratic process that 

would move beyond the 2002 jirga, which had appointed Hamid Karzai the leader of a transitional 

government. Additionally, presidential and parliamentary elections were being planned for 2004. 

59
60

The Bonn process had organized the overwhelming international sympathy toward Afghanistan 

with lead nations designated to oversee security 

sector reform.1

 International support for stabilizing Afghanistan was strong, focused upon the UN 

Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), 

which was led by the renowned and influential 

Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi. A 5,500-

person International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) had transitioned into a NATO-led mission, but remained confined to security duties 

in Kabul. On balance, however, the nationwide 

writ of the provisional government in Kabul was 

tenuous at best, and increasing security concerns 

threatened to undermine both international support and the nascent political process. 

Unfortunately, the U.S.-led military Coalition 

was not well postured to counter the rising threat. 

Coordination between the military and interagency 

partners was hampered by a U.S. embassy and 

military headquarters separated by over 40 kilometers. Unity of effort suffered; the military command-and-control situation was in flux; our tactical 

approach was enemy-focused and risked alienating the Afghan people; and the substantial draw 

of operations in Iraq had put severe limits on the 

availability of key military capabilities for Afghanistan. To make matters more difficult, the American military leadership was rotating, and the first 

U.S. ambassador since 1979 had departed with no 

replacement. Clearly, without a significant change 

in course, Afghanistan was at risk.

This article outlines the changes subsequently 

made to U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. It depicts 

the approach, begun in October 2003, to create a 

successful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign 

in “the other war” that resulted in over two years 

of relative stability and progress. It also provides 

a brief assessment of the situation in Afghanistan 

now, as we move toward the end of 2007.

The Military Situation—Summer 2003

In mid-2003, the U.S.-led Coalition embodied 

over 12,000 troops representing 19 nations. It was 

led by Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180, 

formed in June 2002 as the forward headquarters 

in Afghanistan and based at the old Soviet airbase 

at Bagram, a 20-minute helicopter flight north 

from Kabul. 

The United States had downsized the original 

CJTF in the spring of 2003, replacing a powerful and well-resourced three-star-led headquarters (XVIII Airborne Corps) and a subordinate 

division headquarters (Task Force 82) with a single division-level headquarters (10th Mountain 

Division).2

 As a result, operational tasks once 

performed by the corps headquarters and tactical tasks performed by the division headquarters 

were now assigned to one headquarters struggling 

to oversee both levels of war for a very large theater of operations. 

In Kabul, an Office of Military Cooperation 

(OMC) had been formed in mid-2002 to take 

on the mission of building the Afghan National 

Army (ANA) and de facto a number of politicalmilitary tasks as well.3

 The focus of the U.S. military effort in the aftermath of the December 2001 

fall of the Taliban had been two-fold: to hunt 

down the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban 

across the rugged landscape of southern and eastern Afghanistan and to build the ANA. “Nationbuilding” was explicitly not part of the formula.4

Despite the presence of a large U.S.-led, combined and joint civil-military operations task force 

(CJCMOTF) then based in Kabul, the military 

focus on reconstruction was limited. Four provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) had been 

created—two American teams at Gardez and 

Konduz, a British effort at Mazar-e Sharif, and a 

New Zealand mission in Bamian. All four were in 

relatively quiet areas. There was no PRT presence 
61

in the more volatile south and only one in the east 

(at Gardez), although an expansion of four more 

PRTs had been planned for the spring of 2004. 

Overall, the military span of control in Afghanistan was vast: one division-size joint task force 

headquarters (with a series of temporary commanders in the summer of 2003) supported over 

10,000 soldiers of a multinational force conducting security and reconstruction efforts across a 

nation the size of Texas with a population of 31 

million. (Afghanistan is nearly 50 percent larger 

than Iraq and has 4 million more people).5

Of even greater concern, only one ground 

maneuver brigade had tactical responsibility for 

this immense battlespace. To complicate matters, 

special forces, civil-military operations, aviation, 

and logistics commands operated throughout 

the battlespace, but reported individually to the 

CJTF-180 headquarters in Bagram—not to the 

ground brigade commander.6

The primary approach on the ground was 

enemy-centric. Conventional units operated out 

of sizeable bases, such as Bagram or Kandahar, 

or [out of] smaller forward operating bases, such 

as Shkin or Orgun-e. They gathered intelligence, 

planned operations, and sortied on “raids,” which 

could be small, prolonged patrols of some days’ 

duration or battalion-size operations lasting several weeks (e.g., Operation Mountain Lion). 

Underlying these actions was the concept that 

intelligence drives operations; as a result, tactical operations inevitably remained focused on 

the enemy. 

This “raid strategy” combined with the small 

number of troops had the effect of largely separating Coalition forces from the Afghan people. 

The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) 

units used often worsened this separation. “Tossing” whole villages in a cordon-and-search operation based on an intelligence tip, regardless of its 

accuracy, could quickly alienate a neutral or even 

friendly populace. 

At the time, the U.S. military had not published COIN doctrine since Vietnam, and units 

had relatively little training in COIN before their 

arrival in country. There was much “learning by 

doing” and even disagreement as to whether the 

fight in Afghanistan was a COIN fight at all. In 

fact, unit commanders were forbidden from using 

the word “counterinsurgency” in describing their 

operations—they were executing a “counterterrorist” mission in keeping with U.S. strategic guidance and an operational focus on the enemy.7

In view of this situation, the commander of U.S. 

Central Command (CENTCOM) recognized the 

need for a different headquarters configuration. In 

October 2003, he ordered a new three-star Coalition headquarters to stand up in Kabul and focus 

on political-military efforts, permitting the twostar JTF headquarters at Bagram to focus more 

fully on tactical operations.8

 This initiative represented a distinct break from the previous belief 

that the overall military headquarters should be 

somewhat removed from the capital, in part to 

avoid entanglement in the political complexities of 

a city of three million Afghans. Kabul was interlaced with all manner of international embassies, 

special envoys, NATO ISAF units, UNAMA, 

and a plethora of nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), all working to bring a better future to 

Afghanistan—but in a free-wheeling, confusing, 

and sometimes counterproductive mix. “Kabul 

will consume you,” warned one senior U.S. commander who had served in Bagram.9

A Counterinsurgency Strategy

Although the story of how we created a three-star 

operational headquarters with no existing core staff 

(and from a start point of six members!) in an ongoing operational environment holds important 
62

lessons of its own, the centerpiece of this article 

is the evolution of a COIN strategy for Afghanistan.10 The latter story began shortly after my arrival in country, when Lakhdar Brahimi asked us 

to develop an approach to address the deteriorating security situation in the south and east of the 

country. The UN had responsibility for devising 

and implementing a plan to hold Afghan presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004, and 

it was becoming clear that the organization would 

be unable to extend its reach into significant parts 

of the Pashtun southern half of Afghanistan if the 

security situation continued to remain dangerous 

there. Moreover, a strong Taliban offensive was 

expected in the spring of 2004, which would further threaten the elections and thus undermine the 

“roadmap” set forth by the international community in the Bonn process.

After 10 days of intense staff work led by my 

talented director of planning, a British colonel 

whose 22-man J-5 (future plans) shop now comprised over two-thirds of our entire staff, we were 

able to propose a new approach to security and stability to take into 2004.11 Initially called “Security 

Strategy South and East,” this effort quickly grew 

into a comprehensive COIN approach for Afghanistan. Ultimately, it evolved into a detailed campaign plan cowritten with the U.S. embassy and 

broadly shared by the Afghans and international 

community. Titled “Counterinsurgency Strategy for Afghanistan,” the plan was crafted in the 

absence of U.S. military doctrine, but reflected a 

solid knowledge of classic COIN approaches. The 

bookshelves in my Kabul offices at the embassy 

and military compound were well stocked with 

my own COIN readings, and several senior British officers on my staff supplied important operational insights from their Northern Ireland tours.12

To outline our strategy in simple terms, we created “The Five Pillars” diagram (figure 1). This 

graphic became a powerful tool for explaining the 

basics of our strategy to civilians, and within the 

command it circulated down to the very lowest 

tactical levels. In addition to providing an extraordinarily effective means of communicating complex ideas, it helped us implement the strategy’s 

fundamentals.13

Overarching Principle 1: 

The People as Center of Gravity

The core principle animating the new strategy 

was our identification of the Afghan people as the 

center of gravity for COIN (roof of the five pillars).14 This constituted a sea change in practice 

from earlier approaches, which had held that the 

enemy was the center of gravity and should be the 

focus of our military effort (a determination driven, in part, by the U.S. strategic outlook in 2003, 

which viewed nation-building as an inappropriate military task).

In making this change, we were motivated by 

both classic counterinsurgency practice as well as 

thoughtful consideration of Afghan military history. In late 2003, international forces comprised 

nearly 20,000 armed foreigners living in the midst 

of 31 million (often armed) Afghans who, throughout their history, had shown immense enmity to 

foreign forces. Two successive British expeditions 

in the nineteenth century and the massive Soviet 

invasion in the late twentieth century had provoked 

virulent responses from the people of Afghanistan—each ending in the bloody demise of the 

foreign military presence. In fact, the “light footprint” approach taken by U.S. force planners was, 

in many respects, derived from a strong desire not 

to replicate the Soviet attempt at omnipresence.15 

In our emerging strategy, I viewed the tolerance of the Afghan people for this new international military effort as a “bag of capital,” one that 

was finite and had to be spent slowly and frugally. 
63

Afghan civilian casualties, detainee abuse, lack of 

respect shown to tribal elders, even inadvertent 

offenses to the conservative Afghan culture—all 

would have the effect of spending the contents of 

this bag of capital, tolerance for foreigners, more 

quickly. 

With “respect for Afghans” as our watchword, 

we decided that convincing the Afghan people to 

commit to their future by supporting elections for 

a new government would be the near-term centerpiece of Coalition efforts. Thus, our military 

“main effort” in 2004 would be explicitly to “set 

the conditions for a successful Afghan presidential election”—certainly an unconventional military focus.

One of the changes in our military approach 

evinced by this focus on the population was a 

near-ironclad prohibition against using airpower 

to strike targets not directly engaged in close combat with Coalition troops. Air strikes based solely 

on technical intelligence were almost entirely 

eliminated owing both to their conspicuous lack 

of success and the unintended casualties they 

characteristically caused among Afghan civilians. 

In my estimation, this new judicious reserve in the 

application of Coalition firepower helped sustain 

the people’s fragile tolerance of an extended international military presence. In essence, we traded 

some tactical effect for much more important strategic consequences.

Overarching Principle 2: 

Unity of Purpose

A second principle of our strategy was interagency 

and international unity of purpose. Militarily, this 

was paralleled by a deliberate and measured reorganization to achieve unity of command in Coalition operations. As noted above, our military 

organizational structures had evolved unevenly as 

forces echeloned into Afghanistan in disparate increments following the Taliban’s fall in late 2001. 

During the execution of that early operational 

phase, most U.S. troops were based outside of Afghanistan, and those in-country had only begun 

to establish what would become long-term operating bases. During 2002, Bagram and Kandahar 

Center of Gravity:

The Afghan People

Unity of Purpose: Interagency and International

Defeat 

terrorism 

and deny 

sanctuary

Enable

Afghan 

security 

structure

Sustain area 

ownership

Enable 

reconstruction and 

good governance

Engage 

regional 

states

Information Operations

Figure 1. Counterinsurgency strategy, 2003–5
64

became the primary base locations for large units, 

logistical infrastructure, and Coalition airpower. 

As more units were added to the mix and as the 

Coalition presence continued long beyond initial expectations, a patchwork line of command 

authorities had evolved—an unsurprising situation given the need to cover a huge country with 

a small sliver of forces. 

Our moves over the next months focused on 

establishing two ground brigade-level headquarters, 

one assigned the hazardous south and the other the 

volatile east.16 (The northern half of the country 

remained largely free from any enemy threat, and 

thus became an economy-of-force area.) The brigades’ headquarters in the south and east became 

centers for regional command and control of forces 

in the vast southern half of the country. Each brigade was assigned an area of operations spanning 

its entire region. All organizations operating in this 

battlespace worked directly for, or in support of, 

the brigade commander. This was a striking and 

powerful organizational change. 

Establishing unity of purpose in the nonmilitary sphere was much more difficult. Arguably, the 

greatest flaw in our twenty-first century approach 

to COIN is our inability to marshal and fuse 

efforts from all the elements of national power 

into a unified whole. This failure has resulted in 

an approach akin to punching an adversary with 

five outstretched fingers rather than one powerful closed fist. 

Oftentimes, this rift has had its origin in relations between the U.S. chief of mission (i.e., our 

ambassador) and the military commander—each 

reporting to different chains of command in the 

midst of a nation embroiled in a counterinsurgency 

war. Afghanistan in 2003 was no exception—a 

situation made even more difficult by personnel 

turnover. After the U.S. ambassador departed in 

July without a replacement, the deputy chief of 

mission served as the acting chief for four months, 

and the presidential special envoy for Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, shuttled in and 

out. Ultimately named as the new U.S. ambassador, Khalilzad arrived for full-time duties on 

Thanksgiving Day 2003—but retained his special envoy status and thus had direct and regular 

access to the president as well as to the Department of State (DOS).17 As the U.S. and Coalition 

military commander, I reported to the commander 

of U.S. Central Command, General John P. Abizaid, and through him to the secretary of defense 

and the president. Our system dictates that our 

top diplomat and main military commander 

receive orders from and report to different people, 

coming together only at the president. Moreover, 

the cultural differences that separate the departments of State and Defense—and their people—

are well known. 

Fortunately, chemistry counts, and personalities matter. Ambassador Khalilzad and I both recognized that our personal relationship would set 

the tone for embassy and military teams across 

Afghanistan. We established a strong personal 

bond in Kabul that became a keystone in what 

would be a seamless approach to the interagency 

challenges we faced in Afghanistan.18 (In retrospect, I have viewed this approach as much akin to 

a “supporting-supported” relationship between the 

military and the embassy for many tasks involving other than the military elements of power). 

My guidance to our staff was that as the most 

powerful organization in the country, we would 

take a direct interest in everything—not just the 

traditional warfighting piece. As I told an exasperated and overworked staff officer in October 

2003: “We own it all!”19 Our tactics outside the 

military arena would largely be characterized as 

“leading from the rear” but were nonetheless very 

effective. To demonstrate personal commitment to 
65

this unified embassy-military approach, I moved 

into a half-trailer on the embassy compound and 

established an office there next to the ambassador’s. I began each day attending country-team 

and core security-group meetings with our new 

ambassador. The message to our staffs was unambiguous: there would be no “white space” between 

the military and interagency effort in Kabul and, 

by extension, throughout Afghanistan.

The close personal relationship the ambassador and I established paid us both immense dividends. Through daily meetings of key players 

in the embassy, we developed a common view of 

the fight that further cemented the unity of our 

integrated effort. This shared view significantly 

shaped our unified interagency approach. It also 

had a major impact on the direction of our military efforts.20

Building teamwork and consensus among the 

diverse international players in Kabul was more 

problematic. The simple challenge was getting all 

the players on the same playing field, playing the 

same sport, and moving toward the same set of 

goal posts. (Having everyone in the same jersey 

was not expected!) We spent significant personal 

time and military staff effort building close relations with the Afghans, UNAMA, foreign embassies, the media, and even the NGO community. A 

key element in developing our COIN campaign 

plan was “shopping it around” in draft form—

first to the members of the U.S. embassy, then to 

the broader set of international and Afghan players who would be essential in supporting its goals. 

This unconventional approach sent a message of 

inclusion to all those committed to Afghanistan’s 

future. At the same time, it significantly refined 

and improved our planning. 

We also seconded five military staff officers 

to the ambassador packaged as an unusual new 

group, the embassy interagency planning group, 

or EPIG. Led by a brilliant Army military intelligence colonel, this small core of talented planners—the “piglets”—applied structured military 

staff planning to the diverse requirements Ambassador Khalilzad faced in shaping the interagency 

response in Afghanistan.21 With the ambassador’s 

guidance, the EPIG drafted the embassy’s mission 

performance plan, and it developed and tracked 

metrics for him on all aspects of interagency and 

military performance. Eventually, we also seconded 

military officers from our headquarters to many 

of the embassy’s key sections to augment a small, 

young country team. This served two important 

purposes: it lent structured planning and organizing support to overworked embassy offices, and 

it kept our military team well connected to the 

embassy’s efforts across the spectrum. This move, 

too, contributed to building a unified team with 

close personal ties, trust, and confidence. 

Five Pillars

Our COIN plan for Afghanistan had five pillars: 

• Defeat terrorism and deny sanctuary. 

• Enable the Afghan security structure.

• Sustain area ownership.

• Enable reconstruction and good governance.

• Engage regional states. 

Linking these pillars together was information operations (IO)—winning the war of ideas. 

The keys to delivering on our COIN strategy 

were to implement and integrate the actions called 

for by these pillars, and to have every platoon, 

squad, and team in Afghanistan clearly understand their intent. We had departed notably from 

previous, more constrained approaches by naming the Afghan people as our operational center of 

gravity and by focusing on unity of purpose across 
66

diverse stakeholders. The five pillars reflected our 

reassessment of how to apply even long-standing 

military capabilities in new directions. 

Defeat Terrorism and Deny Sanctuary 

As we switched our focus from the enemy to the 

people, we did not neglect the operational tenet of 

maintaining pressure on the enemy. Selected special 

operations forces (SOF) continued their full-time 

hunt for al-Qaeda’s senior leaders. The blood debt 

of 9/11 was nowhere more keenly felt every day 

than in Afghanistan. No soldier, sailor, airman, or 

Marine serving there ever needed an explanation 

for his or her presence—they “got it.” Dedicated 

units worked the al-Qaeda fight on a 24-hour basis and continued to do so into 2004 and 2005. 

In some ways, however, attacking enemy cells 

became a supporting effort; our primary objective 

was maintaining popular support. Thus, respect 

for the Afghan peoples’ customs, religion, tribal 

ways, and growing feelings of sovereignty became 

an inherent aspect of all military operations. As 

well, the “three-block war” construct became the 

norm for our conventional forces.22 Any given tactical mission would likely include some mixture 

of kinetics (e.g., fighting insurgents), peacekeeping (e.g., negotiating between rival clans), and 

humanitarian relief (e.g., digging wells or assessing local needs). The 2001–3 notion of enemycentric counterterrorist operations now became 

nested in a wholly different context, that of “war 

amongst the people,” in the words of British General Sir Rupert Smith.23

Our forces in the field once again demonstrated their remarkable ability to adjust to changing situations with only general guidance—and 

deliver results. When I asked a superb battalion 

commander how, in the absence of doctrine, he 

was able to shift his leaders toward a largely new 

COIN approach in the middle of their combat 

tour, he laughed and said: “Easy, sir—Books-AMillion.com!”24 Reading classic counterinsurgency 

texts in the field became a substitute for official 

doctrine. The realization grew that “First, do no 

harm” must be a central consideration, and that 

Afghan security forces must play a visible role in 

Coalition military operations. Even local elders 

were enlisted, for we knew that intelligence could 

often be manipulated to settle old scores and discredit our efforts. 

Our growing recognition of the need to respect 

the population eventually led us to develop the 

“Fifteen Points,” a coordinated set of guidelines 

(see box) that we proposed to President Karzai in 

response to his growing concerns about the impact 

of coalition military operations. Together, we publicized these efforts in order to assure the Afghans 

that we recognized and respected the sovereignty 

of their country. This had the intended effect. It 

extended the freedom of action granted to Coalition forces for perhaps years, allowing us to spend 

the “bag of capital”—Afghan tolerance—that 

much more slowly.25

Enable the Afghan Security Structure

Under this pillar, we extended and accelerated the 

training of the Afghan National Army [ANA] and 

ultimately turned our scrutiny to the police as well. 

The development of the ANA and the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) were significant success 

stories in the two years after the fall of the Taliban. Despite intense tribal rivalries, the ANA and 

MOD were recreated with an ethnically balanced, 

merit-based leader selection process that, by late 

2003, had established both as models among the 

most reformed bodies of the Afghan government. 

The ANA training effort produced ethnically 

balanced, well-trained formations down to platoon 

level. The strikingly positive reaction these units 

evoked when they entered villages alongside their 
67

embedded U.S. trainers stood in stark contrast to 

the reactions elicited by the repressive tribal militias then still common in Afghanistan. In fact, 

villagers often assumed that ANA units were foreign forces until their members began to speak in 

local dialects. Their professionalism, discipline, 

and combat effectiveness stood out; they became 

sources of national pride. The Office of Military 

Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), initially led 

by Major General (now Lieutenant General) Karl 

[W.] Eikenberry, [USA], produced a remarkable 

training and combat organizational structure from 

a base of near-zero in less than a year’s time. From 

2003 to 2005, no ANA formations were defeated 

or broke in combat engagements. Moreover, ANA 

units showed notable discipline during intense civil 

disturbance operations—operations for which they 

had not been specifically trained.26

The police forces in Afghanistan during this 

period were more problematic. Initially underresourced and hampered by a training model that 

focused on the individual policeman (unlike the 

ANA, which adopted a “train as units” model), 

the police program faltered until interagency 

realignments in mid-2005 permitted OMC-A to 

assume joint oversight (with DOS) of the police. 

Lobbied for by both the military and the embassy 

from Kabul, this significant change allowed the 

THE FIFTEEN POINTS

1. No searches of national government property are conducted without COMCFC-AFG [Commander, 

Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan] approval. 

2. Units must coordinate to have a government official present during the search of the property 

of another government official. 

3. All units must coordinate for local police or other government officials when conducting 

searches unless there is a compelling and time sensitive reason. Approval authority for this is 

the regional commander. 

4. All material[s]/documents taken in a search will be returned, unless the person is detained, in 

which case the property becomes evidence. 

5. Soldiers participating in searches will be briefed on local customs. 

6. When possible, soldiers will ask locals to open locked doors versus forcing entry. 

7. Units must avoid cuffing/binding hands unless necessary for security. 

8. During low risk operations, a local person will be asked to enter a structure first to explain what 

is happening. 

9. Require regional commander approval for conducting night searches. 

10. Units will infuse reconstruction funds into areas where people were detained and subsequently 

released. 

11. Inform people that the International Committee of the Red Cross has information on detainees. 

12. Establish a joint Afghan-led board in the Ministry of Interior to provide information on detainees 

and coordinate releases. 

13. Work with national government to identify ineffective or corrupt local officials. 

14. Monthly joint review to identify which units are receiving the most complaints. 

15. Assign an Afghan liaison to each of our units.
68

Coalition to put lessons learned in ANA training 

to good effect in police training. It also enabled 

the Coalition to realize economies of scale by combining the two forces’ training oversight. With the 

police widely acknowledged to be the “first line of 

defense” in a COIN campaign, it remains unfortunate that the fusion of police and ANA training oversight came so late.

Sustain Area Ownership 

In my view, this pillar codified the most important, 

although least visible, change on the ground. Area 

ownership is an extension of unity of command. 

Under the previous “raid strategy,” units owned no 

battlespace save the ground they were on during 

a two- or three-week operation. Long term, battlespace was “owned” only at the CJTF-180 level 

in Bagram; no subordinate unit had long-term responsibility for the outcomes in any specified area. 

With area ownership, we dedicated key contested 

areas of Afghanistan (i.e., the south and east) to 

each maneuver brigade and battalion. This seemingly simple concept had profound implications. 

Now, rather than pass through an area intent on 

simply routing out an enemy based on intelligence 

derived in a faraway operating base, units operated 

in their own distinct territory for up to 12 months. 

Our approach consciously mirrored New York 

City’s very successful policy in the 1990s of holding police captains responsible for reducing crime 

in their precincts. Like New York’s captains, our 

commanders now “owned” their areas and were 

responsible for results. Area ownership meant that, 

for the first time in the war, unit commanders had 

a defined area, clear sets of challenges, and direct 

responsibility for long-term outcomes.

Of course, they also had the authority to effect 

those outcomes, along with Commanders Emergency Response Program funding to address pressing civil needs with a minimum of bureaucracy. 

Commanders could become experts in their areas, 

build personal relations with tribal elders and key 

government officials, convince the population that 

they were there to stay—and then see the results.27

The areas were unavoidably large—one battalion 

had an area the size of Vermont, another the size of 

Rhode Island—but those areas were theirs! Again, 

this is classic counterinsurgency, although it was 

new in Afghanistan. 

Enable Reconstruction 

and Good Governance

Extending the reach of the central government was 

fundamental to helping Afghanistan become a nation that embraced the rule of law and entrusted 

its elected government with a monopoly on violence. As Said [Tayeb] Jawad, Afghan ambassador 

to the United States, often notes, “Afghanistan is a 

strong nation, but a weak state.” Afghanistan, over 

its long history, has stayed together as a country 

despite many opportunities for powerful interests 

to fracture the nation into separate tribal parts. At 

the same time, the power of the nation’s legitimate 

institutions grows weaker with every kilometer of 

distance from Kabul. Effective local government 

remains elusive, and traditional tribal and clan cultures hold powerful sway even today throughout 

much of the countryside—and will likely do so for 

generations. The primary military instrument designed to address this challenge was the provincial 

reconstruction team [PRT]. 

Conceived in 2002 by a British officer, PRTs 

were 80- to 100-person organizations normally 

posted to provincial capitals. Led by a colonel 

or lieutenant colonel, they typically comprised 

a security force, medical and logistics components, a civil affairs team, a command and control element, and senior representatives from the 

Afghan Ministry of Interior, U.S. DOS [Department of State], USAID [United States Agency for 
69

International Development], and in certain areas, 

the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The mission 

of the PRTs included security and reconstruction, 

in fine balance. A PRT’s very presence in an area 

served as a catalyst for both, and it signified the 

international and Afghan commitment to bettering the lives of the people through improved 

government support. A multinational PRT executive steering committee in Kabul, cochaired by 

the Afghan Minister of Interior and U.S./Coalition commander, coordinated the PRT effort.28

PRTs became a powerful offensive weapon in 

our strategic arsenal as we crafted our plans for 

2004 in Afghanistan. The four existing PRTs, as 

mentioned earlier, were deployed in largely quiet 

areas (Gardez, Konduz, Mazar-e Sharif, Bamian) 

with the next four being developed at a very deliberate pace. We soon accelerated the latter by largely 

disassembling the combined and joint civil-military operations task force headquarters in Bagram 

and sending its well-resourced pool of civil affairs 

experts to form new PRTs in the field. The immediate goal became eight new PRTs in the south 

and east of Afghanistan, so that when the snows 

melted in the spring of 2004, we would have newly 

deployed PRTs confronting the Taliban across the 

most contested areas. 

This bold move sent an incontrovertible message about the progress of the security and reconstruction effort into the most dangerous areas of 

Afghanistan. It was a calculated risk. PRTs had 

little ability to defend themselves, but the enemy 

well understood that 20 minutes after a distress 

call, any PRT in southern Afghanistan could have 

combat aircraft with bombs overhead and a rapid 

reaction force ready to arrive soon thereafter. The 

2001 offensive that toppled the Taliban had produced a healthy respect for American airpower 

that allowed us, among other things, to conduct 

small patrols far from our bases in relative security. 

PRTs similarly benefitted from air support, and 

leveraged it regularly.

Engage Regional States 

This task fell largely into my inbox, but senior 

leaders at our tactical headquarters in Bagram ably 

supported me.29 Combined Forces CommandAfghanistan’s (CFC-A) combined joint operations 

area for U.S. CENTCOM included all of Afghanistan, all of Pakistan less Jammu and Kashmir, and 

the southern portions of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 

Our forces conducted combat operations only in 

Afghanistan, but my charter gave me authority to 

travel and interact regularly with the senior security leaders of the other three countries—with particular emphasis on Pakistan. 

This Pakistani component of engagement was 

necessary to address border-security issues between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan (the Taliban operated 

in both) and to assist the Pakistanis in their own 

efforts to disrupt and defeat so-called “miscreants” in their tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan. 

Quarterly tripartite conferences chaired at my level 

(and supported by the U.S. embassies in Kabul 

and Islamabad) brought together Afghanistan’s 

and Pakistan’s senior security leaders to address 

security issues of mutual concern. CJTF-180 (and 

later CJTF-76) also hosted monthly tactical border-security meetings along the ill-defined Pakistan-Afghanistan border to reduce local tensions; 

exchange radios, communications frequencies, and 

procedures; and build cross-border relations at the 

local level. Frequent trips to Islamabad rounded 

out our effort and kept me closely engaged with 

senior Pakistani military leaders. 

All this engagement paid significant dividends when the inevitable exchange of fire across 

the border occurred between U.S. or Afghan and 

Pakistani forces. The close military ties that grew 

from building relationships also helped encourage 
70

Pakistani action against the enemy on Pakistan’s 

side of the border. In mid-2004, the Pakistani 

Army conducted major operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Area for the first time in 

Pakistan’s history. The effort inflicted hundreds of 

casualties on the enemy and noticeably disrupted 

Taliban and al-Qaeda operations on both sides 

of the border.30

Crosscutting Vector: 

Information Operations (IO) 

Winning the war of ideas and communicating effectively in a wholly foreign culture was among 

the most vexing tasks in our COIN strategy. We 

recognized early on that winning the war of ideas 

might decide the outcome of the conflict. How 

would the Afghan people perceive our efforts? 

Would they retain hope for their future? In the 

end, would they have more faith in the prospects 

of their own elected government and their embryonic political process, or would they turn back in 

despair to the certainty of total control represented by the Taliban? 

On balance, it became apparent to me that 

international forces would always remain at a permanent disadvantage in perceptions, and that the 

IO effort had to be first and foremost an Afghan 

one. Our challenge was to do everything we could 

to be truthful, to get the facts out, to let success 

speak for itself, and to create the unshakeable story 

of good outcomes—all uncompromised by “spin.” 

Results ultimately speak for themselves. Without 

demonstrably positive results, information operations can be perceived as spewing empty words 

that corrode credibility and legitimacy. 

Evaluating Results of COIN, 2003–5

In retrospect, the late 2003 shift in strategy from 

an enemy-centric counterterrorist strategy to a 

more comprehensive, population-centered COIN 

approach marked a turning point in the U.S. mission. While dedicated forces continued unabated 

the hunt for al-Qaeda leaders and remnants, the 

overall direction of the U.S.-Coalition effort shifted toward a more classic COIN approach (albeit 

with a very light footprint) that would have been 

familiar to Louis Lyautey, Sir Gerald Templer, or 

Creighton Abrams. 

Results over the 2003–5 period were positive 

and dramatic. Meeting in a national loya jirga, 

Afghans drew up and approved the most moderate constitution then extant in the Islamic world. 

Throughout the spring and summer of 2004, 10.5 

million Afghans—twice as many as had been 

expected to do so—registered to vote in the firstever Afghan presidential elections. In the face of 

significant insurgent threats, intimidation, and 

violence, 8.5 million Afghans actually voted that 

fall, electing Hamid Karzai as president with 55 

percent of the vote from among 18 candidates. By 

year’s end, a respected cabinet was in place and a 

peaceful inauguration completed. The year 2005 

built on this success with a nationwide effort again 

turning out millions of voters to elect members of 

the wolesi jirga, or lower house of parliament. The 

winners took their seats by year’s end.

All in all, as 2005 came to a close, we had 

achieved significant progress toward accomplishing the objectives of the 2001 Bonn conference 

and the follow-on 2004 Berlin conference, but 

most importantly, we had built a solid basis of 

hope among the Afghan people for a better future. 

Without hope among the population, any COIN 

effort is ultimately doomed to failure. 

Afghanistan Since 2005

Much has changed in Afghanistan since 2005 ended so promisingly. The Taliban and al-Qaeda have 

gathered strength, changed tactics, and significantly 

increased both their capabilities and their attacks. 
71

As one measure, there were 139 suicide attacks in 

2006, as compared to 17 in 2005, 5 in 2004, and 

2 in 2003. In the first six months of 2007, there 

were over 80 suicide attacks.31 Across the border 

in Pakistan, further offensive operations against alQaeda and the Taliban have been largely suspended since the aggressive Pakistani military efforts in 

2004 disrupted much of the terrorist base structure in tribal areas of Waziristan.32 Consequently, a large potential sanctuary for the Taliban and 

al-Qaeda has gone largely unmolested for nearly three years. 

On the American side of the ledger, the United 

States publicly announced in mid-2005 that NATO 

was assuming full responsibility for military operations throughout Afghanistan. By the end of that 

year, the United States declared that it was withdrawing 2,500 combat troops.33 Unsurprisingly, 

this was widely viewed in the region as the first 

signal that the United States was “moving for the 

exits,” thus reinforcing long-held doubts about the 

prospects of sustained American commitment.34

In my judgment, these public moves have served 

more than any other U.S. actions since 2001 to 

alter the calculus of both our friends and adversaries across the region—and not in our favor.

As promised, by late 2006, NATO had assumed 

command of the military effort in Afghanistan, 

commanding over 26,000 troops (including 12,000 

from the United States). An additional 10,000 

Americans served under U.S. national control, 

many in logistics units and SOF. Twenty-six NATO 

PRTs are now deployed across Afghanistan, but 

they vary widely in size, composition, and mission 

(according to the contributor)—and now report 

through a different chain of command than do 

NATO’s maneuver units in the same battlespace. 

The American-led three-star CFC-A headquarters has been inactivated, and the senior U.S. military commander is a two-star general once again 

located at Bagram—but in tactical command of 

only one-quarter of the country, Regional Command East. Headquarters, ISAF, has tactical responsibility for all of Afghanistan—and is assisted by a 

staff including 14 NATO generals.35 Operational 

responsibility for Afghanistan resides in Brunssum, 

the Netherlands—over 3,000 miles distant. An 

American four-star general commands ISAF, but 

he officially reports only through NATO channels, 

not the United States. Both the Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe, and the Commander of 

U.S. Central Command own the Afghan theater 

and its battlespace—and direct forces in Afghanistan who report separately up their two reporting chains.36 OMC-A has evolved into Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and 

remains located in Kabul. No senior U.S. military commander lives and works at the American embassy. [The] U.S. Embassy Kabul is in its 

final stages of “normalization,” designed to make it 

function and look like every other U.S. embassy in 

the world. It remains, of course, in a combat zone. 

Continual turnover of U.S. senior leaders has 

made continuity of effort a recurrent challenge in 

this very complex COIN fight. Since 2001, the 

U.S. endeavor in Afghanistan has seen five different chiefs of mission and six different military 

commanders—not counting those who served less 

than 60 days.37 Since mid-2005, the comprehensive U.S.-led COIN strategy described above has 

been significantly altered by subsequent military 

and civilian leaders who held differing views. With 

the advent of NATO military leadership, there is 

today no single comprehensive strategy to guide 

the U.S., NATO, or international effort. Unity of 

purpose—both interagency and international—has 

suffered, unity of command is more fragmented, 

area ownership has receded, and tactics in some 

areas have seemingly reverted to earlier practices, 

such as the aggressive use of airpower. 
72

The “bag of capital” representing the tolerance 

of the Afghan people for foreign forces appears to 

be diminishing.38 NATO’s ISAF has assumed a narrow focus on the “20-percent military” dimension 

of COIN. It views the remaining “80 percent nonmilitary” component of successful COIN operations as falling outside the purview of what is, 

after all, a “military alliance.”39 Both NATO and 

Coalition tactics, too, seem to convey the belief 

that the center of gravity is no longer the Afghan 

population and their security, but the enemy. In 

many ways, these changes take us “back to the 

future” of 2002 and early 2003—and they, in all 

likelihood, do not augur well for the future of our 

policy goals in Afghanistan. 

The Afghan people, whose aspirations rose to 

unprecedented heights in the exhilarating days of 

2004 and 2005, have experienced a series of setbacks and disappointments. Besides facing threats 

from a more dangerous Taliban, President Karzai 

is under growing pressure from powerful interests 

inside his own administration. Corruption, crime, 

poverty, and a burgeoning narcotics trade threaten 

to undermine public confidence in the new democratic government. NATO, the designated heir to 

an originally popular international military effort, 

is threatened by the prospects of mounting disaffection among the Afghan people. This threat is 

perhaps only exceeded by political risk at home 

in Europe, owing to the prospect of dramatically 

increased NATO casualties as the lethality perfected in Iraq migrates east with jihadist fighters 

freed to fight other battles in Afghanistan. 

Looking Ahead—Tomorrow 

and the Day After

At the end of the day, what is most important to 

the United States and to our friends in this region is that success or failure in Afghanistan will 

dramatically shape the future of a strategically 

important region for decades to come. Afghanistan’s popular image is that of a backward country 

once best known as a “terrorist-supported state,” 

but it remains at the center of a global energy and 

trade crossroads—one which is only growing in 

significance. It is also situated in an exceptionally 

important neighborhood: to the east lies Pakistan, 

the second largest Islamic nation in the world, and 

likely armed with dozens of nuclear weapons; to 

the northeast is China, with growing regional energy and security interests; across the north, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—three 

former states of the Soviet Union—are struggling 

against internal forces of instability while confronting powerful neighbors; and to the west is 

Iran, whose looming nuclear program and support 

for terrorism in the region is cause for grave concern. This neighborhood defines strategic interest 

for the United States and the West—and within 

it, Afghanistan remains a friendly state anxious to 

increase its connections to the West and especially to the United States. At this juncture of history, the United States and its alliance partners in 

NATO can ill afford to walk away from this region with any other outcome save long-term success in Afghanistan.

Notes

Military Review, September–October 2007, 32–

44. This article is reprinted with the permission 

of Military Review, the Professional Journal of the 

U.S. Army, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

1. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent 

Government Institutions (Bonn: December 2001), 

henceforth referred to as the Bonn process. This 

UN-supported response assigned lead nations to 

oversee varied security-sector reform efforts in 
73

Afghanistan: police—Germany; military—United 

States; justice—Italy; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—Japan; and counternarcotics—United Kingdom. 

2. Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180 (now comprising Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division) 

retained its name upon the departure of XVIII Airborne Corps until March 2004, when it became 

CJTF-76. Its focus became tactical and low-end operational as Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan, the senior Coalition headquarters in Kabul, 

assumed the role of high-end operational and theater (i.e., regional) strategic levels. NATO’s ISAF 

in October 2003 consisted of approximately 5,500 

troops located exclusively within the city of Kabul.

3. Author’s conversation with chief, Office of Military Cooperation, September 2003.

4. Conversations with senior U.S. commanders, 2003; 

see also Nicholas D. Kristoff, “The Wrong Lessons 

of the Somalia Debacle,” New York Times, 5 February 2002. 

5. See The CIA World Factbook online entries for 

Afghanistan and Iraq, https://www.cia.gov/library

/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

6. Author’s first visit to Afghanistan, predeployment, 

September 2003.

7. Author’s conversation with an infantry battalion 

commander, December 2003.

8. Author’s conversation with Gen John P. Abizaid, 

October 2003: “ . . . your mission is ‘big Pol’ and 

‘little mil.’” 

9. Conversation with a former senior U.S. commander 

for Afghanistan, August 2003. 

10.This headquarters officially became Combined 

Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC-A) in early 

2004. Command responsibility was assumed in 

November 2003. 

11. The first augmentation of our staff beyond the original six members came by moving the entire CJTF180 CJ-5 (future plans) section to Kabul under 

Combined Forces Command. Col (now brigadier) 

Ian Liles, UK, was the CJ-5 largely responsible for 

drafting the initial “Security Strategy South and 

East.” By May 2005, CFC-A staff stabilized at just 

over 400 members.

12.See, for example, The History of Revolutionary Warfare, volumes I–V (West Point, NY: United States 

Military Academy, 1974). Among other valued texts 

I read during my 19 months of command were John 

A. Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) and Louis 

Sorley’s A Better War (New York: Harcourt/Harvest Books, 2007).

13.Gen Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret), comments to 

the author on the depth of consistent understanding of CFC-A COIN strategy during his visits to 

units across Afghanistan, 2004. 

14. “Strategy” here is used as a more commonly understood interagency and international substitute for 

what would be called in military parlance a “campaign plan.” Our complete campaign plan addressing all elements of power eventually became a 

400-page document. 

15. The footprint of fewer than 20,000 Western forces 

in Afghanistan in 2003 was light compared with 

over 100,000 Soviet troops at the height of their 

ill-fated military involvement. My belief remains 

that the “light footprint” approach in Afghanistan 

holds great advantages, despite its many challenges. 

See Rory Stewart, “Where Less is More,” New York 

Times, 23 July 2007.

16.This occurred under CJTF-76, which succeeded 

CJTF-180 in April 2004. 

17. This was a powerful advantage. Direct access and 

a personal relationship with the president, vice 

president, and secretaries of state and defense gave 

Ambassador Khalilzad and the Afghan enterprise 

a strong voice at the most senior policy levels in 

Washington.

18.Christopher Griffen, “A Working Plan: Hope Isn’t 
74

the Only Strategy for Afghanistan,” Armed Forces 

Journal (April 2007). 

19. Our entire headquarters staff at this point had fewer 

than 40 people. 

20.Our six-day-a-week security core group meetings 

brought top U.S. interagency leaders together to “synchronize” outlooks and information almost every 

morning. Among the attendees were the ambassador, military commander, USAID chief, Afghan 

Reconstruction Group (ARG) chief, intelligence 

chief, OMC-A chief, and deputy chief of mission. 

All left updated with a common view of events in 

Afghanistan, thus insuring our daily efforts remained 

well coordinated and mutually supportive.

21. The embassy interagency planning group (EPIG) 

was led by Col John Ritchie, USA.

22.Gen Charles C. Krulak, Commandant, USMC, 

created the three-block-war construct.

23.Gen Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art 

of War in the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. 

Knopf, 2006), 5.

24.Discussion at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shkin 

with LtCol Mike Howard, USA, commander, 1-87 

Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, winter 2003–4.

25. Personal observation. The reaction of President 

Karzai, his cabinet, and outward reactions of the 

Afghan people to this effort were very positive. 

26.Herat riots, August 2004; preparations for civil disturbances in Kabul, August 2004. 

27. Paraphrasing LtCol David G. Paschal, commander, 

2-87 Infantry, 10th Mountain Division: “The longer I spent in one place, the more people became 

comfortable with me and were more willing to 

share information. At first, they were fearful, then 

they watched with curiosity, but then they gained 

confidence in us and our ability to provide security and services. With ownership we were able to 

build a level of trust.” Outbrief to Headquarters, 

CFC-A, 5 May 2004.

28.The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 

Executive Steering Committee met monthly and 

comprised senior representatives of all nations contributing PRTs or considering such a contribution. 

It was typically attended by the UN senior representative of the secretary general and cochaired by the 

Afghan minister of interior (who oversaw PRTs in 

the Afghan governmental structure) and the senior 

U.S. (and later NATO) military commanders. 

29.After the departure of Headquarters, XVIII Airborne 

Corps, in the spring of 2003, CJTF-180 was formed 

around Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division; 

later, CJTF-76 formed around Headquarters, 25th 

Infantry Division (Light), and subsequently, Headquarters, Southern European Task Force (SETAF). 

30.Personal observations and discussions with senior 

Pakistani military officers 2004.

31. Figures on 2003–6 suicide attacks are from former 

Afghan Minister of Interior Ali [Ahmad] Jalali.

32.Situation as of mid-July 2007. The Pakistani military response in the FATA to the outburst of nationwide terrorist attacks following the government’s 10 

July assault on the Lal Masjid (“Red Mosque”) in 

Islamabad had yet to fully develop as of this writing.

33.As reported by the Associated Press and AFX 

News Limited. See USA Today, “NATO to take 

over Afghan security in 2006,” 4 August 2005; 

and Forbes.com, “U.S. to reduce troop numbers 

in Afghanistan soon,” www.forbes.com/finance

/feeds/afx/2005/12/26/afx2414408.htm. 

34.A remark we commonly heard from Afghans of 

every stripe was “You Americans are not going 

to abandon us again, are you?” The Taliban were 

often noted for saying “the Americans may have all 

of the wristwatches, but we have all of the time.”

35.CFC-A during this era operated with two generals: one U.S. three-star commander and one UK 

two-star deputy commander. UK deputies were, 

in succession, MajGens John B. Cooper and Peter 

Gilchrist, both exceptional talents. The CFC-A 

staff principals were entirely composed of colonels 
75

or Navy captains; CFC chiefs of staff were, in 

succession, Col Thomas J Snukis, USA, and Col 

David W. Lamm, USA, whose efforts were nothing short of heroic.

36.For example, forces under the “Operation Enduring Freedom mandate” (e.g., U.S. Special Forces) 

in Afghanistan report through a U.S.-only chain to 

Adm William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Central 

Command, in Tampa; forces under the “NATO 

mandate” (e.g., U.S. infantry battalions) report 

through Headquarters, ISAF, in Kabul (tactical 

level), to Commander, Joint Forces Command, 

Brunsuum, the Netherlands (operational level) to 

the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Gen Bantz 

J. Craddock, in Mons (strategic level).

37. Ambassador Robert Finn, Deputy Chief of Mission David Sedney, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, 

Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, Ambassador William B. Wood, LtGen Paul T. Mikolashek, LtGen 

(now Gen) Dan K. McNeill, LtGen John Vines, 

LtGen David W. Barno, LtGen Karl W. Eikenberry, and MajGen David M. Rodriguez.

38.President Karzai press conferences; April 2006 riots 

in Kabul; protests to civilian casualties.

39.David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory 

and Practice (New York: Praeger Security International Paperback, August 2006). According to 

Galula, successful counterinsurgency is 20 percent 

military effort, 80 percent nonmilitary.

About the Author

Lieutenant General David W. Barno commanded 

20,000 U.S. and Coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom for 19 months from 2003 to 2005. 
76

SSgt Daniel J. Demuro Jr., assigned to Marine Light Attack 

Helicopter Squadron 773 at FOB Salerno, removes a jammed 

M89 feeder from the 20mm nose cannon of an AH-1W 

Super Cobra on 5 October 2004. 

Photo courtesy of SSgt Rusty Baker, USAF
Marine Light 

Attack Squadron 

773 (-) Reinforced 

Summary of Action

Adapted from Unit Award Recommendation

Unit: Marine Light Attack Squadron 773 (-) 

Reinforced

Recommended Award: Navy Unit Commendation

Period of Award: 1 October 2003–31 May 

2005

Status: Approved

Originator: Commander, U.S. Marine Forces, 

Central Command

Citation:

For exceptionally meritorious service in support 

of Combined Joint Task Forces 180 and 76 in 

support of Operation Enduring Freedom from 1 

October 2003 to 31 May 2005. The Marines, sailors, and soldiers of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 773 (-) Reinforced (Rein) 

sustained the longest continuous combat deployment of a Marine squadron since the Vietnam War. 

Through three consecutive deployments, HMLA773 (-) Rein flew 4,465 combat sorties, compiled 

6,782 mishap-free flight hours, participated in 

77
78

more than 20 combat operations against al-Qaeda 

and Taliban forces, and accomplished an impressive 100 percent mission completion rate without incurring a single aviation mishap. Employing 

the formidable combat power of the AH-1W “Super Cobra,” the UH-1N “Huey Gunship,” and a 

U.S. Army UH-60 “Blackhawk” Company, the 

“Red Dogs” were credited with the destruction 

of over 300 enemy combatants, the disruption of 

numerous enemy planning cells, and time-critical combat air support to dozens of joint service 

agencies serving in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Over an 18-month period, the remarkable achievements, aggressive fighting spirit, 

and combat proficiency of the Red Dogs, struck 

fear in the enemy and earned praise from three infantry battalions, dozens of Special Forces units, 

and the joint service aviation elements they supported throughout southeastern Afghanistan. By 

their outstanding courage, combat effectiveness, 

and superior performance of duty under austere 

conditions, the officers and enlisted personnel of 

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 773 (-) 

Reinforced reflected great credit upon themselves 

and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine 

Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Summary of Action

On 23 September 2003, HMLA-773 received a 

Prepare to Deploy Order from Headquarters Marine Corps directing the unit to prepare for combat operations, in support of Operation Enduring 

Freedom. In keeping with Commandant of the 

Marine Corps’ direction, “the Marines can deploy to any part of the world in eight days,” the 

Red Dogs Pre-Deployment Site Survey and Advance Party arrived at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, on 1 October 2003. Thus would begin the 

longest continuous combat deployment for a single 

USMC aviation squadron since the Vietnam War.

Soon after, the main body of HMLA-773 (-) 

Rein arrived in Afghanistan, joined the Combined 

Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180), and was designated Task Force (TF) Red Dog on 29 October. 

Hitting the ground running, TF Red Dog was 

operational within one week of arriving in country and began flying area familiarization flights 

on 3 November. On 10 November, TF Red Dog 

commenced air tasking order (ATO) combat flight 

operations. Operation Mountain Resolve began on 

17 November with the Red Dogs providing close 

air support (CAS), armed reconnaissance, quick 

reaction force (QRF), armed escort and insert/

extract missions from Forward Operating Base 

(FOB) Jalalabad and FOB Asadabad.

Operation Avalanche began on 1 December with 

TF Red Dog based out of FOB Salerno. The squadron flew missions in support of the U.S. Army’s 

10th Mountain Division. Tasking included border 

checkpoint security, convoy escort, armed reconnaissance and medevac escort. On 31 December, 

TF Red Dog engaged enemy forces for the first 

time in Afghanistan. A U.S Army ground convoy 

came under ambush by a determined band of alQaeda terrorists in the eastern border area of Mangretay. As the 12-vehicle convoy entered restrictive 

terrain, insurgents launched a pre-planned ambush 

attacking the lead and trail elements simultaneously. Sustaining a heavy volume of small-arms 

ground fire from the brazen insurgents, a section 

of Red Dog AH-1Ws attacked four separate enemy 

positions claiming 11 confirmed enemy killed in 

action. With their support, the ground convoy 

cleared the ambush zone while sustaining only 

three casualties.

The squadron began 2004 with continuous 

operations out of FOB Salerno in support of the 

Army’s 1st Battalion, (Airborne) 501st Parachute 

Infantry Regiment, and 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment. In mid-January, FOB Salerno and 
79

FOB Chapman in the Khowst area sustained multiple coordinated rocket attacks. The Red Dogs 

provided QRF protection for the bases while hunting the perpetrators. Coordinating with 1/501, 

Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), and other government agencies based at FOB Chapman, the Red 

Dogs provided CAS and surveillance for operations that captured four of the suspects. Later that 

month, the Red Dogs responded to a ground convoy ambush site with three injured soldiers, providing continuous CAS coverage, medevac, and 

medevac escort.

On 12 February, TF Red Dog’s timely response 

was critical to countering a sustained rocket attack 

on FOB Chapman. Arriving on station at the 

rocket point of origin, The Red Dogs assumed 

forward air controller airborne (FAC[A]) duties 

for a U.S. Air Force B1-B attack utilizing precision munitions. After the air strikes were completed, the QRF remained overhead in support 

of AMF advancing to the site for bomb damage 

assessments.

In March, HMLA-773 (-) Rein Detachment 

Two arrived in country to assume the squadron 

mission. The Red Dogs conducted a unit relief in 

place without conducting an operational pause. 

During April, the squadron supported Operation Dragonfly, providing convoy escort in support of the 1/87 and fulfilling an increased QRF 

and medevac escort requirement. On the evening 

of 14 April, the Red Dog QRF prevented enemy 

forces from overrunning a border control point 

(BCP) manned by friendly AMF. Two UH-1Ns 

were directed to insert U.S. Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) in the vicinity of the BCP during 

heavy fighting along the border high ground. A 

section Red Dog AH-1Ws were directed to locate, 

identify, and engage the enemy forces. As friendly 

forces were falling back in the face of a reinforced 

platoon-size element and running dangerously low 

on ammunition, the UH-1Ns inserted two joint 

tactical air controllers (JTAC) into a hot landing 

zone. The AH-1Ws located the enemy positions 

thereby drawing their fire away from the friendly 

ground forces. The Red Dogs’ coordinated and 

violent response created confusion and fragmented 

enemy forces while inflicting heavy casualties on 

the enemy.

In May, the Red Dogs continued to provide the 

QRF for FOB Salerno that continued to come under 

frequent enemy rocket attacks. On the morning of 

29 May, BCP 2, south of Salerno, was again targeted by enemy forces. When attacked with a barrage of 107mm rocket fire, U.S. Army and AMF 

requested air support in order to relieve the siege 

and conduct effective counter battery fire. A section of Red Dog AH-1Ws launched, then checking in on station, they were directed to find the 

location of the rocket point of origin and observe 

subsequent impacts of supporting artillery fires. 

Following an exhaustive search of the area, the 

Red Dogs identified dug-in fighting positions, a 

reinforced cave complex, and locations of recent 

anti-Coalition militia (ACM) activity. The reconnaissance continued until the flight was engaged 

with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) from a 

ridgeline along the Afghan border. The section of 

Super Cobras returned fire on the ridgeline and 

cave complex with 2.75-inch rockets and their 

20mm guns inflicting enemy casualties, including three enemy killed in action (EKIA).

In June, three U.S. Army H-60 “Black Hawks” 

augmented HMLA-773 (-) Rein. The event marked 

the first time since Vietnam that a Marine squadron took operational control of a joint service 

unit while serving in combat. The unit supported 

Operation Verendrye providing armed reconnaissance and convoy escort in support of the U.S. 

Army’s 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment. On 

16 June, a convoy of Special Forces and Afghan 
80

security forces were ambushed while proceeding 

to a rocket point of origin from an earlier attack 

on FOB Lwara. The convoy sustained 25 casualties in the ambush and returned to base requesting medevac and QRF aircraft. The medevac 

aircraft launched from FOB Salerno, but were 

forced to turn back due to reduced visibility. The 

Red Dog QRF, returned to the FOB with the 

medevac flight. After boarding medics at FOB 

Salerno, they launched again with zero lunar illumination and limited visibility in order to insert 

the team of medics and provide casualty evacuation back to FOB Salerno. The flight reached 

FOB Lwara, inserted two of the three medics, and 

departed with one critically wounded patient and 

the remaining medic.

On 22 June, the insurgents struck again with 

a rocket attack at FOB Salerno that wounded two 

U.S. Army soldiers, three local national interpreters, and damaged or destroyed 10 U.S. military 

vehicles. Firing from 18 kilometers to the southeast and employing a forward observer element, 

the ACM forces successfully launched a 45-minute 

sustained attack with seven 122mm rockets, several 

rockets hitting FOB Salerno. Launching less than 

10 minutes from the first rocket impact, the Red 

Dog QRF proceeded to the rocket point of origin. 

They located the enemy taking cover among the 

rocks along a tree line. When the Red Dogs came 

under RPG and small-arms fire, they attacked with 

2.75-inch rockets, and their 20mm guns. The follow-on report from CJTF-76 intelligence identified as many as eight EKIA. Furthermore, one of 

the enemy causalities was identified as a high value 

target (HVT) that Special Forces units had been 

attempting to kill or capture for several months.

In early August, the Red Dogs were involved 

in the largest engagement against al-Qaeda and 

Taliban forces since Operation Anaconda. On the 

night of 1 August 2004, BCP 4 was attacked by 

approximately 300 anti-Coalition militia intent on 

over-running the small outpost to conduct followon attacks within the Khowst area. Outnumbered 

approximately four to one, the 5 Combined Joint 

Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) personnel and 70 Khowst Provincial Force (KPF) soldiers 

were in a dire situation. At approximately 0200L, 

the Red Dogs launched the QRF. Ten miles from 

the battle, the flight observed tracer fire from every 

direction engaging the besieged outpost. Upon 

arrival, the Marine Super Cobras were immediately directed to the east of the BCP in order to 

suppress enemy small-arms and machine-gun fire 

from an adjacent ridgeline. They quickly silenced 

the enemy positions to the east of the BCP with 

accurate 20mm fire. The on-scene commander 

then directed the section to find and engage any 

enemy movement on the western ridgeline flanking the BCP. 

The Red Dog AH-1W section then came under 

an intense barrage of RPG fire coming from one 

of the bunkers within the BCP. Determining that 

the enemy forces had over-run the western-most 

bunker complex of the compound, the Marine 

helicopters engaged approximately 50 to 75 of the 

enemy with deadly volleys from their 20mm guns 

and 2.75-inch rockets. They pressed the attack as 

the enemy forces broke ranks, abandoned their 

positions inside the outpost, and retreated back 

into Pakistan. The follow-on BDA reported 65 

EKIA, more than 60 enemy wounded, and 22 

enemy prisoners of war were taken into custody. 

The senior U.S. controller on site credited the Red 

Dog crews with saving the lives of every Coalition 

and Afghan soldier at BCP 4.

In the early evening of 10 September, BCP 3 

came under attack by a significant enemy force 

armed with RPGs, small arms, and shoulderlaunched surface-to-air missiles. Friendly U.S. forces 

located north of the BCP consisted of a 105mm 
81

artillery battery and “Jaguar 04”, a special operations tactical air controller (SOTAC). Jaguar 04 

stated that the Afghan and Coalition troops were 

under attack from a vastly superior force in both 

firepower and numbers. Unable to get “eyes on” 

the battle from his position, Jaguar 04 requested 

immediate air support and airborne control of 

artillery and aircraft fires. The Red Dog section 

maneuvered north of the BCP to spot and control the artillery mission. Then Jaguar 04 handed 

off “Demon 15”, a section of Air Force A-10s, to 

the Marine aviators to coordinate close air support. With that, the Red Dogs assumed FAC(A) 

responsibilities for the battle. Quickly coordinating an airspace deconfliction plan, the Red Dogs 

directed effective artillery fire onto the enemy positions. Friendly forces reported the enemy breaking 

contact and fleeing to the south toward Pakistan. 

The Red Dogs then engaged the retreating enemy 

forces with 2.75-inch rockets and 20mm cannon 

fire, pinning them down and halting their retreat 

into Pakistan. The Red Dogs then controlled the 

A-10 section on multiple passes on the enemy 

positions. Next, the Red Dogs coordinated for 

air medevac of friendly forces while continuing 

to press the fight with the A-10 section, and their 

own munitions. The next morning, the Red Dogs 

inserted special operations assets into the objective, 

where they detained one local national, linked up 

with friendly forces and reported approximately 10 

EKIA, and 5 enemy wounded in action (EWIA).

On the afternoon of 20 September, HMLA-773 

(-) Rein was again in the thick of the fight after 

a Special Forces patrol in contact with the enemy 

required emergency medevac. After an ambush by 

heavy machine-gun and RPG fire, the patrol suffered numerous friendly casualties. The squadron 

launched a section of Marine Cobras to escort medevac aircraft. On approaching the ambush area, the 

Red Dogs learned that the enemy fortified their 

positions and planned to ambush medevac helicopters. The Red Dogs escorted the medevac aircraft into the zone and then joined with another 

AH-1W section. At this point, the patrol was still 

heavily engaged from multiple enemy positions 

up in the high ground. With the patrol’s JTAC 

controlling the action, the Red Dogs attacked the 

enemy while remaining under continuous ground 

fire. During the four-hour engagement, the Red 

Dogs engaged two compounds with TOW missiles, neutralized multiple enemy positions with 

20mm cannon and 2.75-inch rockets, and designated targets for other Coalition aircraft. As a result, 

numerous secondary explosions were observed as 

the Marine Super Cobras engaged fortified positions containing weapons caches. Post engagement patrols reported eight EKIA and destroyed 

stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, RPGs, and 

other small arms.

The first democratic elections in the history of 

Afghanistan in October 2004 promised the prospect of a busy month for the squadron. During the 

week prior to the election, HMLA-773 (-) Rein 

responded as the QRF on multiple occasions. In 

addition, they supported Operation Dragonfly, 

which resulted in the discovery of several weapons 

caches and the capture of several enemy fighters. 

Missions included point, area, and route reconnaissance missions, medevac escort, ground convoy 

escort, and airborne sniper operations. Next, the 

Red Dogs were heavily tasked with operations safeguarding the ballots cast in the elections. Toward 

the end of the month, the Red Dogs participated 

in a large-scale joint mission headed by Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) to the Mangretay area. The mission was deemed a success by 

ODA as numerous buildings and other structures 

known to support ACM activity were destroyed. 

In November, al-Qaeda and Taliban forces 

continued their efforts to strike the Coalition 
82

and to destabilize the country after the successful 

elections of the past month. The Red Dog QRF 

responded on numerous occasions to enemy rocket 

attacks and ground forces in contact in the Llwara 

region. The squadron also prestaged a QRF section in Orgun E to cut our response time in half. 

The first few days of December began quietly 

with the squadron conducting routine missions, 

including convoy escorts, armed reconnaissance 

flights, medevac escorts, and CAS training for 

ground controllers. On 6 December, all that 

changed when enemy forces executed a coordinated night attack against BCP 6, east of FOB 

Salerno, with a diversionary rocket attack aimed 

at the FOB. A section of Red Dog Cobras quickly 

launched into the night and immediately observed 

tracer fire, explosions, and illumination rounds at 

the BCP. Afghan forces manning the BCP expended 

nearly all of their ammunition in their panicked 

and undisciplined defense. The Marines observed 

tracer fire and explosions in the southern part of 

the BCP. The Red Dogs suppressed several enemy 

positions while searching for the point of origin for 

incoming mortar fire. Next, the Red Dog UH-1Ns 

inserted ODA forces and an ammunition resupply to help stabilize the situation. The Red Dogs 

then located the enemy mortars and silenced the 

tubes with 2.75-inch rockets. ODA took control 

of the situation, relieving the Afghan Security 

Forces commander of responsibility and consolidated forces in defensive positions. 

On 17 December, TF Red Dog aircraft were 

again called into action as a U.S. Army patrol was 

engaged in the vicinity of Llwara. Three Red Dog 

AH-1Ws responded to provide close air support only 

200 to 500 meters from the engaged U.S. forces. 

The division expended all their 2.75-inch rockets and 20mm cannon ordnance, thereby allowing the U.S. forces to disengage. On 18 December, 

squadron UH-1Ns successfully tested a new aerial 

delivery system for future emergency resupply 

missions that allowed supplies to be accurately 

dropped without the aircraft landing or damaging the payload.

In February, the operational tempo picked up 

from the previous month. On the night of 11 February 2005, enemy forces attacked FOB Llwara 

with a squad-size unit employing mortars, RPGs, 

and small arms. The Red Dog QRF launched 

from FOB Salerno within minutes of the call. Flying with night-vision goggles through treacherous 

terrain, the section doubled back their flight path 

several times to negotiate dangerous weather that 

impeded movement to the objective area. Once 

on station, they identified multiple enemy positions around the FOB. The Red Dogs quickly laid 

down 20mm covering fire, while coordinating the 

attack run-in of U.S. Air Force A-10s while under 

steady ground fire. 

On 24 February 2005, a platoon-size enemy 

force infiltrated Afghanistan from Pakistan and 

ambushed an Afghan convoy and the nearby BCP 

simultaneously. Following several volleys of RPGs 

and heavy machine-gun fire, four Afghan soldiers were seriously wounded and Coalition forces 

requested the QRF at FOB Salerno to launch in 

order to disrupt the enemy attack and effect a 

medevac of the wounded soldiers. 

Two Red Dog AH-1Ws were already airborne 

conducting a counter-rocket armed reconnaissance 

mission. They were joined by another AH-1W 

and a U.S. Army Black Hawk with a Special 

Forces team on board. The division immediately 

responded overhead and cut off the enemy’s ability to egress across the Pakistan border. The Super 

Cobras maneuvered through massive volleys of 

RPG and machine-gun fire locating the enemy 

positions. Though sustaining damage by enemy 

fire, the Red Dog section engaged the enemy at 

close range to allow the Black Hawk’s safe insert 
83

of the SOF team into a hot landing zone. Despite 

sustained RPG, machine-gun, and small-arms 

fire directed at their aircraft, the Red Dogs flight 

of three Cobras combined with a section of A-10s 

to maintain constant overhead cover during the 

eight-hour battle. The battle produced 20 enemy 

casualties, while the Special Forces team was able 

to collect a significant amount of classified intelligence, communications equipment, and weapons.

On 22 March, enemy forces launched an accurate 122mm rocket attack at night on FOB Salerno. 

Simultaneously, a company-size element of insurgents attacked BCP 6. The Red Dog QRF was 

alerted for launch in response to the rocket attack. 

Running through an incoming barrage, with 

impacts landing on the flight line, the Red Dog 

ground and aircrew made the launch. As the section made its way toward the rocket firing point, 

the battle going on at BCP 6 was obvious. The 

section then proceeded directly to the BCP to 

join the fight. Negotiating heavy machine-gun 

and RPG fire, the section engaged enemy positions with deadly volleys of 2.75-inch rockets, 

TOW missiles, and 20mm cannon fire. The section stayed on the attack until they were out of 

ordnance. A second Red Dog section of UH-1N 

gunships relieved them on station.

 The second Red Dog section continued the 

attack with 2.75-inch rockets and .50-caliber and 

7.62mm door guns. In addition, they relayed the 

coordinates of several enemy positions for the 

combined fires from supporting artillery, British Harriers, and Air Force AC-130 gunships. 

As the battle at the BCP waned, the second Red 

Dog QRF section returned to the rocket firing 

point and expertly ran an adjust fire mission of 

the Salerno counter battery artillery. The enemy 

position was silenced, ending the rocket attack on 

FOB Salerno. The follow-on assessment identified that the BCP was attacked by a force of more 

than 100 of the enemy, resulting in 44 confirmed 

enemy casualties.

The focus of the squadron shifted during the 

latter part of March as TF Red Dog was relieved 

of its combat responsibilities in theater. Personnel, equipment, and aircraft prepared to redeploy 

home. The return of the last deployed members 

of the squadron in mid April marked the conclusion of the longest deployment of a Marine squadron since the end of the Vietnam War. 
84

Marines of Kilo Company, 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, 

await extraction during Operation Mavericks, an operation 

conducted to capture suspected anti-Coalition forces in the 

vicinity of Mehtar Lam, Afghanistan, on 21 March 2005. 

Photo courtesy of Cpl James L. Yarboro
From Bridgeport 

to Blessing

by Ed Darack

Marine Corps Gazette, August 2006

My time with the Marines in the mountains.

My first experience with the U.S. Marine Corps 

occurred at an unlikely place—at 14,200 feet on 

Alaska’s Mount McKinley. Marine mountain leader instructors from the Mountain Warfare Training 

Center (MWTC) at Bridgeport, CA, had come to 

scale North America’s highest peak as part of an 

ongoing training regimen. I never actually met any 

Marines on the mountain (they had long since departed after a successful summit bid), but I came 

to know very well the sturdy snow cave they’d 

built—as it saved my life during an intense fiveday storm. I’ll never forget the snow cave or the 

Marines I never met.

Fast Forward

Nearly 15 years later, in March 2005, I had the great 

fortune of spending two weeks at the MWTC as a 

freelance photographer/writer for an array of writing 

and photography projects. Base leadership had 

arranged for me to observe a full suite of operations 

at the MWTC, from mountain medicine to the 

high-altitude evaluation of the MV-22 Osprey. 

My primary task, however, was to “embed” with 

the Marines of 2d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment 

(2/3), during a workup for their forthcoming 

deployment to Afghanistan. I followed Whiskey 

85
86

Company (Weapons Company operating as a 

line company) through the mountains outside of 

Hawthorne, NV, and Echo Company at the tail 

end of their training in California’s Sierra Nevada 

Mountains.

Life in the cold, high mountains came as a 

completely new experience for the majority of the 

Marines of 2/3, who are based in Kaneohe Bay, 

HI. And life inside a Marine infantry unit came as 

a completely new experience for me. The Marines 

thrived on the challenges of the mountains’ wild 

temperature swings, navigational difficulties, heavy 

loads in thin air. I’d experienced similar challenges 

during my times in the mountains, but I never 

carried the added weight of body armor, a Kevlar 

helmet, radios, batteries, weapons, and rounds on 

top of my standard camping and photography gear. 

I found the attitudes of the Marines inspiring, 

nobody complained, nobody quit, each acted as 

a professional. Many outsiders might consider 

Marines and mountains to be an “oil and water” 

type combination. Observing the Bridgeport-based 

instructors work with the 2/3 Marines, however, 

proved to me that the cultural environment of the 

Marine Corps is ideally suited to the challenges 

of alpine realms.

I spoke with 2/3’s executive officer, Major 

Robert [M.] Scott (now Lieutenant Colonel Scott), 

at the end of my two weeks at Bridgeport. “I’d 

like to embed with 2/3 in Afghanistan,” I said, 

my appetite whet to experience just what the 

Marines were training for. Major Scott gave me 

his contact information, stating that he’d look 

into the possibility.

Afghanistan

I arrived in Kabul six months later laden with four 

cameras, 200 rolls of film, camping equipment, 

and body armor. After credentialing as a freelancer 

at Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan, 

I grabbed a taxi to Bagram Airfield, where the 

Army Combined Joint Task Force 76 public affairs 

representative briefed me on what lay ahead, 

“You’re goin’ somewhere with the Marines.” After 

two helicopter flights, a one-hour-long convoy to 

the village of Watapor, and a three-hour terror 

ride through “IED (improvised explosive device) 

alley” in the back of a “highback” in a drenching 

thunderstorm, I reached that “somewhere”—

Camp Blessing.

Initially established by a small Army detachment, Camp Blessing (named for Jay Blessing, a 

member of that detachment who was killed in 

the area) lies adjacent to the town of Nangalam 

in the mountainous Kunar Province of eastern 

Afghanistan, about 20 miles from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Marines have maintained 

a presence at Camp Blessing throughout much of 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), including 

contingents of various sizes from 2/8, then 3/6, 

followed by 3/3. [The] 3/3 handed Blessing off 

to 1st Platoon, Company E, 2/3 in June 2005. 

Commanded by 25-year-old First Lieutenant 

Matthew [D.] Bartels, Blessing is the only allMarine operated forward operating base (FOB) 

within a combat zone in the entire global war 

on terrorism, and the first of this type since the 

Vietnam War. “Really, we’re a fire base, not a FOB. 

At FOBs, most personnel run to bunkers during 

an attack. Here, everyone stands-to. Everyone 

shoots back,” explained Bartels from the roof 

of the combat operations center. “Everywhere 

you look—360 degrees you’re staring at bad-guy 

country,” he continued as he pointed out specific 

locations.

They launch 82mm mortars at us from that 

ridgeline. . . . They stormed the camp once 

from there. . . . That’s Rocket Ridge, from 

where they launch 107mm Chinese rockets 
87

at us . . . and that valley—you came right 

by it on your way up here last night—that’s 

the Korengal Valley. That’s real, real bad 

guy country. That’s the vicinity of where 

they shot down the Chinook helicopter and 

shot up the Navy SEALs. This is the farthest 

we’re pushed north. This is the tip of the 

spear. We set our watches by the mortar and 

rocket attacks here. Welcome to the edge of 

the empire.

Ringed with Hesco barriers and concertina 

razor wire, the perimeter of the camp is studded 

with Type 75, ZPU-I antiaircraft batteries (aimed 

at the surrounding mountains); recoilless rifles; 

DShK 12.7mm heavy machine guns; and 82mm 

mortar tubes—all Chinese- and Soviet-made 

and all captured from anti-Coalition militia 

(ACM) during weapons cache raids. “For us, 

Soviet weapons systems represent a substantial 

component of our defensive fire plan,” Bartels 

noted.

We have a great relationship with the locals 

of Nangalam and other villages of the Pech 

River Valley. We reach out to them regularly. 

We have people coming to the gate almost 

daily with intel for us, and we help them 

however we can, particularly with medical 

care. We even stitched up a villager’s donkey 

the other day. As soon as we verify their 

information, we act on it—a big dividend 

being the weapons you see here.

Thanks to Bartels’ and his Marines’ interactions 

with the locals, this tiny camp provides a sizeable 

chunk of the battalion’s actionable information.

First Lieutenant Bartels then introduced me 

to one of the camp’s most important assets, its 

ASF contingent.

ASF stands for “Afghan Security Forces”—

they’re locals whom we hire directly, and 

they live here on base with us. They’re 

the guys who use those Soviet and Chinese weapons. They’re incredible fighters; 

most of them grew up battling the Soviets. 

They hate the ACM, and they’re very loyal 

to us.

Earplugs set and straps of my flak jacket and 

Kevlar helmet cinched, I climbed onto the loading ramp of a CH-47 Chinook, one of two courtesy of Army Task Force Saber. Just over one full 

day after arriving at Camp Blessing, I watched the 

camp grow small as the helos lifted Marines, ASF, 

and me toward a high ridge for a surprise insert 

on a mission to find an ACM 82mm mortar position. Operation Valdez, named in honor of Lance 

Corporal Steven A. Valdez, was on.

With two Apache gunships flying close cover 

and an A-IO soaring overhead, the Chinook pilots 

set us onto a grassy landing zone adjacent to a 

joint direct attack munition crater. I reached for 

my backpack but felt a stiff tug toward the rear 

of the helicopter. “Just get off the bird!” a Marine 

yelled over the screeching din of jet engines. I acted 

as instructed, keeping a close eye on the spinning 

rotor blades once out of the craft. “Now get away 

from the helo! We’ll get your stuff for you. We’re 

one big target right now, and this thing still has 

tons of fuel on board!”

Kalashnikov and rocket-propelled-grenade 

(RPG) wielding ASF personnel maneuvered alongside Marines to establish a defensive perimeter. I 

just ran and took pictures. Not two minutes passed 

before the Marines had 30 cases of bottled water, 

50 cases of meals, ready-to-eat [MREs], and everyone’s gear offloaded. The Chinooks’ engines spun 

up, and the helos roared into the sky.

Marine First Lieutenant Patrick E. Kinser, a 
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rifle platoon commander and a Bridgeport-trained 

mountain leader, quickly identified a patrol base 

position. As the ASF occupied an upper and lower 

camp, the Marines established a well-hidden patrol 

base between the two.

Meanwhile, above our base, a scout/sniper team 

that included First Lieutenant Bartels and former 

Bridgeport mountain leader instructor Staff Seargent Keith Eggers kept close watch over not only 

the patrol base, ASF, and Marines but also the 

surrounding ridgelines where ACM could lurk. 

I quickly learned to appreciate the scout team’s 

ability to rule the immediate area of operations 

from above and maintain a guardian angel presence at all times.

“They found the mortar position,” stated First 

Lieutenant Kinser with a satisfied tone after receiving word from a patrol. “And they also found the 

cave where they hide when Camp Blessing returns 

fire.” After a brief pause, the 25 year-old added, 

“That cave won’t be around for much longer.”

I joined a patrol to the just-discovered mortar position the next day. Moving through steep 

mountains with a heavy pack is difficult enough; 

“running the hills” with a “convection oven” Kevlar helmet and heavy body armor just magnifies 

the skin chafing, bone jabbing, and the feeling of 

“crushed chest.” Halfway up the ridge, I swore 

that I’d never watch a newscast of Marines in 

Afghanistan the same way again, that I’d never 

forget how much more difficult having donned 

flak and Kevlar makes moving and I wasn’t even 

carrying a weapon.

“Here it is, Ed,” stated Corporal Justin Bradley, the patrol leader, pointing at a small divot in 

the soil just below the crest of a prominent ridge. 

I learned long ago about the ease with which I 

could get lost in the mountains. Similarly, as Corporal Bradley pointed directly at that very nondescript mortar position, hidden away in the trees 

and further obscured by surrounding boulders, I 

immediately understood just how difficult pinpointing enemy locations in the mountains can be.

“What? How do you know?” I asked. Bradley 

pointed out the telltale signs to me after rechecking 

the location’s 10-digit grid reference with a global 

positioning system. “Now, let’s take a look at that 

cave,” the patrol leader said as he rounded the base 

of a house-size boulder. A flat slab rested at the 

base of a large rock under which about four people 

with gear could hide. “That’s it, a ‘bad guy’ hole.”

The next day, the Marines and the ASF contingent broke camp and pushed to the mortar position. 

The Marines collectively lightened their load that 

day by 150 pounds of explosives. As Corporal Brett 

Bailer, an assaultman, prepped the explosives (for 

two distinct detonations of 75 pounds each), the 

rest of us took cover a few hundred meters down 

the ridge crest. FWHAP! A cloud of pulverized 

rock rose into the clear morning sky. “Keep an eye 

out for falling rocks!” First Lieutenant Kinser bellowed; not even a grain of dust rained down on us. 

We waited for Bailer’s second detonation. While 

waiting, I stared north toward the high mountains 

of the Hindu Kush and felt the earth rock back 

and forth for about 30 seconds. “Is that an earthquake?” I asked. “Probably something Bailer did 

to the mountain with all that C4 [composition C4 

plastic explosives],” a Marine joked. We quickly 

forgot about what we later learned was the devastating Pakistani earthquake.

FWHAP! Once the sky cleared of the second 

detonation’s debris, we pushed onward toward 

the crest of the ridge. Tantil Now, a remote village about halfway between our location and the 

Pech River, was our next goal.

“ASF’s picking up al-Qaeda traffic on the Icom 

[intercom],” First Lieutenant Kinser barked as we 

worked our way through trees and boulders along 

the ridge. I ran up to Kinser’s position; two ASF 
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translators and the ASF contingent leader stared 

at the radio. Sultan, one of the translators, stated 

solemnly, “Forty al-Qaeda fighters are setting 

up PK [Russian machine gun] and RPG positions along that far ridge.” Our route to Tantil 

Now took us directly below that ridge, through 

open fields with virtually no cover for about two 

kilometers.

“Game on, Ed,” Corporal Bradley stated. 

“Make sure your plates are in. Looks like we’re 

gonna take contact.”

“Take contact? What’s that mean?” I asked. 

“Get shot at,” Kinser quipped. “Listen,” the lieutenant began intently, “we can hear the prayers 

from the mosque in Tantil Now through the air, 

and we can hear the same prayer from that same 

mosque in the background over the Icom. They’re 

in that village!”

“We have to practice dispersion, Ed, and that 

means you have to stay 30 feet behind me, and 

Anaya, the corpsman, is 30 feet behind you. Got 

it?” Bradley asked. “But . . . what if they shoot at 

us?” I asked. “We shoot back,” he paused briefly 

before laughing:

. . . and you take pictures of us shooting 

back. Don’t worry. You’ll be fine. Remember, the scout/snipers are above us on 

another ridge. They can see everything. If 

a bad guy tries to set up a PK, or pops up 

with an RPG launcher, that’ll be the last 

thing he ever does. You wanted to run with 

the Marines in a mountain warfare environment in the mountains of Afghanistan—

well this is it. You’re here.

Bradley paused briefly before adding, “The 

bad guys are good at fighting in the mountains, 

but we’re a hell of a lot better.” I started laughing with my friend, now a very good friend. “You 

know what I told my friends and family before 

coming out here?”

“What?”

“The safest place in the world is anywhere in 

the world, so long as you’re surrounded by U.S. 

Marines.”

“Well, Ed, you know what?” the 22-year-old 

asked. “You’re surrounded by U.S. Marines.”

“And so we’ll walk out of here without a scratch,” 

I added.

“That’s exactly right.” And we did.

Note

Marine Corps Gazette 90, no. 8 (August 2006): 

54–57. Reprinted with permission.

About the Author 

Mr. Ed Darack is a freelance writer/photographer 

who documented U.S. Marines in Afghanistan and 

authored the book Victory Point: Operations Red 

Wings and Whalers—The Marine Corps’ Battle For 

Freedom in Afghanistan (Berkley, 2010).
90

U.S. Marine Corps Cpls Thomas Stickles and John Pollander, both riflemen assigned to Kilo Company, 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, provide security on a rooftop 

while other Marines conduct searches through buildings 

during Operation Mavericks on 19 March 2005. The operation was conducted to capture suspected anti-Coalition 

forces in the vicinity of Mehtar Lam. 

Photo courtesy of Cpl James L. Yarboro
Operation Red Wings

by Ed Darack

Marine Corps Gazette, January 2011

What Really Happened?

The events of Operation Red Wings, which spiraled into disaster shortly after the insert of a fourman Naval Special Operations Forces (NavSOF) 

reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) team during the opening phase of the operation, present 

warfighters (and those covering military operations) with a broad array of vital contemporary 

case studies relevant to those functioning at the 

battalion staff, company, platoon, and squad levels. These include studies in deconfliction between 

conventional forces and SOF, the paramount necessity of unity of command/effort, communications in complex mountainous terrain, mountain 

ambush tactics, and the importance of comprehensive, detailed planning, among others. Despite 

these lessons (the knowledge of which will arguably save lives in future operations), little has been 

discussed in professional military papers about 

Operation Red Wings. However, much has been 

written and discussed about Red Wings in general media (which is often referenced by warfighters 

for their ongoing professional military education), 

and much of this, including the content of two 

books on the topic, is rife with misinformation. 

Background, Key Points, and Aftermath 

In November 2004, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (3/3), 

arrived in Regional Command-East (RC-East), 

Afghanistan, and assumed responsibility of their 

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area of operations (AO), which included the restive Kunar Province. [The] 3/3’s overarching goal 

was to continue to increase stability in the region 

with Afghanistan’s 18 September 2005 national 

parliamentary elections on the horizon. 

[The] 3/3 deployed not as part of a MAGTF 

but as an infantry battalion to be integrated into 

a combined joint task force (CJTF). [The] 3/3’s 

staff identified deconfliction issues with SOF 

units working in the same geographic areas that 

3/3’s AO covered. However, 3/3’s staff also identified force multiplicative opportunities they felt 

working with SOF would avail to the battalion. 

[The] 3/3 developed a novel model that allowed 

for operational integration, deconfliction, and de 

facto operational control (OpCon) of SOF ground 

units and SOF support assets not normally available to conventional forces. 

One of the culminating achievements of 3/3’s 

tour in RC-East was the forced surrender of a 

regional high value target anti-Coalition militia 

(ACM) leader named Najmudeen, whom conventional and SOF units had sought for years. Subsequent to Najmudeen’s surrender, which occurred 

just after Operation Spurs, 3/3 conducted Operation Mavericks and then Operation Celtics. All 

three of these operations incorporated SOF in their 

opening phases. In May and June 2005, during 

the relief in place/transfer of authority with 2/3, 

3/3’s staff began planning Operation Stars, which 

was to focus on ACM activity in the Korengal Valley region to the west of Asadabad, the Kunar’s 

provincial capital. Due to a decline in actionable 

intelligence feed, however, Stars had to be delayed, 

and ultimately 3/3 handed what at that point was 

a “shell” of an operation to 2/3. 

[The] 2/3’s staff took the operational shell, 

renamed it Red Wings and, through analysis of 

intelligence, identified a relatively small (fewer 

than 20 ACM), little-known cell and its leader, 

Ahmad Shah, as the focus for Red Wings. (Shah 

was attempting to fill the regional ACM power void 

after Najmudeen’s surrender to 3/3.) Shah based 

his operations high on the slopes of Sawtalo Sar 

Mountain, which sits between the Korengal Valley and the Shuryek Valley. The purpose of Red 

Wings, in continuance of 3/3’s operations, was 

to disrupt ACM activity (with Shah as the focus) 

prior to the 18 September 2005 national elections. 

The Marines planned to have a six-man scout/

sniper team traverse a series of valleys and ridges 

under cover of darkness to a group of predetermined observation points high on the slopes of 

Sawtalo Sar for the opening, or shaping phase, 

of Red Wings. Once the scout/sniper team had 

positively identified Shah and his group, a larger 

force of Marines was to undertake the direct 

action phase, while a company-size element of 

Marines functioned as outer cordon. For this second phase, 2/3 required assault support capable 

of low-illumination infiltration/exfiltration. Not 

having an associated aviation combat element, the 

2/3 staff requested support from the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment (Airborne) (160th 

SOAR[A]) from Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). Red 

Wings was similar in design to operations conducted by 3/3, but 2/3 sought the integration of 

only a SOF aviation support element, not ground 

forces. The SOTF, which had recently undergone a command change to one less amenable to 

SOF combined force integration, responded that 

2/3 could be granted 160th support but only if 

SOF ground personnel undertook the opening 

two phases of Red Wings and were tasked as the 

lead supported elements with full OpCon (inclusive of 2/3) for these phases. With no alternatives, 

the battalion staff agreed. The ground force that 

agreed to undertake the supported first two phases 

of Red Wings was a NavSOF group consisting of 
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an assortment of U.S. Navy SEALs deployed to 

Afghanistan at that time. The NavSOF element 

planned the specifics of these first two phases of 

Red Wings with 2/3’s staff providing input, including briefing the SEALs with preselected 10-digit 

grid reference points on the target area for calls 

for fire from a 105mm artillery battery at Forward 

Operating Base Wright (outside of Asadabad) and 

a recommendation to augment the SEAL’s communications plan (to carry a more robust, albeit 

heavier, radio), among other points. 

Operation Red Wings began with an insertion 

of a four-man NavSOF R&S [reconnaissance and 

surveillance] team near the summit of Sawtalo Sar 

late in the night on 27 June 2005. As with the specifics of the planning of this phase, 2/3 played no 

direct role in command and control, as this was the 

“SOF supported” portion of the operation. The 

team was inserted by helicopter within one mile of 

a populated area—sparsely populated, but populated nonetheless. Late in the morning on 28 June 

2005, unarmed locals soft compromised the team. 

(Soft compromised means opposing forces have 

detected you; hard compromised means they’re trying to kill you.) Within approximately one hour 

of the compromise, a group of between 8 and 10 

of Shah’s men (including Ahmad Shah himself) 

ambushed the R&S team, utilizing AK-47 fire, PK 

(Pulemyot Kalashnikova—designed by the Soviet 

Union and currently in production in Russia) light 

machine-gun fire, rocket propelled grenade (RPG) 

fire, and possibly an 82mm mortar system. As the 

R&S team descended into the northeast gulch of 

Sawtalo Sar (on the Shuryek Valley side of the 

mountain) under the press of the ambush, Shah’s 

men engaged the team with coordinated plunging, interlocking fires from multiple superior topographic positions. The R&S team attempted to 

establish communications with their combat operations center via satellite through an AN/PRC-148 

radio, which failed, and then attempted communications with an Iridium satellite phone, which 

failed. Shah’s men killed three of the team within 

one hour. Hours later, a quick reaction force (QRF) 

was launched, consisting of members of NavSOF 

and Marines, in separate aircraft. [The] 2/3’s air 

officer requested that, before any aircraft attempted 

any insert, members of the QRF positively identify member(s) of the R&S team, either visually 

or by radio. The pilots agreed. No positive identification could be made. Despite this shortfall, 

aviators of one of two MH-47s [Chinooks] of the 

160th attempted to insert eight NavSOF personnel near the summit of Sawtalo Sar. During this 

insert attempt, one of Ahmad Shah’s men shot 

the MH-47 out of the sky with an RPG, killing 

all 16 personnel on board. 

Shah’s men recovered virtually all of the R&S 

team’s gear, including three M4s fitted with M203 

40mm grenade launchers, rounds for the M4s and 

M203s, low-illumination visualization equipment, 

an intact AN/PRC-148 radio, a sniper spotting 

scope and, among many other items, a laptop computer with an intact hard drive containing classified material, including detailed maps of the U.S. 

and British embassies in Kabul. Coalition forces 

could only presume that Shah would utilize what 

he and his men recovered from the SEALs in their 

future attacks against U.S., Coalition, and Afghan 

civilian and government personnel and facilities. 

A massive search and recovery effort was launched in the wake of the ambush and subsequent 

MH-47 shot down. A local villager who had 

befriended Marines at Camp Blessing, roughly 

eight miles distant, had found and then protected 

the only survivor of the R&S team; he sent another 

villager to Blessing with a note from the survivor. 

As the bodies of the SOF personnel were recovered and the survivor rescued, Shah and his men 

absconded into Pakistan, where they produced 
94

and distributed one of two videos they shot during the ambush for propaganda purposes. While 

the massive Coalition presence during the recovery effort achieved the desired end state of the 

operation (disruption of ACM activity), this was 

a short-lived and pyrrhic “victory.” Foreign fighters flowed in to join the emboldened Shah due to 

his overnight infamy. (Media had reported only 

a few facts of the operation, and the dramatic loss 

of so many U.S. troops was the lionized focus of 

this coverage.) Within weeks, Shah’s attacks began 

anew, including an improvised explosive device 

(IED) strike on a convoy of Marines in late July 

2005 and renewed mortar and rocket attacks on 

both military and civilian targets. 

Red Wings was an incredible tragedy for the 

families, friends, and associates of those lost. From 

a tactical/operational standpoint, and from an 

analysis of its influence on furthering security in 

the region (the operation’s purpose), the opening 

phase of Red Wings was an unmitigated monumental disaster—one of the greatest, if not the 

greatest, in recent military history. Because so 

many resources were pushed to aid the recovery 

effort (the search and recovery was called Red 

Wings II), other planned operations (not just in 

that part of the AO but throughout Afghanistan) 

had to be delayed and many cancelled altogether. 

Ahmad Shah, a once unknown local Taliban aspirant, gained instant global fame and saw his ranks, 

finances, and armaments (including those taken 

from the SEALs) burgeon, enabling him to renew 

his attacks with greater intensity and frequency. 

Marine Corps Ethos, 

the Media, and the Truth 

In the spring of 2005, when I first embedded with 

2/3, Major Robert [R.] Scott and Major Thomas 

[D.] Wood, respectively the executive officer and 

operations officer of the battalion, discussed how 

information on military operations is often unfortunately skewed in one form or another. One of 

their key points was that just as painting a military operation or unit in an unfairly negative light 

hurts the overall war effort through erosion of public support, exaggeration and omission to deflect 

responsibility or to “glorify” a unit or event with 

excessive grandiose aggrandizing will, in the long 

run, prove just as injurious (if not more so) to the 

military as a whole. An inaccurate narrative will 

only erode the public’s faith and confidence in the 

military once the public realizes the extent of that 

narrative’s inaccuracies, especially if the public perceives that the misinformation can be traced to the 

military itself. Military stories should be told comprehensively and honestly, inclusive of the good, 

the boring, the bad, the funny, and even the embarrassing. The idea of America having a Marine 

Corps because the citizenry wants and not needs 

a Marine Corps falls in line with having the Marine Corps story told accurately. 

The Misinformation Trail 

Like coverage of most disasters, military or otherwise, media outlets raced to gather any detail of 

Red Wings they could uncover. Outside of the helicopter shot down and American military deaths, 

however, CJTF-76, the lead military command in 

Afghanistan at the time and the core of which was 

comprised of the Army’s Southern European Task 

Force, public affairs released little. Since no media had been embedded with relevant units during Red Wings, news gatherers could only rely on 

daily public affairs briefings for their information. 

Within two weeks of the ambush and shoot 

down, a number of articles attempting to provide in-depth coverage of Red Wings emerged. 

While correct on certain aspects of the tragedy, 

such as only one member of the R&S team surviving and the number of SOF personnel killed, 
95

nothing was reported on the background, development, and purpose of the operation. Furthermore, basic facts of Red Wings—even its name 

(most articles referenced it as Redwing)—were 

misreported, usually grossly. Media accounts also 

omitted Marine Corps involvement in the operation’s background and design, as well as in the 

recovery effort of Red Wings II. 

This dissemination of inaccurate information 

reached a whirlwind pace in June 2007 with the 

publication of the book Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost 

Heroes of SEAL Team 10, about the only surviving 

member of the R&S team.1

 While the survivor, 

Petty Officer Second Class Marcus Luttrell, was 

given authorship credit, the book was actually 

written in its entirety by a British writer, Patrick 

Robinson, who penned primarily military fiction 

titles. In an article written by Robinson in February 2010, he states that the Navy chose him to 

be the ghostwriter of Lone Survivor based on his 

series of novels involving SEALs.2 Shortly after 

Luttrell and Robinson met, just weeks after Red 

Wings drew to a close, the two secured a book 

deal and then a movie deal. Robinson began writing the manuscript as Luttrell returned to active 

duty. The Navy reviewed and approved the manuscript, endorsing it as accurate. 

Shortly after Red Wings, a number of Marines 

of 2/3 carefully reviewed Luttrell’s after-action 

report (AAR) and the R&S team’s gear manifest 

to learn of any recent changes in enemy tactics, 

techniques, and procedures and, more importantly, to ascertain what additional threats they 

might face during operations and patrols due 

to Shah acquiring the SEAL team’s gear. In the 

AAR, Luttrell stated that the team was attacked 

by 20 to 35 ACM. (Analysis of two videos made 

by Shah, as well as other intelligence, indicated 

8 to 10 total, a common ACM team size for this 

area.) Twenty was the number initially released 

by CJTF-76 public affairs. In Lone Survivor, however (which was released the same week Luttrell 

retired from the Navy), Robinson writes that the 

team faced hundreds and that Ahmad Shah was 

one of the top lieutenants to Osama bin Laden. 

During the battle, according to Lone Survivor, the 

SEALs killed dozens of “Taliban.” Robinson does 

not discuss Marine involvement in Red Wings in 

Lone Survivor, or the prior operations after which 

Red Wings was based, or the purpose of the operation, or the development of the operation, or any 

of the command relationships during Red Wings. 

The (very gripping, yet extraordinarily unrealistic) narrative of a small special operations team 

inserted on a lonely mountain to not just surveil, but to take down the operations of one of 

Osama bin Laden’s top men—who had hundreds 

of fighters with him—continued to propagate 

throughout the media. 

Roughly three years after the release of Lone 

Survivor, another book covering Red Wings was 

released. Published by a prominent military publisher, this book focuses on the commander of the 

R&S team, Lieutenant Michael Murphy, USN. 

Although highlighting Murphy the individual, 

the book nevertheless provides a narrative of Red 

Wings, a narrative again riddled with misinformation. The author explained, based presumably 

on information from his sources, the precipitating 

event and the genesis of operation Red Wings: 

On June 3, 2005, Shah’s forces ambushed 

and killed three Marines from Company C, 

1st Battalion (Airborne) near Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun-E, located outside 

the town of Orgune in the Paktika Province 

in southwestern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border. Killed were Captain Charles 

D. Robinson and Staff Sergeant Leroy E. 
96

Alexander. Seriously burned was Staff Sergeant Christopher N. Piper, who subsequently died of his wounds. The Marines 

approached CJSOTF-A’s commanders and 

requested the capture or elimination of Shah.3

While Paktika Province lies in eastern Afghanistan (not southwestern Afghanistan as the author 

states), no Marines operated in Paktika at any time 

near the planning or execution of Red Wings. Of 

course, there is no such unit in the whole of the 

Marine Corps as “Company C, 1st Battalion (Airborne).” Robinson, Alexander, and Piper were all 

members of 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, 

which fell under the command of CJSOTFA while 

in Afghanistan. 

The Marines never approached CJSOTF-A’s 

commanders to request anything but the low-illumination assault support capability of the 160th 

SOAR(A); what they received in return was a 

mandate, rooted in strict adherence to U.S. Special Operations Command doctrine, to integrate 

SOF ground forces for the opening two phases of 

the operation and to designate those forces as the 

supported lead component of Red Wings if 2/3 

was to receive 160th support. 

Conclusion 

The full story of Operation Red Wings yields invaluable information for warfighters of all Services 

as well as civilian journalists covering military operations. An accurate, comprehensive account of the 

planning; the AO; the enemy; NavSOF involvement; execution; breakdown of command, control, and communications; all that went awry on 

Sawtalo Sar; and the aftermath provides volumes 

in lessons learned. But if public affairs officials, authors, reporters, and editors, either through gross 

incompetence or by intentionally chipping the 

story into a custom-honed narrative—regardless 

of how noble they believe their motives may be—

allow these lessons to be drowned in a morass of 

misinformation, then they are lessons doomed to 

be learned again and again. 

The sentiments Majors Scott and Wood articulated to me in 2005 remain relevant and vital 

now more than ever. A healthy democracy with a 

civilian-controlled military requires a high level 

of transparency of the military. This is an important concept deeply rooted in the Marine Corps’ 

culture of fidelity to the nation’s citizenry. The 

many Marines I’ve worked with over the years on 

media projects continue to not just preach it, they 

also prove it. It’s one of the reasons why so many 

of us civilians continue to want a Marine Corps. 

Notes

Marine Corps Gazette 95, no. 1 (January 2011): 

62–67. Reprinted with permission.

1. Patrick Robinson (based on interviews with Marcus Luttrell), Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account 

of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL 

Team 10 (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2007). 

2. Patrick Robinson, “Writing Lone Survivor: The 

Honor and the Anguish,” The Huffington Post, 1 

February 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com

/patrick-robinson/emlone-survivorem-the-sto_b

_444843.html. 

3. Gary Williams, Seal of Honor: Operation Red Wings 

and the Life of Lt. Michael P. Murphy, USN (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010). 

Author’s Note

The following officers (rank at the time) and organization were contacted and interviewed (in some 

cases) to write this article: 

First Lieutenant Matthew D. Bartels (commander, Camp Blessing, 2/3). 
97

Lieutenant Colonel Norman L. Cooling (commanding officer, 3/3). 

Lieutenant Colonel James E. Donnellan (commanding officer, 2/3 [preselected before 2/3’s 

Afghanistan deployment to relieve Lieutenant 

Colonel MacMannis after 30 days in country]). 

First Lieutenant Patrick E. Kinser (platoon commander, 1st Platoon, Company E, 2/3). 

First Lieutenant Robert A. Long (assistant operations officer/sniper platoon commander, 2/3). 

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew R. MacMannis (commanding officer, 2/3). 

Naval Special Warfare Public Affairs: no response. 

Major Andrew T. Priddy (operations officer, 3/3). 

Captain Casmer J. Ratkowiak (air officer, 2/3). 

Major Robert R. Scott (Executive Officer, 2/3). 

Second Lieutenant Regan C. Turner (platoon commander, 2d Platoon, Weapons Company, 2/3). 

Major Scott A. Westerfeld (intelligence officer, 2/3). 

Major Thomas D. Wood (operations officer, 2/3). 

About the Author

Mr. Ed Darack’s book Victory Point was chosen by 

the Naval Institute as one of the best books of 2009. 
98

Then-LtCol Jim Hogberg, PRT commander in Helmand 

Province, meets with Nawa District officials in April 2005 

to survey a potential site for a school. 

Photo courtesy of Col James A. Hogberg
The Chai Patrols—

Conducting Stability 

Operations 

in Afghanistan

by Colonel James A. Hogberg

Backdrop

The ancient code of Afghanistan’s Pashtu community is hospitality, honor, and revenge . . .

although not always in that order. To be assigned 

as the Provincial Reconstruction Team commander 

of Pashtu-dominated Helmand Province, Afghanistan’s (and the world’s) largest producer of opium, 

is akin to living an episode of the Sopranos every 

week. While friendly, entertaining, and even patriotic at times, behind the scenes it can be sarcastically violent as someone is seemingly always getting 

whacked. It is a place where smuggling and drugs 

permeate everything to include the government 

and police. It’s not if corruption exists, it’s how 

corrupt is it? In contrast, this southwestern corner 

of Afghanistan, dissected by the fertile Helmand 

River, is also amazingly hopeful and promising. 

Underlying the drug lords, warlords, religious extremists, illiteracy, and abject poverty is a growing 

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100

young populace that embraces education, Western technology, religious moderation, and possess a self-deprecating sense of humor. There are 

also old timers who still remember a more prosperous youth and understand that the cycle of war 

in which they have spent the majority of their lifetime needs to be broken if there is to be a future 

for their children and a rebirth of their country. 

It’s all about the chai . . . or tea. Pashtu hospitality demands that chai precede all discussion. 

Rarely is an issue too pressing not to drink chai and 

engage in social conversation first. Thirty minutes 

earlier, a suicide bomber in a vehicle-borne IED 

attempts to crash the gate of the Helmand governor’s building and kill security counsel attendees. Instead, the bomber prematurely detonates 

the explosives and is subsequently shot dead by 

Afghan security personnel. Inside, chai is served 

to the provincial governor and the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team commander in defiance 

of the attack and turn to other issues. Engage in 

a conversation on the side of the road with a subsistence farmer and soon be invited to his village 

for a glass of chai and lively conversation. Drive 

200 miles cross-compartment to visit a remote 

Afghan mountain outpost overlooking historical smuggling routes, metaphorically within site 

of the edge of the Earth, and expect to see several 

guards with AK-47s slung, crouched low around 

an open fire, boiling chai, and quick to dispense 

Pashtu hospitality. It is soon clear that bringing stability to this tumultuous region of the world will 

require a unique approach that combines insightful kitchen table diplomacy, humor, persistence 

. . . and, of course, large amounts of cultural awareness that begin with chai. 

The Mission

Absent political sensitivity and nuances, the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) would 

have been better named the Provincial “Stability” Team to best define its mission of dispensing 

doses of governance, security, and reconstruction. 

The PRT assisted and cajoled provincial officials 

in bringing government to the people who were 

by circumstances wildly independent and otherwise untouched by basic public services. The PRT 

trained, mentored, and helped organize dysfunction 

local law enforcement whose leadership protected 

the drug trade yet still understood that their forces 

were responsible for providing rudimentary levels 

of public protection. The PRT also facilitated reconstruction and economic development through 

civil affairs projects, nongovernmental organization coordination, and community engagement.

During the summer of 2005, more than 150 

Afghan police officers were killed in Helmand Province as a mixed result of both an insurgency and 

their own involvement in drug smuggling activities. Poppy production continued unabated and 

many farmers in the province dismissed Coalition 

counter-drug campaigns and reported record yields. 

Left to conduct stability operations and share a 

battlespace with a small Special Forces detachment, the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction 

Team fluctuated in size from 60 to 100 personnel and comprised a mixed-match of personnel in 

different stages of deployment from all Services, 

including a U.S. Army National Guard infantry 

platoon, two squads of active duty U.S. Army military police, a handful of Air Force communication specialists, a U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs 

team, human intelligence collectors, several individual augments to include the commander, from 

the Marine Corps, and Navy, and Department of 

State civilians. 

Absent an infantry battalion that was present 

in neighboring provinces to keep an insurgency 

in check, the Helmand PRT might seem ridiculously small to conduct stability operations in 
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Afghanistan’s largest geographic province (more 

than 16,000 square miles) with a population 

exceeding 1 million people, and where only one 

decrepit paved road transects the countryside. On 

the other hand, when conducting stability operations, is bigger necessarily better? Can a small, 

energetic, and autonomous team tasked with projecting governance have a better and more profound effect than the traditional big stick carried 

by an infantry battalion? Below are the observations of one such team. 

Observations

“The other half of the population,” reaching 

out to females in a conservative Islamic society

Traveling 12 bumpy hours in Humvees over desert 

trails and tertiary mountain roads to reach the remote village of Baghran, a former Taliban stronghold 

that still harbored sympathizers, most soldiers initially wondered where the women were. The dusty 

village market was filled with men, yet the burkaclad women were nowhere to be found. However, 

in a visit a month later, accompanied by a medical 

assistance team that included U.S. female military 

health care providers (medics and doctors), local 

village women streamed out of homes to receive 

much needed medical care. A courageous Helmand 

Minister of Women’s Affairs had opened a women’s center in three of the province’s “moderate” 

areas. In his comments at one such opening ceremony, the provincial governor does not mention 

the word woman or female in his entire address, 

using the platform instead to push a hypocritical antidrug agenda. The U.S. commander, when 

asked to speak, recites a past history of several Afghan female leaders and encourages female education by explaining how women are integrated 

in the world’s largest Islamic country, Indonesia, 

where many are doctors, engineers, and teachers. 

He then asks of the audience whether or not their 

daughters and mothers should be entitled to see 

Afghan female doctors or be taught by female Afghan teachers, just as other Islamic countries allow females to be educated in such professions. 

In the “long war,” education along with a viable role for “the other half of the population,” is 

the definitive solution. In a country where female 

illiteracy rates start in the single digits, where do 

you even begin to address what is clearly generational in scope? How do you plant a seed for the 

future that will eventually blossom? 

Traveling through rural Helmand, it became 

clear that addressing female education and economic opportunity could be a showstopper. It was 

also clear that in a more moderate provincial capital and several urban areas there were opportunities to set conditions that eventually could help 

improve the plight of women as well as polarize 

insurgency support. With limited resources, the 

PRT used some of its Commanders Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) funds to build girl’s 

schools in these urban centers and focus additional funding on economic development projects that targeted women. The idea was to place 

resources where they would be best received and 

least threatened, hoping that over time opportunities for women would build outward and become 

more acceptable. 

The Helmand PRT worked closely, but in the 

background, with the provincial women’s minister to create skilled job opportunities that women 

could pursue indoors and not be immediately dismissed by religious conservatives. Start-up funding was provided to establish an art and apparel 

academy where graduates would receive a sewing 

machine and other supplies required to establish their own small home businesses. Similarly, 

a beauty trade school was also established where 

women could become “certified” beauticians and 
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receive an initial inventory of material to also start 

their own home business. Participants pledged to 

pay back the cost of the program with future earnings so it could continue for others. More than 700 

women signed up for 350 coveted seats in the first 

series of classes. Additional funding supported a 

local nurses and midwife school.

Because education seemed to be a generational 

issue that had bypassed the vast majority of female 

adults, it was important to meet the immediate 

needs of these women with something other than 

traditional education. A lifetime of war had created a significant underclass of women in Helmand Province that had been mostly abandoned 

by even protective tribal networks. Called the Provincial Woman’s Union, this group included war 

widows and disabled and abused spouses from 

drug dependent husbands. They clung together, 

surviving by working menial jobs or begging. 

Partnering with USAID program managers, the 

PRT created several fledgling business opportunities to support these women, such as a jam and 

pickle processing plant and a small dairy processing plant. Afghans consume large amounts of jam 

with bread for breakfast. While fruits were widely 

available, they were typically exported for processing. Similarly, many families maintained a cow, 

and milk could easily be collected and processed 

into dairy projects locally. Again, these ventures 

could be conducted mostly indoors, remain lowkey, and would not directly threaten the existing 

cultural environment. The PRT used its funding to construct the necessary buildings, while 

USAID provided equipment, instruction, and 

marketing experts. 

While the construction of girl’s schools and 

a handful of small business opportunities might 

seem small to an outside observer, from a strategic 

perspective, it’s profound. In a conservative society still reeling from the harsh treatment of the 

Taliban, this activity plants a seed for the future, 

while providing hope to a pivotal disadvantaged 

segment of society at a level that can be readily 

absorbed. It gives regional women leaders, who 

understand that there is a betterway, the energy 

to keep fighting. The PRT discovered that it was 

best not to preach about women’s issues, but rather 

to set tangible examples of how opportunities for 

women could be created within cultural boundaries and, where appropriate, present a common 

sense argument as to why mothers and daughters 

should not be denied opportunities, such as education and business, that are clearly present for 

females in other Islamic societies. 

Triangulation and the religious leadership

By his own admission, the head of the Provincial Ulamas (religious leadership counsel) estimated that more than 80 percent of the mullahs 

had one foot in with the dark side. When tasked 

with finding moderate religious leaders, an initial 

meeting of the PRT commander with prominent 

provincial mullahs yielded slurs, stares, and accusations. Warning against the initial meeting, the 

provincial governor had eventually conceded. Following speeches by the PRT commander and an 

Afghan colonel, mullahs engaged in a three-hour 

tirade and debate that berated everything from 

Coalition forces to Pakistani influences. One 

mullah wanted to return to the days of cutting 

off limbs for criminal offenses and then pondered 

why none of his congregation seemed to listen to 

him anymore. Recorded for local television and 

radio, the initial event garnished such a response 

that it yielded an encore presentation. Afghans 

were hungry to witness such an open debate, and 

the group suggested a follow-on meeting. 

It seemed better to have them shouting at 

you than shooting at you. Subsequent meetings 

yielded more civility. While finding moderation 
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may be an elusive task, at least there was hope for 

creating an attitude of indifference. While the 

head of the Ulamas understood the need to move 

away from extremism, he could not be seen advocating such meetings (his predecessor had been 

assassinated by the Taliban). Instead, he would 

appear as merely the go-between by telling the 

PRT commander to tell the governor to tell them 

to have a meeting. Creating a public directive 

would give him the necessary cover. A consistent 

message was conveyed that it was not necessary 

to agree or even cooperate with Coalition forces, 

however, it was inappropriate to deny Afghans 

the basic rights and economic opportunities available to others, particularly Taliban leaders living 

in Pakistan who enjoyed electricity, roads, and 

schools, yet preached against these same things in 

Afghanistan. Mullahs were encouraged to return 

to their villages and start their own community 

projects rather than advocate the destruction of 

anything built by the Coalition. 

The PRT eventually committed resources 

toward the construction of a “madrassa” or religious school. Unlike madrassas across the border in Pakistan that seemingly mass produce 

Islamic extremism, this school would be administered under the Ministry of Education and 

operate more like a parochial school with academic standards coexisting alongside religious 

instruction. Local religious leaders were anxious 

to create a flagship institution and teach a more 

moderate form of Islam that they said represented 

Afghan values. Whether or not this venture will 

succeed is yet to be determined and, if the mullahs fail to deliver, the building would be turned 

into a traditional school; however, the dialogue 

and planning for such a project between mullahs, mainstream Afghans, and newly elected officials created a stake for the religious leadership 

in the new government that is difficult to deny. 

Reconstruction and economic development 

should follow a “systems approach” 

There has to be a method to the madness. Haphazard spending of aid dollars combined with an over 

abundance of “feel good” projects without considering second- and third-order economic effects are 

common pitfalls of well-intentioned aid providers.

A Provincial Development Counsel consisting of provincial ministers as well as PRT representatives met weekly to discuss economic issues. 

A standing invitation was provided to any other 

aid providers. In order to receive funding, projects typically were required to fall into one of two 

categories—they were either designated as a system development and partnership project or as a 

“red zone” emplacement project. One such system 

project included a “farm-to-market” road funded 

by the PRT that connected agriculture cold storage facilities built by USAID, as well as a school 

built by a nongovernmental organization. Red 

zone emplacement projects involved establishing 

an individual project, such as a school or road, in 

an area of rising instability and insurgent activity. Managing and overseeing the project offered 

the PRT and provincial leaders the opportunity to provide a positive presence, while engaging local leaders and the public on security and 

other issues. 

While large-scale infrastructure is typically 

planned and funded centrally by agencies, such 

as USAID, these projects ultimately take time. 

However, for Afghan villagers who had not seen 

any evidence of reconstruction more than four 

years into stability operations, time was quickly 

running out. Lack of visible government support 

quickly turns to disillusionment and potential 

support for the insurgency. Managing expectations becomes important; while waiting for the 

larger effects of long-term development, leadership engagement and smaller projects, such as 
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irrigation canal cleaning or road improvement, 

can sustain support for the central government. 

The “Chai Effect”—listen more than you 

speak, articulate a vision, and do not be too 

quick to judge

With electricity reaching less then 25 percent of 

the Afghan population, oration is an art and open 

public speaking a primary means of communication. Decision making in Afghanistan is traditionally based on consensus. Common interest groups 

create a “shura,” and a district shura consist of a 

counsel of elders who represent various factions of 

the populace. Local disputes are often deferred to 

the district shura for resolution. However, shuras 

are not just confined to local government. There 

are women’s shuras, businessmen’s shuras, and religious and tribal shuras. These common interest 

groups are embedded throughout Afghan society. 

If a decision is required, a shura is often created 

or consulted to obtain consensus. 

The Helmand PRT conducted what affectionately became known as the “Chai Patrols,” or groups 

traveling to different shuras and going through the 

social ritual of drinking chai and conversation, 

then listening, and finally speaking. Following a 

security incident, such as a Taliban execution or 

IED attack, chai patrols might be sent to different police checkpoints to calm down the neighborhood. Soldiers would gather with local police or 

other officials to drink chai and offer reassurance.

In a tribal centric environment, the PRT was 

often viewed as a neutral observer. They were routinely invited to attend various meetings involving different tribal factions simply because it was 

the only way to get everyone around the table and 

talking. When speaking with Afghans, who are 

traditionally very forthright, it is important to 

not be overly judgmental but instead articulate 

a vision for what might be. Often the first and 

second meeting yield very little, however, subsequent meetings that demonstrate commitment are 

likely to show very positive results. It is important 

to have hip-pocket speeches ready to match the 

oratory ability of Afghan leaders. A social order 

of speaking is also prominent, making it sometimes more important to listen than it is to speak. 

Corrupt leadership, at least it is entertaining

Helmand Province provides 40 percent of Afghanistan’s $2.8 billion opium output. Drugs permeate 

virtually every level of that society and it is rare to 

find a government official without ties to smuggling. Hashish is grown in police garden plots. A 

district administrator complains of a bomb exploding under his vehicle, the suspect is the district police chief. Another district police chief petitions the 

PRT to purchase $500 motorcycles for his police 

station, yet maintains his own living compound 

worth several hundred thousand dollars that was 

admittedly obtained through smuggling operations. Widespread allegations circulated that the 

provincial governor controlled much of the regional drug trade, while the provincial police chief directed the drug smuggling activity for Helmand’s 

most populace tribe. 

Looking past the corrupt leadership was a 

daily practice at the PRT. Not unlike the majority of the population, the provincial police chief, 

who commanded a force of 1,500 men, was illiterate, and the governor, who was undereducated, 

frequently read aloud to himself at meetings. As 

former warlords, they remained in place because 

each filled a power vacuum. Tribal confluences, 

an intermittent insurgent threat, and far-reaching drug interests dictated, at least for the near 

term, an intimate tribal knowledge and strongarm approach to government.

Despite local shenanigans, it was important 

to keep a close hold on government officials. 
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Networking with corrupt government leaders still 

provided useful information and many were still 

in a position to make institutional changes as long 

as it did not interfere with their more nefarious 

activity. The best work-around was to identify individuals within an organization who could assist 

in making institutional changes that would outlast the current leadership. As Afghanistan’s new 

structure matures, leadership dominated by former warlords will eventually become diluted by 

a more educated class. At the tactical and operational level, bringing about institutional change is 

far more important than harboring an obsession 

with the removal of corrupt officials. 

Schedule leadership engagement 

and bring government to the people 

Establishing a routine leadership engagement cycle helps establish credibility and project sincerity. 

Every Sunday, the PRT would meet with the provincial police chief and his staff; on Mondays, the 

PRT would meet with the governor and his security 

counsel; on Tuesday’s, the PRT would be with the 

Provincial Development Counsel to discuss economic development. The remainder of the week 

would be set aside for visits to any of 13 rural or 

remote district centers. Monthly engagement opportunities included the women’s ministry, businessmen’s shura, and religious shura. 

Afghan leaders do not traditionally bring government to the people. Many former warlords still 

use the “kiss the ring” approach to management. 

Representative tribal leaders often come to the provincial center to petition their government rather 

than visiting their constituency. In turn, the governor or other leaders dispense token tribute to 

obtain loyalty. In a tribal-centric environment, it 

is difficult not to show or generate the perception 

of favoritism. To break this cycle, the PRT routinely invited various provincial ministers on trips 

to outlying districts, even going so far as to fly the 

provincial counsel and governor by helicopter to 

more remote locations so they could address “the 

people” many of whom had never experienced representative government. 

Mitigate risk. The honor system works . . . so 

does the governor’s brother, goats, and sheep. 

Be a good neighbor

Projecting a force of as few as 60 soldiers across a 

16,000 square kilometer area of responsibility in 

rugged Afghanistan can be daunting and security 

is always an issue. Intermittent violence came to 

the PRT in the form of suicide bombers, IEDs, 

and small-arms fire. With ground infantry and air 

support more than two hours away, other methods were needed to mitigate risk and still be able 

to project influence. The PRT worked hard to leverage the support of the community, but also 

adapted by using a little creativity and the centuries-old Afghan Pashtu honor system.

In one instance, a district shura arrived at the 

PRT from Helmand’s most distant and mountainous area. A suspected Taliban stronghold, 

this area had yet to be visited by civil affairs 

teams or provincial officials. The shura declared 

that they were ready for economic assistance after 

seeing the project activity in neighboring districts. Because security remained an issue and 

the mountain passes that led to the district center 

were channeled and easily emplaced with IEDs, 

the PRT remained skeptical about a visit. However, when shura members produced a written 

security guarantee with individual signatures and 

thumbprints, Afghan honor was now on the line. 

The host becomes culturally responsible for security, something taken extremely seriously, and 

those who break their oath may be ostracized, 

imprisoned, or upon whom revenge would be 

extracted. As an additional measure of security, 
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the PRT invited the governor’s brother along on 

the three-day mountain visit. As a recognizable 

warlord familiar with the terrain and custom, he 

drove ahead of the military convoy, successfully 

navigating any IEDs. 

Medical and veterinary teams also become 

a useful tool to mitigate risk. Desperate for this 

type of support, Afghans would ensure that medics and vets could work in a secure environment. 

The PRT routinely traveled to remote and “unstable” locations accompanied by veterinary support or medical support but felt confident that 

any threat would be neutralized by the community’s desire to receive such services. Civil affairs 

soldiers trained to deworm animals could provide 

medicine to several hundred animals in a matter 

of hours at a total cost of less than $100. Such 

gestures of goodwill are not a panacea for abject 

conditions, however, they facilitate engagement 

with local leaders and establish dialogue in areas 

where the insurgency may have undue influence. 

PRT soldiers were invited to participate in a 

soccer match against a group of local all-stars. 

For security reasons, the event was a “gut check” 

that required a leap of faith and logistics to pull 

off. Even though the match was not announced 

until game day, a crowd of more than 3,000 gathered at the same local soccer stadium that had 

been used four years earlier to conduct public executions. Joint Afghan and U.S. military police 

patrols provided security in and around the stadium. Two weeks before the national election, the 

“friendship match” was used to kick off a series 

of PRT project ground breaking and completion 

ceremonies that were designed to generate public 

confidence in government and security. With the 

home team blowing out the Americans by a score 

of five to one, it was more than a victory for the 

Afghans. That simple event produced goodwill 

and leveraged community support.

Information operations is an important tool 

for leveraging the support of the community. The 

PRT consistently invited local Afghan press to 

report on its progress and the community events 

they participated in. Unfortunately, they often 

over emphasized military public affairs operations and projected information upward through 

a military organization that seemed intent on 

self-gratification. Afghans needed to see a story 

as told by fellow Afghans to give the community 

confidence in government and they could then 

visibly measure progress. Because literacy rates 

are extremely low, radio, television, and leadership engagement are the most effective information methods.

Once peace has been won, concentrate on 

being a good neighbor. In areas where progress 

had been made and where the hustle and bustle of 

normal life seemed to flow, the PRT made a practice of quiet community engagement but were 

careful not to be seen as overstaying its welcome. 

Convoys would be small, gunners waved more, 

and a greater effort was made to be less threatening to local Afghans.

Distributing aid is a business. Get used to it

A company contracted by USAID to oversee day 

labor jobs and wages for Afghans as an alternative 

to poppy production had 5 of its 14,000 workers executed by suspected Taliban operatives. As a 

result, operations were suspended and thousands 

of workers were left unpaid as the company held 

out for months for an increase in their contract 

to provide additional security. For Afghanistan, 

5 out of 14,000 are pretty good odds for staying alive . . . better than the U.S. military. One 

might assume that signing a contract to work in 

Afghanistan would carry some inherent risk, certainly the Afghans who chose to accept the work 

were aware of the risk; instead, contractors used 
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the opportunity to attempt contract renegotiation, halting development momentum and giving 

impetus to an otherwise dysfunctional insurgency. 

Providing aid is a business, and USAID and 

many nongovernmental organizations simply 

contract out economic development programs. 

Centralized oversight is often fleeting, particularly in outlying areas. The commonality of 

working at the “edge of the empire,” however, 

provides an opportunity for partnership and 

shared experiences. Security information sharing 

and other communication helped develop informal relationships that could inspire performance. 

The PRT held biweekly, unclassified security 

briefings for nongovernmental agencies and contractors working in the area. These briefings 

inevitably would develop into other partnership 

opportunities where economic economies of scale 

could be applied. In addition, the PRT offered 

its own expertise to provide decentralized oversight for the projects of non-governmental agencies and USAID.

Interagency partners . . . the goal is for the 

military to fade away and go home 

Initial PRT organization provided for a five-man 

military police element or Police Transition and 

Assessment Team. Headed by a 20-something 

Army sergeant, the team was tasked to work with 

local law enforcement, critiquing officials and jails 

and identifying requirements. Despite good intentions, the partnership between a buck-sergeant 

and a 55-year-old former warlord police chief 

with a force of 1,500 men is mismatched. While 

additional military police were brought onboard 

to manage a training program, retired U.S. police chiefs were quickly contracted as mentors to 

work with Afghan police leadership. These contractors created evaluation reports that went directly to the Afghan Ministry of Interior, so their 

opinions mattered. With proven experience running civilian police forces, they were better positioned to pressure compliance and encourage 

institutional changes.

Stability operations are transitional. A soldier’s 

ultimate objective is to return home. At the end of 

the day, support, diplomacy, and economic development will need to transfer to civilian control. 

In an unstable environment, the military provides 

both the near-term leadership and security safety 

nets that set conditions for civilian leadership. As 

conditions permit, the military should then fade 

away. The PRT provided a platform for interagency partners and facilitated their important 

engagement. The Department of State and U.S. 

Department of Agriculture provided experts in 

diplomacy and economic development. Because 

the security environment was not permissive, 

interagency coordination with the military was 

crucial. The more civilian expertise that can be 

infused into economic development the better, 

so skill sets that include city planning, judicial 

review, banking, law enforcement, and engineering are in high demand.

The military often fills the gaps in civilian 

leadership during stability operations. With 

the Taliban horrors still a close memory, many 

Afghans simply responded better and felt more 

confident with military control and the security it represented. The military commander was 

invited to speak at civic engagements more frequently than Department of State representatives. 

To break this cycle, a comfort factor with civilian 

leadership can be developed through close interagency partnership. The Helmand PRT commander traveled routinely with a Department of 

State counterpart, with both giving complementary speeches. In areas of governance and mentoring elected officials, every opportunity was 

pursued for a civilian-led effort. 
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Judicial reform . . . Afghan revenge 

can be unique

When asked why a 75-year-old Afghan man was 

in jail, the district police chief replied that his son 

had committed murder but could not be found, 

so the father was serving time in his stead. Following a kettle bomb explosion in his garage, one Afghan warlord told local police not to investigate 

further, he knew who did it and would take care 

of it . . . case closed. In rural Afghanistan, where 

law enforcement has little reach, a tribal shura or 

counsel of elders often decides criminal restitution. 

In Afghanistan, cultural law, Islamic law, and 

constitutional/Western law are all equally pliable. 

What really matters is consensus and community 

acceptance. Absent the resources and infrastructure to maintain an adequate jail system, restitution or even personal retribution becomes a more 

efficient process by default. If a crime takes place in 

the remote countryside, the police are often hours 

away and often lack communication. They have 

to be given time to “gather a posse” and then, not 

unlike those from the Old West, begin to hunt 

the bad guys. 

Sometimes restitution is meted out by a judge 

and, just as often, particularly with matters of 

honor, it is delivered personally. With the ability 

to apply constitutional law in an infancy stage, 

other methods do apply. It is often disingenuous 

to admonish Afghan law enforcement and judicial 

officials for not following what might be considered as due process until adequate systems are in 

place, such as courts and prisons, and the resources 

allocated to maintain them. What really matters is 

the acceptance of the Afghan people in matters of 

judicial resolution rather than outsider opinions. 

Summary

During the 2005 national elections, Helmand 

Province, with its conservative makeup and once 

the stronghold of Taliban support, surprisingly 

yielded Afghanistan’s youngest elected official. An 

18-year-old female, the 2005 high school graduate was elected to the provincial counsel in an extremely competitive race. When asked to identify 

her constituency, she explained that many younger 

voters had supported her. In particular, young, educated, male voters who had become disillusioned 

and mistrustful of male officials. Many explained 

that only educated females should be elected because they are the least corruptible and best qualified to set the course for Afghanistan’s future.

Despite an intermittent insurgency, the opium 

trade, and the presence of religious extremism, this 

is just one example that, as Afghans continue on 

an upward generational plain that includes education, economic development, and independence, 

they will ultimately be able to disengage the dark 

side of humanity perpetuated by the Taliban and 

become peaceful international neighbors. 

The Afghans of Helmand Province that I met 

seemed to respond best to a smaller military presence focused on setting the conditions for good 

governance, security, and economic development, 

as opposed to a larger foreign military presence that 

might act as a magnet for insurgents and be perceived as imposing to the average Afghan. Although 

this posture sometimes opened up remote villages 

and districts to Taliban activity, it also helped 

to alienate the insurgency as locals grew tired of 

their growing demands. The security concerns of 

a small PRT military footprint was partially mitigated by nonthreatening community engagement that helped reduce but not end instances 

of direct military activity against the PRT. This 

methodology, although challenging at a tactical 

level, had a positive response among local Afghans. 

Security conditions may dictate that larger future 

U.S Forces are assigned to Helmand Province or 

elsewhere in Afghanistan, however, these efforts 
109

should only represent a transition for long-term 

economic and diplomatic engagement, and that 

means drinking a lot of chai. 

Notes

Provincial Reconstruction Teams first appeared in 

Afghanistan in 2003 and were designed to bridge 

the broad gap between traditional military operations and nongovernmental aid. With a force protection element, they provide security for military 

civil affairs teams and others conducting stability 

operations, as well as serve as a platform for the 

activities of interagency partners, such as the Department of State, USAID, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in areas with a moderate risk 

environment. The PRT organization continues 

to evolve. Today, more than 20 PRTs operate in 

Afghanistan, commanded by both U.S. and Coalition members. 

About the Author

Colonel James A. Hogberg was assigned as a Marine individual augment to Task Force Bayonet (led 

by the Army’s 173d Airborne Brigade), Combined 

Joint Task Force 76 (OEF-VI), and commanded 

the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team in 

Lashkar Gah throughout 2005. This 60- to 100-

man Helmand PRT operated without the benefit of 

a maneuver battalion to help quell an intermittent 

level of insurgency. Although the PRT dealt with 

IEDs, small-arms fire, and several suicide bombing attempts, their only casualties (four wounded 

in action) took place outside the province while 

traveling to Kandahar by convoy. 
110

Afghan national policemen receive training instruction from 

U.S. Marines with the help of an interpreter in Golestan, 

Farah Province, Afghanistan, on 10 December 2008. The 

Marines, assigned to Company K, 3d Battalion, 8th Marine 

Regiment (Reinforced), train the police to help strengthen 

overall security in Afghanistan. The 3/8 is the ground combat element of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force–Afghanistan (SPMAGTF-A). 

Photo courtesy of LCpl Brian D. Jones
Interview: 

Major Thomas Clinton Jr. 

by Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Major Thomas Clinton Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, 

deployed to Afghanistan in April 2004 to lead 

a 13-man embedded training team assigned 

to coach, teach, and mentor 1st Battalion, 3d 

Afghan National Army Brigade, which was 

considered a commando unit. The following 

has been edited from the original transcript 

for space constraints in this work.

Major Conrad Harvey

My name is Major Conrad Harvey (CH) and 

it is Monday, 12 March 2007. I’m interviewing 

Major Thomas Edward Clinton Jr. (TC). Can 

you go ahead and give me some of your service 

background?

Major Thomas Edward Clinton Jr.

I was commissioned in ’93 in the United States 

Marine Corps through the Platoon Leader’s Course. 

I went to 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, at the 1st 

Marine Division. I served as a platoon commander in a rifle company and a dragon’s platoon commander in a weapons company. I served 

as a company executive officer (XO) and also as a 

rifle company commander, and then I went on to 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and was part of Marines 

Barracks Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for two years 

as a guard officer. I was the XO of Rifle Company Windward and then I was the commander 

of Headquarters Company at Guantanamo Bay. 

111
112

I went to Amphibious Warfare School for a year, 

which is a Marine Corps career-level course, and 

then went on to command two companies in 2d 

Battalion, 7th Marines, one as a headquarters company commander and then later as a rifle company 

commander. I transferred to The Basic School in 

2003, where I was head of the maneuver section 

[that] teaches all the tactics to brand new lieutenants coming into the Marine Corps. I was then 

a company commander and did an advisory tour 

for approximately six months with the Afghan 

National Army (ANA). I returned to the states and 

then transferred to be a student here at the Army’s 

Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

CH: Can you . . . tell me about your experiences in 

the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) since 9/11?

TC: I have two experiences with the 7th Marine 

Regiment and then . . . I did the advisory duty 

[that] was termed as embedded trainers to the ANA. 

That was a program that started at the end of the 

Taliban’s rule after the Army’s Special Forces (SF) 

had basically ejected the Taliban from Kabul and 

3d Special Forces Group, I believe it was, immediately started to stand up the ANA, the initial 

battalion. Something that was kind of unique was 

that the battalion I was with, the 1st Battalion of 

the 3d Brigade, was considered a commando battalion. They were stood up by 3d Group; and then 

when 3d Group was taken away to hunt down 

[the] Taliban, [while] the Army National Guard, 

the Marine Corps and some regular Army, I guess, 

came in and assumed the mission of training and 

advising the fledgling ANA. [The] 1/3 Commando was the only one that had Marines at the 

time; they only had Marine advisors.

CH: Did you get any special training prior to that 

assignment?

TC: Unfortunately, no. The Marine Corps, in my 

opinion, did not learn its lessons well from Vietnam. At the time, it wasn’t considered a dangerous billet; it was considered that you’re going to 

go there and be almost like in a School of Infantry environment where you’re going to train new 

recruits. Of the initial teams that went over, we 

were the third iteration. The first team that went 

over just did training and assist. The second team 

that went over, halfway through the tour, went 

into combat operations with them. They were 

authorized Title 10 to go on patrols and do combat operations. By the time we got there in April 

2004, we were in full-on combat operations. The 

1/3 guys were in combat operations, and they 

were pretty well versed in what they were doing. 

So that’s the kind of thing we fell into. The training we got—the Marine Corps had an element at 

the time that was doing some training, adviseand-assist type stuff, but they were focused more 

on peacetime training. They had been sending 

guys to Georgia in the central Asia area, sending 

guys to Africa, and were assisting different forces, 

kind of like what the Marine Corps did during 

the small wars. They did a lot of police training, 

checkpoint training, and that type of thing in 

small units, probably no bigger than a platoon. But 

this was the first time, really, since the end of the 

Vietnam War in ’72, that you had Marine advisors accompanying forces in combat operations in 

a strictly advise-and-assist role. That’s one of the 

things that’s the hardest to break Marines of, and 

even the chain of command you were working 

for—Army, Marine Corps, and SF. Guys did not 

realize that, at the end of the day, advisors are not 

commanding. Advisors are not in control unless 

all hell breaks loose. But never once did I have to 

take control of a situation other than to facilitate 

maybe air support or medical evacuation (medevac), or my guys would facilitate air support or 
113

medevac. Only in those rare cases did we have to 

take control of a platoon, a company, or a battalion. That was a hard thing to deal with because a 

lot of people didn’t realize that it was their army, 

their forces, and you had no constitutional authority to tell them, really, what to do. There were a lot 

of commanders who were talking to me as if I was 

the commander of that unit. I just told them that 

what they want to do is what they want to do. So 

our training, known as SCET, which stands for 

security, cooperation, education, and training—it 

used to be called special Coalition warfare, which 

I was referring to earlier. The Marine Corps was 

sending guys to South America and Georgia and 

were helping a lot of these police agencies and governments deal with drugs and things like that, but 

it was strictly in a peacetime role. So this SCET 

itself, at the time, really didn’t have any cadre to 

train, didn’t have any funding to train, didn’t have 

a program of instruction, and there weren’t any 

standards. As Marines have done throughout the 

ages, they’ve taken bits and pieces of things and 

adapted them, but—and I can speak for the team 

prior to us and the team after us—all the training 

was generated from initiative within the unit itself. 

We had a 13-man detachment, all senior enlisted 

and officers. We had one sergeant who eventually made staff sergeant while we were over there. 

So we did a lot of convoy-type training, reflexive shooting, went over the basics, taught classes 

to each other—patrolling, offense, defense, basic 

squad/platoon stuff. A lot of medical stuff, we 

did on our own. We did a lot of communications 

training to make sure we were up to speed on the 

radios and stuff which, remind me later, I’ll talk 

about because the gear we fell in on was atrocious. 

When we got over there, the gear that the unit had 

was strictly for self-defense. There were some pistols, a couple carbines, but there weren’t any tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios or machine guns or 

light machine guns or any of that stuff you would 

think you would need to protect yourself in an environment like Afghanistan. At any given moment, 

you could find yourself in the middle of the wild, 

wild west. Guys would say that the Taliban were 

shooting at us. Well, how the hell do you know 

it’s the Taliban? It could just be some p——d off 

local, for all you know. That’s how wild the outer 

land is. But that’s the training we had.

CH: Can you walk me through the process of getting into country and getting yourselves oriented?

TC: We got into country and the whole time 

we’re being told by the Marine Corps side of the 

house that we’re not going to be in combat operations, we’re not doing any of that stuff. We’re not 

allowed to do that. We’re just going there for six 

months of training and then coming back. Fifteen 

days after we arrive in country, my guys are with 

companies in combat operations as a part of Task 

Force 31, which was an SF [Special Forces] task 

force operating out of Kandahar. So there went 

the “strictly training” thing. Fifteen days into it, 

my guys were coming under fire from whatever 

the action was—ambushes, raids, anything like 

that. So we spent about three months in Kandahar. That was a wacky relationship. We were 

attached to Task Force Phoenix, which was a multinational Coalition joint task force. At the time, 

it was commanded by a command element out 

of the National Guard from South Carolina, and 

then halfway through our tour they went home 

and a unit from Illinois came in. That was really 

difficult because in the National Guard group that 

was commanding and running—you had British, 

Germans, Canadians; we even had Mongols teaching artillery to the Afghans. So you had this big 

coalition of guys. The French were there teaching the officer corps and the British were teaching 
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the NCO [noncommissioned officer] corps, which 

makes for some interesting encounters. But you 

had all these guys training, and that’s what they 

came to do was to strictly train. 

At some point, somebody decided the Afghan 

Army had to get out of the training mode and 

go for what it’s built for: to fight the enemies of 

the national government. So they were initially 

attached to SF units, and the advisors who were 

National Guard, Army, or Marine Corps would 

take these guys down to wherever they were going 

to operate in, hand them over to the SF guys and 

they would take them out on training missions, 

which is a weird thing. As a side note, I did not 

see at any time an SF unit engaged in training 

the national army. SF had their own little militia 

groups, which were their indigenous forces that 

they were using, much like they used them in 

Vietnam. They weren’t training these guys to take 

over. They were training them to assist in hunting 

down and killing members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban. When we got there, we were allowed to go 

on missions with them. Here’s the chain of command: each team was made up of a Marine captain and two staff sergeants (or a gunnery sergeant 

and a staff sergeant) and they would go with each 

of the companies. So you had one Marine captain 

who was advising and assisting the Afghan company commander. Oh, by the way, that company 

is attached to an SF operational detachment alpha 

(ODA), which has its own captain and chain of 

command. So you have these two units working 

together. Technically, the SF battalion has tactical control (TACON) over the Afghan battalion, 

but you’re on loan from Task Force Phoenix and 

this is where the problems started. 

We would come under fire—and especially 

with the second iteration of command from Task 

Force Phoenix. Task Force Phoenix was trying to 

tell us what we could and couldn’t do tactically, 

even though we were tactically under the control of the Combined Joint Special Operations 

Task Force (CJSOTF), which was commanded, 

I think, by Colonel Pat[rick M.] Higgins [USA] 

at the time, in 3d Group. So you had that going 

on. It was a weird combination. Then in my case, 

I’m at a firebase on the border with two of our 

Afghan companies and the battalion staff, and 

I got SF captains who are in this weird relationship with me. I outrank them, but they have tactical control of the area and I’m just there to advise 

and assist. They technically couldn’t tell me what 

to do because I outranked them, but at the same 

time they had tactical control of what was going 

on, so it was a weird mix of what was going on but 

we made it work. We had really professional officers and staff NCOs on the Army side but it was 

a weird situation to go into. Technically, if it had 

been Vietnam, I would have been out there with 

the battalion and my guys and no SF or anything. 

Unfortunately, we were tied to SF because they 

controlled the areas of operation (AO) and they 

also backed us up because they had the ammunition and some of the weapons that we ended 

up having to borrow from them, so that made it 

difficult. 

What really happened was that Task Force 

Phoenix never accepted the fact, in my opinion, 

that we had gone into combat operations. Training was over, or as one of my gunnery sergeants 

who was wounded (not seriously) while advising, 

said, “Sir, preseason is over. We’re in the season 

and points are going up on the board. Unfortunately, Task Force Phoenix still thinks they’re at 

training camp but actually we’re already three 

games into the season and we’re not doing well.” 

But we did three months in Kandahar and did 

quite well. We didn’t lose anybody, although we 

did have some minor wounded. No Americans 

from our side were wounded.
115

CH: Could you describe your AO, generally your 

working environment and your relations with the 

Afghans?

TC: Kandahar was a funny region and that, to 

me, is what you would call a classic counterinsurgency war. You knew the enemy was out there 

but nobody was giving them up. I probably talked 

to 10 or 15 Taliban on a weekly basis, but I just 

didn’t know it—and they might have been Taliban 

because it was safer for them to be Taliban than 

it was to be a member of the Coalition. But the 

ANA commander, Colonel Mohammed Esok, was 

pretty professional as far as Afghans go. You have 

to accept the fact that Afghans are not Americans. 

Afghans do what they do to survive. There are a 

lot of rumors of Afghan commanders being drug 

dealers, gun runners, having their own militias. 

But at the end of the day, as an advisor, you have 

to count on them to protect you. In some cases, 

there are only two or three Americans with that 

Afghan unit at a time. We had guys saying, “Oh, 

that guy’s dishonest. He’s selling drugs and he’s 

shaking down the locals.” But you know what? 

That’s the way of life there. They are not Arabs. 

Don’t ever call Afghans that or they’ll cut your 

throat. I had one guy yell at one of my guys because 

he called him an Arab, and he was pretty pissed 

about it. It’s a very martial culture. They believe 

in the gun and the knife. But at the same time, 

they’re not Americans and that means they don’t 

do long-range patrols and they’re not good at tactical discipline for long periods of time. They just 

don’t function that way. They don’t do well being 

away from their families. If you’re taking a battalion that’s been mustered in Kabul from the outlying areas and you go down south, there’s no real 

phone system, there’s no mail system, there’s no 

Internet for them to use, and so keeping in contact 

with their families is very difficult and very trying. 

When we go on a deployment for seven months 

to a year, we don’t think much about it. But to 

them, it’s a very debilitating thing. In fact, they 

thought very highly of us, the way we were spending all this time away from our families to help 

them. The ones who really did care were constantly saying thank you. You always knew they 

really liked you because they would ask you all 

kinds of in-depth question[s] about your family. 

Some of the guys were suspicious when they were 

trying to find out about our families, but they 

really care because that’s how their culture functions. If they didn’t care, they wouldn’t ask you 

anything. Which goes back to the training. We 

got the hand-wave cultural stuff and the history 

and everything, and 90 percent of it was b——l 

s——t. We came back and actually fed a bunch 

of stuff back into the Marine Corps intelligence 

activity, telling them which of the cultural training 

was BS and which only applies to specific regions. 

“This only applies if you’re in Herat on a Tuesday.” There were all these Western visions, just 

like Iraq and everywhere else I’ve been in the Middle East. The U.S. has got it wrong. They think 

they know what the culture is because some Brit 

or American wrote it.

CH: Can you give me some examples?

TC: First of all, not all Afghans are devout Muslims. They’re just like any other religion in America. You have ultra extreme Catholics, Baptists, 

Protestants, and then you have other guys who 

say they were raised a certain religion but don’t go 

to church anymore. They don’t stop and pray five 

times a day. If they were on mission, they didn’t 

stop and pray. They were patrolling; they were 

serious. So Islam is not as strict as you think it is. 

Amongst the extremists it is, but within the ANA 

very rarely did I see anybody young praying. The 
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only time they would go to mosque is if they were 

back in garrison and the battalion commander, 

who is also the spiritual leader of the unit, made 

everybody go. But other than that, very rarely did 

I see any of our guys praying. I saw little groups 

here and there, but not everybody was this ultra 

extremist Islamic person. It’s a good thing to rally 

to if they’re in trouble, though. 

There’s another thing I like to call the “myth 

of the mujahideen,” or the “myth of the muj’.” 

The Afghans are tough fighters. Some of them 

will break and run, but I never saw it. In fact, I 

saw guys stand there when they should have taken 

cover get hit. But the myth of the muj’ is that we 

think they’re so fierce because they threw the Soviets out of Afghanistan. The Soviets, for a lack of a 

better word, f——d them up royally. And when 

the Spetsnaz got into that war—and you talk to 

someone like my battalion commander who was 

17 and is Tajik. He fought in the mountains with 

Ahmad Shah Massoud. He was the real deal. This 

guy could barely walk from his injuries. But in a 

lot of these cases, a lot of these guys were wiped 

out. The thing I call the myth of the muj’ is that 

they only fought when it was convenient for them. 

They would come down from the hills, a bunch 

of guys mustered, maybe smoke a couple hookah 

pipes and go down and assault a column of 100 

tanks and trucks being driven by a bunch of conscript Afghans and Soviets, and then they would 

disappear for a month and not come back. On 

the other side, you had the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), which we would like 

to say were all these dummies who didn’t know 

what they were doing. But there were some Soviet 

trained Afghan officers who I would fight by their 

side today. They were extremely well versed in 

what they did and knew what they were doing. 

But it was interesting dynamics. You’d take these 

muj’ who are a loose collection of guys, stick them 

together with Soviet guys and Soviet discipline, 

which, you know, the old Soviet Army—you don’t 

go on a head call or eat chow unless you’re told 

to. So you mix this group of guys together and it 

makes this weird dynamic. They’re not these freedom fighters who would stand until the last man. 

I mean, they’ll break and run if it means they can 

live to fight another day. So there’s a lot of myth 

about what they can and cannot do. 

But it’s funny, you have Soviet influence, you 

got muj’ cultural influence, and now you’re trying 

to slap decentralized training and command philosophy, Western philosophy, on top of this menagerie of guys with different backgrounds. Oh, and 

let’s throw in the tribal too, because you got Tajik, 

Pashto, Hazara, all these weird groups, so it’s a 

wacky dynamic. A lot of times, you spent a lot of 

your time trying to read the terrain. Some companies had a Hazara first sergeant or a Tajik first 

sergeant and the commanding officer was Pashto, 

and those two guys hated each other. The Tajiks 

are a very militant and proud people. I would liken 

the Tajiks to the Apaches. They’re a warrior culture unto themselves. The Pashtos are a little bit 

more slick; they’re always looking for an angle. Not 

that the Tajiks aren’t, but the Tajiks would rather 

throw down with you in a knife fight. When it 

came down to it, the CIA would rather use Tajiks 

than Pashtos, because Tajiks would stand and fight. 

Pashto units were cowards. Not all, of course, but 

the guys who would break and run were Pashto. 

One of my company advisors, a guy named Captain Pat[rick T.] Faye, likened it to being as if we 

were in the Godfather movie constantly. You always 

felt like you were in that mafia atmosphere where 

everybody is smiling and hugging and everyone is 

a comrade, but you just never know when one guy 

is going to turn against another guy. There was a 

lot of infighting among the company commanders for positioning with the battalion commander. 
117

When I was a battalion advisor, I had company commanders constantly talking to me trying to position themselves. They figured if they 

couldn’t get to the battalion commander that day, 

they would come seek me out and try to position themselves, hoping I would say something 

positive. The staff was like that too, and I dealt 

with the staff mostly. But they would constantly 

be trying to pimp me, asking me what I thought 

the battalion commander was going to say about 

things. “Can you mention this to him? I would 

very much like to be promoted.” My battalion 

commander was the same way. Toward the end, 

I had some issues with him. The Afghan upper 

echelon is very political. One day he said to me, 

“Major [Thomas] Clinton, I just got a letter from 

Major [Christopher M.] Bourne (ph),” who was 

my predecessor. I asked him what happened. “He’s 

congratulating me on making full colonel.” I said, 

“Really? When did that happen?” He wanted to 

know from me why I hadn’t told him he had been 

selected for colonel. “Man, this is the first time 

I’ve heard about it.” Then what I like to call my 

“street sense” clicked in and I asked him for the 

letter that he had in his hands. He quickly changed 

the subject to something else. There was no letter. He was pimping me to see if I could find out 

something because the promotion period was coming up. I wasn’t really involved in that. We had 

to recommend officers for promotion. But once 

again, officers you recommended for promotion, 

we’re basing that on American standards, whereas 

the Afghan Ministry of Defense, the brigade, and 

the corps headquarters were basing promotions on 

“Who will best support me?” That’s not too dissimilar from the way the South Vietnamese military worked in the ’60s. Guys were promoted, 

selected, and put into certain billets because of 

their political affiliation. But that’s a little bit on 

the Afghan culture.

CH: So how was training the ANA?

TC: A lot of the training we did was at the forward operating bases (FOBs). Believe it or not, a 

lot of them are very good shots with AK-47s and 

even better shots with an M4 rifle and an M16. 

They understand the basics. They’re willing to 

learn, they’re really sponges, especially the senior 

enlisted and the junior enlisted. I’ve trained with 

and trained the Jordanians and trained with the 

Saudis. I’ve trained with the Eritreans and the 

Kuwaitis too, and everything is insha’ Allah [if 

Allah wills]—and there wasn’t a lot of that amongst 

the ANA. If we said we were training this day, we 

were training that day. Now, getting them to set 

the training up themselves was the hard part. We 

were at the point where we were trying to break 

them off the nipple with SF, and rightly so. They 

did everything for them. They facilitated the training and gave it to them. The Marine detachment 

who took over from the SF did the same thing. 

The guys before us were trying to wean them off 

and get them to plan their own training. That’s 

when we ran into some problems. The logistics 

officer (S-4) couldn’t do anything; he was really 

frozen—one, by his personality, that he was a lazy 

b——d, and I truly believe he was. The other one 

was reinforced by the fact that he could not request 

anything from brigade, because in order for him 

to request something from brigade, he would have 

to have his battalion commander’s permission, 

then the battalion commander had to go get the 

brigade commander’s permission to do this, and 

only then the S-4 could send it up. It was a pain 

and it was crazy. It just didn’t function. My guys 

went nuts and after awhile I just learned to accept 

it as how they do business, though. 

The battalion commander, when they finally 

got an arms room, could not go down. We as company commanders and battalion commanders, 
118

the units could go down and draw their weapons 

as long as the armory was open and do whatever 

training. But there was only one key to the arms 

room and the brigade commander had it. Nobody 

else could draw and you had to have special permission to take weapons out of the arms room. 

The way I got around that is we stacked arms 

and we had fire watch in the barracks. I was done 

with that. There’s a lot of ammunition hoarding 

amongst the highers, and I truly believe that’s not 

their fault. They’re culturally waiting for the next 

civil war. Hoarding was rampant throughout the 

ANA, and getting them to plan was very hard too. 

I know the brigade staff tried to get them to do 

brigade planning. Another thing about Afghan 

culture, when they’re given the opportunity to 

stand up and talk to a group of people, stand by 

because they’ll go on for hours. It’s their chance 

to run their mouth formally. There’s a reason why 

at the shura that only the old men speak—because 

they’re short and to the point—whereas the young 

guys haven’t learned that yet. Training them at 

the company, platoon, and squad level was relatively easy compared to training staff functioning. 

Company-, platoon-, and squad-level tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)—attack, defense, 

patrol—they’re very good and picked it right up. 

They had been doing it for a while, and we constantly remediated. I think that was the only hard 

part; they couldn’t understand “We did it right 

once, why do we have to continue to do it?” Well, 

because you get rusty and you have to continue to 

remediate and you have new guys coming in and 

there’s different configurations. 

Training brigade and battalion staff was hard. 

We didn’t do a lot of it, and if we did, it would 

have never been reinforced. We went to Kandahar, 

worked for CJSOTF, came back to Kabul, went 

back onto Phoenix, did some training and they 

went on leave, then we went back to CJSOTF, this 

time on the border. CJSOTF would take these guys, 

just break them up into companies and then let 

them function as a battalion. Everybody is yelling, 

not at me personally, but they’re c——k-suckering the system asking why these guys can’t function as a battalion. Well, you’re never going to let 

them function as a battalion. You’re basically training little mercenary companies for the SF to back 

up their militia. Some of my guys ran into trouble 

with that. Some of the SF guys believed that the 

militia was in control of an area and that was it, 

and the militia was shaking down the locals for 

cash. One of our Afghan company commanders, 

who I think was a very righteous guy and really 

believed in the cause, had issues with that and 

threatened to kill the militia commander. The SF 

guys had the balls to say something to one of my 

captains, saying it was b——l s——t and that this 

was the militia’s area. I had to point out to the SF 

captain that the only legitimate army in Afghanistan is the ANA and the militias were only to be 

used in FOB defense. 

The militias were being used in offensive 

actions; and from my understanding when I got 

into country, they were not supposed to be used for 

offensive actions, but they were doing it. That’s the 

other broken thing, which might have changed. Of 

course, it’s been three years now. But you had two 

armies. You had the legitimate ANA, which was 

trying very hard to build up. The guys don’t get 

paid much, there’s no pension at the time, there’s 

no incentive other than you get three hots, a cot, 

and [a] roof over your head. And if they deployed 

down to Kandahar or the border, they got deployment pay. Well, the militia is getting paid 10 times 

what an Afghan soldier was getting paid, and I can’t 

remember the figures off my head. I’d have to look 

them up. So what’s the incentive to join the ANA? 

So in a way, the SF effort was really shooting the 

national army effort in the foot, in my opinion. 
119

I just don’t understand why SF wasn’t strictly in 

the advise, assist, and train mode like they were 

supposed to be doing. Now, granted, I know there 

had to be some SF to hunt down and kill guys, but 

who better to do it with than the locals? 

Going back to this whole weird chain of command thing, you just didn’t know where you stood 

half the time. It was a weird dynamic having been 

in the Marine Corps for, at that point, several years. 

There’s no manual that showed me how to function this way. It was really frustrating how jacked 

up it was. We didn’t have proper equipment. I had 

made several requests up the chain to the point 

where I became such a nuisance with everybody 

that Lieutenant General Wallace [C.] Gregson [Jr.], 

who was the U.S. Marine Corps Central Command (MarCent) commander, sent his deputy out 

to find out what was going on. He flew out and 

was the first officer above the rank of major who 

had ever come out and seen us in the five months 

we had been there. We were kind of out of sight, 

out of mind. When the National Guard command changed over, the general in charge made a 

decree that no Afghan unit will operate in anything 

smaller than a company. Well, every day my guys 

are sending out squad-size to platoon-size patrols 

like you would do with any Army or Marine company in your sector. You have to keep pressure on 

the enemy and you need to know what’s out there. 

You’re doing stability operations. You’re walking 

through the same village every day, you’re shaking hands, you’re getting to know your environment, you get to kind of pick out who’s squirrelly 

and maybe spend enough time with the village 

elders smoking the peace pipe, drinking chai tea, 

and smoking their crappy cigarettes, and you get 

to know them. 

Much like we’re learning now: you get to 

know them and after a while you’ve known this 

guy for two months. He’s the guy who’s going to 

show up or one day pull you aside and say, “There 

are some guys in town who don’t belong here.” 

He’ll give you a heads up. My beef is that they 

told us we couldn’t operate with less than a company. That’s BS! You can’t tell me that. First of 

all, you can’t tell me that. I’m TACON’d to the 

CJSOTF. They said they had already talked with 

SF who said they would not employ us that way. 

I told them that’s not the way you function in a 

combat environment. You can’t do company-size 

patrols every day; it’s just physically impossible. 

Plus, you don’t need a company full of Afghans 

charging through a village every day. 

They made silly decrees, and it was all based 

on the fact that they never came out and saw what 

the common operational environment was out 

there. Their whole time was spent inside the Kabul 

region, going from Bagram to Kabul, maybe flying down to Kandahar, maybe going out to Herat 

on a windshield tour. But the higher command 

never came out and saw what the hell was going 

on. That was the same, I think, for a lot of the 

Army National Guard and Army guys who were 

doing it. It goes back to my thing that they never 

wanted to accept the fact that we had trained in 

the continental United States (CONUS) to train 

Afghans and that was it. They never considered 

us going into combat operations, so when the situation changed, they continued to do what they 

trained to do. It’s a shame because there are some 

great American advisors in those other units who 

were doing a great job kicking a——s and taking 

names. They were just wearing an Army uniform 

or a National Guard uniform. But they were all 

being crippled, in my opinion, by the total incompetence and ineptitude of the f——g chain of command to realize what was going on. The sad thing 

is that they finally stopped harassing me after an 

ambush in which two SF soldiers were unfortunately killed. My gunny was severely wounded, I 
120

had 18 Afghans wounded, and 2 of our interpreters were shot up, not to mention we lost several 

vehicles. Then, and only then, did they realize, 

“Holy s——t!” And the first thing anybody really 

cared about was whether or not they were wearing 

their body armor and how come we were driving 

around in pickup trucks. Well, because that’s the 

only thing we had.

CH: You were saying that there were some equipment issues . . .

TC: When we started off, we had an iridium 

phone and everybody had a 9mm pistol and an 

M4 carbine. We had no night-vision equipment, 

no aiming lights, or anything like that. We had 

the iridium phone and seven PRC-119s. We had 

no TACSAT and the iridium phone was only to 

be used in case of emergency and there was only 

one—and we had five companies in the battalion—you do the math. That was our link to the 

outside world and it was a shame because we did 

two separate 18-hour convoys from Kabul to Kandahar with no overnight site or anything. It was a 

straight shot of 18 hours of driving, and we were 

all done on our iridium phone. That would be like 

driving from Massachusetts to Florida and not 

talking to anybody until you get down to Florida. It was disgusting. Looking back on it now, 

I’m so glad nobody ambushed us because it would 

have been days until somebody figured out what 

happened to us. 

The only thing that gave us security was that 

we had over 500 Afghans who were well armed. 

They had old Soviet stuff. They had recoilless 

rifles, machine guns, RPKs, RPGs, AK-74s, AK47s—you name it. But for the advisors, we had 

very little in the way of equipment. We had no 

up-armored Humvees. The Humvee we did have 

was the hangar queen that one of the Marine 

expeditionary units (MEUs) had left behind from 

2001. We found out the hard way that, when you 

put armor on it and it’s not designed to carry all 

that weight, it overheats the engine and destroys 

it, especially in the 100-degree heat of Kandahar. 

We found out that pickup trucks were the best 

thing to use because they could be fixed on the 

local economy and, believe it or not, they could 

take a lot of punishment and you could put six 

Afghan soldiers in the back of a little Toyota 

HiLux pickup. We also got pretty good at rigging radios and stuff in those things to be able 

to talk. I mean, it looked like Road Warrior. We 

actually had an old Soviet 12.7mm machine gun 

off of a tank or something mounted in the back 

of one of our vehicles, but that’s the type of equipment we had. It wasn’t until the end and the team 

that replaced us that we got the multiband inter/

intra team radios (MBITRs) and headsets. We 

had a hard time when we went in country trying 

to find small arms protective insert (SAPI) plates 

for our Kevlars. Nobody wanted to give us SAPI 

plates because there was so much worry about losing control of the item. So we didn’t have a lot of 

that stuff. 

We had very poor medical equipment. Thanks 

to 1st Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group’s doctors, they gave us more than we could ever imagine—everything from IV kits, tourniquets, to 

anything you needed, you name it. We found out 

the hard way that the stuff you crush up, the clotting agent, doesn’t work. It causes guys to go into 

shock, or if you don’t wash it out and you leave it 

there, it burns. We had a lot of equipment issues. I 

think the Marine gods were probably smiling and 

laughing at us, but we were doing what Marines 

have probably done throughout the centuries—

begging, borrowing, or stealing from anywhere we 

could. We borrowed shit from the New Zealand 

SF guys. We had nothing but ball ammunition. 
121

When I got to Kandahar, we came out of there 

with grenades, antitank rockets. Somebody asked 

me why I needed antitank rockets and I said 

because the Taliban still had tanks in some places 

and BMPs [Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty, or infantry 

fighting vehicle] dug in in some of their strongholds. Not to mention an AT4 [antitank weapon] 

does a good job on a truck with a bunch of bad 

guys in it. So we had a lot of equipment issues, 

but I think that’s been overcome now. The teams 

that followed us, in fact there are two Marine 

teams in country now that have pretty good equipment. They have the MBITRs and they have uparmored Humvees, but at that time it was taking 

a while for the idea to materialize that we’ve gone 

from training to combat operations. . . . That was 

another weird thing. We had a guy show up with 

no desert utilities who had to go and buy desert 

utilities, which was interesting. The ANA wears 

the old Marine Corps/Army woodland uniforms. 

SF guys wear a variety of things, but their militia 

wore the same uniforms as they did. 

My big thing was, why were we wearing desert uniforms when we should be wearing what the 

ANA is wearing? Marine Corps advisors in Vietnam adopted the same dress as the Vietnamese 

battalions because they didn’t want to stick out. 

But the typical Marine Corps or Army straight-leg 

guys were saying “Oh no. That’s not an issued uniform. You can’t wear that.” But they weren’t the 

guy walking around as the only guy wearing desert utilities with a radio on his back and a map on 

a patrol alongside the battalion commander. Who 

do you think the Taliban or al-Qaeda is going to 

shoot first? They are going to hit the guy with the 

radio. They knew. Hit the guy with the radio, the 

American. One time, we were ambushed and the 

first things they attacked were the .50-cals on the 

vehicles and they shot at all the Americans. They 

knew if they could take us out that the Afghans 

would be in trouble. Luckily they weren’t very 

good shots.

CH: What are some of the TTPs that you came 

away with?

TC: If you’re going to be an advisor, you’re not 

making a U.S. soldier or a U.S. Marine out of 

them. You’re making them a good soldier, a good 

fighter who can do the basics. You could try to 

impart some of your ethos and stuff on them, but 

you have to do it within their culture. So remember, they’re not Americans. There are some cultural things where you just have to look the other 

way. We have things we call redlines. We knew 

the battalion commander and some of the company commanders were skimming money. They 

were taking money from their soldiers as tribute. 

Can I prove it? Not really. But did the soldiers 

really complain? No. But our thing was that if 

the soldiers started complaining, we would probably look into it. Physical abuse was a redline. We 

did not tolerate physical abuse. That was difficult 

because a lot of these DRA guys were taught that 

way. That’s how the Soviets disciplined their soldiers, through physical abuse. You have to accept 

the fact that, much like Arabs, they won’t tell you 

the truth. They’re going to avoid it to save face. 

I always tried to make it sound like it’s their idea 

and I always praised them. Your best Marine or 

soldier is not always your best advisor. You have to 

have patience. You have to be willing (and this is 

going to sound weird) to be humiliated, but not to 

the point where it’s going to scar your reputation.

CH: Could you give an example of that?

TC: Sure. At the time, we paid the battalion. We 

would go down to Task Force Phoenix, which was 

in Kabul, and we would get the money. It was like 
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in the old days of the Corps and the Army, you 

were the paymaster. But the deal was that their personnel officer (S-1) maintained accountability. So, 

just like the old days, if you weren’t there on a day, 

if you decided to have an unauthorized absence, 

you didn’t get paid for that day. So say you were 

there for all 30 days, you were paid for all 30 days. 

I think they were always trying to manipulate the 

system to see if they could get more money out of 

us. But what happened was that they were slow. 

The only way you could get the money was after 

they verified who was who and they were all there. 

There was some certification process that I can’t 

remember off the top of my head. The paymasters would deal out the Afghan money to us and 

then we would take it back and pay them. Well, 

they were late in doing it, which delayed them 

going on leave because they have to go on leave. 

There are no banking systems so they have to take 

the money home. Well, the battalion commander 

was fuming, and it was completely his staff’s fault. 

They blew it out their a——s. He came in and 

told us he was in trouble, and I knew it because 

the battalion was p——d. The troops were getting restless; you could see it. The battalion commander was on the hot plate. He told me I had to 

tell the battalion that they were not going to get 

paid today—and I bit my tongue. And it was the 

best thing I ever did, and this is why. 

I went out there in front of the whole battalion and told them through the translator that it 

was my fault and my fault alone. I accepted the 

responsibility. If they were going to be mad at anybody, they could be p——d at me. I told them 

I apologized and basically threw myself on my 

sword. From that day on, I had the battalion commander in the palm of my hand because he knew 

I was willing to take a shot to the face for him. I 

don’t know if he was testing me or not, but I’ve 

thought about this over the years and talked to my 

wife and some other people about it, and actually 

talked to my brother about it too. (He’s a Marine 

himself.) I really think he was testing me to see if 

I was going to stick up for him. After that, I had 

a bodyguard assigned to me, I had my own radio 

operator—I mean, this was after three months into 

it. We had a good relationship. So what I’m saying 

is that you got to be willing to put up with some 

BS to make some strides. Don’t put your values 

aside, don’t go native, but there are some things 

you have to learn and sometimes you smash into 

them. Another thing we didn’t tolerate—one of 

my captains caught a company commander taking money off of a dead Afghan soldier, and we 

crucified him. Not literally, but he was done. He’s 

lucky the first sergeant didn’t drag him off and 

shoot him in the bushes. He was pilfering money 

off a dead soldier. He claimed he was going to 

send it to the guy’s family. I asked him how, there 

wasn’t any mail system. Some other things—have 

utmost patience and remember you are never in 

command. You are an American first and never 

do anything to compromise your principles as an 

American soldier or Marine. Don’t ever do that. 

But at the same time, you have to be willing to 

take some body blows. You have to humble yourself. You need to know your stuff, because they 

expect you to know it. Just like your Marines or 

soldiers expect you to know your job, you better 

know your stuff and then some, because they’re 

really looking to you to learn. 

Another TTP is to get used to drinking tea, 

get used to smoking, get used to sitting around 

and shooting ragtime, because that’s how they do 

business. Having worked in the Middle East quite 

a bit and in Afghanistan, talk about your family 

and bring pictures of your kids. Not your wife, 

but your kids. In fact, Colonel Esok has several 

pictures of my kids that he kept in his office and, 

as of a year ago, I know they’re still there because 
123

the other advisor had seen them. But that’s a sign 

of kinship and clanship among the Tajiks at least, 

I believe. They are a very family oriented people. 

The family is everything to them. The one truism is: don’t ever talk about wives. Colonel Esok 

is a little bit Westernized; he had been trained 

in Britain. He was taken out during the war and 

trained there, so he would make some jokes about 

being careful or else my first wife would have my 

a——s. But I never joked to him about his wife. I 

just never did it. He would make some jokes, but 

nothing bad. You must know your stuff, the culture, and then don’t be wedded to what you have 

been told culture wise. Don’t be afraid to ask about 

something being true or not.

CH: What about the religious aspects?

TC: My Afghan commander, Colonel Esok, was a 

strict Muslim, but he never pushed Islam on anybody else unless you were an Afghan. He wasn’t 

any different than any nun or priest when I was 

growing up. Colonel Esok was very concerned 

about my spiritual well-being, though. He would 

ask me if I had prayed today to God. Muslims, 

at least this brand of Islam, recognize Jesus as a 

prophet. Don’t bring up religion with them, but 

if they bring it up talk to them about it. I asked 

all kinds of questions. In fact, if you want to learn 

more about Islam, talk to a Muslim about Islam. 

Some of the Americans got upset with me. They 

wanted to know why I was talking about Islam. 

They’d ask me what I did today and I told them 

I had spent six hours in a philosophical discussion about Islam and Christianity with Colonel 

Esok. They couldn’t believe I had done that, but I 

explained that he’s the one who brought it up. I’ll 

tell you what, I learned a lot talking to him. Make 

every effort to learn the language. We worked with 

our interpreters at night to learn the language, and 

don’t be shy to use it. They’ll laugh and make fun 

of you as you pronounce words wrong, but they’ll 

help you. Every little bit helps because it shows 

you give a s——t. 

Just like with your soldiers and Marines, don’t 

become wedded to those guys or don’t become 

friendly with them. Be cordial, but with Afghans, 

especially, because they don’t understand. If you 

show the enlisted guys any amount of attention 

or stuff like that, that’s bad news if you’re going 

to Afghanistan. I would not do that. You have to 

remember too that a lot of these guys don’t read or 

write. They really don’t know anything about current events outside what they’re told. Some of them 

are farm boys. Some of the city guys do know. You 

have to remember that a lot of these guys grew up 

in Pakistan, so their vision of the world is limited. 

Unfortunately, six months is not long enough. We 

should have been there a year, living with that battalion. That’s what the Marines and Army did in 

Vietnam. They stayed for a year. Not a full year, 

but sometimes longer than six months. 

Also, use common sense. If it feels wrong and 

smells wrong, it is wrong. But you definitely have to 

put a cultural filter to everything you’re doing. You 

know the old saying, “Think before you open your 

mouth”? You really have to think and then think 

like an Afghan or an Iraqi or a Saudi. How is that 

going to be viewed when you open your mouth? If 

you’re a field grade officer, they recognize the rank 

structure. If you’re senior enlisted, like a gunny or 

a first sergeant or a sergeant first class, they recognize us. So when you open your mouth, you’re 

speaking with the authority of the U.S. military. 

Don’t promise stuff you can’t deliver. I got boxed 

into a lot of stuff. They try to shame you, but so 

what? You don’t know how many times my battalion commander would get upset with me: “You 

promised me.” I said, “I didn’t promise you anything. I said I’d look into it, but I don’t have the 
124

money to pay for this.” Afghans think that anybody who raises their voice and yells is a crazy person. So yelling and screaming like we’re used to 

to get a point across doesn’t do anything and you 

immediately lose credibility. Instead, don’t show 

up to a meeting. That sends a better message. On 

several occasions, I would show up late to prove 

a point. Afghans think they’re pretty good about 

keeping time, but they’re not. It depends on how 

they’re feeling that day. I was punctual when I 

wanted to be punctual and there were other times 

when I wanted to prove a point. 

Like Colonel Esok wanted to talk to me 

because he had gone out and spent some money 

thinking I was going to back pay him. He went 

out and bought some equipment off the black market because they were so badly supplied. We had 

to buy socks and things like that because getting 

something from [the] supply system was like getting blood out of a stone. After I told him not to 

buy it, yet because I didn’t have the money, he went 

out and bought these ICOM radios, these little 

hand held radios, anyway. He was buying them 

from a buddy of his and he was getting a kickback from us. So say they were 50 bucks a piece. 

They were probably 20 bucks a piece and he was 

getting 30—and they probably stole them from 

somebody else. But I got wise to that early on. It 

goes back to what we were talking about. You’re 

living in almost a mafia-type society . . .

CH: What about any operational TTPs?

TC: We did classic counterinsurgency—patrols, 

looking through the villages. Another TTP is that 

if you’re working with indigenous forces, send them 

into the village and let them do the talking. Make 

it look like you’re almost serving them, that you’re 

just another trooper or Marine with the unit. That 

helps out a lot. Kids like to talk to Americans, but 

be careful about talking and giving stuff to kids 

because the enemy will target them and do horrible, horrible things to children. So be careful with 

what you do with children. A lot of guys like to 

give them candy and stuff, and we stopped them 

right away from doing that. One, because it’s dangerous. Any time a U.S. unit rolled through, some 

of the kids were throwing themselves at the front 

of the vehicles to get you to stop because they 

were trying to get something from you. I never 

saw it, but there were reports of Taliban mutilating and killing children because they took candy 

from Americans. I believe it, I just never saw it. 

So you have to be careful of that. But always put 

an indigenous face on it. My thing was to play up 

to their national pride, speaking specifically about 

Afghanistan. They are a nation unlike the Iraqis. 

They want to have a central government and they 

want to believe they’re a world player, but they don’t 

want the central government telling them what to 

do—although they want all the benefits, just like 

Americans. I don’t want to pay taxes, but I want 

nice roads, cops, firemen, Social Security—but I 

don’t want to pay any taxes. 

They’re no different than Americans. They 

want roads, schools, water, wells, all this stuff. Wait 

until they try to institute a DMV [Department 

of Motor Vehicles] over there. I mean, everybody 

has a vehicle. Compared to them, the Afghans 

think Americans have money coming out of their 

butts. I gave a class once on the American Revolution 101. I talked about taxation and all this 

stuff. When I started talking about the taxation 

piece with England, they asked what taxes were. 

I started explaining that it was much like your 

warlords who used to tax people. “Oh no, that’s 

just stealing.” Then I had to explain the whole 

tax thing. The officers were enthralled because 

they didn’t have any concept of taxes. There’s no 

real concept of a central government that has all 
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this overarching power from Asadabad to Herat 

in the west down to Kalat and Kandahar in the 

south and Spin Boldak and Mazar-e Sharif to the 

north. They have no concept of a government 

agency that taxes and does all that stuff, so that’s 

an education. So when you thought all the mathematics and history you had in college and high 

school didn’t count, I’ll tell you what, I was on 

Google making sure that what I was saying was 

right when I had the chance. Teaching them about 

America. That’s how you get guys to talk about 

their government and how they think things are 

going. They’ll open up then. From an advisor’s 

standpoint, be yourself and be personable. If you’re 

going there to get a combat tour, thinking you’re 

going to get yours and win a medal, you’re in the 

wrong business. I can count on both hands how 

many times I was shot at, and most of them were 

not firefights. Those things were like gunfights at 

the OK Corral and there’s like five or six guys at 

the most. I watched a guy step out who literally 

tried to spray a platoon of Afghan soldiers and 

they let him have it.

Note

Oral history courtesy of the Operational Leadership Experiences Program of the Combat Studies Institute.
126

On 27 June 2004, U.S. Marines assigned to Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, with the ground combat element of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit approach 

a cave to search for hidden weapons caches during Operation 

Asbury Park. 

Photo courtesy of GySgt Keith A. Milks 
Marines Deliver 

in Mountain Storm

by Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie, 

Major Roberta L. Shea, and 

Major Christopher Phelps 

U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 

November 2004

In winter 2004, the U.S. Central Command committed its theater reserve, the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (22d 

MEU[SOC]), into central Afghanistan to serve 

as the main effort of Combined Joint Task Force 

(CJTF) 180’s Operation Mountain Storm. The 

operation was designed to preempt a long-anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” and help set the 

conditions for successful voter registration and national-level elections.

The operational concept developed by CJTF180 planners called for the 22d MEU to enter 

Afghanistan through the southern airfield of Kandahar in March 2004. The physical and logistical challenges were daunting. Located in southern 

Afghanistan, Kandahar Airfield lies just 10 miles 

southeast of the former Taliban capital, Kandahar 

City. The ship-to-shore movement to Kandahar 

Airfield required the MEU to traverse southern 

Pakistan’s Baluchistan region, one of the most 

rugged and remote lands in the world. Avoiding 

the 8,000-foot ridges with rotary-wing aircraft 

lengthened the transit to 420 miles.

127
128

Difficult Terrain

After force closure at Kandahar, the MEU struck 

north 80 miles to operate in the Oruzgan Province area. By way of bone-jarring routes leading 

north from Kandahar City, there are only two 

main passes that afford operational access to Oruzgan Province. They cut through the 8,000-foot 

ridgeline that separates Oruzgan from Kandahar 

Province and were to occupy much of the MEU’s 

attention as it transitioned to Tarin Kowt, the capital of Oruzgan.

Oruzgan Province stretches about 130 miles 

north to south and 95 miles east to west. With 

poor unpaved “roads” and deep, narrow passes, 

Tarin Kowt was home to Mullah Omar and his 

family during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. 

The province, long considered a Taliban stronghold, is suited ideally to insurgency because of its 

geography and isolated populace. It is dominated 

by some of the most hardline ethnic Pashtuns in 

the country—people who reflect the rugged mountains around them.

At the heart of the MEU’s area of operations 

(AO) was Tarin Kowt, a small town of 17,000. The 

lush vegetation that follows several watersheds leading down to the town contrasts sharply with the 

steep, arid mountains that surround it. At the bottom of the Tarin Kowt “bowl” (at 4,400 feet) was 

an old abandoned dirt airstrip that became the centerpiece of the 22d MEU’s air-ground operations.

Mission Analysis

Before forces began to move, MEU planners and 

subordinate commanders visited Bagram twice 

to conduct detailed planning with the CJTF-180 

staff, the core of which came from the Army’s 10th 

Mountain Division.1

 The task force staff incorporated the 22d MEU’s staff in all facets of operations plan development. Thus, the MEU clearly 

understood the joint task force (JTF) commander’s 

intent. Two early decisions by CJTF-180 were key 

to effective operations: the MEU was to function 

as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and 

was assigned its own AO, with attendant freedom 

of movement.

Based on analysis of the campaign plan, 22d 

MEU planners developed a mission statement:

Commencing 25 April 2004, 22d MEU

(SOC) conducts combat operations to defeat 

anti-Coalition militants (ACMs), secure 

major population areas, and support civilmilitary operations (CMO) in AO Linebacker 

to create a secure and stable environment 

in order to facilitate United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)-

sponsored voter registration and elections.

The MEU’s primary task was to set the conditions for a safe election process leading to [the] 

establishment of a secure and stable government 

in Afghanistan. This entailed finding and defeating anti-Coalition forces, securing major population areas, and supporting civil-military operations 

across the MEU’s AO—with the emphasis on voter registration.

The MEU commander’s intent provided the 

working framework for mission accomplishment:

• Develop a bottom-to-top intelligence architecture capable of identifying locations of 

anti-Coalition leaders and enablers, areas 

of sanctuary, and infiltration lanes. The 

intent was to gather and fuse intelligence 

at the MEU level without being entirely 

dependent on higher sources. The previous 

work of Special Forces and other agencies 

in the AO was most helpful in this regard.

• Provide a visible security environment for 

voter registration.

• Capitalize on MAGTF flexibility to conduct 
129

intelligence-driven combat operations against 

enemy forces.

• Aggressively link combat and civil-military 

operations to achieve long-term security.

• Take advantage of existing CJTF-180 capabilities and work closely with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.

• Develop the infrastructure and logistical 

capability austerely so as to fight the MEU 

without detracting from support to frontline forces.

• Because the fight will be carried by noncommissioned officers, tailor combat support and combat service support to meet 

their requirements.

Campaign Planning and Execution

The 22d MEU designed a four-phase operation 

that capitalized on MAGTF strength while leveraging joint and national assets. Phase I (25 

March–24 April) consisted of shaping operations. 

Based from Kandahar, the MEU executed a series 

of five, long-range, overt patrols into Oruzgan 

Province. Moving in high-mobility multipurpose 

wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and locally procured vehicles, the MEU capitalized on support 

provided by Special Forces teams operating in the 

area and used its Maritime Special-Purpose Force 

as the main effort. These initial operations were 

designed to study the terrain, select a site for the 

MEU forward operating base (FOB), begin contacts with the local populace to help identify Taliban leaders, and establish a working relationship 

with the Oruzgan provincial governor, Jan Mohammed Khan.

The MEU commander accompanied Marines 

on one of the operations and spent two days with 

Mohammed at his gubernatorial headquarters in 

Tarin Kowt. After the initial contact, a Marine fieldgrade officer equipped with secure communications 

was assigned to the governor’s entourage. The value 

of these liaison efforts in the subsequent phases 

of Mountain Storm cannot be overemphasized.

The 22d MEU first gained contact with the 

enemy during the shaping phase. While moving 

through the 6,600-foot defile known as Central 

Pass, a convoy was ambushed by direct fire and 

a remote-controlled improvised explosive device 

(IED). A medium tactical vehicle replacement 

(MTVR) was destroyed by the Italian antitank 

mine that formed the core of the IED and one 

Marine was injured severely. (This was the only 

effective IED attack against the 22d MEU during its seven-month deployment.)

Phase II (25 April–10 May) was devoted to 

securing the Tarin Kowt bowl. After arriving in the 

province, the MEU concentrated on establishing 

its FOB near Tarin Kowt. A strategic imperative 

of the Taliban was to ensure that Oruzgan Province remained isolated from the rest of Afghanistan, thereby affording safety to Taliban operations 

and support.

Establishment of the FOB was critical to the 

MEU’s concept of sustainment and combat power 

projection. Named after Marine Colonel John W. 

Ripley of Dong Ha fame, the base would feature 

a 6,000-foot runway, a complete helicopter fueling and rearming point, and 13 helicopter landing pads. The MEU command-and-control center 

was set up in the middle of the Oruzgan bowl. 

Until the airstrip became operational, however, 

all equipment and resupply had to traverse the 85 

miles from Kandahar over Route Tiger, a two-day 

trip on primitive, vehicle-destroying roads ripe 

with ambush sites.

Two combat operations served as a shield 

behind which MEU [Marine] Service Support 

Group 22 [MSSG-22] and the command element 

deployed to FOB Ripley. The MEU air combat element, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 
130

(Reinforced) [HMM-266], helilifted two reinforced rifle companies into AOs Georgia and Alabama; a third company was landed in AO North 

Carolina. The air assaults attacked Taliban elements in areas they viewed as safe and provided 

cover for movement of the six large convoys that 

carried the bulk of the MEU’s logistical support 

infrastructure to Ripley.

While these operations netted large weapons 

caches—especially in AO Georgia—the greater 

effect was to directly challenge the Taliban’s ability to continue to isolate Oruzgan. Establishment 

of the command-and-control center at FOB Ripley ended Phase II. The 22d MEU had positioned 

itself right in the Taliban’s backyard.

Phase III (11–31 May) featured intelligencedriven operations aimed at facilitating voter registration. Oruzgan Province had long been denied 

to UN voter registration workers because of wellfounded concerns about personal safety. To this 

end, Phase III operations focused on clearing Taliban forces from southern Oruzgan, improving the 

security environment, and—most important—initiating voter registration.

In early April, the MEU commander and key 

staff officers met with Southern Region UNAMA 

officials in Kandahar to discuss the way ahead. 

There was consensus that the most important step 

would be to create the visible perception that the 

security situation would allow voter registration 

to proceed unmolested. Agreements were reached 

between the MEU and UNAMA to provide area 

security for voter registration sites, action plans for 

countering attacks, and medical evacuation support. An overarching plan was crafted for initiating and expanding voter registration throughout 

Oruzgan Province.

Hand in hand with voter registration was initiation of a broad array of civil affairs projects 

designed to show a credible alternative to the 

negative path offered by the Taliban. Under the 

MEU’s direction, numerous civil affairs projects 

were initiated in Oruzgan and northern Kandahar Province, and extensive medical and dental 

outreach programs were initiated.

Underwriting these long-term projects were 

combat activities. Operations Thunderball in AO 

Tennessee and Bladerunner I in AO Kentucky 

were directed against enemy elements operating in 

southern Oruzgan. These HMMWV and MTVRmobile actions were built around heavily reinforced 

rifle companies and the battalion mobile command 

post. Contact was light throughout these operations because the enemy chose to withdraw rather 

than face Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/6.

As the MEU progressed through Phase III, it 

became clear that the threat to Tarin Kowt did not 

lie in the villages and bottomland of the Oruzgan 

bowl. Instead, anti-Coalition elements were concentrated in the distant highlands that ringed the 

bowl: Dey Chopan to the east and Cehar Cineh to 

the west. In the narrow valleys and almost completely inaccessible high ground of the two areas, 

Taliban sanctuary had been persistent and arrogantly self-confident. When voter registration began 

in earnest in Tarin Kowt and started to spread to 

the outlying districts, MEU planners focused on 

the high ground to the east.

Phase IV (1 June–13 July) built on earlier 

operations that had created the necessary logistical 

infrastructure, established security for voter registration and civil affairs work, and identified the 

rough foundation of the Taliban presence. Decisive combat operations against Taliban concentrations and sanctuaries would force the enemy 

to respond to the MEU’s activities in Oruzgan.

On 1 June, BLT 1/6 embarked on Operation Asbury Park to directly target the Taliban 

stronghold in the Dey Chopan highlands. This 

proved to be one of the most effective operations 
131

in Afghanistan since Coalition forces entered the 

country in October 2001.

For two weeks, moving exclusively in HMMWVs 

and locally procured Toyota Hi-Luxs and Land 

Rovers, the BLT engaged Taliban forces eight 

times. Reinforced with Afghan Militia Forces and 

accompanied by Governor Jan Mohammed, the 

Marines employed every available platform for close 

air support: [Lockheed] AC-130s, [Boeing] B-1Bs, 

[Fairchild-Republic] A-10s, [McDonnell Douglas] 

AV-8Bs, and Marine and Army attack helicopters. 

During this sustained operation, 85 Taliban were 

killed; another 40 probably were killed in closedup caves or inaccessible high ground. The fighting ranged from air strikes to intense close-range 

infantry engagements. In a testament to the leadership, fighting skills, and tactical acumen of smallunit leaders, no Marines were killed and only 14 

were wounded.

Based largely on the success of Asbury Park 

and supporting operations, the combatant commander extended the 22d MEU’s Afghanistan 

deployment by 30 days. On receiving this decision, CJTF-76 put the 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry 

(2/5), of the Army’s 25th Infantry Division (Light) 

under the tactical control of the MEU. Now with 

two ground maneuver battalions, the MEU developed a plan to exploit the success of Asbury Park.

Commencing Operation Thunder Road, BLT 

1/6 moved quickly into the Cehar Cineh area, 

Photo courtesy of Gunnery Sgt. Keith A. Milks 

The headquarters element of Charlie Company, BLT 1/6, the ground combat element of the 22d MEU(SOC), coordinate 

the search of the village of Miam Do, Afghanistan, for Taliban insurgents and weapons caches during Operation Thunder Road on 29 June 2004.
132

accompanied by the governor and Afghani forces. 

Located in the western part of AO Linebacker, 

the Taliban had yet to surrender Cehar Cineh to 

conventional forces. Concurrently, in Operation 

Asbury Park II, 2/5 Infantry relied extensively 

on its organic artillery and mortars and exploited 

the success of BLT 1/6 in the Dey Chopan area.

Both operations continued to dislodge enemy 

combatants from sanctuaries. While many weapons caches were uncovered, it soon became apparent that they had no more stomach for fighting. 

With Taliban authority effectively neutralized, 

the MEU took advantage of the two battalions’ 

offensives by reinforcing security, accelerating civil 

military projects, and initiating voter registration.

Application of MAGTF doctrine and concepts 

was of prime importance to the MEU. Simultaneously leading two maneuver battalions and as 

many as five separate company/platoon teams 

required detailed planning and careful application of resources, especially given highly mobile 

operations and missions as diverse as providing 

security for women’s health clinics and applying artillery, air, and theater intelligence assets to 

attack the Taliban. In addition, being weighted 

as the CJTF’s main effort gave the MEU tactical and logistic support that a MAGTF is well 

equipped to employ.

Results

In the short term, the security environment in 

Oruzgan Province improved dramatically. Thousands of ordnance systems, weapons, and other 

combat implements were destroyed. The MEU 

was in contact 32 times and confirmed 101 enemy killed and another 50 probable kills, including 

several key Taliban leaders. Attacks against Coalition forces declined to nearly zero in Oruzgan and 

northern Kandahar provinces. Most significantly, 

attacks also declined to the south in and around 

Kandahar City and the ring road to Kabul. These 

were decisive and measurable military effects but, 

as with everything in Afghanistan, only time will 

tell if they have long-term benefits.

Nonetheless, it is clear that improved security 

permitted the introduction of programs that will 

have the greatest effect on long-term security. The 

MEU’s operations permitted the introduction of 

UNAMA voter registration teams; 58,357 Afghan 

citizens were registered in Oruzgan between 1 

May and 10 July. These efforts represented more 

than 44 percent of UNAMA’s provincial goal and 

helped overcome the initial hurdle of demonstrating to the populace that safe elections were possible in Afghanistan. Voter registration went hand 

in hand with 108 civil affairs projects that provided long-range hope for Afghanistan: for example, well digging, establishment of schools, and 

road and infrastructure improvement. An aggressive medical and dental outreach program cared 

for 2,000 patients, many of whom received assistance for the first time.

Conclusions

The early decision by CJTF-180 planners to employ the 22d MEU in accordance with MAGTF 

doctrine was the foremost reason for the MEU’s 

strong performance. Its high degree of air-groundlogistical integration was of inestimable value to 

the kind of operations required in Oruzgan Province. (In addition to a full plate of complex tasks, 

the ACE [air combat element] furnished AV-8B 

[Harrier] sorties for use in other parts of the CJTF 

AO.) The MEU’s organic firepower and mobility, 

ability to execute operations rapidly, and the dedicated effort to fuse intelligence from below and 

above proved decisive.

The grit and determination of the individual 

rifleman shone in an extremely harsh environment. Marine noncommissioned officers were 
133

the most effective weapons in the MEU’s arsenal. Small-unit leadership was tested in excessive 

elevations, heat, and dust; and it passed with flying colors. Marines remain the masters of smallunit actions.

The predeployment training provided to 

the MEU as part of the standard workup package proved to be a sound basis for operating in 

Afghanistan. In particular, the rapid response 

planning training provided by the II Marine 

Expeditionary Force Special Operations Training Group enabled the MEU to focus on timesensitive targets with great effect and had a most 

positive effect on all other decision-making and 

staff operations.

CJTF-180 and -76 were supportive and eager 

to employ the MEU. They arranged a true “plugand-play” joint environment and worked constantly to enhance the considerable intelligence 

capabilities of the MAGTF. In every way, they 

were dedicated to the effective application of individual service capabilities. Their leadership and 

support were essential.

The 22d MEU’s deployment to Afghanistan 

demonstrated the inherent capabilities of the 

MEU(SOC) program in every measurable category. It traveled inland more than 500 miles to 

some of the most inhospitable terrain in the world 

and proved to be an expeditionary and exceptionally lethal force. It used combined arms in 

intense firefights while concurrently conducting 

civil-military operations. The MEU’s successful 

integration into a joint command served to reinforce the merits of the Marine air-ground team 

and demonstrate the value of its integration with 

a joint force.

[The] strategic results of the deployment still 

are being assessed, but recent peaceful elections—

even in former Taliban sanctuaries—are nascent 

signs of long-term success. And, in Oruzgan Province, they result directly from the 22d MEU’s 

determined march into the storm.

Notes

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 130, no. 11 (November 2004), 48–53. For more information, see 

U.S. Naval Institute at www.usni.org. Reprinted 

with permission.

1. CJTF-180 would change in mid-April 2004 to the 

25th Infantry Division (Light), resulting in a designator change to CJTF-76.

About the Authors 

Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie was commanding officer of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(Special Operations Capable). Major Roberta L. 

Shea and Major Christopher Phelps were the staff 

communications officer and intelligence officer, 

respectively.
134

A 22d MEU Marine kicks in a locked door during a search of 

the village of Khabargho, Afghanistan, for arms caches and 

Taliban insurgents during Operation Asbury Park. During 

eight days of intense fighting, more than 80 Taliban fighters 

were killed and only 8 Marines were wounded. 

Photo courtesy of GySgt Keith A. Milks
Artillery “Gruntz” It Out

by Captain Matthew M. Maz, First Lieutenant Jason R. Gibbs, First Lieutenant David 

W. Litkenhus, and First Lieutenant Wayne 

A. Wood

Marine Corps Gazette, November 2004

A Marine artillery battery always needs to be prepared to serve as a provisional rifle company in 

combat. The experiences of Battery G, Battalion 

Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (BLT 

1/6), during Operation Enduring Freedom prove 

that the battery can execute a variety of essential 

functions in combat. During BLT 1/6’s combat operations in Afghanistan, the battery was assigned 

numerous tasks in addition to artillery operations, 

including humanitarian assistance operations, convoy operations, security for Forward Operating 

Base (FOB) Ripley, liaison and security for United Nations-sponsored voter registration, personunder-custody handling, and other stability and 

support operations. The battery’s task organization for combat was unique in that it included 

the BLT’s tank platoon (3d Platoon, Company 

D, 2d Tank Battalion), assault amphibious vehicle (AAV) platoon (2d Platoon, Company B, 2d 

AAV Battalion) and, for part of the time, several 

other detachments, to include the aviation combat 

element’s low-altitude air defense platoon, forming a task force of [more than] 200 Marines and 

sailors serving directly under the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), rather than its parent unit, 

BLT 1/6. This organization provided the flexibility necessary to accomplish numerous operations 

simultaneously.

135
136

Transition to a Provisional 

Rifle Company

Everyone is familiar with the cliché “every Marine 

a rifleman.” Unfortunately, it’s not as simple as annual qualification on a rifle range to become a rifleman. When faced with converting an artillery 

battery into a provisional rifle company, the battery leadership had to be flexible and creative in 

how we attempted to overcome the inevitable challenge of organizing Marines with a diverse mix of 

military occupational specialties (cannoneers, fire 

direction controlmen, cooks, maintenance management specialists, motor transportation mechanics, etc.) into cohesive fireteams and squads and, 

ultimately, one cohesive rifle company.

The primary focus was to task organize around 

accomplishing all foreseen missions, while maintaining fireteam and squad integrity. Initially we organized the battery into three separate platoons: two 

rifle platoons and a weapons platoon comprised of 

the Marines assigned to crew-served weapons. On 

paper this looked great, and it worked because of 

the adaptability of the Marines, but we may have 

been able to organize more efficiently. We often 

found ourselves rearranging the task organization at 

the small-unit level because of the need for drivers 

and radio operators, and the need for cannoneers 

to man the howitzers (that were flown directly to 

FOB Ripley after the establishment of the base). 

A better solution may have been to evenly distribute the motor transport Marines and radio operators across the squads, while maintaining the 

integrity of smaller groups like the fire direction 

center. This organization would have made each 

squad virtually self-supporting. The concept of 

the weapons platoon worked well for the battery, 

because it afforded the battery the flexibility to 

attach machine-gun teams to the rifle platoons, 

as well as provide security for convoys. The AAV 

and tank platoons operated as rifle platoons. To 

maintain unit integrity, we accepted the one large 

platoon (48 AAVs) and one small platoon (19 tanks) 

that resulted from these units’ table of organization strength in a BLT.

Despite ongoing changes to task organization, 

we were able to accomplish the wide variety of missions we were assigned. Mission success can only be 

attributed to diligent focus on infantry individual 

training standards (ITS) and superior leadership 

at the noncommissioned officer (NCO) level. The 

fact that all Marines were trained to basic riflemen 

standards ensured that the Marines could adapt 

and overcome the challenges presented by regular 

changes in task organization and the diverse missions we were tasked to accomplish.

It is paramount that Marines know the basics, 

especially land navigation, combat orders, patrolling, personal and crew-served weapons handling, 

rules of engagement (ROE), etc. Also, proficiency 

in communications skills cannot be overemphasized. Marines must be comfortable operating, 

troubleshooting, and maintaining radios and 

have a solid understanding of signal plans. Once 

Marines understand the basics, the unit can begin 

introducing platoon-level tactics, such as convoy 

operations, actions upon contact, room clearing, 

and cordon-and-search techniques.

Convoy Operations

Battery G conducted convoy operations almost 

daily. Typically, the convoys would be comprised 

of 5 to 55 vehicles and could stretch up four kilometers in length. The convoys were slow moving 

due to the size of the convoys, harsh terrain, and 

numerous enemy threats (i.e., land mines, improvised explosive devices [IEDs], ambushes, etc.). The 

majority of the terrain was mountainous, and traffic was limited to unimproved dirt tracts due to 

the fact that paved or improved roads were nonexistent in our area of operation. Most of these 
137

routes were wide enough to accommodate only 

one lane of traffic.

Many of the convoy security procedures taught 

to Marines during basic unit training as an artillery 

battery, AAV, or tank platoon were still applicable in Afghanistan, such as positions in the vehicle, gear stowage, fields of fire/view, dismount 

procedures, and signals. Emphasis was placed on 

convoy briefs that addressed threat areas, procedures for halts, bump plans, ROE, actions upon 

contact, communications plans, close air support 

(CAS) availability, checkpoints, weapons test fire 

locations, etc.

The tactics, techniques, and procedures used 

to negotiate long choke-points, such as mountain passes, were complicated and employed many 

combat resources, but the risk involved was worth 

taking the time to do it right. Prepositioned units 

secured both sides of the pass in order to prevent 

traffic from entering. Forward air controllers contacted EA-6B Prowlers that possessed an IED 

jamming capability, and the planes conducted a 

sweep of the pass. Other CAS platforms loitered 

over the possible ambush sites offering reconnaissance and force protection. The two lead hardback HMMWVs from the convoy provided more 

reconnaissance and ensured that all traffic in the 

pass had exited before bringing the main body of 

the convoy through.

Every convoy had to be prepared to handle a 

variety of maintenance issues, as vehicle breakdowns were commonplace. Mechanics were vital 

to the success of every convoy, and we ensured 

they were equipped with the proper tools and 

parts (hoses, fluids, tires, etc.). Oftentimes we 

would end up towing vehicles, so we always carried numerous seven-ton and HMMWV tow bars. 

Welding machines were also used during convoys 

to repair trailers and ring-mounts. Our contact 

truck traveled at the end of the convoy and was 

always equipped with a radio to quickly respond 

to any problems.

Numbering each vehicle and assigning corresponding call signs as they were positioned in 

the convoy eased convoy command and control. 

Each vehicle had a radio in it. Not all had highpower radios but at a minimum man-packed AN/

PRC-119s were used. The use of Motorola and 

ICOMs intrasquad radios was not allowed due to 

their susceptibility to signals interception and the 

risk of setting off IEDs. Squad-size elements rode 

in seven-ton trucks that were dispersed throughout the convoy in order to provide a dismounted 

assault force to be used when we gained contact 

with enemy forces.

FOB Ripley Security

Planning for FOB Ripley security began with [a] 

detailed map study and size estimation. To put 

the size of the FOB in perspective, it needed to 

be large enough to fit 8 helicopter pads, a runway 

capable of supporting C-130s, facilities for 2,000 

Marines, numerous command posts, 2 M198 howitzer gun positions, an ammunition supply point, 

a motor pool capable of supporting nearly 200 vehicles, and compounds for a battalion of Jordanian Special Operations Forces and a company of 

the Afghan National Army. The final perimeter 

exceeded five miles.

Initially, FOB security was handled like the 

occupation of a defensive position. The battery 

was the first combat element on the ground in the 

area that would become FOB Ripley; therefore, 

we focused on reconnaissance, identifying likely 

avenues of approach and key terrain, emplacing 

crew-served weapons, establishing radio communications, formulating an effective fire support plan, 

and constant patrolling. The size of the perimeter 

gradually expanded as the remainder of the MEU 

began to flow into the area. Engineering supplies, 
138

such as concertina wire and HESCO barriers, 

arrived allowing the Marines to move from basic 

fighting positions into guard towers constructed 

from wood, HESCO, and International Organization for Standardization containers. FOB security evolved to include countermaneuver wire 

plans, entry control points (with interpreters), 

the manning of confinement facilities, and the 

establishment of a quick reaction force (QRF). 

Dismounted and mounted security and presence 

patrols were conducted almost 24 hours a day for 

four months, focusing on limiting the enemy’s 

ability to engage the FOB with 107mm rockets 

and denying the enemy observation of key locations inside the perimeter.

Prior to the arrival of two M198 howitzers to 

the FOB, organic fire support consisted of 81mm 

mortars attached to the battery. The mortars provided on-call suppression for dismounted patrols 

and supported the nightly illumination plan. 

When the M198 howitzers arrived via C-130, they 

increased the security capabilities of the FOB. This 

was the first time in history that Marine forces 

had introduced the M198s to Afghanistan—

indisputably, “the biggest guns in Afghanistan.” 

The howitzers ranged all the potential 107mm 

rocket sites, provided illumination for mounted 

patrols, and were tied into Q-36 counter-mortar 

radar through the fire direction center. The Q-36 

radar and howitzers provided a quick “sensorto-shooter” link critical to the counter-rocket 

fight. While the howitzers increased security, the 

requirement to man the howitzers, while simultaneously conducting multiple operations, placed 

a strain on our forces. Managing the number of 

Marines available to conduct operations, other 

than those directly related to FOB security, was 

closely monitored.

Keeping the Marines motivated and informed 

day in and day out over a five-mile perimeter 

became a full-time job for the unit’s leadership. 

Engaged NCO and staff NCO supervision was 

crucial to ensuring that the Marines stayed intense, 

vigilant, and motivated.

Photo courtesy of Gunnery Sgt. Keith A. Milks 

Afghan children gather around a Humvee from BLT 1/6 providing security near the village of Miam Do, Afghanistan, during Operation Thunder Road on 29 June 2004.
139

Security for Humanitarian 

Assistance Operations

Upon arrival at voter registration, medical care, or 

dental care sites, Marines from the security squads 

dismounted, established a perimeter around the 

site, and cleared the buildings to ensure that the 

area was safe for support personnel to conduct 

their operations. One entry and one exit point 

were established. Patrons were marked with a magic marker once they entered and exited the facility. Marines providing security would be posted 

on rooftops or any dominating terrain feature in 

the area to provide early warning. Vehicle checkpoints were routinely manned in order to establish a presence in the area and control the flow of 

personnel and vehicles.

Occasionally, local government officials would 

not allow Marines to be involved in activities that 

were viewed as potential Taliban targets, such as 

United Nations-supported voter registration. Consequently, the MEU or the battery would provide 

a liaison to the local authorities, and a QRF was 

established in order to respond if necessary.

Conclusion

The battery truly proved itself as the “king” of more 

than artillery, considering its performance as a versatile combat multiplier in combat. The depth of 

the battery’s technical expertise, communications 

gear, vehicles, and weapons systems allowed it to 

adapt to numerous situations with successful results. However, deploying MEU (special operations capable) artillery units must develop a flexible 

task organization that allows for easy transition 

to function as a provisional rifle company, while 

maintaining the ability to effectively employ their 

assets and still maintain squad and fireteam integrity. Strict training and adherence to infantry ITS 

will enable artillery units to become proficient riflemen. The stronger the infantry proficiency is at 

the individual level, the easier it will be to transition through changes to task organization and accomplish a variety of nontraditional missions for 

an artillery unit. With an ever-increasing demand 

on our forces, we have to be ready to assume the 

mission of infantry units during our training in 

preparation for the deployment.

Note

Marine Corps Gazette 88, no. 231 (November 

2004): 43, 44, 46. Copyright Marine Corps Gazette. Reprinted with permission.

About the Authors

Captain Matthew M. Maz served as the commanding officer, Battery G, 2d Battalion, 10th 

Marines (2/10).

First Lieutenant Jason R. Gibbs was the fire direction officer, Battery G, 2/10.

First Lieutenant David W. Litkenhus was the guns 

platoon commander, Battery G, 2/10.

First Lieutenant Wayne A. Wood was the executive officer, Battery G, 2/10.
140

Marines of Kilo Company, 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, climb a stone wall on the way to a village during 

Operation Mavericks, an operation conducted to capture 

suspected anti-Coalition forces in the vicinity of Mehtar 

Lam on 19 March 2005. 

Photo courtesy of Cpl James L. Yarboro
A Mission Ends 

As Army, NATO Troops 

Take Over in Afghanistan, 

Marines Reflect on a Tour 

that “You Never Forget”

by Christian Lowe

Marine Corps Times, 29 May 2006

They were members of the first conventional 

ground unit into Afghanistan, flying more than 

400 miles aboard heavy-lift helicopters from amphibious ships off the Pakistan coast to take ground 

in a landlocked country. And after that precedentsetting flight, then-Brigadier General Jim [James 

N.] Mattis, commander of Task Force 58, forcefully declared to his leathernecks: “The Marines 

have landed, and we now own a piece of Afghanistan,” planting the American flag on a remote 

desert camp surrounded by Taliban and al-Qaeda 

fighters just weeks after 11 September. But after 

nearly five years and thousands of Marine footprints left on Afghanistan’s craggy peaks, the Corps 

is pulling out, leaving the defense of the fledgling 

Afghan government and the hunt for Osama bin 

Laden and his supporters to the Army and NATO 

troops, a top Corps official confirmed.

“We’re attempting to reduce our operational 

tempo and deployment tempo,” said the Corps’ 

plans, policy, and operations chief, Lieutenant 

141
142

General Jan [C.] Huly, in an 18 May interview. 

“A good way to do that is not send as many units 

overseas.”

Huly admitted, however, the exodus will be a 

drop in the bucket of near-constant Marine deployments to Iraq and regular Marine expeditionary 

unit [MEU] pumps. So don’t expect more time at 

home as a result. The move means infantry battalions and other units that were looking for a break 

from Iraq rotations by going to Afghanistan are 

now back in line to join their brethren in Anbar 

Province and other Iraqi hot spots.

But those rotations are in the maybe column; 

based on recent patterns, just because you’re in an 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

A U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter lands during a mission to insert Marines assigned to Kilo Company, 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, during Operation Mavericks.
143

infantry battalion doesn’t mean your seabag has an 

Iraq sticker on it. Despite the Marines’ shrinking 

presence on the Horn of Africa, not every battalion that deploys to the Middle East goes into Iraq, 

and the units in that country don’t always spend 

a lot of time there. Some MEUs have deployed 

in “theater reserve” status, meaning the battalion 

landing team stays mainly on its amphibious ships 

for the bulk of the deployment, conducts the odd 

training exercise in the region, and waits for a call 

to go into Iraq that may not come. 

The Corps will still provide some support troops 

to the Afghan mission, including intelligence technicians and military training teams, Huly said. 

Marine expeditionary units could also be on call 

to plug in gaps if needed. The end of the Corps’ 

Afghan deployments comes as the overall U.S. commitment to that country is on the decline. Military officials have said that American forces will 

be reduced from the roughly 23,000 troops there 

now to 16,500 by the end of the summer. And it 

also means the end of a duty many Marines say is 

unique, a mission some strategists have said is tailor-made for light infantry forces like the Marines.

“It’s an area that, once you’ve been there, you 

never forget it for the rest of your life,” said Colonel Kenneth [F.] McKenzie, commander of the 

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit, which deployed 

to Afghanistan for nearly five months in 2004. 

The Corps leaves Afghanistan with a mixed 

security situation, however. Recent clashes between 

NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 

troops—who are in charge of overall security for 

the Afghan government—and insurgents resulted 

in the deaths of about 90 enemy forces, 15 Afghan 

police, 1 Canadian soldier, and an American civilian near Kandahar. Huly said the security situation did not affect the decision to pull Marines 

from Afghanistan. “I don’t think that was discussed,” he said. 

The country has seen a recent surge in violence, with enemy forces increasingly resorting to 

suicide bombers and roadside explosive devices—

tactics common in Iraq. “We are predicting that 

the enemy will get more alert [and] more active in 

the summer,” said Afghan National Army Lieutenant General Sher Karimi at a 4 May Pentagon 

press briefing. “So we are accordingly planning to 

be more alert, more active and have more aggressive operations, offensive operations, in many areas 

against the enemy.”

Taking to the Hills

Since the landing at Camp Rhino by Mattis’ Task 

Force 58—a combined force of the 15th and 26th 

MEUs—in November 2001, the Corps has sent 

a wide range of forces to Afghanistan to bolster 

security and hunt down terrorist holdouts. Marines 

were the first troops to secure and reopen the 

U.S. embassy in Kabul, sending the antiterrorism 

battalion from the now-disbanded 4th Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade to hold the ground with a 

more robust force.

Since then, the Corps continued to send at 

least one battalion of leathernecks to the fight, 

with the Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii-based units of 3d 

Marines taking over the mission in late 2004 as 

the Army’s Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division 

took command of the Afghan counterterrorism 

operation, dubbed Combined Joint Task Force 76.

Marine Reserve units have also served in 

Afghanistan. The Marietta, Georgia-based Marine 

Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 773 [HMLA773] provided close air support and light heliborne 

lift to Marine and Army forces out of Bagram 

Airbase near Kabul and Camp Salerno in Khost 

in 2003 and 2004. Reserve CH-53E Super Stallion 

squadrons provided much-needed heavy lift for 

Coalition missions in the high mountains of 

eastern and central Afghanistan.
144

In the spring of 2004, the Camp Lejeune, 

North Carolina-based 22d MEU pushed inland, 

setting up combat outposts in the Taliban breeding 

ground of Tarin Kowt, north of Kandahar—an 

area generally devoid of any U.S. troops since Army 

Special Forces units left in 2002.

During their nearly five-month deployment, 

the MEU’s grunt unit, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 

engaged in skirmishes for weeks against Taliban 

holdouts, killing more than 80 rebel fighters 

during a few intense weeks of fighting. “There’s 

not a lot of urban area, there’s a lot of rural area. 

It’s a lot of open maneuver work,” McKenzie said 

of Afghanistan’s rugged terrain. “Units tend to 

operate over vast distances with very little or no 

infrastructure at all.”

More recently, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines—the 

last unit to deploy to Afghanistan—participated 

in the largest air assault operation since Operation 

Anaconda in 2002. The operation involved six 

Marine and Army battalions, pushing more than 

2,500 Afghan and Coalition troops through the 

eastern Korengal Valley in April and May.

Lessons Learned

Though Huly said part of the objective of withdrawing Marines from Afghanistan was to ease 

the strain on operational tempo, he admitted 

the relief would not be significant. “Taking one 

battalion out of the Afghanistan bin and putting 

it in the Iraq bin will afford some relief, but not 

a whole lot,” he said. Neither, he said, would 

3d Marines begin to assume unit deployment 

program stints on Okinawa, Japan—a historic 

ready supply of infantrymen for Japan-based 

Marine rotations.

The UDP [Unit Deployment Program] cycle 

has been disrupted by deployments to Iraq and 

Afghanistan since 2001. Some units have shipped 

over to Okinawa for the six-month UDP cycle 

only to be deployed immediately to Iraq. Others 

have skipped the UDP pump altogether. Though 

the Afghan deployments have given the Corps 

manpower headaches as well as glory, overall the 

Corps has benefited from its experience in Operation Enduring Freedom, officials have said. The 

deployments have brought an increasing emphasis on mountain survival and combat training, 

prompting a boost in the number of students 

at the Mountain Warfare Training School in 

Bridgeport, California.

The deployments have also forced Marine 

units to operate to an even greater extent in close 

cooperation with sister Services and allied units. 

In late 2003 and mid-2004, Marine AH-1W 

Super Cobra squadrons were assigned to support 

Army units in southeastern Afghanistan. Aviators from HMLA-773 lived alongside soldiers 

with the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry 

Regiment, near Khost, where they helped secure 

convoys and casualty evacuation missions and 

provided close air support to ambushed Army 

units in the remote mountains of Khost Province. 

“It is a very joint and combined environment,” 

McKenzie added.

Afghanistan was also the proving ground for 

the experimental “distributed operations” platoon from [1st Battalion, 3d Marines] 1/3—a 

specially trained and equipped grunt unit with 

increased capability to operate far from support. 

The mountainous terrain and diffused enemy situation allowed the platoon from Bravo Company, 

1/3, to test its capability effectively, the platoon’s 

leader, First Lieutenant Carlo DeSantis, has said. 

“We were trailblazers there in that we were the 

first ones in,” Huly added. “We were able not only 

to make contributions to the security and stability 

of Afghanistan through the normal way in which 

we operated, but we were also able to flex our ability and try out our distributed operations.” 
145

Note

Marine Corps Times, 29 May 2006. Reprinted 

by permission of Gannett Government Media 

Corporation. 

About the Author

Christian Lowe is a Washington, DC-based journalist covering the Marine Corps for Gannett’s 

Marine Corps Times.
146

Gen James T. Conway, then-Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, walks with Marines on 6 August 2007 at one of the 

gates connecting Pakistan and Afghanistan roads. 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Nathan W. Hutchinson, USA
Marines Push to Take 

Lead in Afghanistan

by Sean D. Naylor

Marine Corps Times, 11 October 2007

Generals in the Army and on the Joint Staff reacted 

with surprise at a Marine Corps move to assume the 

Army’s combat role in Afghanistan and expressed 

doubt that the Corps could handle the mission 

without substantial support from the larger ground 

service.

The New York Times and The Los Angeles Times

reported 11 October that the Marine Corps has 

floated the idea of removing its estimated 25,000 

troops in Iraq and taking over the mission in 

Afghanistan, where there are no significant Marine 

forces at present.

“This is not going to go down well with the 

Army,” said a general on the Joint Staff, adding 

that the issue “is going to be more contentious and 

sensitive than many people outside of the inside 

team realize.”

The Joint Staff officer was one of several generals who spoke only on the condition of anonymity and said the Marine initiative to supplant the 

Army in Afghanistan runs counter to the U.S. 

military’s increasingly joint approach to warfare.

“We’re seeking joint solutions to most of the 

challenges we face today, to include Afghanistan 

and Iraq,” he said. “A single Service approach? Holy 

smokes. Why would we ever go back to that way 

of war fighting, particularly when it doesn’t give 

you any advantage over your enemy and in fact 

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148

complicates life tremendously in terms of sorting out how you’re going to support all of this?”

A retired Army general with Afghanistan experience agreed. “The fact that a Service would propose somehow that their service would take over 

a war seems to me to fly in the face of everything 

that’s been done since Goldwater-Nichols was 

passed in 1986,” he said, referring to legislation 

mandating integration of the capabilities of the 

military Services.

However, he said, “There’s going to be a tremendous number of Army soldiers out there, even 

if, quote unquote, the Marines take over the mission,” because the Marines would have to rely on 

the Army for support in Afghanistan.

“There are some extraordinarily obvious flaws in 

this,” the retired Army general said. “The Marines 

don’t bring any of the infrastructure, logistics, aviation, all of the other enablers that are necessary 

to fight in this environment successfully.”

The Joint Staff general noted that although 

the Marine combat formations are organized on 

deployments into Marine air-ground task forces, 

or MAGTFs (pronounced mag-taffs), which combine ground maneuver forces with fixed-wing air 

support. “The MAGTF is not designed to do sustained operations inland without any extensive 

Army support as well as Navy support,” he said.

Marine units are designed to be self-sustaining 

for up to 30 days in the case of a Marine expeditionary unit and 60 days in the case of a Marine 

expeditionary brigade, he said. For longer deployments, the Army is obliged “by law” to provide 

logistical support to the Marines, he added.

An active-duty Army general with recent Afghanistan experience said the Marines lacked much 

of the equipment that allowed the Army to fight 

effectively in Afghanistan. For instance, he noted 

that Marine helicopters are not as capable as those 

of the Army.

The Marines’ twin-rotor CH-46 [Sea Knight] 

is not considered as strong as its Army equivalent, 

the CH-47 Chinook, a critical factor when operating in the rugged mountainous terrain of eastern Afghanistan.

“If you’re along the [Pakistan] border . . . you’d 

better have the capability to get up around 10,000 

feet,” the Army general said. “It’s a tough fight in 

Afghanistan. . . . It’s not a cakewalk by any measure, and if you’re not geared appropriately, it’s 

even harder.”

The generals also expressed concern that the 

Marines’ seven-month rotations were ill-suited to 

the demands of a counterinsurgency campaign 

in which nurturing relationships with local figures over long periods can be the key to victory. 

Army units deploy to Afghanistan for at least 15 

months.

“Marines rotate for seven months,” said the 

retired Army general. “That’s extraordinarily disruptive in a counterinsurgency campaign. The 

[Army] brigade that just came out of Afghanistan 

was there for 16 months.”

“The Afghans, they have the utmost respect 

for the United States military and they don’t 

want you to leave,” said the active-duty Army 

general with recent Afghanistan experience. “If 

you’re constantly churning at six months or seven 

months, as the Marines are doing now . . . people 

aren’t going to connect with you, and you’ll lose 

some of those gains.”

Marine Commandant General James [T.] 

Conway briefly joked about the proposal at a dinner hours after the news reports hit the streets 

and were generating controversy, but otherwise 

refused to discuss it.

“Would any of you retirees like to go with us 

to Afghanistan?” he quipped at the Marine Corps 

Association’s Ground Awards Dinner in Arlington, Virginia, where he was the guest speaker.
149

After the dinner, he declined to discuss the 

issue with a Military Times reporter.

“It’s premature at this time for me to talk about 

it,” Conway said. “If there is an appropriate point 

in time, if certain things happen, we’ll let you 

know so we can get it out to the Marines.”

Army General Dan [K.] McNeill commands 

NATO’s International Security Assistance Force 

in Afghanistan, and is the overall commander of 

U.S. forces in the country, which number about 

26,000. But if the Marines provided the bulk of 

the U.S. combat forces, the Corps might push for 

one of its own to be given that four-star command 

slot, according to the retired Army general with 

Afghanistan experience.

“That’s certainly something that would be 

out there on the table now, wouldn’t it?” he said. 

The Joint Staff general agreed. “I’m sure that has 

entered the equation,” he said.

The generals also took umbrage at the implication in the newspaper stories announcing the 

Marine initiative that it was the Marines stationed 

in Iraq’s Anbar Province who played the leading 

role in fostering the “Anbar Awakening” that saw 

local Sunni tribes switch sides and take up arms 

against al-Qaeda in Iraq. They said that much of 

the credit belonged to Army Colonel Sean [B.] 

MacFarland and his 1st Brigade, 1st Armored 

Division.

“There is concern [among Army officers] that 

we’re overplaying the Marines’ assertion that 

they’re the masters of counterinsurgency and they 

might be trying to export that into Afghanistan,” 

the retired Army general said.

The active-duty Army general with recent 

Afghanistan experience said there appeared to 

be a lack of analysis underpinning the reported 

Marine initiative.

“The question that has to be asked is: do they 

have the command and control, logistics and 

equipment architecture to conduct this fight?” he 

said. “You have to do a troop-to-task analysis on 

the ground in Afghanistan and work it backwards, 

and then say, what is the right force for this mission? As opposed to making a strategic announcement that this is where we want to go, and then 

trying to make it fit.”

Note

Marine Corps Times, 11 October 2007. Reprinted by permission of Gannett Government Media 

Corporation. 

About the Author

Sean D. Naylor is a senior writer for the Army Times 

Publishing Company and the author of the book 

Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (Berkley Books, 2004).
150
Part III

The Buildup, 2008
152

The following articles outline the situation facing Marines when they 

returned in numbers to Afghanistan. 

Even though large-scale deployments 

ceased for a time, the Marine Corps continued to 

deploy Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), and 

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) deployed single companies to 

support Combined Joint Special Operations Task 

Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Marine Corps formed 4th 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Antiterrorism (4th 

MEB [AT]) to provide a standing quick reaction 

force to combat terrorist threats. Soon after, the 

Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) signed a liaison agreement and 

began to integrate Marine Corps capabilities into 

future special operations. By 2006, much of 4th 

MEB (AT) transferred to the newly established 

MARSOC, which stood up as a component of 

SOCOM. The rapid growth and integration of 

MARSOC led to the 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion (1st MSOB) taking command of 

a joint special operations task force operating in 

northern and western Afghanistan in late 2009.

The long-term Marine presence in southwest 

Afghanistan began in early 2008 with the arrival 

of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (or Task Force 2/7). 

Besides its line companies, the battalion received 

reinforcements to conduct its primary mission 

mentoring the Afghan police, including a combat 

engineer platoon, shock trauma platoon, a radio 

battalion detachment, and reconnaissance Marines 

in addition to DynCorp civilian contractors and 

personnel specializing in civil-military operations.

However, without all of the support organic 

to the MAGTF, the firmly ensconced insurgency 

complicated the battalion’s mission. Rather than 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl Alex Guerra 

Members of the Afghan National Police set to patrol with Marines from Alpha Company, BLT 1/6, in Helmand Province, 

Afghanistan.
153

depending on Coalition or other joint assets for 

support, the scale of the insurgency facing Task 

Force 2/7 prompted senior Marines to send detachments of Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallions and 

Bell AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters to provide 

both heavy lift and close air support, respectively. 

From that point forward, Marines generally came 

to the fight as part of a MAGTF.

The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24th 

MEU) also arrived in Helmand Province in early 

2008 and began conducting counterinsurgency 

(COIN) operations, most notably Operation Azada 

Wosa (“Stay Free” in the local Pashto language). 

The MEU’s organic command-and-control assets 

enabled the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MarCent) to attach additional aircraft in 

support of Task Force 2/7. Nearing the end of its 

deployment, the MEU played a key role when it was 

designated to act as interim command element 

and bridge for the newly designated Special Purpose MAGTF-Afghanistan (SPMAGTF-A). The 

SPMAGTF, commanded by Colonel Duffy W. 

White, continued to build the Marine presence, 

conduct operations against the insurgency, and 

develop infrastructure for follow-on forces before 

its relief by 2d MEB-Afghanistan in May 2009.
154

HA Brian Rumbles, USN, assigned to Golf Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, fires on two Taliban insurgents 

fleeing up a mountainside while on a mounted patrol near the 

Bala Baluk forward operating base in Farah Province. 

Photo courtesy of Cpl Jason T. Guiliano
A Change in Mission

by Kristin Henderson

The Washington Post Magazine, 

21 June 2009 

“Fix bayonets.” Not long after giving that order, 

First Lieutenant Arthur [E.] Karell was hunched in 

a dirt trench crowded with Marines. The hushed 

darkness bristled with eight-inch blades fitted beneath the barrels of dozens of M16 assault rifles. 

You fix bayonets when you expect to need the 

aggressive combat mind-set that’s produced by the 

primal sight of massed blades. You fix them when 

you expect to search hidden places. You fix them 

when you expect the fight could push you within 

arm’s reach of your enemy—gutting distance. In 

modern warfare, that’s extraordinarily rare. 

The problem was, Karell didn’t know what to 

expect. He was from Arlington [Virginia]. He’d 

traveled the world. This place, though, was like 

nowhere he’d ever been. The 2d Battalion of the 

7th Marine Regiment had deployed to Afghanistan last spring to train Afghan police. But when 

Karell’s platoon arrived in Now Zad, [Afghanistan,] the largest town in a remote northern district of Helmand Province, they’d rolled into a 

ghost town. 

The Afghans who used to live here, more than 

10,000, had been gone for several years, their abandoned mud-brick homes slowly melting into the 

dusty valley. Insurgents were using the place for 

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156

R&R. At night, all you heard were the jackals, 

ululating like veiled, grieving women. The fact 

that Now Zad had no civilian residents, much less 

any police, had somehow escaped the notice of the 

Coalition planners who had given the Marines 

their mission. 

“They saw what they wanted to achieve but 

didn’t realize fully what it would take,” Task Force 

2/7’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Richard 

[D.] Hall, said at the time. “There were no intel 

pictures where we are now because there were few 

or no coalition forces in the areas where we operate. They didn’t know what was out there. It was 

an innocent mistake.” 

So, with no police to train or civilians to protect, the Marines in Now Zad were left with the 

job of evicting the insurgents who had taken over 

the town. The fight to root them out began a year 

ago in the predawn twilight of 15 June in a trench. 

Karell was about to lead the first assault of his 

first deployment. Some Marines in his platoon had 

done tours in Iraq, but Afghanistan was new to 

all of them. The dried-up irrigation trench they 

were in led toward the edge of Now Zad, then ran 

parallel to a thick mud wall that was taller than a 

man and separated the town from a small forest. 

No Coalition forces had ever been beyond that 

wall. With the trees blocking their view, all they 

knew about what lay beyond was that whenever 

they got close, they were shot at. Whether the 

small-arms fire had been coming from bunkers 

in the wall or the trench alongside it, they didn’t 

know. So Karell gave the order to fix bayonets. 

Silently creeping forward through the trench, 

Karell remembered feeling the same charged mix 

of fear and electric anticipation as when he rowed 

crew in high school and college—that last 30 seconds before a race as the craft slid into place. He 

and his platoon sergeant, Staff Sergeant Gabriel 

[G.] Guest, had been first to jump into the dark 

trench and had already decided they would be at 

the front when the assault on the wall began. “We’re 

not asking them to do these things unless we’re 

willing to do it,” they’d reasoned between themselves, because the old cliché was true: “Everyone 

can get afraid out there.” 

Among the Marines in the trench, Karell was 

one of the oldest at 29, though he looked younger. 

Now Zad’s blowing dust had cracked his voice, as if 

his teen years at Arlington’s H-B Woodlawn High 

School weren’t that long ago. After Harvard and 

the University of Virginia law school, he’d gone 

to work on K Street for Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, 

investigating corporate corruption in developing 

countries and watching the news from Iraq and 

Afghanistan. “Seeing these guys go off to these 

wars time and again, these young guys who are 

having kids they never see,” Karell remembered, 

“I couldn’t just sit there while that was going on.” 

He’s the oldest of six, his father the son of Finnish immigrants, his mother Mexican American. At 

the time, no one in his family was in the military. 

He joined the Marines. 

He’s a good guy, said the Marines in his platoon, 

a good lieutenant. He called them gents. They 

called him the L. T. He walked with a slouching 

lope. One Marine thought the L. T. had grown up 

a California surfer. Another corrected him, said 

that was just the L. T.’s personality, the laid-back 

philosopher type. They said he laughed at himself, and that’s why they liked him. 

But the battalion surgeon, Commander James 

[L.] Hancock, called him a hunter. “Lieutenant 

Karell,” Hancock said, “is just as liable to be running down a hall shooting at bad guys as any of 

the rest of them.” 

As the Marines in the trench neared the wall, 

Marine support vehicles, armed with heavy machine 

guns, began to growl into view to the rear. Suddenly, a rocket-propelled grenade, an RPG, flared 
157

out from the wall. It whooshed over the heads of 

the Marines concealed in the trench and on toward 

the vehicles. The Marines later recalled the vehicles’ guns erupting with roaring bursts. To the 

front, enemy PKM machine guns chattered back, 

the muzzle flashes along the wall’s base revealing 

that the bunkers had been dug into the wall, not 

the trench. 

The Marines said the fear disappeared as their 

training took over. They began to bound—Karell 

and the platoon’s 1st Squad running forward under 

fire while 2d Squad fired back to cover them, then 

1st Squad firing back while 2d Squad leapfrogged 

them. Over and over they did this, bounding alongside the wall to outflank the bunkers. 

Incoming rounds snapped past them. It was 

their first big firefight—they went through a 

great deal of ammunition. Through the smoke 

and noise, Karell remembered seeing Staff Sergeant Guest, 6-foot-3 and as light on his feet as 

he was big, dashing out from cover to bring more 

ammunition. The machine gun chatter from the 

other side of the wall sputtered out as the insurgents began to run. 

Karell brought forward the Marine combat 

engineers, who fired mine-clearing devices so 

that he and an engineer could climb out of the 

trench to blow a hole in the wall. The platoon 

poured through. 

It was like passing through a portal into another 

world. As the sun came up, they stepped out of the 

dusty desert town and into paradise. They heard 

birds singing and the burble of flowing water. 

Pomegranates and apples hung from the trees. All 

at once, Karell understood why so many people 

used to live there. 

They started destroying the bunkers in the 

wall. Then Karell led the platoon deeper into the 

forest’s lush undergrowth. They were headed for 

the Mound. Seen from the air, the Mound rose 

out of the treetops, a huge, round, chalk-white 

monolith 40 feet high. It was hewn by nature but 

mysterious nonetheless—and a likely command 

bunker. This is where Osama is, Coalition forces 

had joked as they’d bombed it over the years. 

On the ground, the Mound emerged through 

the thick vegetation like a stone fortress. The 

Marines started up, climbing beneath the weight 

of weapons, ammunition, and body armor. The 

summer sun beat down on them. They were looking for that command bunker. They were looking 

for caves. They were expecting resistance. They 

reached the cratered top; they looked around. Then 

they looked at each other and laughed. They’d just 

climbed a big pile of solid rock. 

*** 

Three weeks before that first assault, at the tail 

end of the spring poppy harvest, Karell and the 

3d Platoon of Foxtrot Company had arrived in 

Now Zad after a 12-hour convoy. A few Afghan 

interpreters and a retired San Diego police officer 

named Frank Carson rode in with them. Carson 

was along for the ride because the Marines’ official 

mission was to train police. So, naturally, they’d 

been equipped with a police trainer . . . and little 

of what they would really need for the major combat they were about to undertake. 

Rolling into Now Zad, the platoon drew up in 

an open square next to a tiny, beleaguered encampment of British and Estonian soldiers. They parked 

Humvees at the corners as guard posts, strung concertina wire in between, and hunkered down for 

the night. Karell lay down with both his M9 9mm 

Beretta pistol and his rifle at hand. He doesn’t 

remember sleeping much. No one did. Third Platoon was in Taliban country. 

The Taliban’s Islamic extremists had been driven 

from power more than six years earlier, but the 

threadbare effort to secure and rebuild Afghanistan had opened the door to a metastasizing insur-
158

gency. In the southwest, opium poppy production 

exploded—drug money bankrolling the violence. 

The United Nations estimates Afghanistan now 

produces more than 90 percent of the world’s 

illicit opium, the raw ingredient in heroin. Half 

comes from Helmand, one of Afghanistan’s biggest and most fertile provinces. Helmand should 

be this hungry country’s breadbasket. Instead it’s 

a battleground. Now Zad is a stark example. 

During the early post-Taliban years, the town 

thrived. People came for miles to its bazaar; the 

UN started building a school. But by the time 

Karell’s platoon arrived, Now Zad’s dirt streets 

rustled only with shadows carrying weapons. 

The people of Now Zad had been driven out by 

threats and violence, maybe from returning Taliban, maybe from narcotics traffickers. Back then, 

there was no one to protect them. There weren’t 

enough Coalition or Afghan soldiers to station 

there, and the local police weren’t trained to do 

anything—not policing and certainly not soldiering. They fled with the people. 

Hall, Task Force 2/7’s commander, had gotten a hint of all this a few months before the task 

force arrived in Afghanistan last year. He and his 

staff did what higher-ups apparently hadn’t—they 

went to Helmand and talked with Special Operations forces. “Once we started talking to people 

on the ground,” he said, “it became very obvious 

that we were going to do more fighting than training.” In Now Zad, that was an understatement. 

During those first few weeks before the trench 

assault, Karell’s platoon started patrolling and 

building a forward operating base, an FOB. No 

Afghan contractor had been willing to risk coming out there to construct it for them. So the 

Marines piled up sand-filled barriers around the 

UN’s half-built, dirt-floored, roofless school and 

called it an FOB. 

Within a couple of weeks, most of the rest of 

Fox Company arrived in Now Zad, along with 

a new mission: make it possible for the people 

and their police to move back to town. How they 

were to accomplish that wasn’t spelled out. They 

were just told to get in, do what they could for 

six months, and get out because, Hall said, “We 

came over here thinking we weren’t going to be 

replaced” with more Marines. Ultimately, the goal 

was for the Afghan National Army to take over. 

So, Carson, the police trainer, was packed off 

to a town that actually had police to train, and 

the Marines began clearing the insurgents out 

of Now Zad. However, while their mission had 

changed, their equipment and support structure 

had not. They had access to a police trainer they 

didn’t need, but had to get by without things such 

as dedicated close air support. 

They weren’t alone. Helicopters are in short 

supply across Afghanistan. NATO’s International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was usually generous with its jets whenever the Marines needed 

bombs dropped. And the Army was pretty good 

about sending helicopters to pick up the wounded—

though the shortage meant evacuations could take 

two hours in Afghanistan, compared with under 

an hour in Iraq. 

But during operations, the Marines had no 

attack helicopters continually overhead to do reconnaissance or swoop in on short notice with rockets, missiles, and cannon fire. Marine infantrymen 

call the pilots of Cobra attack helicopters “angels 

on our shoulders.” For most of their deployment, 

the Marines in Now Zad had no angels. 

*** 

Lance Corporal John [J.] Schrey Jr. was 27. He 

built walls and blew holes in them and swept for 

mines and improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, 

with a long-handled piece of equipment that 

looked like a beachcomber’s metal detector. One 

night in July, Karell and 3d Platoon’s 3d Squad 
159

put on their night-vision goggles and followed 

Schrey and another engineer outside the wire, 

scrambling single file over rubble north of town. 

A week after the surreal adrenaline rush of the 

trench assault, 3d Platoon had supported Fox Company’s 1st Platoon as they fought in what turned 

out to be a minefield of IEDs. Twenty-six Marines 

were wounded, most of them in 1st Platoon. Some 

lost legs, an arm. Two days after that, Staff Sergeant 

Christopher [D.] Strickland was crouched over an 

IED a patrol had found, disarming it, when it blew 

up. He was killed instantly. He was 25, an ordnance disposal expert. That was especially sobering, Fox Company commander Captain [Richard] 

“Ross” Schellhaas said, because “if it can happen 

to an expert, it can happen to anyone.” 

Now, a month later, Schrey had put on his minesweeper’s headset. As always, his steps slowed and 

his head bowed to concentrate on the dirt ahead 

and what lay beneath. He was tattooed with a pair 

of praying hands and John 3:16, the bible verse his 

grandfather had taught him. Each time he heard a 

metallic hit, he led the way around it. Karell and 

the 3d Squad followed him like silent ducklings. 

Just north of the IED minefield, they hid in 

a sparse, bony orchard within sight of their target: an empty compound with an adobe building. 

The insurgents used it as a rallying point, a place 

to stage equipment before going out to man fighting positions or lay more IEDs. 

North of the rally point, a swath of trees hid a 

one-kilometer strip of closely packed, walled compounds where farming families had once tended 

orchards and gardens. Only heavily armed men 

lived there now. They used it the way they’d used 

the town, as a safe haven. Sometimes, when the 

Marines heard their voices, they didn’t hear Pashtu 

or Dari, the local languages. They heard Urdu, the 

language of Pakistan, where many foreign fighters 

in Afghanistan come from. “Pakistani Alley,” the 

Marines called it, and they knew that before they 

left Afghanistan, they were going to have to clear 

it out, too. But first they had to clear the territory 

between Pakistani Alley and Now Zad. It was only 

a kilometer and a half, but clearing it would take 

months of step-by-step fighting. Today’s step was 

to destroy the rally point. 

At dawn, Karell heard the Muslim call to prayer, 

rising and falling from Pakistani Alley through the 

trees to the north. Then, from the southwest came 

the surging groans of armored vehicles, bringing 

up the rest of 3d Platoon. Shouting erupted from 

the trees. Two insurgents, one of them carrying 

an RPG, dashed across an open wadi—a dry riverbed—unaware of 3d Squad in the orchard. 

Karell listened to the insurgents moving around 

inside the rally point, eerily close. In the distance, 

the whoosh and roar of RPGs and machine-gun 

fire began. It was aimed at the Marines’ armored 

bulldozer as it plowed through the minefield, clearing a lane toward the rally point. A massive seventon truck followed it, the Kevlar-helmeted heads 

of 2d Squad just visible over the armored sides of 

the open back. 

Second Squad had a new leader, a tall, bigshouldered, sunburned corporal named Aaron 

[W.] Tombleson, 23 years old, just married and, 

for the first time, responsible for a dozen other 

Marines during an operation. By now, Karell and 

Guest had started to step back on operations like 

this, leaving it to young leaders, such as Tombleson, to kick in the doors while Guest managed 

logistics and casualty evacuations and Karell concentrated on maneuvering the squads and calling 

for fire support. 

Tombleson was like an old[er] brother, sometimes hooting and roughhousing with his squad 

in their plywood hooch, sometimes sober with 

the weight of steering them through each day. 

His point man was Private First Class Ivan [I.] 
160

Wilson, who wasn’t good with words, but when 

he said, Roger that, I’ll get it done, he always did. 

He was short and solid. He wanted to be called 

Juggernaut. But he smiled too much for that, so 

everyone just called him Willie. Mortars began to 

explode near their seven-ton. 

Over in the orchard, Karell heard a boom. 

He watched something small and round arc up 

from the west. It was a wheel off the seven-ton, 

the tire shredded away, growing bigger and bigger, definitely headed in 3d Squad’s direction. It 

slammed into the ground among the orchard’s 

stunted trees. The bulldozer had taken a wrong 

turn, and while it was getting back on track, the 

seven-ton hit an IED. The wheel was the only 

casualty. But it was a mobility kill for the truck. 

Tombleson transferred 2d Squad to another 

seven-ton. 

It was the first of four IEDs the platoon hit 

that day. 

They hit the next one after voices on the radio 

told Karell that the bulldozer had knocked a hole 

in a compound wall, then gotten itself stuck on 

the rubble pile. A four-man fireteam climbed down 

from the seven-ton to provide security. Willie, the 

point man, led the way alongside the seven-ton 

toward the back of the bulldozer, where they knew 

the ground was clear. But then incoming rounds 

began to hammer the side of the seven-ton. 

The fireteam did what had been drilled into 

them: when you’re under fire, you return fire, 

take cover, then return accurate fire. They ran to 

the compound wall to take cover, point man first, 

and Willie knelt to return accurate fire. He knelt 

on an IED. 

Waiting in the orchard, 3d Squad heard the 

explosion. Karell heard Guest’s voice shouting 

on the radio to arrange casualty evacuation, others shouting orders and offers of support. Karell 

strained to keep them from shouting over each 

other. They shouted that 2d Squad had four or five 

casualties and one KIA, killed in action. 

Hospitalman Anthony [S.] Ameen, 3d Squad’s 

Navy medical corpsman, requested permission to 

go help. Third Squad had a secure position, and 

Marines trained as combat lifesavers. Karell was 

under the impression that 2d’s corpsmen had been 

overwhelmed. 

“You can go,” he told Ameen, “as long as you 

take the engineer with you so he can sweep for you.” 

So Schrey set out again at the head of a line 

of Marines. Another corpsman, Hospitalman 

Jack Driscoll, was right behind him, then a few 

Marines providing security, one wearing a helmetmounted camera, then Ameen farther back in the 

line. Cameras were now everywhere on the battlefield—from the noses of aircraft to the helmets of 

infantrymen, who sometimes strapped them on as 

personal video diaries. 

On the video recorded that morning in July, 

the helmet-cam catches glimpses of Schrey’s detector at the head of the line as it reaches each end of 

its arc—a pendulum sweeping back and forth just 

above the ground, ticking off the seconds it’s taking to reach the injured Marines. Slowly, steadily, 

the seconds turn into minutes. The men cross a 

dirt field, pass through a wall, cross another field. 

They come around the seven-ton and turn, and 

there, in the lee of another wall, is a huddled cluster of Marines. 

That’s where Willie is. He isn’t dead. He’s lost 

both legs and an arm, and at first he had no pulse, 

but a corpsman revived him. Schrey’s ticking pendulum leads the line of rescuers along the wall 

toward Willie. Then, somewhere, there’s an explosion. The Kevlar helmets in the line turn quickly 

left, the helmet-cam swiveling left, too. A plume 

of dark smoke rises beyond the trees. 

The camera’s view swivels back to the line, but 

everyone is distracted now—the explosion, plus the 
161

Marines huddled around Willie are directly ahead, 

only yards away. The pendulum is still sweeping, 

but for some reason the line has slowed; it isn’t 

moving forward. 

There’s motion off to the right. A figure blurs 

past the helmet-cam between the line and the wall. 

It’s Ameen. He has stepped out of the line because 

it’s drilled into corpsmen that when one of your 

Marines is hurt, corpsman up!, you run. Willie’s 

right there, just ahead, needing him, corpsman 

up! Ameen steps out of the stalled line and runs. 

He’s passing Driscoll and Schrey when he steps 

on the next IED. 

The boom knocks Schrey down, his feet flying in the air. Ameen’s down, too, rolling on the 

ground, moaning. Driscoll is up. Schrey sees him 

wandering around in a daze, bleeding from his ears. 

“Driscoll!” Schrey shouts, but Driscoll can’t hear 

him. Schrey is desperate for Driscoll to stop walking around before he hits another IED. “Driscoll! 

Driscoll!” 

With that, the video ends. 

Driscoll finally stopped and was medevaced 

along with Ameen, who would lose a foot. Tombleson and all of 2d Squad carried Willie to the 

seven-ton, and as they struggled to lift him into the 

tall truck, he came to. He tried to help the Marines 

helping him. He reached out to pull himself up 

and realized he had only one arm. 

In the back of the seven-ton, Willie slipped 

into unconsciousness again, unaware of the Estonian soldiers, who charged up in one of their fast, 

heavily armored personnel carriers. The Estonians are known for their fearless charges. They 

hauled him to the helicopter landing zone on the 

far side of Now Zad faster than the Marines’ vehicles could have. 

Tombleson pulled 2d Squad back together. Karell 

moved the assault forward, ordered rocket shots, 

called in mortars and airstrikes. They destroyed 

the insurgent’s rally point that day. That afternoon, during the retrograde to Now Zad, another 

vehicle hit the fourth IED. No one was hurt, just 

a mobility kill, but it slowed their return to the 

FOB, where the news waited that in the medevac helicopter thundering over the desert, Willie had died. 

Karell called 3d Platoon together. They were 

exhausted and dirty, and he could see in their 

eyes they were shaken. He knew they’d be asking 

themselves what they were doing here, why was 

this happening. He tried to give them a solid, factual context for their sacrifice and loss. He heard 

himself speak in clichés. He didn’t used to. As 

someone who appreciates the English language, he 

sometimes wondered why everyone in the military, 

including now himself, always spoke in clichés. But 

clichés are efficient. Use a cliché to express emotion, and you can quickly get back to the mission 

and the business of staying alive. 

Karell remembered talking about how they’d 

been sent around the world to a place they’d never 

been, to help bring justice and development to a 

people they’d never met. No matter what happened, he told them, they should always be proud 

of what they were doing and what Willie had died 

for. Hospitalman Eddie Daniel, a slight 20-yearold sailor and 1st Squad’s corpsman, wore a big 

pack of medical gear on his back when he went 

out on missions, and a prayer to St. Michael inside 

his Kevlar. He listened and struggled to hide his 

frustration, anger, and tears. 

Eight months before, while training for this 

deployment, Karell had asked his new platoon a 

question. They were out on a field exercise on a 

warm Southern California day, sprawled across broken-down bleachers for a class. “When you were 

in Iraq,” he asked them, “how many of you felt 

like you were just driving around waiting to get 

blown up?” Almost all of them raised their hands. 
162

After that, he focused their training on changing that mind-set. “You’re not just a target,” he’d 

tell them, “you’re hunters. You fight back. You go 

after the enemy.” 

The day Willie died, that same night, Karell 

walked eight members of 1st Squad, including 

Daniel, back up near the bombed-out rally point. 

By now, the Marines knew the insurgents often 

returned to the scene of a fight to do assessments 

and plant more IEDs. Sure enough, no sooner 

did 1st Squad get up there, than they received a 

report of movement just out of sight. I want to 

get these guys, Karell thought. But the grass was 

dry, and every step made noise. Whoever was out 

there heard the Marines coming and ran back 

to the north. “At least it showed them that we’re 

out there, it’s not safe for them at all,” he told his 

Marines. “We disrupted whatever they were trying to do tonight.” 

But after a long, heartbreaking day, there was 

another reason for that hard night’s walk: morale. 

Looking back, Karell said quietly, “That’s what 

it takes for the guys, psychologically, to stay in 

the fight.” 

*** 

The summer wore on. When the Marines fought 

during the day, they did it in temperatures of 120 

degrees Fahrenheit. The supply convoys kept getting blown up. They were eating the same three 

prepackaged meals over and over again. There was 

no running water, no A/C, and clouds of dust blew 

through their hooches. Contact with the outside 

world was limited to a shared satellite phone and 

intermittent Internet access. But what bothered 

them most: they knew they weren’t going to be 

replaced. The day when there would be enough 

Afghan police and soldiers to take over was still a 

long way off. 

The Afghan National Police alone needed 2,300 

trainers. The European Union Police Mission had 

promised to provide them, but as of last summer, 

fewer than 200 were on the job, as reported by the 

congressionally established United States Institute 

of Peace [USIP]. Enabling a government to protect its people is a crucial part of counterinsurgency strategy. That’s why Task Force 2/7 had 

been sent—to help fill the gap and try to make 

up for lost time. 

But the effort was still undermanned and 

the Marines underprepared. “If my Marines are 

going to do this,” police trainer Frank Carson 

told a Marine interviewer, “they need more training back in the States.” Plus, in Helmand, the 

Marines were simultaneously fighting a war. 

As a result, Afghan police and soldiers were 

spread very, very thin. When the Fox Company 

Marines left Now Zad, there would be no one to 

hold the territory some of them had died to clear, 

and the people and their police would probably 

never move back. Staff Sergeant Kevin [A.] Buegel, the no-nonsense 27-year-old who took over as 

platoon sergeant after Guest was wounded, said 

bluntly, “For a while, it felt like it was for nothing.” 

One day, Schellhaas gathered Fox Company 

together. The commander’s family had served in 

the U.S. military for generations. He was enlisted 

before he became an officer. He stood like a man 

carrying a heavy load. He climbed halfway up a 

ladder, looked out over the crowd of dusty young 

men. He was as dusty as they were. 

He remembered telling them: “You’re Marines; 

you live in an austere environment. We’re here 

to extend Afghan governance. The only way 

we’re going to win this thing is if we can get 

the Afghan police up here.” At the very least, 

he said, they were making a difference for other 

towns, drawing insurgents away from those 

battlegrounds to fight in Now Zad instead. 

Then, in September, they learned that four 

Cobras and four CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters were 
163

being pulled out of Iraq and sent to Helmand. 

But there was still bigger news: when Fox Company left Now Zad, another company of Marines 

would be taking their place after all. Earlier this 

year, when the Obama administration announced 

plans to send thousands of additional troops and 

trainers, the whole undermanned effort received 

a similar morale boost. “That was huge,” Karell 

remembered, “that someone would be coming in 

to finish the work that we had started.” 

*** 

Karell squinted through a small window down into 

a smoke-filled basement. Between the gunpowder from the grenades his Marines had thrown in 

and the dust the explosions had kicked up from 

the dirt floor, Karell recalled that he couldn’t see a 

thing. He couldn’t see whether the insurgent with 

the AK-47 rifle was still a threat. 

It was late October, and 3d Platoon, backed up by 

the better part of Fox Company, had finally plunged 

into Pakistani Alley to take on the insurgents holed 

up there. After months of unrelenting combat, 

they had cleared the insurgents out of Now Zad 

and even a kilometer or two of the valley around 

it. For this last big assault, with only weeks to go 

before Fox Company headed home, Karell hadn’t 

bothered with an order to fix bayonets. By now, no 

one needed help getting into a combat mind-set. 

Squinting into the basement inside a compound in Pakistani Alley, Karell knew he was silhouetted, an easy target. So he aimed his M9 pistol 

at the spot where they’d heard the shooter with 

the AK moving around and unloaded the rest of 

a 15-round clip into the smoke. 

Corporal Joseph [S.] Culliver listened to the M9 

bang away. He was second in the line of Marines 

waiting to go in. He was 23, flat-voiced, prone to 

ironic commentary. Back when Culliver was still 

in classes at George Mason University, he partied with his fraternity brothers and played a lot 

of paintball with his housemates, hours of pow, 

pow, ha-ha. 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Alfredo G. Cantu 

PO3 Edwin L. Daniel, USN, of Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, provides cover on a rooftop during a clearing 

operation in Now Zad, Afghanistan.
164

There was nothing ha-ha about this. Talking 

about it the next day, Culliver and the other Marines 

said they thought the basement had already been 

cleared. Then one of their team walked in, got 

shot at, and jumped back. Several of the Marines 

had picked up some Pashtu and shouted to the 

shooter to give himself up. 

Culliver was Fox Company’s intelligence analyst. He would have liked to talk to the shooter, 

who actually did come out with his hands up. 

But when the shooter saw four Marines pointing 

rifles, he ran back into the basement. The team 

of Marines all said they had the same thought: 

damn, now we have to go after him. 

So they kept throwing in grenades and lining 

up to go in. Culliver had been on the receiving end 

of grenades before, and he knew how you couldn’t 

hear afterward. But still, each time they went in, 

they shouted in Pashtu for the shooter to surrender. They kept getting shot at for their trouble. 

Never one to mess around, Buegel, the platoon sergeant, applied some C4 explosives, but even that 

got them nowhere. The shooter just kept shooting. 

He wasn’t going down despite being hit repeatedly. 

Meanwhile, the rest of 3d Platoon was pushing 

on through Pakistani Alley, clearing it compound 

by compound. They were fighting their way forward against mortar blasts that knocked them off 

their feet, grenades that came soaring over walls, 

and heavy machine-gun fire from tunnels that riddled the compounds. 

Karell made his way over to the basement. “It 

only takes one guy shooting at you to hold you 

up,” he said later, and they couldn’t afford to get 

held up. They had a lot of compounds to clear and 

too few Marines to clear them. 

Daniel took aim through the basement window. In the months since Willie had died, Daniel had earned a Purple Heart and gotten very 

good with his M4. He fired into the basement. 

That made the shooter pop his head out the door, 

but the Marines were still there, and he ducked 

back inside. 

Finally, the smoke-filled basement went still. 

Culliver heard Karell empty his M9 through 

the window as a final precaution, and then the 

Marines went in. Culliver was second through 

the doorway. Through the smoke, he saw the 

mortally wounded shooter. He saw him reach for 

his AK-47. 

The Marine in front of Culliver fired two 

rounds. Both hit the shooter in the head, according to Culliver. After the smoke cleared, Culliver 

wasn’t surprised to find syringes. He had guessed 

the shooter, like others, had been amped up on 

something—despite all his wounds, the man 

never cried out. 

Many of the leaders of Afghanistan’s insurgency may be Taliban, fanatically religious men. 

Others are old-school warlords. But the frontline fighters are often malnourished addicts or 

drug traffickers or hard-case farmers who’ve never 

been subject to any form of government and don’t 

intend to start now. Some are Afghan. Some 

aren’t. Referring to all the insurgents as “Taliban” 

is a form of shorthand, agree Afghan and Coalition personnel. 

Then one of the other two squads spotted more 

insurgents moving toward them. Karell hurried 

through an alleyway and clambered up onto a 

roof. A rocket failed to push back the insurgents, 

so he got on the radio to call in a mortar. The 

fight ground on. 

From the air, the Cobra pilots could see Karell’s 

three small squads of Marines spread out and 

pushing west through the compounds—essentially an urban area, the worst kind of place to be 

spread out. In that environment, it took 3d Platoon seven hours, including pauses for airstrikes, 

to fight their way past what Karell guesses were 
165

only half a dozen insurgents. That was nothing 

compared to what the pilots could see lay ahead. 

From the western end of Pakistani Alley, insurgents were swarming east toward the scattered 

Marines. Only bombs from above drove the fighters back. 

Before 3d Platoon ran low on water, ammunition, and daylight, they did succeed in capturing their first detainee in combat—held their fire 

after getting shot at, used their Pashtu to talk 

him through surrendering. Unlike in the basement, it worked. They also found a building full 

of materials for making IEDs and destroyed it. 

But they only cleared halfway through the 

compounds, and Culliver said there were more 

IED factories up ahead that they just didn’t have 

the manpower to get to. Schrey said they weren’t 

able to destroy all the bunkers and fighting positions they found, either, because they ran out of 

explosives. There were more back in the vehicles 

waiting at the entrance to Pakistani Alley, but the 

alley was too narrow to drive in the explosives, 

and that manpower problem made it impossible 

to carry it all in. 

“To clear an area that size, that’s a companysized operation,” Karell explained. “We had a platoon.” That’s just a few dozen Marines, one-third 

of a company. 

Without enough troops, they also couldn’t 

corner the insurgents and force them into a fight 

where more could be captured or killed. “Unless 

you can block the enemy’s avenue of egress, you 

can’t get them to engage,” said Schellhaas. “They 

run away.” 

There weren’t enough Marines to hold the 

compounds they did clear, either. When 3d Platoon left Pakistani Alley, the insurgents filtered 

back in. 

*** 

The day after the Pakistani Alley operation, Karell 

loaded a squad into a few Humvees and a seventon. Culliver climbed in, too. Today they drove 

south. Heralded by a plume of dust, they bounced 

three kilometers across the valley’s broken ground 

to the hamlet of Khwaja Jamal. 

The Marines used to get shot at when they 

drove near. Lately they’d been able to start walking foot patrols and talk with the villagers. The 

squad dismounted and followed a footpath walled 

in by mud-brick compounds. Village men drifted 

out to peer at them. 

Rural Afghans have been living in hardscrabble villages like this for generations. The Marines 

weren’t living much differently, and that suited 

Culliver fine. He’d walked away from a scholarship at George Mason to enlist in the Marine 

Corps because he felt like his whole life had been 

handed to him. He and his college housemates 

had a pool table in their rented house. He’d been 

a Senate page; it bored him. He’d joined a fraternity and taken a heavy class load and wound 

up distracted and burned out at the same time. 

“It wasn’t a big enough challenge,” was how he 

explained it. “I hadn’t shown what I could do.” 

In the Marines, after his intel training, he chose 

to go with the infantry because, he said, “the infantry way of life is hard. And you’re treated pretty 

crappy.” The spartan FOB in Now Zad had lived 

down to all his expectations. 

The Afghans Culliver had met out here seemed 

to have similar expectations. As an intel analyst, it 

was his job to handle tactical questioning whenever a patrol encountered civilians or suspected 

combatants. He said flatly, “There’s no strive 

toward modernization. They just want to live in 

their homes in peace, grow their poppy, live, die, 

rinse, repeat.” His assessment was seconded by others in the military and civilian efforts here: more 

than anything, the average Afghan just wants the 

fighting to stop. 
166

The peering villagers grew into a crowd, more 

than Karell had seen in a while. Apparently the 

Pakistani Alley operation hadn’t soured them on 

the Marines. 

Culliver and an Afghan interpreter stepped 

in under the thatched roof of a small shop. 

The shopkeeper stocked marijuana, hashish, 

and powdered narcotics. He tried to sell Culliver some weed. Villagers pressed in around 

them. A man told Culliver that at night, after 

the Marines left, the Taliban usually came. The 

shopkeeper kept trying to sell him some weed.

One of the villagers insisted that the Afghan 

government worked for the United States. Culliver 

reported dryly, “I tried to correct that impression,” 

by explaining his take on it: that America was just 

helping the Afghan government take care of the 

Afghan people. 

The shopkeeper kept pushing the weed. 

A few men continued to loudly question American motives until the Marines’ young Afghan interpreter lost his cool and yelled at the villagers, “You 

guys are crazy! These guys are trying to help you!” 

The rest of the Marines hung back, one eye on 

the crowd around Karell and Culliver, one on the 

pathways that wound out of sight. 

As the sun set, the Marines walked out of 

Khwaja Jamal and climbed into their vehicles. 

Rocking in the back of the seven-ton, Karell 

raised his voice over the groaning engine. “Half 

the questions were about farming and water!” he 

shouted. “And for the first time, they started asking when they can move back into Now Zad!” 

“Yeah!” Culliver shouted back. “And half the 

questions were, ‘How many Marines live on your 

base? How far can your guns shoot?’” All the 

Marines laughed, but quickly fell silent. They 

gazed out at the sunset. It was soft and pink above 

a starkly beautiful moonscape hemmed in on both 

sides by mountains jagged as crocodile teeth. 

*** 

By November, Fox Company was making way 

for their replacements. Karell and Buegel walked 

slowly through Now Zad’s empty streets, clouds 

of moon dust poofing up around their boots. In 

the past six months, one-third of their platoon had 

been wounded, including Buegel, blown out the 

door of a Humvee by an IED. 

“It’s going to be weird leaving this place,” Buegel murmured, “after everything . . .” 

“It’ll be weird,” Karell agreed, “for about five 

seconds.” 

A couple of weeks later, they were back in 

California, driving to work on Camp Pendleton 

every day, shopping in grocery stores, flushing 

toilets. For Karell, the weird part was that being 

back didn’t feel weird at all, not even for five seconds. He settled in with less than a month left on 

his active-duty obligation. Just before Christmas, 

he was back in Arlington. 

On Wilson Boulevard, in the crowded backroom bar of Ireland’s Four Courts pub, Karell 

was talking to Martin Weinstein, his old boss at 

the law firm. Karell had to shout to be heard over 

the welcome home party going on around them, 

introducing Weinstein to his parents. 

“His office is waiting for him!” Weinstein 

shouted to the Karells. “He’s got a job when 

he’s ready to come back! He’s a hero around our 

office!” Karell looked embarrassed. 

On the TV over the bar, the Ravens were 

kicking a——s down in Texas Stadium. Karell 

was shouting to Weinstein, “I got in a gunfight 

my last day in Now Zad!” It happened a month 

after the Pakistani Alley operation, just south of 

Khwaja Jamal. One day they were handing out 

blankets. The next day they were ambushed. 

Karell looked heavenward, laughing with disbelief. “And I’m like, ‘This is my last day! This is 

not happening!’” 
167

In a quieter moment that night, Karell admitted to Weinstein, “Every day, I question the decisions I made, how we could have done better.” 

His instructors had told him that, in combat, 

the 70 or 80 percent solution now is better than 

the 100 percent solution a week from now. Still, 

the second-guessing would always start immediately, even as he went on pressing the fight, and it 

continued now—everything from the operation 

that killed Willie to the struggle to get the insurgent out of the basement. About both situations, 

Karell said, “Knowing what I knew at the time, 

I think I made the right call.” His face was somber. “I’m not saying I regret any of the decisions I 

made. It’s just, because of the consequences, you 

obviously think about it.” 

Despite the second-guessing, his takeaway 

from Afghanistan reflects a quintessential American optimism. “It’s easy to write that place off,” 

he said. “There are Taliban everywhere. But just 

seeing what one infantry company is able to do, 

it’s not a lost cause.” Then he added, “Just think 

what doubling the troops could do. That’s not 

going to win the war; guys like USAID are going 

to win the war. But . . .” He let the thought hang. 

The civilian side of the U.S. effort is even more 

undermanned than the military side. 

The Marines of 2/7 will deploy again next 

fall. In the meantime, there’s always some turnover when a unit comes home—Marines are promoted, rotated, their enlistments run out. Karell’s 

active-duty obligation ended five days before this 

homecoming party. Without him, that left Buegel as Fox Company’s only leader with Afghanistan experience, experience they’ll need for the 

next deployment. 

Which is why Karell has signed on for another 

tour. 

Note

The Washington Post Magazine, 21 June 2009, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content

/article/2009/06/12/AR2009061202123_pf.html. 

Reprinted by permission of the author.

About the Author

Kristin Henderson was embedded with 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Afghanistan.
168

SN Benjamin Thiel (left), USN, assigned to Golf Company, 

2d Battalion, 7th Marines, provides security while patrolling though a village outside of Bala Baluk’s forward operating base in Farah Province. 

Photo courtesy of Cpl Jason T. Guiliano
Counterinsurgency 

on the Ground 

in Afghanistan: How 

Different Units Adapted 

to Local Conditions 

A U.S. Marine Platoon 

in Gulistan, Farah, 2008

by Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, 

and James A. Gavrilis

From May to November 2008, a platoon of U.S. 

Marines from 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment 

(2/7), operated in the isolated and dangerous Gulistan Valley in Farah Province in southwest Afghanistan. Gulistan District was an enemy sanctuary 

that had never been pacified. The insurgents had 

a firm hold on the population, and on the district 

government and police. By November, the platoon 

of Marines had pushed the Taliban out of the district’s main villages and had built a base of support for the government.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, was the first 

U.S. Marine battalion to establish a permanent 

presence in southern Afghanistan. Its mission 

was to train the Afghan police in eight districts 

in northern Helmand and Farah—a vast, mostly 

ungoverned area where insurgents moved freely. 

After arriving in theater, the battalion learned that 

169
170

there were few functioning police forces in these 

districts, and that the area was almost entirely controlled by the Taliban.

Gulistan was the most remote district in 2/7’s 

area of operations. The platoon’s outpost in Gulistan 

was located more than a day’s drive from the nearest 

U.S. base. A few U.S. and NATO units had been 

in and out of Gulistan, but none had established 

a permanent presence. These forces had achieved 

little and built few relationships with the locals.

Establishing the Marines’ Footprint 

in Gulistan

In April 2008, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7), 

was sent to southwest Afghanistan to train the local police. The battalion was spread across eight 

districts in two provinces straddling two regional 

commands. In Helmand Province, the battalion 

was responsible for the districts of Musa Qala, Sangin, Now Zad, and Washir. In Farah Province, the 

battalion had Bala Baluk, Bakwa, Delaram, and 

Gulistan Districts.1

In this vast area, there were large numbers of 

highly proficient Taliban fighters and virtually no 

competent police. British forces in Sangin, Musa 

Qala, and Now Zad were under constant siege. 

In six of these districts, the Marines were the only 

significant military force (there were British forces 

in Sangin and Musa Qala); it was up to them to 

hold these districts against the Taliban while building police forces from scratch. [The] 2/7’s deployment was meant to be a one-shot deal with no plan 

for follow-on forces. Yet the battalion ended up 

establishing what would become a long-term U.S. 

Marine presence in Farah and northern Helmand.

Within weeks of arriving in theater, the battalion was ordered to disperse its three rifle companies across this vast area. One company was sent 

to Sangin, another to Musa Qala and Now Zad. 

The third went to Delaram, a notorious truck stop 

along the Ring Road between Helmand and Farah 

Provinces. This third company was responsible for 

four districts in Farah, all Taliban sanctuary areas. 

In late May, a platoon of Marines left Delaram 

and drove north into the remote Gulistan Valley. The platoon set up a makeshift combat outpost at the district center next to the local boys’ 

school, and met with local officials. Armed only 

with some basic maps, many of them dating back 

to the 1950s, the Marines knew almost nothing 

about the area. 

The Marines did not know before they arrived 

that Gulistan District was entirely under the control of the insurgents. The insurgents collected 

taxes and operated a parallel shadow government. 

It was common knowledge in the valley that the 

district governor and police chief were actively collaborating with the Taliban, which ruled through 

a combination of political alliances and intimidation. Militants from Helmand and other areas 

of Afghanistan used Gulistan as a safe haven—a 

place to rest, train, and plan operations.

The platoon’s combat outpost, located at the 

district center, was a day’s drive from the company 

headquarters in Delaram—through mountain 

passes controlled by the insurgents. In October 

2007, [more than] 100 insurgents from Helmand 

had launched a catastrophic ambush on a U.S.-

Afghan convoy attempting to regain control over 

the valley. Before the Marines arrived, the small district police garrison had been repeatedly over-run.

As soon as the Marines arrived, the Taliban 

stepped up its campaign of intimidation. Within 

days of the platoon’s arrival, the Marines observed 

a car driving through the village. As the vehicle 

passed down the main road in the village, people 

turned off their lights and generators. The Marines 

learned the next morning that the car was that of 

a Taliban commander threatening people with 

beatings or death if they played music, allowed 
171

women to leave the home, sent their girls to school, 

or interacted with the Marines.

The Taliban delivered night letters (written 

threats delivered under the cover of darkness) 

to a nearby girls’ school, forcing it to shut down. 

The Marines countered with security patrols and 

a mobile defense of the schoolhouse during the 

school day. Within two weeks, the school was 

running again. The insurgents also threatened the 

police, most of whom were local men with families living in the valley. There were daily reports 

that insurgents were organizing to attack the platoon’s combat outpost.

The district governor and police chief actively 

collaborated with the Taliban. Although they were 

from different clans, they were close allies. These 

officials fed the Marines false information and 

sold weapons and ammunition to the insurgents.

The Taliban continued to control the only 

route into and out of the valley, through the Buji 

Bast pass south of the district center. In midJune, the Marines surrounded a village near the 

pass known to harbor insurgents attacking traffic on the road. Despite exaggerated claims about 

the strength of the enemy force, the insurgents 

fled before the Marines arrived. When the Taliban tried to return several days later, the village 

leadership fought them off. The villagers were no 

longer afraid after seeing how quickly the insurgents were defeated at the hands of the Marines.

From the day the Marines arrived, they executed 

a deliberate campaign plan developed by the platoon commander to influence the area. The platoon did two to three foot patrols a day to nearby 

villages, plus one mounted patrol to an outlying 

village. After several weeks of continuous patrolling and relationship building, the townspeople—

especially the shopkeepers and teachers—began 

cooperating with the Marines. During their patrols, 

the Marines noticed that in some villages people 

appeared supportive or at least indifferent, while 

in other areas the population was openly hostile.

The platoon commander insisted that every 

patrol have a specific mission other than just presence—to speak with a local shopkeeper, hold a small 

shura, or gather specific information about the area. 

The Marines learned to come to every meeting with 

an agenda, but to be patient and engage in casual 

conversation first. It was not part of local Afghan 

culture to get to the point quickly. In every meeting, 

the Marines repeated the same message: that they 

were there to provide security, train the police, and 

stop anyone who threatened the villagers or Marines.

The Marines demonstrated understanding and 

compassion without displaying timidity or weakness. They engaged and pursued anyone who shot 

at them on patrol, and never hesitated to dismount 

and close with the enemy when it made tactical 

sense. They were ready to engage the population 

or the enemy as the situation required.

In early July, [more than] 100 insurgents armed 

with rockets and other heavy weapons attacked 

the platoon’s outpost at the district center. Their 

plan was to over-run the position, and if that 

failed, force the Marines to call in air strikes on 

civilian compounds the insurgents were using as 

firing positions. The fighting raged for over two 

hours. The platoon did not call in air strikes. The 

Marines exercised restraint, and no civilians were 

harmed. The Taliban lost at least 13 men before 

they withdrew.

After the attack, the Marines noticed a change 

in attitude among the people living around the district center. The Marines heard villagers saying that 

“there is something different about Marines”—

that they were stronger than the insurgents. People 

began cooperating with the Marines, telling them 

about the valley’s tribes and political dynamics.

The Marines eventually learned that there were 

two dominant Noorzai Pashtun clans in the val-
172

ley—the Jimalzai and the Khojizai. The Jimalzai, 

many of whom were teachers and businessmen 

with some education, were more supportive of the 

U.S. presence. The Taliban enjoyed strong support in many Khojizai villages. The Marines also 

learned that the district governor was the seniormost leader among the Khojizai, and that he had 

deliberately misled the Marines about his tribal 

affiliation.

Rolling the Taliban Back 

and Rebuilding the Police

In July, 75 local men from the Afghan National 

Police (ANP) returned from the regional training 

academy in Shouz in Herat Province in the west. 

Despite their extra training, the police still lacked 

basic infantry and marksmanship skills. Corruption and drug abuse were rampant. The main 

source of income for individual police was bribes 

and extortion. They were not trusted by the population. The platoon struggled just to keep the 

police from using drugs while on patrol and standing guard.

The district police chief was widely known for 

incompetence, treachery, and vindictiveness. Police 

officers complained of beatings and rape, and of 

fears that they might be murdered in their sleep. 

By mid-July, 10 police had deserted. Another 30 

Photo courtesy of Cpl Pete Thibodeau 

U.S. Marines with India Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, and an interpreter speak with villagers at a bazaar 

in Farah Province, Afghanistan, on 15 February 2009. The Marines are talking with civilians at the bazaar to better understand local needs and concerns, a key element in conducting successful counterinsurgency operations.
173

went on leave and never returned. By the end of 

July, only 21 police were left. The Marines later 

learned that the police chief’s plan was to purge 

the police of all men not personally loyal to him, 

then reconstitute the force with his own people.

The police chief tried several times to lead the 

Marines into areas where they would be vulnerable 

to attack. The platoon commander tried repeatedly 

to have him removed, but to no avail. The police 

chief had been appointed by the district governor, 

who had connections in Kabul. According to the 

platoon commander, “We had to keep eyes in the 

back of our head. All we could do was mitigate 

his ability to threaten us, by keeping at least two 

Marines for every one police, in order to keep the 

police from becoming a liability in a gunfight.”

Immediately after the return of the newly 

minted police, the Taliban threatened the police 

and kidnapped their relatives. Insurgents kidnapped an engineer from Kabul who was in charge 

of building a forward operating base for the platoon near the district center. The Taliban also 

stepped up its campaign of intimidation against 

the population, including sending night letters to 

the teachers at the local boys’ school, as well as villagers suspected of cooperating with the Marines. 

The platoon split into three rifle squads and conducted four weeks of continuous patrolling in the 

district center. The idea was to prevent the insurgents from intimidating the police, so that the 

police could train with the Marines. The insurgents backed off and focused on outlying villages.

In late July, eight kilometers north of the district center, insurgents kidnapped, tortured, and 

killed three Tajik policemen returning home on 

leave. The district police chief—who viewed the 

Tajiks in his force as a threat to his power in the 

valley—had reportedly told insurgents that the 

policemen would be traveling that way. When the 

Marines tried to recover the bodies of the three 

slain policemen, insurgents trapped the convoy in 

a well-laid, L-shaped ambush. As the joint Marines 

and police moved south toward their base, they 

were hit again.

In early August, 40 to 50 Taliban ambushed a 

squad of Marines in vehicles as they tried to establish a cordon around a village believed to be harboring insurgents. An eight-hour firefight ensued 

in which the Marines drove the insurgents out of 

the village. The next day, the village elders came 

to the district center and held a shura with the 

platoon commander. The elders expressed gratitude to the Marines for sparing innocent lives in 

the house-to-house assault through the village, 

and indicated that more than 20 insurgents had 

been killed. These engagements took a heavy toll 

on the local Taliban and improved the stature of 

the Marines. Yet, the security situation remained 

precarious in most of the district’s villages. The 

insurgents continued to control much of the valley. 

More police deserted in August. The police chief 

let them go “on leave,” knowing that they would 

not come back. By the end of the month, only 9 

police were left out of the original 75.

The Marines decided that the situation in the 

police force had become intolerable. They pushed 

the district governor and police chief to reconstitute the force with local recruits and send them 

away for training. According to the platoon commander, “They [the district governor and police 

chief] said, ‘we’ve got this cousin and that cousin, 

and we will give them a weapon and a uniform’.” 

The Marines had serious misgivings, but believed 

they had no choice except to leave recruitment 

to the district government. The police chief got 

what he wanted—the dissolution of the existing 

force, which represented various ethnic and tribal 

groups in the district, and its replacement by a 

force personally loyal to him and drawn largely 

from a single clan. 
174

In mid-August, the Marines faced another 

crisis related to the construction of the forward 

operating base near the district center. The Kabulbased contractor in charge of the project had not 

paid the workers in more than two months. People had come from all over the valley to work on 

the project—many of them farmers who had left 

their fields uncultivated for the summer. Many 

of the workers had borrowed against their promised wages, and had fallen into debt with local 

moneylenders. The workers trusted the Marines, 

believing they would eventually be paid. By fall, 

the workers still had not been paid and, although 

work was nearly complete, most men returned to 

their fields. The Marines attempted to repay the 

villagers through various means of barter, such as 

food and fuel, but the debt was simply too great.

In late August, the Taliban began leaving the 

district and regrouping in more remote areas to 

the east. Local people began telling the Marines 

that the insurgents had left the northern part of 

the district—though there continued to be attacks 

around the Buji Bast pass along the southern edge 

of the valley. In October, the district governor 

began cooperating openly with the Marines for 

the first time.

Reports of Taliban intimidation ceased, and 

children returned to school. Farther south near the 

Buji Bast pass, villagers stood up to the Taliban—

telling them to leave and never return. In November, many local officials who had been victims of 

intimidation returned to work in the bazaar and 

at the forward operating base. They dealt openly 

with the Marines.

During the last week of November, the Marines 

turned over command to a platoon from 3d Battalion, 8th Marines. There continued to be attacks 

in the southern part of the valley and reports of 

insurgent movement on routes between Helmand and Farah. Yet, the Taliban was no longer 

in control in most of the valley, and security was 

much improved. These gains endured through 

2009 and into 2010.

Conclusion

The Marines in Gulistan operated on their own in 

one of the most remote areas of Afghanistan—far 

from higher headquarters, reinforcements, and resupply. The platoon had little time to prepare and 

knew almost nothing about the area going in. The 

Marines were surrounded by Taliban-controlled 

territory, and forced to work with local officials 

who were actively collaborating with the enemy.

Such conditions put considerable pressure on 

the Marines. In order to operate effectively—perhaps even to survive—they had to be creative, flexible, and aggressive.

The platoon commander had to become an 

expert on the politics of the area, sift through the 

deceitful claims of treacherous officials, identify 

potential supporters and detractors, and fight off 

large groups of proficient enemy fighters—all in 

an environment of persistent Taliban intimidation of the local population. These tasks went far 

beyond the unit’s original mission to simply train 

the local police.

Dealing with the police proved to be the platoon’s greatest challenge. Corruption and drug 

abuse were rampant; morale was terrible. Worst 

of all, the district police chief worked for the Taliban. The police chief systematically abused the 

men under his command, with the express intention of forcing them to desert. There was no way to 

build a viable police force with such a man at the 

helm. Yet, he could not be removed. The Marines 

had no choice but to work with him.

Despite these obstacles, the Marine platoon 

managed to push back the Taliban, regain control over the Gulistan Valley, and secure the support of much of the population.
175

According to the platoon commander, the key 

to his unit’s success was managing to be flexible, 

to be able to accept and deal with a certain level of 

corruption and treachery—and above all else, to 

demonstrate superior strength and will. The platoon had considerable autonomy to adapt its tactics 

and operations to the unique conditions it faced.

The unit succeeded due to a disciplined adherence to basic infantry principles and a thorough 

pre- and post-combat action process. A basic understanding of the concepts of counterinsurgency, 

coupled with a solid grasp of infantry tactics (with 

a bias toward speed and maneuver), ensured the 

platoon’s ability to tackle the complexity of tribal 

networks, while enabling it to prevail in every tactical engagement.

Notes

Reprinted with permission from Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: How Different 

Units Adapted to Local Conditions, CNA Corporation, November 2010, 25–34. Copyright CNA, 

www.cna.org. 

1. Unless otherwise noted, information in this vignette 

comes from interviews with the platoon commander 

on 13 May 2010.

About the Authors

Jerry Meyerle, PhD, is a senior research scientist 

in CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies. He served 

on Afghanistan and Pakistan policy reviews and as 

an advisor to the commander of the Kunar Provincial Reconstruction Team in eastern Afghanistan. 

From August 2011 to March 2012, he served as an 

advisor to the commanding general of II Marine 

Expeditionary Force (Forward) in southern Afghanistan. Megan Katt is a research analyst in CNA’s 

Strategic Studies’ Center for Stability and Development, where she focused on insurgency and 

counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. From 2011 to 

2012, she deployed to eastern Afghanistan in support of counter-IED intelligence and operations. 

James Gavrilis is also a senior advisor at the Center 

for Stability and Development. Gavrilis is a former 

U.S. Army Special Forces officer with more than 

24 years of experience in the infantry and special 

operations. Gavrilis also served at the Pentagon and 

was responsible for political-military operational 

analysis, policy, and strategy for the chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, 

and Service staffs. He is also an adjunct professor 

at Georgetown University and George Washington University, and teaches at the Department of 

State’s Foreign Service Institute.
176

Marines march past the Marine Corps War Memorial in 

Arlington, Virginia, during a Navy Cross medal award ceremony honoring GySgt Brian M. Blonder for his actions 

while serving in Afghanistan with 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.

Photo courtesy of PO2 Kevin S. O’Brien, USN.
Belated Honors for 

Marines in Fierce Battle

by Jeanette Steele 

The San Diego Union-Tribune,

10 July 2011

Ambushed and outmanned, a 30-member Marine 

platoon fought back and, before the long day was 

over, almost half had earned major military medals for valor—perhaps a measure of just how fierce 

the 2008 Battle of Shewan was.

The Camp Pendleton [California] force-reconnaissance platoon is finally getting public recognition 

for that battle on 8 August 2008, when they stumbled 

into a nest of 250 seasoned Taliban fighters while trying to secure a village in southwestern Afghanistan.

In the end, the Marines routed the enemy without a single U.S. fatality. But possibly the bigger 

victory, according to observers, was showing the 

local residents that American forces could dig in 

and beat the Taliban, despite the distraction of 

the Iraq war.

It was a precursor to later hard-won battles 

in Afghanistan after major U.S. troop surges in 

2009 and 2010.

“The situation in Afghanistan at that time was 

really pretty dire. The south of the country was 

as bad as you can imagine,” said Jeffrey Dressler, 

a senior analyst at the Institute for the Study of 

War in Washington, DC.

“It was one of the first tastes of what the Marines 

were going to bring to bear.” Captain Byron [J.] 

177
178

Owen and his Marines were ordered to take Shewan, a Taliban stronghold astride a key transportation route.

Owen, now 30 [years old], was the commander 

of 2d Platoon, a force-reconnaissance unit from 

Camp Pendleton, working with the 2d Battalion, 

7th Marine Regiment, from Twentynine Palms, 

[California].

The captain grew up in City Heights and then 

graduated from La Jolla High in 1998. An Eagle 

Scout, he always wanted to join the military but 

wasn’t sure he was cut out for officer’s bars until 

nearly the end of high school, said his father, James 

Owen. Beefing up his grades, he was admitted to 

the U.S. Naval Academy, class of 2003.

Owen was leading a seasoned 30-man platoon 

that morning, with several gunnery sergeants and 

staff sergeants. They would need all that experience before the eight-hour battle ended.

“The battle of Shewan was the most intense 

fighting I have seen in four combat deployments. 

The enemy was some of the best I have ever seen,” 

said Owen, interviewed by email from his current 

post in Afghanistan.

“Every shot they fired was well-aimed. At one 

point in the battle, they pinned us down with 

machine-gun fire and hit us with air-bursting mortars, after we took cover. I remember seeing them 

adjust the height of burst on us to be more effective and thinking, ‘Who the hell are these guys?’”

Owen received a Silver Star on 1 July [2011] 

for his role in skillfully marshalling Marines once 

the shooting started. His platoon sergeant, Gunnery Sergeant Brian [M.] Blonder, had received the 

top medal for the battle, the Navy Cross, in May 

[2011]. It is the second-highest military award for 

bravery against an enemy.

A platoon sniper, Sergeant Franklin [M.] Simmons, was honored with a Silver Star for exposing 

himself to bullets while heading for high ground 

with his MK11 [sniper] rifle. He got his medal 

on 4 July [2011].

In all, five Bronze Stars with V for valor and six 

Navy-Marine Corps Commendations with V were 

approved for Marines and Navy hospital corpsmen serving with the Camp Pendleton platoon.

The medals came nearly three years after the 

fact because of their sheer number for a one-day 

battle, a Marine personnel command official said.

It “required the development of a very detailed 

and indepth analysis of the contributions of each 

member involved, to ensure that the proper actions 

were credited to the correct Marine or sailor,” said 

spokeswoman Major Shawn [D.] Haney.

Also, military rules say that awards for the 

same event must move up the chain of command together. And the Navy Cross requires 

the signature of the Navy Secretary. Owen, who 

recommended his men for the honors, said so 

many medals were appropriate because “a lot of 

Marines had to do some extraordinary things.”

The battle could have easily gone the other 

way, he admits. It was an abusively hot day. Temperatures of greater than 120 degrees eventually 

led to some Marines dropping with heatstroke.

In the morning, they trooped toward Shewan 

on foot and with Humvees. Just before noon, 

rocket-propelled grenades and machine-gun fire 

began to hit.

What the Marines hadn’t known was that 

high-level Taliban commanders were meeting in 

the village that day, and 100 well-trained fighters 

were also present. Once bullets were in the air, the 

commanders coordinated their troops and called 

in more forces.

But Owen had Gunnery Sergeant Blonder, 

a Florida native with 13 years in the field. “We 

all hit the deck except for Blonder. Gunny just 

stands there like a gunslinger for the longest two or 

three seconds in my life, as the enemy is spraying 
179

machine-gun fire everywhere. He takes aim as cool 

as can be and drops a guy with a single shot to the 

forehead from 100 yards,” Owen said, recounting 

the first moments of the battle.

“He never hits the deck. I have never seen anything like it. He doesn’t skip a beat and starts after 

the rest of the enemy. There was a guy aiming in 

with his (rocket-propelled grenade), and he put 

it down when he saw his buddy’s head explode. 

That one shot changed the tempo of the battle.”

As for Simmons, his platoon captain said the 

young sniper from Oregon, now 27 [years old], 

was an amazing clutch shot that day.

“He crawls up on a berm, totally exposing himself to enemy machine-gun fire, and starts taking 

guys out left and right,” Owen said. “The official 

Marine Corps count is 18 kills, 2 possible kills, 

with 21 shots in 20 minutes. Incredible.”

The battle went on and on, with attacks and 

counterattacks by the Marines. Strafing fire from 

Air Force F-15s helped relieve pressure at crucial 

moments.

As for Owen, the action summary with his Silver Star citation says the captain calmly directed 

the fire of the Marines, despite the chaos of being 

ambushed and outnumbered eight to one.

At one point, Owen needed to focus his gunners 

on the enemy’s positions. But his radio was fried.

So, with bullets landing on his Humvee, Owen 

stood up and waved his arms overhead to catch a 

gunner’s attention. Using hand and arm signals 

and his own tracer bullets, he successfully relayed 

the target positions.

More than that, however, according to the summary: “Captain Owen’s comprehensive precombat 

preparation and planning, rapid decision making 

and bold decisive leadership not only allowed the 

platoon to recover from a devastating ambush and 

turn the tide of battle, his decision to decisively 

defeat the Taliban and prevent them from claiming . . . a victory undermined Taliban dominion 

and achieved a major victory.”

That win, it concluded, was felt long afterward. 

The Taliban didn’t attack the area for months.

Owen still remembers the period vividly, and 

the contributions of each of his men. 

“People write books about guys like that,” he said.

Note:

Reprinted with permission from The San Diego 

Union-Tribune, 10 July 2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/Jul/10/marine-platoon

-gets-belated-honors-for-fierce/. 

About the Author:

Jeanette Steele is a reporter for The San Diego UnionTribune and was an embedded reporter with the 

Marines in Afghanistan.

Photo courtesy of PO2 Kevin O’Brien 

Secretary of the Navy Raymond E. Mabus presents GySgt 

Blonder with the Navy Cross medal on 10 May 2011.
180

Marines of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 

prepare AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters for a mission at 

Camp Bastion, Helmand Province. 

Photo courtesy of LCpl Brian D. Jones
Cobras Strike 

in Afghanistan

Special Purpose Marine 

Air-Ground Task 

Force–Afghanistan

by Captain Justin M. Welan

Defense Video and Imagery Distribution 

System

CAMP BASTION, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—The shriek of the air horn breaks the silence 

of the day, the peaceful calm of the flight line 

violently interrupted. In seconds, papers fly, chairs 

are knocked out of the way, and shouts fill the air 

as maintainers and aircrew sprint to the aircraft.

To the casual observer, it seems nothing more 

than chaos erupting. But for Marine Light Attack 

Helicopter Squadron 269 [HMLA-269], Detachment B, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force–Afghanistan, this is an intricate and 

rehearsed reaction, as each member moves with the 

rapid precision reminiscent of a NASCAR pit stop. 

One hundred meters and 30 seconds later, pilots 

are already donning their flight gear. Just minutes 

later, the aircraft are already started, armed, and 

pilots are grabbing last-minute details for the troops 

in contact from the battalion air officer. As they 

pull in collective, clawing into the air, the aircraft 

momentarily shudder as every single ounce of lift 

181
182

is allocated to getting a full load of fuel, rockets, 

rounds, and missiles airborne. As the Cobras disappear on the horizon, silence again fills the air 

along with the nervous anticipation among the mix 

of airframers, avionics technicians, and ordnance 

men. They turn-to in preparation for hot reloading, troubleshooting, and battle damage assessment, as the next evolution of managed chaos is 

about to begin. 

The Marine Corps’ 2d Battalion, 7th Marine 

Regiment [2/7], originally scheduled to deploy to 

Iraq, was redirected a month prior to deployment 

and by April found itself operating in the Helmand 

Province of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 

Tasked with the mission of training and mentoring 

the Afghan national police, 2/7 was baptized under 

the full assault of Taliban and insurgent forces. 

They faced rocket and mortar indirect fire, or 

IDF attacks, direct-fire engagements from small 

arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and heavy machine 

guns, as well as a vast network of improvised explosive device manufacturers and emplacers.

The mission of 2/7 was to establish, train, 

and mentor local ANP [Afghan National Police] 

Photo courtesy of LCpl Chad J. Pulliam 

The Afghan National Police Commander for Musa Qala (left) talks with an interpreter as he greets LtCol Richard D. Hall, 

commanding officer, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, on 9 June 2008 at Camp Bastion, Helmand Province. 
183

units in order to build confidence in their ability to deter and interdict the insurgency. Reinforcements assigned to assist 2/7 with its mission 

included a combat engineer platoon, a shock trauma 

platoon, a radio battalion detachment, reconnaissance Marines, DynCorp civilian contractors, and 

personnel specializing in civil-military operations.

No deployment is complete, however, without the presence of “Mr. Murphy” [Murphy’s 

Law]. The Marines of 2/7 rapidly found themselves deeply engaged in combat operations and 

quickly realized that their training and mentoring mission would have to be complemented by 

significant counterinsurgency and combat operations. The mission for 2/7 formally changed and 

the wheels at Headquarters Marine Corps were set 

in motion to reconfigure the Marines in Afghanistan for full combat support. Among the shortfalls identified immediately were rotary wing close 

air support assets. 

“Be prepared to leave for Afghanistan as early 

as this weekend.” Those were the words of our 

executive officer, as he spoke to us on a Tuesday 

morning in early August in our ready room aboard 

Marine Corps Air Station New River, Jacksonville, North Carolina. Even though the squadron 

had spent the previous months preparing for its 

fifth deployment to Iraq, rumors had been swirling around about an alternate tasking to provide 

a detachment in support of 2/7.

In the end, the decision was made to deploy 

HMLA-269, Detachment B, to Afghanistan to 

support Task Force 2/7. The detachment, comprised of four AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, 10 pilots, and approximately 40 aircraft 

maintainers, ordnance men, and support Marines, 

arrived at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, in midAugust 2008.

Upon its arrival to Kandahar, HMLA-269, 

Detachment B, was initially placed under 

operational control to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s [24th MEU] air combat element 

formed from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 [HMM-365], also stationed out of MCAS 

New River.

That first week in-country was filled with a 

variety of briefs with topics ranging from rules of 

engagement to first aid. In addition to theater inbriefs and acclimatization, pilots began their orientation flights while the maintainers quickly got 

acquainted with the aircraft. Frequent IDF [indirect fire] attacks reminded everyone that even 

though Kandahar Airfield was a sprawling multinational base hosting thousands of service members and civilian contractors with a steady flow of 

U.S. and international heavy-lift aircraft, foreign 

attack jets, and a wide array of transport helicopters, both civilian contractor and military, it was 

located in the middle of a dangerous combat zone.

The advantages of Marine Corps rotary wing 

close air support became readily apparent to the 

operational forces in Regional Command–South. 

HMLA-269, Detachment B, was comprised of 

experienced pilots and maintainers, most with two 

previous combat deployments under their belts. 

Within one week of arrival, HMLA-269, 

Detachment B, repositioned from Kandahar to 

its present home at Camp Bastion and began conducting flight operations in support of 2/7. The 

mission was simple: provide close air support in 

direct support of 2/7, 24 hours a day, seven days a 

week. With no end date established, the Marines 

of HMLA-269, Detachment B, were ready to get 

to work.

On several early flights in 2/7’s area of operations, surface-to-air fire was encountered and 

dealt with appropriately and effectively. The mission of forward air control (airborne) was also frequently executed to control aviation and surface 

fires at the outposts. Much like 2/7, HMLA-269, 
184

Detachment B, quickly found itself immersed in a 

kinetic fight on a regular basis. The move to Camp 

Bastion was a step back in time to the days of the 

Corps’ combined arms exercises at Marine Corps 

Air-Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms 

[California]. A single airstrip, with a small contingent of general purpose medium-size tents represented the entire Marine air-ground task force 

footprint. Looking off to the north, Hildago was 

replaced by Kuh’e Khvajeh Ultat Baba, and at 

about the same distance to Gay’s Pass was Forward Operating Base Cafferetta, on the edge of a 

town called Now Zad, a war-torn village that conjures images of no-man’s land from World War I. 

Thankfully, the offensive smell of the waste-water 

treatment pond, also know as Lake Bandini, was 

left back at Kandahar.

Built in early 2006, Camp Bastion is the largest British overseas military camp built since 

World War II and the main British military base 

in Afghanistan. It is situated northwest of Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand Province. Originally quartering only British Forces and a small 

number of U.S. Special Forces and civilian contractors, Camp Bastion became the home of 2/7 and, 

after a brief stay in Kandahar, home to HMLA269, Detachment B.

In spite of its small size, Camp Bastion revealed 

itself to be a busy place. HMLA-269, Detachment 

B, shared the airfield with British Apaches, [Boeing] CH-47s [Chinook], H3s, and Lynx. U.S. 

Army Black Hawks flew out of Camp Bastion, filling the medevac role for the area of operations. In 

addition to these aircraft that called Camp Bastion home, the airspace was continuously transited 

by Marine [Sikorsky] CH-53s [Sea Stallion] and 

[Lockheed] C-130s [Hercules], Air Force [Boeing] C-17s [Globemaster], Coalition unmanned 

aerial systems, and a wide variety of Coalition and 

civilian cargo aircraft.

Task Force 2/7’s area of operations [AO] was 

greater than 35,000 square kilometers (more than 

twice the size of Connecticut), with terrain that 

varied from flat, open desert to rugged 9,000-foot 

mountain peaks. Population centers ranged in size 

from small groups of tents erected by sheepherders to cities with populations in the thousands. 

Nowhere in their AO was there a safe haven 

for the Marines that was free from the constant 

threat of enemy attack. Such attacks were, at times, 

as simple as pressure plate IEDs or as complex as 

coordinated small-arms and mortar attacks complete with support-by-fire positions and maneuver elements.

Using the theater call sign “Abusive,” HMLA269, Detachment B, immediately got to work for 

2/7 by focusing on a core mission set that centered 

around close air support, surface and rotary wing 

escort, and armed reconnaissance. Previous training and experience allowed HMLA-269, Detachment B, to quickly get the[ir] birds in the air and 

support the ground troops needing the firepower 

they had to offer. The detachment quickly established a battle rhythm. In addition to preplanned 

missions, HMLA-269, Detachment B, was ready 

at a moment’s notice to respond to mission supporting troops in contact. Within the first week 

after their arrival, the pilots on both shifts became 

intimately familiar with the various towns and 

widely varying terrain as a result of supporting 

tasking and responding to missions throughout 

all 35,000 square kilometers of 2/7’s AO. 

Word of HMLA-269, Detachment B’s arrival 

at Camp Bastion spread fast throughout the AO 

and support requests from a wide array of Combined Joint Special Operation Task Force units, 

Estonian forces, and British ground forces started 

flooding in. The task for the HMLA-269, Detachment B, operations officer was to liaise with the 

MEU operations section in order to balance all of 
185

the various requests. HMLA-269, Detachment B’s 

primary mission was to support 2/7, however, great 

effort was put forth to provide support to other 

units as asset allocation would allow. 

The months of September and October found 

the Marines of HMLA-269, Detachment B, heavily engaged with the Taliban and insurgents. Little 

by little, however, the insurgent fighters learned 

that shooting while “the skinny gray helicopters” 

(Taliban description of the [Bell] AH-1W [Super 

Cobra]) were overhead was not a bright idea. 

Soon, the distinctive sound of the AH-1Ws flying 

overhead was enough to quell attacks on friendly 

forces. The pilots of the detachment were faced 

with the feeling, familiar to any attack helicopter pilot, that the “bad guys” were getting away. 

However, the security that the presence of AH-1Ws 

overhead provided was often enough for mission 

accomplishment, even if a round was never fired.

After an initial honeymoon period of relatively 

little surface-to-air fire as the insurgents reacted 

to the presence of AH-1Ws in the AO, the situation gradually evolved and surface-to-air fires 

became more frequent. Along with radio intercepts discussing their attempts to hide from the 

helicopters, enemy fighters’ discussions turned frePhoto courtesy of LCpl Brian Jones 

Sgt Joshua E. Stone (right), Cpl Jason E. Beatie (left), and LCpl Patrick D. Ausley (front) align the gun sights on an AH-1W 

Super Cobra helicopter prior to a mission on the flight deck at Camp Bastion, Helmand Province.
186

quently to shooting at those same helos, with airburst RPG’s being the weapon of choice. As the 

threat evolved, the pilots of HMLA-269, Detachment B, continually reexamined their tactics so 

as to best accomplish the mission while reducing 

the enemy’s effectiveness.

Cowardly one moment, brazen another, the 

insurgent fighters proved to be a resilient and 

ever-present threat. They were knowledgeable on 

the alliance forces’ rules of engagement and were 

quick to adapt and change their own tactics, techniques, and procedures to exploit the limits of the 

alliance’s ROE. They gave little to no thought to 

using innocent civilians as human shields. One of 

the obvious advantages they had was an intimate 

knowledge of the terrain and population centers. 

They used this familiarity to mask their movements and to blend in with the local populace.

During the early part of November, the squadron detachment gained a new headquarters element. The 24th MEU departed and was replaced 

by SPMAGTF-A. Headquartered out of Kandahar, SPMAGTF-A picked up where the 24th 

MEU left off, taking over command of HMLA269, Detachment B, as well as 2/7. 

In late November, after eight intense months 

of daily combat operations, 2/7 was replaced by 

3d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced). 

Since HMLA-269 and 3/8 are both stationed in 

Jacksonville, North Carolina, the arrival of 3/8 

brought a number of familiar faces to Camp Bastion, to include two Cobra pilots from HMLA-269 

who were on one-year FAC [forward air control] 

tours. With their relief-in-place with 2/7 complete, 3/8 rapidly got to work, picking up where 

their predecessors left off.

In addition to a change in higher headquarters 

and supported units, November brought another 

undeniable change—cold weather. Sitting at 

roughly 3,000 feet mean sea level, Camp Bastion’s 

temperatures regularly dropped below freezing at 

night and struggled to break the mid-40s during 

the day. This presented increasing challenges to 

the maintenance Marines. With no hangar facilities, all maintenance, from the routine “daily 

and turnarounds” to indepth phase inspections, 

was conducted while exposed to the deteriorating 

weather. Mid-December also marked the official 

beginning of the Afghan rainy season, which complicated the situation even further. Camp Bastion’s 

dirt roads, combined with the influx of rain and 

heavy vehicle traffic, created a quagmire.

Photo courtesy of LCpl Brian Jones 

Sgt Joshua E. Stone establishes a targeting point to realign 

weapons systems on an AH-1W Super Cobra helicopter prior 

to a flight mission at Camp Bastion, Helmand Province, on 

12 January 2009. The Marines of HMLA-269 provide support to 3d Battalion, 8th Marines (Rein), the ground combat element of SPMAGTF–A.
187

In spite of the worsening weather, the mission 

and operational tempo did not change. The expected 

slow-down in insurgent activity that normally arrives 

with the Afghanistan winter never materialized. In 

fact, through the first half of December, the squadron detachment flew nearly as many hours at it had 

in any previous full month. HMLA-269, Detachment B, found itself being requested by external 

agencies and multinational forces even more than 

usual during periods of degraded weather, when 

fixed-wing aircraft couldn’t fly. The detachment’s 

capabilities and training allowed it to operate in 

conditions considered unworkable for any other 

rotary wing asset in theater. 

The AH-1W Super Cobra’s all-weather capabilities make it absolutely vital to the fight in 

Afghanistan, especially during the winter months 

when the weather traditionally takes a turn for the 

worse. The pilots of HMLA-269, Detachment B, 

realized that their enemies were bound and determined to hold onto any and all tactical and geographical advantages they had secured throughout 

the recent months.

Looking back on the time that HMLA-269, 

Detachment B, spent in Afghanistan, it is impossible 

to ignore the improvements made by U.S. and alliance ground forces. Their efforts have assisted the 

government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in weakening the grip of terror to which Taliban and insurgent fighters had been subjecting 

the people of Afghanistan. The combination of 

kinetic operations and civil-military interactions 

to include the training of local forces and in-depth 

counterinsurgency operations has made significant strides toward pacifying the strongholds of 

the insurgents. The balanced use of the full range 

of mission capabilities of the MAGTF once again 

demonstrated why the Marine Corps is the force 

of choice when combating an insurgency.

Note

Reprinted with permission from Defense Video and 

Imagery Distribution System, 16 January 2009, 

http://www.dvidshub.net/news/28917/cobras-strike

-afghanistan#.Ula5Eu0gIqY. 

About the Author

Captain Justin M. Welan was a public affairs correspondent for the Special Purpose MAGTF–

Afghanistan at the time this story was written.
188

Marines with 1st Platoon, Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion, 

12th Marines, prepare an M777A2 howitzer after receiving 

a call for artillery fire. The platoon was supporting a unit 

in the area that had positive identification of an insurgent 

emplacing an improvised explosive device (IED). 

Photo courtesy of Cpl Thomas E. Bellegarde
Combined Arms 

in Afghanistan

by Major Samuel L. Meyer

Marine Corps Gazette, August 2009

CAX [combined arms exercise] was not that bad.

Let’s take a look at Marine air-ground task force 

(MAGTF) fire support integration through an 

examination of a Marine expeditionary unit’s 

(MEU’s) experience in Afghanistan. It will provide valuable learning points for units preparing 

for their deployments.

Situation

In early 2008, 24th MEU was directed to deploy 

to Afghanistan in support of NATO and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). In the 

following months, the MAGTF was envisioned to 

operate as a theater task force in response to troubled 

areas in the nation. Arriving in March, the Marines 

would soon utilize the critical MAGTF concept of 

combined arms in support of the ground combat 

element (GCE) scheme of maneuver. MEU fire 

support integration would be greatly tested as U.S. 

Marines brought desperately needed help to those 

supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Enemy

The enemy in Afghanistan was not unlike the enemies seen in Operation Iraqi Freedom I (OIF I), 

189
190

albeit on a smaller scale. Insurgents still fought 

with guerrilla tactics—shoot and move, use the 

terrain and local populace to hide, and attempt to 

demoralize ground forces with harassing fires and 

homemade bombs—however, this enemy seemed 

to learn more quickly than those in Iraq. Lessons 

learned were available through discussions with 

ISAF counterparts; the enemy was utterly fearless, 

expectedly tenacious, and very adaptive.

They used the lineal terrain features like the 

canals, things they know we have a hard time 

crossing, to engage us from the other side. They 

thought we would not come at them, or if we 

did, we would have to [assault] into the teeth of 

their fire.1

Despite attempting to mass in greater numbers 

and reinforcing their fighters, the enemy would 

prove unable to repel the speed, strength, and agility of the MAGTF. “The enemy was completely 

overwhelmed by us and not used to the way we 

fought. . . .”2

Mission

As part of its first assigned mission, Operation 

Azada Wosa (Stay Free), 24th MEU would enter 

the southern Helmand Province town of Garmsir, 

a central point for the flow of personnel, weapons, 

and opium supporting the Afghan insurgents and 

terrorists. The Marines would establish ground 

lines of communications for subsequent tasking. 

Routes would be secured by Battalion Landing 

Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (BLT 1/6), with 

one company moving via convoy from the northwest, while two reinforced companies would be 

inserted by helicopter inside the eastern portion 

of the town. The BLT would secure the route and 

the surrounding area in conjunction with organic 

artillery and aviation fires.

Once the convoy and artillery support by fire 

were in position on the west side of Garmsir, the 

battalion (minus) heliborne insert could begin 

within the eastern sector. ISAF could not assist, 

as they were previously tasked or unable to fly 

in low ambient light levels. In the early morning 

hours, waves of [Sikorsky] CH-53E [Super Stallion] and [Boeing Vertol] CH-46E [Sea Knight] 

assault helicopters inserted two reinforced companies into the town. Harriers, Cobras, and Hueys 

waited overhead, providing close air support 

(CAS) and initial terminal guidance (ITG), while 

KC-BOs provided battlefield illumination and 

command and control. All assets provided crucial radio relay and pushed information back to 

the respective BLT and MEU combat operations 

centers (COCs). With the exception of minor 

injuries due to heavy pack loads and soft terrain, 

the insert was uneventful, and no enemy fire was 

received.

In the following days, the BLT maneuvered 

through Garmsir, a village full of Afghanistan’s 

primary cash crop—the opium poppy. While the 

MAGTF fought to expel a well-organized enemy 

from a trench system likened to those of World 

War I, it took equal care not to target civilians or 

the plants they grew. Throughout the battle, fire 

support integration was essential. Marine aviation 

provided CAS and urgent casualty evacuation 

(casevac) support; artillery provided destruction 

and suppression of enemy troops. MAGTF fires 

kept the enemy off balance as the BLT swept 

through the town. Combined arms were instrumental as the Marines took an enemy stronghold 

that had plagued ISAF and NATO for years. 

Imbedded reporters witnessing the operations 

generated media clips that often resembled trailers for war movies; however, the actions of the 

MEU simply demonstrated the execution of a 

well-conditioned MAGTF. Through combined 

arms and maneuver warfare, the Marines fixed, 

surrounded, and overwhelmed the enemy.
191

Combined Arms Support

“Our center of gravity is our combined arms.” 

“We overwhelmed them with all the vehicles, air, 

and arty [artillery].” These quotes did not come 

from strategic planners or dusty publications. They 

came from a sergeant and a lieutenant who served 

in BLT 1/6. As proven in the past, and again in 

Garmsir, what sets the Marine Corps apart is our 

ability to train and fight as the “air-ground” team. 

CAS and supporting fires were in short supply and 

high demand for all of OEF, but the MAGTF possessed organic fire support. While retaining control 

of its aviation assets was difficult at times in this 

multinational arena, commanders made it clear 

that the MEU was not a “shopping cart of toys” 

to be disbanded or piecemealed; it was a team that 

trained, planned, and operated as a single unit. 

Organic fire support and fire support integration 

were critical to mission success.3

Aviation Fires and FAC(A)

Aviation was a vital part of the plan for the MAGTF, 

providing logistical mobility and fire support. 

Rotary-wing (RW) and fixed-wing (FW) CAS assets 

combined to deliver aviation fires as well as contingency battlefield illumination; nontraditional 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); 

and casevac escort. With MEU KC-130 support, 

Harriers extended on-station times and increased 

ordnance loads, allowing multiple targets to be 

serviced in single sorties. Using a forward arming 

and refueling point collocated with the BLT COC, 

Hueys and Cobras provided maximum time overhead with continuous CAS coverage and minimal 

response time. “Every time we got shot at, the helicopters [and jets] would be right there ready . . . 

just looking for something to shoot.”4

Equally as vital for fires integration was the 

presence of a forward air controller (airborne) 

(FAC[A]). The MEU possessed the only certified 

FAC(A)s in the entire country. MEU FAC(A)s 

received more extensive ISAF training in rules of 

engagement and were well versed in BLT tactics, 

techniques, and procedures and it’s scheme of 

maneuver (SOM). FAC(A)s served to extend the 

tactical air control party by conducting terminal 

controls, but equally important were their abilities to provide radio relay, reconnaissance, asset 

coordination and deconfliction, coordinate generation, etcetera.5

 While in positive contact with 

the ground FAC, air officer (AirO), fire support 

coordination center (FSCC), and other ISAF aviation assets, RW FAC(A)s coordinated target generation, developed nine-lines [procedure form] 

(required by ISAF), controlled artillery fires, and 

refined friendly positions. The GCE often moved 

with such speed that ground leaders’ knowledge of 

forward units was difficult at best. RW FAC(A)s 

were ideal to coordinate friendly and enemy positions. They were close enough to see both friend 

and foe with the human eye, either directly or 

on night-vision goggles, while out of the current 

threat envelope.

All RW CAS platforms were FAC(A) qualified; 

this unique capability proved essential to fires integration and mitigated risk of fratricide innumerous 

cases. Through practiced procedures via MAGTF 

workups and predeployment training (PTP), missions were approved by the FSCC in seconds, not 

minutes. The speed resulted from extensive practice, trust, and experience with detailed planning 

and integration between FAC(A)s, the FSCC, and 

GCE. The Harrier community recently instituted 

a single-seat FAC(A) program. The single-seat 

qualified FW FAC(A) was instrumental in similar coordination and provided unique capabilities 

with sensors that were superior to those of legacy 

AH-IWs [Bell Super Cobra]. He was able to coordinate suspected improvised explosive device sites 

to the ground FACs. He also coordinated airspace, 
192

provided ITG and ISR as required, and then rapidly coordinated CAS and artillery fires with the 

FSCC. As the FSCC monitored the terminal attack 

direction net, attack briefs and enemy locations 

were relayed and missions were approved almost 

immediately. Targets were addressed most rapidly 

with aviation, allowing the Marines to maneuver 

in conjunction with those fires.6

Awesome isn’t even the word. The air was really, 

really on target . . . you knew you could bring in a 

500-pound bomb 190 meters away from you and 

you weren’t going to get anyone hurt because [the 

pilots] were that good.7

The MAGTF trained together, which facilitated accurate ordnance impacts, at times within 

danger-close distances, with minimal risk of fratricide and in harmony with GCE SOM. FAC(A) 

integration served as a battlefield multiplier and 

played critical roles in integration of timely and 

accurate supporting fires, to include artillery. MEU 

aviation dropped over 60 tons of ordnance during 

operations in OEF.8

Artillery Fires

Artillery fires with the M777 provided effects on 

targets and “suppression” of threats as the BLT 

pressed forward in Garmsir. The enemy possessed 

little air defense artillery and only “possible” manportable air defense systems (MANPADS), so traditional suppression of enemy air defense was not 

applicable. Enemy compounds or positions that 

could affect RW CAS were addressed using sequential timelines with aviation and artillery. These 

“packages” were strikingly similar to those taught 

at combined arms exercises (CAXs) and were used 

to facilitate deliberate assaults on major objectives; they required extensive, detailed coordination between artillery, aviation, the GCE, and the 

FSCC. “When the grid to suppress or the grid to 

mark changes [is] five minutes before the TOT [time 

on target], that’s when the pressure is really on.”9

As S-2 (intelligence) reports of possible MANPADS increased, artillery was used in situations 

that were deemed prohibitive to aviation. Marine 

artillery proved vital to cover gaps that aviation 

could not fill due to the threat or limitations with 

time on station. Artillery fire support required 

meticulous coordination, essential to assist Marines 

fighting an enemy only meters away. “Nearly all 

missions were fired danger close.” Artillery also 

provided critical fires that diverted enemy attention at night, allowing the BLT to refit and rearm 

for follow-on offensive operations. Marine artillery 

fired over 1,200 rounds in support of the BLT.10

FSCC

The FSCC functioned as advertised to integrate 

all MEU fires into a synergistic effort. Located in 

a Hesco bunker, the BLT S-3 (operations), the 

fire support coordinator (FSC), the AirO, and 

the direct air support center (DASC) sat shoulder 

to shoulder. Friendly positions were reported by 

ground units, refined by aviation and unmanned 

aircraft system (UAS) assets, and plotted by hand 

on a simple board with pins and strings representing MEU units and gun target lines. The artillery 

battery commander, serving as the FSC, and the 

AirO worked to approve fire missions as they coordinated with the BLT operations officer. RW CAS 

and casevac crews standing alert were also present 

in the COC and FSCC. Alert aircrews followed 

all developments via radio, mIRC (Internet relay 

chat client), and Scan Eagle. UAS and remotely 

operated video enhanced receiver feeds were critical as the COC and RW pilots gained higher situational awareness. With information influx to the 

COC, instructions for CAS and casevac crews were 

received directly from the FSCC prior to launch. 

This data allowed pilots better positive target identification and better weapons standoff.
193

DASC

The DASC performed its vital role in the Marine air 

command-and-control system, integrating aviation 

assets and deconflicting airspace. It provided control 

of MEU airspace through a high-density airspace 

control zone and owned the airspace covering 38 by 

50 nautical miles and from the surface to 28,000 feet 

surrounding Garmsir.11 Although normally using 

solely procedural control and not equipped with 

radar, they were able to tie into radar pictures from 

other ISAF agencies for higher situational awareness.

[The DASC] was very helpful throughout operations . . . having a direct air support center right 

there next to us. . . . We were really set up for success with the stuff we had.12

Marines additionally controlled numerous 

NATO and U.S. Army aircraft in support of Operation Azada Wosa. The DASC provided up-todate information flow as it coordinated airspace 

and maximized communications regarding the 

friendly and enemy situation to Marine aviation. 

During Operation Azada Wosa, the DASC controlled 3,631 sorties and supported 20 casevacs 

and medical evacuations and 76 troops incontact.13

As the BLT continued to move throughout the 

town during the month of May, supporting fires 

were constantly available to the infantry to address 

enemy fire and support friendly maneuver. Integrated fire support was essential to destroy, neutralize, and suppress enemy positions in conjunction 

with ground SOM. These efforts required quick 

thinking and detailed planning and were only 

possible after months of MAGTF training. “The 

[enemy] only left, I think, when they couldn’t deal 

with the combined arms anymore.”14

Lessons Learned and Future Training

According to ISAF, 24th MEU was “catastrophically successful.” Simply stated, the MAGTF executed as trained. The proficiency with which the 

MEU integrated organic fire support with ground 

scheme of maneuver separates the MAGTF from 

any other force on the modern battlefield. MAGTF 

fires allowed 24th MEU to clear the most hotly 

contested southern Helmand Province enemy 

stronghold in roughly one month, a feat ISAF 

had been unable to accomplish in nearly five years. 

Even with the success in Garmsir, if the Marine 

Corps expects continued success with combined 

arms and fire support integration, we must refocus MAGTF training that has been lacking in past 

years. MAGTF training in combined arms integration has declined since OIF began. While the 

decline was arguably inevitable for a time, effective training in fire support coordination for the 

MAGTF has fallen short in the past few years. 

The answer may not be the CAX of old, but the 

current training to bring the MAGTF together to 

plan, rehearse, and execute fires should be addressed 

Marine Corps-wide.

General training will continue to be a challenge 

for the entire Marine Corps as we battle operational tempo versus dwell time; finite training days 

are indeed treasures. However, more fire support 

coordination exercises must be executed to facilitate air-ground team and FSCC proficiency during PTP. In Operation Azada Wosa, pilots and 

artillerymen often relied on previous experiences 

that dated back as early as CAX in 2002. Other 

Marine infantrymen and artillerymen had never 

trained to integrated fires or had seen them with 

much lower integration at revised CAX or Exercise Mojave Viper.

The MAGTF was nothing more than MCDP-1 

[Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1] Warfighting, a concept in my head until I got here. I’ve 

been with the battalion for going on four years 

now, and this is the first time I’ve seen everything 

combined. It’s pretty awesome.15, 16

Make no mistake; BLT 1/6 was not inexpe-
194

rienced. They were a seasoned and tested group 

that had, only months before, returned from operations in Ramadi, Iraq.

Current training exercises do not address combined arms and integration with ground maneuver to a sufficient level. The lack of “sponsored” 

training has forced units to seek local solutions 

and train themselves. Marine Aircraft Group 39 

(MAG-39) hosts its own fire support coordination 

exercise called Scorpion Fire. [The] 24th MEU 

conducted similar “homegrown” training exercises. Lowland Fury, conceptualized by a 24th 

MEU Harrier pilot, provided focused training in 

ISR, FAC(A), and CAS between the BLT and the 

aviation combat element (ACE). 

The MEU also conducted its own integrated 

fires exercises focusing on combined arms integration and recertification of joint terminal attack 

controllers (JTACs) with evaluators organic to the 

MEU. FAC(A) training and proficiency were critical for ACE and BLT fires and should be considered mission essential. The Marine air control 

group detachment never trained to DASC operations during MEU PTP with Special Operations 

Training Group, yet they controlled and coordinated more than 4,000 aircraft in a complex 

theater with U.S. and NATO aviation assets in 

support of combat operations. Increased training 

in fire support coordination must be incorporated 

in PTP requirements.

If this critical training is not provided, accomplishment of proficiency falls on individual units 

amidst a storm of ever-increasing PTP requirements. If everything is important, nothing is 

important. PTP must be continuously reevaluated 

to guarantee that training is the absolute best use 

of the limited time to train. [Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force Training Command] Twentynine 

Palms and CAX venues are ideal, but with strains 

in time and logistics on certain units, some solutions might involve alternative venues with MAG 

and regimental planners who are supervised by 

division, wing, the Marine expeditionary force, 

or other qualified Marine Corps representatives. 

The Marine Corps possesses agencies dedicated 

to MAGTF fires integration; we must continue to 

engage them, on some level, and guarantee fires 

standardization and training across the operating 

forces. In these areas, we can do better to ensure 

that the MAGTF remains proficient with supporting arms coordination, still a part of full-spectrum 

operations, as we prepare our deploying forces.

Summary

Aviation, artillery, and infantry units may be 

experts individually, but the MAGTF demands 

integration to overwhelm the enemy. The advantages of coordinating, planning, and executing 

as a MAGTF have not changed; success is still 

directly proportional to training. Our challenge 

is to continue to undertake tough training and 

to be flexible as we face high operational tempo 

and deployment rates. The answer must be agreed 

upon by the Marine Corps to ensure standardized and supervised training of the MAGTF in 

kinetic, integrated fires. The first time units experience combined arms and fire support integration 

should not be on the battlefield.

Notes

Reprinted with permission from Marine Corps 

Gazette (August 2009): 37–42. Copyright Marine Corps Gazette.

1. 24th MEU, BLT 1-6 lessons learned, After Action 

Report, 2008.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Maj S. “Noser,” Brown, “Working for ‘The Man’: 
195

FAC(A) Coordination for Ground Commanders,” 

Air, Land, Sea Bulletin, January 2009.

6. 24th MEU ACE, Marine Medium Helicopter 

Squadron 365 (Reinforced), Lessons Learned and 

Compiled Data, March–November 2008, hereafter 24th MEU lessons learned.

7. 24th MEU GCE lessons learned.

8. 24th MEU ACE lessons learned.

9. Ibid.

10. 24th MEU GCE lessons learned.

11. 24th MEU ACE lessons learned.

12.24th MEU GCE lessons learned.

13. 24th MEU ACE lessons learned.

14. 24th MEU GCE lessons learned.

15. Ibid.

16. 24th MEU ACE lessons learned.

About the Author

Major Samuel L. Meyer is an AH-1W Cobra pilot, forward air controller (FAC), FAC(A), and 

joint terminal air controller (JTAC) evaluator. He 

served as the primary tactics officer and S-3A with 

24th MEU aviation combat element, HMM-365 

(Rein) in OEF.
196

LCpl Sean D. Kunis, a rifleman with Company I, 3d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, maintains security during a 

patrol in the Helmand Province, Afghanistan. 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Pete Thibodeau
Special Purpose Marine 

Air-Ground Task 

Force–Afghanistan: 

Bridge to Marine Corps’ 

Future in Afghanistan

by Sergeant Scott A. Whittington

Defense Video and Imagery 

Distribution System

KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, Afghanistan—Called to 

action with only a couple months notice, a unit was 

needed to fill an important and time-critical role.

A task force of about 2,200 Marines and sailors was summoned by the Pentagon and pieced 

together from various units around the globe—

from North Carolina to Okinawa, Japan—to create 

a bridge for a future, larger Marine Corps presence in Afghanistan. This group of warriors composed Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force–Afghanistan [SPMAGTF–A].

For the past seven months, SPMAGTF–A has 

been conducting counterinsurgency operations 

with a focus on training and mentoring the Afghan 

national police. The purpose: to provide security 

for the Afghan people, set the conditions required 

for successful future assumptions of authority by 

the ANP [Afghan National Police], and extend the 

authority of government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan [GIRoA] by increasing its influence 

over security, stability, and regional development.

197
198

Colonel Duffy W. White, commanding officer of SPMAGTF–A, made his intent clear before 

his force arrived in their area of operations. The 

commander’s desired end state was to increase 

security in assigned district centers, contribute 

to the legitimacy of the GIRoA, and be prepared 

for follow-on missions when directed. His command experienced progress in each one of these 

areas, but it took every part of the MAGTF to 

meet the mission.

In the Beginning

In August 2008, a notification of a potential mission came to the headquarters of 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division—to lead and form the 

command element of a special purpose MAGTF 

that would head into southern Afghanistan to relieve the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and Task 

Force 2/7 (a task force built around 2d Battalion, 

7th Marine Regiment).

SPMAGTF–A deployed in early November 

2008 and assumed control of the area of operations previously held by Task Force 2/7 [or TF 

2/7]. TF 2/7 was heavily engaged in intense 

fighting with insurgents since they deployed in 

April 2008, and their Marines successfully established a strong foothold. It would be the job of 

SPMAGTF–A to hold the ground gained by TF 

2/7, sustain the momentum they established, 

and prepare the way for a larger force—a Marine 

expeditionary brigade. 

In addition to the importance of the SPMAGTF–

A mission, this deployment had a special significance for 3d Marines, according to Lieutenant 

Colonel Jeffrey C. Holt, SPMAGTF–A operations officer.

“It marked the first time we entered a combat 

zone as a regiment since the Gulf War,” Holt said. 

“It was our time.”

Forming the task force in theater, 3d Marines 

expediently gathered the units that would serve 

under the command element. Without having 

Photo courtesy of CWO3 Philippe E. Chasse 

LtCol David L. Odom, commanding officer for 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, talks to Afghan local nationals about their 

concerns in Delaram, Farah Province, Afghanistan, who have been the victim of insurgent suicide attacks and improvised 

explosive devices.
199

time for predeployment training, the Marines 

and sailors of the task force came together and 

adapted to the situation. The ground combat element of SPMAGTF–A was identified as 3d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, from Camp Lejeune, 

North Carolina, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David L. Odom.

Combat Logistics Battalion 3 [CLB-3] was 

tapped to serve as the logistics combat element 

of SPMAGTF–A. The unit from Marine Corps 

Base Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael [J.] Jernigan, is the newest battalion in the entire Marine Corps, and this 

deployment was the unit’s first. The battalion was 

also augmented by its Okinawa-based parent command, Combat Logistics Regiment 3.

The aviation combat element encompassed several different units from various locations across 

the Marine Corps and represented all three Marine 

expeditionary forces. The ACE [air combat element] was initially commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Ostermeyer from Marine Wing 

Headquarters, Squadron 3, and command was 

transferred [on] 1 February to Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Watkins of Marine Wing Headquarters, Squadron 2.

Doing More with Less

Some of the significant challenges facing the task 

force stemmed from its small size relative to its 

landlocked area of operations [AO] roughly the 

size of Vermont, which spreads across two provinces and encompasses extremely rough terrain. 

The AO includes very mountainous regions, a 

desert plagued by regular sandstorms and high 

winds, cold temperatures in the winter and extreme heat in the summer, and a near nonexistent 

infrastructure with only two paved roads.

These unique conditions may have posed the 

most considerable obstacles for the logistical 

efforts. The single biggest factor in logistics operations was the ACE, according to Major George 

W. Markert, SPMAGTF–A logistics officer.

“Many of the ground convoys were contested 

by the enemy . . . they took time,” Markert said. 

The use of aerial delivery into the forward operating bases was critical in enabling battlespace 

distribution.”

Another logistical challenge facing SPMAGTF–

A was its initial table of equipment, which was not 

up to the level required. The task force’s supply, fiscal, and contracting Marines aggressively pursued 

the equipment and administrative supplies needed.

“The biggest accomplishment logistically was 

the rapid build-up of the SPMAGTF–A table 

of equipment, and thus the combat capability,” 

Markert said.

The task force’s communications Marines also 

experienced some unique challenges.

“We had to learn quickly,” said Corporal Kristoffer R. Lang, SPMAGTF–A network administrator, who went from on-the-job training during 

the beginning of the deployment to becoming a 

duty expert in less than seven months.

The communications Marines started with a 

small number of personnel and then spread them out 

across numerous forward operating bases, according to Corporal Crag T. Tauyan, SPMAGTF–A 

network administrator. “We were stretched pretty 

thin, but we worked double to meet the mission,” 

he said.

Significant Operations and Achievements

Prior to the arrival of Task Force 2/7 and SPMAGTF–A, the insurgent presence was more active 

in assigned district centers. The Marines helped to 

improve the conditions in the towns by conducting 

frequent dismounted patrols, training and mentoring the ANP, and developing positive relationships with the local elders and government leaders.
200

SPMAGTF–A has seen progress in the districts 

of Bakwa, Golestan, and Delaram. In the district 

of Now Zad, which has been abandoned by its former civilian populace, Marines have fought the 

enemy using more conventional tactics.

SPMAGTF–A conducted a major combat 

operation in the insurgent-infested district of Now 

Zad [on] 3 April. Marines struck well-known 

enemy locations identified within and near the 

insurgent-infested Now Zad district center without harming any civilians during the operation.

“The Marines in Now Zad conducted deliberate targeting of enemy positions . . . to prevent 

the enemy’s ability to maneuver on our forces,” 

Holt said. “We still look to the future when the 

enemy is completely [defeated in] Now Zad, and 

the displaced civilians feel safe to return home.” 

As the SPMAGTF–A LCE [logistics combat 

element], CLB-3 supplied essential gear, provisions and rations, as well as mechanics, maintenance, and engineering capabilities across a vast 

area of operations through rough and unforgiving terrain.

Venturing throughout southern Afghanistan, 

they conducted 51 combat logistics patrols, covered more than 7,300 miles, and delivered more 

than 11 million pounds of cargo to SPMAGTF–

A forces.

Another significant success of SPMAGTF–A 

was the LCE’s aid station, which provided medical care to U.S. service members and the local 

Afghan populace. Nearly 700 surgeries and other 

lifesaving procedures were conducted for patients 

with bullets wounds, head injuries, and numerous 

other serious conditions.

One of SPMAGTF–A’s more significant operations was Operation Gateway, where Marines 

cleared 43 kilometers of the improvised explosive 

device-ridden Route 515 connecting the two vital 

district centers of Delaram and Bakwa. Before the 

Marines cleared it, the route was so dangerous that 

the local Afghans would not even use it.

Also under the watch of SPMAGTF–A, Marine 

Wing Support Squadron 371 constructed the 

world’s largest aircraft parking expansion adjacent to the airfield aboard Camp Bastion in Helmand Province. The expansion totals 1.9 million 

square feet and is 4,846 feet in length.

SPMAGTF–A was also the first U.S. Marine 

Corps unit to integrate a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System [HIMARS] into operations 

in Afghanistan. Compared to traditional artillery, HIMARS has greater accuracy and mobility, 

according to Major Frankie P. Delgado, 2d Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment, Battery D commander.

Due to the landlocked nature of the AO, the 

Marines of the SPMAGTF–A ACE have additional pressure to conduct logistics, refueling, troop 

movement, close air and assault support missions.

The ACE provided airlift for millions of pounds 

of cargo and more than 5,000 passengers, and 

provided battlefield illumination to Marines and 

NATO’s International Security Assistance Forces 

on the ground.

“Our Marines have done very well despite the 

environmental challenges,” said Captain Jason E. 

Mitchell, a CH-53E pilot with 361. “We have done 

everything the MAGTF and the ACE have asked 

of us, and our Marines are some of the most professional and technically proficient Marines I have 

ever encountered.”

During the past seven months, SPMAGTF–

A had the honor of hosting more than 40 distinguished visitors that came to speak to its Marines 

and sailors in Afghanistan. Some of which included 

Secretary of Defense Robert [M.] Gates, Vice President [Joseph R.] “Joe” Biden Jr., Senator John 

[S.] McCain [III], Admiral Michael [G.] Mullen, General David [H.] Petraeus [USA], General 

David [D.] McKiernan [USA], General James [T.] 
201

Conway, General James [F.] Amos, Lieutenant 

General Richard [C.] Zilmer, Lieutenant General 

[Dennis J.] Hejlik, Lieutenant General [Samuel 

T.] Helland, and Lieutenant General [Gary L.] 

North, [USAF].

Developing Relationships 

with the Afghan People

A major part of a successful counterinsurgency 

operation is winning the “the hearts and minds” 

of the population. SPMAGTF–A, with the help 

of 3d Civil Affairs Group [3d CAG], remained 

focused on this goal throughout their deployment. 

One of the primary focuses was conducting key 

leader and general population engagements.

“Mitigation of friction between the military 

and the civilian populace in a combat environment is the really purpose of civil affairs,” said 

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew T. Roberto, 3d CAG, 

Detachment G, commanding officer.

SPMAGTF–A completed six civil affairs projects, which included such improvements as the 

construction of new wells and public restrooms. 

Although these projects were simple in nature, 

they had an immediate impact on the economic 

and social development of these communities.

“The important thing to remember is that 

there is progress in Afghanistan,” Roberto said. 

One Afghan leader in Golestan shared his feelings about the Marines operating in his district. 

“Without you, I cannot live and work in this area 

I am in,” said Qasim Khan, the district sub-governor, as translated by an interpreter. “One of the 

first things you created here was safety, and that 

is the biggest thing.”

Khan meets with the Marines often to discuss local issues, and his sentiments are echoed by 

other community leaders who have worked with 

SPMAGTF–A.

“We all understand you left your children, you 

left your wives and have left them to come to a faraway land for me, for our country,” Khan said. “We 

pray every day that you all make it home safely.”

Civilians in some areas were initially reluctant 

to interact with the Marines, but the people now 

trust them and will even shake their hands in public, according to Corporal Christopher L. Parra, a 

civil affairs Marine who was attached to 3/8 [3d 

Battalion, 8th Marines]. “It is completely different now,” he said.

Training and Mentoring 

Afghan National Police

Marines from the SPMAGTF–A GCE [ground 

control element] worked closely with the ANP 

and its recruits, assisting in mentoring and 

instructing. Their goal was to help the Afghan 

government develop a sustainable police force.

“I actually feel like we are making a difference 

out here,” said Sergeant Nicholas [W.] Fagerquist, 

one of the U.S. Marine instructors assisting the 

ANP. “[The policemen] have great military discipline, they’re eager to learn, they’re motivated 

and they’re being proactive.”

American civilian law enforcement instructors 

with SPMAGTF–A directed some of the ANP 

training programs, while empowering Afghan 

police instructors to train the ANP recruits. At 

the same time, Marines invoke leadership qualities among the students by doing what Marines 

do best: teaching the ANP recruits how to step 

up and take a leadership role among their peers.

“We make them realize that [being a policeman] is more than a [paycheck]; it’s a big responsibility,” said Corporal Thomas A. Moss, a U.S. 

Marine instructor assisting the ANP.

The training for the new policemen includes 

instruction in areas such as weapons handling with AK-47 assault rifles, marksmanship, advanced first aid, and nonlethal weapons 
202

techniques with an emphasis on human rights.

“I am very happy to have learned from [the] 

Marines,” said policeman Abdulgaber Farhay, a 

course graduate. “I will [go] back to my home and 

use what I learned to help my country.”

Team Players

The SPMAGTF–A command element also conducted coordination for operations through four 

major commands: Regional Command-South 

[RC-South], Regional Command-West [RCWest], U.S. Forces Afghanistan, and Marine Corps 

Central Command [MARCENT]. SPMAGTF

–A was one of the smaller units in Afghanistan 

conducting direct coordinating with such senior 

commands.

SPMAGTF–A not only served under a NATO 

command, RC-South, it provided direct support 

to allied forces on numerous occasions. The task 

force supplied aviation, explosive ordnance disposal, and signals intelligence capabilities to more 

than 12 major commands under International 

Security Assistance Forces-Afghanistan.

“We worked daily with the British, Dutch, 

Romanian, Canadian, Belgian, and Australian 

Forces,” said Captain Nathan O. Morales, 

Photo courtesy of Cpl Pete Thibodeau 

LCpl Kevin Gonzalez Sierra with the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, maintains security on a patrol during Operation Gateway 

III in Farah Province, Afghanistan, on 7 January 2009.
203

SPMAGTF–A fires liaison officer to RC-South. 

“We all have the same goal but have different ways 

of doing things; learning from our differences has 

been beneficial to all us.”

There have been several occasions where 

SPMAGTF–A has been asked to support NATO 

missions, and the Marines have not had a problem meeting the task, according to Morales. “The 

ability of SPMAGTF–A to plan and employ assets 

rapidly has been of great benefit to our NATO 

partners,” he said.

“You set the example in Afghanistan with 

your close coordination with the joint, coalition, 

and Afghan forces, which resulted in tactical and 

operational successes throughout your area of 

operations,” said Lieutenant General Samuel T. 

Helland, commander of MARCENT, in a message to SPMAGTF–A. 

MEB Enabling and 

the Transfer of Authority

One of the SPMAGTF–A tasks was “MEB enabling,” laying the groundwork for a larger force 

to enter the country and continue the fight on a 

greater scale. SPMAGTF–A did exactly that—improving security in the AO, securing lines of communication, overseeing the expansion of existing 

camps, and establishing additional forward operating bases—essentially providing a bridge for an 

MEB to enter the country and begin operations 

as quickly as possible.

Deployment of an MEB meant an increase 

of about 8,000 Marines in Afghanistan. When 

SPMAGTF–A first arrived, there were no bases 

that could hold this amount of personnel, according to Captain Louis B. Lecher, SPMAGTF–A 

Headquarters Company commanding officer. 

“Therefore, we established a ‘mayor cell’ to coordinate the construction and buildup of a new 

base—Camp Leatherneck.”

“A crucial part of MEB enabling was identifying their initial requirements,” Markert said. “We 

had to think about what equipment we could get 

for the MEB ahead of time—tents, refrigerators, 

air-conditioning units—anything we knew they 

would need.” In order to lay accurate expectations 

for the MEB, SPMAGTF–A analyzed the challenges associated with the force and equipment 

flows and estimated the impact on a unit five times 

the size, according to Markert.

The MEB has arrived in Afghanistan, and the 

transfer of authority took place 29 May as the 2d 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade assumed command 

and control of all U.S. Marine Corps Forces previously under SPMAGTF–A.

“As you continue the fight as [Regimental 

Combat Team 3], take pride in knowing that you 

have displayed all that is best in the Marine Corps 

and military services,” said Helland. “The respect 

and admiration of a grateful nation is well-placed, 

hard-earned, and well-deserved . . . [you] have paved 

the way for the Afghan people to commence enjoying freedoms in their communities once again.”

The command element of the SPMAGTF–A 

will now transition into that of RCT-3 and serve 

as the MEB’s ground combat element.

Notes

Reprinted with permission from Defense Video 

and Imagery Distribution System, http://www

.dvidshub.net/news/34343special-purpose-marine

-air-ground-task-force-afghanistan-bridgemarine

-corps-future-afghanistan, 1 June 2009.

About the Author

Sergeant Scott A. Whittington was a journalist for Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force-Afghanistan at the time this article was 

written.
204

A Marine Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion with Marine 

Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 conducts external lift operations to transport one of several up-armored Humvees in 

southern Afghanistan. 

Photo courtesy of Cpl Juan D. Alfonso
Afghanistan Deployed 

Aviation Combat 

Element Performs 

Above, Beyond 

Expectations

by Sergeant Juan D. Alfonso

Defense Video and Imagery 

Distribution System

KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan—Twelve hours on, 12 hours off. 

Grease covers their uniforms. Their arms and legs 

[are] sore from turning wrenches, climbing their 

aircraft, or the eight-hour mission they just completed. Exhausted, dirty—happy to wake up the 

next morning and do it again.

For the past seven months, Marines and sailors with Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force–Afghanistan’s [SPMAGTF–A] aviation combat element [ACE] have worked around the clock 

to support the unit’s mission of conducting counterinsurgency operations with a focus on training 

and mentoring the Afghan National Police. 

Rain or shine, these Marines have successfully 

conducted logistics, refueling, troop movement, 

close air and assault support missions around the 

clock in one of the most challenging environments 

on the planet. When they weren’t flying, they were 

fixing their birds. Never tiring, never complaining despite the challenges of working in an austere 

205
206

landlocked country, these service members have 

pushed themselves and their equipment to ensure 

the Marines on the ground in southern Afghanistan never had to say, “where’s my air support?”

Fixed Wing

The SPMAGTF–A’s ACE is a composite unit with 

squadron detachments representing the three active 

Marine expeditionary forces.

The mission of the ACE’s fixed-wing units is to 

support the SPMAGTF–A commander by providing air-to-air refueling and assault support, day or 

night, under all weather conditions during expeditionary, joint, or combined operations.

Included were the aircrew and maintainers of 

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 

from Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, 

North Carolina. Its Marines performed combat operations from Kandahar Airfield, Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan, from 23 October 2008 

to 12 April 2009.

During their stint as the ACE’s fixed-wing squadron, they carried more than 1.7 million pounds 

of cargo, 3,000 passengers, delivered more than 

60,000 pounds of supplies via aerial delivery, and 

provided battlefield illumination to Marines and 

NATO’s International Security Assistance Forces 

on the ground.

“Aerial delivery is probably the most important [support] we can provide ground troops due 

to the poor weather and a lack of road structure,” 

said Captain Kevin M. Shiels, a [Lockheed Martin] KC-130J aircraft commander.

Delivering essential items such as water, rations, 

fuel, and ammo via parachute allowed the operating forces, whether they were U.S. Marines, British Royal Marine commandos, or Special Forces, 

to continue to operate in the battlespace, extending their presence within a specific area, according to Shiels.

After nearly seven months in Afghanistan, the 

time came for a new refueling squadron to take 

the reigns.

[Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 

352] VMGR-352, from MCAS Miramar, California, took charge of the ACE’s fixed-wing needs 

[on] 13 April.

Since their arrival, 352’s Marines have transported more than 2,000 passengers and 2 million 

pounds of fuel, water, rations, and ammunition in 

addition to providing battlefield illumination, aerial refueling, and aerial deliveries to 3d Battalion, 

8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), SPMAGTF–

A’s ground combat element, and its supporting 

U.S. and NATO allies.

One Marine officer attributed the operational 

successes to the “outstanding Marines” in 352’s 

command.

“The guys in our maintenance section have 

been working extremely hard to keep the aircraft 

ready to go 24/7, and our load masters have just 

done a phenomenal job,” said Captain Mike M. 

Proctor, 352’s safety officer. “Without our maintainers, crew chiefs, and load masters, we wouldn’t 

have been able to do the job we have.”

Despite the limited amount of personnel and 

supplies, neither unit has ever failed to accomplish their mission.

“It’s pretty incredible and says a lot about the 

leadership in our maintenance sections and the 

caliber of Marines serving in VMGRs today,” 

Proctor said. “These Marines are flexible and have 

really proven that Marines are ready for any mission they’re given at any time.”

Heavy Lift

Since 3d Marine Regiment, SPMAGTF–A’s command element, arrived in early November, the ACE 

has seen three heavy-lift helicopter squadrons provide assault, logistics, and troop movement support 
207

in a country where the roads may be littered with 

mines from previous wars or improvised explosive 

devices [IED] from the current one.

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 

[HMH-466], from MCAS Miramar, [California,] hit the ground running during its stint as the 

ACE’s only heavy-lift squadron. On one occasion, 

HMH-466 delivered more than 95,000 pounds, 

via CH-53E Super Stallions, of forward operating base materials in support of Operation Gateway III, a clearing mission to help create freedom 

of movement for the Afghan people along what 

used to be the IED-ridden Route 515 [main road 

in Bakwa District].

The operation was a heavily organized event, 

which required several hours of maintenance from 

helicopter mechanics as well as coordination with 

all the elements of SPMAGTF–A, from the Marines 

on the ground to the Marines in the air.

With the dust-filled environment to which the 

aircraft are constantly exposed, the aircraft often 

couldn’t produce the engine power required to lift 

the 20,000-pound shipping containers used during 

the operation, but the Marines were up to the task.

“Our maintainers got the engines back up to 

specification power,” said Major Stuart [H.] Howell, a [Sikorsky] CH-53E [Super Stallion] pilot 

and 466’s weapons and tactics instructor. “The 

Marines just worked it back into shape, cleaning out the engines and in some cases replacing 

them. We couldn’t have accomplished this mission without them.”

After a job well done, HMH-466 turned over 

the mission to HMH-361, another CH-53E unit.

The MCAS Miramar-based unit picked up 

right where 466 left off, conducting more than 

260 flight hours a month of assault, logistics, and 

troop movement.

“Our Marines have done very well despite the 

environmental challenges,” said Captain Jason E. 

Mitchell, a CH-53E pilot with 361. “We have done 

everything the MAGTF and the ACE have asked 

of us, and our Marines are some of the most professional and technically proficient Marines I have 

ever encountered.”

Today, HMH-361’s flight hours have become 

more manageable due to the recent arrival of 

HMH-362.

The unit from Marine Corps Base Kaneohe 

Bay, Hawaii, arrived with [Sikorsky] CH-53D Sea 

Stallions ready to take its share of the loads from 

its heavily tasked sister unit, despite the unique 

circumstances surrounding its deployment to 

Afghanistan.

Originally deployed to al-Asad, Iraq, [on] 23 

January 2009, to conduct assault support, logistics, and movement of personnel missions, the 

unit’s leaders redirected 362 to Afghanistan due 

to President Barack [H.] Obama’s announced 

troop build up.

“Afghanistan is where the fight is now,” said 

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Hagan, HMH-362’s 

commander. “There was a planned drawdown 

in Iraq and an increasing need for medium-lift 

capabilities in Afghanistan. So we began making 

arrangements to move from al-Asad to Kandahar 

Airfield, Afghanistan.”

Though the unit was motivated and prepared 

for its new mission, environmental differences 

between the two theaters coupled with operational requirements called for major modifications to their CH-53Ds.

The unit’s maintenance Marines began working around the clock to exchange the T64-GE-413 

engines, typically found in CH-53Ds, to hotter 

burning T64-GE-416 engines used in CH-53Es, 

according to Master Sergeant Robert Webb, 362’s 

maintenance section chief.

In addition to the modifications, the Marines 

had to partially dismantle their aircraft for trans-
208

portation to Afghanistan. Each bird was sent one 

at a time. But despite their daunting task, the 

Marines pulled together, rolled up their sleeves 

and went to work.

“Our maintenance Marines are the best in the 

Marine Corps,” said Major Gary W. Thomason, 

362’s aircraft maintenance officer. “On their backs 

is how we made this happen. I think I speak for 

everyone involved when I say, fantastic job.”

Cobras

No aviation combat element can truly be prepared to take on their full scope of duties without 

rotary-wing fire power. For that reason, the Corps’ 

deployed Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 [HMLA-269] from MCAS New River, 

North Carolina.

Originally under the command of the 24th 

Marine Expeditionary Unit [24th MEU] to provide close air support to Task Force 2d Battalion, 

7th Marine Regiment, 269’s Marines soon found 

themselves providing close air support to a unit 

spread over an area twice the size of Connecticut. They began to immerse themselves in combat operations on a regular basis, giving 2/7 the 

added help needed to suppress enemy insurgency 

in southern Afghanistan.

After the 24th MEU transferred authority to 

SPMAGTF–A in November 2008, 2/7 pulled 

out and the familiar faces of 3d Battalion, 8th 

Marine Regiment (Reinforced), also from North 

Carolina, pulled in quickly, picking up where 

2/7 left off. The squadron continued to provide 

close air support throughout the harsh winter 

months, resulting in added maintenance to 269’s 

already hectic around-the-clock maintenance 

schedule. But 269’s maintainers pitched in and 

pulled through.

HMLA-167 replaced 269 in late February. 

HMLA-169 took over combat operations, 1 May.

Support

During the ACE’s existence, it has seen two Marine 

Aviation Logistics Squadrons—first was MALS16 from MCAS Miramar, [San Diego, California,] and later MALS-26 from MCAS New River, 

North Carolina.

Aviation logistics units work behind the scenes, 

diligently repairing damaged engines and mechanical components too far damaged for the maintainers and crew chiefs of individual squadron and 

detachments to handle—a job they have happily 

done and have never failed.

But during their time on Kandahar, MALS-16 

performed a skillset outside of the regular scope 

of duties in an aviation unit, proving that every 

Marine is a rifleman first.

The Marines conduct bimonthly convoys to 

transport their squadron’s flight surgeon and medical personnel to a women’s medical clinic on Camp 

Hero [Kandahar Province]. There, Navy Lieutenant Christine [R.] Stehman, the ACE’s former flight 

surgeon, started an ongoing mission, training and 

mentoring an Afghan midwife to help curb the 

mortality rate of women and children in a country with one of the highest rates of maternal and 

infant deaths in the world.

Despite the discovery of several improvised 

explosive devices along their routes during the 

past year, these Marines embraced the opportunity to conduct convoy operations on the ground.

“We really don’t get to do these kinds of operations in the wing,” said Staff Sergeant Jason R. 

Rochefort, a dynamic component mechanic with 

MALS-16, who also served as the aviation combat element’s convoy commander. “These convoys 

are a good opportunity to put down our wrenches 

and pick up our rifles.”

To prepare for their task, the MALS Marines 

received extensive ground operations training prior 

to their first convoy mission.
209

According to Corporal Clintt F. Hazlet, a flight 

equipment mechanic with MALS-16, he and the 

team of Marines conducted basic fireteam, squad, 

and vehicle formation training, in addition to several escalations of force and Afghan culture briefs. 

Drivers and vehicle commanders received even 

more advanced training.

The MALS-26 Detachment was later redesignated as MALS-40 and is currently operating in 

Afghanistan.

Commander

As the SPMAGTF–A ACE prepares to be absorbed into the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s Marine Aircraft Group 40, it can look back 

on what its commander said is a job well done.

“We all came from different areas, representing three active duty and one reserve, air wings 

and have been focused on the SPMAGTF–A 

mission from the moment we landed in Afghanistan,” said Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Watkins, the ACE commanding officer. “There have 

been many limitations to accomplishing our mission, but I have been very impressed with how 

quickly the Marines adapted and the support 

they gave especially considering the size of the 

area we covered.

“My Marines had a very aggressive mindset 

and were excited to take on the mission. During 

our time here, we have been proud to support not 

only U.S. forces, but we were able to provide battlefield illumination, troop transportation, and 

close air support to many of our NATO allies. We 

are all excited about taking the fight to the enemy 

and helping out in any way we can. 

“I’ve been extremely impressed to watch these 

Marines work so hard to provide support for every 

service member on the ground. It’s the kind of 

hard work and dedication that makes you proud 

to be a Marine.”

An aviation combat element was formed from 

bits and pieces of the whole Marine Corps almost 

a year ago and, despite the dust, the blistering cold 

of the Afghan winter months, and the sweltering 

heat of the Afghan summer, they pulled together 

to function as one unit and accomplished the 

Corps’ mission in Afghanistan.

Note

Reproduced with permission from Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, http://www

.dvidshub.net/news/34018/afghanistan-deployed

-aviation-combat-element-performs-above-beyond

-expectations, 24 May 2009.

About the Author

Sergeant Juan D. Alfonso was a public affairs correspondent for Special Purpose MAGTF–Afghanistan at the time this article was written.
210

Mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles (MRAP) operated by 2d Platoon, Motor Transportation Company, Combat Logistics Battalion 3 (CLB-3), line up to depart from 

Combat Outpost Puller in Farah Province, Afghanistan, during Operation Gateway III. Gateway III relied on CLB-3 as 

the combat logistics element and 3d Battalion, 8th Marine 

Regiment (Reinforced), as the ground combat element to 

place combat outposts along southern Afghanistan’s Route 

515 through the Bakwa District, improving security and 

travel for U.S. military convoys and local Afghans. 

Photo courtesy of LCpl Ronald W. Stauffer
Interview: 

Captain Robert 

G. Barber

by Marine Corps History Division

Marine Corps oral historian Lieutenant Colonel Melissa D. Mihocko interviewed Captain 

Robert G. Barber, Combat Logistics Battalion 3 

(CLB-3), operations officer for the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Afghanistan (SPMAGTF–A) in 2008–9. The following 

has been edited from the original transcript for 

space constraints in this work.

Mihocko: Did you have any idea . . . that it was 

going to become CLB-3?

Barber: We did. . . . We had known that for almost 

a year, year and a half. We knew that there was 

a reorganization that it would be CLB, and we 

knew that there would be a separate CLC (Combat Logistics Company) at the time that was not 

a part of us. The naming convention I don’t think 

had been worked out, what it would be called, 

but we knew that we would be a DS [direct support] CLB.

Mihocko: And in terms of the reorganization, what 

was your role as the OPSO [operations officer]?

Barber: The commanding officer of CSSG [Combat Services Support Group] at the time had already 

211
212

reorganized CSSG to look like Combat Logistics 

Battalion 3 with Combat Logistics Company 35 

so that when we did the deactivation there wasn’t 

a huge shuffling of people.

Mihocko: And what about the deployment to 

Afghanistan? Did you know at that point when you 

took over as OPSO that you would be deploying?

Barber: When we did the redesignation or activation, I think 27 June 2008 . . . in August, we 

were told that 3d Marines was going to do a site 

survey for a Special Purpose MAGTF [Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force] potentially in Afghanistan. [The] 3d Marines asked us to go as logistics 

planners for the SPMAGTF. The LCE [Logistics 

Combat Element] at the time had not been identified. That was the second week in August, so Colonel [Michael] Jernigan and I went to Afghanistan 

for about three and a half weeks. We came back the 

first week in September and immediately started 

planning that CLB-3 would go just because 3d 

Marine Regiment was going. With the new MLG 

[Marine Logistics Group] reorganization, it put a 

direct support combat logistics battalion with an 

infantry regiment. Hence, our naming convention of CLB-3 and in direct support, 3d Marine 

Regiment. About two weeks later, we were about 

Twentynine Palms, [California,] with 3d Marines 

for a mission rehearsal exercise and were told by 

Photo courtesy of Cpl Daniel Woodall 

Marines with CLB-3, 1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward), finished construction of a bridge and guard post in Marjah, 

Afghanistan, on 5 December 2008. Combat engineers with CLB-3 conducted operations in direct support of Marine units 

operating in the area.
213

the MARCENT [U.S. Marine Forces, Central 

Command] that we had been tagged to go. That 

was 27 September, and literally four days later our 

advance party and quartering party left. About 

35 days later, the whole battalion had deployed.

Mihocko: What, from your perspective, is the 

mission of CLB-3?

Barber: Our formal mission statement is to provide direct support [DS] combat logistics to 3d 

Marine Regiment and general support [GS] logistics to other Marine units. So for our mission in 

here, it’s GS and DS to the base and the 3d Marine 

Regiments. 

Mihocko: When you then were tagged to support 

the SPMAGTF, how did that change the mission?

Barber: It was direct support to an infantry battalion not a regimental-size unit so 3/8 [3d Battalion, 8th Marines] was our main customer. We 

were direct support to them for all their logistical 

needs and then we were also general support to 

the MAGTF and, again, essentially every Coalition unit in southern Afghanistan. We fixed and 

repaired and did logistics for the British, the Dutch, 

the CJSOTF guys [Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force], Army, Navy, Seabees [Naval 

Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB)]. We 

did support for all those guys, but primarily our 

focus was direct support for 3/8. 

Mihocko: As an operations officer in the battalion . . . once you found out you could be deployed 

to Afghanistan, what were your specific goals in 

terms of you now running the operations?

Barber: One goal . . . was to make sure all the 

Marines had some level of training so that when 

we got there it wasn’t just taking a Marine out 

[of] his unit and sending him to Afghanistan. So 

we were able to divert an IED [improvised explosive device] lane training team that was on its 

way back to the schoolhouse and we got a week 

of training with them.

Mihocko: Training the Marines to what? Be familiar with IEDs or recognizing them?

Barber: Recognizing them mainly, that was really 

an after action from 2/7. Their convoy drive times 

were, you know. . . . That was a hardball road. Our 

longest trip was about 50 hours and that was two 

and a half days. So it’s hard for us to do that here 

in Hawaii, to even simulate a six-hour convoy. But 

immediate actions [IAs] for convoys since we knew 

that convoys and distribution operations would be 

our biggest challenge. If anyone was current, we 

kind of set up they were current but we didn’t slack 

on the training for weapons, marksmanship training, the immediate action drills, motor transport 

driving familiarity. Our goal before we left was to 

get everybody as much and as thorough training 

as possible. We didn’t want to do it just to check 

our PTP [predeployment training phase] continuum sheet and say we did it, but with the timeframe so crunched it was tough.

Mihocko: What were some of the other challenges 

that you faced [in the predeployment phase]?

Barber: Not having the entire battalion here. 

We didn’t meet 103 of our 305 Marines until we 

landed in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, the Air Force base 

that does the in-processing going to Afghanistan. 

That’s where we first met one third of the battalion.

Mihocko: And those 103, were they just across all 

MOSs [military occupational specialties], all ranks?
214

Barber: One of them turned out to be a company 

commander, we had a first sergeant come from Okinawa, and then we had all of our EOD (explosive 

ordinance disposal) guys and then almost all of 

the other special skills, postal, services, exchange 

services, disbursing spread out. We had a company executive officer that came, our senior watch 

officer and Lieutenant [Johanna] Schaffer led the 

female engagement team (FET). We had a lot of 

key personnel that came from Okinawa.

Mihocko: So how did you overcome that you’re 

not able to train basically as a battalion? Once you 

finally did [train] in-country or in-theater, how 

did you overcome that challenge?

Barber: At the time, we got lucky. Not that we 

wanted it, but when we landed in Kandahar 

[Afghanistan] we had intended to go straight to 

Camp Bastion [northwest of Lashkar Gah, the 

capital of Helmand Province] and start setting up 

for the arrival of 3/8 into Camp Bastion. Because 

of bed space, we weren’t allow[ed] to go to Camp 

Bastion because of 2/7 and 3/8 both being there, 

there wasn’t enough bed space. That allowed us 

about three weeks at Kandahar to continue our 

blocks three and blocks four training. And in 

that three to four weeks, we were able to finish 

. . . increase our weapon shoots, we were able to 

hone some immediate action drills, we were able 

to run some COC [combat operations center] 

battle drills and some CPX [command post exercise] type stuff. And we were able to really pull 

the team together so that we had all 305 of us or 

all 340 of us there for three weeks solid. We continued to do mission analysis, we continued to 

do OPTs [operational planning team] on how 

to move to Bastion and what to do once we got 

there. So that three weeks paid dividends for us 

in hindsight.

Mihocko: So by the end of the three weeks, did 

you feel like the whole battalion was well integrated and felt comfortable at that point [that] 

everyone was well trained?

Barber: I don’t know, at some point in the deployment—the first months, six weeks, eight weeks—I 

had a feeling that the battalion was well integrated. 

Mihocko: Not necessarily the first three weeks 

though?

Barber: Right. And I did learn, even after Christmas, I mean five months into the deployment, I did 

hear—one of the Marines that worked for me was 

a senior watch officer—came up and said, “Have 

you heard anything about Okinawa Marines not 

being treated fairly or Marines that have been integrated not being treated fairly?” And I had not, 

but I wasn’t in the group that was integrated into 

the Hawaii group, so I don’t know if their perception was different than ours, but I know no one 

I know ever held any animosity nor did they not 

accept the integration of these Marines. We were 

excited to have them and work[ed] to integrate 

them as quickly as possible.

Mihocko: Right, I mean because that is quite a 

large percentage of your unit in total. So when 

you moved down to Camp Bastion at that time, 

talk a little bit about your perceptions about arriving there. I assume [that] even when you were at 

Kandahar you were having to provide support to 

3/8, even though you weren’t colocated but once 

you were actually on the ground with 3/8, talk a 

little bit about the operations down there.

Barber: Before we moved to Camp Bastion as a 

battalion, we sent guys down there every day. In 

addition to that, we sent guys out to the FOBs 
215

[forward operating base] from Kandahar to provide maintenance teams and support as much as 

we could . . . When we did move down, it was 

very similar to OIF-1 [Operation Iraqi Freedom 

I]. We showed up and they [were like] here’s your 

lot, here’s your dirt, no tents, no power, you know, 

no infrastructure. They did have some building 

tents, but we couldn’t get a handle on moving into 

those until everybody left from 2/7 and some contractors were there and nobody really had a solid 

plan on how the camp was to be set up. So that 

took some time at the beginning—two weeks, 

three weeks—I think I probably slept in six or 

seven different tents, including my own office, 

until finally they said here’s where you’re going to 

sleep. Support-wise, Colonel Jernigan had a guidance that when we get there the first thing we’re 

going to do is start helping 3/8 and the MAGTF. 

If we need stuff for us, like building benches and 

morale and welfare stuff, that can wait. We’ll 

dish out all the support we can as soon as we get 

there. And we did that, and we worked incredibly long, I’d say 24 hours every day for the whole 

deployment, but initially it was getting a handle 

on what our mission was, what we had to do. We 

inherited about $60 million dollars in supplies 

that were not inventoried, and we had about four 

Marines allocated in the supply section to do that 

inventory. They just couldn’t do it all; it would 

have taken them years. So that piece, realizing 

roles and responsibilities from what MAGTF and 

what 3/8 wanted us to do, and their S-4 section 

looked at us as an extension of their S-4 section 

whereas we looked at 3/8 as willing to support 

their operations. Their CO would come over and 

ask us to order chairs, to order things that they 

can all do stuff internally. And I don’t think the 

roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, we 

kind of use the MEU [Marine expeditionary unit] 

model as a baseline. You think of us as an MSSG 

[MEU Service Support Group], we can do all the 

stuff that’s above your capability, but they bring 

a lot if not more capability. They have more auto 

mechanics than we have.

Mihocko: Did that eventually get resolved?

Barber: There’s always friction. Their S-4 asked 

us to do things that he could have very easily done 

himself. I think it was the easy way out, we were 

happy to do them and we told him we’d support 

and do that overflow maintenance or whatever the 

piece was. But on some occasions, you just couldn’t 

do it because we just didn’t have the people or the 

capability. So there’s always friction, they’d want 

us to drive somewhere when we could easily fly the 

stuff there by helicopter a day later rather than put 

60 guys and 10 trucks on the road. So there was 

always some level of friction, but it wasn’t enough 

to stop the mission or stop support.

Mihocko: How did you prepare your Marines, 

in particular, for living on base in Afghanistan?

Barber: There was a lot of discussion in this room 

before we left with the commanders and the staff. 

My Marines at the time were staff guys, COC watch 

officers, and EOD guys that I didn’t meet until we 

got there, but preparation was the training packages that were put together. We did do some COC 

operations out at the Marine Corps training area at 

Bellows [Air Force Station, Waimanalo, Hawaii,] 

and some out here in our backyard to get caught 

up on the command and control systems and the 

logistics operations centers and things like that. 

But I think everybody here, going into it, assumed 

that it would be OIF-1 or Fallujah, OIF-2 or 3 in 

Fallujah all over again where you carry what’s on 

your back, you got to sleep in a tent, which we 

did for the whole deployment. Specific preparation 
216

was nothing more than what normal Marines do 

for quick deployment training.

Mihocko: This is your third deployment. [For] 

most of the Marines in your section, [was this] 

their first deployment? 

Barber: My S-3A, my assistance operations officer, 

this is his third deployment in four years. He did 

one to Iraq and this was his second to Afghanistan. My ops chief did not have any combat deployments, but he was with [the] MEU for a ton of 

those so he deployed, just not to Iraq or Afghanistan. Most of the Marines, this was their second 

or third deployment. We really had very few that 

this was their first deployment unless they were 

really young Marines. We actually briefed the staff, 

the Commandant, when he came through, that 

we had 50 percent of the Marines in the battalion 

had deployed, this was their second deployment. 

And [for] 50 percent of those, this was their third 

or more. So it was quite substantial.

Mihocko: And do you think, [that with] this 

being your third deployment, that makes a big difference in terms of the way the Marines perform?

Barber: I do, I think it’s huge. I mean, the first 

time you go, you don’t know what to expect. So 

going back this time, I didn’t have any reservations about what I was getting into. I went there 

for the site survey so I had a feeling of it anyway. 

Photo courtesy of LCpl Ronald Stauffer 

LCpl Robert Burgos (left) and Jesus A. Chavez inventory gear in the supply lot at Camp Barber, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, on 19 January 2009.
217

But most of the guys got there and literally within 

three or four days you would always hear, “Do it 

this way, this is how we did it in Iraq last year, 

and it worked, still works.” So those lessons, those 

techniques that they used in Iraq, at a certain 

level still worked. The overarching tactics in Iraq 

are beneficial to know but don’t always apply to 

Afghanistan.

Mihocko: Talk a little bit about Operation Gateway III.

Barber: Gateway III was an operation to open a 

route in Afghanistan, Route 515. The route went 

from Delaram [western Afghanistan] to Bakwa 

[Farah Province]. Two COPs (combat outposts) of 

FOBs (forward operating base) that the MAGTF 

had a presence at. Before the MAGTF got there, 

2/7 had traveled down [Route] 515. They had tremendous loss of life, and it was deemed by most 

people in southern Afghanistan as the most dangerous road in southern Afghanistan. I think when 

we started Gateway III there were two or three 

IEDs marked on our map for 515 and when we 

finished there were over 60 IEDs.

Mihocko: Marking them where you had found 

them?

Barber: Found and cleared or struck. 

Mihocko: Had 2/7 or any other unit before you 

tried to take this proactive approach to clearing?

Barber: Not that I’m aware of. [The] 2/7 did go 

down at one time and then, because of the loss that 

they had, they decided to go around it through open 

desert. And that was the normal friendly tactic in 

southern Afghanistan. You just don’t travel on the 

roads if you don’t have to. It’s all open desert, so 

you just shoot an azimuth [measuring an arc of 

the horizon] or use your BFT [blue force tracker] 

and cut across the desert. But Gateway III was to 

open that route, and the big picture of Gateway 

III was typical COIN [counterinsurgency]. They 

were going to establish combat outposts every eight 

or nine klicks [kilometers] on 515 with overwatch. 

They were going to establish a presence, they were 

going to conduct counterinsurgency operations 

with securing the populace, holding the road, 

and building infrastructure on 515. They wanted 

to get it paved, they wanted to improve it so that 

it could open up traffic and eventually secure the 

population through very typical counterinsurgency strategy. 

Mihocko: And how long of a distance did you 

say that this road was?

Barber: It was about 30 or 40 kilometers.

Mihocko: And what was the duration of this 

operation?

Barber: It was originally supposed to last less than 

30 days, I don’t remember the specifics. And then 

we built three combat outposts along 515, so we 

followed in [the] trail of 3/8 and their route clearance platoon. I think they had a weapons company and route clearance embedded with them. 

They would go in and clear the spot, we would 

move in right behind them and build a combat 

outpost, literally within hours.

Mihocko: For them?

Barber: For them. And it was the platoon-size combat outpost billeted [for] 40 to 50 Marines. It was 

about a football field in size, 90 meters by 80 meters 

or so square, with an ECP [entry control point] 
218

in one of the corners. We used 20-foot ISO containers in three of the corners with a guard tower 

on top, and then we just used berms and pushed 

dirt with a bulldozer in concertina wire. Force 

protection was there, it was just a really rudimentary combat outpost. We built three of those, and 

we built each one literally in less than 12 hours. 

It was phenomenal that we would go to sleep at 

night and we would wake up the next morning 

our Marines had been working all night and there 

was this football-field-size, enclosed eight-foot-tall 

dirt berm pushed all around you with concertina 

and Hesco and mortar pit in the middle. 

Mihocko: Any idea that the platoon would remain 

at the combat outpost and provide a presence 

along the route?

Barber: Yes ma’am.

Mihocko: And how long were they intended to 

stay there?

Barber: Their intention was to stay there for 30 days 

to continue patrolling once the three outposts were 

established to secure the road, and then they were 

going to turn that over to the Afghan National Army 

[ANA] . . . Force levels for that and [the] national 

army failed to produce enough Afghan soldiers to 

fill those COPs. So by the time we left, 3/8 was still 

heavily embedded in those three combat outposts 

on 515.

Mihocko: By the time CLB-3 left?

Barber: Yes ma’am, and 3/8 turned those over in 

the entirety to 2d Battalion, 3d Marines.

Mihocko: So a new Marine unit came in and 

filled it.

Barber: But the original plan was to turn those 

over to the Afghans and then pull 3/8 out and 

move to the next objective, but I don’t think there 

were ever enough Afghan National Army to fill 

those combat outposts.

Mihocko: Before we move on, is there anything 

else you want to say about Operation Gateway?

Barber: Gateway was our first major operation. 

Our engineers were out there for three weeks 

building these things. Again, it was phenomenal 

to see the UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] footage, a picture of it, the next day when you woke 

up. Afghans would go to sleep at night and there 

would be nothing but dirt and they’d wake up 

and see a platoon of Marines next to them with a 

combat outpost.

Mihocko: Did any of the Marines stay out there? 

Barber: They did. Our Marines stayed out there 

and then we would send guys out that were recovery 

teams, or a wrecker with a recovery team, and they 

would stay out there as well as our M88 [armored] 

tank recovery vehicle that we had. They stayed 

out in the middle COP to do recovery operations 

for the route clearance team and for 3/8 Marines. 

Mihocko: Can you talk a little bit about the female 

engagement teams?

Barber: They used those during Operations Gateway III and Pathfinder, and they wanted to model 

it after the Lioness Program in Iraq. So 3/8 [did] 

not hav[e] female Marines and CLB-3 did. Lieutenant Joannah [R.] Schaffer, our senior watch officer in the COC, put together a team and went to 

Delaram, which was the opening of [Route] 515 

as you moved east to west. Did some preliminary 
219

training there with our intel officer, Matthew [F.] 

Lottinger, who’s a human intel (HUMINT) officer by trade. He gave them some talking [points], 

not interrogation techniques, but just how to talk 

to Afghan people. We had a military police on our 

staff as a first sergeant. He gave them some search 

techniques and what they need to do if they ever 

had to search female Afghans. And then they just 

did some cultural classes and some other objective-based classes, [like] site exploitation, what to 

look for, and they went out on patrols with 3/8.

Mihocko: And what was 3/8’s intention? What 

was their request in terms of not asking for this 

engagement team?

Barber: They wanted to engage the other 50 percent of the population; the women in the Afghan 

villages. Because they would speak to the men, 

but they wanted to also engage the women of the 

Afghan villages. So they requested a Lioness Team 

similar to Iraq. Our Marines came back and said, 

“Whatever I do the rest of this deployment, nothing will make up for that.” It was the greatest thing 

they [FETs] had done. They visited villages and 

they were invited into homes by the women and 

they were given food and they were asked to sing. 

They gave [out] candy; the kids loved them. And 

talking to one of the [Afghani] women led to an 

IED emplacer being captured and being detained 

because the women felt free to talk to our women. 

Whereas, they don’t feel that free talking to male 

Marines. 

Mihocko: Is this something that is going to be 

implemented in the future?

Barber: I would hope so. I think in Iraq they 

showed that it was remarkably successful. I wish 

they would do it on a larger scale in Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan, as you may know, is much more 

oppressive [for] women than Iraq is. It is not, and 

there’s no similarity of modern society in Afghanistan like there is in Iraq; no TV, no cell phone, 

no running water. At least where we were. I think 

that’s the only way you are going to engage the 

women in the village, and I think you have to do 

that to successfully conduct COIN in southern 

Afghanistan.

Mihocko: Can you briefly talk about honesty 

traces?

Barber: [It] is a way to plot your route on a map 

overlay—your actual route versus your planned 

route. So what we found is when we would do our 

planned route, we would vary it every time, even 

in our planning. When we started doing honesty 

traces, which is a British technique that we picked 

up, we found that we were crossing some of the 

wadis [valleys] and the crossings at the same point 

every time, even though we know we planned to go 

different routes. The enemy doesn’t see what your 

planned route is. They only see what your actual 

route is. So they were putting things in our actual 

routes where we were saying, “Well we went that 

way last time. We’ll go back another way.” And 

then just because of the canalization of the wadi, 

we would have to cross at the same spot. We were 

able to get information from the British and we 

were also able to plot our own information and 

it had some pretty significant patterns. Yes, we 

would always start off in different directions, but 

there were some really unique places where you’d 

have to cross and it showed all the routes running 

through there.

Mihocko: Right, and the risk being?

Barber: That’s where they are going to put the 
220

IED. Now what that did for us [is] it identified 

more than any other platform we had—more than 

human intel, more than UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] overhead, more than witnesses spotting somebody putting it in the road. It identified 

where our guys needed to get out of the vehicles 

and use their metal detectors to sweep for IEDs. 

That technique alone found and cleared more 

IEDs than any other technique. 

Mihocko: So it was really that predictable.

Barber: We used mine rollers extensively over 

there.

Mihocko: Was that in your support company? 

Who used those? 

Barber: Motor T Company used them on the 

trucks, but our EOD guys and our S-2 did a pretty 

thorough study on mine roller effectiveness. 

Mihocko: What is a mine roller?

Barber: It’s like the beam that sits out in front of 

the truck—the MTVR [medium tactical vehicle replacement], the HMMWV [Humvee], or 

MRAP [mine resistant ambush protected]—

that has wheels on it that is intended to strike the 

IED before it hits the vehicle. Now if it hits the 

mine roller, it completely destroys the mine roller 

in most cases.

Mihocko: But not the vehicle?

Barber: But not the vehicle. There’s about 12 

to 16 feet of stand-off from the vehicle itself. So 

what we found was these mine rollers [was] that 

we were not detonating the IEDs. The IEDs 

would strike the second or third or sometimes the 

eleventh or thirteenth vehicle in the convoy. We 

didn’t know if that meant that it was command 

activated or what was wrong with it. We finally 

figured out that they weren’t command activated; 

that they were just, by design, poorly made and it 

took a few [times to set them off]. So [the result] 

was unintentional by the enemy, but it had significant effects, because the mine roller was less 

effective. I think at one point, we were recording 

11 percent effectiveness for our mine roller. Now 

11 percent is better than zero, but we expected it 

to be higher. After extensive testing on the mine 

roller, using actual recovered IEDs, our EOD 

guys [took] various steps to increase that effectiveness by adding weight to the mine rollers. Almost 

50 percent! So significant improvement for the 

mine rollers and now, since we have made those 

improvements, the people who make the mine 

roller have gone back, redesigned the mine roller 

using our technique, and classified it as the next 

generation mine roller. So it is pretty phenomenal 

that our EOD guys can get out there, change a 

mine roller a little bit, make it more effective, and 

then that gets implemented Marine Corps-wide.

Mihocko: Were there other challenges or difficulties that you faced during this deployment? 

Barber: The flow of equipment and supplies. Just, 

for example, our SORTS [status of resources and 

training system] report, and our rating was the 

lowest [it] can be up until about three or four 

months into the deployment, and then it jumped 

up one notch. 

Mihocko: Now explain that in laymen’s terms, 

SORTS reporting. 

Barber: We rate our equipment readiness and our 

personnel readiness on a scale of one to four—four 
221

being the lowest and one being the best. Ours was 

four for equipment. Not because we couldn’t repair 

it, because we didn’t have it. We only had about 

50 percent of our mission essential equipment up 

until about three or four months in, and then we 

started getting more equipment in the springtime, until eventually I think we were at about a 

SORTS rating of two when we left. But it’s just 

hard to get some of that equipment into Afghanistan without a seaport. They come into Pakistan 

and they drive up a road into Kandahar and from 

Kandahar they pushed it over to us. But when you 

are moving a 50-ton crane, you can’t just fly this 

thing straight into Bastion. 

Mihocko: And what was the majority [of the] 

equipment you had?

Barber: Recovery vehicles was one. Vehicle recovery wreckers both for the LVS [Logistics Vehicle System] and the MTVR variants that we 

used. Our initial Headquarters Marine Corps 

approved allocation was, I think it was five or 

seven, and the most we ever had was three. You 

know a lot of things like that. Metal detectors 

for our sweep team so they could identify IEDs.

Mihocko: Where was most of this equipment 

coming from?

Barber: We identified it in our mission analysis brief during the site survey. It was eventually approved by Headquarters Marine Corps in 

October or November timeframe. I’m not sure of 

the sourcing. I imagine it was globally sourced or 

direct units were directed to send it. But we did not 

take anything with us of that size. We didn’t take 

any MTVRs. We didn’t take any LVSs. We did 

take some smaller things. We took our command 

operation’s center suite of computers and screens. 

We took some specific stuff for our maintenance 

guys that we knew they would need.

Mihocko: Did you expect that?

Barber: We were told that it was either there waiting on us or it would be there before us and come 

in. Eventually, we started getting stuff in, but when 

we left we were still at only about 75 percent of 

our mission essential equipment.

Mihocko: How do you think it would have changed 

your operations as a battalion had you had all the 

equipment, because it sounds like you were quite 

successful at accomplishing the mission? 

Barber: What we were doing without motor T 

vehicles, for example, and our MTVRs and our 

MRAPs is [that] we only ever had enough equipment [for] one platoon [to] go out at a time. I could 

keep a general support element back that could do 

a quick reaction force [QRF] mission of 13–15 

Marines and six vehicles. But if I wanted to run 

full simultaneous convoy operations to the east and 

to the west, I didn’t have enough equipment to do 

that. [Or] a platoon would return from a convoy 

that lasted three days and we would have scheduled another platoon to leave two days later or the 

next day later. But they were using the same trucks 

as the platoon that just got back; same wrecker, 

same trucks, same MRAPs, and if those things 

broke or got blown up we now have less than 36 

hours to repair this stuff so that we can get it back 

out. That was the most challenging. Yes, we had 

two platoons, but we could only operate one at 

a time because of the equipment stuff. Same for 

the maintenance guys. There were a lot of maintenance guys . . . I think we had an 11 or 12 and, 

in some reports, I saw was up to 17 that was their 

single MOS. For example, communications and 
222

electronics repair or the guy that repairs optics on 

the .50-cal. We had one guy and if he went out to 

the FOB to fix it [.50-cal] because they couldn’t 

afford to bring that weapon system back and they 

couldn’t fix it a Camp Bastion.

Mihocko: Right.

Barber: So a lot of these guys bounced all over the 

FOBs, repairing their specialized equipment, and 

they would continuously rotate and they were a 

one-man show. They had one 2112 [MOS], which 

is a small arms repairman, that could fix the sniper 

rifles and some of the other specialized weapons 

that we have, but he was a one-man show. So, for 

the maintenance piece, it was a personnel limitation. For the transportation piece, it was an equipment limitation.

Mihocko: Any other challenges that you want 

to mention? 

Barber: The only difference, and it was a challenge for us, was the fires support piece. There was 

no central fire direction control center in Iraq. For 

example, if you are in a convoy out on the road, 

help’s only about 30 minutes away in any direction. Whether it’s air, whether it’s a ground QRF. 

Our first convoy took 54 hours, and the closest 

help was about 10 hours away. So for us to coordinate artillery air support, British rockets, we did 

that all on our own through the assistant operations officer, Captain [Andrew S.] Johnson, who 

was an 0302 [MOS] by trade.

Barber: Our COC was not set up like a typical logistics operations center or combat service 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Pete Thibodeau 

LCpl Christopher Hudson, with 3d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), maintains security on a patrol during 

Operation Gateway III in the Farah Province, Afghanistan, on 7 January 2009. Third Battalion was the ground combat 

element of SPMAGTF–A.
223

support operations center. It was a combat operations center. We coordinated fires, we did medevacs, we tracked movement, and we didn’t realize 

this until the first troops in contact we got into. 

Traditionally, the logistics operations center had 

all the logistics functions inside. So in the middle 

of a TIC [troops in contact] that lasted about 90 

minutes of troops in contact, we’re trying to get 

Cobras there. We’re trying to get a QRF. We’re 

trying to make sure nobody is hurt. Trying to see 

if we need medevac. The phone rings and they 

say, “Hey, you have mail at the flight line, could 

you come pick it up?” So we immediately shifted 

all the logistics stuff out of our COC and ran a 

combat operations center. 

Mihocko: Right.

Barber: That was a challenge for us because, not 

only did we have new team, we didn’t have appropriate combat operations center training. And 

then we had to discount all of the logistics functions that we were responsible for out of the S-3 

and give them a backup role. So while we still did 

logistics, distribution, transportation, and maintenance, we didn’t track those in the S-3 COC 

like it’s normally done. I think we’ll probably do 

it similar next time, but we would keep it closer 

to the S-3 so we would have better control of it. 

We gave those functions to the S-4 and the S-4 

did a lot of our UMCC [unit movement control 

center] stuff and some other things that are done 

traditionally by the S-3 and the CLBs.

Mihocko: Do you think future combat logistics 

battalions that go to Afghanistan will have a similar setup or was that sort of an exception to your 

specific situation?

Barber: I think it was an exception because we 

didn’t have anyone above us that could coordinate support for us. MAGTF was the next echelon 

above and they were in Kandahar. So I couldn’t 

call the MAGTF and ask them for a quick reaction force or to call in fire. The CLB that replaced 

us has a regiment CLR [combat logistics regiment] 

over them that also has a COC that is right next 

door to the MEB [Marine expeditionary brigade] 

so they would report things to the regiment and I 

think you will see that as they build up forces in 

Afghanistan like they did in Iraq where CLBs will 

work for the CLR who will have that capability 

directly with the MEB or the MEF [Marine expeditionary force] forward that we didn’t have. I’d 

like to think that other CLBs could operate that 

way, but it was extremely challenging.

Mihocko: What are some of your most memorable moments from this operation?

Barber: First convoy [and] within 90 minutes [we 

had] troops in contact . . .

Mihocko: Were you in the COC or were you in 

the convoy?

Barber: I was in the COC. But that’s one memorable moment because it was the first major engagement with MAGTF. And all of our Marines did 

phenomenal. We made it through unscathed. 

Prior to that, they had hit an IED with this mine 

roller and we were able to externally sling load it 

on a British CH-47 [Chinook helicopter] with the 

mine roller. It all happened in about an hour, got it 

coordinated, and we watched it on the Scan Eagle 

of the UAV feed, which is pretty phenomenal seeing what took off on land. That was memorable. 

It was really unique in that once Gateway started, 

and once we moved from establishing the base and 

then Camp Bastion and Camp Barber and moving 
224

into Operation Gateway III, it really got to steady 

state operations after Operation Gateway III. We 

just mellowed it into, “We’re going to Now Zad 

tomorrow,” and, “Okay. Got it. We’re going to 

Golestan in three weeks.” Each one of those convoys had significant events that happened. I think 

90 percent of the time we either found or struck 

an IED or had some form of enemy contact. Mortars would land 300 meters away. But each convoy going out was a significant event and we just 

waited for it to happen. 

Mihocko: As the deployment progressed, [did] 

those convoys or the events they encountered just 

become more routine?

Barber: Yeah, we had to fight that, the complacency. It was about 90 days out and you could get 

that sense. I mean, we went to Now Zad, which 

was traditionally one of our hardest routes, twice 

without a single incident. And of course, then all 

the Marines want to jump on that run and go to 

Now Zad because it’s outside the wire and seems 

to be a fairly easy one. And the next time we went, 

we had a vehicle get blown up and some pretty 

significant increase in the activity. I remember us 

discussing that it’s been pretty quiet and we’ve 

all gotten pretty complacent and we just try and 

fight this as we can. 

Mihocko: Can you talk a little bit about the 

Marines, specifically, anything that stands out in 

terms of their performance? 

Barber: The [biggest] thing that stands out is 

that these Marines, over a wide swath of MOSs 

from different bases—Okinawa, Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, we had a Marine from Quantico, we had doctors from Bremerton, Washington, 

and all over—all came together and these guys 

did things out on the convoys, sweep teams, and 

security teams searching for IEDs, immediate 

action drills and they would take fire . . . that was 

absolutely phenomenal. With, I don’t want to say 

very little training, but they didn’t receive the six 

or nine months workup package like the infantry guys get or other guys get by going through 

Mohave Viper and doing immediate action drills 

and reacting to fire . . . these guys all did it and 

they did it phenomenally. I went out on convoy 

for Gateway III and specifically remember coming back with a brand new second lieutenant platoon commander who had been in CLB-3 about 

four months before we deployed to Afghanistan. 

It was the most professionally run convoy I had 

ever been on. Radio chatter was minimal and we 

had no instances [of trouble] on the convoy. It was 

remarkable that they had come from fixing stuff 

in Hawaii and doing normal Hawaiian operations 

to doing combat operations in Afghanistan with 

what looked like with relative ease. 

Mihocko: What do you feel the battalion’s biggest accomplishments were? 

Barber: I think we had a few. First, we brought 

everybody back home. No one was killed. We 

had two Marines injured about two weeks before 

we were redeployed. Both of them are from Okinawa, EOD Marines. Their vehicle hit an IED. 

It wasn’t [that] they were working on it as EOD 

guys, they just happened to be riding in the vehicle that got hit. I think one guy had some torn 

ligaments in his knee and the other guy broke his 

arm, but they are both going to be fine. We left 

with 37 days notice. . . . We had PTP Training 

but no substantial workup to go and we threw 

this group together and, Marines being Marines, 

it was remarkable that we all went out there and 

we all came home.
225

Mihocko: Can you think of any historical firsts 

on this deployment?

Barber: Airlifting the mine rollers. We have a field 

service rep from mine rollers [who] told us that 

was a first, and he asked us to document it and 

say[ing] that it’d never been done before. I think 

the way we set up our COC wasn’t a first for the 

Marine Corps, but it was a first for a CLB to run 

combat operations like that. We had B-1 bombers overhead on our convoys talking directly to 

our joint terminal air controller [JTAC] that was 

embedded with CLB-3. This [JTAC] was an F-18 

pilot; he was assigned to us from the MAGTF and 

he talked to all the air that flew over. Normally 

JTACs are not integrated in convoys, they reside 

at the battalion [level]. We pushed this guy on 

the road and he went on every trip with us. So I 

think using a JTAC in that capacity was a first, and 

there were a ton of firsts. I’m sure Colonel Jernigan has a list. We set up the first Marine Corps 

Exchange in Afghanistan. That little exchange 

did about $15,000 a day. I mean, it was remarkable how much stuff came in and how many people would buy. 

Mihocko: What do you think in 10 years will be 

remembered about CLB-3 and this deployment 

in particular?

Barber: It was enough to do what the MAGTF 

needed to do to support 3/8 and us and [act as] 

a bridging force for the MEB to hold what 2/7 

had done, but we joke about it over there. We’re 

going back there in three years and it’ll be overcome by a larger force. I would like to think that 

CLB-8 would set up like we did, but if I had to 

go in there now, I wouldn’t set up the same way 

because I would rely on established infrastructure . . . so I could concentrate more on providing logistics support to the MAGTF.
226
Part IV

Marineistan, 2009
228

S

hortly after his inauguration in February 2009, President Barack H. Obama 

announced that an additional 17,000 

troops would be sent to Afghanistan. The 

deployment, including an 8,000-strong Marine 

expeditionary brigade, came in response to then 

Commander of International Security Assistance 

(ComISAF) General David D. McKiernan’s, USA, 

request for troops to check the Taliban’s resurgence. 

The announcement also signaled the shift in Marine 

Corps operations from Iraq to Afghanistan that 

then Marine Corps Commandant General James 

T. Conway had been advocating for over a year. 

The president later replaced McKiernan with 

General Stanley A. McChrystal, USA. To implement President Obama’s goal to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda and prevent 

their return to Afghanistan, McChrystal saw 

swaying the population away from insurgent elements and improving the stability of Afghanistan as critical to success. In response, the new 

COMISAF revamped the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan to focus on a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) effort based on U.S. lessons and 

experiences in Iraq. By the fall, McChrystal presented the president with options for a surge to 

bring Afghanistan back from the brink. In early 

December 2009, President Obama announced the 

deployment of another 30,000 troops, the bulk of 

which were Marines. 

The gains made by Special Purpose MAGTFAfghanistan between fall 2008 and spring 2009 

laid the foundation for 2d Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade (2d MEB) to begin operations soon after 

Brigadier General Lawrence D. Nicholson took 

command of Marines in southern Afghanistan. 

Nicholson’s brand of COIN kicked off with Operation Khanjar on 2 July 2009. The operation rapidly introduced approximately 4,000 Marines and 

hundreds of Afghan National Army troops into 

major population centers of the Helmand River 

valley previously dominated by the Taliban prior 

to national elections in August. The MEB continued to follow up on its success with Operations 

Eastern Resolve and Cobra’s Anger in fall 2009. 

In February 2010, the MEB closed in on Marjah, 

what then COMISAF General McChrystal called 

“the bleeding ulcer” of Helmand Province during 

Operation Mostarak.

Photo courtesy of LCpl Caleb Gomez 

U.S. Army Gen Stanley A. McChrystal (left), commander 

of the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. 

Forces-Afghanistan, visits with BGen Lawrence D. Nicholson, commanding general of 2d MEB-Afghanistan, at Camp 

Leatherneck, Helmand Province, on 2 September 2009. 
229

The MEB’s deployment allowed Marines to 

introduce an Afghan governmental and Coalition 

presence into areas previously dominated by the 

Taliban. The MEB also had to contend with the 

vast poppy fields growing in Helmand that helped 

financially support the insurgency. Nicholson’s 

approach to COIN featured both kinetic operations along with some nontraditional operations 

such as Mullah engagement, female engagement 

teams, and Joint Security Academy Shorabak—

a Marine Corps-led Afghan police training facility. However, the Marine approach and some of 

its methods were considered controversial by some 

senior Army officers and senior State Department officials. Marine insistence on autonomy 

and doctrinal reliance on the MAGTF prompted 

detractors to label the Marine operational area as 

“Marineistan.”

Photo courtesy of LCpl Walter D. Marino II 

Marines from 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, conduct combat operations in Now Zad, Afghanistan, during Operation Cobra’s 

Anger on 4 December 2009.
230

BGen Lawrence D. Nicholson, commanding general of 2d 

MEB–Afghanistan, speaks at the transfer of authority ceremony at Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 

on 29 May 2009. Nicholson assumed authority of Marine 

battlespace and forces in the province from Col Duffy W. 

White, commanding officer of SPMAGTF–Afghanistan. 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Christopher R. Rye
Interview: 

Brigadier General 

Lawrence D. Nicholson

by Marine Corps History Division

Marine Corps oral historian Lieutenant Colonel 

Michael I. Moffett interviewed the commanding 

general of 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The 

following has been edited from the original transcript for space constraints in this work. 

Moffett: This is Lieutenant Colonel Michael 

Moffett. This is an oral history interview with 

Brigadier General Lawrence [D.] Nicholson. 

Brigadier General Nicholson was the commanding officer for the Marine expeditionary brigade 

in Afghanistan from May 2009 until 12 April 

2010. General Nicholson, thanks for your time. 

Nicholson: I spent 12 months in Fallujah and was 

selected for brigadier general. I did a year at Quantico [Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia] and 

then was sent to II Marine Expeditionary ForceForward [II MEF] to be the ground combat element 

[GCE] commander for Major General Richard T. 

Tryon, and I was going to replace General Richard P. Mills. So I went to turn over with General 

Mills as the GCE commander in Iraq. While there, 

Major General John F. Kelly called me in the office 

and said, “You better get back to [Marine Corps 

Base Camp] Lejeune, [Jacksonville, North Carolina]. I think you’ve got a change of orders.” So 

I did. I got back and asked Lieutenant General 

Dennis J. Hejlik, the MEF commander, “Sir, is 

231
232

there anything I should know?” The answer was, 

“No, keep preparing. You’re going to Iraq. I don’t 

know what Kelly’s talking about. You’re going to 

Iraq.” That went [on] until 17 December. On 17 

December, General Hejlik put his finger in my 

chest and said, “Start forming the [2d] MEB.” 

The joke I tell everyone is, if you look around 

Camp Lejeune on 17 December, there’s not a 

lot of guys you’d like to form a MEB with. I 

think we started in earnest putting the team 

together in January, and the interesting thing 

was [that] unlike a MEU, where you can look at 

other MEUs and figure out what they’re doing, 

there’s not a real bright template to putting a 

MEB together. It is the proverbial blank sheet of 

paper that you’re staring at—where the forces are 

coming from, where the equipment is coming 

from, what the mission is. You’re really starting 

from scratch, so there was a lot of great help. General [Richard T.] Tryon, of course, he’s preparing 

to take the MEF (Forward) over to Iraq, understanding that he would probably be the last MEF 

(Forward) to go, and now all of a sudden he’s 

being asked to cut forces, to cut staff, to cut equipment, to give birth to the MEB, both of which 

are coming out of Camp Lejeune. There was a lot 

of consternation in the Marine Corps that maybe 

the West Coast should take the MEB. The East 

Coast can do the MEF into Iraq, [and] the West 

Coast will take the MEB to Afghanistan. 

General Hejlik kind of raised his hand and 

said, “I can do both.” I MEF had just gotten 

home, so they had their own series of problems 

trying to generate a force from a MEF that had 

just returned from a year [deployed], so you had a 

lot of dwell time issues. General Hejlik surprised a 

lot of people, and he said, “I can do it. We’ll figure 

it out. I can do it.” So we built about a 250-man 

staff. We identified very quickly the battalions 

we would be taking over, as 1/5 [1st Battalion, 

5th Marines], 2/8 [2d Battalion, 8th Marines], 

2d LAR [2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion]. We would inherit 3/8 [3d Battalion, 8th 

Marines] that was already in there as part of Colonel Duffy [W.] White’s Special Purpose MAGTF 

that was operating in country. The next part was 

the gear. That was the harder piece.

Moffett: It sounds like a lot of your gear and 

equipment was behind you, or you got there 

ahead of a lot of it. Is that fair to say?

Nicholson: Well, I think the president made the 

decision to plus up [17,000 troops in February 

2009]. The first 10,000 they wanted to get in 

there, of course, was the MEB, so there was a rush 

to determine where the gear was going to come 

from. The infantry battalions didn’t come with 

their gear. They came with very small portions of 

their gear. They brought their personal weapons, 

but crew-served weapons, radios, COCs [combat 

operations centers], trucks, MRAPs [mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles], those things were 

generated ecumenically, if you will, from throughout the Marine Corps. We joked that even 8th 

and I gave up their machine guns for this thing. 

Everyone gave people, everyone gave gear, so 

there was a taxation on the Marine Corps. It took 

a lot for the Marine Corps to put a MEF over 

there continuously, year after year, so now to put 

a MEB on top of that really was difficult, but they 

did it. They figured it out. But the need to get this 

done quickly was obviously very important [for] 

the Marine expeditionary mindset: “We are the 

expeditionary force in readiness.” So we couldn’t 

take a hell of a lot of time to get that gear there. 

So we started loading ships, literally, as we 

were forming it up in January. By late January, 

we’re loading ships in Blount Island [Jacksonville, 

Florida]. Gear is coming from all over, and I sent a 
233

team down there. The guys at Blount Island did a 

great job, but we’re loading ships. “Hey, we’ll sort 

it out later.” . . . Much of the gear came directly 

from the factories and at MARCORSYSCOM 

[Marine Corps Systems Command]. The orders 

went in, so a lot of brand-new gear [was] coming 

in, and a lot of it coming by FedEx and DHL . . . 

“Hey, what is it?” “I don’t know. Load it. We’ll 

sort it out later.” That was very much the plan 

of the day, but we had about five ships that had 

to get loaded and get sailing very, very quickly, 

because there’s no straight shot to Afghanistan. 

You can’t just pull into Kuwait and drive it in like 

we could for Iraq. The ships had to leave Blount 

Island, and they weren’t allowed to go to Karachi, in Pakistan. They had to go to Fujairah, UAE 

[United Arab Emirates], offload there, where they 

were cross-decked into Pakistani freighters, and 

then the Pakistani freighters would take the gear 

into Karachi.

Moffett: At great peril to some of the gear, it 

sounds like.

Nicholson: Well, there have been a lot of pictures in the media about convoys being burned 

and hit, so there was a lot of apprehension, and 

we went in with the assessment that 10 percent of 

the gear that we shipped would never make it, and 

that was a very optimistic assessment. I got over 

there in—I guess February is when I did my site 

survey. I sought out General David [D.] McKiernan, USA, in Kabul, who was commander ISAF 

[International Security Assistance Force] at the 

time, and I remember the discussion. Marjah 

[Nad Ali District, Helmand Province] had been 

talked about extensively as being the worst place 

and, for all intents and purposes, Marjah had 

seceded from the union is the best way I can say it. 

They were no longer part of Afghanistan. 

They were their own little autonomous republic, run by the Taliban, very, very proudly. We 

were very careful while we were there not to 

use the F-word—the Fallujah word. We didn’t 

want to draw unfair and just not-sound comparisons between Fallujah and Marjah. But, at the 

end of the day, what we found was there were 

a lot of similarities in the sense that, like Fallujah pre-al-Fajr, it had become no-go terrain for 

us. It had become sort of an isolated area, where 

at one point, al-Qaeda in Fallujah and the Taliban in Afghanistan had taken refuge, had taken 

sanctuary, and had run the area. They had their 

own government, they had their own jurists. 

They arbitrated civil disputes. They had their 

own defense. They had their own police. There 

were people in uniform running around in Marjah. Previous Taliban had started setting up their 

own government so, for all intents and purposes, 

it was an autonomous republic, and nobody from 

the government of Afghanistan or the Coalition 

ever went in there. 

So, I’m sitting with General McKiernan, and 

he was very generous with his time, and I said, 

“Boss, if this is the worst place in Afghanistan, 

why don’t you let us go there?” 

Moffett: You mentioned Marjah, which is a question I’ll jump to because you just mentioned it. 

[The] 3/6 [3d Battalion, 6th Marines] is in the 

process of coming back. I know they were there 

for quite a while—seven months. But, as you 

know, there’s been a lot of press about the Marjah situation—Operation Moshtarak. A lot of the 

theme that I pick up on in the media is that Marjah somewhat stalled.

Nicholson: Stalled, backsliding. If it’s the first big 

test of the new policy, it has not manifested itself 

into a great victory.
234

Moffett: I suspect that you might have been reading some of this material, sir. So what is your reaction to this narrative on Marjah not working out 

so well? 

Nicholson: To me, it’s fairly simple. I use the 

analogy that I was the regimental commander of 

Fallujah in 2006 and Christmas 2006, we were 

under pretty good fire Christmas day, two years 

after Operation al-Fajr. Two years after al-Fajr, 

we had gunfights every day in the city of Fallujah. Did that mean that al-Fajr was not worth it 

or was a failure or didn’t work? No. It served its 

intended purpose of taking that city away from 

the insurgency in Iraq, and it opened up what had 

previously been no-go terrain, what had previously 

been an area that the enemy dominated as their 

hub and their sanctuary. . .

This was an area that we could not go into—

unlike any other areas in Helmand [Province], 

this was an area that we could not get into. This 

was an area where the enemy was in great numbers and in great strength. Geographically, also, 

I think what’s intriguing about Marjah that the 

media really just doesn’t even consider is that it’s 

not a homogenous population. And even my buddy, 

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, from The Washington Post, 

who wrote an article about Nawa versus Marjah, 

they’re only 10 kilometers apart . . . he failed to 

grasp one of the most essential and obvious facts 

about Marjah, and that’s that it’s not a homogenous population. Marjah was settled by 40 different 

tribes. There’s a Wardak area, [or] neighborhood. 

There’s an area of people from Kunduz. There’s 

Tajiks, there’s Uzbeks, there’s Hazaras, there’s 

Pashtuns, there’s everything and every mix imaginable. But when Marjah was built in the ’50s and 

’60s, it attracted people, and they sought people 

from all over Afghanistan to come down there. 

So unlike Nawa, which is very homogenous and 

has one or two tribes to deal with, there is no real 

natural leadership from Marjah. 

There is no traditional, longstanding “My family has been in Marjah for five centuries.” It is sort 

of a mosaic of newcomers and, frankly, not a lot of 

deep roots of tribal leadership exist there. There 

are factions, and there was a lot of conflict between 

rival factions between tribes, and there was a lot of 

tribalism there. I think that’s what makes Marjah 

so unique among any other place in Helmand is 

that it’s not a natural evolution of tribal dynamics. It is an artificial mosaic. So, number one, you 

have that tribal dynamic. Number two, no one 

had been in Marjah for many years. Certainly no 

Coalition forces. Afghan forces were forced out in 

’06, and I think we talked a lot about the people 

choosing. One day, the people will choose, and 

they will—well, in Marjah they did it, and they 

chose the Taliban, purposefully. They chose the 

Taliban and kicked out the government. They 

killed whatever police were left, kicked them out, 

and told the government to leave. 

We couldn’t even fly. For nine months, we 

couldn’t fly anywhere near Marjah, or we’d take 

fire. We had a platoon, a unit that shall go unnamed 

. . . get disoriented as they were traveling in the 

south, and they got a little too close to Marjah, 

and they got the hell shot out of them and took 

some casualties. Not a good day. No one killed, 

but we had some vehicles blown up, and we had 

some Marines wounded because the lieutenant 

got a little disoriented and got too close to Marjah. This is months before Operation Moshtarak 

in Marjah in February 2010. 

So Marjah had been no-go terrain for us and 

it belonged to the Brits. It was in the British battlespace until two weeks before the op. . . . The 

Brits never had enough manpower to go in there, 

nor did we, until the arrival of 1/6 and 3/6. I 

think our job was relatively straightforward: kick 
235

in the door and go in and take away this sanctuary. I asked General McKiernan when I was 

on my site survey in February/March of ’09, “If 

the worst place you’ve got, boss, is Marjah, let 

us go to Marjah first.” And the answer was no.

Moffett: Because of the elections.

Nicholson: Because of the elections. But that 

haunted us a little bit for the first nine months, 

because whatever success we had in Nawa [District, Ghazni Province] and Garmsir [District, 

Helmand Province], and even Rajiv . . . Now Zad 

[Helmand Province], Delaram [District, Nimruz 

Province], Golestan [Farah Province]. Wherever 

we went, we had relative success, in some cases dramatic success. But during that entire time, people 

would say, “Hey, Nicholson, boy, your Marines are 

really doing well here.” Afghans, they would say, 

“The Marines are doing well here and here, here, 

and here, but, jeez, the enemy’s in Marjah. When 

are you going to Marjah?” It was almost as if . . . 

as Bing West [Francis J. “Bing” West, former asisstant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs] says, if you guys are really that strong, 

why aren’t you going there? Because that’s where 

all the really bad actors are, and that’s where a lot 

of the nexus targets were and a lot of the opium 

facilitators and financiers. We knew it, they knew 

it, and based on the fact of where we went and 

where the lay down was, we had to operate in the 

areas we went to. 

You couldn’t take a company and put them 

in Marjah. Apparently now, we were right. That 

wouldn’t work. You had to go big into Marjah, 

and you had to take that away, and that’s what 

the operation in February was designed to do—

Moshtarak. So our job was really to kick in the 

door, and I think in talking to General Mills and 

Brigadier General Joseph L. Osterman, our job was 

that first 60 days that we were there, was to kick in 

the door, bring the Afghan Security Forces in, try 

to establish the government-in-a-box thing, which 

we talked about a lot. As best we can get started, 

and I think our mission was to get started and take 

away what was an open and existing sanctuary 

away from the Taliban. I think that was accomplished. Is it pretty? No. Every day there are IEDs. 

Every day there’s probably gunfire, but it is dramatically changed, I think, from the pre-Moshtarak days, where it was a safe haven for them. That 

safe haven is gone. It doesn’t mean that it’s a great 

neighborhood. Certainly, there’s some progress. 

There’s some schools open, the markets are open, 

the population in many cases—large portions of the 

population are existing pretty well there, I guess. 

One of the things that troubled us early on was 

the assignment of Hajji [Abdul] Zahir [Qadir] to 

the governor. Nice guy, 15 years in Germany as a 

cab driver, but not the right guy. It would take a 

very special person to coalesce the efforts and try to 

build unity among the 40 tribes that are resident in 

here. I think what has been underreported, too, is 

the amount of work done by the provincial reconstruction team and by a lot of great folks in terms 

of trying to set conditions prior to Moshtarak, the 

advance force ops, or the shaping operations that 

occurred there and the level of engagement that 

was done, reaching out to all 40 of the tribes, in 

many cases very successfully meeting elders that 

lived in Marjah, elders that lived outside of Marjah. Many of them couldn’t go back in because 

they were not the right tribe. Over 200 engagements with people from Marjah of all walks of life, 

businessmen, educators, tribal chieftains, trying 

to get a better feel for that human terrain. And 

I think one of the greatest challenges for us was 

understanding the human terrain of Marjah prior 

to crossing the LD [line of departure], and trying 

to gain some allies before we even went in there, 
236

trying to gain some cooperation, and trying to 

explain to a lot of the locals what we were trying 

to do before we went in and enlist their support, 

at least in supporting the government. 

In some cases, we had some success there. In 

some cases, obviously, there are some areas that 

are not particularly calmed down. I think opening Marjah up and the introduction of forces there 

was a natural progression of what we had to do. If 

you look at a map from [Camp] Leatherneck to 

get to Nawa or to Garmsir, we had to fly around. 

It was a very cumbersome, circuitous route to go 

anywhere, and it was the elephant in the room. 

Marjah was the elephant in the room for the first 

9 or 10 months, so we had to kick that door open. 

And I am very confident, and I talk with [Colonel 

Randall P. Newman], the regimental commander 

[RCT-7] who will be there until November. I am 

very confident that progress is occurring. Everybody wanted this thing wrapped up with a bow in 

30 days, and I think we were very cautious early 

on. And I think if you look back to what we said 

early on was that this was going to take some time, 

and the enemy was going to contest this. They 

weren’t going to just let us have it without a fight, 

and I think while Marjah is probably mostly in 

control of the Coalition and the security forces, 

there are incidents that will continue to go on for 

another couple of months, I’m sure.

Moffett: But the question goes back to Rajiv’s 

article about the “Marineistan” issue. 

Nicholson: I think one of the things we tried to 

preach and imbue into our leaders, and Sergeant 

Major [Ernest K. Hoopii] and I talked with every 

unit coming in, but we didn’t talk to them at the 

battalion level. We talked to them at the company 

level, because when you talk to a battalion you kind 

of lose the effect. It’s 1,200 guys sitting in a circle. 

You just don’t connect. But talking to a company, 

one at a time, with the company commander and 

the first sergeant standing next to you, one of the 

things we tried to do is agility at the point of friction, innovation at the point of friction. One of 

the things we endeavored to do early on, from the 

very beginning, was experimentation. 

I think we tried to get that down to the squad/

platoon level. As I would tell our guys, I could send 

you to 10 Mojave Vipers [30 days of training at 

Twentynine Palms, California], I could give every 

one of you a PhD in the cultural anthropology of 

Afghanistan, and you’re still not going to be ready 

for some of the scenarios that will unfold. You’re 

not going to be ready for all those things. But it’s 

the agility. It’s your ability to improvise as a leader, 

as a squad leader, as a platoon commander, as a 

company commander, your ability to improvise 

at the decisive time and place. General [Charles 

C.] Krulak, with the strategic corporal—hell, we 

had strategic privates. 

We had guys making fundamentally strategic decisions every day by their actions, by their 

conduct, by the manner in which they carried 

out their mission, by the way they interacted with 

the Afghan Security Forces. A lot of the things 

we took out came right from my experience in 

Iraq. So many people told me before I went over, 

“Hey, remember, Larry, Afghanistan is not Iraq. 

They’re so very different.” Well, yes, they are, but 

COIN principles are principles for a reason. It’s 

because they are transferrable, because they do 

fit more than one scenario and how you treat the 

people, how you work with the people, how you 

earn their trust. You can surge troops and equipment, but you can’t surge trust, confidence, and 

personal relations. That has to be built up over a 

period of years.

 It was a compilation and a build of trust that 

you had to earn. I think what made a fundamen-
237

tal difference between Anbar [Province] and Helmand is that we don’t like to think [of] ourselves as 

occupiers or invaders. When we went into Anbar 

in ’04, I think people looked at us like occupiers or 

invaders. Helmand’s different. In Helmand, they 

don’t all get us like that. One of my great stories 

is [that] on day three of Marjah we had 32 TICs 

[troops in contact]. In two tours in Iraq, one tour 

in Afghanistan, I’ve never been in a day that was 

more kinetic. It was the most kinetic day I had 

ever seen. Day three of Marjah, there wasn’t a guy 

in there that wasn’t in a direct firefight. It was tremendously kinetic. 

Day four of Marjah, the sergeant major and I 

were downtown in the city center of Marjah, and 

there was a shura [consultation] going on with 

Lieutenant Colonel Calvert L. Worth, the battalion commander of 1/6. And he had Haji Zahir 

. . . the newly appointed governor of Marjah that 

had been kind of undressed in the press for 15 years 

of being a cab driver and for child abuse in Germany and being imprisoned in Germany and what 

have you. There’s 50 men sitting on the ground 

and there’s Cal Worth at the front and Haji’s here 

with him. I’m sitting in the back with the sergeant 

major and with Rajiv from The Washington Post

and a couple of other journalists. This guy stands 

up, and he looks like a tough-looking b——d

—late 30s, early 40s. He goes, “I’m a Taliban. We 

are all Taliban.” He points to Cal Worth and he 

says, “I like you. I like Americans, because Americans helped build Marjah.” Marjah is an artificial creation. Marjah is open desert that USAID 

in the ’50s and ’60s went in and built these canals, 

Venice like. 

Unfortunately, it became the poppy capital of 

the world because of all the great irrigation projects that USAID had done. He goes, “I like you, 

and I trust you.” And he pointed to Haji Zahir and 

he goes, “I don’t like you. I don’t trust you. You 

represent a failed and flawed and corrupt government.” My words, but, “You represent a tyrannical 

government that oppresses the people and steals 

from the people, but I’ll work with you until you 

prove that I can’t trust you. Then I will come and 

kill you,” which was one of the seminal moments 

where you’re like, “Wow.”

Nicholson: By day eight, I knew Marjah was pretty 

well over from a kinetic standpoint, when I saw 

two miles worth of tractors and trailers bringing 

all the families back in, and we had not asked for 

people to leave. In fact, we had told them to stay. 

The governor didn’t want a Fallujah-like mass 

exodus of the city. He wanted people to stay, and 

he didn’t want people leaving, and it would have 

created second- and third-order effects, refugee 

problems, but a lot of people did leave. A lot of 

people knew this was going to occur. They didn’t 

know when, they didn’t know how and they didn’t 

know exactly where, but they knew that something 

big was coming, and we were advocates of that. 

It’s Pashtunwali culture, where strength is everything. We really couched this as an inevitability. 

Okay, Nawa has fallen, it belongs to the government. Garmsir belongs to the government, Khan 

Neshin [Helmand Province], Now Zad, which as 

interesting as Marjah is. Now Zad is more compelling, because it’s a return of the population. It’s 

almost a Balkans-like scenario where 30,000 people had been forced out of their town, out of their 

city, and they were now coming back. 

I think the innovation and I think the rogueness, and Bing West probably helped capture some 

of this a little bit. But I think we were just very 

aggressive on all lines of operation. I always got 

distracted when I heard a guy say, “Hey, I’m a lawyer. I don’t do that COIN s——t.” “Wait a second. What is that COIN s——t?” From high-level 

Khanjar or Marjah or Now Zad-like operations, 
238

where you have supporting arms, where you’ve 

got 4,500 guys being introduced in a seven-hour 

period by Army aviation, Marine aviation, where 

you’re muscling through, using amphibious assault 

vehicles [AAV] to breach Soviet-type minefields 

and you’ve got guys marking lanes and convoys 

moving through in the middle of the night, that’s 

COIN. But that’s the high end of COIN. The low 

end of COIN is eating goat, drinking tea, holding hands, and doing a lot of man kissing. Everywhere in between those two, that’s all COIN. I 

think the innovation and what we tried to preach, 

I think we were just more aggressive. 

Bing West is doing an article. He compared 1/5 

with Lieutenant Colonel William F. McCullough 

against the battalion from RC-East [Regional 

Command-East]. He had this mathematical thing 

where every patrol from 1/5, or every squad, does 

two patrols a day, 12 hours a day, 16 hours a day, 

the amount of coverage, the amount of time. We 

ended up coming up with a term. It’s an aviation 

maintenance term, but touch time. The amount 

of touch time on the population was off the chart. 

I mandated that squads don’t go out for six hours, 

eight hours. Oftentimes, squads will go out for two 

or three days. They were encouraged.

Moffett: The Marineistan thing?

Nicholson: Yes. It was kind of a backhanded compliment. The article, which I hope you’ve got in 

your archives, talked a lot about innovation. One 

of the things I always pushed with our Marine 

officers was—the quote I always used was “innovation at the point of friction.” I wanted leaders 

that could think on their feet, that were agile and 

adaptable to the situations they found themselves 

in. Again, if you were in Now Zad, the scenario 

was very different than what it would be in Nawa, 

and very different in Khan Neshin. Each of these 

areas was very unique, and even within battalion 

areas. You look at Garmsir, the company that was 

northernmost in Garmsir District had a very different fight than the one that was in the southern.

I talked to Rajiv afterward, and he felt that 

he had written a very complimentary article. He 

felt that he had highlighted and illustrated Marine 

Corps innovation. One of the things we did differently, that I think he did highlight a little bit, 

was the mullah engagement. We’re very good in 

Iraq and Afghanistan about dealing with the local 

elected or appointed leadership. That was easy, Governor Mamoun, Governor Mangal. We got good 

in Iraq [at] working with the tribal leadership, but 

initially—and again, I was Major General Richard F. Natonski’s G-3 at the purple finger moment 

when Ambassador [L. Paul] Bremer said, “Only 

deal with the elected officials. The tribal leadership has been marginalized by 30 years of Saddam 

rule. Don’t pay any attention to them. They have 

no authority.” Boy, that was bad advice. That was 

terrible advice, the second-worst piece of advice, 

other than disbanding the Iraqi Army, perhaps. 

The Marine Corps learned very quickly, and 

during our tour we reached out. We learned very 

quickly that the tribal leadership did have a lot 

of moral authority, did have a lot of real input. 

The one area that I don’t remember dealing with 

in Iraq was the third leg of the leadership stool, 

and that was the religious leadership. We brought 

an Islamic Navy chaplain over, and he became a 

rock star. We took him out. He was only there 40 

days, but he probably made 35 trips out in areas, 

and he met with all the mullahs. We called it the 

Mullahpalooza tour. 

We reached out to these guys, and I think 

we were very surprised, in most cases, [that] they 

reached back. So we had ceded the religious leadership in Afghanistan to the Taliban for some 

time, because it’s awkward. It’s Islamic. It’s not in 
239

our comfort zone. And that was one of the things 

Rajiv highlighted a little bit, was that we had gone 

out and gotten these guys to work with us, gotten 

these guys to meet with us. Boy, you talk about an 

authority. Unlike Iraq, where it seemed like everyone had satellite TV and everyone had the ability 

to drive into Baghdad, in Helmand [Province], it’s 

much more isolated. No one had TV, unless you 

were Lashkar Gah or one of the bigger cities. TV 

was ridiculous. No one had it. For most Helmandis, going to Kabul would be like going to Paris. It’s 

a postcard scene, they’re never going to go. They 

have no chance of going. They’ll spend their lives 

never going anywhere near that. So where do they 

get their guidance? Who gives them their leadership? Well, it’s going to be that tribal leader, but 

it’s also going to be that religious leader. And the 

Friday sermons were so very important in terms 

of shaping public opinion. 

 I get asked a lot, and I got asked by a lot of 

folks about measures of effectiveness, metrics, and 

measurements, “How do you know if you’re doing 

well in a COIN environment?” Is it the number of 

IEDs? No. Number of casualties? No. All of those 

things tell you part of the story, but they don’t tell 

you the whole story. So what are the things that 

you can hang your hat on? One, for us, was [the] 

return of the population. When we saw populations return to the areas, that was a great sign. 

You knew things were getting better. Two was 

the number of young men raising their hand to 

join the army or the police . . . that was a pretty 

good indicator that things were getting better. 

The other was schools, not the material construction of schools, but school attendance. We opened 

32 schools, and every week we looked very carefully at attendance. And you could tell that, if in 

Khan Neshin [District] all of a sudden we had a 

50-percent reduction of attendance, it was like a 

bad Western [movie]. Some guys had ridden into 

town and were threatening the people. But when 

you send your kid to school, you’re voting with 

your own flesh and blood, and you have enough 

confidence in the local security that you’re going 

to send your kid to that school. 

That was one of those irrefutable, indisputable 

metrics of measurement that we used, judging communities, and we used those extensively. I didn’t 

get too upset over Rajiv’s article. I was surprised 

by Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry’s comments, 

because Ambassador Eikenberry used to come see 

us, and all he would ever tell us was, “Man, you 

guys are doing great. Golly, I wish everything was 

moving as well as this. You guys are really doing 

great stuff.” He was always super complimentary. 

General Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, every time 

he came down, very complimentary. Lieutenant 

General David M. Rodriguez, USA, who I really 

liked. General Rodriguez used to come down, 

because he was the courts manager. General Rodriguez used to come down a fair amount and loved 

being out with the Marines. He’d go out on patrol 

with the Marines, and that was great.

Moffett: Just to follow up on that Marineistan 

article before we go back to the beginning of the 

MEB’s deployment, Rajiv quoted several unnamed 

sources, presumably Army officers in Kabul and 

also some administration officials, but there was 

one comment in the story by someone from ISAF 

presumably saying, “We have all these Marines in 

Afghanistan. Why are they in Helmand and not 

Kandahar?” Can you speak to that? 

Nicholson: I think Mike Killian came up with it. 

The Ruhr valley to Berlin . . . Helmand was the 

Ruhr valley to Kandahar. We have been in Kandahar for nine years, frankly. For nine years, there 

had been Coalition presence, principally Canadian, but initially, of course, Marine. Kandahar 
240

is a patchwork quilt of some areas [that] are doing 

okay, but some areas not so good. Obviously, by 

the large operation that’s about to be conducted 

sometime in July by RC-South [Regional Command-South], it’s not where anyone thinks it 

ought to be, and it is the home, the spiritual 

home, of the Taliban. It’s where Mullah Omar 

obviously is from. I don’t know that you can separate the two. 

I think Helmand had suffered for a long time 

from neglect, and the advantages of the Marines 

going into areas we had not been in—and back 

to your initial question, I didn’t pick where to go. 

There was British Helmand, and then there was 

everything else. Everything else became Marine 

Helmand. We decided where we were going to go 

in Helmand, and again, whether you’re General 

McChrystal or a company commander, you’ve got 

to pick and choose where you’re going to be. This 

was a massive area—the Marine AO [area of operation]. You can’t be everywhere. So you’d better 

pick and choose carefully where you’re going to 

be and accept a little risk in the other areas. But 

what we knew from Iraq was that where we went, 

we had to stay. Where we stayed, we held. Where 

we held, we built. And where we built, we transitioned. 

You can’t go somewhere and then leave, and 

we learned that lesson as Marines in the western 

Euphrates River valley when RCT-7 [Regional 

Combat Team 7] was ordered up and into Fallujah when Fallujah I started. And they uncovered, 

frankly, a lot of towns out there—Rawah, Anah, 

Hit, Haditha. We put a MEU out there, but it 

didn’t drive quite the coverage that a three-battalion RCT did. After we came back and went back 

into the western Euphrates River valley, a lot of 

those people that we had befriended, that we had 

trusted—the city councils, the leaders, the principals that we had worked with—they were either 

dead or run off. They weren’t real happy to see us, 

because we had essentially thrown them under 

the bus, and we vowed that that couldn’t happen 

there. This ties back into my initial conversation 

with General McKiernan, and it’s where I said, 

“Boss, sir, if the worst place in all of Afghanistan 

is Marjah, let us go to Marjah.” Everyone was 

talking about “Marjah, Marjah, Marjah.”

Moffett: This is February 2009 when you had 

this conversation.

Nicholson: Right. So I’m in Kabul with General 

McKiernan, one on one, and I said, “Sir, if it’s the 

worst place, let us go there.” And his answer was, 

“Larry, I can’t let you go there, because the elections are in August, and Marjah is going to be 

extremely kinetic. Marjah is going to be a hell of 

a fight.” We’re very careful never to compare Fallujah and Marjah, but there was a Fallujah-esque 

quality to it in the sense that it was a no-go terrain for us. It had seceded from the union. This 

was an autonomous republic. 

There was no Afghan flag. There was no 

Afghan government, and the Afghan government was terrified to go anywhere near it. If 

you flew anywhere near it, you took aircraft fire. 

Our Cobras were just flying around, trying to 

sometimes attract it. Hate to say that, but just 

how close can we get? What kind of antiaircraft 

[would we come up against]? When we went in 

in February, it was like putting your hand in the 

hornets’ nest. You didn’t know how those defenses 

would hold up. But McKiernan said, “No, I can’t 

let you do that, because if there’s a huge fight in 

July and the election’s in August, then internationally on everybody’s evening news it’s going 

to look like [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai’s 

lost control of his country. Because the media will 

focus on Marjah, and it will focus on this very, 
241

very kinetic fight. And Karzai doesn’t want that 

right before the election. It’s just going to p——s 

a lot of people off, and it’s going to p——s the 

Pashtuns off.” So we were told, “Hey, thank you 

for your interest in ISAF affairs, but you’re not 

going to Marjah. You can go anywhere you want, 

but don’t go to Marjah.” So we ended up going to 

Nawa [District, Ghanzi Province, Afghanistan], 

where there was pretty good fighting with [Lieutenant Colonel William] “Bill” [F.] McCullough 

early on.

Moffett: Khanjar.

Nicholson: Operation Khanjar.

Moffett: Okay, and we left off talking about 

[when] you were with General McKiernan and I 

mentioned Khanjar, but just so that we’re chronological, you were setting things up. You had done 

the site survey in February [2009] and met General McKiernan. You were talking about the gear 

being embarked. So you came back from the site 

survey and continued to plan.

Nicholson: We went into more detailed planning. At that point, we were ready to get into 

some mission analysis and look at the areas, and 

[we] formulated the plan of introduction of the 

force into the Helmand River valley. Nawa was 

about 30 Brits surrounded, literally, at the district center there, where there were firefights 

every day. Garmsir [District], the great success 

story of Garmsir from 24th MEU, Colonel Peter 

Petronzio and 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, had 

kind of regressed, digressed. I remember walking around Garmsir with the Brits, the dragoons, 

good guys but undermanned, and I think focused 

on—probably because of their inadequate numbers—focused almost exclusively on the district 

center and on the city of Garmsir, Darvishan. 

I remember driving around, walking around 

Garmsir, with the Brits, but it was just uneasy. 

The atmospherics were not good.

Moffett: What time was this?

Nicholson: This was during my site survey, so 

this was in February. I know that 24th MEU 

had done great work in taking Garmsir back, but 

they’d turned it over to the Brits, and I think the 

Brits had what they called a PB line, a patrolbased line, around Garmsir. But if you went 100 

meters past that, you were getting shot at. So 

there was a very small enclave around Garmsir 

that was relatively secure, but I don’t think the 

people felt secure. The market was feeble. There 

were a few shops open, which I guess was progress because they hadn’t been open at all the year 

prior. There were some shops open, but Garmsir needed a breakout. We needed to get out and 

get south, because the Garmsir District extended 

almost all the way down to Khan Neshin [District], and the rest of Garmsir District was under 

Taliban control, very clearly under Taliban control. One of the things we discovered was that the 

enemy was far more linear than we had expected. 

Whether it was the patrol base (PB) line in 

Garmsir or in Now Zad, where two kilometers 

away from the Marine positions was entrenched 

enemy, dug in, into fighting holes and positions, 

with overhead cover and with sandbagged crewserved weapons positions. That was hard for us 

to get our head around, that the enemy was right 

there. Now Zad had been empty for four years, 

since 2006, when the fighting got so bad between 

the Brits and the Taliban up there when the population left. They were driven out. Now Zad had 

deteriorated significantly, just the infrastructure, that there was no one there. There was no 
242

one in the city. There were some wild dogs running around that would occasionally hit IEDs. 

We had patrols going through sometimes, but 

that became untenable because of the amount 

of IEDs. 

The enemy for years now had been putting 

IEDs on the sides of buildings and walls and mud 

huts, on the streets, so there were a lot of areas—

most of the areas in that city were going to have to 

be de-mined professionally before the population 

could return. There were just a few isolated streets 

that we felt safe enough to be on. But I think we 

had an enemy that was very linear in nature and 

very comfortable with going toe to toe, chest to 

chest. They wanted to know where your forward 

lines were, and then just out of small-arms range, 

they would come in and establish their own forward lines. We didn’t see that in Iraq, but this was 

a very different scenario in terms of the enemy. 

So prior to Khanjar, we knew [what] we were 

getting into [in] Nawa. Nawa was just a little bubble, and there wasn’t security, because every day 

those 30 Brits were under fire. There was a little 

bubble of security around Garmsir. There was relatively no security in Now Zad. Khan Neshin was 

our Hail Mary. Khan Neshin was the entry point 

that we saw. We looked at all the tracks of movement through joint surveillance target attack 

radar system [JSTARS] and the other ground 

moving target indicator [GMTI]. What we saw, 

the movement trails and tracks that were plotted, 

they came from Bahram Shah [Minaret], the border, and they moved into Khan Neshin. And once 

they were in Khan Neshin, now they were in the 

Helmand River valley. Now they could move up 

the valley. 

So our big plan was on 2 July 2009, we put 

1st Battalion, 5th Marines, into multiple positions 

in and around Nawa. We put 2/8 into multiple 

positions up and down the Helmand River valley and in and around Garmsir, but the battalion 

headquarters in Garmsir. And then we took 2d 

LAR and gave them about a 200-kilometer crosscountry movement across the open desert, timed 

it so [that] as the sun came up on 2 July, LAR 

was coming into (inaudible). The Taliban knew, 

the enemy knew, that several thousand Marines 

had gone into Camp Leatherneck. And Leatherneck is its own story, too, because frankly, on my 

site survey, Colonel Duffy White was at Kandahar. Being at Kandahar and fighting in Helmand 

would be like—I guess the analogy in Iraq would 

be like being in Baghdad and fighting in Anbar. 

It didn’t make any sense. Duffy didn’t have any 

choice. He was put in Kandahar, and that’s where 

his headquarters was, but we had a choice. We 

could have tried to stay in Kandahar, which I 

don’t think anyone was really crazy about [that], 

especially us. That was not going to work. 

You’ve got to be in the area you’re fighting 

in, although we did keep our [Lockheed] C-130s 

[Hercules] and our Harriers at Kandahar because 

of the air facility, but that’s all we had there. So we 

went to [Camp] Bastion, the British base there, 

and had a great airfield, [a Boeing] C-17 [Globemaster] capable airfield, and said, “Okay, we need 

some room. What have you got?” Well, the Brits 

were very gracious and generous, and they showed 

us four or five different parking lot areas and said, 

“Well, you can have this, you can have that.” But 

at the end of the day, we would have been spread 

over this British base. Literally walk to the edge of 

the base to the back gate and looked over, climbed 

up a British sangar [watchtower] and looked over 

at open desert and said, “Who owns that?” “Well, 

nobody. I guess the government does. If you want 

it, I guess you can have it.” We knew that if we 

were going to put an MEB in there, and potentially an MEB is the lead echelon of a larger unit, 

you better have a place that you can build. You 
243

better have a place that has capacity for expansion 

and a place that you can put your force.

Moffett: So in February 2009, there was nothing there. You were up in the tower and you 

looked at what later became Camp Leatherneck.

Nicholson: It was myself and a few guys on the 

site survey with me, and there was a Navy Seabee with me, and he was like, “Okay, sir, how big 

do you want this?” And the [swag] was, “A mile 

and a half in this direction, a mile and a quarter 

in this direction.” We went out and walked it and 

said, “Is it safe?” So we went out and walked and 

said, “Well, now it’s connected to Camp Bastion. 

What do you want to call it?” I wanted a name 

that was not East Coast or West Coast. I wanted 

to get away from that silliness, so I said, “Let’s just 

call it something. Camp Devil Dog? No. Camp 

Jarhead? How about just Camp Leatherneck? 

Everyone knows about Leatherneck. Let’s just 

call it Camp Leatherneck.” An honorable Marine 

name that everybody will know that’s where the 

Marines are at. So that’s how Leatherneck was 

born, and we left that day and flew back to Kandahar. . . . And before we left that day, no kidPhoto courtesy of by Sgt Aaron Rooks 

Navy Cdr Benjamin Nicholson, commander of Provincial Reconstruction Team-Farah, talks to BGen Larry Nicholson, commanding general of MEB-Afghanistan, about the billeting and dining areas located at the Afghan National Army compound.
244

ding, there was one tractor, one dozer out there, 

starting to berm. A lieutenant commander and a 

couple of Seabees, they’re like, “Okay, sir. That’s 

it. That’s what we’ll do.” I went back and told 

the Brits that’s what we were going to do, and I 

think they looked at us like, “Are you sure?” You 

go to Leatherneck today, and there’s this expansive urban area.

Humble beginnings. It’s not often in your 

career where you’re asked to start from nothing 

and build something—build something from 

nothing. Traditionally, you go to Iraq or a new 

unit comes over, you’ve got a facility, you tap 

the guy on the shoulder and say, “Okay, buddy, 

I got it. Thanks a lot.” He stands up and leaves 

the computer, and you sit down. Not here, so we 

really started from scratch. We put up the tent, 

[that] was one of the first things we did, and we 

started trying to get that set up and wired. Our 

advance parties were principally engineers just 

trying to set up some kind of infrastructure. 

The Seabees did magnificent work, just in 

terms of starting to put buildings together and 

COCs, sight unseen, just literally back-of-anapkin kind of work on the site survey. Saying, 

“Okay, I’d like the building area here. Let’s build 

three LSAs [Logistics Support Areas], LSA-1, 2, 

3. We’ll have the motor pools here.” We sat down 

literally on the back of a napkin and sketched out 

what we thought the base ought to look like, and 

we wanted it connected to [Camp] Shorabak, 

which was the Afghan base, and we wanted a gate 

between Shorabak and Leatherneck. We wanted 

to make sure that was important. We wanted to 

open that gate, tear down the wall, and have an 

open gate between us and the Afghans. 

And with that, I came back to Camp Lejeune, 

and we started. A very talented staff, [Eric Nalger] 

was my G-3 at the time. Lieutenant Colonel Scott 

[W.] Pierce, one of the great planners, we started 

sketching what we thought the initial introduction of force would look like. How would we do 

it? Well, we thought it would be aviation intense. 

We wanted to get in there quickly, and again, the 

intention was to overwhelm the enemy, going into 

his strong point. We wanted to put the enemy on 

the horns [so] that everywhere he looked, north, 

south, everywhere along the Helmand River valley there were Marines coming in. We worked 

with the Brits, who were coming up. They were 

going to do a similar op called Panchai Palang [or 

Panther’s Claw], where they were going to go into 

Babaji [north of Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province] and some other areas. 

The cumulative effect was such that if you 

were the Taliban, whether you were in the U.S. 

sector or the British sector, everywhere in Helmand, things were moving, and that there was 

this large-scale introduction of force that would 

cause the enemy to either fight or flee, and I didn’t 

really care. If it’s not my area, if he was going to 

make peace with his government, or if he felt now 

was a good time to switch sides—and a lot did—

then that was fine, too. If he was going to fight, 

then that advantage was probably to us, because 

we were probably going to do pretty well in terms 

of anyone that really wanted to oppose us. So 

early morning 2 July—we did a lot of rehearsals. 

We did a lot of planning. I think one of the more 

innovative things is we laid a map out for the governor, Governor Mangal. We went into his office 

and started working the key leadership engagement piece.

Moffett: When did you first meet Governor 

[Mohammad Gulab] Mangal? During the site 

survey or once you got there in May?

Nicholson: I met him on the site survey, but it 

was a very 30-minute kind of how are you doing. 
245

He had no idea who I was, or he had no idea of the 

impact we would have on his province. I’m sure 

he meets a lot of military leaders, and he was cordial. I liked him instantly, and just like in Anbar 

toward the tail end, we started working. We figured out very quickly that engineers above all, 

above any other specialty . . . were the best guys 

to work with, even as administrators or as leaders. Because, again, they are, by definition, problem solvers. They’re guys that fix things. They’re 

guys that look at problems and figure out how to 

make them work. I had a great relationship with 

a lot of the engineers in Fallujah, and I was very 

happy to see that Mangal had an engineering 

background and was a very pragmatic guy. You 

hear a lot about the corrupt leaders, and again, I 

don’t know that everyone is—I don’t know that 

Mangal is lily white, but I’ll tell you, he cared. 

You can’t fake it. He cared about the people, he 

cared about the job. He was always under threat, 

but he was out and about. He did not lead from 

inside. He was out and about, and I saw that over 

my year with him. We exposed him many, many 

times to some dangerous situations, and he was 

always game. He would always get out there, and 

he was never happier than [when] surrounded by 

people, talking to them. So I’m very fond of the 

governor. I tell my guys all the time, this is not a 

black-and-white scenario. It’s not good guys and 

bad guys. It is—

Moffett: Shades of gray.

Nicholson: Shades of gray, and you’ve got to be 

able to discern what shade of gray you can work 

with and what shade of gray you can’t. But if 

you’re looking for a bunch of guys in white hats, 

you’re not necessarily going to find them.

Moffett: It’s not.

Nicholson: Yes, that’s right. Counterinsurgency 

is tough, and the intel reports on everybody—I 

mean, I had five intel reports on me that accused 

me of doing things. Everyone, certainly every 

Afghan, had somebody accusing him of something. Sorting out what was true and what was 

not . . . But by and large, I think we were able to 

very quickly separate the guys that we could work 

with and the guys that we couldn’t. I think we set 

about doing that very quickly. So, anyway, we laid 

a map out with Governor Mangal, sitting in his 

office. We’re now in May, probably mid to late 

May, laid a map out and showed him the enormity, of course, of the Helmand River valley and 

said, “Governor, if you were me, where would you 

go? I can’t go everywhere. Where would you go? 

If you were going to bring these Marines in here, 

in what areas would you go into?” 

Now, 80 percent of what he had recommended, 

we had probably already deduced were the right 

areas to go into, but he gave us about 20 percent. 

About 20 percent of the places he had picked out, 

we had not looked at, and so we adjusted a little bit. We never talked about Khan Neshin, so 

he never knew about Khan Neshin. [We] didn’t 

know how much we could trust him, but at some 

point, he’s the governor and he and his staff had a 

pretty good inkling. I think the Taliban was savvy 

enough to know, okay, we’ve got 10,000 Marines 

at Camp Leatherneck. They’re going to go somewhere. Where are they going to go? Well, they’re 

probably going to go to—they did think Marjah. 

There was a lot of activity in Marjah. They were 

either going to go to Marjah, Garmsir, or Nawa. 

July 2d was Operation Khanjar [Strike of the 

Sword] and that was our first op as a MEB. It was 

the day we put a battalion into Nawa, 1/5 [1st Battalion, 5th Marines]. It’s the day we put a battalion into Garmsir, 2/8 [2d Battalion, 8th Marines]. 

It’s the day we put a battalion into Khan Neshin, 
246

2d LAR [2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion]. Putting 4,500 Marines in a seven-hour 

period into those three districts that were obviously 

very Taliban-controlled districts, I think two days 

before the op, the last day or so of June, there had 

just recently been a change of command at ISAF. 

General McKiernan had been let go and General McChrystal had arrived. There was a tactical 

directive that was released that talked about you 

can’t strike buildings, you can’t do A, B, C, and D. 

Our guys were already in the field. Our guys 

were already staged, they were ready to go, and 

there was frankly a lot of angst as that thing came 

across the wire, and it seemed restrictive. But as 

I read through it, and I probably read that document 10 times, just so I could immerse myself into 

it, and I think as Marines we’re real big into commander’s intent. Arguably, more so—we pay probably more attention to that than even our Army 

brethren. I think as a Corps we train our guys, 

“Tell me what the mission is. Give me your commander’s intent. Give me a left and right lateral 

limit and get out of my way. Don’t tell me how to 

do this mission.” 

As I sat there reading that thing over and over, 

where I knew that there was some trepidation out 

there in the ranks, so to speak, I came away feeling that the guidance we had already issued met 

the commander’s intent that General McChrystal was trying to get across in the document. So I 

went out to our forces and said, “No change. No 

change to what we had planned on doing. There’s 

no change. We’re not going to do anything differently, because our intent is not to go in there 

and kill a bunch of innocent people anyhow. Continue with the plan.” I think being judicious in our 

application of firepower is not weakness and it was 

not seen as handcuffing to us. It was seen as smart 

COIN. I think what I issued to my battalion commanders, and I met with them all several times, 

even the night before the op, was, “No change. 

We’re going to go in and do this thing the way we 

had talked through it, the way we planned it, the 

way we [rock] drilled it.” Again, commanders pay 

attention to civilian casualties. I think going back, 

and I have the luxury in the not-too-distant past 

of having been a regimental commander in Iraq, 

I’ll tell you, I think we got a little bit complacent 

in Iraq in terms of use of firepower. 

The analogy I would give to my guys when 

I’d talk to them is, okay, I’m in Fallujah. I’m in 

Iraq and we’re in a firefight and 5, 10 enemy break 

and run. They run into a building. You have the 

option then of—you look through your binos 

[binoculars], you look at the building, you don’t 

see any women and children . . . drop the building. You use aviation-delivered fires, surfacedelivered fires, but drop the building. That was 

our standard thing, and I think what we’ve taught 

and what we pushed is that’s probably not going 

to be good enough in Afghanistan. We’re probably going to have to be a little more—we’re going 

to have to pay a little more due diligence to this 

process, because we understood that in Afghanistan, even more so than Iraq, that civilian casualties were going to cause real issues for us in this 

Pashtunwali culture with revenge being such a 

dominant thing. That’s absent from the discussion many times—the Pashtunwali code. 

I had some discussions with the governor prior 

to Khanjar and we talked through a couple of scenarios, and Governor Mangal was terrific. But as 

we talked through that scenario I had just given, 

where the 10 insurgents ran into a building, if you 

drop the building and you kill the insurgents, but 

you kill 5 women and children, you’re probably 

going to have some issues. You could make a case 

from the Western mindset, “But, governor, those 

men ran into that building and they were hiding amongst women and children. They’re cow-
247

ards.” And I think the Pashtun comeback is, “Yes, 

but the Taliban didn’t kill those women and children. You did.” 

I think if you understand that, if you understand that that’s how they look at things, then you 

have to do a little more than just drop the building because there are some Taliban running into 

it. So what does that mean? What does that mean 

for a battalion commander and a company commander? What that means is that you now have to 

pursue. You have to follow them to the vicinity of 

that building, as opposed to just being able to sit 

back and drop the building. You have to now pursue. You have to surround the building. You have 

to gain—try to get a local and find out does anybody live there. You’re taking the extra step. You 

may even try to do a callout and, at some point, 

if you’re taking fire, you may back up and drop 

the building. And at that point, that’s okay. You’ve 

done that due diligence. You’ve tried something 

else, and I think that’s how we taught it. That’s 

how we [rock] drilled this thing with our small-unit 

leaders, is you’ve got to take the extra step. We’ve 

got to be able to say we tried. It doesn’t mean you 

won’t drop the building. You will drop the building, if you need to, but you’re going to go that extra 

step to make sure that it’s not casual, that it’s not, 

“Hey, there’s enemy in there, let’s drop the building. I don’t care who’s in there. We’re just going 

to drop the building.” I think that was one of the 

examples we used, but you have to be very careful as a commander to temper that to make sure 

that you don’t take the aggressiveness out. One 

of the greatest things we have on young Marines 

is their aggressiveness, their ability, their willingness, their desire to make contact and dominate 

the enemy. You don’t want to do anything to mitigate that. You just want to do it smartly.

Moffett: It said 120 degrees when Operation 

Khanjar commenced on 2 July, so that’s one of 

the things I was looking to have you speak to was 

the incredible impact of the climate. 

Nicholson: We didn’t surprise a whole lot of people when we went into Garmsir and Nawa. I think 

how we got in, the speed, the size of the force 

going in and the speed at which we built up that 

combat power was very much like an amphibious operation for us. Only instead of flying over 

ocean, we were flying over sand. Camp Dwyer 

was the other camp that we had established. It 

was a small British camp that we expanded probably tenfold, about 15 kilometers west of Garmsir. 

We had staged one of our battalions there, and we 

had staged the other battalion—1/5 was at Leatherneck, 2/8 had moved down to Dwyer. 

We looked at it very much like an amphibious 

operation in the sense of the insertion, going ashore. 

. . . Again, completely right out of the amphibious 

warfare doctrine, because getting the force ashore 

is one thing, but supporting and sustaining that 

force was something else entirely. 

It was a combination of surface and aviation, so it was very reminiscent of the most basic 

amphibious operations that you would do, where 

you would do a combination of assault support 

and ground support forces going in. On 2 July, we 

launched and we went to those three places very, 

very quickly. There was some pretty intense fighting on the first couple of days. I think in Garmsir, 

especially, we unhinged an enemy that was on the 

PB line because we got behind him. And what we 

found out in Now Zad and Nawa and Garmsir, is 

that when you get behind this linear enemy, you 

unhinge them very quickly. Because, like any linear front, nobody likes somebody behind them, 

and I think the threat of people in the rear was 

really—they left a lot of things right there in their 

holes. There were a lot of weapons and caches and 
248

supplies that were just abandoned as they took off. 

Again, many of the enemy we were fighting we 

ended up hiring. I’m convinced of that. 

I am a big subscriber to the big-T, little-T theory that probably 10 percent of the Taliban are the 

big-T guys, or the ideologues or the irreconcilables. 

You’re never going to convince them. No amount 

of reasoning . . . they are going to be out there to be 

killed or captured. But 90 percent of these guys are 

probably the economic Taliban, the lunch pail Taliban, the guys who are working for five, six bucks a 

day. I think they can be co-opted very easily. They 

have nowhere to go. They’re not moving anywhere. 

They go home every night, and if the area they’re 

living in all of a sudden is under Afghan control, 

well, then they’ll probably get along. They probably will work with whoever’s in charge locally, 

but especially if they can take a paycheck home. 

If they can provide food and subsistence to their 

family, they will work for whoever is in charge. 

They have no real ideological bent to them, 

but in this Pashtunwali culture, they will respond 

to whoever the biggest dog is, and if the biggest 

dog is the Marines or the Afghan Army or the Taliban, they’ll respond accordingly. I think as the 

sun went down on 2 July, we were thrilled, absolutely thrilled with the fact—we had one casualty, one KIA on D-day—but we were absolutely 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Randall A. Clinton 

Cpl William Ash, a squad leader from 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, BLT 1/6, leads a patrol through a city in Helmand 

Province, Afghanistan.
249

stunned in some ways that we had been able to 

pull off the largest heloborne op since Vietnam 

and do it successfully and get in. But that was only 

the start of the problem, because the temperatures 

were about 120 [degrees], and I was at that point 

more concerned about heat casualties than I was, 

frankly, about the Taliban. I knew we could handle the Taliban.

The backbone of our sustainment efforts 

were the [Sikorsky] CH-53Ds [Sea Stallions] and 

CH-53Es [Super Stallions]. We muscled in our 

logistics convoys, but that takes time to build up 

the kind of supplies, and even if you hit one spot, 

even if you get in, it’s tough to get it out to everyone. And, again, we crossed line of departure 

[LD] with 49 percent of our gear. There was a lot 

of teeth sucking. Every day was Christmas Day 

on our soak lot. The “soak lot” is this lot outside 

Leatherneck where gear is arriving from Karachi 

[Pakistan]. We talked about how difficult it is to 

get gear in. We lost sight of gear when it went to 

Karachi, even though it had identification tags 

and they were supposedly scanned, the Pakistanis 

weren’t doing that. So with those identification tags, 

we lost control. It was Pakistani contractors. There 

were no Americans in Karachi, and we were very 

much at the mercy of the Pakistanis to see what 

was showing up every day. Some things showed 

up immediately, some things took three months, 

so there was no telling where some of these things 

went. But we did a lot better than 10 percent. We 

had expected 10 percent loss. We probably had 

less than 1 percent loss. Most of the gear made it, 

and very little damage was inflicted. 

We got those vehicles, I remember sitting 

around with Colonel John W. Simmons, my CLR 

commander [CLR-2], all my battalion commanders, Duffy White. We were every day counting 

how many HMMWVs, how many MRAPs, how 

many MTVRs, seven-tons [we had]. Did we have 

enough? What was our minimum? We looked at 

when does the green light come on. This is not 

what I want, but it’s what I need. It’s what I have 

to do to at least get in there. And we were very 

much betting on the fact that there would be a 

continuous flow of equipment over the rest of 

July and August. It would continue to come in, 

so we could backstop any losses. But we were at 

a razor-thin margin in terms of gear, getting the 

equipment and the materiel, and we made that 

decision probably on about 28 June. We had our 

final workouts, and we slotted the table and said, 

“Okay, everybody’s green.” Nobody had what they 

wanted, but we had what we thought we needed 

to at least get ashore. One of the driving factors 

here was the elections in August 2009. We had to 

get in. One of the implied tasks was to get in and 

start setting up the conditions that would allow 

for elections in some of these areas that, frankly, 

had been under Taliban control for many years.

Moffett: That was another one of my questions. 

What guidance did you get from Kabul in terms 

of helping the elections take place, monitoring 

security? What was your mission in terms of that?

Nicholson: This was a pleasant surprise for us. 

I was very surprised that the Afghans really took 

the lead and dictated the terms of how this election would go and what our role would be. And 

our role was really, frankly—we were backstopping. We were the reaction force. We were not 

going to be anywhere near the polls. We had to 

use our helicopters to distribute election materials, 

tables, chairs, voting apparatus, ballots. But it was 

always accompanied by international observers. 

It was always accompanied by Afghan observers. 

But we were prepared to do a lot more planning 

than we really did. There were a lot of meetings, 

a lot of high-level planning sessions, but they were 
250

really run by the 205th Corps ANA and by the 

police. We were pleasantly surprised, very pleasantly surprised. One of the remarkable things 

early on was that we had a violence-free election 

in our AO. We had people voting in places that 

had never had a chance to vote. Many thousands 

of people were registered to vote for the first time 

in their lives, and we had no attacks on polling 

stations. I don’t think we had a casualty that day. 

We felt pretty good after that election. That was 

a big event for us. 

Just to comment on the army [ANA], and 

I’ve talked about it with a lot of different groups, 

but my experience in Fallujah was that the locals 

hated the army, because the army, they were a 

bunch of Shia kids from Basrah and Sadr City and 

they were there to take advantage of the Sunnis. I 

guess I expected the same thing in Helmand, but 

I couldn’t have been more mistaken. The people really liked the Afghan Army, and they were 

a bunch of kids [but] not from Helmand or from 

Nimroz. They were a bunch of Tajiks and Uzbeks 

and Hazaras, and many of them had very oriental 

features. They came from the north and the west 

of the country. They weren’t Pashtun for the most 

part and, if they were Pashto, they were Kabul 

Pashto, which may as well be a different ethnicity. 

Very few of them spoke the local language. They 

all spoke Dari. Some spoke Dari, some spoke Urdu, 

yet the people liked them, because they didn’t hit 

on the people, they didn’t take from the people. 

They didn’t steal.

Moffett: I sat in on one of your meetings once, 

and you asked about Golestan being so isolated 

and could that happen there, so I know that was 

part of your thinking. 

Nicholson: Just as an aside, the Golestan thing, 

just based on the sheer geographical distance, 

there’s always a concern, especially in my mind if 

the weather got s——y, because sometimes you 

could, sometimes you couldn’t, fly up into Golestan. So how do you QRF [quick reaction force] a 

place like Golestan, up in the mountains, where 

you couldn’t mass? My worst scenario was the 

massing of the enemy north of Golestan in the 

mountainous area where we wouldn’t have picked 

it up, where we don’t have any ISR [intelligence, 

surveillance, reconnaissance] necessarily flying 

routinely, and attack south into Golestan during 

a period of bad weather, where our guys would be 

vulnerable, where the ISR would not be necessarily up, where the ground based operational surveillance system [GBOSS] would be less effective, 

and where our ability to provide a quick reaction 

force or even tactical aircraft—they’re certainly 

not in artillery range. They had mortars. How 

would we respond? And certainly that was—you 

get asked a lot, what keeps you up at night? That 

was one of them. It was tough to be in a location 

that you didn’t have mutual support. There was 

not another place where I could roll forces quickly.

Moffett: There was a lieutenant in charge up 

there. Correct?

Nicholson: There was a lieutenant in charge. Now, 

the dirty little secret was [that] we said we had a 

platoon in Golestan, but oftentimes we had in 

excess of 100 guys in Golestan, a pretty formidable, robust force in terms of protecting themselves. 

But nonetheless, there was always concern that if a 

platoon was out, if a patrol was out, it would be a 

tough place to have to QRF under certain conditions, and we looked at that. Now, the good news 

is in Golestan that they had worked some amazing 

community relations up there. The good thing, 

on Christmas Day in Golestan, the locals brought 

them 12 turkeys. I just think we had worked very 
251

hard in Golestan and we had had the right guys 

up there to be able to work with the community. 

Moffett: I know in RC-South, in my experience, 

in your experience, an ever-greater percentage of 

our operations involved indigenous ANSF [Afghan 

National Security Forces] types. Talk a little bit 

about the Brits, who you worked directly with. 

In fact, this is pre-RC–Southwest, but we spoke 

before. I did want to touch on some of the other 

countries, from the Bahrainians to the Estonians 

to the Georgians to the Danish tanks, etcetera, 

but we didn’t have time. I want to spend a little 

bit of time in particular on the Brits. I know from 

some of your meetings you seem to have a lot of 

affection for Al—I’m trying to think of the British officer’s name, [the] liaison officer. But General [Nick] Carter was your senior. Is that correct?

Nicholson: Yes, from November to February. Prior 

to that, I had a Dutch commander. Of course, 

RC-South was commanded by the Dutch for a 

year and I got there in April-May, so my first six 

months [were spent] working for a Dutch commander—a Dutch two star—and my last five 

months working for a British two star. But during that entire period, of course, we were tied at 

the hip with Task Force Helmand. Brigadier Tim 

Radford was the commander of Task Force Helmand when I got there, and [Brigadier] James 

Cowan turned over in I think November, as well 

October-November timeframe. I went with two 

iterations, two different brigades from Task Force 

Helmand. Again, great affection for the Brits, and 

I think that it was an impossible mission they had 

been given initially, for Task Force Helmand to 

be in all of Helmand. 

They were the only Coalition forces there—an 

enormous area—10,000 [troops], but really 6,000 

with 4,000 in support. They weren’t organized as 

a MAGTF, so the brigadier did not have control 

over the air, which is odd and certainly a position 

I’m glad I was not in. Didn’t have control over his 

own logistics. There was a national logistics element. The air force that was there to support him, 

the British Air Force, to include the helicopters, 

answered directly to Whitehall [headquarters for 

the British Ministry of Defense]. I think [that’s] 

a tough spot to be in. First of all, the challenges 

of the terrain and just the enormity of Helmand. 

Again, as we talked about earlier, an incredibly difficult area that was thick with Taliban and really 

underaddressed for many, many years. 

A lack of Afghan security forces. There was 

one corps in the south, and they were headquartered at Kandahar, 205th Corps, with one brigade 

in Helmand, an undersized brigade in Helmand, 

and that was led by Brigadier General Muhayadin Ghori. My assessment of the Brits is that they 

have terrific soldiers, terrific tough, young guys, 

but given almost an impossible task to try to go 

into Helmand by themselves and make that work. 

We . . . relieved them in Garmsir. Garmsir had 

become a little bit of an enclave. They were frankly 

surrounded. We relieved them in Nawa. Nawa 

was a gunfight. Every day, their CP in Nawa, the 

government center, was under direct-fire attack, 

every day. They had been in Now Zad earlier. Not 

the guys that we met when we were there, but the 

Brits had been in Now Zad. When Now Zad emptied out and the population left back in ’06, their 

worst place probably was Sangin, which today, 17 

August, we are in the process—Colonel Paul J. 

Kennedy and the 2d Marine Regiment, General 

[Richard P.] Mills and General [Joseph L.] Osterman, they’re in the process of relieving the Brits 

in Sangin with 3/7 [3d Battalion, 7th Marines].

Moffett: Having already relieved them in Musa 

Qala [District Center, Helmand Province].
252

Nicholson: We did that when I was there. We 

took over Musa Qala. We resisted a little bit when 

I was there to go up to Kajaki [District Center, 

Helmand Province], because there were 50 Brits, 

again, surrounded at Kajaki, sitting at the dam. 

We now have an artillery battery up there, but I 

think we understand very clearly that that route 

from Kajaki all the way down through Sangin, 

and that route all the way down to Lashkar Gah, 

that’s critical. That’s critical terrain that’s got to be 

cleared. I thought the Brits fought exceptionally 

well, but they have a little bit different methodology than we do. I think the Brits were garrisoned 

in smaller units. They had, in many cases, squadand platoon-size units everywhere. I think that 

what that takes away from you—and we were very 

hard on platoon-size locations. There’s a good reason for having a platoon by itself, and . . . there’s 

some criteria that I would require before we would 

allow a platoon to be by itself. One, that you’ve 

got Afghan policy; two, that you’ve got Afghan 

Army; and three, that you have some local support.

Moffett: Going with the Golestan model.

Nicholson: Yes, so that you have some local support and interaction. If you’re in a Fort Apachetype scenario, a platoon doesn’t make any sense 

because, at that point, all you’re able to do is pretty 

well defend yourself. You can’t really do much of 

anything. Frankly, we closed some FOBs that we 

had taken over from the Brits because they were 

in a Fort Apache-type scenario. But if you can’t 

generate combat power and you can’t reaggregate 

your force to be able to go do something, you find 

yourself essentially imprisoned in these small little COPs up and down the Helmand River valley, 

where the enemy has all the advantage in the world 

because he’s got you surrounded, and he’s got you 

pinned down, and you’re able to accomplish little 

to nothing. My sense was that there were a number of small British COPs that frankly they had 

inherited from previous rotations. I don’t think 

necessarily my counterparts wanted to be laid out 

like that. I think that they inherited some of these 

situations, where the lay down was something that 

had been done over previous years. 

In contrast, the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, James T. Conway, when he came to visit 

he talked to General Muhayadin Ghori, and 

Muhayadin was raving about the relations with 

the Marines, about how well they got along. He 

made a comment that General Conway carried 

back and used as one of his talking points. What 

Muhayadin said is, “You know the reason I love 

the Marines, General Conway? Because they drink 

out of the same canteen as my soldiers, and not 

everyone does that.” I think that, in a nutshell, 

captures the difference. If you go into a Marine 

COP in the Helmand River valley, in most cases, 

the Afghans and the Marines are living the same. 

There are not two standards. In many cases, they’re 

living together. I think 1/6 and 3/6 for Marjah, 

and the complete immersion, the complete putting Afghan soldiers into our squads, where every 

squad had a fireteam of Afghans. 

It’s not the preferred methodology of doing 

it, but it was necessary at the time because these 

were recruits that we got. We were hoping for 

some crack Afghan combat units to come down 

from other parts of the country to join us. We got 

companies of recruits with less than three weeks 

to train them and integrate them into the combat formation. They didn’t really have any of their 

own officers, or not many. They were not able to 

function independently. So how do you do that? 

So I think what [Lieutenant Colonel Calvert] 

“Cal” Worth [Jr.] and Lieutant Colonel Brian S. 

Christmas did, and [Colonel Randall] “Randy” 

[P.] Newman as regimental commander, the deci-
253

sion was we needed to integrate them at the lowest possible level, and that was the squad level. 

There are great pictures and footage of squads of 

Marines moving through Marjah with four, five, 

six Afghans as part of those squads. Again, that’s 

not going to get you where you want to go in the 

long term, because the Afghans have to be able to 

function independently at some point. But when 

you talk about partnering, this was total immersion. This was absolute immersion. And I know 

that that wasn’t being done in—probably nowhere 

in the country did anyone try anything like that. 

Again, it goes back to innovation, but that was out 

of necessity. We didn’t think that was just such a 

great idea on its own merit. That was a necessity.

We shut down— Just as a factoid, and I don’t 

remember the exact numbers, but as we took over 

Musa Qala from the Brits, we went up there several times during the turnover process, just trying to get a review of “Okay, what are we getting 

into here?” We shut down. Lieutenant Colonel 

Michael A. Manning in 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, 

my guidance to him, my guidance to Paul Kennedy, was we are not going to inherit 40 COPs, 40 

squad-size outposts. That’s not how we’re going to 

do business. We’re going to do it differently. So I 

gave them complete license, “Take a look at every 

one of these things. Find out which ones we want. 

Find out which ones we don’t, and let’s reorganize. 

Look at this as a blank sheet of paper. Given the 

fact that there are a couple of large FOBs that we’re 

going to inherit, and the airfield, obviously; but 

in terms of what the lay down is, in terms of our 

forces, let’s do this our way. Just because there’s 

a generator and a water bowl there doesn’t mean 

we’ve got to put a squad there.” 

I think they did. In fact, they did. A number of 

small COPs and FOBs—another thing was police 

stations. We would never, ever have a police station 

somewhere where there were police by themselves. 

Throughout the Musa Qala—and I know Musa 

Qala because I was on that piece, and again, I don’t 

know Sangin, but there were a number of places in 

Musa Qala District where there were 10, 15 police 

by themselves. We wouldn’t do that. That’s not 

us. So we shut those down and moved the police 

to another place, reaggregated, if you will, some 

of the forces so we could go out and do things. I 

think kind of re-looking at the areas we’d gotten 

into and closing down some of these squad-size 

FOBs was something we did when I was there.

Moffett: Just to shift gears to air. But can take 

just a few moments and address Marine Aircraft 

Group 40 (MAG-40), Colonel Kevin S. Vest, and 

the role that they played in things? 

Nicholson: As we started forming the MEB, I 

was told that there would be an ACE [aviation 

combat element] force and there was no real decision as to who that ACE would be or what they 

would be called, but that there would be an ACE, 

and that we would enlarge the existing footprint 

of Marine aviation in country. Duffy White, of 

course, had a relatively small ACE. Duffy’s ACE 

was probably even smaller than what a MEU normally takes, but it provided enough combat power 

for that battalion, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines. And 

again, prior to 3/8, 2/7 [2d Battalion, 7th Marines] 

had been there, and 2/7 had really no air, and 

2/7 went ostensibly on a police training mission, 

working for CSTC-A [Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan], and as they got 

into into Delaram and Golestan and Bakwa and 

Now Zad, what they found out [was that] for the 

most part there were no police. In most of those 

areas, there were no police at all. What there were 

plenty of were Taliban. So now you had 2/7 getting into a very kinetic fight as a straight-legged 

battalion with no aviation. 
254

[The] 24th MEU, Pete Petronzio, the distress 

call went out, “Hey, can you help?” Well, they had 

their hands full in a very different geographical 

area down in Garmsir as 24th MEU and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony M. Henderson with 1/6 

went in and started doing the great work they did 

down there. They tried, and as the Special Purpose MAGTF stood up, I think principally one 

of the reasons it was stood up was to provide that 

command and control, the linkage to higher headquarters. The air piece, to bring air in to support 

that one battalion that was up in what we called 

[Hotbox] Tripoli. 

I guess sometime in late January, I met Colonel Vest. I was informed that he would be the commander, and that MAG-40, which had been [in] 

mothballs, the colors had been rolled—it was kind 

of a breaking glass, time-of-war kind of organization, but that MAG-40 would be reactivated and 

would be the command for the MEB. There was 

a supply bridge, an air bridge of supplies. What 

was convenient for us and mutually beneficial 

was that as Iraq was drawn down, they had excess 

gear, so we were able to really take great advantage of that. We flew C-130s, there was almost a 

nonstop air bridge of C-130s going from Bastion 

to al-Asad, Iraq, and back, coming back loaded 

with gear—radio gear, comm wire, cabling, anything and everything, parts, spare parts. We were 

able to—not only through the normal system, 

but through an intertheater operational/logistics 

hub that was established at al-Asad. I’ll tell you, 

Brigadier General Juan G. Ayala was very generous to us in terms of trying to help us get what we 

needed. He was the 2d Marine Logistics Group 

(2d MLG) commander with II MEF (Forward), 

so he was at TQ (al-Taqaddum Airbase, Iraq) and, 

as they were closing down TQ, frankly, I think 

we helped them, but they certainly helped us in 

terms of the amount of gear coming in. 

We were so dependent on Marine air to support 

our force, and we were so vulnerable. We knew that 

the principal vulnerability to the heat, and again, 

not knowing how much contact we would make, 

with the ability to reinforce and resupply our guys 

with ammunition. Less concerned about chow, but 

water was terribly concerning. At the end of 30 days, 

on 2 July, we took stock of where we were at. We 

had 17 heat casualties in 30 days, 17 medevaced 

heat casualties, and all but one returned to duty. 

But Marine aviation, every aspect of it, whether 

it was CAS [close air support] in support of us 

or whether it was just the constant movement of 

personnel and gear in and around the battlefield, 

did an amazing job. Of course, the Ospreys came 

in with Lieutenant Colonel Anthony J. Bianca.

Moffett: They came in later?

Nicholson: Yes. They came in. They just finished, so about seven months ago. I’m trying to 

remember when they came in. They just rotated 

out, so I guess they would have come in in October, November. I think November. I was expecting 

someone at Headquarters Marine Corps to tell me 

to take it easy on the Ospreys, protect them, coddle 

them, baby them. No one ever did, and we didn’t. 

Whether it was Operation Cobra’s Anger, putting 

them in fire, putting them under fire, time and 

time again, these guys were going into hot zones. 

I think that aircraft—I know it went to Iraq for a 

couple of rotations. I just don’t know how much 

combat it saw. These guys were phenomenal. Not 

only were the crews trained and well prepared for 

this mission, but the aircraft itself vindicated itself 

against a lot of the critics that have been out there. 

I got to the point where my preferred mode 

of transportation for a longer trip was the Osprey, 

no question. Shorter trips, I always like to take the 

UH-1Y Huey, the [four-bladed] Huey, because that 
255

again was a tremendous change for us, when we 

got the Yankees—when we got rid of the UH-1N 

Hueys and brought the Yankees in, what they were 

able to do and the relief they were able to provide 

the 53s. Previous to that, every time I had to go 

anywhere, I had to go in a 53, and that was always 

dedicated aircraft that we felt we were taking away 

from the daily sustainment and movement of the 

force. I was very, very pleased with Marine aviation and their work with, frankly, Army aviation, 

because a couple of our principal lifts, whether 

it was Khanjar or Marjah, we used Colonel Paul 

W. Bricker, USA, and the 82d Combat Aviation 

Brigade. They did a tremendous job in support 

of the Marines.

Moffett: I know that we used Danish tanks up 

at Now Zad.

Nicholson: We worked with the Danes because they 

had tanks, period. The Danes are a battle group 

that works for the British, so as we undertook— 

Let me go back to my February conversation with 

McKiernan. I’m sitting with McKiernan, and we’re 

talking about Marjah. Now the discussion comes 

up—tanks. I want to bring a company of tanks 

with me because, I think in the rolling open desert of the south tanks, [they] make sense. They 

don’t make sense up in RC-East in the mountainous area, but they make sense down south. I made 

my argument, and McKiernan looked at me and 

kind of smiled and said, “Larry, the greatest tank 

force in the world is the United States Army. The 

United States Army has no tanks in Afghanistan. 

I’ll be d——d if the United States Marine Corps 

is going to bring tanks in here.” I think there was 

a lot of discussion about [that] it would smack of 

the Soviets. I’ve heard it time and time again. “You 

can’t have tanks, because it’s going to remind people of the Soviets. It’s sending the wrong image. 

We’re here to help the people. You send tanks in 

and it looks like we’re here to kill the people.” I’m 

like, “Well, okay. A Stryker [armored vehicle] is 

not a tank, but the Stryker is a pretty formidable 

looking, pretty muscular vehicle.”

Moffett: And the Afghans call everything a tank.

Nicholson: Yes, everything’s a tank. So then I 

said, “Okay, sir. Don’t worry about a company. 

How about a platoon? Just give me a platoon of 

tanks because I’m going to need it for Marjah. I’m 

going to need it for Now Zad. I’m going to need 

it for these other places.” He was like, “Larry, you 

don’t understand. No tanks. No friggin’ tanks.” So 

we pulled them off. They were on the force list at 

that point. That was the original thinking. So we 

scratched them and, frankly, we were told, “No, 

you can’t take the tanks.” When we needed the 

ABVs [assault breacher vehicle], when we decided 

that these minefields, these IED belts were so formidable, Soviet-esque in their design and nature, 

we asked for the ABV, we initially got the same 

response. “No, it’s a tank. It’s going to scare the 

people. It’s going to remind them.” 

We fought like hell to convince the U.S. Army 

leadership in Kabul that, “G——d d——n it, these 

are not tanks. These are engineer vehicles.” But 

no one had ever seen an ABV because the Army 

doesn’t have anything like it. All they know is it’s 

on an M1 chassis. Well, if it’s on an M1 chassis, 

if it looks like a tank, smells like a tank, must be 

a tank. We made a great case and I got some help 

up there. 

Major General John A. MacDonald, USA, 

and a couple of guys really helped me convince 

COMISAF that, okay, this is an engineered vehicle. It shoots mine clearing line charges [MICLIC]. 

It does a hell of a lot more damage, they’re a lot 

more formidable than a tank at some level, but we 
256

were able to get those—15 in the Marine Corps. 

And out of the 15 in the Marine Corps, we had 

5 of them in Afghanistan, so we had a pretty 

good slice. They had never been used in combat 

before, and the first time ever used was in Now 

Zad. Again, 1,700 pounds of C4 launched by the 

MICLIC can open a pretty nice lane to move the 

forces through, but we needed them. 

The IEDs were just so formidable. Those IED 

belts were for real, but back to my youth. I felt like 

a lieutenant at Twentynine Palms [California] 

breaching minefields there, the old Soviet style. 

So when it came time for Now Zad, we wanted 

tanks. We talked with the Brits, we talked with 

RC-South, and the Brits were very generous in 

allowing us to use those tanks. And the Danes were 

very excited to be able to work with the Marines, 

and I’ll tell you, they did a great job. The Marines 

loved them. They fit right in. A great young Danish lieutenant came up there and led that platoon 

and they got some shots. They were able to actually use their main gun. But it sent the right signal 

in Now Zad, that the situation changed, that the 

Coalition and the government of Afghanistan, the 

status quo had changed. It’s no longer acceptable. 

Moffett: In Garmsir, there was a riot. Of course, 

Delaram had a riot, too, but if you can speak a little bit to dealing with the subversives or the Taliban trying to come in and stir things up, Koran 

desecrations, and that type of thing.

Nicholson: What we called it was the oldest play in 

the book. It was the hidden-ball trick. If you can’t 

criticize or if you can’t go after the Coalition forces 

based on their conduct, based on their actions, the 

most base level at which you’re going to be able to 

attack us and probably gain some traction is on 

religion. It is that area that there is always some 

doubt that why are the Americans—especially to 

a largely uneducated population. Afghanistan, I 

think there is such broad ignorance—they’re not 

stupid, they’re just not educated. I think the base 

level at which you could stir emotion very, very 

quickly is religion. Any accusation about desecration to the religion, to the Koran, achieves immediate results, and it did. 

We had our first one in Delaram, and then 

got through that. I thought the police and the 

army did a great job of settling that. The governor of Delaram or the governor of Nimroz, Dr. 

[Ghulam Dastgir] Azad, got on the radio and he 

told people, “Hey, this is a Taliban trick. It didn’t 

happen. It’s the Taliban.” Very quickly, he was out 

in front of the story, and he helped. He told the 

print media very, very quickly. He got the word 

out to his network, “This is b——l s——t, the 

Americans didn’t do that. Taliban trick.” When it 

happened in Garmsir, I’m quite sure that where it 

happened the people genuinely believed it, because 

they started finding the Korans. But we knew a 

Marine is just not going to do that. I have a hard 

time believing that a Marine would ever do anything like that.

I think there wasn’t a lot of concern that that 

was something we had done. The concern was, 

“Okay, here they go again. This is the hidden ball 

trick one more time.” It worked in Delaram a little bit. Let’s see if it can work here. Getting the 

local leaders to aggressively respond and say that 

they would investigate and take charge of the situation was kind of tough. Carter Malkesian [diplomatic advisor], and I guess it was Major Scott 

A. Cuomo and some of the local guys in 2/8, did 

a great job of sitting down, of stopping the mob, 

bringing in the elders. They brought the elders in, 

they sat down, they talked to them, and things 

calmed down a little bit. It wasn’t, though, until 

we found the bagful of Korans, burnt Korans, that 

we were able to take it to the governor, take it to 
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all the local leaders and say, “Look, look what we 

found.” It was amazing. Every time a Marine left 

a building, there would be a burnt Koran behind 

him. I think they overplayed it a little bit, and they 

found this bag of burnt Korans. 

One of the immediate things we set out to do 

was get every one of our leaders together at every 

level—platoon commanders working with their 

Afghan counterparts—and make sure that they 

understood, “If it hasn’t happened yet, it’s going 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Timothy Brumley 

U.S. Navy casualty evacuation corpsmen with MAG-40 receive a weapons safety brief before firing on a battle-sight zero 

range outside Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan, on 11 May 2009. MAG-40 is the aviation combat element for the 2d MEB, 

which conducts counterinsurgency operations in partnership with Afghan national security forces and prepares them to 

assume future security responsibilities.
258

to happen. You need to know right now—mayor, 

governor, local city—it’s going to happen. Someone’s going to come up to you and say, look, I 

found this burnt Koran. I found a burnt Koran, 

the Americans have done that.” The question is, 

how are you going to act? In Garmsir, they burned 

the school down. I think our two-minute drill 

on that was to go out, to do an immediate reach 

out to every local leader, whether he was elected, 

tribal, or religious, and have that talk. That talk, 

that special chat, was, “It’s going to happen. It’s 

going to happen right here in beautiful Nawa, or 

beautiful Khan Neshin. It hasn’t happened yet, 

but it’s going to happen. What are you going to do 

Mr. Local, Tribal, or Religious Leader when that 

happens? How are you going to react? If you don’t 

come out strong and say we’re going to investigate, 

we will take a look at this. If you don’t come out 

strong and do that very, very quickly, then you’re 

in danger of losing control of your school, of your 

city. Who knows what they’ll do next?” 

I think what the Afghans had a hard time 

with was that any real Muslim would burn a 

Koran. They had a hard time wrapping their 

head around the fact that “Yes, the Taliban are 

some shady guys, but they’re Muslim. They would 

never do that.” Well, yes, they actually would. 

They actually did, and when the guy got caught 

with those 60 burnt Korans, that became [a] great 

counterinformation operations (IO) platform for 

us, that these guys are so desperate, these guys 

are so despicable, that they would use your religion against us. I think for us the IO was—our 

best IO footprint was what we were doing every 

day. “Look at the people that are at work, look at 

the schools that are open, look at the clinics that 

are open, look at how the Marines treat the people.” I think it was not just our message, it was 

our actions that allowed us to really capitalize on 

our own IO.

Moffett: The civil affairs piece is huge and ongoing. Sir, if you could speak to the female engagement team (FET) piece of it. 

Nicholson: You go to Kabul, you see women. You 

go to Lashkar Gah, you see women. Anything outside of Lashkar Gah and Helmand, you don’t see 

women. You don’t see them in Delaram [District, 

western Afghanistan]. You certainly don’t see them 

in Bahram Shah. I mean, you don’t even see them. 

I’m not talking about dealing with them, you don’t 

see them. They don’t shop. Women are so isolated 

and so protected, but sheltered and hidden. We 

had a Pashtun woman called [Holly Jawani]. She 

lives in Alexandria, [an] American citizen, but 

Pashtun and spent a lot of time in Afghanistan. 

We had some very talented civil affairs folks. We 

just had a perfect storm of opportunity there to 

put together some teams to go out and experiment. 

Again, I go back to the opening with Rajiv 

of the rogue out-of-control network. Like I said, 

we threw a lot of stuff against the wall [and] said, 

“You know, that worked.” Some worked, some 

didn’t. Some was a miserable failure. The FET 

was an experiment. Post-kinetic, after things have 

settled down a little bit, as we’re trying to win 

the confidence of the population. I think we had 

some opportunities to take some small teams of 

women, put them out there in areas that recently 

had been contested, and just started engaging, 

seeing what the other 50 percent of the population was thinking. We started with Holly Jawani 

and some of the women, Master Sergeant Julia L. 

Watson, and we did some experiments. We literally 

knocked on some hatches, knocked on some compound doors, and went in. [Holly’s] pretty strong. 

She’d throw the men out and they were very docile, the men would all leave. They’d sit there with 

10, 15, 20 women in a compound, women and 

girls. They’d drink tea and they would just chat 
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for hours. It was not an intel-gathering organization, not designed for that, but you can’t help but 

come out of there with some atmospherics as to 

what’s going on and what do you think. What are 

the men saying? What’s the perception of the community? And I think those things are important. 

We also found that the FET team was exceptionally good at working with men, with Afghan men. 

Afghan men were much less reticent about coming 

up and telling our women any number of things. 

We saw a tremendous opportunity for growth 

here, and we started taking volunteers to take them 

to an FET academy, and Colonel Edward Yarnell 

did a great job of kind of taking the lead on that 

with Master Sergeant Watson. Probably once a 

month, we’d have a class of volunteers. Women 

would raise their hands. We worked it like a volunteer fire department thing, where we would train 

women from the MLG [Marine logistics group], 

from the ACE, pull them out of the flight line, 

from headquarters, and when we needed a team to 

go to Now Zad or Khan Neshin or Marjah, we’d 

ring the bell and see who’s available. Send a mass 

email out saying we need 10, and for 10 [spots] 

we’d have 100 volunteers. We’d pick 10 and we’d 

take them out two or three weeks at a time, and 

then we’d bring them back and let them go back 

to the flight line or supply warehouse or wherever. 

But while they were there, they were doing great 

jobs. They were working in the schools. They 

were out every day. They were not sheltered. They 

were going out and we just saw great potential. I 

had several female Marines tell me, “Hey, sir, if I 

could do this for the rest of my career, I’d sign up 

tomorrow. If I could do this forever, this is what 

I’d like to do.”

Moffett: I wanted to give you a chance to touch 

quickly on technology. You talked about ISRs 

[intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance]. So, in 

terms of Marine Corps history, there was a lot of 

historic use of Ospreys and then the mine clearing at Now Zad and then later at Marjah. We’re 

certainly interested in anything that smacks of the 

historical. But GBOSS (ground based operational 

surveillance system), obviously Vietnam didn’t have 

the GBOSS capability. Could talk about some of 

the novel or historic uses of technology.

Nicholson: I like to tell a story, when I got to Fallujah for my regimental command tour, and I did 

that in ’04/’05 as a G-3. But when I got back to 

Fallujah, if I wanted to send a portfolio or a package of secret information to a company commander, 

downtown Fallujah, if I wanted to send something 

to Mr. John Kael Weston, my POLAD [political 

advisor] downtown at the government center, it was 

Civil War-like, only instead of giving it to a rider 

on horseback, I’d call the gunny and tell him to 

get the PSD [personal security detail] ready. And 

I’d give a package of material to the gunny. I’d say, 

“Take this to Captain [Allen] at FOB Blah.” And 

off they’d go. “Take this to Stonewall, and don’t 

get caught.” By the time I left Fallujah, almost 

every company FOB had secret Internet protocol router network [SIPR], had a GSWAN [general support wide area network]. We called it our 

SWAN antenna or satellite. That was a quantum 

leap. That was not evolutionary. That was revolutionary. How [do] you survive in a combat environment without data, without secure data, SIPR? 

I don’t know how we did it. That was 2006. So 

by 2007, almost everyone had them. By the time 

I left in February ’07, almost everyone had them. 

Flash forward to Afghanistan and GBOSS. We 

had one or two. The first GBOSS tower ever—

this is a great story. 

I come back now to Afghanistan and every 

platoon—if a platoon is at a site, Golestan, they 

have SIPR. They not only have one, but some-
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times multiple GBOSS towers, which is a big thing 

for us. As we’re sitting in Camp Lejeune saying, 

“Okay, what do we need? What do we need in 

terms of specialized gear, GBOSS and GSWAN, 

those SWANs that can get SIPR?” We ordered 

a hell of a lot of them, anticipating the fact that 

as the situation matured, we would put platoons 

out there. Lieutenant Colonel Martin F. Wetterauer and the guys took it to the next level in Now 

Zad. As we had the breakout there with Operations Cobra’s Anger and Eastern Resolve, as we 

started spreading our tentacles there and we went 

down to some of those local towns around Now 

Zad, we put smaller FOBs around. We had towers up. So now we had the potential for the company commander not just to see the tower that’s 

located outside its FOB, but to be able to see the 

towers within his company area. We call it the 

constellation, and we worked with our science and 

technology guys to have the ability in Lima 3/4’s 

[Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines] COC. 

And, again, that was a dramatic leap forward 

in the use of technology. As we pushed down 

into the Helmand River valley, as we pushed 

down into Marjah, shortly after getting settled, 

in came those GBOSS towers. We had to order 

a lot of them. They’re not inexpensive, but what 

a tremendous capability. I think that helped. I 

think we’re always looking for some sort of persistent surveillance platforms and techniques, 

looking for guys laying IEDs and what have you. 

It’s not a magic bullet. It doesn’t solve all your 

problems, but it certainly helps. From a force 

protection standpoint, it is a tremendous asset.

Moffett: Anything else on technology, the drones?

Nicholson: The ISR, by the time you got Afghanistan, you had company commanders that could 

take control of Predator and Reaper UAVs—armed 

Predators and Reapers—and they had the ability to use them. The trickle down of technology 

to the maneuver company level was exceptional. 

HIMARS is a great platform; it certainly reduces 

the reliance on tubed artillery. The HIMARS, 

with the extent of the range, with the precision, 

was an invaluable weapon that we used when we 

needed it.

Moffett: Iran is usually in the news for different 

reasons, but it does border on Nimroz and Farah. 

The road that the Indians built [Route 606 or the 

Delaram-Zaranj Highway] basically ties in Iran 

with Delaram. So can you offer just a couple quick 

thoughts on Iran as part of the equation near where 

the Marines had been working?

Nicholson: As I used to tell folks, and it would 

be annoying, the most important highway in my 

AO was not Highway 1 [circulates inside boundary of Afghanistan].

Moffett: It was Highway 9 [or Route 606].

Nicholson: It was Highway 9. Highway 1 was 

intermittently busy, a lot of contractor vehicles 

traveling on Highway 1. Highway 9 was bumper to bumper. It was open 12 hours a day and it 

was crowded 12 hours a day [with] 18-wheelers 

coming up a modern, Western road from Zaranj 

[southwestern Afghanistan near border of Iran]. 

Unfortunately, there were areas on that road that 

the Taliban controlled and they collected tolls on, 

which drove us to distraction and which special 

operators targeted from time to time. But until we 

could establish a permanent presence in some of 

those areas—[Kashru] was the name I’m talking 

about—until we could get down there, that was 

going to be a problem for us. But we knew that 

there was great commerce coming in. 
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We knew that Delaram— And again, I felt 

sometimes that I was explaining this over and over 

to guys in Kandahar and Kabul, that Delaram was 

an emerging center of commerce, and it was one of 

the only places in the country where two hardball 

roads connected—Highway 1 and Highway 9—

and the city was booming. The city was relatively 

secure and safe. It was prosperous. The Marines 

had a good relationship there. We had good ANA 

there, very cultivated. We were very proud of 

Delaram and the progress there in Delaram, but 

we had a hard time convincing others that anything west—anything in that western portion was 

worth their attention. Population-centric operations absolutely agree with that, but again, it’s the 

effects on the population, not the geolocation of 

the population. 

I make the analogy all the time that if you 

take population-centric operations, if you don’t 

understand that correctly, you would think that 

your forces need to be in the populated areas. Take 

Garmsir. If we moved all of our forces from the 

southern areas into Garmsir, the fighting in Garmsir would start soon, because that’s now the flood. 

You have to be outside, and I think Garmsir is very 

prosperous because of the fact that we pushed the 

enemy so far down toward Khan Neshin. I did 

not see as much traffic as was coming through 

Zaranj, and as much commerce as was coming 

through there. And I’m sure that there were some 

bad things coming in, no doubt in my mind. We 

were always concerned about any kind of escalation of activity on the other side of the border in 

terms of the Iranians scrambling fighters or moving forces to the border, and it never happened. 

I just don’t know that we had a good feel for 

all of the things coming in on that road, and I 

would have liked to have spent more time and 

attention keeping that highway safe and keeping that highway open, because I think for the 

commerce of Helmand and for the prosperity of 

Helmand, that’s a pretty damn important lifeline that was there. Again, I did not see any. We 

caught guys from time to time and we detained 

guys with Iranian papers and we turned them in. 

But word came back, “No, he’s a worker who was 

working in Iran, but he came back.” So we never 

really knew. We never knew exactly what the flow 

was, but there’s no question there was a hell of a lot 

of people coming across those borders from Iran. 

And, certainly, while many of them were probably legitimate workers, no doubt there were some 

that were causing problems for us.

Moffett: If you could take a mulligan—if there’s 

one or two things, the biggest things, that you 

would have done differently if you could.

Nicholson: I think going after local leadership 

earlier on, trying to develop, trying to get more. 

What I’m hearing right now is that the MEF is putting together a civil service academy. It’s a brilliant 

idea, and again, it speaks to the Marine innovation 

that is resident in all of us. For the same reason, 

we started police boot camp and then army boot 

camp. If the institution doesn’t give you what you 

need, do it yourself. It’s the sort of attitude that permeates our Corps. I would like to have gone after, 

and whether it’s Kandahar University, I would have 

liked to have worked harder to fill the [line] ministries. One thing that I didn’t get done was I wanted 

at every district an education minister, we would 

have a health minister, we would have all those 

people, and we didn’t collect that level of talent.

Moffett: And some of this goes back to paying them.

Nicholson: Yes. One thing we wanted to do [that] 

I didn’t get done was [an] independent Afghan battlespace. I think as we sat down at Camp Lejeune 
262

and thought about what we were going to do when 

we got over there, one of our goals was [an] independent Afghan battlespace. But the reality of it was 

[that] when we got there, there were 400 Afghans 

within the entire AO. We really started well behind. 

We couldn’t do the kinds of things we had initially 

wanted to do in terms of it. But I told General 

Mills that that was something we had failed to get 

done. . . . I think another thing we would have 

liked to have gotten done, but we just ran out of 

airspeed and altitude, and again, Moshtarak kept 

getting pushed back and pushed back, but opening the border at Bahram Shah. It’s inevitable, and 

while we ran into a lot of resistance as we talked 

about getting down there and establishing that border, it’s a Wild West smugglers’, criminals’ town.

Moffett: To get to my final question, and you 

know better than anyone, if you look at the situation in May 2009, with the Brits doing what 

they could and with the Taliban everywhere, versus April 2010, when the MEB staff departed, [it 

was] a dramatic, profound, wonderful, historic, 

and consequential deployment. I know it’s hard to 

ask you this question, because there are so many 

accomplishments, but if you could cite one or two 

things that maybe nobody’s noticed or that should 

be part of the historical record. 

Nicholson: One of the more amazing things about 

the deployment had nothing to do, frankly, with 

Afghanistan. It had to do with the ability of our 

Marine Corps to put together such a large, disparate force, with units coming from all four divisions, all four wings. And I had reserve squadrons 

from the very beginning—all four MLGs, Reserve 

Marines, regular Marines—putting them all 

together in this experiment that we call II MEF 

or MEB–A. Hell, we didn’t even settle on a name 

until we were about done. And effectively introducing that force into sustained, significant combat operations in early July when much of it was 

forming in March, April . . . gear still flowing. 

The fact that we crossed the LD with 49 percent of our gear, the fact that we accepted that risk, 

I’m very proud of that. . . . I didn’t know Colonel Vest. I didn’t know my MSC [Military Sealift 

Command] commanders. I’d never heard of them. 

I didn’t know Duffy White. Bringing that size force 

in from all over the world . . . and in a very short 

period of time being able to make sure everybody 

was on the same page. And we trained hard for a 

very short period of time, and we trained in country. There was no Mojave Viper for us. There was 

no, “Hey, let’s get the whole MEB to the national 

training center for 30, 40, 60 days of training.” 

. . . I mean, we sort of got to know each 

other electronically. We had a couple of quick 

meetings at Camp Lejeune, but not everyone, and 

then we fell in on the Special Purpose MAGTF, 

which was already in country, already in the 

fight with 3d Battalion, 8th Marines. We fell in 

on that and 3d Marine Regiment imploded. As 

soon as we got there, their OPSO left. Half their 

staff had to rotate out because they were on 210-

day orders. They were going off to command. 

. . . [I]t was a challenge to put that team together and it was a tribute to that team, and really a 

tribute to our Corps, that we are able to composite 

a force from throughout the world, with a bunch 

of relative strangers, put them together and in a 

few short weeks—a few short weeks, put them 

in sustained, very difficult combat situations and 

have them succeed. That is probably what I am 

most proud of is being a part of that. 

. . . I’m proud of so many things and so many 

people, so many great heroes of the MEB, and 

certainly very humbled by the great sacrifices that 

so many of our guys made. This was not cost free. 

This was a very expensive deployment in terms of 
263

lives and warriors. I am immensely proud of the 

fact that we were able on very short notice . . . to 

put that team together and introduce them into 

the fight. And we did it again a little bit in January 

as 1/6 and 3/6 showed up, but by then at least we 

had the infrastructure. . . . But whether it’s Afghan 

training, the army, the police, whether it’s Now 

Zad, whether it’s a list of our districts from A to 

Z, and look at where they’re at today from where 

they were at 15–16 months ago. Even the most 

ardent critic could not say that, “Holy crap, that’s 

pretty impressive improvement in those areas.”
264

A convoy from 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 

2d MEB-Afghanistan, crosses the line of departure during 

Operation Khanjar to join other Marine forces in the Helmand River valley. 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Aaron Rooks
Marines Launch 

Mission in Afghanistan’s 

South Focused on 

Security and 

Governance

by Rajiv Chandrasekaran

The Washington Post, 2 July 2009

CAMP LEATHERNECK, Afghanistan, 2 July

—Thousands of U.S. Marines descended upon 

the volatile Helmand River valley in helicopters 

and armored convoys early Thursday, mounting 

an operation that represents the first large-scale 

test of the U.S. military’s new counterinsurgency 

strategy in Afghanistan. 

The operation will involve about 4,000 troops 

from the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which 

was dispatched to Afghanistan this year by President [Barack H.] Obama to combat a growing 

Taliban insurgency in Helmand and other southern provinces. The Marines, along with an Army 

brigade that is scheduled to arrive later this summer, plan to push into pockets of the country 

where NATO forces have not had a presence. In 

many of those areas, the Taliban has evicted local 

police and government officials and taken power. 

265
266

Once Marine units arrive in their designated 

towns and villages, they have been instructed to 

build and live in small outposts among the local 

population. The brigade’s commander, Brigadier 

General Lawrence D. Nicholson, said his Marines 

will focus their efforts on protecting civilians from 

the Taliban and on restoring Afghan government 

services instead of mounting a series of hunt-andkill missions against the insurgents. 

“We’re doing this very differently,” Nicholson 

said to his senior officers a few hours before the 

mission began. “We’re going to be with the people. We’re not going to drive to work. We’re going 

to walk to work.” 

Similar approaches have been tried in the eastern part of the country, but none has had the scope 

of the mission in Helmand, a vast province that is 

largely an arid moonscape save for a band of fertile land that lines the Helmand River. Poppies 

grown in that territory produce half the world’s 

supply of opium and provide the Taliban with a 

valuable source of income. 

The operation launched early Thursday represents a shift in strategy after years of thwarted 

U.S.-led efforts to destroy Taliban sanctuaries in 

Afghanistan and extend the authority of the Afghan 

government into the nation’s southern and eastern regions. More than seven years after the fall 

of the Taliban government, the radical Islamist 

militia remains a potent force across broad swaths 

of the country. The Obama administration has 

made turning the war around a top priority, and 

the Helmand operation, if it succeeds, is seen as 

a potentially critical first step. 

Traveling through swirling dust clouds under 

the light of a half-moon, the first Marine units 

departed from this remote desert base shortly after 

midnight on dual-rotor CH-47 Chinook transport 

helicopters backed by AH-64 Apache gunships and 

NATO fighter jets. Additional forces poured into 

the valley during the pre-dawn hours on more helicopters and in heavy transport vehicles designed 

to withstand the makeshift but lethal bombs that 

Taliban fighters have planted along the roads. 

The initial Marine units did not face resistance 

as they converged on their destinations. Marine 

commanders said before the start of the operation 

that they expected only minimal Taliban opposition at the outset, but that assaults on the forces 

would probably increase once they moved into 

towns and began patrols. Field commanders have 

been told to prepare for suicide attacks, ambushes, 

and roadside bombings. 

Officers here said the mission, which required 

months of planning, is the Marines’ largest operation since the 2004 invasion of Fallujah, Iraq. In 

the minutes after midnight, well-armed Marines 

trudged across the tarmac at this sprawling outpost 

to board the Chinooks, which lumbered aloft with 

a burst of searing dust. A few hours later, another 

contingent of Marines boarded a row of CH-53 

Super Stallion helicopters packed onto a relatively 

small landing pad at a staging base in the desert 

south of here. As the choppers clattered through 

the night sky, dozens of armored vehicles rolled 

toward towns along the river valley. 

The U.S. strategy here is predicated on the 

belief that a majority of people in Helmand do not 

favor the Taliban, which enforces a strict brand 

of Islam that includes an-eye-for-an-eye justice 

and strict limits on personal behavior. Instead, 

U.S. officials believe, residents would rather have 

the Afghan government in control, but they have 

been cowed into supporting the Taliban because 

there was nobody to protect them. 

In areas south of the provincial capital, local 

leaders, and even members of the police force, 

have fled. An initial priority for the Marines will 

be to bring back Afghan government officials 

and reinvigorate the local police forces. Marine 
267

commanders also plan to help district governors 

hold shuras—meetings of elders in the community—in the next week. 

“Our focus is not the Taliban,” Nicholson told 

his officers. “Our focus must be on getting this 

government back up on its feet.” 

But Nicholson and his top commanders recognize that making that happen involves tackling numerous challenges, starting with a lack of 

trust among the local population. That mistrust 

stems from concern over civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations as well as from 

a fear that the troops will not stay long enough to 

counter the Taliban. The British Army, which had 

been responsible for all of Helmand since 2005 

under NATO’s Afghan stabilization effort, lacked 

the resources to maintain a permanent presence 

in most parts of the province. 

“A key to establishing security is getting the 

local population to understand that we’re going 

to be staying here to help them—that we’re not 

driving in and driving out,” said Colonel Eric 

[M.] Mellinger, the brigade’s operations officer. 

With the arrival of the Marines, British forces 

have redeployed around the capital of Helmand, 

Lashkar Gah, where they are conducting a large 

Photo courtesy of SSgt William Greeson 

Helmand Province government officials meet at Patrol Base Jaker in the Nawa District of the Helmand Province on 23 July 

2009 with Provincial Reconstruction Team-Helmand and BGen Lawrence Nicholson, commander of 2d MEB-Afghanistan, to discuss reestablishing the Afghan government in the Nawa District.
268

anti-Taliban operation designed to complement the 

Marine mission. Two British soldiers were reported 

killed in fighting in the province Wednesday. 

The Marines have also been vexed by a lack of 

Afghan security forces and a near-total absence of 

additional U.S. civilian reconstruction personnel. 

Nicholson had hoped that his brigade, which has 

about 11,000 Marines and sailors, would be able 

to conduct operations with a similar number of 

Afghan soldiers. But thus far, the Marines have 

been allotted only about 500 Afghan soldiers, 

which he deems “a critical vulnerability.” 

“They see things intuitively that we don’t see,” 

he said. “It’s their country, and they know it better than we do.” 

Despite commitments from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development that they would send additional personnel 

to help the new forces in southern Afghanistan 

with reconstruction and governance development, 

Photo courtesy of CWO3 Philippe E. Chasse 

U.S. Marines with 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 3, 2d MEB, along with approximately 650 Afghan 

soldiers and police officers from the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), prepare to board CH-53D Sea Stallion and 

CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters at Forward Operating Base Dwyer, Afghanistan, on 2 July 2009. The Marines and ANSF 

are partnered for a major operation in Helmand Province to transition security responsibilities to Afghan forces. 
269

State has added only two officers in Helmand since 

the Marines arrived. State has promised to have a 

dozen more diplomats and reconstruction experts 

working with the Marines, but only by the end 

of the summer. 

To compensate in the interim, the Marines are 

deploying what officers here say is the largest-ever 

military-civilian affairs contingent attached to a 

combat brigade—about 50 Marines, mostly reservists, with experience in local government, business management, and law enforcement. Instead 

of flooding the area of operations with cash, as 

some units did in Iraq, the Marine civil affairs 

commander, Lieutenant Colonel [T.] Curtis Lee, 

said he intends to focus his resources on improving local government. 

Once basic governance structures are restored, 

civilian reconstruction personnel plan to focus on 

economic development programs, including programs to help Afghans grow legal crops in the 

area. Senior Obama administration officials say 

creating jobs and improving the livelihoods of 

rural Afghans is the key to defeating the Taliban, 

which has been able to recruit fighters for as little 

as $5 a day in Helmand. 

In meetings with his commanders at forward 

operating bases over the past three days, Nicholson acknowledged that focusing on governance 

and population security does not come as naturally to Marines as conducting offensive operations, but he told them it is essential that they 

focus on “reining in the pit bulls.” 

“We’re not going to measure your success by the 

number of times your ammunition is resupplied. 

. . . Our success in this environment will be very 

much predicated on restraint,” he told a group of 

officers from the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, on 

Sunday. “You’re going to drink lots of tea. You’re 

going to eat lots of goat. Get to know the people. 

That’s the reason why we’re here.” 

Note

Reprinted with permission from the The Washington Post, 2 July 2009.

About the Author

Rajiv Chandrasekaran is a senior correspondent and 

associate editor with The Washington Post. He was 

bureau chief in Baghdad for the first two years of 

the Iraq War. He also has been a correspondent in 

Cairo and Southeast Asia. Chandrasekaran is the 

author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City (Knopf, 

2006), a best-selling account of the troubled American effort to reconstruct Iraq. A graduate of Stanford University, he joined The Post in 1994 as a 

reporter on the metropolitan staff.
270

Marines from 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, India Battery, fire 

an M777A2 lightweight howitzer during a field fire at the 

training ranges near Camp Leatherneck in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand Province on 4 June 2009. 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Christopher R. Rye
“Arty” in Afghanistan—

“We’re Here to Shoot”

by Andrew Lubin

Leatherneck, January 2010

Task Force Leatherneck’s efforts are attracting worldwide attention; 100 members of different media 

outlets have embedded since last July’s Operation 

Khanjar in Afghanistan. People like CNN’s Anderson Cooper and the NBC folks travel with baggage 

handlers and crew. Cooper spent a week with 1st 

Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, and The Washington Post ran an article in October lauding the 

unit’s success. Other media organizations reporting on TF Leatherneck include National Geographic

magazine, Reuters Cairo, Slovenian Television, and 

The Netherland’s de Volksrant newspaper. 

“All are very interested in what the Marines are 

doing in Helmand Province,” said Slovenian TV’s 

Karmen Svegal. “It’s very impressive how successful their counterinsurgency [COIN] strategy is in 

only three months.” 

With 3d Battalion, 11th Marine 

Regiment, at FOB Fiddler’s Green 

“We have two missions,” said Lieutenant Colonel 

James “Chris” Lewis, the battalion’s commanding 

officer. “One is to be in position to fire in support 

of any fire mission, and the other is to provide 

mobile fire support throughout our entire area.” 

Even for Marine artillery that is a tall order. 

Task Force Leatherneck’s area of operations covers 

Helmand Province, Nimroz Province, and parts 

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272

of Farah Province, and 3/11 [3d Battalion, 11th 

Marines] brought only two firing batteries: Battery I (India) and Battery N (November). 

But 3/11 made a name for itself quickly; not 

only was it the first Marine artillery unit in Afghanistan with TF Leatherneck, records indicate it also 

was the first to transport the new howitzers via 

helicopter to support a combat operation. At the 

same time, similar to the experiences of countless 

“cannoncockers” in Iraq, the Marines of 3/11 not 

on the gun line spent hours as provisional infantry doing foot patrols with the Afghan National 

Army (ANA). 

“We’re stretched thin,” Lewis admitted. “November [Battery] is some 100 klicks [kilometers] (62 

miles) south of us at FOB [Forward Operating Base] 

Pico, supporting 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, in ‘The 

Fishhook,’ and we recently took away three of their 

guns to support an LAR [light armored reconnaissance unit] movement pushing even farther south.” 

With 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, in almost daily 

firefights with the Taliban, November Battery also 

executes fire missions almost daily, and at the time 

of this writing has sent some 400 rounds downrange 

in a mix of high explosive, illumination, and global 

positioning system-guided “Excalibur” rounds. 

The missions at Fiddler’s Green are simple, if 

intensive: provide fixed artillery support, send provisional infantry patrols out into nearby villages, 

and be ready to provide mobile artillery support 

wherever and whenever TF Leatherneck requires it. 

“We’ve got no enablers attached to us,” said 

Major [Christopher] “Chris” [B.] McArthur, the 

artillery battalion operations officer. “There’s no 

CAG [civil affairs group], and no contract lawyers; while we’ll do some provisional infantry, 

we’re here to shoot.” 

With India Battery 

India Battery is commanded by Captain Chad [I.] 

Altheiser, who spends his days balancing the need 

to keep two guns manned and ready for firing 24 

hours a day, seven days a week with the requirement 

to provide provisional infantry to help train the 

Afghan National Security Force units being cycled 

through Fiddler’s Green. There is an Afghan army 

camp adjoining the Marine FOB, and Altheiser 

and his men have brought a variety of Afghan army 

units out on patrol with them. Currently, ANA’s 

3d Company, S Kandak, 206th Corps, is on base. 

This is reported to be a special unit loyal to President Hamid Karzai, and this is the first time they’ve 

been sent so far away from Kabul. 

“We’re supporting 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 

to our east,” Altheiser explained, “plus we need to 

be ready to shoot into Marjah, the local Taliban 

stronghold. We’re shooting lots of illums [illumination rounds] to keep them off balance. At the 

same time, I need to send Marines out daily for 

local presence patrols and training the Afghans.” 

There was a change of pace on 13 October 

as the Marines and Navy at Fiddler’s Green celebrated the birthday of the U.S. Navy. Lieutenant Colonel [James] Lewis, [USA,] addressed the 

assembled Marines and sailors, reminding them 

of the tradition of those who came before them 

and how they need to be ready to fight in air, on 

land, and at sea. 

Mobile Arty to Golestan 

Under the command of Captain [Matthew] “Matt” 

[H.] Bates, Battery F’s mission was to support 2d 

Battalion, 3d Marines, in clearing Taliban from 

a mountainous area. “We flew three guns up to 

Golestan . . .,” said First Lieutenant Caleb Murphy, the battery fire direction officer. “The Taliban 

controlled the Baji-Ba Pass, and 2/3 [2d Battalion, 3d Marines] infantry [Fox Company] needed 

our help to drive them out.” The Baji-Ba Pass is a 

chokepoint on the single road north to Golestan, 
273

and Lieutenant Colonel [Patrick] “Pat” [J.] Cashman, commanding 2/3, needed to have it cleared 

in order to resupply his Marines. 

The artillerymen helilifted their howitzers, 

crews, and local security into a field and set up. 

“We sited the guns first thing,” said Lance Corporal Justin Roberts, “setting our azimuths before 

filling sandbags and establishing our base.” Sleeping in two-man tents, they alternated digging, 

manning their guns, and sleeping until their second evening. 

“We got attacked with volleys of RPGs [rocketpropelled grenades] and rockets,” said Corporal 

[Matthew] “Matt” [A.] Mennecke, “but our outgoing fire drove them off.” 

The guns were sited in on the foothills of the 

Hindu Kush—an area with terrain so fierce and 

mountainous that the guns were set back some 25 

kilometers from their potential targets, which did 

not deter India Battery. 

“At ‘game-on,’ it was awesome,” related Lance 

Corporal Joseph [M.] Boschinski. “We were firing 

Charge 7 and Charge 8 red bags, with a 48-second VT [variable time] fuze.” 

“We mostly fired IS [immediate suppression] 

missions,” added Roberts. “We knew the ‘grunts’ 

needed our help, and we weren’t going to let them 

down.” 

One of the howitzers went down, however, so 

the two remaining guns “talked” by themselves 

during the 30 fire missions called in the next two 

days. Their fire was effective, even on the difficult reverse slope missions. 

“We’d hear on the Taliban radio that we’d just 

killed four, and they needed more men,” said First 

Lieutenant Murphy, “and I told the Marines how 

good a job they were doing.” At one point, a fierce 

leatherneck artillery barrage drove a group of Taliban into a cave. 

“We were begging for an Excalibur mission; 

we wanted to finish them off,” said Boschinski, 

“but higher [headquarters] gave it to Marine air, 

who sealed the cave with a Hellfire, but it was us 

who drove them into that cave!” 

With 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 

at FOB Jaker 

Some eight miles to the east of 3d Battalion, 11th 

Marines, the Nawa marketplace is bustling. “On 

Friday, there were 2,000 people here shopping, as 

compared to when we arrived in June when the 

shops were mostly closed up and might attract 

30 people,” said Captain [Frank] “Gus” [A.] Biggio, the 4th Civil Affairs Group officer attached 

to Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1/5]. 

The Nawa marketplace is lively now, but when 

Charlie Company, 1/5 arrived in mid-June, it was 

anything but. A British detachment of 40 infantry was based there, but with such a small number, they were unable to regularly patrol the nearby 

marketplace or outlying farmlands. The Taliban 

took advantage of the weak Coalition force to tax 

the people, close the schools, and generally control 

this rich agricultural area of about 75,000 people. 

“It’s Clear, Held . . .” 

“We changed the dynamics here,” the Charlie Company commanding officer, Captain Brian [P.] Huysman, said, “and the locals have responded to us. 

We took fire our first day here, from that treeline 

[perhaps 100 yards away], and we lit it up.” It was 

a full-fledged combat zone; the Taliban were firing 

107mm rockets, RPGs, and AKs, and the Marines 

and Brits replied with even heavier firepower. 

“The bad guys weren’t used to Marines,” 

explained First Sergeant David Wilson. “We 

pursued them, we didn’t break contact, and we 

hunted them down and shot them—and in 10 

days the area was secure.” 

And then the Marine presence got even heavier. 
274

Task Force Leatherneck—2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade—kicked off Operation Khanjar [on] 

2 July, and 4,000 Marines were inserted at night 

in the biggest helicopter assault since Vietnam. By 

dawn, they’d set up small bases the length of the 

Helmand River valley. “That assault changed the 

minds of a lot of locals,” said Wilson. “Suddenly, 

they realized we were here in force, and that we 

could—and would—fight.” 

“. . . and Build” 

The first goal of a successful “COIN” is to show 

the local citizens that cooperating with the Marines 

improves their lives, and killing or driving out the 

Taliban was an enormous step in that direction. 

With Huysman’s Marines having successfully initiated “clear and hold,” it was time for the infantrymen, civil affairs, and United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) to concentrate on the “build” phase of counterinsurgency 

operations. 

Nawa is an agricultural district running south 

along the Helmand River; in better times (before 

the Taliban and the Russians) grapes, apples, wheat, 

soybeans, and meal were grown and trucked north 

to the larger towns of Marjah and Lashkar Gah. 

USAID built an irrigation canal system there in 

the 1950s and ’60s, and Captain Biggio, in conjunction with the local USAID official, hired 

the locals as basic laborers to clear those canals. 

The program was well received; 254 people are 

employed now, earning cash salaries for the first 

time in several years. 

“The word about jobs gets around,” Biggio said. 

“Even where 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, is fighting down south, the locals are coming to them 

and looking for work.” 

Governance ranks equal to economics in importance in COIN. Unlike many appointed officials, 

Abdul Manaf, the Nawa District governor, lives in 

a district town and visits Kabul sporadically. He’s 

the visible face of governance in Nawa as he travels with the Marines, demonstrating to the locals 

that there is a viable local government working to 

provide them with basic services. 

Appearing at a small shunt (town hall-type 

meeting) with Marine battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel [William] “Bill” [F.] McCullough, 

after the locals expressed their thanks to “Colonel Bill,” as he is known locally, for the improved 

security, they also took the opportunity to express 

to Manaf their need for schools in their villages as 

well as female doctors for their wives and daughters. This is “COIN Marine Corps style,” where 

the local villagers see their lives improve by working with the Marines, who are assisting the local 

government. 

The locals are uneducated, but they are intelligent, and in Nawa District they want their children educated. Although less than 50 students 

attended school sporadically when the Marines 

arrived, now, just 100 days later, 1,200 children, 

grades K-12, attend school daily. 

In their short time, Huysman’s “Charlie” Company Marines have made a significant improvement. 

The entrepreneurial locals have the confidence 

that security brings: They reopened their livestock 

market and also built a waterwheel, hooked it to a 

generator, strung wires, and electrified the Nawa 

District Center. No cash was requested; their only 

request was to borrow a Marine crane in order to 

place the waterwheel into the river. 

But with success comes increased risk. When 

accompanying a patrol into the marketplace, 

an improvised explosive device [IED] made of 

two mortar rounds was discovered 20 yards outside of the marketplace. It took explosive ordnance disposal Marines several hours to come 

to the scene; however, only minutes before the 

IED was discovered, a careless insurgent blew 
275

himself up along with a bridge while attempting 

to plant another IED. This was the bridge that a 

designated quick reaction force would have used 

to drive to the town center, demonstrating that 

this enemy, while not yet technically competent, 

is attempting to bring the fight to the Marines. 

That same evening, friendly citizens delivered 

warnings that the Taliban may soon be targeting locals who work with the Marines. While the 

Nawa District is more peaceful now than it has 

been in many years, the fight is far from over. So, 

that night Charlie Company leathernecks planned 

yet another day’s presence patrols into Nawa. 

Note

Leatherneck 93, no. 1 (January 2010): 38–42. 

Reprinted with permission. Copyright Leatherneck Magazine. 

About the Author

Mr. Andrew Lubin embedded with 3d Battalion, 

11th Marines, at FOB Fiddler’s Green in Nawa 

District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, and 

with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, at FOB Geronimo along the Helmand River valley.
276

Combat artist rendering of a U.S. Marine standing post 

inside FOB Jaker located in Nawa District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. 

Courtesy of SSgt Kristopher J. Battles
Counterinsurgency 

on the Ground in 

Afghanistan: How 

Different Units Adapted 

to Local Conditions

U.S. Marine Battalion 

Nawa, Helmand, 2009

by Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, 

and James A. Gavrilis*

In the summer of 2009, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine 

Regiment (1/5), undertook an operation to clear 

and hold a Taliban stronghold in the Nawa District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

In June, 300 Marines joined a small contingent 

of British and Afghan soldiers already in Nawa to 

patrol near their base and draw insurgents into 

the district center. Two weeks later, the remainder of the battalion closed in on the district center 

from the north, south, and west. After two days of 

fighting, the Taliban was tactically defeated. The 

Marines quickly transitioned from combat and 

clearing operations to stability and holding operations that included befriending locals, holding 

*Unless otherwise noted, information in this vignette comes from interviews 

with U.S. Marines from 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, on 24–25 

February; 22, 29, and 30 March; 21, 27, and 28 April; 6 and 19 May 2010.

277
278

community shuras, and conducting small reconstruction projects.

Throughout their deployment, the battalion’s first priority was to provide security for 

local Afghans. In order to do so, the Marines 

spread out to 26 outposts over 400 square miles 

of farmland and desert. They conducted multiple daily foot patrols along with Afghan National 

Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP)

—collectively known as Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF)—for the primary purpose of talking to locals and creating alliances with key leaders.

While locals were initially hesitant to cooperate with the Marines and ANSF, the presence 

and actions of the Coalition gained the Afghans’ 

trust over time. While the Marines were managing 

the security situation, the battalion commander 

worked closely with the new district government 

representatives to help promote local governance. 

The battalion commander also formed close relationships with the British stabilization advisor, 

USAID representative, and civil affairs officer to 

ensure unity of effort. Together, they held community shuras to discuss major Afghan concerns 

and visited villages to conduct impromptu shuras with local leaders. Working with key leaders 

also allowed them to devise a reintegration campaign for villagers who had low levels of involvement with the insurgency.

In addition, the battalion helped Afghans 

rebuild the infrastructure throughout the district. 

They cleared canals, built roads, improved small 

bridges, and opened schools and clinics. Once security was provided, the Coalition prioritized projects to win over locals and stimulate the economy 

using information collected by the Marines during their patrols and shuras. Within weeks of the 

Marines’ arrival, Afghans began to return to Nawa. 

The district center was transformed from a ghost 

town to a relatively secure and lively marketplace.

A British Platoon Surrounded

In 2006, a small British Operational Mentor and 

Liaison Team (OMLT) was sent to Nawa to mentor Afghan soldiers and police. Collectively known 

as Task Force Nawa, the British and ANSF were 

outnumbered by Taliban fighters and became 

pinned down [by] heavy, daily firefights. The British in Nawa lacked the manpower to conduct daily 

patrols. When they did patrol, they could rarely 

travel far from their patrol base at the district center. The task force became tactically isolated and 

was only accessible by helicopter as Taliban fighters encircled the base. As a result, the British had 

little access to the population and, in turn, knew 

little about what was happening outside their base. 

Beyond their small security zone, the Taliban had 

freedom of movement.

During this time, there was no Afghan government in place. By 2009, the district governor 

had not been to Nawa in two years. The Taliban 

taxed, threatened, and stole from locals, closed 

schools, and generally controlled the area. Many 

of the locals fled. Only a handful of the approximately 120 shops in the district center’s main 

bazaar remained open.

These conditions prevailed until summer 2009, 

when the U.S. Marines deployed to southern 

Afghanistan. 

Shaping Operations in Nawa

In the early summer of 2009, the Marines worked 

with the British military to devise a plan to drive 

the Taliban out of Nawa. In late June 2009, 300 

Marines arrived in the district. These Marines 

joined the British OMLT and ANA soldiers at 

the district center.

Insurgents attacked the district center as soon as 

the Marines arrived and continued to attack them 

every day. For two weeks straight, the Marines experienced heavy, daily fighting.1 The Taliban in Nawa 
279

were good fighters; they were aggressive and had a 

basic understanding of infantry tactics. The police 

fought aggressively and with little restraint—“like 

cowboys”—alongside the Marines at the schoolhouse. Within days, the Marines began including 

the ANP on their platoon-size patrols, expanding 

the security zone.

The ultimate goal of the U.S. Marine surge 

in the south was not only to provide security, but 

also to instill confidence in the local population 

about their government. Shortly after the initial 

300 Marines arrived in the district, a new district governor, Haji Abdul Manaf, was appointed 

to Nawa. Locals knew and respected Governor 

Manaf from his experience fighting against the 

Soviets during the 1980s.

Clearing Nawa

In early July, the rest of the battalion entered Nawa 

as part of a major offensive across Helmand called 

Operation Khanjar (“Strike of the Sword”). An 

additional 800 Marines and their ANSF partners 

conducted movement to contact, cleared the district center, and expanded the security zone around 

the district center. The Marines encountered little 

opposition. The Taliban were tactically defeated 

and relinquished control of the district within 36 

hours. While many Taliban fighters were killed, 

others fled to the nearby town of Marjah or went 

into hiding. The battalion dispersed throughout the 

district into small outposts. Each Marine company 

was assigned two positions based on the locations 

of population centers and lines of communication.

The Marines’ number one priority was to provide security for the population and, by doing so, 

separate the insurgents from the population. Therefore, they were more concerned with befriending 

the local populace than hunting down enemy 

fighters. They limited the use of mortars and air 

power.2

 Despite opportunities [to strike at Taliban 

fighters], they did not drop a single bomb out of 

fear of harming civilians and alienating the population. The Marines also reimbursed many locals 

for damage that occurred during the fighting.3

Similarly, the Marines initially conducted some 

raids against suspected Taliban leaders. However, 

after a few missions, the Marines realized that these 

raids upset the local population while yielding few 

results. The Marines cut back on these raids. Communication with the population was vital to the 

Marines’ success in Nawa. Unlike in many other 

operations, prior to their deployment the Marines 

prepared a unified strategic communication plan 

based on five “enduring talking points” to explain 

who they were, what was going on, and why they 

were there. These were as follows:

1. We are here in your village/town at the 

request of your government to help your 

brave Afghan National Security Forces 

make the area safer, more secure, and 

increase prosperity for the people.

2. We are here in partnership with your 

Afghan security forces. Together, we can 

improve peace and prosperity in your town.

3. We seek your assistance in identifying 

those who are seeking to destroy your 

government and keep you in fear. The 

sooner we can identify these enemies of 

Afghanistan, the sooner we can remove 

them from your village.

4. Coalition forces have no intention to 

stay in your village permanently. We will 

stay long enough to ensure security and 

will leave when your own security forces 

can maintain this security on their own.
280

5. We look upon you as our friends. We have 

left our families to assist you, just as we 

would for any friend.

Holding Nawa

Before the operation, the battalion expected 

heavy fighting until September. So when fighting stopped just two days after they arrived in 

Nawa, they were forced to transition from combat 

to stability operations much sooner than anticipated. The Marines spent the remaining months 

of their deployment patrolling the area, supporting the expansion of governance, and developing 

security forces to “hold” and “build” the district.

The Marines and ANSF had sufficient numbers to disperse throughout the district. From 

the initial assignment of two company-size positions, the Marines further dispersed into platoon- and squad-size outposts, ending up with 

26 positions by the end of their deployment. 

These additional outposts were selected based on 

areas that the battalion needed to control, such 

as villages and roads where there had been frequent Taliban activity. Marines at these outposts 

conducted three to four patrols a day, which 

reassured locals that there were Marines everywhere, providing security. In addition to protecting Afghans, Marines conducted foot patrols to 

meet with locals (with the help of interpreters), 

discover local issues and concerns, and identify 

local leaders.

At first, however, few locals wanted to talk to 

the Marines, as the Taliban continued to threaten 

and intimidate locals. For example, the Taliban 

had spread propaganda that the Marines would 

leave after the August 2009 presidential elections, and the Taliban would then regain control 

of Nawa. Since Nawa had been cleared in the past 

and the Coalition had never stayed in sufficient 

numbers to hold the area, local Afghans were 

inclined to believe the rumors. To demonstrate 

their lingering presence, the Taliban occasionally 

left threatening “night letters” (shabnamah) in villages after nightfall to let villagers know that they 

were still around and watching them. Villagers 

also received threatening phone calls. However, 

the Marines actively sought to continuously disprove Taliban propaganda—for example, by staying in the area after elections—and distinguish 

themselves from the threatening actions of the 

Taliban. Marines emphasized the “golden rule”: 

to treat others as they would want to be treated 

if their roles were reversed. They were also apologetic when necessary. The population soon realized that the Taliban could no longer back up 

their threats, which prompted local Afghans to 

cooperate more freely with Marines.

The Marines met with locals on every patrol, 

shaking hands and drinking tea. By doing so, 

the Marines also differentiated themselves from 

their British predecessors who had “pointed guns” 

at locals when they patrolled and had not spent 

much time talking with them. The Marines were 

careful to be “culturally aware” and respectful of 

the local culture. For example, Marines respected 

mosques and did not enter them unless they were 

invited.

Persistent foot patrolling made the Marines’ 

presence known to the local population. The battalion commander’s policy was that no Afghan 

was to go 72 hours without seeing a Marine or 

police officer. Some platoons distributed their 

own version of night letters during night patrols 

to let people know that the Marines were always 

around. Many locals began to believe that the 

Marines never slept.

The Marines used their patrols as an opportunity to collect information about their area. They 

asked locals about their opinions and top five concerns. Typical questions included:
281

• What changes to the population have there 

been in the past year? Have people left? 

Have people returned? Why?

• What are the most important problems? 

Why?

• Who do you believe can solve your problems? Why?

• What should be done first? Why?

Asking these questions required the Marines 

to have patience and good “people skills.” It was 

worth the effort, though—the Marines familiarized themselves with the area, befriended locals, 

and prioritized projects.

During their patrols, the Marines also made a 

conscious effort to identify an area’s key leaders 

and befriend them. After discerning powerbrokers 

in their area of operation (AO)—including village 

elders, tribal leaders, and religious leaders (mullahs)—the Marines met with them at least once 

a week to drink tea and talk about their concerns. 

In some cases, these discussions increased in frequency to every other day by the end of their deployment. Many company and platoon commanders 

took off their gear when talking with elders as a 

sign of respect. This key leader engagement not 

only helped the Marines learn more about what 

the locals needed, but also drove operations by 

providing Marines with better and more accurate 

information about whom to talk to and what was 

happening in their area.

The Marines also worked with key leaders on 

reintegration. From the beginning of their time in 

Nawa, the Marines advertised that local Afghans 

who had worked with the Taliban—known to 

the Marines as the “little t” Taliban—would have 

the opportunity to reintegrate. That is, Marines 

would forgive past small grievances and not arrest 

past aggressors as long as they were peaceful in 

the future. By late July, it became an official policy. This involved the assistance of village elders. 

In front of their village elders, men pledged not 

to participate in insurgent actions; by witnessing 

their pledges, the local elders took responsibility 

for keeping them straight.

Community meetings (shuras) gave the Marines 

another opportunity to collect information about 

their respective AO. The battalion commander 

and district governor walked around to talk with 

locals in what became known as a “walking shura.” 

Similarly, Marines held impromptu shuras with 

locals at the platoon and squad levels during their 

patrols. After noticing ripped-up leaflets in canals, 

the Marines decided against the routine mass 

distribution of informational materials. Instead, 

the Marines began to use the handouts as an icebreaker with which to convene a small impromptu 

shura. They would have an interpreter on hand 

to explain the leaflets. The idea was that those 

Afghans would then take the leaflets back to 

their village to an educated villager, who would 

read and confirm what they had been told by the 

Marines. In addition to leaflets, the Marines began 

to publish a Nawa District newsletter every couple of weeks to explain what was going on in the 

district. The Marines also relied on policemen to 

hand out these newsletters in main bazaar areas. 

Because of low literacy rates, all written products 

included numerous pictures.

In addition, the Marines distributed radios 

in a box (RIABs) to locals during their patrols.4

These radio transmitters had recorded messages 

from leaders, such as the district governor, police 

chief, and ANA commander. Separately, the battalion also operated a local radio station and broadcast music, prayers, news, and health messages for 

the local populace.
282

The Marines partnered with ANSF at the 

lowest level. They ate, lived, and patrolled sideby-side with ANP and Afghan National Civil 

Order Police (ANCOP). They also planned most 

operations together. On every patrol, the Marines 

encouraged positive ANP interaction with the populace. For example, they encouraged the police to 

distribute flyers and to stay to answer any questions from the local populace.

Upon arrival, one Marine likened the ANP to 

the Mexican Federales because they only behaved 

when closely monitored. If the Marines did not 

closely watch them, a policeman might smoke hashish or carry away a farmer’s chicken. In October, 

the local ANP were sent to the police academy as 

part of the eight week focused district development (FDD) program. Additional ANCOP were 

sent to the area to take their place. Although the 

locals initially preferred them to the ANP, they 

ended up requesting their local police back because 

they were more familiar with the area. After the 

ANP returned from their training, the Marines 

noticed a slightly more professional force. Their 

behavior also improved the longer they spent with 

the Marines. By the end of the 1/5 deployment, 

some of the ANP even tried to mirror the Marines’ 

appearance by cutting their hair in Marine fashion.

Even when the ANP were not present, the 

Marines tried to build up police credibility among 

locals by talking about the positive things the ANP 

had done. Posters of police officers with Afghans 

were posted in bazaars to improve how the locals 

perceived the ANP, and to give the police a constant reminder of the need for professionalism.

A few weeks after the Marines cleared the area, 

shops began to open and residents began to return 

home to Nawa. Many residents had fled north to 

Lashkar Gah but returned once they heard (through 

word-of-mouth) that security was improving. By 

the end of October 2009, the Marines noticed 

that at least 80 of the 120 shops were open in the 

district center bazaar, demonstrating that locals 

had growing faith in the economy and the security environment.

By the end of the Marines’ deployment, local 

Afghans had started to take responsibility for their 

own security. IED incidents went down 90 percent.5 As security improved, locals approached the 

Marines about other issues, such as healthcare and 

irrigation. Lack of water was always an issue. The 

Marines listened to the locals’ problems but emphasized to them that the solutions to these problems 

were the district government’s responsibility. Yet the 

Marines enabled the government by providing funds 

and equipment for projects. In essence, the Marines 

served as a broker. This demonstrated to locals 

that everyone was working together. The Marines 

also conducted numerous confidence-building 

projects, including clearing canals and building 

roads. Each platoon had a budget—almost exclusively funded by the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP)—but local village 

elders decided on projects. Locals were hired to 

do all the building.

Even though Helmand was responsible for 

the most opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and Nawa District was the second-highest 

cultivator in the province in 2008, the Marines 

(unlike their ANSF counterparts) avoided participating in poppy eradication. However, in conjunction with the Helmand provincial reconstruction 

team (PRT), they did help push out wheat seed 

distribution during the planting season in the fall. 

They also discussed opium poppy planting with 

locals and recommended that they not grow it in 

the next season.

Building Nawa

By providing security, the Marines were able to 

help foster the development of local government. 
283

The battalion commander created strong ties to 

the new district governor and other local leaders, 

and was so widely respected by the population that 

he became known as “Colonel Bill” throughout 

the district. The battalion commander and district governor began attending community meetings together to build confidence in the Afghan 

government. The district governor and administrator went out in the district center every day 

and to outlying areas at least twice a week. While 

the people did not trust the central government 

in Kabul, they trusted the provincial and district 

leadership. By force of personality, the battalion 

commander was able to work closely with the U.S. 

and British civilians in the area. Within a month 

of arriving, the Helmand PRT sent a British stabilization advisor to the district from another part 

of the province. The battalion was also assigned a 

USAID representative. Both civilians, in addition 

to a civil affairs reservist, worked closely with the 

battalion commander and his Marines.

At least once a week, the battalion held a highprofile community outreach shura to discuss major 

district issues and concerns. They typically involved 

the battalion commander, district governor (and 

in some cases the provincial governor), district 

administrator, USAID representative, and British stabilization advisor, and so demonstrated a 

united front. Each week these meetings were held 

in a different part of the district. The first one, 

in late July, involved the provincial governor. Platoons advertised these shuras during their patrols, 

and more locals attended them as time went on.

These planned shuras allowed the battalion and 

Afghan government officials to address big issues, 

such as civilian deaths and Taliban propaganda. 

For example, early in their deployment, a Marine 

sniper team killed a farmer who was irrigating at 

night, mistakenly believing that he was planting an 

IED. The battalion held a large shura afterward to 

apologize to locals and admit their mistake. These 

shuras also helped address Taliban propaganda. 

For example, the Taliban spread rumors that the 

Marines were there to change the Afghan lifestyle. 

The Marines quickly tried to emphasize that they 

wanted to help improve the local Afghan lifestyle 

and provide Afghans with the security necessary 

to allow for political discussions. Local concerns 

seemed to be assuaged rather quickly once a commanding officer addressed it at a shura.

Despite improvements in security, there were 

also setbacks. In late September, the PRT worked 

with the district government to build a 46-member 

community council in Nawa (including a handful 

of known former Taliban). The district governor 

persuaded elders to reconstitute a traditional council 

featuring locally selected representatives from each 

subdistrict. Unfortunately, after the community 

council was created, insurgents assassinated three 

of its members, all former Taliban. Their deaths, 

however, only seemed to strengthen the community council’s resolve and reaffirm their belief that 

they needed to continue. For security purposes, the 

council members all stayed in a house together, 

which forged a bond between them.

As winter approached, the locals became worried because the Marines they knew were about to 

be replaced by a different Marine battalion.6

 The 

outgoing Marines eased their fears by introducing their replacements to locals and key leaders 

and distributing flyers explaining the transition.7

Conclusion

During the summer and fall of 2009, the Marines 

conducted a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign in Nawa. Because they faced far 

less resistance than expected, they began executing the “hold” within days of the “clear.” The 

Marines transitioned quickly from a situation that 

they thought would be heavily kinetic to a heavy 
284

civil affairs and information operations (IO) focus 

in order to favorably influence local perceptions. 

They were flexible and quickly adapted to a campaign of “handshakes and smiles.”

Throughout their campaign, the battalion’s 

enduring mission was to protect locals from the 

Taliban threat and win their confidence. The 

concentration of force, with the recommended 

troop-to-population ratio, pushed Taliban fighters out and then protected the population on 

daily foot patrols. Ultimately, the population did 

not care who provided security, as long as it was 

provided. While there was some early hesitation 

to cooperate, locals seemed to resent being bullied by the Taliban. By living among the people 

and reassuring Afghans that they would be there 

for “as long as it takes,” the Marines gave villagers a sense of security. The return of families was 

a sign of progress.

The relatively secure environment allowed the 

Marines to build personal relationships and trust 

with locals. The battalion realized that “building 

castles and wearing heavy armor” would distance 

them from the people. Therefore, the Marines 

operated in small units (alongside ANSF) and 

walked everywhere to focus on befriending the 

populace, not hunting the Taliban. This required 

patrols to have tactical patience—to spend time 

drinking cups of tea and shaking hands with 

locals—and not being in a rush to get back to the 

base. By taking the time to talk with locals and 

build these relationships, the Marines were able 

to collect better intelligence that they could use 

to hunt insurgents.

Understanding the local population was a priority. Squad leaders, platoon leaders, and company 

commanders were all responsible for analyzing the 

civilian communities and befriending local leaders in their respective areas of operations. It took 

some time for Marines to get used to the Afghan 

schedule and their customs (e.g., irrigating at 

night), but they learned quickly and were able to 

adapt to local circumstances.

Information operations were the primary driving force behind all Marine actions and were integrated throughout all activities. As part of their IO 

campaign, the Marines did not make big promises 

at the beginning of their deployment, and were 

careful not to promise anything they could not 

deliver so they did not raise unrealistic expectations. Even as the end of their tour approached, the 

outgoing 1/5 Marines distributed informational 

materials, explained the troop transition, mentored their replacements, and introduced them to 

locals and key leaders to assuage the people’s fears. 

After the battalion’s focus on security, governance and development followed. The Marines 

worked to build the credibility of the district government and security forces while maintaining 

security. The battalion commander created strong 

ties with capable Afghan and civilian partners, 

and his company commanders mirrored him. It 

also helped that all of the company commanders 

had former counterinsurgency experience in Iraq.

Through large community outreach shuras 

and small impromptu shuras, the Marines—from 

the battalion commander to the squad leader—

worked with local leaders to identify community 

problems and gain a better understanding of what 

was happening in their area. The Marines were 

outside the wire every day talking with locals and 

addressing concerns, such as civilian casualties or 

misperceptions spread by the Taliban. In addition, 

they helped the local government fund and supply local development projects.

Notes

“U.S. Marine Battalion Nawa, Helmand, 2009,” 

Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: 

How Different Units Adapted to Local Conditions,
285

35–48. Reprinted by permission. Copyright © 

2010 CNA, www.cna.org.

1. Mark Walker, “Local Marines Holding Ground 

in Helmand’s Nawa District,” The North CountyTimes, 25 July 2009.

2. Tony Perry, “Marine’s Success in Afghanistan has 

a History,” Los Angeles Times, 31 December 2009.

3. John McCall, “H&S Marines Guard the Perimeter of Patrol Base Jaker,” Leatherneck 92, No.10 

(October 2009): 15–16.

4. Tony Perry, “Marine’s Success in Afghanistan has 

a History,” Los Angeles Times, 31 December 2009.

5. Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence 

Relevant in Afghanistan (Center for New American 

Security, January 2010), 13.

6. Tony Perry, “Marines in Afghanistan Hear a Plea: 

Don’t Leave Too Soon,” Los Angeles Times, 23 

November 2009.

7. Richard Tomkins, “Thanksgiving is a Hard Time 

for Marines,” UPI, 25 November 2009.

About the Authors

Jerry Meyerle, PhD, is a senior research scientist 

in CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies. He served 

on Afghanistan and Pakistan policy reviews and 

as an advisor to the commander of the Kunar Provincial Reconstruction Team in eastern Afghanistan. From August 2011 to March 2012, he served 

as an advisor to the commanding general of II 

Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) in southern Afghanistan. Megan Katt is a research analyst 

in CNA Strategic Studies’ Center for Stability and 

Development, where she focused on insurgency 

and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. From 2011 

to 2012, she deployed to eastern Afghanistan in 

support of counter-IED intelligence and operations. James Gavrilis is a senior advisor also at the 

Center for Stability and Development. Gavrilis 

is a former U.S. Army Special Forces officer with 

more than 24 years of experience in the infantry 

and special operations. Gavrilis also served at the 

Pentagon and was responsible for political-military operational analysis, policy, and strategy for 

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Service Staffs. He is also an 

adjunct professor at Georgetown University and 

George Washington University, and teaches at the 

Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute.
286

U.S. Marines assigned to Special Operations Task ForceWest in Herat Province, Afghanistan, return to their camp 

following the completion of a presence patrol. 

Photo courtesy of Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System
With Special Operations 

Marines in Afghanistan

by Stewart Nusbaumer 

Leatherneck, November 2009

This is no oasis. In winter, it’s frigid; in summer, a 

furnace. Patches of scrawny pine trees, clumps of 

scraggly bushes, and scraps of crab grass all desperately struggle to survive. They usually don’t. What 

thrives here is brown and desolate and often annoying. Windswept dirt and shifting dunes mashed 

into fine grain sand scratch your eyeballs red. Jagged rocks scattered about can cause you to twist 

your ankles. Craggy brown mountains perched on 

the horizon highlight the bleakness. 

Herat Province, gateway to the Dashti Margo

—the “Desert of Death,” slayer of foreign armies 

from the Persians in 500 BC to the Soviets in the 

1980s—continues to be a nasty hotbed for ugly 

weather and dangerous people. 

To the south is a stronghold of the resurging 

Taliban, its forces slipping into Herat Province 

to harass and kill. To the west is Iran—no one 

knows what the Iranians are up to. To the north 

and the east is an impregnable wall, the Hindu 

Kush mountains. Swarming throughout this harsh 

and brutal land squeezed between pressing Taliban and hostile border and towering barrier are 

gunrunners, opium dealers, and smuggling gangs. 

And smack in the middle of this nasty neighborhood are U.S. Marines. They’re Marines of 

the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations 

Command (MARSOC). 

287
288

The base unit consists of the 14-man Marine 

Special Operations Team (MSOT). In Afghanistan, Special Operations Marines deploy in company-size units, but today they are more often 

scattered around in small-unit teams—MSOTs—

conducting distributed operations. I embedded 

with an MSOT from “Fox” Company, 2d Marine 

Special Operations Battalion, in Herat Province 

this past summer. 

MARSOC With the 

Afghan National Army 

Riding in several sport utility vehicles, the Marines 

pulled up abruptly, shooting a cloud of dust over 

the staging area. On the edge of an Afghan National 

Army (ANA) base, an Afghan platoon was weighed 

down with machine guns, belts of ammo, and 

RPG-7 rocket launchers. They were packed for 

battle. 

Although the patrol route was not necessarily 

dangerous, in Afghanistan not necessarily dangerous can turn very deadly in a flash. And there 

were rumors that Taliban “squirters” fleeing the 

Marine offensive down south had slipped into 

Herat. Two files of Afghans and Marines mixed 

[together] and both wearing tri-color Afghan uniforms exited through a side gate and hiked at a 

comfortable clip down an asphalt road lined with 

lanky pine trees. Then the asphalt ended, the dust 

began, rocks worked on our ankles, and the sun 

inched higher. 

The lead Marine advisor for these Afghan troops, 

a herculean-built sergeant, said he views foot patrols 

as patrols-plus: the plus being an opportunity for 

Afghan soldiers to improve their patrolling skills 

spacing, pacing, changing formations with changing environments . . . everything that can give 

a patrol an edge if it turns deadly. “We’ve been 

covering all this in classes and drills on the ANA 

base,” he said while scanning the barren landscape 

for movement, “but reinforcement and live conditions are crucial for their progress.” 

Four days a week, the sergeant and other operators train and mentor an Afghan army platoon 

in basic infantry skills: shooting positions, vehicle convoy security, mission planning, leadership, 

and human rights. “But these are not Marines; 

you have to do extra things with them,” the sergeant emphasized. “Like march all the way back 

to their barracks with them, eat with them, drink 

chai with them. These things are very important 

to Afghans.” 

We turned on to a dirt path, crossed an open 

area, and headed down a gravel road with trees and 

several simple houses. The Afghan soldiers were 

alert and appeared to be in good physical shape. 

The sergeant served three years in 2d Recon 

Battalion, another three years in 2d Force Recon, 

and left the Corps to attend college. Afterward, 

he rejoined 2d Force Recon, which became 2d 

Marine Special Operations Battalion. “I was out of 

the Marines for four and a half years, but returned 

because there was a war going on and there were 

still things I wanted to accomplish in the Marines.” 

During college, the Marine veteran worked as 

a mental health technician in a lockdown facility 

for abused kids, ranging from age 7 to 18, with 

psychiatric problems. “It’s amazing how much you 

can learn from human beings with mental disorders,” he said while studying a motorcycle kicking up a trail of dust on a parallel road. “You have 

to really listen to understand them. You have to 

reach those people on their level. That takes a lot of 

patience. That’s where I learned to have patience.” 

We entered a village of low buildings, the main 

road lined with tiny shops selling basic food and 

household items. The residents stared, some with 

icy glares, others with smiles—the children all 

smiled. In 10 minutes, we were out of the village 

and humping across a broad open area—another 
289

potential ambush area. We then looped back to 

the ANA base. 

At the staging area, after the three-hour patrol, 

the sergeant addressed his Afghan platoon: “Everyone did a good job. You did a good job on security, on pace, and on changing formations.” Then 

the Afghans hiked back to their barracks and the 

Marines drove back to their base—except for the 

sergeant, who hiked with his Afghan platoon. 

MARSOC Marine Qualities 

Riding back to base with the leathernecks, I asked 

them what personal qualities make for a good Special 

Operations Marine. “Physical and mental toughness,” said the team chief, a gunnery sergeant. “No 

selfishness,” said a staff sergeant, the team’s communications chief, adding, “. . . take extreme pride in 

what you do.” Another Marine said, “The ability to 

mesh with a changing environment.” The one attribute every team member mentioned was “maturity.” 

The staff sergeant explained: “Operating at 

this level requires a Marine to have a certain level 

of life experiences and Marine Corps experiences. 

We need guys who can make quick life-or-death 

decisions without any hesitation. The more mature 

you are, the less your senses get overloaded during a crisis, and you can make sound decisions. 

If you have a young guy out of boot camp, you 

are going to have to supervise him, and that can’t 

always happen [on a team]. I would say a lot of 

experiences, and we work together and can get 

through any situation.” 

With classified information and clandestine 

missions and sensitive information, loose talk 

and immature boasting is dangerous. The staff 

sergeant added, “That’s something that cannot 

be tolerated. Operators live by the motto, ‘Silent 

Professionals’.” 

Operators also spoke a great deal about being 

“adaptive.” Being a small unit operating far from 

“Big Marine Corps” support and working closely 

with local troops, leaders, and civilians in their 

local culture—flexibility and adaptability are crucial. There is not one way to do things here. Nor, 

is there one job for every Marine. 

“Everyone has several duties,” the team leader, 

a captain, said. “All of us have many skill sets to 

learn,” the team chief added. 

For this team, they work on foreign internal 

defense several days a week, training Afghan soldiers. Yesterday they had a direct action mission. 

Soon there will be a special reconnaissance assignment. Today was a civil affairs project. For Special 

Operations, change is one of the few constants. 

Maturity and adaptability, with other qualities, are 

what make a good Special Operations operator. 

MARSOC Marines and Civil Affairs 

Several hundred Afghans, in anxious anticipation, huddled against the shiny whitewashed wall 

for shade. In the rising morning sun, the brightwhite structure contrasted sharply with the village’s dirt brown buildings and the surrounding 

desolate desert. 

At a few minutes after 9:00 a.m., a group of 10 

women, including a distraught woman carrying a 

screaming baby, a frail, elderly woman assisted by 

a young teenage girl, and a tiny girl with disheveled hair and a big case of sniffles, was escorted 

inside to a waiting room where they sat on brightly 

colored rugs. Then men, including a middle-aged 

man hobbling on wooden crutches, an old man 

with a long white beard being pushed in a wheelbarrow, and a sneezing teenage boy, were directed 

to a long wooden bench in the courtyard. 

The old and feeble and young yet sick are all dirt 

poor in one of the poorest countries in the world 

with nowhere to go for medical care. Nowhere, 

except, to the weekly MEDCAP (Medical Civil 

Affairs Program). 
290

On every Thursday, Special Operations Marines 

with Army Special Forces join Afghan Commandos and soldiers for a public medical clinic. The 

Afghans furnish two female nurses, a doctor and 

physician assistant, two pharmacists, and Army 

and Commando medics. The Americans contribute two Navy corpsmen with MARSOC and two 

Army Special Forces medics. The local population 

furnishes 300–350 patients, more than 4,000 in 

the last three months. 

The Afghan doctor, with trimmed white beard, 

said he treats “lots of mental problems, and intestinal and kidney problems.” I asked him what is 

needed most, expecting to hear expensive equipment and trained health personnel. “What is needed 

most is health education. Why people should wash, 

how often, why dirty water will make them sick.” 

“It feels good to help these people,” said a broadshouldered corpsman, a hospital corpsman third 

class. “It also lets them know that we are here to 

help them. I give them meds, mostly for headaches, sore throats, worms, pains ‘in their bones,’ 

and lots of baby formula. Some are dehydrated. 

They drink strong black tea all the time.” 

The corpsman’s training included the Basic 

Reconnaissance Course at Camp Pendleton, California; airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia; and Navy Diving and Marine Combatant 

Diver training in [Panama City,] Florida. In Special Operations, corpsmen need to be prepared 

for anything. 

“It worked out that 2d Marine Special Operations Battalion needed a corpsman, so I was lucky 

enough to receive orders here.” 

Old Breed, New Breed: The Marine Breed 

There are many reasons why Marines and sailors 

volunteer for an assignment to MARSOC, although 

from my experience with this team, the reasons can 

be boiled down to three. Foremost is the personal 

challenge. Highly motivated and driven to excel, 

Special Operations, especially for those who were 

in Force Recon, was their next logical challenge. 

A second reason is they felt restrained, held back 

by the “Big Marine Corps,” its bureaucratic rules 

and regulations. In unconventional warfare, there is 

more freedom of action. Finally, with the struggle 

against Islamic radicalism, these Marines and their 

corpsmen wanted to be in the middle of the fight. 

And in Special Operations, they are challenged, have greater autonomy, and are in the 

middle of the fight. Plus something every Marine 

relishes: they have intense camaraderie. In small 

units, Marine comradeship flourishes big-time. 

Inside the clinic—on other days the building is 

used to train Afghan Army and Commando medics—patients were directed to one of five treatment rooms. Immediately their seats in the waiting 

room and on the bench were filled. After visiting 

a medical practitioner, patients were directed to 

the pharmacy at the end of the hall. It’s all well 

organized, with a stern-faced Afghan directing 

the steady flow of patients. 

If the leathernecks’ reasons for joining Marine 

Special Operations are clear, MARSOC is less 

so. When you think Army Special Forces, Navy 

SEALs, Air Force Special Operators, you have a 

clear idea who they are—superb culture warriors, 

first-class direct action operators, and daredevil fliers. But Marine Special Operations? Well, nothing, beyond Marines. 

“We’re [MARSOC] still in our infancy,” the 

team chief said. “We haven’t settled into a niche 

yet,” another gunnery sergeant added. Other Special Operations components have been in SOCOM 

[Special Operations Command] for more than 20 

years. Some units have existed for more than 40 

years, while MARSOC has existed for a little more 

than 3 years. It takes time to develop an identity, 

or maybe just a cliché. 
291

Some Marines have called the MARSOC 

Marine “a new breed of Marine.” Yet these MARSOC Marines disagree. “We’re not new,” said the 

lead advisor sergeant. “We have a lineage that goes 

back to World War II with the Raiders.” At the 

other extreme, some leathernecks have expressed 

a concern that Special Operations Marines are 

no longer really Marines. “We are Marines first!” 

every MARSOC Marine insisted. 

The Marine Corps, more than any military service, has a long and rich history in unconventional 

warfare. During the “Banana Wars” of the twentieth century, small units of Marines engaged in 

pacification programs and direct action. 

In the early, dark days of World War II, Marine 

Raiders battled behind enemy lines and spearheaded main-force Marines. Joint assault signal 

companies executed special reconnaissance, and 

under horrific conditions directed air and naval 

gunfire. Leathernecks in the amphibious reconnaissance battalion scouted enemy beachheads 

right under the eyes of Japanese soldiers. 

In Vietnam, force reconnaissance became the 

premium deep recon and direct action unit, and 

pioneered new insertion methods. Combined action 

platoon Marines lived in Vietnamese villages and 

organized local defense units. 

In Herat Province, these Special Operations 

Marines are not a new breed. They are the latest of an old breed. A breed that for more than 

100 years has fought in small units separated 

from the main force and used unconventional 

tactics—unique reconnaissance, lightning raids, 

assisting civilian populations, counterinsurgency 

programs, precision assaults, and training local 

militaries. And they are, like the Marines before 

them, excelling at this different type of warfare. 

Note

Leatherneck 92, no. 11 (November 2009): 40–

45. Reprinted with permission. Copyright Leatherneck Magazine. 

About the Author

Stewart Nusbaumer, a Vietnam veteran, embedded with numerous Marine units in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan.
292

U.S. Navy LtCmdr Abuhena Saifulislam (right), Central 

Command mullah, talks with an Afghan National Army 

soldier serving with 201st Corps and a religious cultural 

advisor during a key leader engagement at Forward Operating Base Mehtar Lam, Laghman Province, Afghanistan 

on 2 February 2012. 

Photo courtesy of Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System
Religious Leader 

Engagement in 

Southern Afghanistan

by Alexs Thompson

Joint Force Quarterly, 4th Quarter 2011

Interaction with religious leaders and institutions 

in Afghanistan has been inconsistently addressed by 

foreign military, diplomatic, and development officials. Recent efforts to correct that trend in southern 

Afghanistan make it clear that a sustained, consistent, well-thought-out religious leader engagement 

program supports and advances the traditional 

components of counterinsurgency (security, development, and governance). Systematic engagement 

of religious leaders at the provincial, district, village, and farm levels created another line of communication whereby the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) promoted its mission of 

stability and Afghans voiced their needs and commitment to a stable future.

One of the most pressing observations made 

about U.S. military efforts in the twenty-first century has been the need to leverage culturally specific 

factors in support of counterinsurgency (COIN) 

efforts. One of the most important—and underemphasized—aspects of Afghan society is the 

importance of religious leaders in countering antiAfghan rhetoric.1 This article examines the role of 

religious leaders and institutions in Afghan society and identifies them as a crucial dimension to 

stability operations in Afghanistan. It is argued 

that religious leader engagement is a core factor for 

293
294

expressing U.S. objectives, mitigating the effects 

of kinetic operations, and legitimating the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIRoA) through specifically Afghan modes of 

discourse and participation. The observations and 

conclusions presented are informed by the author’s 

personal experiences in Afghanistan and his interviews with others who have implemented religious 

leader engagement programs in southern Afghanistan. Religious leaders, and especially those at the 

district and village level who are regarded as representatives of their communities, are powerbrokers whose position and authority situate them as 

key partners for stability and who should not be 

ignored by the United States or ISAF.

Roles of Religious Leaders 

Religious leaders and institutions play a significant 

role in how the legitimate GIRoA describes itself; 

the same is true for the enemies of Afghanistan.2 

The primary question, then, is not whether religious leaders will continue to play a significant role 

in the future of Afghanistan, but rather how those 

leaders and the institutions they represent can be 

fully integrated into stable, effective political processes. The highest priority is not simply to provide counter “-religious” ideology, but to counter 

specifically “violent” religious ideology that quells 

the voice and will of the Afghan people.3

 Undermining the impact of violent religious rhetoric, 

however, is primarily the responsibility of Afghans; 

they should encourage, publicize, and sustain the 

incorporation of religious language, individuals, 

and institutions in their own vision of the future. 

One of the ways that the U.S. government/ISAF 

can support Afghans in this endeavor is to promote 

sustained programs of religious leader engagement.

As a starting point for engaging religious leaders, it is prudent to envision a future Afghanistan 

where religious institutions and leaders are promoted 

as essential aspects of the social fabric—not eliminated or begrudgingly accepted. Even those religious leaders who currently support the enemies 

of Afghanistan find themselves seeking reconciliation with GIRoA from time to time and pursue 

full participation in the political process.4 If religious leaders will be prominent in Afghanistan’s 

future, it behooves the U.S. government and ISAF 

to identify religious leaders who are amenable to 

dialogue and integration with GIRoA; this will 

set the conditions for the marginalization of radical religious leaders in favor of those who support stable political processes. It is of tremendous 

importance, then, that religious leaders from all 

dogmatic, geographic, and linguistic communities 

be engaged in consistent public dialogue so that 

Afghans can responsibly choose how they wish to 

advance a narrative that preserves their religious 

heritage and ensures long-term, sustainable political processes. Such a wide-ranging program would 

require coordination across the security, development, and governance spectra with reliable leadership from GIRoA and ISAF. While it may be clear 

that engaging religious leaders is a critical component of stability operations, what is less clear is how 

those engagements can be conducted in a way that 

does not undermine key ISAF objectives or alienate large swathes of the population. What follows 

are several examples of religious leader engagement 

in Helmand Province and recommendations for 

how religious leader engagement can be broadly 

conceptualized so that it respects local variations 

and supports stability operations. 

Engagement in Southern Afghanistan 

Beginning in October 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Carroll, USMC (Ret), and Patricio 

Asfura-Heim began to develop a religious leader 

engagement program for 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB) that addressed the tendency 
295

for religious leaders to be ignored in military and 

diplomatic engagements. Carroll explained that, 

in the early period of his deployment, he traveled 

to six districts in Helmand Province to assess the 

effectiveness of local government structures. He 

went on to write, “My conclusion was that we 

were thoroughly partnered with the Afghan district governor and some of the officials from his 

tashkiel [organization] or other provincial line ministry tashkiels. . . . When I asked about the engagement with influential religious scholars, such as 

mullahs or ulema [experts in Islamic doctrine] . . . 

I heard comments like ‘The mullahs are not that 

important.’”5 

In the wake of such prevalent dismissal of religious leaders, Carroll observed that even if mullahs 

served only a religious role, the primary argument of 

the Taliban is that they are pious individuals fighting foreign infidels, and therefore “the most credible 

voices to counter the Taliban’s rhetoric were moderate mullahs themselves; i.e., Islamic religious leaders who did not believe in the Taliban’s extremist 

interpretations of the Qur’an, who would support 

. . . GIRoA and who were at least neutral—possibly positive—to the presence of ISAF.”6 Carroll 

highlighted one of the most important aspects of 

religious leader engagement: it is not necessary that 

religious leaders support ISAF (but they must at 

least be neutral toward it) so long as they support 

GIRoA and legitimate governmental processes. 

Such an attitude reflects the necessity for Afghans 

to conceptualize and implement the future of their 

country; how religious leaders and institutions 

function in Afghan society is an Afghan question. 

In support of his observations, Carroll and 

Asfura-Heim began a project to reintegrate religious leaders in their provincial religious organizations, such as the Helmand Ulema Council and 

the office of the Helmand Director of Hajj. Carroll 

and Asfura-Heim found that religious leaders in 

southern Afghanistan were open to direct engagement and had specific grievances that could be 

addressed through greater integration of religious 

leaders. Primary among the concerns of these religious leaders was that they had been marginalized 

by the central government and had been sidelined 

in community discussions that did not directly 

address religious issues.7

 Given their personal 

experience with religious leaders at various levels 

of Afghan society, Carroll and Asfura-Heim concluded that religious leaders’ impact was not confined to religious issues; religious leaders were key 

powerbrokers whose input should be included in 

discussions about economics, security, and development projects. Integrating religious leaders at 

the provincial level proved fairly simple with Carroll and Asfura-Heim’s ability to travel to provincial headquarters; what was lacking, however, was 

consistent interaction with religious leaders at the 

subprovincial level. 

Attention to subprovincial religious leaders was 

further strengthened with the arrival of a U.S. 

Navy Muslim chaplain in February 2010. Chaplain “Salam,” whose name has been withheld, is a 

naturalized U.S. citizen and a naval chaplain who 

was serving in the Washington, DC, area when he 

was asked to come to Afghanistan.8

 Based on his 

past experience with the U.S. military and foreign 

Muslim officials, it was determined that Chaplain Salam would be the ideal person to extend 

the reach of the religious leader engagement program. Chaplain Salam and Chaplain Philip [J.] 

Pelikan did not act alone, however; they had the 

support of the 2d MEB commander. In recognition of the important role that religious leaders 

and institutions play in the overall COIN effort, 

then–Brigadier General Lawrence [D.] Nicholson, commanding general of 2d MEB, inquired 

whether it would be possible and beneficial to 

facilitate the visit of a Navy Muslim chaplain to 
296

Afghanistan. Chaplain Pelikan knew such a person and undertook a six-month process to bring 

him to Afghanistan.9 

In an article he wrote for Small Wars Journal, 

Chaplain Pelikan summarized Nicholson’s intent: 

By order of the Commanding General, 

2dMarine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), 

Afghanistan, the Command Chaplain and 

a Muslim Chaplain (if obtainable), along 

with appropriate political specialists, governance advisors, and necessary security, were 

to engage with Islamic leadership in Helmand and Farah Provinces in discussions to 

enhance the relationship with key religious 

leaders and the communities in which they 

serve in order to convey the good will and 

otherwise positive intentions of U.S. Government and ISAF (International Security 

Assistance Force)/NATO [North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization] forces operating in 

the region in conjunction with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIRoA) and its military and police forces.10

In effect, Nicholson called for a systematic 

engagement of local religious leaders with the 

knowledge that these leaders are key nodes in 

the social network and have increased capacity to 

spread the U.S. government/ISAF message of support for GIRoA and rejection of violent religious 

ideology.11Command support is yet another crucial factor for successful reintegration of religious 

leaders. The logistical support requirements and 

the sometimes prevailing attitude that religious 

leaders are not of central importance to building 

stability can hamper the attempt to engage religious leaders. Afghan religious leaders primarily 

serve the role of a mediator; as trusted leaders of 

their local communities, they are local advocates 

to ensure that ISAF projects and intentions match 

those of the community. Concomitantly, as trusted 

partners to ISAF, Afghan religious leaders transmit and reinforce the ISAF message of security 

and effective governance. 

In addition to calling for a systematic engagement plan with religious leaders, Nicholson offered 

a paradigm for understanding that their target 

audience was “little ‘t’ Taliban.” “Little ‘t’ Taliban” were those who were lured into the Taliban 

with promises of power, money, and stability—

for financial and social, not religious, reasons. If, 

Pelikan offered, local Afghan religious leaders 

could explain the ways that ISAF and GIRoA were 

working to bring stability and clarify the opportunities for local Afghans to participate in those 

programs, then it would be possible that Taliban 

rhetoric would be undermined. If U.S. military 

chaplains, and Muslim chaplains in particular, 

could engage with religious leaders, then those 

religious leaders could act as trusted partners for 

participation in legitimate political, commercial, 

and religious institutions.12 What Nicholson and 

Pelikan brought to the growing focus on religious 

leaders in Helmand was the value of military chaplains. It was not enough for provincial-level 2d 

MEB individuals to meet with provincial-level 

religious leaders; there was a need for both groups 

to reach to the district and village levels where the 

message of stability has the most impact. The ability to extend to subprovincial levels was brought 

about most effectively through the work of military chaplains. 

The introduction of a Muslim chaplain served 

as an “icebreaker” for many religious leaders in 

southern Afghanistan and fostered trust between 

ISAF and the tens of Afghans who traveled from 

remote villages for the engagements.13 In particular, the religious leader engagement team would 

schedule their religious leader engagements such 
297

that the Muslim chaplain would open with brief 

remarks that were followed by an open discussion with local religious leaders. As one example, 

the effects of these discussions had significant 

positive effects in Golestan District, Farah Province: “[the engagements] enhanced the ability of 

the Marine company commander at the Golestan Forward Operating Base (FOB) to communicate with the locals, determine better ways to 

assist the community with their many ‘quality of 

life’ issues, and helped empower the local mullahs by connecting them with GIRoA through 

the Farah Provincial Director of Hajj.”14 There 

was certainly an atmosphere of religious camaraderie in the reports about these meetings, but the 

most important aspect was the ability of local 2d 

MEB commanders to open new channels of communication through religious leaders and ensure 

that the needs of Afghans across the entire spectrum were being considered. 

Other Perspectives 

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, who reported on these events 

for The Washington Post, noted that 2d MEB was 

Photo courtesy of 1stLt Timothy R. Irish 

Navy Lt Asif Balbale, a Muslim chaplain and imam, prepares for a meal at the district governor’s compound in Sangin, 

Afghanistan, on 3 September 2009. Balbale visited with elders, local mullahs, and political leaders from the area. He spent 

the month of Ramadan conducting religious engagements and leading prayers across Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
298

one of just a few units in Afghanistan that made a 

concerted attempt to engage religious leaders as part 

of its campaign plan. Such a feat by the Marines 

stands as a testament to the religious and nonreligious impact of mullahs and other religious leaders 

in small, remote villages in southern Afghanistan. 

Chandrasekaran pointed out the impact of bringing one of only a few Muslim chaplains to southern 

Afghanistan: “At his [the Muslim chaplain’s] first 

session with religious leaders in Helmand, the participants initially thought the clean-shaven [chaplain] was an impostor. Then he led the group in 

noontime prayers. By the end, everyone wanted to 

take a picture with him.”15 The benefit of involving 

a Muslim chaplain in this religious leader engagement program is undeniable: it bolstered existing 

relationships, weakened barriers to communication through shared language and ritual, and fostered new and enduring relationships with religious 

leaders at every level of Afghan society. 

The U.S. contingent in Helmand was not 

the only group to consider the role of religious 

leader engagements, however. The United Kingdom (UK) delegation at the Helmand Provincial 

Reconstruction Team also constructed a religious 

leader engagement program in late 2009 that was 

intended to undermine Taliban propaganda by 

having religious leaders act as reliable mediators 

between ISAF and the Afghan people. As part of 

their efforts, the UK delegation invited a group 

of Afghan religious leaders to Great Britain; in 

response to their visit, one mullah said, “The Taliban tell everyone that Britain is an infidel nation 

hostile to Muslims, but the mullahs were able to 

see for themselves that in fact Britain is a tolerant country in which Muslims can build mosques 

and practice their religion peacefully.”16 The UK 

efforts, similar to those of the United States, aimed 

at discrediting the Taliban by addressing the dominant source of their claim to legitimacy: piety. 

By engaging religious leaders at every level, 

UK and U.S. representatives were able to disseminate the message of Afghan stability to the farthest reaches of their areas of responsibility with 

the face and voice of Afghans. For example, while 

visiting Bakwa District, Farah Province, the religious leader engagement team was approached 

by a mullah who wore the mark of the Taliban—

a crescent moon and star tattooed on the right 

hand—who was deeply moved by the presence 

of Afghans and Americans praying together: “He 

told us that he was a Taliban Mawlawi [religious 

scholar] who taught in a Madrasa . . . just outside 

Bakwa. So tremendously impressed by our message, he stated, ‘Before today I just thought that all 

Westerners were infidels and I was against you. But 

today I saw something that I’d never seen before. 

And I have changed my mind about Americans. 

I will work with you from now on.’”17 In this way, 

Afghan religious leaders acted as force multipliers, 

strategic communicators, and trusted allies in the 

fight for stability. As more Afghan religious leaders are engaged, Afghans themselves will carry the 

message of responsible development, effective governance, and sustainable security. 

Role of Chaplains 

The involvement of chaplains was central to the 

success of the religious leader engagement program 

in southern Afghanistan, but the historic and doctrinal role of chaplains presents certain challenges 

for how these types of programs can be expanded. 

Chaplains have traditionally been charged with providing for the morale and spiritual well-being of 

their troops. As military operations have evolved 

in the twenty-first century, so have the responsibilities and expectations of chaplains; whether by 

personal abilities or requests from various partners, 

chaplains have been regularly involved in stability operations through engagement and support of 
299

local populations. Chaplains may represent an ideal 

nexus for religious leader engagement programs 

because of their intimate knowledge of religious 

matters: “In the general conduct of counterinsurgency operations the religious aspect is often either 

overlooked or is simply thought of as something to 

shy away from because many people feel unqualified to discuss religion. We chaplains, however, 

are never ashamed to talk about religion. And 

our experience in this operation proved that the 

direct approach with the Afghan religious leaders 

was the right one.”18 

Chaplains’ commitment to religious ideals is 

an invaluable asset for developing relationships 

with local religious leaders, but that religious basis 

is a means by which to develop relationships that 

channel legitimate Afghan concerns from the 

lowest to the highest levels of Afghan society.19

The designation of chaplains as noncombatants 

is another consideration for how they can participate in stability operations: “A potential controversy exists when a chaplain is asked for specific 

information from commanders or intelligence officers related to his interaction with local mullahs. 

Chaplains, as doctrinal noncombatants, could be 

placed in the awkward position of providing targeting information to commanders, a combatant 

task.”20 The designation of noncombatant has its 

limitations, but it is also a contributing factor to 

presumptions of good-faith interactions that allow 

chaplains to develop relationships that can ensure 

the faithful transmission of the true objectives of 

ISAF and GIRoA in the face of anti-Afghanistan 

rhetoric.21

Military doctrine is continually adapting to 

more effectively describe and empower chaplains 

at every level. Army Field Manual (FM) 1–05, 

Religious Support, appendix A, “Religious Support in Civil Military Operations,” for example, 

describes specifically how U.S. Army chaplains 

ought to support civil-military operations. While 

reaffirming that the primary duty of chaplains 

is to support the religious needs of soldiers, the 

appendix goes on to encourage chaplains to advise 

commanders on the religious dynamics of the 

local population and reinforces that chaplains 

ought not to be the sole participants in negotiations with host nationals or in human intelligence 

collection.22 In this way, chaplains are seen, primarily, as part of a larger engagement team; where 

chaplains are restricted in their behavior, other 

members can take the lead. 

Photo courtesy of LCpl Travis A. D’Ambrogii 

Navy Lt Dru A. Nelson, a chaplain with the 3d Battalion, 4th 

Marines, Regimental Combat Team 8, speaks with Marines 

at Combat Operating Post Ouellette in Helmand Province, 

Afghanistan, on 16 July 2011. Nelson briefed the Marines 

on the traditions of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
300

FM 1–05 represents the growing awareness 

that chaplains can play a leading role in engaging local religious leaders of host nations, but 

there still remain certain limitations to how chaplains can be involved in stability operations. For 

example, Chaplain William Sean Lee proposed 

that military doctrine be changed to include the 

title “religious liaison” for chaplains. In that role, 

chaplains would be formally tasked with engaging “indigenous religious groups and leaders” to 

support stability operations; were such a change 

to be implemented, chaplains could be identified 

as the primary partner for religious leaders, with 

those relationships occurring in concert with security, governance, and development objectives.23

Thus, while chaplains are uniquely prepared to 

engage Afghan religious leaders because of their 

sensitivity to religious issues, there are certain factors that should be borne in mind to maximize 

their effect. While chaplains are a vital tool in the 

fight against a jihadi narrative, they are not the 

sine qua non of religious leader engagements. As 

seen with 2d MEB, chaplains can help open dialogue, lay a foundation of trust, and demonstrate 

ISAF commitment to the Afghan people, but the 

sustained work of religious leader engagement 

Photo courtesy of LCpl Richard Sanglapherami 

Afghan National Army mullah, Capt Mawlanoor (right) from the Garrison Support Unit, 1st Brigade, 215th Corps, welcomes attendees from different districts in Helmand Province attending the Voices of Religious Tolerance (VORT) conference at Camp Garmsir, Afghanistan, on 17 April 2011.
301

comes through continued involvement with religious leaders within the communities where they 

enjoy positions of authority. 

Religious leaders and religious institutions play 

an undeniably important role in Afghan society, and it is in the best interest of the U.S. military to design, implement, and effectively sustain 

engagements with those leaders. Religious leader 

engagement programs in southern Afghanistan 

demonstrate that well-thought-out plans of action 

can have tremendous impact on GIRoA’s intent to 

counter anti-Afghanistan propaganda and address 

the legitimate needs of the Afghan people. In 

short, ISAF is a short-term solution to a long-term 

set of complex issues that can only be addressed 

by Afghans and the individuals they identify as 

legitimate powerbrokers. Ultimately, no amount 

of foreign savvy can account for the credibility 

and sustainability of driving the religious leader 

engagement process through legitimate GIRoAaffiliated individuals and institutions. 

To ensure the continued integration of religious 

leaders at every level of Afghan society, religious 

leader engagement programs should be routed 

through official GIRoA channels to ensure that 

the process can be sustained once GIRoA takes 

full control of its affairs. In Helmand, for example, 

the director of Hajj and Religious Affairs, Sayed 

“Mullah” Mukhtar Ahmad Haqqani, was a key 

partner in the fight to discredit Taliban ideology 

because “he was a dynamic and engaging man who 

immediately grasped our plan and intentions and 

took [Salam and Pelikan] ‘under his wing’ as we 

circulated throughout the province together.”24As 

Afghans determine how, when, and which religious leaders are actively involved in the process 

of their own stabilization, ISAF and the U.S. government will accomplish their goals.

From the perspective of ISAF and the U.S. government, it should be kept in mind that religious 

leader engagement is a distinct type of engagement 

that has benefits and limitations that differ from 

other types. Engagement with religious leaders 

should rest on a long-term, sustainable plan that 

specifically considers the role that religious leaders 

play in village-level to national-level operations. 

U.S. military chaplains are key to the creation and 

sustainment of religious leader engagements, but 

their role does not need to be constant and should 

respect their status as noncombatants. There is 

reason to believe that the doctrinal elements of 

chaplain responsibilities ought to be reconsidered 

and adjusted to meet the rapidly changing needs 

of military operations in the twenty-first century. 

One of the most beneficial aspects of religious 

leader engagement in southern Afghanistan was 

the involvement of a Muslim chaplain; his presence broke down barriers between local religious 

leaders and allowed for more honest discussions 

about stability operations. 

One of the difficulties associated with the religious leader engagement programs was the availability of U.S. military Muslim chaplains. The 

U.S. military may wish to consider reaching out 

to nonmilitary chaplains (at hospitals, universities, 

and prisons, for example) who would be willing 

to support religious leader engagements around 

the world. A robust chaplaincy that can minister 

to U.S. troops as well as host nationals will boost 

U.S. military stability operations around the world. 

In fact, sustained religious leader engagement 

programs need not be confined to conflict zones; 

American foreign policy, in general, can benefit 

from recognizing the role of religion in societies 

throughout the world. 

The enemies both of GIRoA and of stability 

in Afghanistan have waged a war based primarily on violent ideology shrouded in religious language that cannot be bombed into submission. The 

most effective method of dealing with ideology 
302

is to provide viable rhetorical alternatives. Active, 

sustained, and consistent engagement with religious leaders cultivates meaningful relationships 

and empowers local leaders to articulate ISAF and 

GIRoA commitment to stability. The primary 

effect of religious leader engagement has been to 

bring greater legitimacy to GIRoA. By connecting 

local religious leaders with their district political 

and religious leaders, district officials with provincial officials, and provincial officials with national 

leaders, ISAF was able to undermine some of the 

most frequent causes of instability: political alienation, religious extremism separated from mainstream society, knowledgeable religious leaders 

operating outside legitimate institutions, and the 

allure of violent narratives.

Notes

Reprinted with permission from Joint Force Quarterly 63 (4th Quarter 2011): 95–101.

1. William Sean Lee, Christopher Burke, and Zonna

Crayne, Military Chaplains as Peace Builders: Embracing Indigenous Religions in Stability 

Operations (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 

University, 2004), 5, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin

/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

&AD=ADA425869, hereafter Lee, Burke, and 

Crayne, Military Chaplains as Peace Builders. 

2. “The enemy has succeeded in establishing jihad as 

their pervasive, overarching narrative. Consistently 

over time and space, all of their remarkably sophisticated information operations uniformly hammer 

home this religious message of jihad. Virtually all 

Taliban leaders, from senior military and political 

leaders down to sub-commanders at the district 

level, are mullahs. The implications of this have 

not yet sunk in. We are fighting a counterinsurgency; the enemy is fighting a jihad. But the intersection of how insurgencies end and how jihads 

end is historically nil.” Thomas H. Johnson and M. 

Chris Mason, “Refighting the Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template,” Military Review 

(November–December 2009), 2–14, http://usacac

.army.mil/ cac2/militaryreview/archives/english

/militaryreview_20091231_art004.pdf, hereafter 

Johnson and Mason. 

3. Jeffrey Cozzens, “The Culture of Global Jihad: 

Character, Future Challenges and Recommendations,” The Future Actions Series, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation 

and Political Violence, October 2008, www.scribd

.com/doc/16073473/The-Culture-of-Global-Jihad

-by-Jeffrey-B-Cozzens.

4. Johnson and Mason, 2–14. 

5. Patrick Carroll and Patricio Asfura-Heim, “Victory in Afghanistan Part 2: Countering the Taliban Narrative Through Credible Religious Voices,” 

Marine Corps Association, www.mca-marines

.org/gazette/article/victory-afghanistan, hereafter 

Carroll and Asfura-Heim, “Victory in Afghanistan Part 2.” 

6. Ibid. 

7. Author intvw with Patrick Carroll, 7 February 2011. 

8. Carroll and Asfura-Heim, “Victory in Afghanistan 

Part 2”; Carroll commented on the importance of 

bringing this Navy chaplain to the religious leader 

engagement program: “Our efforts received an additional boost in early 2010 when the G–3 Fires and 

Effects Coordination Cell/Information Operations 

and the MEB chaplain’s office arranged for a U.S. 

Navy Muslim imam to come out to the AO [area 

of operations].” 

9. Author intvw with Chaplain Philip Pelikan, 10 

January 2011, hereafter author intvw with Pelikan. 

10. Philip Pelikan, “Mullah Engagement Program: Helmand and Farah Provinces, Afghanistan 15 February–15 March 2010,” Small Wars Journal (28 

December 2010): 1–10, http://smallwarsjournal

.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/631-pelikan1.pdf, 
303

hereafter Pelikan, “Mullah Engagement Program.” 

11. “An example of a senior Army chaplain who properly balanced his roles as a religious leader and a staff 

chaplain was CH (LTC) Larry Adams-Thompson, 

the CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force] 76 Chaplain 

in Afghanistan from March 2004 through March 

2005. Continuing the work of his predecessor CH 

(LTC) Ken Sampson, CH Adams-Thompson organized monthly meetings with local mullahs. The 

intent of these meetings was to discuss religious 

issues, moral concerns, and to build clergy-to-clergy 

relationships.” Kenneth Lawson, “Doctrinal Tension: The Chaplain and Information Operations,” 

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 35, no. 2 

(April–June 2009): 24–31, www.fas.org/irp/agency

/army/mipb/2009_02.pdf. 

12.Author intvw with Pelikan. 

13.Author intvw with Patricio Asfura-Heim, 14 February 2011. 

14. Pelikan, “Mullah Engagement Program.” 

15. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “At Afghan Outpost: 

Marines Gone Rogue or Leading the Fight Against 

Counterinsurgency?” The Washington Post, 14 

March 2010, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn

/content/article/2010/03/13/AR2010031302464

.html. 

16.Ministry of Defence, “Former Afghan Refugee 

Returns to Helmand with UK’s Stabilisation Unit,” 

stroicar.com/eng/news_ detail.php?id=2634. These 

engagements were headed by Pamir Patang, who fled 

Afghanistan for Britain in 2000. See also Stabilisation Unit, “Salaam Aleikum—SU’s Pamir reflects 

on his Afghan experience,” www.stabilisationunit

.gov.uk/ index.php/our-people/stories-from-the

-field/429-salaam-aleikum-sus-pamir-reflects-on

-his-afghan-experience. 

17. Pelikan, “Mullah Engagement Program.” 

18.Ibid. 

19. Ibid. 

20.Lawson, “Doctrinal Tension.”; Department of the 

Navy SECNAV Instruction 1730.7b, 12 October 

2000, prohibits chaplains from being assigned compromising collateral duties or (in section 6g) being 

forced to reveal sensitive information. 

21. See, for example, SECNAV Instruction 1730.7b, 

section 5e (4). 

22.See also FM 1–05, section 5–40, G–13, and G–18. 

23.Lee, Burke, and Crayne, Military Chaplains as 

Peace Builders. 

24.Author intvw with Pelikan.
Marine Capt Alison M. Anderson, future operations officer 

for G-3 communications, Marine Expeditionary BrigadeAfghanistan, shakes the hand of a local Afghan woman as 

they say goodbye after a chai break. The female engagement 

team meets with local women to find out what their wants, 

needs, and desires are, a task that male Marines or military 

officials could not easily accomplish. 

Photo courtesy of Sgt Jennifer Calaway
Female Engagement 

Teams: The Case 

for More Female 

Civil Affairs Marines

by Master Sergeant Julia L. Watson

Marine Corps Gazette, July 2011

There is a direct relationship between the security of women and the security of states. Levels of 

democracy, economic development, and identity show that the physical security of women is a 

better predictor of state security and peace.1

 For 

this very reason, the Marine Corps needs to take 

a progressive role in the training and employment 

of increasing female engagement efforts in Afghanistan before harm comes of our actions. There is 

doctrine, MOSs [military occupational specialties], and vast research from those who have been 

engaging women for decades in Afghanistan that 

has yet to be fully utilized to support engagement 

efforts. There is also a century’s worth of science 

available from anthropology and ethnography to 

draw from before we make decisions regarding 

what some believe is a new concept. Not doing 

so could keep us fighting Taliban in Afghanistan 

for decades.

The engagement concept isn’t new in counterinsurgency (COIN), as the success of the combined 

action platoon program2

 in Vietnam and the many 

examples found in the 1940 Small Wars Manual

305
306

show us. Using female service members wasn’t necessary until the last decade where the culture prohibited servicemen from interacting with half of 

the population in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although we had observed lessons in Iraq on 

the enabling effects of using female service members to access, engage, and search Iraqi women, we 

didn’t bring a trained capability with us going into 

Afghanistan, resulting in the Afghanistan female 

engagement teams (FETs) being built in reaction to 

a security incident in July 2009.3 This effort combined the concepts of two earlier Marine Corps 

programs that were initiated in Iraq—the Lioness 

Program and the Iraqi Women’s Engagement Program (IWE). Lioness was mainly a search effort at 

entry control points and was used for some “knock 

and greets,”4

 but had little to no follow through 

after initial contact with women. IWE was aimed at 

identifying sources of instability from the women, 

connecting the women together, and then coordinating with local government, civil affairs personnel, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 

provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to facilitate the reduction of those instabilities.

Under 2d MEB–Afghanistan [2d MEB–A], 

teams were ad hoc and on call. During this time, 

they gained anecdotal cultural and atmospheric 

information, and many local Afghans accepted 

FET presence, but at the time there was limited 

ability to assess their effectiveness according to 

the MEB–A’s logical lines of operations (LOOs). 

Ad hoc anecdotes led I MEF (Forward [Fwd]) to 

bring an all-female detachment to serve as fulltime teams that would eventually be replaced by 

II MEF (Fwd) FETs. The anecdotes also supported a recommendation5 to the commander of 

International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) to 

replicate the Marine Corps model of FET, which 

promptly led to a directive for ISAF units to standardize engagements.6

Based on a few successful vignettes, ISAF units 

looked to the Marines in Helmand [Province] for 

lessons on training and employment, making FET 

a “buzzword”7 that has continued to generate a 

lot of confusion and disputes as to best training, 

employment, and effects. It has also sparked the 

U.S. Army to rush to adopt the Marine Corps’ 

FET program,8 resulting in degraded learning 

due to assumptions from the absence of method, 

purpose, and end state of female engagement.9 

Although FETs have received high visibility in 

the media due to their access to half of the population and their roles as women in combat and 

COIN, the effort needs evaluation to ensure that 

its ever-changing mission supports long- or shortterm essential stability tasks.10

In support of the local battlespace owner’s 

intent, the FET mission statement has gone 

through many changes but has always retained 

the notions of direct engagement with the 

local population, disseminating commanders’ 

messages, information collecting (passive and 

active),11 deescalating/softening the public’s perception of offensive operations, and influencing 

and understanding the needs of the population.

Marine leaders have leveraged the availability of these [female] Marines to mitigate these 

challenges when it comes to the female population in their area of operations. But the culture 

is so diverse and ancient that there are few who 

are able to become experts on true engagement. 

I propose that true female engagement should be 

a part of meaningful dialogue and not just “girl 

talk” or information collection. These face-to-face 

engagements require appropriate follow through 

and resources that will give the commander the 

ability to understand and influence the population to support operations.

As the employment and engagement mission 

of the FET has morphed over time, so too has 
307

its predeployment training. The current concept 

of employment is for a single team to be used as 

a “female in a box” for multiple efforts, such as 

searching, information operations, military information support to operations, civil-military operations (CMO), and garnering information that has 

infringed at times into intelligence collection.12 

Being marginally trained in a variety of skills 

and then thrust into on-the-job training once intheater will not yield full capacity and may be dangerous. This “jack-of-all-trades, master of none” 

approach leads to an unbalanced engagement, confuses the local population, overlooks opportunities for nonkinetic targeting, reduces the ability 

to build relations, and inhibits follow through in 

an effective and sustainable manner, especially 

when female service members are often viewed 

as a benevolent presence.

Because Pashtun gender prohibitions are de -

signed to protect Pashtun women not Western 

women, female service members are perceived as a 

“third gender”13 and as being “there to help versus 

there to fight.”14 This perception allows us access 

to the entire population, which is crucial in population-centric operations. Our military’s need for 

information is inexhaustible, and we are anxious 

to collect it, but we’ve allowed advertisement of 

the FET to be viewed as “collecting intelligence 

from the Afghan women.”15, 16 Garnering information should not come at the expense of the population, for it’s the people we should be protecting 

as we aim to separate them from the insurgents. 

There is a belief that because we are females, we 

have an edge since insurgents and malign actors do 

not appear to know or account for the capability 

of female Marines.17 From my limited experience 

and what Afghan men and women have told me, 

I argue this concept and believe that the Afghan 

people are acutely aware of our intentions and capabilities as FETs. The truth is, once we leave their 

compounds, there is nothing we can do to protect 

the women we engage. Afghan women have been 

beaten and intimidated for far less than engaging 

with a Western female,18 and our engagements 

must be thoughtful and well planned so as to not 

place Afghan women in jeopardy.

It should be required for female engagers to be 

fused into a gender-mixed team19 rather than constructed into all-female teams if we want to fully 

expand the ability to understand the operational 

environment. But in training and employing allfemale teams (believed to have a distinct identity 

and an autonomous mission), by default we have 

created “METs” (male engagement teams). Not 

only does this put a wedge in our unity of effort 

toward the population, it may, to our detriment, 

affect the perception and our influence on the 

local population.

FETs, like their male counterparts, are and 

should engage with local men. It’s important to 

recognize that it may be more critical for female 

enablers to engage with local men than solely 

with local women. Not only do the vast majority of female engagements only occur and are 

allowed through the men of the community,20 

but neither can we bring jobs, education, or longterm solutions to the plight of the Afghan women 

unless the Afghan men facilitate them. Possibly 

the most valuable part of a female engaging is not 

that they are talking to Afghan women, but that 

the Afghan men are interacting differently with 

and often providing more and differing information to female servicemembers.21 It makes sense 

that if the military’s desire was really to help these 

women, then we’d have the influence and authority to do so, beyond simple interaction, in the eyes 

of the Afghan men.

What does a young,22 all-female team bring 

to the table in order to get buy-in for sustainable effects along the LOOs when working with 
308

decision-making Afghans? Without the money, 

rank, influence, or power that our male Marine 

tribal elders (our inferred social structure)23 carry, 

the FETs may have severe limitations.

Since we have the perception that we are women 

“there to help,” it needs to be noted that engagement creates expectations. FETs are meeting with 

local women and discussing their problems. These 

problems are largely related to livelihood, insecurity, health care, education, employment, and 

other socioeconomic needs. Discussing needs raises 

expectations that the FETs will provide this socioeconomic assistance. But, FETs lose out on fully 

influencing the local people if they pass off what 

they should and could follow through on to other 

enablers, essentially saying, women really can’t take 

care of the problem, and they are just here to talk 

(collect intelligence), hand out soap and aspirin, 

and nothing more.

While it is critical to have all-female personnel 

for the majority of engagements with conservative 

Afghan women, FETs as they are constructed and 

trained are not linked to other similar enablers and 

lack transitional efficacy in their work. There are 

multiple, short-term initiatives that are providing 

a temporary means to win hearts and minds, such 

as medical outreach, humanitarian assistance, providing school supplies, and small businesses for 

women, but until recently they lacked the coordination with the district stabilization team, PRT, 

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), or NGOs that bring the capacity 

for long-term sustainability. There is a time and 

place for these efforts, but without key leaders in 

the community, and a unity of effort, these efforts 

have a short shelf life, create a society of dependency, and often fail once units leave the area.

Until recently FETs also lacked a systematic 

approach to consulting women, as our approach 

should be less dichotomous and focus on “them 

and them” versus “us and them.” We should be 

facilitating local women engaging each other in 

order to connect the women to GIRoA at the district level; Helmand Women’s Department; preexisting networks, such as midwives; and the over 

23 women’s associations in Helmand.24

Thanks to guidance from the CMO/G-9 

[civil-military operations], concept of operations 

and utilization, the ingenuity of FET personnel 

and exceptional leadership within their ranks, the 

FETs are now beginning to address the expectations they create. Although FETs are beginning 

to increase their effectiveness, their construct is a 

redundant capability and a nonintegrated enabler 

because they are in fact conducting CMO and the 

core tasks of civil affairs. As the Commandant’s 

Planning Guidance25 and Marine Corps Operating 

Concepts26 suggest, the Marine Corps is not only 

short civil affairs personnel,27 but also is looking to 

reduce the redundant efforts in order to be more 

effective. Civil affairs Marines focus on the population; the Afghan women are simply the female 

demographic of the population, so an increase in 

the force structure of overall billets in the civil 

affairs community (Active and Reserve components) makes sense instead of building an autonomous enabling unit that is likely not an enduring 

requirement post-Afghanistan. While quantity is 

not quality, the quantity of FET personnel currently being employed could easily augment the 

female Marines in the Reserve and Active component civil affairs detachments.

During predeployment, FETs have received, 

on average, a three-day training session on CMO. 

Female Marines slated to engage should attend 

the civil affairs MOS school in addition to their 

unit’s predeployment training. Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) has had 

a similar capability, called cultural support teams, 

since November 2009.28 MARSOC sees the value 
309

of gender in the conduct of CMO and has begun 

to send its female Marines to the Civil Affairs 

School in Quantico [Virginia].

While some support the concept of disbanding FETs and increasing females in civil affairs, 

those who oppose focusing FETs as civil affairs 

augments argue that by doing so other capabilities, such as collection, influence, and searching, 

will be lost. The seeming losses of these tactical 

capabilities are in reality a part of the civil affairs 

milieu. CMO is by definition operational in 

nature and the responsibility of the commander. 

All Marines conduct CMO, not just those who 

are civil affairs Marines. CMO crosses all LOOs 

during all phases of operations, enhances a commander’s ability to influence and have access to 

people, and is not limited to development.29 Therefore, if a female civil affairs Marine is needed for 

occasional searches, then so be it. A trained civil 

affairs Marine will turn the search into an engagement opportunity.

Civil affairs teams specialize in assessing and 

working with the civil dimension. It is significant to relate the August 2006 female engagement efforts led by a female civil affairs Marine 

in al-Qaim, Iraq. Al-Qaim had been under insurgent control until 2006. This started to change 

in late 2006, as it became the first part of Anbar 

Province to effectively throw out and fight insurgents (also known as the al-Anbar Awakening). 

In 2008, al-Qaim had become the most economically and politically advanced city in Anbar. As 

there is not a single effort that could cause the 

local people to shift their support away from 

the insurgency, the role that local women played 

behind the scenes when they decided to organize, 

meet often, and bring problems they couldn’t fix 

on their own to their city-level government (due 

to CMO efforts toward the female demographic) 

may not be accounted into why al-Qaim had the 

COIN success it did so quickly after the local 

women became more involved.

Cultural intelligence analyst Larissa Mihalisko also related what a civil affairs team (including a female civil affairs Marine) did in Now Zad 

[Helmand Province] during and after [Operation] Cobra’s Anger (conducted during December 2009):

They humanized the “Taliban,” in that 

[the civil affairs team] broke down that 

label to identify the real reasons why people were fighting. Always unsatisfied with 

the cheap, lazy label of “Taliban” that did 

nothing to help Marines figure out how 

they could best counter to the insurgency, 

I think their proximity to the Afghans and 

incredibly robust engagement efforts made 

them actually empathize with locals. When 

I talk about proximity and engagement, I 

don’t mean that they just lived next to the 

district center and held shuras. They visited people’s homes, opened schools, jumpstarted major de-mining operations, knew 

the names and backgrounds of every local, 

engaged their communities at home to get 

involved, danced at weddings, buried the 

dead at funerals, and much, much more. 

. . . They kindly allowed the civilian to help 

dissect Now Zad with them, and although I 

was always warmly welcomed there is nothing like living with these people [as the civil 

affairs team did].30

The Afghan’s ability to perceive honesty, sincerity, empathy, and even alternate motives is astounding, as this ability is what they have had to rely 

on just to survive decades of war. They can recall 

vivid images of past decades like it happened yesterday, and what our FETs are doing today will 
310

be vivid in the minds of the youth for decades 

to come. Essentially FETs are planting “seeds of 

hope” among the women. If the seeds don’t grow, 

if they are injured, or if their environment doesn’t 

change, then after a time we may lose the support 

of not only the Afghan women (which was beginning to occur during my deployment in 2010), 

we may also lose the support of generations to 

come as stories are passed for generations about 

our failed attempts to help them after we drink 

their tea and they risk their lives to give us information. Hence, we are possibly creating a new 

generation of Taliban that is fueled from Afghan 

mothers to their sons.

If Afghanistan’s stability depends on the Afghan 

women’s involvement in democracy and economics, then our female engagement effort needs an 

overhaul before we continue to unnecessarily put 

Marines and Afghan lives at risk. Therefore, the 

Marine Corps needs to look to our history and 

use existing doctrine and research available when 

determining the way forward with the employment of FETs.

Notes 

Marine Corps Gazette 95, no. 7 (July 2011): 20–

24. Reprinted with permission. Copyright Marine Corps Gazette.

1. Valerie M. Hudson, Mary Caprioli, Bonnie BallifSpanvill, Rose McDermott, and Chad F. Emmett, 

“The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women 

and the Security of States,” International Security, Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Winter 

2008/09, 7–45.

2. Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View 

of the Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval 

Institute Press, chapter 12, 1999).

3. Matt Pottinger and Hali Jilani, “2d MEB–A Female 

Engagement Team: Findings and Recommendations,” Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 

paragraph 2, September 2009.

4. Jennifer Farina, “Neither Joan of Arc nor Tank Girl: 

The Struggle To Be Sensible in Preparing Female 

Marines for the Twenty-First Century Operating 

Environment,” Marine Corps Center for Lessons 

Learned, 4 May 2009.

5. Maria Vedder, “Recommended ISAF Guidance 

for Female Engagement Teams,” Combined Intelligence Operations Center Afghanistan, 23 February 2010.

6. Commander, ISAF, U.S. Forces-A Directive, “Engagement With Afghan Females,” Headquarters, ISAF, 

Afghanistan, 31 May 2010.

7. William Owen, “The War of New Words: Why 

Military History Trumps Buzzwords,” Armed 

Forces Journal, Springfield, VA, November 2009.

8. Paula Broadwell, “CST: Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, Washington, DC, 8 February 2011.

9. Memorandum for G-3 (Operations), U.S. Army 

John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 

School, “Review of Cultural Support Team Course 

(CSTC) Pilot,” Fort Bragg, NC, 13 December 2010.

10. Field Manual 3-07 (FM 3-07), Stability Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 

October 2008.

11. Emily Naslund, “I MEF (FWD) Female Engagement Team Deployment After Action Report,” 

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 10 

October 2010.

12.FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 

September 2006. This section delineates responsibilities between tactical questioners and counterintelligence/human intelligence personnel.

13.Larissa Mihalisko, “Female Engagement in the 

MEB-A Area of Operations,” 2d MEB–A, Marine 

Corps Intelligence Activity, Cultural Intelligence Team, Quantico, VA, April 2010, hereafter 
311

Mihalisko, “Female Engagement in the MEB–A 

Area of Operations.”

14. Matt Pottinger, Hali Jilani, and Claire Russo, 

“Half-Hearted: Trying To Win Afghanistan Without Afghan Women,” Small Wars Journal, Quantico, VA, 2010.

15. Elizabeth Bumiller, “For Female Marines Tea Comes 

With Bullets,” The New York Times, 2 October 2010.

16.Associated Press, “Female Marines Wear Headscarves Over Body Armor in Afghanistan,” FoxNews

.com, 14 August 2009.

17. Naslund, “I MEF (FWD) Female Engagement 

Team Deployment After Action Report.”

18.Amnesty International, “Women in Afghanistan: 

A human rights catastrophe,” 3 November 1995, 

http://www.rawa.org.

19. James Beebe, Rapid Assessment Process: An Introduction, Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2001.

20.Mihalisko, “Female Engagement in the MEB–A 

Area of Operations.”

21. Ibid.

22.Barak Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and 

Applications (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, chapter 5, 2008).

23.Ibid.

24.Alternate Strategies Institute, IO [Information 

Operations] Capstone Task Order Product, “Prospect for Engaging Women in Helmand and Southern Afghanistan,” Germantown, MD, 30 March 

2010.

25.The 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, Washington, DC, November 2010.

26.Marine Corps Operating Concepts, Headquarters 

Marine Corps, Washington, DC, June 2010.

27. Gina Cavallaro, “Amos’ Vision,” Marine Corps 

Times, Springfield, VA, 8 November 2010.

28.Trisha Talton, “MARSOC Looks to Women for 

New Mission,” Marine Corps Times, Springfield, 

VA, 14 November 2009.

29.Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 

Joint Staff, Washington, DC, July 2008.

30.Mihalisko, “Female Engagement in the MEB–A 

Area of Operations.”

About the Author

Master Sergeant Julia L. Watson is a heavy equipment maintenance chief and a marksmanship instructor/competitor with the USMCR Shooting 

Teams. She is currently assigned to Security Cooperation Education and Training Center, Quantico, Virginia.
312

The Police Mentoring Team walks the streets of the Now Zad 

bazaar in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, during a routine 

patrol on 10 April 2010. The increased presence alongside 

newly graduated Afghan policemen created a safer environment in the bazaar, and previous residents of the area are 

moving back into their homes. 

Photo courtesy of Cpl Paul J. Basciano
Acknowledging Limits: 

Police Advisors and 

Counterinsurgency 

in Afghanistan 

U.S. Marine Corps 

Police Mentor, 

Now Zad District, 2009

by William Rosenau, PhD

A gunnery sergeant serving with a military police (MP) company, 2d Marine Division, arrived 

in Now Zad District, Helmand Province, in August 2009.*

 As a member of a PMT [Police Mentoring Team], he trained members of the district’s 

Afghan National Police (ANP).

“Welfare Cases”

Some of the Afghan police had been trained by 

British mentors. They had uniforms, and 10 of 

them had been through the Focused District Development, which vetted, retrained, reequipped, 

and mentored district police forces. But the 36 men 

that the sergeant was to mentor required substantial additional training.

“We had only a handful of guys who wanted to 

be legitimate police,” he recalled. Conditions for 

*Quotations used in this vignette are drawn from the author’s interviews, 

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 17 February 2010, and subsequent email 

communications.

313
314

ANP officers were poor. There were a lot of “welfare cases,” he said. “They weren’t getting their 

basic needs met—food, warm clothing, vehicles.” 

The district chief of police did nothing to try to 

meet these shortfalls. Driven out by the Taliban 

in 2007, the chief was “more concerned about his 

Land Rovers and getting a gift” now that he was 

back, the Marine recalled.

Things Start to Get Hot

The team set up a training schedule for the ANP. 

For two weeks, the focus was on developing law 

enforcement skills, including checkpoint operations and vehicle and personnel searches. But 

then “things started to get hot again” when Taliban snipers began operating in Now Zad, remembered the Marine advisor.

In addition to mentoring, the PMT had to 

serve as a quick reaction force (QRF). “We were 

called into action to assist the infantry who were 

pinned down by the enemy sniper teams,” he 

explained. “I had military working dogs that I 

used to track the enemy snipers to their positions and take them out.” The team also provided 

security during the evacuation of civilian casualties and during joint Afghan National Army–

Marine patrols. Continuing threats posed by 

the Taliban illustrated for the police mentor the 

importance of previous combat experience. “You 

needed to go to survival mode quickly,” he said.

Police-Oriented Training

During the fall, security had improved to the 

point where the team could devote more attention to police-oriented training. “We tried to 

go beyond just having them go out and arrest 

people,” the Marine advisor said. “The focus 

went from being aggressive to starting to collect names and intelligence on local bad guys.” 

The PMT also attempted to foster relationships 

between the district police and village elders—a 

version of Western-style community policing in 

which law enforcement personnel worked with 

local residents to solve problems. “We had the 

ANP attend shuras and play mediator in things 

like land disputes,” the Marine mentor recalled.

But overall, progress was slow. As in many 

other districts across Afghanistan, most of the 

ANP in Now Zad were illiterate, and a number 

of policemen were as young as 14 years old. A lack 

of formal education meant that Now Zad policemen generally lacked the discipline and persistence to absorb the PMT’s mentoring. “They had 

a 10- to 15-minute attention span,” the sergeant 

said. “We had to keep things very visual and do a 

lot of hands-on training.”

The ANP’s personnel system presented the 

mentors with other difficulties. Provincial police 

headquarters in Lashkar Gah [capital of Helmand Province] was supposed to generate an 

ANP roster for the district but never did. As a 

result, it was impossible for the team to determine who was officially a policeman and who 

had been vetted by the Afghan authorities. Provincial headquarters also failed to provide a 

police recruiter, but according to the sergeant, no 

recruiter was willing to venture into the district.

Motivating the Now Zad police proved to be 

a considerable challenge. “They didn’t want to 

run point on patrol,” he recollected. “We had to 

use psychology on them.” For example, the PMT 

appealed to the Afghans’ self-image as a culture 

of warriors: “I’d say to them, ‘We hear back in 

the states that you’re fierce warriors, but I’m not 

seeing it.’” The PMT pressed the police to take 

responsibility for planning and conducting their 

own operations, but with limited success. “We 

didn’t go outside the wire without the ANP,” the 

Marine said. “We pushed them to plan cordonand-knock operations and raids. We’d tell them, 
315

‘You have information, this is your country, you’re 

the police. What are you going to do about it?’”

A Question of Trust

In the sergeant’s view, two other factors limited 

the ability of the mentors to make progress with 

the ANP. The first was the inability of the Marines 

to “get past” the differences they had with the Afghans. The problem was particularly acute with respect to rampant police corruption and criminality, 

which the ANP considered a normal part of being 

a police officer. The PMT found it hard to develop a sense of respect for men who engaged in illicit behavior to the degree the Now Zad ANP did.

The second factor was a lack of trust. Team 

members often found themselves second-guessing 

the Afghans and their motivations. In the case of 

the ANP’s mediation of land disputes, for example, the police seemed to be acting in a positive 

way, but the Marine advisor often found himself wondering what the real agenda was behind 

their actions. “With the Afghans, who knows?” 

he wondered. He was also concerned about the 

ANP’s loyalty. “How much do you really want to 

train them?” he asked. “After all, they can switch 

sides and join the Taliban.”

Conclusion

The sergeant’s experience in Now Zad highlights 

some of the major challenges that police mentors 

faced in many parts of Afghanistan. The security 

situation in Now Zad required the team to function as a QRF in addition to performing their 

mentoring duties. In his view, previous combat 

experience was invaluable in a mentoring environment that could quickly “get hot.”

The police force was riddled with corruption, 

incompetence, and criminality. At the senior 

level, the district chief of police was unwilling 

or unable to improve the conditions of the men 

serving under his command. At the rank-and-file 

level, illiteracy and a lack of discipline made mentoring difficult.

Motivating the district police posed another 

serious challenge. The team prodded them to take 

responsibility for planning and conducting their 

operations and appealed to their sense of themselves as Afghan “warriors” to carry out their missions, but with limited effect.

Finally, the sergeant’s tour with the Now Zad 

PMT exemplifies the importance of trust in effective police mentoring. The mentoring team found 

it impossible to look beyond the corruption and 

criminality that plagued the force. Widespread 

illicit behavior on the part of the police led the 

Marines to call into question the motivation of the 

men they were mentoring. The team also questioned the loyalty of the Now Zad police. Under 

such circumstances, it was impossible to create 

the bonds of trust and respect necessary for effective mentoring.

Note

Reprinted with permission from “U.S. Marine 

Corps Police Mentor, Now Zad District, 2009,” in 

Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Quantico, VA: Marine 

Corps University Press, 2011), 89–94. Copyright 

© 2011 CNA, www.cna.org.

About the Author

Bill Rosenau, PhD, is a senior analyst with CNA 

Strategic Studies’ Center for Stability and Development. His current research focuses on internal 

conflict, security force assistance, and counterterrorism. Before joining CNA, he spent 10 years in 

the International Security Program at the RAND 

Corporation, where he chaired the RAND Insurgency Board.
316

A Marine infantry instructor at the Afghan National Security Force Academy at Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province, assists a recruit executing a low crawl tactical movement 

technique on 9 November 2009.

Photo courtesy of Sgt Jennifer Calaway
Victory in Afghanistan

by Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Carroll, 

USMC (Ret) and Chief Warrant Officer-5 

Terry L. Walker, USMC (Ret)

Marine Corps Gazette, June 2010

Ultimate success in counterinsurgency (COIN) 

is gained by protecting the populace, not the 

COIN force.1 It is likewise the police officer, operating in his “battlespace” or in his precinct, who 

serves as the living embodiment of long-term security in a civilized society. With that framework in mind, the most important legacy that 

the United States Marines can leave behind in 

the COIN fight in Afghanistan is credible, local Afghan police forces. Victory in Afghanistan 

will ultimately revolve around the Government 

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA)

ability to assume responsibility for security within 

its own borders, and to provide good governance 

and measurable improvements in the delivery of 

services.2 While the Marine Corps is a supporting 

actor in the quest to establish strong local governance in Afghanistan, it can—and will—take the 

lead in training and mentoring local Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). U.S. Marines only know one 

acceptable outcome: once combat is joined—victory! If the Afghan police cannot fight, though, then 

the Marines cannot win decisively in this COIN. A 

well-trained local AUP is arguably the key to fully 

establishing local governance on the provincial and 

district levels and thereby allowing for the transfer 

of lead security responsibility (TLSR) to GIRoA 

and its Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).3

317
318

When the 2d MEB arrived in southern Afghanistan in April 2009, there were less than 300 police 

officers within their Area of Operations (AO) 

Sea Dragon. Moreover, the vast majority of these 

police were untrained and largely ineffective. As 

of the first of this year, however, there are over 400 

trained AUP operating within the seven districts 

controlled by the Marines within Helmand, Nimroz, and Farah Provinces,4 and there are plans to 

train hundreds more at the Joint Security Academy Shorabak (JSAS), a Marine Corps-led academy at Camp Shorabak, the Afghan National 

Army’s (ANAs) facility adjacent to the MEBs headquarters at Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province.5 Until October 2009, the Marine Corps had 

relied on Afghan police recruits generated from 

two nationally run police academies in the capital city of Kabul and Spin Boldak in Kandahar 

Province. Nevertheless, the commanding general 

(CG), 2d MEB, Brigadier General Lawrence [D.] 

Nicholson, quickly recognized the need to accelerate this process and subsequently ordered the 

establishment of the Marine’s own police training academy. 

The result is an eight-week course at JSAS that 

is taught by eight Marine instructors, three AUP 

instructors, and five contracted civilian police trainers/advisors. Furthermore, the academy’s curriculum has been refined to reflect the challenging 

security environment facing the graduating police. 

JSAS teaches all of the required core-level skills 

prescribed by the Kabul Police Academy, but the 

Marines go the extra mile to teach “critical combat skills”—primarily shooting and combat patrolling—that will ensure victory for the Afghan police 

in southern Afghanistan. Since the police will face 

a wide array of enemy in the south, the insurgents 

must not only see the “cop on the beat,” but must 

also recognize that it is the insurgent who is clearly 

outmatched in combat skills. The first 52 recruits 

of this “new” police proudly graduated at a formal 

ceremony held on 10 December 2009 at Camp 

Leatherneck, the headquarters for the 2d MEB. As 

each new policeman accepted his graduating certificate from Governor [Mohammad Gulab] Mangal of Helmand Province and Governor [Ghulam 

Dastagir] Azad of Nimroz Province, he [the graduate] loudly declared to the assembled crowd of 

Afghan, U.S., and NATO dignitaries, “I pledge 

to work in the service of Afghanistan!”

More important than their appearance in front 

of these Afghan officials, though, the Afghan population needs to see these police out in their villages—day in and day out. Persistent presence is the 

critical watchword. If the populace cannot see the 

“cop” in the bazaars and at vehicle checkpoints, 

then security does not exist in their minds. This 

is why this first step in Marine Corps training, 

mentoring, and partnering with the local police 

forces of southern Afghanistan is so very important. With President Barack [H.] Obama’s declaration at West Point [U.S. Military Academy] on 

1 December 2009 that we will begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011,6 

the Marine Corps needs to already start thinking about how to conduct transition of lead security responsibility with GIRoA and the ANSF. So, 

what should transition of lead security responsibility look like? We should start with two basic 

assumptions.

The long-term presence of U.S. Marines in Afghanistan’s provinces and districts is not a normal state of 

affairs. This is true for not only all foreign troops 

(like our partners in AO Sea Dragon—the British, 

the Danes, the Italians, the Bahrainis, etcetera), 

but it is likewise true for the ANA. The ANA’s 

ultimate role for GIRoA is to defend the nation 

from external threats. The use of ANA—many of 

whom are either of non-Pashtun tribal ethnicity or 

Pashtuns from eastern Afghanistan—should only 
319

be a temporary stopgap, similar to the employment 

of U.S. Marines “to clear” but not necessarily “to 

hold” or “to build,” especially over the long haul.

“Normalcy” is local Afghan government officials 

providing for the basic needs of their citizens and a 

credible, experienced local AUP guaranteeing internal security and stability. Everywhere Marines have 

gone and conducted tactical conflict assessment 

planning and framework surveys, they have heard 

the same thing from the local citizens. Their primary concern in all districts is “security, security, 

security.”7 This is reminiscent of the immediate 

period in Fallujah, Iraq, following Operation alFajr in November 2004. The only security footprint 

were Marines and a largely Shi’a Public Order Brigade. Locals did not truly feel secure until a local 

(Sunni Arab) Fallujah City Police Force under 

CG Salah al-Ani was established in the summer 

of the following year.

So, how does the Marine Corps get from here 

to there? First, it is important for Marines to 

continue to do much of what they are already 

doing in southern Afghanistan. Infantry and light 

armored reconnaissance battalions are out daily 

(and nightly) conducting multiple ground security patrols. They are engaging in a positive manner with the local citizens within all of the Afghan 

districts under their watch. Attached civil affairs 

teams are out initiating reconstruction and development projects using Commanders Emergency 

Response Program funds, implementing cash for 

work projects, and working with the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID) to plan 

for even larger projects. Operating right alongside 

them are the civilian advisors who constitute the 

district stabilization teams (DSTs), coordinating 

with their military partners, engaging daily with 

Afghan district subgovernors, developing and 

partnering with local Afghan community councils, working with district ministry representatives, 

etcetera. Nevertheless, there is at present a dearth 

of Afghan civil servants—educated and experienced bureaucrats and technocrats. No matter 

how determined the United Kingdom’s District 

Stabilization Advisors, U.S. Department of State 

officials, or USAID officials on these DSTs are, 

some factors are simply beyond their control when 

it comes to attracting more qualified Afghan civilians to fill critical government jobs in the districts. 

In particular, there is a need for more qualified civil servants to fill out the tashkils8 of the 

district subgovernors or the ministry representative’s offices. Some of the reasons for this current 

state of affairs have to do with the poor state of 

education in Afghanistan. Over 75 percent of the 

Afghan population is illiterate,9 and there just are 

not enough highly educated individuals who are 

willing to work as civilian servants. Low pay, danger, or poor living conditions all lead to a negative 

situation in most cases. The provincial reconstruction teams are all striving with Regional PlatformSouth and/or with the U.S. embassy, and in turn 

with the organs of GIRoA, such as the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), 

to improve this situation. Furthermore, according to the Five-Year Strategic Workplan of the 

IDLG,10 much of the reform in Afghan civil service is years away—2011 and beyond. Here is one 

example from the work plan:

By the end of 1389 “hejira” date (20 March 

2011), the government will build institutional and administrative capabilities in 

provincial, district and, municipal administrations to manage basic service delivery 

through reforming organizations structures, 

streamlining management processes, developing essential skills and knowledge of civil 

servants and, improving; management of 

public service delivery.
320

With this in mind, the Marines need to set their 

sights at how to best support the governance effort, 

and the ideal way to do that is to expand the security zone in districts and to set the stage for transition of lead security responsibility. What Marines 

can therefore most affect is the development of 

AUP—from recruiting them (with the help of the 

DSTs and local Afghan civil, tribal, and religious 

leaders) and sending them to formal schooling at 

JSAS, to welcoming them back to their districts 

along with local Afghan officials and elders, to 

partnering with and thoroughly training them to 

become the best police in the country. 

If the Marines have learned anything from their 

experience in al-Anbar Province in Iraq, it is the 

necessity of achieving security first. One cannot 

win where the native population is intimidated, 

threatened, and abused by insurgents. Moreover, 

the Marines’ superb combat forces constitute 

the security blanket that provides the necessary 

time—even as little as one year or 18 months—

to get the police forces trained and in place. It 

might seem counterintuitive at first, but the U.S. 

Marines in Afghan need to return to their “Smedley Butler roots” and his training of the Haitian 

gendarmerie in the earlier part of the last century. 

We should realize that the training of indigenous 

police forces is part of Marine Corps history, and 

it should be done again. Indigenous police are 

indeed the cornerstone and bedrock of the rule 

of law in a society; they are the first rung on the 

national security ladder. Conversely, the Taliban 

largely offers death, destruction of schools, tyranny, ignorance, and poverty. One of the reasons 

that local Afghans have told us that they have 

sometimes sided with the Taliban “shadow governments,” however, is that in the absence of any 

GIRoA capacity, the Taliban at least represent some 

minimal form of justice, as barbarous as it may 

be. Yet even the Afghans admit that the Taliban 

largely enforce their “justice” through medieval, 

cultish fear, and Afghans—like all men—if given 

the choice of living in fear or free, will all choose 

to live in freedom.

The Marines of 2d MEB and their associated 

civilian counterparts have set the stage for success in southern Afghanistan through their valiant efforts during much of 2009. The 2010–11 

time frame, though, is the period in which they 

should continue the emphasis on JSAS and should 

focus more and more on generating quality AUP 

and partnering with them to the greatest extent 

possible. Marines will also set high standards for 

these police. No underage men are allowed,11 

there is no tolerance for illegal drugs, and all of 

the police in the Marines AO will be systematically sent for formal schooling at JSAS. They must 

also strengthen the ethics training for the Afghan 

policemen. One of the many complaints from local 

Afghans against GIRoA is the graft, greed, and 

corruption of the Afghan security forces in the 

past, particularly the police. The Marines need to 

improve how the Afghan police view themselves 

within their society and with respect to their relations with the local population they serve. Along 

these lines, the Marines must also make aggressive attempts toward improving the Afghan policemen’s general level of education, even basic civics, 

lessons on good governance, and rule of law. Nevertheless, the Marines must also be realistic and 

accept the fact that the finished product will not 

necessarily reflect a Western construct. 

The police of 2050, just like the state of GIRoA 

in 2050, will largely rely on Afghans embracing 

institutions that fit with their cultural norms. 

What we, the Marines, need to focus on is training to win . . . now! Shooting and combat patrolling skills, basic ethics education and training, 

and confidence through experience on the ground, 

partnered with the world’s finest warriors, will all 
321

pave the path to success. If the Marines put in a 

maximum effort from now through the next 18 

months, they will achieve victory, the successful transfer of responsibility to local security in 

many of the districts currently under the MEB’s 

control, a plan for future transition of lead security responsibility in the remaining districts, and 

a long-term partnership between the government 

of the United States of America and the GIRoA to 

continue to develop more and more Afghan civilian government capacity.

Notes

Marine Corps Gazette 94, no. 7 (July 2010): 22–

25. Reprinted with permission. Copyright Marine Corps Gazette.

1. Field Manual 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters 

Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 2007.

2. Afghanistan National Development Strategy: 1387-

1391 (2008–13), Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy 

Directorate, Gul Khana Palace (Sederat), Kabul, 

21 April 2008.

3. ANSF is an “umbrella” term that includes all Afghan 

Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces.

4. Golestan and Bakwa Districts (Farah Province), 

Delaram District (Nimroz Province), and Now 

Zad, Nawa, Garmsir, and Rig Districts (Helmand 

Province).

5. Camp Shorabak is also the headquarters for the 3d 

Brigade, 205th Corps, of the ANA; the ANA unit 

closely partnered with the 2d MEB.

6. President Obama’s speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, 1 December 2009.

7. After security, the basic needs of the Afghan people are typically clean water for human consumption and agricultural projects, education/schools, 

medical care, infrastructure, and a justice system.

8. An Arabic/Pashto word meaning “organization,” 

but roughly the equivalent of our Marine Corps 

term for table of organization.

9. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications

/the-world-factbook/.

10. Municipal Governance in Afghanistan: A Handbook, Volumes I and II, published by USAID and 

funded by the Afghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program-International City/County Management Association (Kabul), March 2009.

11. All Afghan police recruits must be 18 years of age 

to apply for the AUP.

About the Authors

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Carroll is an infantry 

and Middle East foreign area officer who served as 

a cultural and governance advisor, G-9 Civil Affairs 

Section, 2d MEB. He is employed by L-3 Communications Expeditionary Operations Branch. 

Chief Warrant Officer-5 Terry L. Walker is a Marine Corps gunner with more than 34 years of active duty service, with much of that time spent 

training indigenous forces. He served as the special advisor on ANSF training to the commanding general, 2d MEB. Walker is also employed 

by L-3 Communications Expeditionary Operations Branch.
322

President Barack H. Obama awards Sgt Dakota L. Meyer 

the Medal of Honor on 15 September 2011. Meyer is the first 

living Marine recipient of the Medal of Honor for actions 

in Iraq or Afghanistan. He and his family and friends gathered at the White House to commemorate his selfless service. 

Photo courtesy of LCpl Daniel A. Wetzel
Remarks by the 

President Awarding the 

Medal of Honor 

to Sergeant 

Dakota Meyer

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release 

15 September 2011 

East Room

2:50 p.m. (EST)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, everybody. Please 

be seated. Thank you, Chaplain [Margaret G.] Kibben. Good afternoon, everyone. And on behalf of 

Michelle and myself, welcome to the White House.

It’s been said that “where there is a brave man, 

in the thickest of the fight, there is the post of 

honor.” Today, we pay tribute to an American who 

placed himself in the thick of the fight—again and 

again and again. In so doing, he has earned our 

nation’s highest military decoration, the Medal of 

Honor. And we are extraordinarily proud of Sergeant Dakota Meyer. (Applause.)

Today is only the third time during the wars 

in Afghanistan and Iraq that a recipient of the 

Medal of Honor has been able to accept it in person. And we are honored to be joined by one of the 

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324

two other recipients—Sergeant First Class Leroy 

Petry, who is here.

I would point out something else—of all the 

Medal of Honor recipients in recent decades, 

Dakota is also one of the youngest. He’s 23 years 

old. And he performed the extraordinary actions 

for which he is being recognized today when he 

was just 21 years old.

Despite all this, I have to say Dakota is one of 

the most down-to-Earth guys that you will ever 

meet. In fact, when my staff first tried to arrange 

the phone call so I could tell him that I’d approved 

this medal, Dakota was at work at his new civilian 

job on a construction site. He felt he couldn’t take 

the call right then, because he said, “If I don’t work, 

I don’t get paid.” (Laughter.) So we arranged to 

make sure he got the call during his lunch break. 

(Laughter.) I told him the news, and then he went 

right back to work. (Laughter.) That’s the kind of 

guy he is. He also asked to have a beer with me, 

which we were able to execute yesterday.

Dakota is the kind of guy who gets the job 

done. And I do appreciate, Dakota, you taking 

my call. (Laughter.) The Medal of Honor reflects 

the gratitude of the entire nation. So we’re joined 

here by members of Congress, including somebody 

from your home state, the Republican leader of 

the Senate, [Addison Mitchell] “Mitch” McConnell [Jr.]. We are joined here by leaders from across 

my administration, including Secretary of Veterans Affairs [Eric Ken] “Ric” Shinseki and Navy 

Secretary [Raymond Edwin] “Ray” Mabus, and 

leaders from across our Armed Forces, including 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps General 

James [F.] Amos.

We’re honored to welcome Dakota’s father, 

Mike, who’s here; his extraordinary grandparents; and more than 120 of Dakota’s family and 

friends, many from his home state of Kentucky. 

I want to welcome Dakota’s comrades from the 

Marine Embedded Training Team 2-8, and we 

are humbled by the presence of the members of 

the Medal of Honor Society.

Dakota, I realize the past two years have not 

been easy for you, retelling the story of that day 

and standing here today. You’re a very modest 

young man. But, as you’ve said, you do it for a 

simple reason—retelling the story—because it 

helps you to honor those who didn’t come home, 

and to remind your fellow Americans that our 

men and women in uniform are over there fighting every single day.

So that’s how we’ll do this today. It’s fitting 

that we do so this week, having just marked 

the 10th anniversary of the attacks that took 

our nation to war. Because in Sergeant Dakota 

Meyer, we see the best of a generation that has 

served with distinction through a decade of war.

Let me tell the story. I want you to imagine it’s 

September 8, 2009, just before dawn. A patrol of 

Afghan forces and their American trainers is on 

foot, making their way up a narrow valley, heading into a village to meet with elders. And suddenly, all over the village, the lights go out. And 

that’s when it happens. About a mile away, Dakota, 

who was then a corporal, and Staff Sergeant Juan 

Rodriguez-Chavez, could hear the ambush over 

the radio. It was as if the whole valley was exploding. Taliban fighters were unleashing a firestorm 

from the hills, from the stone houses, even from 

the local school.

And soon, the patrol was pinned down, taking ferocious fire from three sides. Men were 

being wounded and killed, and four Americans—

Dakota’s friends—were surrounded. Four times, 

Dakota and Juan asked permission to go in; four 

times they were denied. It was, they were told, 

too dangerous. But one of the teachers in his high 

school once said, “When you tell Dakota he can’t 

do something, he’s is going to do it.” (Laughter.) 
325

And as Dakota said of his trapped teammates, 

“Those were my brothers, and I couldn’t just sit 

back and watch.”

The story of what Dakota did next will be told 

for generations. He told Juan they were going in. 

Juan jumped into a Humvee and took the wheel; 

Dakota climbed into the turret and manned the 

gun. They were defying orders, but they were 

doing what they thought was right. So they drove 

straight into a killing zone, Dakota’s upper body 

and head exposed to a blizzard of fire from AK-47s 

and machine guns, from mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.

Coming upon wounded Afghan soldiers, Dakota 

jumped out and loaded each of the wounded into 

the Humvee, each time exposing himself to all 

that enemy fire. They turned around and drove 

those wounded back to safety. Those who were 

there called it the most intense combat they’d 

ever seen. Dakota and Juan would have been forgiven for not going back in. But as Dakota says, 

you don’t leave anyone behind.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

(From left to right) HM3 James R. Layton, USN, GySgt Aaron M. Kenefick, 1stLt Michael E. Johnson, and Sgt Dakota 

Meyer with Afghan National Army members in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. 
326

For a second time, they went back—back into 

the inferno; Juan at the wheel, swerving to avoid 

the explosions all around them; Dakota up in the 

turret—when one gun jammed, grabbing another, 

going through gun after gun. Again they came 

across wounded Afghans. Again Dakota jumped 

out, loaded them up and brought them back to 

safety.

For a third time, they went back—insurgents 

running right up to the Humvee, Dakota fighting them off. Up ahead, a group of Americans, 

some wounded, were desperately trying to escape 

the bullets raining down. Juan wedged the Humvee right into the line of fire, using the vehicle as 

a shield. With Dakota on the guns, they helped 

those Americans back to safety as well.

For a fourth time, they went back. Dakota was 

now wounded in the arm. Their vehicle was riddled 

with bullets and shrapnel. Dakota later confessed, 

“I didn’t think I was going to die. I knew I was.” 

But still they pushed on, finding the wounded, 

delivering them to safety.

And then, for a fifth time, they went back—

into the fury of that village, under fire that seemed 

to come from every window, every doorway, every 

alley. And when they finally got to those trapped 

Americans, Dakota jumped out. And he ran toward 

them. Drawing all those enemy guns on himself. 

Bullets kicking up the dirt all around him. He 

kept going until he came upon those four Americans, laying where they fell, together as one team.

Dakota and the others who had joined him knelt 

down, picked up their comrades and—through all 

those bullets, all the smoke, all the chaos—carried 

them out, one by one. Because, as Dakota says, 

“That’s what you do for a brother.”

Dakota says he’ll accept this medal in their 

name. So today, we remember the husband who 

loved the outdoors—Lieutenant Michael [E.] Johnson. The husband and father they called “Gunny 

J”—Gunnery Sergeant Edwin [W.] Johnson [Jr.]. 

The determined Marine who fought to get on that 

team—Staff Sergeant Aaron [M.] Kenefick. The 

medic who gave his life tending to his teammates—

Hospitalman Third Class James [R.] Layton. And 

a soldier wounded in that battle who never recovered—Sergeant First Class Kenneth [W.] Westbrook [USA].

Dakota, I know that you’ve grappled with the 

grief of that day; that you’ve said your efforts were 

somehow a “failure” because your teammates didn’t 

come home. But as your commander-in-chief, and 

on behalf of everyone here today and all Americans, I want you to know it’s quite the opposite. 

You did your duty, above and beyond, and you 

kept the faith with the highest traditions of the 

Marine Corps that you love.

Because of your Honor, 36 men are alive today. 

Because of your Courage, four fallen American 

heroes came home, and—in the words of James 

Layton’s mom—they could lay their sons to rest 

with dignity. Because of your Commitment—in 

the thick of the fight, hour after hour—a former 

Marine who read about your story said that you 

showed how “in the most desperate, final hours 

. . . our brothers and God will not forsake us.” 

And because of your humble example, our kids—

especially back in Columbia, Kentucky, in small 

towns all across America—they’ll know that no 

matter who you are or where you come from, you 

can do great things as a citizen and as a member 

of the American family.

Therein lies the greatest lesson of that day in 

the valley, and the truth that our men and women 

in uniform live out every day. “I was part of something bigger,” Dakota has said, part of a team 

“that worked together, lifting each other up and 

working toward a common goal. Every member 

of our team was as important as the other.” So in 

keeping with Dakota’s wishes for this day, I want 
327

to conclude by asking now-Gunnery Sergeant 

Rodriguez-Chavez and all those who served with 

Dakota—the Marines, Army, Navy—to stand 

and accept thanks of a grateful nation. (Applause.)

Every member of our team is as important as the 

other. That’s a lesson that we all have to remember—

as citizens, and as a nation—as we meet the tests 

of our time, here at home and around the world.

To our Marines, to all our men and women in 

uniform, to our fellow Americans, let us always 

be faithful. And as we prepare for the reading of 

the citation, let me say, God bless you, Dakota. 

God bless our Marines and all who serve. And 

God bless the United States of America. Semper 

Fi. (Applause.)

MILITARY AIDE: The President of the United 

States, in the name of the Congress, takes pleasure 

in presenting the Medal of Honor to Corporal Dakota L. Meyer, United States Marine Corps, for 

conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk 

of his life above and beyond the call of duty, while 

Photo courtesy of Sgt James J. Shea 

Stateside on his father’s farm in Greensburg, Kentucky, Sgt Dakota Meyer shows the black wristbands he wears on each arm 

honoring the three Marines and the Navy corpsman who were killed in action in Ganjgal, Afghanistan, on 8 September 

2009. Meyer said he will wear these wristbands for the rest of his life to honor his fallen friends. Meyer received the Medal 

of Honor, the nation’s highest award for valor, from President Barack Obama in Washington, DC, on 15 September 2011, 

making him the first living Marine recipient since the Vietnam War. 
328

serving with Marine Embedded Training Team 2-8, 

Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-7, in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, on 8 September 2009.

Corporal Meyer maintained security at a patrol 

rally point, while other members of his team moved 

on foot with two platoons of Afghan National 

Army and border police into the village of Ganjgal for a pre-dawn meeting with village elders. 

Moving into the village, the patrol was ambushed 

by more than 50 enemy fighters firing rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, machine guns from four 

to five positions on the slopes above. Hearing over 

the radio that four U.S. team members were cut 

off, Corporal Meyer seized the initiative.

With a fellow Marine driving, Corporal Meyer 

took the exposed gunner’s position in a gun truck 

as they drove down the steeply terraced terrain in 

a daring attempt to disrupt the enemy attack and 

locate the trapped U.S. team. Disregarding intense 

enemy fire now concentrated on their lone vehicle, 

Corporal Meyer killed a number of enemy fighters 

with the mounted machine guns and his rifle—

some at near point-blank range—as he and his 

driver made three solo trips into the ambush area.

During the first two trips, he and his driver 

evacuated two dozen Afghan soldiers, many of 

whom were wounded. When one machine gun 

became inoperable he directed the return to the 

Photo courtesy of Cpl Ned Johnson 

Sgt Dakota Meyer fires an MK12 during a visit with comrades while Cpl Adam Martinez, 1st Recon Battalion, spots for 

him on 27 September 2011. Meyer, a trained sniper, talked to the Marines about their last deployment before joining them 

on the firing line.
329

rally point to switch to another gun truck for a 

third trip into the ambush area, where his accurate fire directly supported the remaining U.S. 

personnel and Afghan soldiers fighting their way 

out of the ambush.

Despite a shrapnel wound to his arm, Corporal Meyer made two more trips into the ambush 

area in a third gun truck, accompanied by four 

other Afghan vehicles, to recover more wounded 

Afghan soldiers and search for the missing U.S. 

team members.

Still under heavy enemy fire, he dismounted 

the vehicle on the fifth trip and moved on foot to 

locate and recover the bodies of his team members. 

Corporal Meyer’s daring initiative and bold fighting spirit throughout the six-hour battle significantly disrupted the enemy’s attack and inspired 

the members of the command force to fight on. 

His unwavering courage and steadfast devotion 

to his U.S. and Afghan comrades, in the face of 

almost certain death, reflect a great credit upon 

himself and upheld the highest traditions of the 

Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

(The medal is presented.) (Applause.)

CHAPLAIN KIBBEN: Let us close in prayer: 

God, may this ceremony serve as a reminder of 

the responsibility that comes with receiving the 

grace gift of freedom. And as we depart this hallowed hall and return to our daily lives, we pray 

that you would ennoble and enable us, that when 

called up we would recall the resolute fearlessness 

of Sergeant Dakota Meyer and all those who wear 

the stars of valor, and live up to our responsibilities to bring honor to You and to this country.

It is in your holy name we pray. Amen.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all for joining 

us here today. We are grateful for Dakota. We are 

grateful for all our men and women in uniform. 

And I hope that all of you have not only been inspired by this ceremony, but also will enjoy the 

hospitality of the White House. I hear the food is 

pretty good. (Laughter.)

Thank you very much, everybody. God bless 

you. (Applause.)

END

3:06 p.m. (EST)
SSgt Antonio P. Dominguez (left), a platoon commander 

for 2d Battalion, 3d Marine’s Echo Company, uses an interpreter to tell one of the local elders when and where people 

can pick up the food brought by Echo Company Marines 

and Afghan National Police officers on 1 September 2009 

at the bazaar in Delaram, Afghanistan. 

Photo courtesy of LCpl John P. Hitesman
At Afghan Outpost, 

Marines Gone 

Rogue or Leading 

the Fight Against 

Counterinsurgency?

by Rajiv Chandrasekaran

The Washington Post, 14 March 2010 

DELARAM, AFGHANISTAN—Home to a dozen truck stops and a few hundred family farms 

bounded by miles of foreboding desert, this hamlet in southwestern Afghanistan is far from a strategic priority for senior officers at the international 

military headquarters in Kabul. One calls Delaram, a day’s drive from the nearest city, “the end of 

the Earth.” Another deems the area “unrelated to 

our core mission” of defeating the Taliban by protecting Afghans in their cities and towns. 

U.S. Marine commanders have a different view 

of the dusty, desolate landscape that surrounds 

Delaram. They see controlling this corner of remote 

Nimruz Province as essential to promoting economic development and defending the more populated parts of southern Afghanistan. 

331
332

The Marines are constructing a vast base on 

the outskirts of town that will have two airstrips, 

an advanced combat hospital, a post office, a large 

convenience store, and rows of housing trailers 

stretching as far as the eye can see. By this summer, more than 3,000 Marines—one-tenth of the 

additional troops authorized by President [Barack 

H.] Obama in December—will be based here. 

With Obama’s July 2011 deadline to begin 

reducing U.S. forces looming over the horizon, 

the Marines have opted to wage the war in their 

own way. 

“If we’re going to succeed here, we have to experiment and take risks,” said Brigadier General Lawrence D. Nicholson, the top Marine commander 

in Afghanistan. “Just doing what everyone else is 

doing isn’t going to cut it.” 

The Marines are pushing into previously ignored 

Taliban enclaves. They have set up a first-of-itskind school to train police officers. They have 

brought in a Muslim chaplain to pray with local 

mullahs and deployed teams of female Marines to 

reach out to Afghan women. 

The Marine approach—creative, aggressive 

and, at times, unorthodox—has won many admirers within the military. The Marine emphasis on 

patrolling by foot and interacting with the population, which has helped to turn former insurgent strongholds along the Helmand River valley 

into reasonably stable communities with thriving bazaars and functioning schools, is hailed as a 

model of how U.S. forces should implement counterinsurgency strategy. 

But the Marines’ methods, and their insistence that they be given a degree of autonomy not 

afforded to U.S. Army units, also have riled many 

up the chain of command in Kabul and Washington, prompting some to refer to their area of operations in the south as “Marineistan.” They regard 

the expansion in Delaram and beyond as contrary 

to the population-centric approach embraced by 

General Stanley A. McChrystal, the U.S. and 

NATO commander in Afghanistan, and they are 

seeking to impose more control over the Marines. 

The U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Karl W. Eikenberry, recently noted that the international security force in Afghanistan feels as if it comprises 

42 nations instead of 41 because the Marines act 

so independently from other U.S. forces. 

“We have better operational coherence with virtually all of our NATO allies than we have with the 

U.S. Marine Corps,” said a senior Obama administration official involved in Afghanistan policy. 

Some senior officials at the White House, at 

the Pentagon, and in McChrystal’s headquarters 

would rather have many of the 20,000 Marines 

who will be in Afghanistan by summer deploy 

around Kandahar, the country’s second-largest 

city, to assist in a U.S. campaign to wrest the 

area from Taliban control instead of concentrating in neighboring Helmand Province and points 

west. According to an analysis conducted by the 

National Security Council, fewer than 1 percent 

of the country’s population lives in the Marine 

area of operations. 

They question whether a large operation that 

began last month to flush the Taliban out of Marjah, 

a poor farming community in central Helmand, is 

the best use of Marine resources. Although it has 

unfolded with fewer-than-expected casualties and 

helped to generate a perception of momentum in 

the U.S.-led military campaign, the mission probably will tie up two Marine battalions and hundreds of Afghan security forces until the summer. 

“What the hell are we doing?” the senior official said. “Why aren’t all 20,000 Marines in the 

population belts around Kandahar city right now? 

It’s [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar’s capital. If you 

want to stuff it to Mullah Omar, you make progress in Kandahar. If you want to communicate to 
333

the Taliban that there’s no way they’re returning, 

you show progress in Kandahar.” 

Marines Support Marines

Until earlier this month, McChrystal lacked operational control over the Marines, which would 

have allowed him to move them to other parts of 

the country. That power rested with a three-star 

Marine general at the U.S. Central Command. He 

and other senior Marine commanders insisted that 

Marines in Afghanistan have a contiguous area of 

operations—effectively precluding them from being split up and sent to Kandahar—because they 

think it is essential the Marines are supported by 

Marine helicopters and logistics units, which are 

based in Helmand, instead of relying on the Army. 

Concern about the arrangement reached the 

White House. In early March, General David H. 

Petraeus, who heads Central Command, issued 

an order giving McChrystal operational control of Marine forces in Afghanistan, according 

to senior defense officials. But the new authority vested in McChrystal—the product of extensive negotiations among military lawyers—still 

requires Central Command approval for any plan 

to disaggregate infantry units from air and logistics support, which will limit his ability to move 

them, the defense officials said. 

“At the end of the day, not a lot has changed,” 

said a Marine general, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, as did several other senior officers and officials, to address sensitive command 

issues. “There’s still a caveat that prevents us from 

being cherry-picked.” 

The Marine demand to be supported by their 

own aviators and logisticians has roots in the World 

War II battles for Guadalcanal and Tarawa. Marines 

landing on the Pacific islands did not receive the 

support they had expected from Navy ships and 

aircraft. Since then, Marine commanders have 

insisted on deploying with their own aviation and 

supply units. They did so in Vietnam and in Iraq. 

Despite the need to travel with an entourage, 

the Marines are willing to move fast. The Commandant of the [Marine] Corps, General James T. 

Conway, offered to provide one-third of the forces 

Obama authorized in December, and to get them 

there quickly. Some arrived within weeks. By contrast, many of the Army units that comprise the 

new troop surge have yet to leave the United States. 

“The Marines are a double-edged sword for 

McChrystal,” one senior defense official said. 

“He got them fast, but he only gets to use them 

in one place.” 

Marine commanders note that they did not 

choose to go to Helmand—they were asked to 

go there by McChrystal’s predecessor, General 

David D. McKiernan, because British forces in 

the area were unable to contain the intensifying 

insurgency. But once they arrived, they became 

determined to show they could rescue the place, 

in much the same way they helped to turn around 

Anbar Province in Iraq. 

They also became believers in Helmand’s strategic importance. “You cannot fix Kandahar without 

fixing Helmand,” Nicholson said. “The insurgency 

there draws support from the insurgency here.” 

“Mullahpalooza Tour”

The Marine concentration in one part of the country—as opposed to Army units, which are spread 

across Afghanistan—has yielded a pride of place. 

As it did in Anbar, the Corps is sending some of 

its most talented young officers to Helmand. 

The result has been a degree of experimentation and innovation unseen in most other parts 

of the country. Although they account for half of 

the Afghan population, women had been avoided 

by military forces, particularly in the conservative 

south, because it is regarded as taboo for women to 
334

interact with males with whom they are not related. 

In an effort to reach out to them, the Marines have 

established “female engagement teams.” 

Made up principally of female Marines who 

came to Afghanistan to work in support jobs, 

the teams accompany combat patrols and seek to 

sit down with women in villages. Working with 

female translators, team members answer questions, dispense medical assistance and identify 

reconstruction needs. 

Master Sergeant Julia L. Watson said the 

effort has had one major unexpected consequence. “Men have really opened up after they 

see us helping their wives and sisters,” she said. 

The Marines have sought to jump into another 

void by establishing their own police academy at 

Camp Leatherneck in Helmand instead of waiting for the U.S. military’s national training program to provide recruits. The Marines also are 

seeking to do something that the military has not 

been able to do on a national scale: reduce police 

corruption by accepting only recruits vouched for 

by tribal elders. 

“This is a shame culture,” said Terry [L.] Walker, 

a retired Marine drill instructor who helps run the 

academy. “If they know they are accountable to 

their elders, they will be less likely to misbehave.” 

Then there’s what Marines call the “mullahpalooza tour.” Although most U.S. military units 

have avoided direct engagement with religious 

leaders in Afghanistan, Nicholson has brought 

over Lieutenant Commander Abuhena Saifulislam, one of only two imams [Islamic leader] in 

the U.S. Navy, to spend a month meeting—and 

praying with—local mullahs, reasoning that the 

failure to interact with them made it easier for 

them to be swayed by the Taliban. 

At his first session with religious leaders in 

Helmand, the participants initially thought the 

clean-shaven Saifulislam was an impostor. Then 

he led the group in noontime prayers. By the 

end, everyone wanted to take a picture with him. 

“The mullahs of Afghanistan are the core of society,” he said. “Bypassing them is counterproductive.”

Reviving a Ghost Town

In December, columns of Marine armored vehicles punched into the city of Now Zad in northern Helmand. Once the second-largest town in the 

province, it had been almost completely emptied 

of its residents over the past four years as insurgents mined the roads and buildings with hundreds of homemade bombs. Successive units of 

British and U.S. troops had been largely confined 

to a Fort Apache-like base in the town. Every time 

they ventured out, they’d be shot at or bombed. 

To Nicholson and his commanders, reclaiming 

the town, which the Marines accomplished within 

a few weeks, has been a crucial step in demonstrating to Helmand residents that U.S. forces are 

committed to getting rid of the Taliban. To other 

military officials in Afghanistan, however, the mission seemed contrary to McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy. 

“If our focus is supposed to be protecting the 

population, why are we focusing on a ghost town?” 

said a senior officer at the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] regional headquarters 

in Kandahar. 

Nicholson notes that Helmand’s governor supported the operation, as did many local tribal leaders. Hundreds of residents have returned in recent 

weeks, and at least 65 shops have reopened, according to Marine officers stationed in Now Zad. 

“Protecting the population means allowing 

people to return to their homes,” he said. “We’ve 

taken a grim, tough place, a place where there was 

no hope, and we’ve given it a future.” 

Nicholson now wants Marine units to push 

through miles of uninhabited desert to establish 
335

control of a crossing point for insurgents, drugs, 

and weapons on the border with Pakistan. And he 

wants to use the new base in Delaram to mount 

more operations in Nimruz [Province], a part 

of far southwestern Afghanistan [east of Iran] 

deemed so unimportant that it is one of the only 

provinces where there is no U.S. or NATO reconstruction team. 

“This is a place where the enemy are moving in 

numbers,” he said, referring to increased Taliban 

activity along a newly built highway that bisects 

the province. “We need to clean it up.” 

Nicholson contends that if his forces were kept 

only in key population centers in Helmand, insurgents would come right up to the gates of towns. 

Other U.S. and NATO military officials say 

that what the Marines want to do makes sense 

only if there were not a greater demand for troops 

elsewhere. Because the Marines cannot easily be 

moved to Kandahar, U.S. and British military 

and diplomatic officials have begun discussions to 

expand the Marine footprint into more populous 

parts of Helmand with greater insurgent activity 

where British forces have been outmatched. That 

shift could occur as soon as this summer, when a 

Marine-run NATO regional headquarters is established in Helmand. 

Until then, however, Marine commanders want 

to keep moving. 

“The clock is ticking,” Nicholson told members 

of an intelligence battalion that recently arrived 

in Afghanistan. “The drawdown will begin next 

year. We still have a lot to do—and we don’t have 

a lot of time to do it.” 

Note

Reprinted with permission from The Washington 

Post, 14 March 2010.

About the Author

Rajiv Chandrasekaran is a senior correspondent 

and associate editor with The Washington Post and 

author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City (Knopf, 

2006) about the American-led Iraqi reconstruction program.
President Barack H. Obama delivers remarks to an audience of Marines and sailors during a visit to Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida. 

Photo courtesy of PO2 Kevin S. O’Brien, USN
Remarks by the 

President in an 

Address to the Nation 

on the Way Forward 

in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan

by President Barack H. Obama 

The White House 

Office of the Press Secretary 

For Immediate Release 

1 December 2009 

Eisenhower Hall Theatre, United States 

Military Academy at West Point, 

West Point, New York

8:01 p.m. (EST)

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. To the United 

States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of 

our Armed Services, and to my fellow Americans: 

I want to speak to you tonight about our effort 

in Afghanistan—the nature of our commitment 

there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy 

that my administration will pursue to bring this 

war to a successful conclusion. It’s an extraordinary honor for me to do so here at West Point—

where so many men and women have prepared to 

stand up for our security, and to represent what is 

finest about our country. 

337
338

To address these important issues, it’s important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first 

place. We did not ask for this fight. On 11 September 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and 

used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. They 

struck at our military and economic nerve centers. 

They took the lives of innocent men, women, and 

children without regard to their faith or race or 

station. Were it not for the heroic actions of passengers onboard one of those flights, they could 

have also struck at one of the great symbols of our 

democracy in Washington, and killed many more. 

As we know, these men belonged to al-Qaeda—

a group of extremists who have distorted and 

defiled Islam, one of the world’s great religions, 

to justify the slaughter of innocents. Al-Qaeda’s 

base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they 

were harbored by the Taliban—a ruthless, repressive, and radical movement that seized control of 

that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet 

occupation and civil war, and after the attention 

of America and our friends had turned elsewhere. 

Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the 

use of force against al-Qaeda and those who harbored them—an authorization that continues to 

this day. The vote in the Senate was 98 to nothing. The vote in the House was 420 to 1. For the 

first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization invoked Article 5—the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is 

an attack on all. And the United Nations Security 

Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to 

respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies, 

and the world were acting as one to destroy alQaeda’s terrorist network and to protect our common security. 

Under the banner of this domestic unity and 

international legitimacy—and only after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden—we 

sent our troops into Afghanistan. Within a matter 

of months, al-Qaeda was scattered and many of 

its operatives were killed. The Taliban was driven 

from power and pushed back on its heels. A place 

that had known decades of fear now had reason to 

hope. At a conference convened by the UN, a provisional government was established under President Hamid Karzai. And an International Security 

Assistance Force was established to help bring a 

lasting peace to a war-torn country. 

Then, in early 2003, the decision was made to 

wage a second war in Iraq. The wrenching debate 

over the Iraq War is well known and need not be 

repeated here. It’s enough to say that, for the next 

six years, the Iraq War drew the dominant share 

of our troops, our resources, our diplomacy, and 

our national attention—and that the decision to 

go into Iraq caused substantial rifts between America and much of the world. 

Today, after extraordinary costs, we are bringing the Iraq War to a responsible end. We will 

remove our combat brigades from Iraq by the end 

of next summer, and all of our troops by the end 

of 2011. That we are doing so is a testament to 

the character of the men and women in uniform. 

(Applause) Thanks to their courage, grit, and perseverance, we have given Iraqis a chance to shape 

their future, and we are successfully leaving Iraq 

to its people. 

But while we’ve achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has 

deteriorated. After escaping across the border into 

Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al-Qaeda’s leadership 

established a safe haven there. Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it’s been hampered by corruption, the drug 

trade, an underdeveloped economy, and insufficient security forces. 

Over the last several years, the Taliban has 

maintained common cause with al-Qaeda, as they 
339

both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. 

Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while 

engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating 

attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani people. 

Now, throughout this period, our troop levels 

in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they 

were in Iraq. When I took office, we had just over 

32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war. 

Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for 

support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive. And 

that’s why, shortly after taking office, I approved 

a longstanding request for more troops. After 

consultations with our allies, I then announced 

a strategy recognizing the fundamental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan and 

the extremist safe havens in Pakistan. I set a goal 

that was narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and its extremist 

allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian efforts. 

Since then, we’ve made progress on some important objectives. High-ranking al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we’ve stepped up 

the pressure on al-Qaeda worldwide. In Pakistan, 

that nation’s army has gone on its largest offensive 

in years. In Afghanistan, we and our allies prevented the Taliban from stopping a presidential 

election, and—although it was marred by fraud—

that election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan’s laws and constitution. 

Yet huge challenges remain. Afghanistan is 

not lost, but for several years it has moved backward. There’s no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has 

gained momentum. Al-Qaeda has not reemerged 

in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 

9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the 

border. And our forces lack the full support they 

need to effectively train and partner with Afghan 

security forces and better secure the population. 

Our new commander in Afghanistan—General 

[Stanley A.] McChrystal—has reported that the 

security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: the status quo is not sustainable.

As cadets, you volunteered for service during this time of danger. Some of you fought in 

Afghanistan. Some of you will deploy there. As 

your commander-in-chief, I owe you a mission 

that is clearly defined and worthy of your service. 

And that’s why, after the Afghan voting was completed, I insisted on a thorough review of our strategy. Now, let me be clear: there has never been 

an option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so there has been no delay or 

denial of resources necessary for the conduct of the 

war during this review period. Instead, the review 

has allowed me to ask the hard questions and to 

explore all the different options, along with my 

national security team, our military and civilian 

leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners. 

And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people—and our troops—no less. 

This review is now complete. And as commander-in-chief, I have determined that it is in 

our vital national interest to send an additional 

30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 

months, our troops will begin to come home. 

These are the resources that we need to seize the 

initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that 

can allow for a responsible transition of our forces 

out of Afghanistan. 

I do not make this decision lightly. I opposed 

the war in Iraq precisely because I believe that we 

must exercise restraint in the use of military force, 

and always consider the long-term consequences 

of our actions. We have been at war now for eight 

years, at enormous cost in lives and resources. 
340

Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left 

our unity on national security issues in tatters, and 

created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop 

for this effort. And having just experienced the 

worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, 

the American people are understandably focused 

on rebuilding our economy and putting people to 

work here at home. 

Most of all, I know that this decision asks even 

more of you—a military that, along with your families, has already borne the heaviest of all burdens. 

As president, I have signed a letter of condolence 

to the family of each American who gives their life 

in these wars. I have read the letters from the parents and spouses of those who deployed. I visited 

our courageous wounded warriors at Walter Reed 

[National Military Medical Center]. I’ve traveled 

to Dover [Air Force Base, Delaware] to meet the 

flag-draped caskets of 18 Americans returning 

home to their final resting place. I see firsthand 

the terrible wages of war. If I did not think that 

the security of the United States and the safety 

of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our 

troops home tomorrow.

So, no, I do not make this decision lightly. I 

make this decision because I am convinced that 

our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism 

practiced by al-Qaeda. It is from here that we 

were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that 

new attacks are being plotted as I speak. This is 

no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In the last 

few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from 

the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to 

commit new acts of terror. And this danger will 

only grow if the region slides backward, and alQaeda can operate with impunity. We must keep 

the pressure on al-Qaeda, and to do that, we must 

increase the stability and capacity of our partners 

in the region. 

Of course, this burden is not ours alone to bear. 

This is not just America’s war. Since 9/11, al-Qaeda’s safe havens have been the source of attacks 

against London and Amman [Jordan] and Bali. 

The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes 

are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, 

because we know that al-Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them. 

These facts compel us to act along with our 

friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains 

the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat alQaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies 

in the future. 

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny 

al-Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen 

the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and 

government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future. 

We will meet these objectives in three ways. 

First, we will pursue a military strategy that will 

break the Taliban’s momentum and increase 

Afghanistan’s capacity over the next 18 months. 

The 30,000 additional troops that I’m announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010—

the fastest possible pace—so that they can target 

the insurgency and secure key population centers. 

They’ll increase our ability to train competent 

Afghan security forces, and to partner with them 

so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And 

they will help create the conditions for the United 

States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans. 

Because this is an international effort, I’ve asked 
341

that our commitment be joined by contributions 

from our allies. Some have already provided additional troops, and we’re confident that there will be 

further contributions in the days and weeks ahead. 

Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan. And now, we must come 

together to end this war successfully. For what’s at 

stake is not simply a test of NATO’s credibility—

what’s at stake is the security of our allies and the 

common security of the world. 

But taken together, these additional American 

and international troops will allow us to accelerate 

handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and 

allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of 

Afghanistan in July 2011. Just as we have done in 

Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, 

taking into account conditions on the ground. 

We’ll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan’s 

security forces to ensure that they can succeed 

over the long haul. But it will be clear to the 

Afghan government—and, more importantly, to 

the Afghan people—that they will ultimately be 

responsible for their own country. 

Second, we will work with our partners, the 

United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue 

a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security. 

This effort must be based on performance. 

The days of providing a blank check are over. 

President Karzai’s inauguration speech sent the 

right message about moving in a new direction. 

And going forward, we will be clear about what 

we expect from those who receive our assistance. 

We’ll support Afghan ministries, governors, and 

local leaders that combat corruption and deliver 

for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will 

also focus our assistance in areas—such as agriculture—that can make an immediate impact in 

the lives of the Afghan people. 

The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They’ve been confronted with 

occupation—by the Soviet Union, and then by 

foreign al-Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land 

for their own purposes. So tonight, I want the 

Afghan people to understand—America seeks an 

end to this era of war and suffering. We have no 

interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the 

door to those Taliban who abandon violence and 

respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. 

And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan 

grounded in mutual respect—to isolate those who 

destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten 

the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a 

lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron. 

Third, we will act with the full recognition that 

our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked 

to our partnership with Pakistan. 

We’re in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from 

once again spreading through that country. But 

this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That’s why we need a 

strategy that works on both sides of the border. 

In the past, there have been those in Pakistan 

who’ve argued that the struggle against extremism 

is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off 

doing little or seeking accommodation with those 

who use violence. But in recent years, as innocents 

have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has 

become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are 

the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani army has waged 

an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And 

there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy. 

In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days 

are over. Moving forward, we are committed 
342

to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a 

foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, 

and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan’s 

capacity to target those groups that threaten our 

countries, and have made it clear that we cannot 

tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location 

is known and whose intentions are clear. America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and development. We 

are the largest international supporter for those 

Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going 

forward, the Pakistan people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s 

security and prosperity long after the guns have 

fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed. 

These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a 

transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive 

action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan. 

I recognize there are a range of concerns about 

our approach. So let me briefly address a few of 

the more prominent arguments that I’ve heard, 

and which I take very seriously.

First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabilized, and we’re better off cutting our 

losses and rapidly withdrawing. I believe this 

argument depends on a false reading of history. 

Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy 

of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a 

broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were 

viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain 

a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border. To abandon this area now—

and to rely only on efforts against al-Qaeda from 

a distance—would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al-Qaeda, and create 

an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our 

homeland and our allies. 

Second, there are those who acknowledge that 

we can’t leave Afghanistan in its current state, but 

suggest that we go forward with the troops that 

we already have. But this would simply maintain 

a status quo in which we muddle through, and 

permit a slow deterioration of conditions there. 

It would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would 

never be able to generate the conditions needed 

to train Afghan security forces and give them the 

space to take over. 

Finally, there are those who oppose identifying 

a time frame for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and 

open-ended escalation of our war effort—one that 

would commit us to a nation-building project of 

up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets 

goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a 

reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to 

secure our interests. Furthermore, the absence of 

a time frame for transition would deny us any 

sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have 

to take responsibility for their security, and that 

America has no interest in fighting an endless war 

in Afghanistan. 

As president, I refuse to set goals that go beyond 

our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And 

I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation 

faces. I don’t have the luxury of committing to just 

one. Indeed, I’m mindful of the words of President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower, who—in discussing our national security—said, “Each proposal 

must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and 

among national programs.” 

Over the past several years, we have lost that 

balance. We’ve failed to appreciate the connection 
343

between our national security and our economy. 

In the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our 

neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle 

to pay the bills. Too many Americans are worried 

about the future facing our children. Meanwhile, 

competition within the global economy has grown 

more fierce. So we can’t simply afford to ignore 

the price of these wars. 

All told, by the time I took office, the cost of 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approached a 

trillion dollars. Going forward, I am committed 

to addressing these costs openly and honestly. Our 

new approach in Afghanistan is likely to cost us 

roughly $30 billion for the military this year, and 

I’ll work closely with Congress to address these 

costs as we work to bring down our deficit. 

But as we end the war in Iraq and transition 

to Afghan responsibility, we must rebuild our 

strength here at home. Our prosperity provides a 

foundation for our power. It pays for our military. 

It underwrites our diplomacy. It taps the potential of our people and allows investment in new 

industry. And it will allow us to compete in this 

century as successfully as we did in the last. That’s 

why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended, because the nation that I’m 

most interested in building is our own. 

Now, let me be clear: none of this will be easy. 

The struggle against violent extremism will not 

be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring 

test of our free society and our leadership in the 

world. And unlike the great power conflicts and 

clear lines of division that defined the twentieth 

century, our effort will involve disorderly regions, 

failed states, diffuse enemies. 

So as a result, America will have to show our 

strength in the way that we end wars and prevent 

conflict—not just how we wage wars. We’ll have to 

be nimble and precise in our use of military power. 

Where al-Qaeda and its allies attempt to establish a foothold—whether in Somalia or Yemen or 

elsewhere—they must be confronted by growing 

pressure and strong partnerships. 

And we can’t count on military might alone. 

We have to invest in our homeland security, 

because we can’t capture or kill every violent 

extremist abroad. We have to improve and better 

coordinate our intelligence, so that we stay one 

step ahead of shadowy networks. 

We will have to take away the tools of mass 

destruction. And that’s why I’ve made it a central 

pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear 

materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of 

nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world 

without them—because every nation must understand that true security will never come from an 

endless race for ever more destructive weapons; 

true security will come for those who reject them. 

We’ll have to use diplomacy, because no one 

nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone. I’ve spent this year 

renewing our alliances and forging new partnerships. And we have forged a new beginning 

between America and the Muslim world—one 

that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking 

a cycle of conflict, and that promises a future in 

which those who kill innocents are isolated by 

those who stand up for peace and prosperity and 

human dignity. 

And finally, we must draw on the strength of 

our values—for the challenges that we face may 

have changed, but the things that we believe in 

must not. That’s why we must promote our values 

by living them at home, which is why I have prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay [Cuba]. And we must make it clear 

to every man, woman, and child around the world 

who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that 

America will speak out on behalf of their human 
344

rights, and tend to the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the dignity 

of all peoples. That is who we are. That is the 

source, the moral source, of America’s authority. 

Since the days of Franklin [Delano] Roosevelt 

and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents 

and great-grandparents, our country has borne a 

special burden in global affairs. We have spilled 

American blood in many countries on multiple 

continents. We have spent our revenue to help 

others rebuild from rubble and develop their own 

economies. We have joined with others to develop 

an architecture of institutions—from the United 

Nations to NATO to the World Bank—that provide for the common security and prosperity of 

human beings. 

We have not always been thanked for these 

efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But 

more than any other nation, the United States of 

America has underwritten global security for over 

six decades—a time that, for all its problems, has 

seen walls come down, and markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific 

progress, and advancing frontiers of human liberty. 

For unlike the great powers of old, we have 

not sought world domination. Our union was 

founded in resistance to oppression. We do not 

seek to occupy other nations. We will not claim 

another nation’s resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different 

from ours. What we have fought for—what we 

continue to fight for—is a better future for our 

children and grandchildren. And we believe that 

their lives will be better if other peoples’ children 

and grandchildren can live in freedom and access 

opportunity. (Applause) 

As a country, we’re not as young—and perhaps 

not as innocent—as we were when Roosevelt was 

president. Yet we are still heirs to a noble struggle for freedom. And now we must summon all 

of our might and moral suasion to meet the challenges of a new age. 

In the end, our security and leadership does 

not come solely from the strength of our arms. 

It derives from our people; from the workers and 

businesses who will rebuild our economy; from 

the entrepreneurs and researchers who will pioneer new industries; from the teachers that will 

educate our children and the service of those who 

work in our communities at home; from the diplomats and Peace Corps volunteers who spread 

hope abroad; and from the men and women in 

uniform who are part of an unbroken line of sacrifice that has made government of the people, 

by the people, and for the people a reality on this 

Earth. (Applause) This vast and diverse citizenry 

will not always agree on every issue—nor should 

we. But I also know that we, as a country, cannot 

sustain our leadership, nor navigate the momentous challenges of our time, if we allow ourselves 

to be split asunder by the same rancor and cynicism and partisanship that has in recent times poisoned our national discourse. 

It’s easy to forget that when this war began, we 

were united—bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the determination 

to defend our homeland and the values we hold 

dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot 

summon that unity again. (Applause) I believe 

with every fiber of my being that we—as Americans—can still come together behind a common 

purpose. For our values are not simply words written into parchment; they are a creed that calls us 

together, and that has carried us through the darkest of storms as one nation, as one people. 

America—we are passing through a time of 

great trial. And the message that we send in the 

midst of these storms must be clear: that our cause 

is just, our resolve unwavering. We will go forward 

with the confidence that right makes might, and 
345

with the commitment to forge an America that is 

safer, a world that is more secure, and a future that 

represents not the deepest of fears but the highest 

of hopes. (Applause) 

Thank you. God bless you. May God bless the 

United States of America. (Applause) Thank you 

very much. Thank you. (Applause) 

END 8:35 p.m. (EST)

347

Appendix A:

Command and Staff List

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58

(November 2001–February 2002)

Commanding General: BGen James N. Mattis

Deputy: Capt William E. Jezierski, USN (until January 2002)

Capt Kenneth M. Rome, USN 

Chief of Staff: Col Peter T. Miller (until January 2002)

Col Ronnell R. McFarland 

N-1: SSgt Benny A. Rodriguez

N-2: Lt Col Steven P. Martinson (until February 2002)

Maj Timothy J. Oliver 

N-3/5: Capt Richard Hascup, USN (until February 2002)

LtCol Clarke R. Lethin 

N-4: LtCol John J. Broadmeadow

N-6: Maj Scott F. Stebbins

Attachments:*

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 Detachment: LCdr Leonard W. W. Cooke, USN

[NMCB-133]

Task Force 64 (Australian Special Air Service): LtCol Peter Gilmore, ADF [TF-64]

Task Force K-Bar (Naval Special Warfare): Capt Robert S. Haward Jr., USN

I Marine Expeditionary Force Shock Trauma Platoon: Cdr Bruce C. Baker, USN

II Marine Expeditionary Force Shock Trauma Platoon: Cdr Robert P. Hinks, USN

21st Special Tactics Squadron Detachment: Capt Michael J. Flatten, USAF

*To present a comprehensive order of battle for the entire period covered by this anthology (2001–9) would require a volume unto itself. The goal of this appendix is to give as comprehensive a list as possible within the space provided. Consequently, not every attached unit is represented.
348

Amphibious Squadron 1 [COMPHIBRON 1]

Commodore: Capt William E. Jezierski, USN

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [15th MEU (SOC)]

(September 2001–January 2002)

Commanding Officer: Col Thomas D. Waldhauser

Executive Officer: LtCol Kevin P. Spillers

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Hubert O. Caloud

S-1: Capt James A. McLaughlin

S-2: Maj James B. Higgins Jr.

S-3: LtCol Gregg P. Olson

S-4: Maj Mikel E. Stroud

S-6: Maj Stephen O. Vidaurri

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 1st Marines [BLT 1/1]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Christopher M. Bourne

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 [HMM-163]

Commanding Officer: LtCol James K. LaVine

MEU Service Support Group 15 [MSSG-15]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Carl D. Matter

Amphibious Squadron 8 [PHIBRON 8]

Commodore: Capt Kenneth M. Rome, USN

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [26th MEU (SOC)]

(November 2001–March 2002)

Commanding Officer: Col Andrew P. Frick

Executive Officer: LtCol Gary R. Oles

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj William McKnight Jr.

S-1: Capt Darren S. Boyd

S-2: Maj Gregory G. Koziuk

S-3: LtCol Daniel D. Yoo

S-4: LtCol Andrew N. Killion

S-6: Maj David B. Parks
349

Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 6th Marines [BLT 3/6]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jerome M. Lynes

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 [HMM-365]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kevin M. Devore

MEU Service Support Group 26 [MSSG-26]

Commanding Officer: LtCol William M. Faulkner

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [13th MEU (SOC)]

(January 2002–May 2002)

Commanding Officer: Col Christopher J. Gunther

Executive Officer: LtCol Timothy W. Fitzgerald

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Jeffrey A. Morin

S-1: Capt Heather J. Cotoia

S-2: Maj Joseph D. Sinicrop Jr.

S-3: LtCol Richard C. McMonagle

S-4: LtCol Joseph N. Raferty

S-6: Maj Robert M. Flowers

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 4th Marines [BLT 1/4]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Robert O. Sinclair

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 [HMM-165]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Gregg A. Sturdevant

MEU Service Support Group 13 [MSSG-13]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Rodman D. Sansone

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]

(November 2003–May 2004 )

Commanding Officer: LtCol Robert G. Petit 

Executive Officer: Maj James D. Bracken

Sergeant Major: 1stSgt William F. Squires
350

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [22d MEU (SOC)]

(March 2004–July 2004)

Commanding Officer: Col Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.

Executive Officer: LtCol Joseph E. George

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj George H. Mason II

S-1: Capt Marisa P. Serano

S-2: Maj Christopher L. Phelps

S-3: LtCol Michael P. Killion

S-4: Maj Mark D. Light

S-6: Maj William C. Berris (until June)

Maj Robert L. Shea

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines [BLT 1/6]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Asad A. Khan

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 [HMM-266]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Joel R. Powers

MEU Service Support Group 22 [MSSG-22]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Benjamin R. Braden

Task Force Bobcat/2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (USA)**

Commanding Officer: LtCol Terry L. Sellers

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

(April 2004–December 2004)

Commanding Officer: LtCol Julian D. Alford

Executive Officer: Maj Peter D. Huntley

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Michael S. Johnston

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

(November 2004–June 2005)

Commanding Officer: LtCol Norman L. Cooling

Executive Officer: Maj Patrick A. Beckett

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj William T. Stables

**Task Force Bobcat was assigned operational control (OPCON) to 22d MEU from 18 June to 10 July 2004.
351

2d Battalion, 3d Marines [2d Bn, 3d Mar] 

(June 2005–January 2006)

Commanding Officer: LtCol Andrew R. MacMannis (until 15 July 2005)

LtCol James E. Donnellan

Executive Officer: LtCol Robert R. Scott

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Robert J. Lafleur Jr.

1st Battalion, 3d Marines [1st Bn, 3d Mar]

(January 2006–June 2006)

Commanding Officer: LtCol James W. Bierman Jr.

Executive Officer: Maj Michael T. Miller

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Michael D. Berg

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [24th MEU (SOC)]

(January 2008–November 2008)

Commanding Officer: Col Peter Petronzio

Executive Officer: LtCol Kent W. Hayes

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Jessie J. Cordes

S-1: Capt Linda D. Long

S-2: Maj Carl L. McLeod

S-3: LtCol Matthew G. Trollinger

S-4: Maj Clifton B. Carpenter (until 31 August)

Maj Michael F. Olness

S-6: Capt Michael T. Hlad (until 31 August)

Maj David R. Stengrim

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines [BLT 1/6]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Anthony M. Henderson 

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (Reinforced) [HMM-365]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John C. Vara

Combat Logistics Battalion 24 [CLB-24]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Ricky F. Brown
352

2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 7th Mar]/Task Force 2/7

(March 2008–November 2008)

Commanding Officer: LtCol Richard D. Hall

Executive Officer: Maj Lee G. Helton

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Matthew B. Brookshire 

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Afghanistan [SPMAGTF–A]

 (November 2008–May 2009)

Commanding Officer: Col Duffy W. White

Executive Officer: LtCol Patrick C. Byron

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Paul G. McKenna

S-1: Capt Mark D. Nicholson

S-2: Maj John S. Davidson

S-3: LtCol Jeffrey C. Holt

S-4: Maj George W. Markert V

S-6: Maj Matthew D. McBroom

3d Battalion, 8th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol David L. Odom 

 

Aviation Combat Element

Commanding Officer: LtCol Richard T. Ostermeyer (until February 2009)

 LtCol Michael E. Watkins 

Combat Logistics Battalion 3 [CLB-3]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael J. Jernigan

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade [2d MEB]

(May 2009–April 2010)

Commanding General: BGen Lawrence D. Nicholson

Deputy: Col George S. Amland

Chief of Staff: Col William P. McLaughlin 

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Ernest K. Hoopii

G-1: LtCol John W. Bicknell Jr.

G-2: LtCol Scott T. Derkach
353

G-3: Col Eric M. Mellinger (until July 2009)

Col Michael P. Killion

G-4: Col Christopher B. Edwards

G-6: Col Allan M. Faxon

Command Element

Brigade Headquarters Group

Commanding Officer: LtCol Christopher L. Naler

Ground Combat Element

Regimental Combat Team 3 [RCT-3]

Commanding Officer: Col Duffy W. White

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

Commanding Officer: Col Randall P. Newman

Aviation Combat Element

Marine Aircraft Group 40 [MAG-40]

Commanding Officer: Col Kevin S. Vest

Marine Combat Service Support Element

Combat Logistics Regiment 2 [CLR-2]

Commanding Officer: Col John W. Simmons

355

Appendix B:

Unit List

U.S. Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom

October 2001–December 2002

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

Embassy Security1

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar] 

Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121 [VMFA(AW)-121]2

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212 (-) (Reinforced) [VMFA-212]3

Marine Attack Squadron 513 (-) (Reinforced) [VMA–513]4

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 234 (-) [VMGR-234]5

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) [VMGR-352]

Marine Air Control Squadron 2 (-) (Reinforced) [MACS-2]6

Marine Air Control Squadron 4 (-) [MACS-4]7

United States Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. Fifth Fleet

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58 [TF-58]

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [15th MEU (SOC)]

Command Element

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 1st Marines [BLT 1/1] 

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (Reinforced) [HMM-163]

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 15 [MSSG-15]

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [26th MEU (SOC)]

Command Element

Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 6th Marines [BLT 3/6] 

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (Reinforced) [HMM-365]

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 26 [MSSG-26]

USS Theodore Roosevelt [CVN 71], Carrier Air Wing 1 [CVW-1]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 [VMFA-251]
356

USS John C. Stennis [CVN 74], Carrier Air Wing 9 [CVW-9]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 [VMFA-314]

Combined Joint Task Force Mountain [CJTF-Mountain]

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [13 MEU (SOC)]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (Reinforced) [HMM-165]8

U.S. Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom

2003

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

Embassy Security

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar] 

3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Mar]

Combined Joint Task Force 180 [CJTF-180]

Marine Ground Units

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]9

Marine Aviation Units

Marine Attack Squadron 513 (-) (Reinforced) [VMA–513]10

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 773 (-) (Reinforced) [HMLA-773]11

U.S. Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom

2004

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

Embassy Security

3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Mar]

2d Battalion 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

United States Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. Fifth Fleet

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [22d MEU (SOC)]

Command Element

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines [BLT 1/6] 

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 (Reinforced) [HMM-266]

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 22 [MSSG-22]
357

Combined Joint Task Force 180/76 [CJTF-180/76]12

Marine Ground Units

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]

Headquarters Company, 6th Marines [HqCo, 6th Mar]13

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

Marine Aviation Units14

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 773 (-) (Reinforced) [HMLA -773]15

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 769 [HMH-769]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462]

U.S. Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom

2005

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

Embassy Security

2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan [OSC-A]

Embedded Training Team [ETT]16

Combined Joint Task Force 76 [CJTF-76]

Marine Ground Units

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]17

2d Battalion, 3d Marines [2d Bn, 3d Mar] 

Marine Aviation Units

Marine Air Control Squadron 2 [MACS-2]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 3 [VMAQ-3] 

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 773 (-) (Reinforced) [HMLA -773]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462]
358

U.S. Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom

2006

United States Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. Fifth Fleet

USS Enterprise [CVN 65], Carrier Air Wing 1 [CVW-1]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251(-) [VMFA-251]18

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan [CSTC-A]

Embedded Training Team [ETT]19

Combined Joint Task Force 76 [CJTF-76]

Marine Ground Units

1st Battalion, 3d Marines [1st Bn, 3d Mar] 

Marine Aviation Units

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (Reinforced) [HMM-365]20

U.S. Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom

2007

United States Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. Fifth Fleet

USS Enterprise [CVN 65] Carrier Air Wing 1 [CVW-1]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 [VMFA-251] 

USS Nimitz [CVN 68] Carrier Air Wing 11 [CVW 11]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 [VMFA-232] 

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan [CSTC-A]

Embedded Training Team [ETT]21

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan [CJSOTF-A]

Company F, Marine Special Operations Command [Co F, MARSOC]

Company A, Marine Special Operations Command [Co A, MARSOC]

Company G, Marine Special Operations Command [Co G, MARSOC]
359

U.S. Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom

2008

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan [CSTC-A]

Embedded Training Team [ETT]22

Task Force 2/7

2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 7th Mar]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 (-) [HMLA-269]23

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 (-) [HMH-466]

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan [CJSOTF-A]

Marine Special Operations Team 5 [MSOT-5]

Company I, Marine Special Operations Command [Co I, MARSOC]

International Security Assistance Force, Theater Tactical Force [ISAF TTF]24

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit [24th MEU]25

Command Element

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines [BLT 1/6] 

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (Reinforced) [HMM-365]

Combat Logistics Battalion 24 [CLB-24]

U.S. Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom

2009

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ-1]

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan [CSTC-A]

Embedded Training Team [ETT]26

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan [CJSOTF-A]

Company D, Marine Special Operations Command [Co D, MSOC]

Company I, Marine Special Operations Command [Co I, MSOC]

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-South [ISAF RC-S]

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Afghanistan [SPMAGTF-A]
360

Command Element

3d Marine Regiment Headquarters

Battery D, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry D, 2d Bn, 14th Mar]27

Marine Ground Combat Element

3d Battalion, 8th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

Marine Aviation Combat Element28

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 (-) [MWHS-3]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466(-) [HMH-466]

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 (-) [HMLA-269]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (-) [MALS-16]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 (-) [MWSS 371]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Battalion 3 [CLB-3]

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan (-) (Reinforced) [2d MEB-A]29

Command Element

2d MEB Brigade Headquarters Group 

 5th Battalion, 10th Marines [5th Bn, 10th Mar]

 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-) (Reinforced) [2d ANGLICO]

Marine Ground Combat Element

Regimental Combat Team 3 (Reinforced) [RCT-3]

 1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]

 2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]

 2d Battalion, 3d Marines [2d Bn, 3d Mar]

 3d Battalion, 11th Marines [3d Bn, 11th Mar]

 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [2d LAR]

 1st Combat Engineer Battalion [1st CEB]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

Marine Aircraft Group 40 [MAG-40]

 Marine Air Control Group 28 (-) [MACG-28] 

 Marine Attack Squadron 214 [VMA-214]

 Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 [HMH-362]

 Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 772 (-) (Reinforced) [HMH-772 (-) Rein]
361

 Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) [VMGR-352]

 Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (-) [HMLA-169]

 Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (-) [VMU-2]

 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 40 [MALS-40]

 Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 [MWSS-371]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Regiment 2 [CLR-2]

 Combat Logistics Battalion 8 [CLB-8]

 8th Engineer Support Battalion [8th ESB]

Notes

1. The 4th MEB(AT) provided the sourcing for Task Force Kabul/Marine Security Force Kabul; it provided one company from the Antiterrorism Battalion on a rotating basis until 2005 for the U.S. embassy.

2. Squadron provided close air support for Operation Enduring Freedom from Manas, Kyrgyzstan.

3. Squadron provided Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance System (ATARS) and FAC(A) missions for OEF. 

Though based from al-Jaber, Kuwait, aerial refueling enabled the squadron to support missions from 

Kabul and Gardez in the north to the southern Pakistani border on missions that routinely exceeded 10 

hours. VMFA-212 composited with VMFA(AW)-332 and elements of Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 12 (MALS-12). The squadron deployed eight McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18C Hornets and four Boeing F/A-18D Hornets. The F/A-18D aircraft allowed the squadron to support missions over Afghanistan 

using ATARS.

4. Bagram, Afghanistan.

5. Four plane detachments deployed beginning in November 2001 and provided assault support for the initial assault into Afghanistan and also for Operation Anaconda in early 2002. The detachments were based 

out of Jacobabad, Pakistan, and flew into Khandahar and Bagram.

6. MACS-2 operated detachments in Manas, Kyrgystan, from 2002 to 2003.

7. MACS-4 operated detachments throughout the region to provide positive air space control. Detachments 

operated from Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan, and Khandahar, Afghanistan, among others.

8. During Operation Anaconda (4–26 March 2002), HMM-165 deployed with Task Force 165 to Bagram, 

Afghanistan, including 80 Marines, five Bell AH-1W Super Cobras, three Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters along with two Lockheed-Martin KC-130s and daily McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier combat sorties from the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6).

9. The 2/8 deployed in late November 2003 to relieve U.S Army Task Force 2-87 at Bagram, Afghanistan.

It assumed three standing missions: Bagram Airfield security, CJTF-180 Bagram Airfield Quick Reaction Force, and security for mission support site in Asadabad.

10. Bagram, Afghanistan.

11. Ibid.

12. CJTF-180 transitioned to CJTF-76 in April 2004.
362

13. HqCo, 6th Marines, deployed to Afghanistan in late February and early March to provide command and 

control to various combat and operating forces in Bagram, Afghanistan.

14. Bagram, Afghanistan.

15. Squadrons were supported by detachments from MALS-42 and MWSS-471, 472, and 473.

16. Three embedded training teams deployed in 2005, each consisting of 16 Marines.

17. Marine Corps infantry battalions deployed from 2005 to mid-2006 and provided the core of Task Force 

KOA, which operated in the vicinity of Jalabad Airfield. They also provided support to Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Jalalabad, a joint civil-military operation (CMO).

18. Most of the squadron aircraft (nine) redeployed for 67 days from USS Enterprise to al-Asad Airbase in 

western Iraq, leaving only a division of aircraft (three) aboard ship. However, the squadron detachment 

still managed 187 sorties, totaling 493.5 hours in support of OEF as part of CVW-1.

19. The number of ETTs deployed rose from three to six by December 2006.

20. The AV-8B Harrier component of the 24th MEU’s HMM-365 flew a short but productive stint in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. HMM-365 flew 136 combat missions over Afghanistan in just 13 

days, dropping a total of 17 precision-guided bombs.

21. The Marine Corps provided 7 embedded training teams consisting of 16 Marines each to the Afghan 

National Army. One corps-level and six battalion-level teams to train and mentor the Afghan National Army.

22. Ibid.

23. Both detachments from HMLA-269 and HMH-466 arrived in mid-August 2008; until that time, TF 

2/7 was forced to rely on NATO aircraft for support. After TF 2/7 departed, both squadron detachments 

continued their deployment as part of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Afghanistan 

(SPMAGTF–A).

24. The commander for ISAF held 24th MEU as the theater tactical force for both Regional Command-South 

and Regional Command-West for the 2008 campaign named Operation Shamshir.

25. In addition to becoming the NATO main effort for the 2008 campaign season, from September to the 

end of October, the MEU provided the bridge and nucleus for the evolving Marine buildup of forces that 

would become SPMAGTF–A. The MEU command and aviation combat elements also provided support 

for TF 2/7 and HMLA-269/HMH-466 assigned to support 2/7.

26. The Marine Corps provided seven embedded training teams consisting of 16 Marines each to the Afghan 

National Army. One corps-level and six battalion-level teams to train and mentor the Afghan National Army.

27. Battery D, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines, deployed to Afghanistan in general support of the SPMAGTF–A 

in January 2009. The deployment marked the first time that a Marine rocket artillery-equipped battery 

operated in Afghanistan. Capitalizing on the range and accuracy of the HIMARS system allowed the 

battery to be employed using split battery operations, a new concept at the time, with one section based 

at Delaram and the other at Camp Bastion.

28. The SPMAGTF ACE rotated squadrons with the following units, relieving those listed above: Marine 

Wing Headquarters Squadron 2 (-) [MWHS-2], Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361], 

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 [HMH-362], Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 

(-) [VMGR-352], Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 (-) [HMLA-167], and Marine Aviation 

Logistics Squadron 26 (-) [MALS-26] later redesignated as MALS-40.
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29. The 2d MEB–A conducted a transfer of authority from SPMAGTF–A on 29 May 2009. Due to continual rotation of both ground and aviation units, the 2d MEB order of battle most closely represents the 

MEB as it stood just prior to Operation Khanjar to secure major population centers in Helmand Province ahead of Afghan national elections from July to August 2009.

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Appendix C:

Selected Terms and Abbreviations from 

Operation Enduring Freedom

ABV (M1) Assault Breacher Vehicle

ACE Aviation Combat Element

al-Qaeda “The base”; an international militant Islamic terrorist organization 

ANA Afghan National Army

ANGLICO Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

ANP Afghan National Police

AOR Area of responsibility

ArCent U.S. Army Forces Central Command

ARG Amphibious Ready Group

AT Antiterrorism

BLT Battalion Landing Team

burqa A loose enveloping garment worn by some Muslim women to cloak 

their faces and bodies in public places

CAAT Combined Anti-Armor Team

CAG Civil Affairs Group

CAS Close Air Support

CATF Commander Amphibious Task Force

CEB Combat Engineer Battalion

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component Command

CFACC Coalition Forces Air Component Commander

CFMCC Coalition Forces Maritime Component Command

CFSOCC Coalition Forces Special Operations Component Command

CG Commanding General

CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

CLB Combat Logistics Battalion

CLF Commander Landing Force

CLR Combat Logistics Regiment
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CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center

COP Combat Outpost

COIN Counterinsurgency

ComdC Command Chronology

ConPlan Concept of Operations Plan

CSAR Combat Search and Rescue

CSTC Combined Security Transition Command

CVN Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear (fixed-wing aircraft)

CVW Carrier Air Wing

D-Day Day on which operations are scheduled to commence

DASC Direct Air Support Center

DOD Department of Defense

DON Department of the Navy

EODMU Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit

ESB Engineer Support Battalion

ETT Embedded Training Team

FAC Forward Air Controller

FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)

FARP Forward Arming and Refueling Point

fatwa Islamic religious ruling

FET Female Engagement Team

FOB Forward Operating Base

GBOSS Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GMTI Ground Moving Target Indicator

GRC Gray Research Center

H-Hour Hour when operation is scheduled to commence

HESCO A multi-cellular wall system manufactured from wire mesh and 

lined with a heavy-duty material then filled with earth to provide 

a semi-permanent barrier for military installations

HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

HMH Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

HMLA Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

HMM Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

HMMWV (Humvee) High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
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HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IO Information Operations

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISI The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JIC Joint Intelligence Center

jihad Holy war waged as an Islamic religious duty

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

Kandak Afghan National Army Battalion

LAAD Low Altitude Air Defense

LAV Light Armored Vehicle

LTD Laser Target Designator

LHA Landing Helicopter Assault (general purpose amphibious assault ship)

LHD Landing Helicopter Dock (multipurpose amphibious assault ship)

LD Line of departure

loya jirga Traditional meeting of tribal elders to solve problems 

LPD Landing Platform Dock (amphibious transport dock)

LPH Landing Platform Helicopter (amphibious assault ship)

LSA Logistics Support Area

LSD Dock Landing Ship (amphibious assault ship)

LVS Logistics Vehicle System

MACG Marine Air Control Group

MACS Marine Air Control Squadron

madrassa Islamic religious school

MAG Marine Aircraft Group

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MALS Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron

MarCent U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

MARSOC Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command

MARCORSYSCOM Marine Corps Systems Command

MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MCHD Marine Corps History Division

MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
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MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit 

MICLIC Mine-Clearing Line Charge

MLG Marine Logistics Group

MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force

MRAP Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected

MSOB Marine Special Operations Battalion

MSOT Marine Special Operations Team

MSSG Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Service Support Group

MTVR Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement

mujahideen Those who wage a jihad; holy warriors 

mullah Male religious teacher or leader who is schooled in Islamic law

MWHS Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron

MWSS Marine Wing Support Squadron

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NavCent U.S. Naval Forces Central Command

nm Nautical mile

NMCB Naval Mobile Construction Battalion

ODA Operational Detachment Alpha

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OP Observation Post

OSC–A Office of Security Cooperation–Afghanistan

PA Public Affairs

Pashtunwali A way of life and system of customary laws that stress honor above all else

PB Patrol Base

PR Public Relations

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

QRF Quick Reaction Force

RC Regional Command

RCT Regimental Combat Team

RIP Relief in place

RPG Rocket-propelled grenade

Sangar Used by British forces to describe a watchtower

Seabee U.S. Navy Construction Battalion
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SEAL Sea, Air, and Land (U.S. Navy Special Operations force)

sharia Islamic law

shura A town hall-style council of decision making by consultation 

and deliberation

SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

SOC Special Operations Capable

SOF Special Operations Forces (generic)

SPMAGTF Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

SWAN Support Wide Area Network

Taliban “Seekers, religious students”; an Islamic-based, Afghan political 

military organization that emerged during 1994 and that ruled 

large parts of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001

TF Task Force

TIC Troops in contact (with the enemy)

TTF Theater Tactical Force

TOA Transfer of authority

TOW Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided Missile

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN United Nations

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USNS United States Naval Ship

USO United Service Organizations

USS United States Ship

VMA Marine Attack Squadron

VMAQ Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

VMFA Marine Fighter Attack Squadron

VMFA(AW) Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron

VMGR Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron

VMM Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron

VMU Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron

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Appendix D:

Chronology of Events, 2001–9

2001

11 September Nineteen militants associated with the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda hijack 

four commercial airliners and carry out suicide attacks against targets in the 

United States. Two of the planes flew into the towers of the World Trade Center 

in New York City, a third plane hit the Pentagon just outside Washington, DC, 

and the fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. Often referred to as 9/11, 

the attacks resulted in the death of more than 3,000 people, triggering major U.S. 

initiatives to combat terrorism.

15–17 September President George W. Bush convenes a war cabinet meeting at Camp David, Maryland, to review national security developments. The consensus is to negotiate with 

the Taliban, attack al-Qaeda, and then address other state sponsors of terrorism 

at a time of the administration’s choosing. The group agrees that military options 

presented by Gen Henry H. Shelton, USA, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

are obsolete and that the Pentagon needs to pursue unconventional approaches. 

The State Department delivers an ultimatum to the Taliban, demanding they 

extradite Osama bin Laden.

7 October President Bush announces the start of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

10 October The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MEU 

[SOC]) deploys to Pakistan in support of OEF. 

18 October Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 became the first Marines to be engaged in 

combat in Afghanistan supporting OEF. The Marines, piloting F/A-18 Hornets, 

took off from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) 

and flew several bombing missions, including the destruction of a bridge in northern Afghanistan. 

20 October Two CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters from the 15th MEU (SOC) execute a tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) to salvage the wreckage of a U.S. 

Army UH-60 Black Hawk that crashed in Pakistan during a raid on a Taliban 

compound the night before. The Black Hawk was abandoned on the return trip 
372

when, while refueling, the Stallions came under enemy fire. The Marines returned 

to the refueling site and recovered the Black Hawk on 24 October. 

3 November The 15th MEU (SOC), aboard the USS Peleliu (LHA 5), flies its first bombing missions as part of OEF. Harrier pilots with the 15th MEU (SOC) dropped 

500-pound MK-82 bombs on Taliban and al-Qaeda targets located in southern 

Afghanistan. 

22–24 November The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s (26th MEU), aboard the USS Bataan

(LHD 5), amphibious ready group (ARG) arrive in the Arabian Sea after receiving orders to deploy from the Mediterranean Sea. 

25 November The 15th MEU air assaults from amphibious shipping off the coast of Pakistan 

400 miles inland to Afghanistan. Encountering no resistance, the MEU sets up a 

fortified base, Camp Rhino, at an airport south of Kandahar. The mission, codenamed Swift Freedom, aimed to cut off incoming supplies and escape routes for 

the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 

4 December Elements of the 26th MEU land in Afghanistan to reinforce the 15th MEU at 

Camp Rhino located south of Kandahar. 

7 December Marines from the 15th MEU (SOC) engage a seven-vehicle convoy attempting to 

flee Kandahar. A firefight erupts when the first vehicle attempts to run a Marine 

roadblock and the passengers fire upon the Marines. The rest of the convoy heads 

in another direction only to be destroyed by supporting aircraft. The Marines suffered no casualties, while enemy casualty estimates varied between 50 and 150.

13 December Elements of the 15th and 26th MEUs secure the Kandahar International Airport 

after anti-Taliban forces flushed the Taliban out of the city just days before. Four 

days later, a Marine color guard at the airport raises an American flag, which had 

been sent and signed by rescue workers and friends and family of victims of the 

11 September terrorist attacks.

17 December The U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, ceremoniously reopens as Marines raise 

the same flag that was hastily lowered by Marine security guards when the embassy 

was evacuated on 31 January 1989. A detention facility was set up at the Marine 

Corps base at Kandahar International Airport in Afghanistan to house suspected 

Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. 
373

19 December Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James L. Jones, accompanied by Sergeant 

Major of the Marine Corps, Alford L. McMichael, travels to Kandahar International Airport to visit Marines stationed in the area. 

25 December Cpl Christopher T. Chandler, the Marine who lost his left foot in a mine explosion 

at Kandahar Airport on 16 December, becomes the first Marine to be awarded a 

Purple Heart during Operation Enduring Freedom. 

2002

1 January The American flag is ceremoniously raised alongside the Afghanistan national 

flag as a display of strengthened U.S. and Afghan relations. The 26th MEU participated in the ceremony outside of the recently secured Kandahar International 

Airport.

9 January Seven Marine crewmen are killed when their Lockheed Martin KC-130R crashes 

near a forward operating base at Shamsi, Pakistan. The Marine Aerial Refueler 

Transport Squadron 352 (VMGR-352) Marines are the first to die in the global 

war on terrorism. 

10 January Marines from the 26th MEU (SOC) take defensive positions and return fire at the 

Kandahar International Airport after shots were fired near the northern perimeter. The gunfire erupted shortly after a C-17 transport plane carrying 20 detainees en route to Camp X-Ray, Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, departed. 

18 January Marines relinquish control of the largest U.S. base in Afghanistan to the 

Army’s 101st Airborne Division located at the Kandahar International Airport. 

8 February The 26th MEU (SOC) completes its back load onto the Bataan. The MEU 

extended the perceived operational reach of a deployed amphibious force by conducting combat operations deep into northern Afghanistan at distances of 750 

miles from naval shipping. 

3 March At the direction of U.S. Forces Central Command, the 13th MEU forms Task 

Force 165 (TF-165) in support of Operation Anaconda in the Shah-i-Kot Valley 

near Gardez, Afghanistan. The task force included 80 Marines, five AH-1W Super 

Cobras, three CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters, and KC-130 Hercules aircraft 

in addition to daily AV-8B Harrier sorties from the deck of the USS Bonhomme 

Richard (LHD 6).
374

4 March Five AH-1W Cobras from the 13th MEU provide close air support during Operation Anaconda to Coalition Joint Task Force-Mountain.

24 March Marine LtCol Gregg A. Sturdevant, commanding officer of the 13th MEU 

(SOC)’s Aviation Combat Element, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165, 

is awarded the Bronze Star for “exceptionally meritorious achievement” while 

serving as the commanding officer of TF-165, in the Coalition Joint Task ForceMountain at Bagram, Afghanistan, in direct support of Operation Anaconda. 

Thirteen other Marines from the unit were also presented awards from the U.S. 

Army. Six AH-1W Super Cobra pilots were awarded the Air Medal with combat 

“V” designation and seven Marines received the Army Commendation Medal.

26 March TF-165 concludes operations ashore in Afghanistan.

13 April About 100 members of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Antiterrorism 

(4th MEB-AT) return to Camp Lejeune after helping reopen the U.S. embassy 

in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

15 April Six F/A-18D Hornets of Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121 (VMFA 

[AW]-121), “Green Knights,” are the first U.S. aircraft to arrive at the Coalition 

air base in Kyrgyzstan in support of OEF. 

18 June Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212 (-) Reinforced (VMFA-212) completes a 

three-month deployment at Ahmed al-Jaber Air Base, Kuwait. The squadron flew 

missions over Afghanistan, which routinely exceeded 10 hours in length due to 

the extreme distances involved in transit from Kuwait to Afghanistan. 

5 July AV-8B Harriers from the 22d MEU fly combat missions over Afghanistan from 

the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1).

11 September Members of the 4th MEB (AT) bury a piece of the World Trade Center on the 

grounds of the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.

20 September Task Force India, comprised mostly from Company I, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, 

return to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, after spending months providing security at the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. The Marines were part of 4th 

MEB (AT) and were relieved by Company L, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines.

2 October VMFA(AW)-121, the Green Knights, return to MCAS Miramar, California, after 

a more than five-month deployment to Manas, Kyrgyzstan. 
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__ October Six AV-8B Harriers from Marine Attack Squadron 513 (VMA-513), based out of 

Yuma, Arizona, deployed late in the month to Bagram Airfield, north of Kabul, 

provided close air support, armed reconnaissance, combat escort, and precision 

strike capability for American and Coalition units.

14 November A VMA-513 AV-8B Harrier joins other aviation assets in engaging enemy forces 

during a firefight near a U.S. special operations base.

2003

21 May Marines mistakenly shoot and kill four Afghan soldiers outside the U.S. embassy 

in Kabul, Afghanistan. The slain soldiers were part of a disarmament team unloading weapons at a collection depot in an intelligence agency complex across from 

the embassy. Conflicting reports claimed the Marines were returning fire after 

being fired upon. Embassy officials blamed the incident on “heightened tensions.” 

1 October Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 773 (-) Reinforced (HMLA-773) arrives 

at Bagram, Afghanistan, for a seven-month deployment in support of CJTF-180. 

The squadron was later designated as Task Force Red Dog.

17 November HMLA-773 provides close air support for during Operation Mountain Resolve.

 23 November Marines with 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, leave Camp Lejeune for a seven-month 

deployment to Afghanistan and become the first active duty Marine unit in Afghanistan since the 2001 campaign to topple the Taliban regime.

28 November Marines from 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, join the Coalition forces of CJTF-180 

in pursuit of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. 

1 December HMLA-773 provides close air support for elements of the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division during Operation Avalanche.

4 December The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, conduct relief in place with U.S. Army Task Force 

2-87 to assume three standing missions: Bagram Airfield (BAF) Security, CJTF180 BAF quick reaction force, and security for mission support site Asadabad.

14–16 December The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, conduct Operation Ring Road to protect Afghan 

President Hamid Karzai during ceremonies to open the Ring Road from Kabul 

to Kandahar.
376

__ December Company E (Rein), 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, supports Operation Winter Strike 

by establishing blocking positions and vehicle checkpoints near Asadabad in Kunar 

Province.

2004

2 January Elements of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, conduct a joint cordon-and-search raid 

on a suspected Taliban and drug trade suspect with FBI agents in the vicinity of 

Wardak Province.

16 January Elements of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, conduct recovery of a weapons cache in 

Loy Rod located in Parwan Province.

__ February Headquarters Company, 6th Marines, deploys to Afghanistan in late February 

and early March to provide command and control to various combat and operating forces based at Bagram Airfield.

12 March Operation Mountain Blizzard concludes. The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, conducted supporting missions that began in January 2004. During the operation, 

the Coalition conducted 1,731 patrols and 143 raids and cordon-and-search operations. They killed 22 enemy combatants and discovered weapons caches with 

3,648 rockets, 3,202 mortar rounds, 2,944 rocket-propelled grenades, 3,000 rifle 

rounds, 2,232 mines, and tens of thousands of rounds of small-arms ammunition.

__ April HMLA-773 supports Operation Dragonfly by providing convoy escort, quick 

reaction force, and medevac escort.

10–13 April The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines (-) (Rein), conducts cooperative medical assistance 

(CMA) with Task Force Victory and Parwan PRT in Surobi, Jegdelek, and Dagona, Afghanistan. 

14 April The 22d MEU (SOC) completes its move to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and begins 

operations as CJTF-180’s main effort for Operation Mountain Storm. The operation was designed to preempt a long-anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” and 

help set the conditions for successful voter registration and national-level elections. 

The 22d MEU was redesignated as Task Force Linebacker with the addition of 

joint attachments.

25 April The 22d MEU commences Operation El Dorado to rapidly seize the Tarin Kowt 

valley from anti-Coalition militia. The MEU then established Forward Operating 

Base Ripley to support combat and civil-military operations in Oruzgan Province.
377

__ June HMLA-773 is assigned tactical control (TACON) of three U.S. Army UH-60 

Black Hawk helicopters, marking the first time since the Vietnam War that a 

Marine squadron has operational control of a joint service aviation unit in combat. 

1–18 June The 22d MEU (TF Linebacker) commences Operation Asbury Park in the Deh 

Chopan District of Zabul Province. The operation marks the heaviest sustained 

combat of the deployment over a period of 10 days. 

3 June While on a cordon-and-knock operation in Zabul Province, SSgt Anthony L. Viggiani’s Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 22d MEU (SOC) 

destroys a cave occupied by three enemy fighters firing a machine gun at a Marine 

fireteam. Although wounded, SSgt Viggiani continues on in pursuit of the enemy, 

leading his Marines to eventually kill more than a dozen insurgents. For his actions, 

SSgt Viggiani received the Navy Cross. 

21 June The 22d MEU (TF Linebacker) is granted a larger area of operations spreading 

into Deh Copan and Deh Rawod districts historically known for anti-Coalition 

militia activity. Task Force Bobcat (U.S. Army’s 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment) was under operational control of 22d MEU. 

22 July The 22d MEU (SOC) redeploys out of Afghanistan.

1 August HMLA-773 engages an estimated 300 anti-Coalition militia fighters intent on 

over-running a remote border control point manned by some 75 Coalition and 

Afghan troops along the Pakistan/Afghan border. The timely arrival of Marine 

Super Cobras results in more than 140 enemy casualties and relief of the besieged 

garrison.

9 October The people of Afghanistan vote in massive numbers in the country’s first democratic election.

31 October The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, from MCAS Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, begin deploying to Afghanistan to relieve 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. 

2005

7 February The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, complete Operation Spurs. Marines inserted into 

different parts of the snow-covered Korangal Valley in northeastern Afghanistan to 

search for terrorists and provide the local villagers with medical care and supplies.
378

5 April The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, conclude Operation Mavericks. The Marines successfully rounded up suspected insurgents and confiscated several weapons caches 

in the snow-covered mountains of eastern Afghanistan. 

9 May Marines clash with a band of insurgents in eastern Afghanistan after receiving a 

tip about insurgents operating in Laghman, an opium-producing area 60 miles 

east of Kabul. The insurgents opened fire with small arms and rocket-propelled 

grenades before splitting into two groups. The five-hour fight left two Marines 

and two dozen enemy dead.

31 May The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, return to the Tora Bora mountains in search of the 

Taliban and conduct civil-military operations as part of Operation Celtics.

__ June The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, relieve 3d Battalion, 3d Marines.

27 June U.S. Navy SEALs and the Army’s 160th Special Operations Air Regiment conduct the opening phases of 2d Battalion, 3d Marines’s Operation Red Wings to 

capture insurgent cell leader Ahmad Shah in Kunar Province. Friction integrating Special Forces and 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, leads the special operations task 

force to take over planning and command and control of the opening phases of 

Operation Red Wings. Tragically, shortly after its insert, a U.S. Navy SEAL fireteam was ambushed by Amad Shah’s fighters, killing three of the four, and a rescue helicopter with 16 aboard was shot down trying to rescue the team.

13 August The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, launch Operation Whalers again targeting insurgent cell leader Ahmad Shah in the remote Afghanistan Korengal Valley. The 

Marines’ success helped secure the country ahead of the fall elections. 

16–23 October The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, conduct Operation Pil in the Watapor Valley in 

Kunar Province to help improve security and stabilize the local government. 

12–22 November The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, conduct Operation Sorkh Khar (Red Donkey) in 

Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley to disrupt al-Qaeda-backed insurgents in their staging grounds near the Pakistan border. 

2006

5 January The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, deploy to Afghanistan in relief of 2d Battalion, 3d 

Marines.
379

11 April The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, take part in Operation Mountain Lion, a brigadesize Afghan and U.S. operation in Kunar Province.

18 May The Marine Corps announces its plans to pull out the majority of its troops serving 

in Afghanistan. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, start arriving home from Afghanistan after completing a five-month deployment in support of OEF.

24 August The Thunderbolts of VMFA-251 redeploy from the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) into 

al-Asad Airbase, Iraq, leaving only 3 of the squadron’s 12 aircraft aboard ship. The 

three-plane detachment continues shipboard operations and flies 187 sorties, totaling 493.5 hours in support of OEF while the rest of the squadron flew in support 

of OIF ashore in Iraq. At no other time in history did a Marine squadron support 

two campaigns simultaneously.

21 September The 24th MEU’s Harriers launch from the deck of the USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), 

flying 136 combat missions over Afghanistan in just 13 days and dropping a total 

of 17 precision-guided bombs. 

2007

4 March Marines with Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 

open fire, killing at least eight Afghan civilians in eastern Afghanistan. Different 

versions of the events lead to tensions between U.S forces and the local population, with the Marine unit being expelled from the country later in the month by 

the U.S. Army general in charge. The incident also sparked an investigation into 

whether the Marines responded with appropriate force to an ambush or if they 

had opened fire without provocation.

17 May The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James T. Conway, rebuke Army officials for offering premature apologies for the actions of special operations Marines 

after they were struck by a car bomb in Afghanistan on 4 March. The Marines’ 

reaction to the attack is still under investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, prompting Gen Conway to state, “As has historically been the 

case, a service member under investigation or undergoing trial is innocent until 

proven guilty. And too much in the terms of declaration of guilt and apologies 

has already been said.” Lawyers for a few of the Marines under investigation also 

submitted formal letters to the Army requesting its leadership cease making prejudicial statements.
380

6 November VMFA-251 aboard the Enterprise supports OEF for a total of 10 days, flying 277.3 

combat hours in 42 sorties.

17 November The 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion (1st MSOB), U.S. Marine Corps 

Forces, Special Operations Command, returns to Camp Pendleton, California.

2008

15 January Marine Corps officials announce that the 24th MEU and 2d Battalion, 7th Marine 

Regiment, will deploy in spring 2008 to Afghanistan in response to a request 

for additional forces from the NATO-International Security Assistance Force 

commander. 

29 January Testimony ends in a special court of inquiry into the allegations that a Marine 

special operations unit opened fire on Afghanistan civilians in March 2007, killing several people.

7 March The special court of inquiry commissioned to hear testimony regarding Marines 

killing 19 Afghani civilians in March 2007 delivers its report to LtGen Samuel 

T. Helland, commander of Marine Corps Forces, Central Command.

17 March The 24th MEU begins arriving in southern Afghanistan for a scheduled sevenmonth deployment in support of OEF. 

29 April The 24th MEU launches Operation Azada Wosa to secure the Garmsir District, 

Helmand Province. BLT 1/6 storms into the Taliban-held town of Garmsir in 

the first major American operation in the region in years. Over the next 35 days, 

Marines fought the Taliban in more than 170 engagements.

23 May LtGen Helland decides not to bring criminal charges against two officers whose 

special operations unit was accused of killing 19 Afghanistan civilians in March 

2007. The general made the decision after reviewing the findings of a special tribunal that had spent three weeks hearing testimony in the case in January.

28 May BLT 1/6 assaults the historic nineteenth-century British Jugroom Fort. Converted 

by the Taliban, the mud brick fort not only served as a headquarters but was also 

heavily fortified with tunnels, machine-gun bunkers, minefields, and IEDs. The 

day also saw Marine combat engineers employ the mine-clearing line charge 

(MICLIC) for the first time in Afghanistan to create a breach in the mud brick 

walls of the fort.
381

26 June GySgt John S. Mosser, team sergeant for Marine Special Operations Company 

H, 2d Marine Special Operations Battalion, comes under heavy fire while conducting a night-time combat reconnaissance patrol to apprehend a high value 

target and an enemy security element. The team comes upon two vehicles, one 

of which was blocking the path. The Marines dismount their vehicles only to 

come under intense enemy fire. Mosser braves enemy fire on multiple occasions 

to direct accurate return fire on enemy positions and drag wounded to a place of 

relative safety. For his actions, he received the Navy Cross in December 2009. 

8 July While on foot patrol in Sangin District, Helmand Province, LCpl Richard S. Weinmaster, Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, engages enemy positions with 

his squad automatic weapon when the patrol came under fire. He then spots two 

hand grenades thrown into the midst of his patrol. Without hesitation, he places 

himself between the grenades and his fireteam leader and several other Marines. 

Using himself as a shield, he prevents the fireteam leader from being hit by the 

deadly shrapnel though sustaining critical wounds himself. Despite his wounds, 

LCpl Weinmaster continues to engage the enemy with accurate fire, compelling 

the enemy to withdraw, until he finally collapses from his wounds. For his actions, 

he received the Navy Cross.

13 July Marines of ETT 5-3 and Afghan soldiers aid U.S. Army soldiers of the 503d 

Infantry Regiment in repelling an attack by about 200 insurgents on the small 

U.S. outpost at Vehicle Patrol Base Wanat in eastern Afghanistan. Cpl Jason D. 

Jones, who was subsequently awarded the Silver Star, and a fellow Marine sprint 

through enemy fire with machine guns and ammunition to repel the attack. Jones 

also sprints 35 yards through enemy fire in a separate action during the battle to 

rescue a seriously wounded Afghan soldier. 

21 July The Taliban ambush elements of Company G, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Shewan, a known Taliban base of operations, in Farah Province, Afghanistan. During 

the ambush, then-LCpl Brady A. Gustafson, turret gunner in the lead mine-resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle, which is part of a four-vehicle mounted 

patrol, is hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. The impact incapacitates the driver 

and partially severes Gustafson’s right leg. Despite his life threatening injury, he 

continues to man his M240B machine gun to engage enemy positions only yards 

away. While another Marine applies a tourniquet to his wound, Gustafson reloads 

his weapon, twice firing more than 600 rounds as the vehicles extracted themselves from the danger area. Not until the patrol reaches a safe area and the other 

Marines evacuate the burning vehicle does he allow himself to be treated and evacuated. For his actions, LCpl Gustafson later received the Navy Cross. 
382

__ August The Pentagon orders Task Force 2/7, comprised of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, to 

extend their deployment an extra 30 days. Task Force 2⁄7 was the Marine Corps’ 

first battalion-size unit assigned to train, mentor, and advise the Afghanistan 

National Police.

8 August Marines from 2d Force Reconnaissance Platoon and elements of Company G, 2d 

Battalion, 7th Marines, engage in the Battle of Shewan in Farah Province. The 

platoon of Marines interrupt a meeting of Taliban commanders, inadvertently 

trapping them in their compound. The Marines are ambushed and outnumbered 

almost 8 to 1, facing some 250 insurgents who repeatedly attacked their position. 

Volleys of intense rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and machine-gun fire and 

skillfully adjusted airburst mortar rounds disable one of the platoon’s vehicles and 

trap several Marines in the kill zone. An intense eight-hour battle ensues after the 

initial engagement. Led by GySgt Brian M. Blonder, the Marines begin a series 

of flanking attacks that gain ground, forcing the Taliban out of the entrenched 

positions. Meanwhile, designated marksman Cpl Franklin M. Simmons makes 

20 well-aimed shots that demoralize and defeat a company-size enemy RPG and 

machine-gun ambush by killing 20 enemy fighters despite intense return fire on 

his exposed position. At the end of the day, the Marines not only broke the enemy’s hold on a key supply route in the Bala Baluk District, Farah Province, but 

also broke the enemy’s spirit, forcing them to flee the battlefield weaponless while 

leaving behind more than 50 of their dead. For their actions, GySgt Blonder later 

received the Navy Cross and Cpl Simmons the Silver Star. 

8 September U.S. Marines from the 24th MEU turn over responsibility for Garmsir in Helmand Province to the British and Afghans.

13 October Marines with the 24th MEU begin cycling out of Afghanistan after an eightmonth deployment in support of OEF.

14 November Col Duffy W. White, 3d Marine Regiment commander, assumes command of 

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Afghanistan from Col Peter 

Petronzio, 24th MEU.

26 November 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, relieve 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. 

2009

17 Feb Secretary of Defense Gates orders the deployment of the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB) from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to Afghanistan with 

approximately 8,000 Marines in late Spring 2009.
383

22 March While on a foot patrol in the Now Zad District of Helmand Province, Cpl Michael 

W. Ouellette, Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, is mortally wounded 

by the detonation of an IED. Despite his wounds, Cpl Ouellette calmly organizes 

his squad’s reaction to enemy fire, calling in supporting fires and evacuation helicopters. After ensuring his assistant squad leader had control of the situation, he 

allows himself to be evacuated. For his action, he posthumously received the Navy 

Cross.

5 May Marines from Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 and sailors from Navy Mobile 

Construction Battalion 5 begin work on a 2.2-million-square-foot helicopter parking expansion at Camp Bastion in Afghanistan. The historic project was the largest airfield constructed of aluminum matting ever in a combat zone.

29 May Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)–Afghanistan commanded by BGen Lawrence D. Nicholson assumes command from SPMAGTF–A commanded by Col 

Duffy W. White.

2 July Operation Khanjar conducts clearing operations in key population centers along 

the Helmand River valley in an effort to secure the local population ahead of 

national elections. Nearly 4,000 Marines and sailors from MEB–Afghanistan 

(MEB–A) constitute the bulk of the U.S. forces conducting the operation, along 

with approximately 650 Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National 

Police (ANP) forces.

2 July Marine helicopters from Marine Aircraft Group 40 along with the U.S. Army’s 

82d Combat Aviation Brigade insert more than 2,000 Marines into the Helmand 

River valley in the Marines largest heliborne operation since Vietnam. 

12 August MEB–A launches Operation Eastern Resolve II in the Now Zad District of Helmand Province in an effort to disrupt insurgent violence and intimidation campaigns ahead of provincial and national elections. 

26 August LCpl Donald J. Hogan, Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, Regimental 

Combat Team 7, identifies an imminent command detonated IED attack against 

his squad while on a foot patrol in Helmand Province. He hurls himself into the 

nearest Marine to shield him from the effects and then places himself in the road 

to warn the remainder of the patrol. In the ensuing blast, LCpl Hogan suffers a 

mortal wound. For his actions, he was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross. 
384

8 September Approximately 15 kilometers south in the village of Ganjgal, Kunar Province, 

Afghanistan, Embedded Training Team (ETT) 2-8, Regional Corps Advisory 

Command 3-7, joins with elements of ANA and Afghan Border Police for an operation to conduct a key leader engagement with village elders to discuss security 

development plans. As they approach the village, approximately 50 insurgents in 

well-fortified positions, ambush the patrol along a premeditated one-kilometerlong, U-shaped kill zone. Over the course of a six-hour firefight, Capt Ademola D. 

Fabayo, SSgt Juan Rodriguez-Chavez, and Cpl Dakota L. Meyer, without regard 

for their own personal safety, enter the kill zone four separate times to provide 

cover fire for Marines and Afghan soldiers fighting their way out of the ambush. 

On his fifth trip into the kill zone, Meyer moves on foot under heavy enemy fire to 

recover the bodies of four missing Marine advisors. For their actions, Capt Fabayo 

and SSgt Rodriguez-Chavez were presented with the Navy Cross by Secretary of 

the Navy Ray Mabus in June 2011. In a separate ceremony, Meyer received the 

Medal of Honor from President Barack H. Obama in September 2011. 

30 September HMH-772 (-) (Rein) provides assault support for Operation Azadi South by airlifting approximately 300 British troops into the Lakari Bazaar. 

5 November Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 [VMM-261] becomes the first tiltrotor 

squadron to deploy to Afghanistan when it departs for Camp Bastion, Helmand 

Province. 

1 December President Obama announces plans to send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a planned 18-month surge followed by a gradual drawdown.

4 December VMM-261 inserts 80 reconnaissance Marines into multiple landing zones in vicinity of Now Zad. Marines from 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, then storm the Taliban-controlled town during Operation Cobra’s Anger. 

7 December Responding to President Obama’s surge plan, the Marine Corps announce the 

deployment of an additional 8,500 Marines and sailors to expand MEB–Afghanistan to a full Marine expeditionary force (MEF-Forward) composed of more than 

19,400 Marines and sailors. 
385

Appendix E:

Medal of Honor Citation

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the 

MEDAL OF HONOR to

Corporal Dakota L. Meyer 

United States Marine Corps

For service as set forth in the following

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while 

serving with Marine Embedded Training Team 2-8, Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-7, in Kunar 

Province, Afghanistan, on 8 September 2009. Corporal Meyer maintained security at a patrol rally point 

while other members of his team moved on foot with two platoons of Afghan National Army and Border Police into the village of Ganjgal for a pre-dawn meeting with village elders. Moving into the village, the patrol was ambushed by more than 50 enemy fighters firing rocket propelled grenades, mortars, 

and machine guns from houses and fortified positions on the slopes above. Hearing over the radio that 

four U.S. team members were cut off, Corporal Meyer seized the initiative. With a fellow Marine driving, Corporal Meyer took the exposed gunner’s position in a gun-truck as they drove down the steeply 

terraced terrain in a daring attempt to disrupt the enemy attack and locate the trapped U.S. team. Disregarding intense enemy fire now concentrated on their lone vehicle, Corporal Meyer killed a number 

of enemy fighters with the mounted machine guns and his rifle, some at near point blank range, as he 

and his driver made three solo trips into the ambush area. During the first two trips, he and his driver 

evacuated two dozen Afghan soldiers, many of whom were wounded. When one machine gun became 

inoperable, he directed a return to the rally point to switch to another gun-truck for a third trip into the 

ambush area where his accurate fire directly supported the remaining U.S. personnel and Afghan soldiers fighting their way out of the ambush. Despite a shrapnel wound to his arm, Corporal Meyer made 

two more trips into the ambush area in a third gun-truck accompanied by four other Afghan vehicles 

to recover more wounded Afghan soldiers and search for the missing U.S. team members. Still under 

heavy enemy fire, he dismounted the vehicle on the fifth trip and moved on foot to locate and recover 

the bodies of his team members. Corporal Meyer’s daring initiative and bold fighting spirit throughout 

the 6-hour battle significantly disrupted the enemy’s attack and inspired the members of the combined 

force to fight on. His unwavering courage and steadfast devotion to his U.S. and Afghan comrades in 

the face of almost certain death reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions 

of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Barack H. Obama

President of the United States of America

387

Appendix F: 

Selected Sources and Annotated Bibliography

(Selections in bold type appear in this anthology.)

Published Sources 

Bleu, Christian. “The Afghanistan Analyst Bibliography, 6th Edition.” PhD candidate, Centre for Arab 

and Islamic Studies (Middle East and Central Asia), The Australian National University, July 2011. 

http://afghanistan-analyst.org/bibliography.aspx. 

Comprehensive bibliography on all topics cultural, geographical, and military; a solid starting 

point for the researcher.

Bush, George W. “Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, 7 October 2001.” 

Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001–2008. http://georgewbush-whitehouse

.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf.

Presidential speech to the nation announcing the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Cassidy, Robert M. War, Will, and Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2001–2011. Quantico, 

VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2012.

Author provides both a historical framework and an in-depth scholarly analysis of the insurgency 

on both sides of the Afghan/Pakistan border. It also looks at efforts and outcomes of Coalition 

actions to combat the insurgency to provide recommendations for future improvement. 

Crecca, Thomas W. United States Marine Corps Reserve Operations: 11 September 2001 to November 

2003. New Orleans, LA: U.S Marine Forces Reserve, 2005.

A pictorial history of U.S. Marine Reserve operations in the global war on terrorism. 

Crews, Robert D., and Amin Tarzi, eds. The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008. 

The book is organized into a series of essays that explore the Taliban—its development, rise to 

power, fall after the U.S.-led campaign, and resurgence.

Darack, Edward. Victory Point: Operations Red Wings and Whalers—The Marine Corps Battle for Freedom in Afghanistan. New York: Berkley Trade, 2009.

The embedded reporter details 2d Battalion, 3d Marines’ (2/3’s), participation in Operations 

Red Wings and Whalers during its 2005 tour in Kunar Province.

DeLong, Michael, and Noah Lukeman. Inside CentCom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2004.
388

This book by retired Marine LtGen Michael DeLong details CentCom’s plans and inner 

workings to conduct the global war on terrorism after 9/11 from an insider’s viewpoint. 

Fay, Michael D., Ainsley Fay, and W. Stephen Hill. Fire and Ice: Marine Corps Combat Art from Afghanistan and Iraq: Art Work. Quantico, VA: History Division, Marine Corps University, 2007. 

A booklet that displays the combat artwork of Marine reservist CWO2 Michael D. Fay. Most 

of the art depicts combat operations in Iraq; however, there are several renderings that depict 

Marines guarding the U.S. embassy in Kabul. 

Friedman, Norman. Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War. Annapolis, MD: Naval 

Institute Press, 2003. 

The author discusses the rise of al-Qaeda, adapting the U.S. military to meet twenty-first century 

threats, and America’s early response to 9/11, including Task Force 58 and Operation Anaconda.

Grau, Lester W., trans. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996. 

This discussion of Soviet tactics in Afghanistan is based on self-assessments and after-action 

reports at the company and battalion level arranged in a series of vignettes. The author built 

on an original work by the Soviet Frunze Military Academy and added additional commentary 

based on extensive conversations with veterans of the Soviet Union’s Afghan campaign.

———. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost; the Russian General Staff. Michael 

A. Gress, ed. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002. 

This text offers a complete history of the Soviet experience as written by the Soviet general staff 

and focused on the operational level of war.

Holmes-Eber, Paula, Patrice M. Scanlon, and Andrea L. Hamlen. Applications in Operational Culture: 

Perspectives from the Field. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009. 

Through a series of essays, the publication stresses the importance of cultural awareness and 

incorporating it into operations based on Marine Corps experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the SovietAfghan War. Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, Studies and Analysis Division, 1999.

This title provides an in-depth study of tactics from the perspective of the insurgent.

Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. New York: W. W. Norton 

& Co., 2009. 

The Rand Corporation political scientist argues that Afghanistan’s political corruption and 

exploding drug trade could add America to the list of empires that failed in the Central Asian 

country. 
389

Jones, Seth G., and Arturo Muñoz. Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces. Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010. http://www.rand.org/content/dam

/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1002.pdf. 

The authors argue that the top-down security approach used by the Afghan central government is not effective and largely ignores existing local structures that could be leveraged by 

taking a bottom-up approach to engage the people and isolate insurgents. 

Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press, 2010.

Kilcullen, one of world’s leading authorities on combating insurgencies, was the key senior 

counterinsurgency advisor to Gen David H. Petraeus, USA, in Iraq and later an advisor to Gen 

Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, in Afghanistan. The book presents much of Kilcullen’s work “as 

a unified body of thought” with updated notes as of late 2009.

Lowrey, Nathan S. U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2002: From the Sea. Washington, DC: United 

States Marine Corps, History Division, 2011. 

Lowrey covers the Marine Corps’ initial participation in Operation Enduring Freedom. Focusing 

primarily on the development and rapid employment of the provisional Marine expeditionary 

brigade known as Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58, Lowrey provides a comprehensive look 

at Marine operations in Afghanistan from the seizure of Camp Rhino through Operation 

Anaconda in early 2002. The book also outlines later Marine support for U.S. and NATO 

operations from 2003 onward.

Luttrell, Marcus, and Patrick Robinson. Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing 

and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2007.

Luttrell’s account documents that of the sole survivor of the Navy SEAL team sent to take 

down an al-Qaeda leader in a Taliban stronghold in which 19 sailors and soldiers died trying 

to rescue the Navy SEAL team. Ed Darack, embedded reporter with 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

dismisses the book as it was “written in its entirety by a British writer, Patrick Robinson, who 

penned primarily military fiction titles. In an article written by Robinson in February 2010, 

he states that the Navy chose him to be the ghostwriter of Lone Survivor based on his series of 

novels involving SEALs.”

Magnus, Ralph H., and Eden Naby. Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. 

This title offers a history of Central Asia and Afghanistan through to modern times and a 

detailed account of this tribal society.

Malkasian, Carter, and Gerald Meyerle. How Is Afghanistan Different from Al Anbar? Alexandria, VA: 

CNA Corporation, 2009. 

The authors highlight major differences between al-Anbar, Iraq, and southern Afghanistan 

and their impact on Marine Corps operations.
390

Meyerle, Jerry, Megan Katt, and James A. Gavrilis. On the Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in Practice. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press and CNA Corporation, 2012. 

This study looks at how small units from differing services and Coalition forces adapted and 

defeated insurgents in remote parts of Afghanistan. Three vignettes about Marines detail 

Task Force 2/7’s efforts in 2008, then battalion ops in Helmand Province in 2009, and 

finally Marine advisors embedded with ANA forces in Tagab Valley, east of Kabul, in 2008.

Meyerle, Jerry, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Mike Markowitz, Lonn Waters, Hilary Zarin, Brian Ellison, Chris Jehn, and Bill Rosenau. Conscription in the Afghan Army: Compulsory Service versus an All 

Volunteer Force. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis and Solutions, 2011. http://www.cna.org

/research/2011/conscription-afghan-army. 

The authors discuss the historical aspects of the Afghan military and current efforts to develop 

a national army. The final analysis argues that Afghanistan is best suited to developing an allvolunteer force vice a conscript army.

Munro, Gale, and Joan Thomas. Afghanistan and Iraq: Combat Art: From the United States Navy and 

United States Marine Corps Combat Art Programs. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 2008.

Naylor, Sean. Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda. New York: Berkley 

Books, 2005.

Naylor recounts the details of Operation Anaconda and the command-and-control issues with 

the operation.

Norman, Catherine. What do Afghans want from the Police? Views from Helmand Province. Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2012. http://www.cna.org/research/2012/what-do-afghans

-want-police-views-helmand-province. 

This study was conducted at the behest of Regional Command-Southwest (RC-SW) to make 

police training more effective and more accurately reflect Afghans values and needs. Marine 

leaders at RC-SW understood that the Western ideal of a police force is a foreign concept 

sure to lose support following a withdrawal of Coalition forces. The study’s data came from 

information collected from Helmand Province in late 2010. It recommends focusing training 

to develop a literate and functional staff for district police chiefs, police engagement with the 

local population, and continued support for police trainers once the military withdraws.

Obama, Barack H. “Remarks by the President in an Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 01 December 2009.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press

-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 

Presidential speech that announced the “surge” of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.
391

———“Remarks by the President Awarding the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Dakota Meyer, 15 

September 2011.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/15/remarks-president

-awarding-medal-honor-sergeant-dakota-meyer.

Presidential remarks during the award ceremony for Sgt Dakota Meyer whereby Meyer was 

awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, on 8 September 2009.

Perito, Robert M. “The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified.” United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005. http://www.usip.org/publications/us-experience-provincial-reconstruction

-teams-afghanistan-lessons-identified. 

This report was created as part of USPI’s Afghanistan Experience Project. The report used 

interviews conducted with American and foreign officials, soldiers, and nongovernmental organization’s that worked directly with PRTs and Marine battalions in Afghanistan.

Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: 

Yale University Press, 2000. 

This pre-9/11 study of the Taliban and Islamic fundamentalism explains its origins, its 

impact on Afghanistan, and how the country became the nerve center for Islamic terrorism.

Rosenau, William. Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press and CNA Corporation, 2011.

This work relates experiences, challenges, and limitations of the police training and mentoring 

program in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2009. The publication is organized in a series of 10 

vignettes based on the experiences of British, U.S. Army, and U.S. Marine Corps advisors. 

Schlosser, Nicholas J., and James M. Caiella, eds. Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq and 

Beyond. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2011.

Dr. Schlosser’s and Mr. Caiella’s work documents topics discussed at a 2009 symposium, 

“Counterinsurngency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond.” Section topics focus on 

the development and importance of leadership at each level from company grade to general 

officer in combating insurgencies based on experiences in America’s recent wars. 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2009. New York, 2009. http://

www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2009_summary.pdf.

This annually revised report provides data on opium production in 2009, which centers around 

Helmand Province as a major source of income for the Taliban.
392

U.S. Army. Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook. Handbook No. 11-16. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2011. 

This handbook provides current U.S. government interagency lessons learned and the most 

effective practices for PRT administration in Afghanistan.

———. Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010. 

Wanat is a battle study detailing combat actions of U.S. Army soldiers and Marines from 

Embedded Training Team 5-3 along with Afghan National Army soldiers against approximately 

200 insurgents forces at a small combat outpost in the Waygal Valley, Nuristan Province. 

U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5. Washington, DC: 

Headquarters Department of the Army and Headquarters Marine Corps Combat Development Command, December 2006.

Counterinsurgency serves as a doctrinal manual that was developed by the U.S. Army and 

Marine Corps for conducting COIN. The author and the leading counterinsurgency expert, 

David Kilcullen, called it “the most important initiative” undertaken by the Services and 

sponsored jointly by Army Gen David H. Petraeus and Marine Corps Gen James N. Mattis. 

U.S. Department of Defense. News briefing with Gen Conway from the Pentagon. 27 August 2008. 

http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4279. 

This 2008 press conference by Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen James T. Conway 

covers the drawdown in Iraq and buildup of Marine Corps forces in Afghanistan that was 

originally proposed in 2007. 

———. DOD News Briefing with MajGen Toolan via teleconference from Afghanistan. 16 June 2011. 

http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4844. 

A 2011 press conference with RC-Southwest commander MajGen John A. Toolan about the 

2011 campaign and transition to civilian/ANA security forces with RC-SW. 

West, Bing. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan. New York: Random House 

Inc., 2012. 

West’s book argues that Afghanistan is not a good fit for the counterinsurgency strategy adopted 

by U.S. and Coalition forces. He also details the events that led to Sgt Dakota L. Meyers’ Medal 

of Honor. However, McClatchy DC News’ embedded field correspondent wrote firsthand 

accounts of that fateful day and disputes West’s version of events.

Wise Jr., James E., and Scott Baron. The Silver Star: Navy and Marine Corps Gallantry in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Conflicts. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008.
393

The authors discuss the origins of the Silver Star Medal and list Marine Corps recipients with 

summaries of action and citation. At the date of publication, only four Marines thus far have 

received the medal from Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Unpublished Sources

Albano, Major Lou. Transcript of interview by Operational Leadership Experiences in the global war 

on terrorism. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 29 January 2009.

A project of the Combat Studies Institute, the Operational Leadership Experiences Interview 

Collection archives firsthand, multiservice accounts from military personnel who planned, 

participated in, and supported operations in the global war on terrorism. Albano’s account 

details his experiences as a Marine Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion pilot during the seizure of 

Camp Rhino and follow-on operations in late 2001 to early 2002.

Barber, Capt Robert G. Transcript of interview by Marine Corps History Division. Quantico, 

VA: Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Division, 10 September 2010.

Barber describes his experience as the Combat Logistics Battalion 3 (CLB-3) operations officer 

for SPMAGTF–A. The interview details the organization and global sourcing to field the logistics 

element of the SPMAGTF and also discusses tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), such 

as “honesty traces” to counter IEDs. Honesty traces were a technique used by Marines in the 

field to trace their routes and potentially predict where insurgents might distribute IEDs.

Clinton Jr., Maj Thomas. Transcript of interview by Operational Leadership Experiences in the 

global war on terrorism. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 12 March 2007.

Maj Clinton was deployed to Afghanistan in 2004 and led a 13-man embedded training team 

(ETT) to mentor 1st Battalion, 3d Afghan National Army Brigade.

Nicholson, BGen Lawrence D. Transcript of interview by Marine Corps History Division. Quantico, VA: Oral History Collection. Marine Corps History Division, 9 June 2010. 

A wide-ranging interview with the 2d MEB–A commanding general about the development 

and employment of the MEB to Afghanistan. The interview covers many topics, including 

Nicholson’s views on how Marine Corps amphibious warfare doctrine is still relevant even in 

a landlocked country like Afghanistan, COIN, logistics, and Operation Khanjar. 

Runkle, LCdr Michael. Transcript of interview by Operational Leadership Experiences in the global 

war on terrorism. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 17 April 2007.

LCdr Runkle recalls his time as the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer in charge of a 

joint Marine/Navy EOD team at Kandahar International Airport.
394

Stengrim, Maj David. Transcript of interview by Operational Leadership Experiences in the global war 

on terrorism. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 3 November 2010.

Stengrim served as the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit communications officer (S-6) during 

2008 in support of OEF. Maj Stengrim discusses the MEU organization and the communications 

department’s efforts to establish communications assets at forward operating bases in Afghanistan.

Vest, Col Kevin S. Transcript of interview by Marine Corps History Division. Quantico, VA: Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Division, 3 December 2010.

Col Kevin S. Vest served as the ACE commander for 2d MEB–Afghanistan. This interview 

covers Operation Khanjar, the Marine Corps’ largest heliborne operation since Vietnam, as 

well as the sourcing and deployment of the MAG. 

U.S. Marine Corps. Aviation Combat Element (ACE)-Forward (FWD) Battle Staff Operations: Lessons 

and Best Practices from 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Quantico, VA: Center for Marine Corps Lessons Learned. 

Official document that describes many details of how 3d MAW staffed and integrated combined 

staff to support operations in Regional Command-Southwest. Lessons are broken down by 

functional area within the staff.

———. Marine Light Attack Squadron 773 (-) Reinforced, Summary of Action, 1 October 2003–

31 May 2005. Quantico, VA: Unit Award File Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division. 

The unit award files contain detailed information on unit-specific participation in various 

operations as well as chronological records of actions in the award summaries. 

———. Meyer, Dakota L. Quantico, VA: Subject Files, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division. 

Files related to Sgt Meyer’s service and actions related to him receiving the Medal of Honor.

———. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Tactical Units with Strategic Impact. Quantico, 

VA: Center for Marine Corps Lessons Learned.

This document offers observations and lessons based mainly on information from three PRTs 

primarily in southeastern Afghanistan.

———. Report of the Afghanistan Marine Energy Assessment Team, December 2009. Washington, 

DC, 2011. http://www.worldcat.org/title/report-of-the-afghanistan-marine-energy-assessment-team

/oclc/703167366.

The Marine Energy Assessment Team (MEAT) report was driven by the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps (CMC) to address the energy and logistical challenges of operating in austere 

environments with a pervasive asymmetric threat. 

———. USMC Tank Operations In Afghanistan: Delta Co, 1 Tank Battalion After Action Report. 
395

Quantico, VA: Center for Marine Corps Lessons Learned.

This report provides a detailed description of how the first U.S. main battle tanks to operate 

in-country successfully adapted to the counterinsurgency role.

———. Quantico, VA: Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Division. 

The Marine Corps Oral History Collection contains numerous interviews with current and 

retired Marines of varying grade and specialty. Databases can be searched and researchers can 

view a summary of the data contained in the interview, however, most are not yet transcribed. 

———. 22d MEU Unit File. Quantico, VA: Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division. 

———. 24th MEU Unit File. Quantico, VA: Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division. 

The History Division Reference Branch contains a mix of primary and secondary source 

material related to specific unit awards, history, and deployments. 

Articles

Alfonso, Sgt Juan D. “Afghanistan deployed aviation combat element performs above, beyond expectations.” Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, 24 May 2009. http://www.dvidshub.net

/news/34018/afghanistan-deployed-aviation-combat-element-performs-above-beyond-expectations#

.UnEg4u0gIqY. 

This article discusses the 2d MEB–Afghanistan aviation combat element of the MAGTF, 

providing the type/model/series breakdown of missions and units participating.

Allison, Dr. Fred H. “Bagram Nightmares.” U.S. Marines in Battle, Afghanistan, 2001–2009: 

Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 45–53, 2014.

Article by Dr. Fred Allison covers the first AV-8B Harrier deployment to Bagram, Afghanistan. 

An edited version of this article was previously located at http://www.sldinfo.com.

———. “Thunderbolts: Strike First Marine Corps Blow Against Taliban.” Leatherneck 85, no. 

11, 28–31, November 2002.

The article discusses VMFA-251 sorties over Afghanistan while based aboard USS Theodore 

Roosevelt (CVN 71) in the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Ardolino, Bill. “On Patrol in Karamanda: Scenes from the War in Afghanistan.” The Weekly Standard 

Online Edition, 11 July 2010. http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/patrol-karamanda. 

The embedded reporter follows 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, in northern Helmand Province.

Bailey, Timothy J. “Why Not Afghanistan?” Marine Corps Gazette 91, no. 8, 14–17, August 2007.

The author argues that “Afghanistan represents a perfect ‘small war’ situation—a type of combat 

for which Marines are exceptionally well suited.”
396

Baker, William T., and Mark L. Evans. “The Year in Review.” Naval Aviation News 85, no. 5, 24–32, 

July/August 2003. 

The article briefly describes Navy/Marine Corps contributions to Operation Anaconda.

Barno, LtGen David W. (USA).“Fighting ‘The Other War’: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005.” Military Review 87, no. 5, 32–44, September/October 2007.

Gen Barno, USA, outlines changes to U.S. strategy in Afghanistan to create a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign against al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants to allow national elections 

and reconstruction efforts to move forward followed by a summary of events and situational 

update as of 2007. 

Biggio, Frank. “Afghanistan Can Be Won.” The Weekly Standard Online Edition, 2 July 2010. http://

www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/afghanistan-can-be-won.

This blog post was written by a Marine reservist who argues that the bottom-up implementation of COIN by Marines is working. 

Brill Jr., Arthur P. “Afghanistan Diary, Corps Considerations: Lessons Learned in Phase One.” 

Seapower 45, no. 4, 75–79, April 2002.

The author recounts the initial introduction of Task Force 58 into Afghanistan.

Brinkley, C. Mark. “Business as Usual?–Despite Predictions, Marine Action in War on Terror May Be 

Limited.” Marine Corps Times, 8 October 2001. 

This article reports the opinions of some analysts who wrongly predicted that the Marine Corps 

would play little part in Afghanistan due to its distance from the coast as a landlocked country.

Broberg, Scott E. “Are We Properly Prepared for Helicopter Operations in Afghanistan?” Marine Corps 

Gazette 86, no. 5, 70–74, May 2002.

The author discusses the capabilities and limitations of Marine Corps helicopters in Afghanistan.

Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Letting Women Reach Women in Afghan War.” The New York Times, 6 March 

2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/world/asia/07women.html?_r=0.

Bumiller covers the efforts of Female Engagement Teams to interact with “the other 50 percent 

of the Afghan population.”

Burgess, Richard R. “Limiting Exposure.” Seapower 54, no. 3, 40, March 2011.

This article discusses Marine Corps experiments with unmanned cargo delivery systems in 

Afghanistan, using the Kaman K-Max helicopter and the Boeing A160T Hummingbird 

unmanned aerial helicopter, to resupply isolated combat outposts vice relying on vulnerable 

vehicle convoys.
397

——— . “Navy and Marine Corps Units Continue Hunt for Terrorists.” Seapower 45, no. 2, 19–21, 

February 2002.

The author discusses the Navy/Marine Corps team’s initial and continued contributions to the 

fight in Afghanistan during 2001–2.

——— . “The Yankees are Coming.” Seapower 52, no. 11, 34, November 2009.

The article discusses the arrival of the new Bell UH-1Y Venom utility helicopter to Afghanistan.

Cannon, Christopher J., and Christian B. Peterson. “Expeditionary Logistics in the Mountainous Environment.” Marine Corps Gazette 88, no. 11, 30, 32, and 34, 2004.

The article discusses the logistical challenges that the 22d MEU Service Support Group faced 

in the mountainous terrain of central Afghanistan. 

Carroll, LtCol Patrick J., and CW05 Terry Walker. “Victory in Afghanistan.” Marine Corps 

Gazette 94, no. 7, 22–25, July 2010. 

The authors describe Joint Security Academy Shorabak (JSAS), a Marine Corps-led academy 

at Camp Shorabak, Helmand Province, where, in addition to core skills, the Marines teach 

marksmanship and combat patrolling to develop a police force capable of routine patrolling 

and defeating insurgents through superior tactics and training.

Cavan, Joshua, and Bob Bullard. “The Next Decade.” Marine Corps Gazette 88, no. 11, 21–23, November 2004.

This article outlines Marine Corps operations in Afghanistan.

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “At Afghan Outpost, Marines Gone Rogue or Leading the Fight 

Against Counterinsurgency?” The Washington Post, 14 March 2010. http://www.washington

post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/13/AR2010031302464.html.

Better known as the “Marineistan article,” the author investigates Marine Corps counterinsurgency efforts and arguments to conduct the war as a MAGTF in relative autonomy compared 

with Army units. Chandrasekaran cites the Marine way of war as having “riled many up the 

chain of command in Kabul and Washington, prompting some to refer to their area of operations in the south as ‘Marineistan’.” They viewed Helmand Province as a Marine Corps fiefdom and sought to “impose more control over the Marines.”

———. “Marines Launch Mission in Afghanistan’s South Focused on Security and Governance.”

The Washington Post, 2 July 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article

/2009/07/01/AR2009070103202.html?hpid=topnews&utm_source=wordtwit&utm_medium=social

&utm_campaign=wordtwit.

This article describes MEB–Afghanistan’s initial thrust into Helmand Province during Operation 

Khanjar (Strike of the Sword) ahead of Afghan elections.
398

Chivers, C. J. “Afghans Voice Their Fears Among Marja Campaign.” The New York Times, 21 February 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/22/world/asia/22civilian.html. 

Chivers’ article discusses a Marine/Afghan civilian “shura” in the wake of the Marine-led 

assault into Marja. 

———. “Marines Do Heavy Lifting as Afghan Army Lags in Battle.” The New York Times, 20 February 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/21/world/asia/21afghan.html?pagewanted=all. 

The author questions official assertions from Coalition headquarters in Kabul that the Afghan 

National Army “is planning the missions and leading both the fight and the effort to engage 

with Afghan civilians.” 

Cooke, LCdr Leonard W. W. “A Deployment To Remember: The Navy’s Seabees in Afghanistan.” Seapower 45, no. 10, 55–57, October 2002.

The article recounts the deployment of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 to Afghanistan in support of Task Force 58 to provide a contingency engineering capability. 

Cooling, Norman, Dale Alford, Chip Bierman, and James Donnellan. “Retooling for Afghanistan.” 

Marine Corps Gazette 93, no. 10, 10–16, October 2009.

This article was written by battalion commanders previously deployed to Afghanistan.

Cuomo, Scott A. “Embedded Training Teams.” Marine Corps Gazette 90, no. 6, 62–67, June 2006.

The author discusses problems with ETT selection, training, employment, and ways to improve 

their effectiveness.

Curvin, Cpl Michael. “Bomb Materials and Narcotics Seized in Afghanistan Bazaar.” Defense 

Video and Imagery Distribution System, 23 July 2009. http://www.dvidshub.net/news/36697/

bomb-materials-and-narcotics-seized-afghanistan-bazaar. 

The article discusses Marine efforts to stem poppy production, which provides a major source 

of the Taliban’s funding, and to interrupt IED networks. 

Darack, Ed. “From Bridgeport to Blessing.” Marine Corps Gazette 90, no. 8, 54–57, August 2006.

This freelance reporter, who later wrote about Operation Red Wings, shares his experiences 

going through mountain warfare training with 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, then on deployment 

to Afghanistan.

———. “Operation Red Wings.” Marine Corps Gazette 95, no. 1, 62–67, January 2011. 

Until 2008, Marine battalions most often deployed not as part of a MAGTF but as an infantry 

battalion integrated into a combined joint task force (CJTF). Darack’s article details the friction 

between successive Marine units and Special Operations Forces sharing the same operational 

area and its contribution to the failure and loss of life during Operation Red Wings.
399

Decotiis, 2dLt Art G. “Le Petit Beourge du Decotiis.” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 7, 36–38, 

July 2002.

Decotiis discusses Kilo Company’s 1st Platoon defense in Kandahar, Afghanistan. 

Drwiega, Andrew. “USMC and JHF(A) Unite in War on Taliban.” Aviation Today, 1 August 2010. http://

www.aviationtoday.com/regions/mideast/USMC-and-JHFA-Unite-in-War-on-Taliban_70361.html.

The article discusses integration of UK rotary-wing aircraft into 3d MAW (FWD) in 2010.

Ducar, Matthew S., James B. Hunt, and James K. McBride. “Joint Aviation in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM V.” Marine Corps Gazette 88, no. 11, 35–37, November 2004.

The authors recount that success in Operation Enduring Freedom V was due, in part, to the 

joint aviation that Marines relied on in addition to their own organic aircraft.

Dunham, Oliver H. “Elections in Small Wars.” Marine Corps Gazette 93, no. 8, 46–51, August 2009.

Dunham details not only the importance of elections to establishing a legitimate government, 

but how the U.S. military can be better prepared to support them.

Dunlap Jr., Charles J. “Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today.” Parameters 38, no. 

2, Summer 2008. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/08summer/dunlap.pdf. 

Dunlap argues that, despite (COIN) FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5’s relative lack of emphasis on 

airpower, ground commanders came to rely on it extensively because of advances in precise 

targeting.

Falivene, Jason T. “A Tour in the Life.” Marine Corps Gazette 92, no. 3, 37–39, March 2008.

The article discusses effective command and control in combat from the perspective of a 

battalion S-6 (communications).

Fick, Nathaniel, and John Nagle. “The ‘Long War’ May Be Getting Shorter.” The New York Times, 20 

February 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/opinion/21nagl.html?_r=1. 

The authors argue that U.S. COIN strategy has placed Afghanistan at a tipping point.

Hastings, Michael. “King David’s War.” Rolling Stone, 2 February 2011. http://www.rollingstone.com

/politics/news/king-davids-war-20110202. 

The author critiques then-ISAF commander Gen David Petraeus’ efforts to implement COIN 

strategy in Afghanistan.

Henderson, Clayton. “Weapons Platoon in the Defense of Kandahar.” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 

7, 42–45, July 2002.

Henderson discusses obstacles the platoon overcame to effectively employ the weapons platoon, 

while still adhering to traditional defensive fundamentals and crew-served weapons techniques. 
400

Henderson, Kristin. “A Change in Mission: Marines Battle Insurgents in Afghanistan.” The Washington Post Magazine, 21 June 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article

/2009/06/12/AR2009061202123.html. 

The article focuses on Task Force 2/7’s 2008 deployment to Afghanistan with an embedded 

reporter with F Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.

Hilburn, Matt. “Beans and Bullets.” Seapower 49, no. 8, 46–47, August 2006.

The 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, experiment with distributed operations to test the latest 

in communication equipment to link various elements to higher and supporting fires. The 

experiment conducted under tactical conditions also highlighted logistical constraints where 

both the rugged terrain and the Taliban are considerations to conducting resupply operations.

———. “Onto the Battlefield.” Seapower 49, no. 8, 44–45, August 2006.

When 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, deployed to Afghanistan, it 

tested the Marine Corps’ new concept of distributed operations (DO) where squad-size units 

operate independently of each other while still linked to higher through advanced communications equipment.

Hodge, Nathan. “How To: Run an ‘Honesty Trace’ to Counter Roadside Bombs.” In Danger Room 

in Afghanistan Blog, Wired Magazine Online Edition, 25 August 2009. http://www.wired.com

/dangerroom/2009/08/how-to-run-an-honesty-trace-to-counter-roadside-bombs/#more-16382. 

A blog article about how former Wall Street Journal reporter turned Marine intel officer, 1stLt 

Matthew Pottinger, developed a system for CLB-3 using handheld GPS data to create “honesty 

traces.” The system allows a patrol/convoy to plot its actual path vice the planned route to look 

for areas that naturally canalize troops and that are likely ambush areas.

Hoffman, Maj Randall S. “The Way Ahead: Reclaiming the Pashtun Tribes through Joint Tribal Engagement.” In Applications in Operational Culture: Perspectives from the Field. Paula Holmes-Eber, Patrice M. 

Scanlon, and Andrea L. Hamlen, eds., 79–116. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009.

Maj Hoffman’s article is part of a larger work on the importance of understanding culture and 

incorporating that knowledge into current and future operations.

Hogberg, Col James A. “The Chai Patrols-Conducting Stability Operations in Afghanistan.” 

U.S. Marines in Battle, Afghanistan, 2001–2009: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 99–109, 2014.

Col Jim Hogberg, PRT commander in Helmand Province, reflects on lessons learned, successes, 

and difficulties experienced on his 2005 tour. 

Holterman, Jay M. “The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Seizure of Camp Rhino.” Marine Corps 

Gazette 86, no. 6, 41–43, June 2002.
401

Jay Holterman is the assault flight leader for the six CH-53Es that executed the longest amphibious 

airfield seizure in the history of the U.S. Marine Corps. 

Hough, Mike. “Aviation Command and Control Transformation.” Aviation Command and Control 

Transformation: Wings of Gold 29, no. 3, 24 and 31, Fall 2004.

The author discusses the expeditionary nature of Marine forces, particularly how Marines from 

the 15th MEU’s Marine Air Control Group 38 detachment were among the first in-country 

and enabled follow-on positive air space control for air assault forces into Camp Rhino.

Jackson, Joseph A. “Moving Artillery Forward: A Concept for the Fight in Afghanistan.” Fires, 19–24, 

March–April 2011.

This article discusses the “artillery gap” that existed, especially early in the Afghan War, and 

argues for the adoption of a smaller 75mm mountain howitzer similar to those that saw service 

in WWII and the Korean War.

Jaffe, Gregg. “LtGen John Kelly, Who Lost Son to War, Says U.S. Largely Unaware of Sacrifice.” The 

Washington Post, 2 March 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/01

/AR2011030106355.html. 

Gregg describes the personal loss of Gen Kelly along with the military’s own worries that the 

American public is isolated and detached from both the war and the men and women of the 

Armed Services.

Jansen, John M., Nicolas Dienne, William T. Bufkin, James B. Sisler, et al. “The Tower of Babel: Joint 

Close Air Support Performance at the Operational Level.” Marine Corps Gazette 87, no. 3, 33–38, 

March 2003.

The authors offer a discussion and critique of joint close air support (JCAS) performance in 

Afghanistan during Operation Anaconda by aviators from different Services. 

Jarvis, James D. “Kabul, Afghanistan Marines Return to Reclaim Their Post.” 26th MEU Public Affairs, 

11 December 2001. http://www.marines.mil/unit/26thmeu/Pages/2001/Kabul,%20Afghanistan%20

Marines%20return%20to%20reclaim%20their% 20post.aspx. 

Jarvis describes Marines from the 26th MEU and their return to the U.S. embassy that had 

been left shuttered for more than a decade.

Kemp, Robert E. “Local Governance and COIN in Eastern Afghanistan 2004–2008.” Military Review

91, no. 1, 54–63, January/February 2011.

Kemp discusses local governance and PRTs in eastern Afghanistan during 2004–8, where 

Marine battalions and ETTs provided security for reconstruction efforts and trained Afghan 

security forces. 
402

Khan, Asad. “Pakistan—An Enduring Friend.” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 6, 34–37, June 2002.

LtCol Asad L. Khan, who would later command BLT 1/6 during the 22d MEU’s successful 

COIN operations in 2004, relates the importance of Pakistan’s cooperation to transit from 

ship-to-shore movement of logistics.

Kreisher, Otto. “Ethos of Energy Efficiency,” Seapower 54, no. 6, 14, June 2011.

The article describes 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, actions in Sangin District, Helmand Province, while testing experimental renewable energy sources to reduce expeditionary forces reliance on fossil fuels, such as diesel, which are expensive and make easy targets for asymmetric 

attacks on vulnerable convoys.

———. “MARSOC Evolves.” Seapower 53, no. 6, 10, June 2010.

The author discusses MARSOC’s evolving role from its inception in 2006 to its current focus 

in Afghanistan training the ANA and protecting the civilian population.

Kugler, Richard. “Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle.” 

In Case Studies in Defense Transformation, no. 5. Fort McNair, Washington, DC: National Defense 

University, 2007.

Among other aspects, Dr. Kugler’s investigation highlights the competing chains of command 

and lack of coordination with regards to joint air assets as learning points that the U.S. military 

took away from the battle.

Kummer, David. “MoonLancers.” Leatherneck, 32–36, May 2012.

The article discusses VMFA-212’s historic deployment as an F/A-18 Hornet composite squadron 

made up of two different type/model/series aircraft. It also details the squadron’s little-known 

contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom from its base in Kuwait, which required a 

grueling nine-hour flight for each mission. 

Lamothe, Dan. “Ambush Survivor Up for Medal of Honor.” Marine Corps Times, 8 November 2010. 

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20101108/NEWS/11080310/. 

———. “MoH Nominee Says He Does Not Feel Like a Hero.” Marine Corps Times, 23 November 

2010. http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20101123/NEWS/11230318/MoH-nominee-says

-he-does-not-feel-like-a-hero.

———. “Obama OKs Medal of Honor for Living Marine.” Marine Corps Times, 19 July 2011. http://

www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20110719/NEWS/107190308/Obama-OKs-Medal-of-Honor-for

-living-Marine. 

These articles cover the nomination of Sgt Dakota L. Meyer for the Medal of Honor.
403

———. “Outnumbered But Not Outgunned: Marines Overcome 8-to-1 Odds During an 8-Hour 

Battle.” Military Times, 21 December 2008. http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2008/12/marine

_20Kills_122108w/. 

This article covers the Battle of Shewan, where elements of Task Force 2/7 were attacked by 

more than 250 enemy fighters. 

Landay, Jonathan S. “‘We’re Pinned Down’: 4 U.S. Marines Die in Afghan Ambush.” McClatchy 

Newspapers, 8 September 2009. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/09/08/75036/were-pinned-down

-4-us-marines.html. 

A primary account posted by embedded reporter Jonathan S. Landay about the ambush in 

Ganjgal, Afghanistan, in which four Marines of ETT 2-8 were killed and the heroic attempts 

by several Marines to rescue their comrades, which led to then-Cpl Dakota Meyer eventually 

receiving the Medal of Honor.

Landis, 1stLt Jeff. “Leatherneck Air on Target During Operation Anaconda.” Leatherneck 85, 

no. 6, 20–21, June 2002.

This article briefly describes Marine close air support during Operation Anaconda.

Legree, Larry. “Thoughts on the Battle for the Minds: IO and COIN in the Pashtun Belt.” Military 

Review 90, no. 5, 21–31, September/October 2010.

Cdr Larry Legree, USN, offers his perspective on COIN from that of a Kunar Province PRT 

commander.

Lewis, Ray. “Task Force 2/7 Aids in Training Afghan Police Recruits.” 20 June 2008. http://

www.1stmardiv.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/8585/Article/88567/task-force-27-aids

-in-training-afghan-police-recruits.aspx.

This short news report describes the mission of Task Force 2/7. 

Lowe, Christian. “A Mission Ends: As Army, NATO Troops Take Over in Afghanistan, Marines 

Reflect on a Tour that ‘you never forget’.” Marine Corps Times, 29 May 2006. 

The article discusses the Marine pullout from Afghanistan in 2006 and provides an overview 

of Marine operations to date. 

———. “On Watch in Kabul.” Marine Corps Times, 8 July 2002. 

The author discusses 4th MEB (AT) duties to secure the U.S. embassy in early 2002. 

Lubin, Andrew. “Afghanistan—The War Escalates.” Proceedings 134, no. 9, 24–28, September 2008.

The article highlights 24th MEU, which deployed to Afghanistan in early 2008 before the surge.
404

———. “Arty in Afghanistan: We’re Here to Shoot.” Leatherneck 93, no. 1, 38–42, January 2010.

The author describes the employment of the first USMC artillery battalion to deploy to 

Afghanistan in support of the larger Marine Corps mission.

MacMannis, Andrew R., and Robert B. Scott. “Operation RED WINGS.” Marine Corps Gazette 90, 

no. 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20, December 2006.

The article was written by the commanding officer and executive officer for 2d Battalion, 3d 

Marines, and highlights unresolved command-and-control and fire support issues in the joint 

operating environment at the time of Operation Red Wings and its successor.

Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 7, 42, July 2002.

The entire issue focuses on significant events relating to the Marine Corps’ seizure and defense of 

the Kandahar International Airport shortly after the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. 

“Marine General Shelves Troop Shift Plan.” FoxNews Network. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,315

460,00.html. 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates postponed a planned Marine shift from Anbar Province, 

Iraq, to Afghanistan in 2007 due to concerns that security gains could be reversible.

“Marine receives Silver Star in Okinawa.” Marine Corps Times, 4 April 2009. http://www.marine

corpstimes.com/news/2009/04/marine_silverstar_040309w/.

The article covers the deployment of Cpl Jason Jones with Embedded Training Team, 5th 

Battalion, 3d Marines. Jones received the Silver Star for his part in fending off a 13 July 2008 

attack by approximately 200 insurgents on a small U.S. outpost in eastern Afghanistan.

Maz, Capt Matthew M., 1stLt Jason R. Gibbs, 1stLt David Litkenhaus, and 1stLt Wayne A. Wood. 

“Artillery ‘Gruntz’ it Out.” Marine Corps Gazette 88, no. 11, 43, 44, and 46, November 2004.

The authors discuss the 22d MEU’s artillery battery transitioning to conduct provisional rifle 

company duties.

McKenzie, Col Kenneth F., Maj Roberta L. Shea, and Maj Christopher Phelps. “Marines Deliver 

in Mountain Storm.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 130, no. 11, 48–53, November 2004.

This article covers the 22d MEU’s 2004 deployment to Afghanistan as the theater reserve force 

that became the Coalition’s main effort for the 2004 campaign season.

McNerney, Michael J. “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters 35, no. 4, 32–46, Winter 2005/2006.

McNerney expounds on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ (PRTs’) importance to Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Despite challenges, he argues that PRTs represented the few coordinated civil/military missions undertaking reconstruction in Afghanistan.
405

Merida, Paul. “Dismounted Infantry Operations.” Marine Corps Gazette 88, no. 11, 39–41, November 2004.

Merida discusses areas in which an infantry company learned valuable lessons from its experiences 

in Afghanistan.

Metcalf, Alex S., Jason A. Richardson, Augusto F. Santa Cruz, Antione J. Howell, et al. “Kandahar 

Ambush Patrols.” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 11, 56–58, November 2002.

The authors discuss Kilo Company, 6th Marines, BLT 3/6, 26th MEU (Special Operations 

Capable) (26th MEU[SOC]) in Operations Enduring and Swift Freedom. Specifically, an 

average 24-hour ambush patrol is presented.

Meyer, Maj Samuel L. “Combined Arms in Afghanistan: CAX Was Not That Bad.” Marine Corps 

Gazette 93, no. 8, 37–42, August 2009.

Meyer espouses the continuing relevance of combined arms and the MAGTF based on the 

24th MEU’s 2008 deployment to Afghanistan.

Milks, Keith A. “22d MEU Public Affairs in the Forgotten War.” Marine Corps Gazette 88, no. 11, 

50–51, November 2004.

Milks describes the role and importance of public affairs (PA) to get the story out in Afghanistan.

Naylor, Sean D. “Marines Push to Take Lead in Afghanistan.” Marine Corps Times, 11 October 2007. 

Naylor’s article describes the Marine initiative to leave Anbar Province, Iraq, and shift its 

capabilities to Afghanistan to the concern of some senior Army officials who worried the Marine 

Corps was too light, lacking both the manpower and infrastructure to lead the mission, while 

at the same time reviving intraservice rivalry between the Army and Marine Corps. 

Nelson, Soraya Sarhaddi. “Woman to Woman: A New Strategy in Afghanistan.” NPR Online, 7 September 2009. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112606206. 

Nelson describes the contributions of women Marines serving on Female Engagement Teams 

(FET) to interact with the other half of the Afghan population as part of COIN strategy. 

Nissenbaum, Dion. “For Marines, Marjah market is battleground for Afghans’ trust.” McClatchy 

Newspapers, 4 April 2010. http://www.stripes.com/news/for-marines-marjah-market-is-battleground

-for-afghans-trust-1.100601. 

The article describes the Marine Corps’ ongoing COIN efforts to overcome suspicion and fear 

of the Taliban to win over local Afghans.

———. “McChrystal calls Marjah a ‘bleeding ulcer’ in Afghan campaign.” McClatchy Newspapers, 24 

May 2010. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/24/94740/mcchrystal-calls-marjah-a-bleeding.html. 
406

Nissenbaum discusses meetings between then-ISAF commander Gen Stanley McChrystal and 

Marines on the ground in Marjah to show friction between military realities and the Obama 

administration’s initial plan to begin withdrawing forces from Afghanistan in July 2011.

Nusbaumer, Stewart. “With Special Operations Marines in Afghanistan.” Leatherneck 92, no. 11, 

40–45, November 2009.

Nusbaumer describes his time embedded with Marine Special Operations Teams (MSOTs) 

from Company F, 2d Marine Special Operations Battalion, in Herat Province.

Osbourne, William V. “Southwestern Afghanistan.” Marine Corps Gazette 93, no. 7, 47–50, July 2009.

Osbourne describes the physical and human terrain of southern Afghanistan as seen by Task 

Force 2/7’s intel officer.

Perry, LtCol Brian D. “The Embassy: Kabul.” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 12, 34–36, December 2002.

Perry describes his journey through Kabul, Afghanistan, to the U.S. embassy that had been 

left derelict since the U.S. evacuation a decade earlier.

“Ready to Fight.” Marine Corps Gazette 88, no. 11, 14–17, November 2004.

This article describes the 22d MEU’s 2004 deployment to Afghanistan and the training that 

enabled it to succeed along with the key lessons learned.

Roberson, Matthew, C. Mark Brinkley, and Gordon Lubold. “4th MEB Lands to Secure Embassy—AntiTerror Unit Provides Large Force to Relieve 26th MEU Troops.” Marine Corps Times, 14 January 2002.

The authors discuss the arrival of elements of 4th MEB (AT) that were established shortly 

after 9/11.

Roberts, Adam. “Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War.” Survival 44, no. 1, 7–32, 

Spring 2002. 

Roberts discusses enemy prisoner of war (EPW) handling procedures at the outset of the war 

on terrorism.

Rosen, Nir. “How We Lost the War We Won: Rolling Stone’s 2008 Journey Into Taliban-Controlled 

Afghanistan.” Rolling Stone, 31 January 2011. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-we-lost

-the-war-we-won-rolling-stones-2008-journey-into-taliban-controlled-afghanistan-20110131. 

The article follows the reporter’s journey into areas reclaimed by the Taliban despite years 

of U.S. efforts to build up indigenous forces and rebuild infrastructure, both of which were 

complicated by the Unites States’ inability to legitimize a Karzai government that had largely 

been sidelined in Kabul and riddled with corruption. 

Shachtman, Noah. “Danger Room in Afghanistan: A Close Fight, and a Couple of Miracles.” In Danger 

Room in Afghanistan Blog, Wired Magazine Online Edition, 27 August 2009. http://www.wired.com
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/dangerroom/2009/08/danger-room-in-afghanistan-a-close-range-fight-and-a-couple-of-miracles/.

This blog entry recounts a Marine sniper team’s fight against Taliban insurgents.

Stauffer, Ronald. “Corps’ artillery rocket system poised to strike in Afghanistan.” Defense Video 

and Imagery Distribution System, 1 March 2009. http://www.dvidshub.net/news/30584/corps

-artillery-rocket-system-poised-strike-afghanistan. 

This article describes the first deployment of the first Marine Corps High Mobility Artillery 

Rocket Systems (HIMARS) battery to Afghanistan.

Steele, Jeanette. “Belated Honors for Marines in Fierce Battle.” The San Diego Union-Tribune. 10 July 

2011. http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/jul/10/marine-platoon-gets-belated-honors-for-fierce/.

Steele’s story reports on actions by Marines attached to Task Force 2/7 during a 2008 battle in Farah Province, Afghanistan, better known as “The Battle of Shewan.” Several Marines 

were later recognized for valor, including then-GySgt Brian Blonder who received the Navy 

Cross in 2011.

Thieme, Don J. “Fighting: Are We Relearning the Same Lessons?” Marine Corps Gazette 95, no. 8, 

68–69, August 2011.

Thieme’s article addresses concerns about preserving the institutional memory of lessons learned 

the hard way on the battlefield in Afghanistan.

Thompson, Alexs. “Religious Leader Engagement in Southern Afghanistan.” Joint Forces Quarterly 63, 95–101, 4th Quarter 2011.

The author describes MEB–Afghanistan’s highly successful mullah engagement effort that is 

often referred to as the “mullahpalooza tour.”

Treglia, Philip J. “Force Reconnaissance Missions.” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 10, 14–16, October 

2002.

The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company Marines of the 15th MEU (SOC) were the besttrained, best-equipped Marines fighting in Afghanistan. During the course of the deployment, 

the platoon would perform all three of their distinct and separate missions: deep reconnaissance, 

direct action as a maneuver element, and specialized independent missions as directed.

“USS Theodore Roosevelt Pounds Taliban and Terrorist Targets.” Seapower 44, no. 12, 24, December 2001.

This article discusses Navy and Marine Corps fixed-wing carrier-based airpower as part of the 

initial U.S. actions to attack al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks.

Valdespino, Luis P., Jr. “Navy Corpsmen With Special Ops Saves Lives in Combat Zone.” Navy Medicine, 16–17, May/June 2008.

Valdespino describes how Navy corpsmen skillfully save lives in austere conditions after they 

receive special training to deploy with Marine Special Operations companies in Afghanistan. 
408

Watson, MSgt Julia. “Female Engagement Teams.” Marine Corps Gazette 95, no. 7, 20–24, July 

2011.

MSgt Watson discusses the use of FETs in Afghanistan during her tour with 2d MEB–A.

Welan, Capt Justin M. “Cobras Strike in Afghanistan.” Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, 1 January 2009. http://www.dvidshub.net/news/28917/cobras-strike-afghanistan#

.UnFaRu0gIqY.

The article not only describes the background on TF 2/7 but also HMLA-269, which provided 

close air support for the task force.

Whittington, Sgt Scott A. “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force—Afghanistan: 

Bridge to Marine Corps’ future in Afghanistan.” Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, 1 June 2009. http://www.dvidshub.net/news/34343/special-purpose-marine-air-ground

-task-force-afghanistan-bridge-marine-corps-future-afghanistan. 

Whittington describes the development and employment of SPMAGTF–A as part of the 

buildup of the Marine presence in southwest Afghanistan.

Williams, Kenneth H., ed. “Right Now We Cannot Just Let Go: An Interview with Amin Tarzi on the 

Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Marine Corps University Journal 1, no. 1, 26–47, Spring 2010.

Dr. Tarzi, an American of Afghan descent, provides insights into the motivations of Afghans 

and Pakistanis on either side of the border.

———. “This Will Not Come Quickly: An Interview with Anthony H. Cordsman on the Situation 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Marine Corps University Journal 1, no. 1, 7–25, Spring 2010.

This article presents the author’s interview with well-known international security analyst 

and professor who holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies in Washington, DC. Williams interviewed Cordsman while he was 

part of ISAF commander Gen Stanley A. McCrystal’s strategic assessment group in 2009. A 

subsequent follow-up interview, conducted just prior to President Obama’s announcement of 

the surge in December 2009, expands on some of the topics first discussed earlier in the year.

Young, James G. “Lessons from Rhino LZ: How the Afghanistan Invasion Changed Combat Airlift.” Armed Forces Journal (online edition), November 2011. http://www.armedforces journal.com

/2011/11/7948194/. 

The article discusses the Air Force’s role in providing lift for Task Force 58’s seizure of Camp 

Rhino. It also relates how the Air Force adapted certain tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTP), such as training conventional C-130/C-17 aircrews to conduct night-vision goggle 

(NVG) landings, normally reserved for crews that specialized in inserting Special Forces. 
409

Index

A

Abizaid, John P. (Gen, USA) 64, 73

Afghan National Army (ANA), xi, 56, 60, 66–68, 111–12, 115, 117–18, 121, 137, 143, 158, 218, 228,

243, 250, 272, 278, 288–89, 292, 300, 314, 318, 321, 325, 328, 362, 367, 383–4, 390, 392,

398

Afghan National Police (ANP), 56, 110, 162, 172, 182, 197, 199, 201, 205, 278–9, 282, 313–15, 330, 383

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), 251, 257, 268, 278–80, 282, 317–18, 321

Afghan Uniformed Polic (AUP), 317–21

Airbase, U.S.

al-Asad, 362, 379

al-Taqaddum, 254

Bagram, 143

Airborne warning and control system (AWACS), 51

Aircraft, U.S.

Bell AH-1W Super Cobra, 19, 21, 40–43, 75–76, 78–82, 144, 153, 180, 183, 185–7, 191, 361, 

373–4, 377

Bell Boeing MV-22 Osprey, 21, 85, 254, 259

Bell UH-1N Huey, 19, 78–79, 82–83, 190–91, 254–55

Boeing C-17 Globemaster, 19, 22, 30–31, 184, 242, 373, 408

Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight, 148, 190

Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II, 46, 50, 53, 81–83, 131

Grumman F-14 Tomcat, 9–10

Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, 30, 48

Lockheed C-141 Starlifter, 32

Lockheed Martin KC-130 Hercules, 17, 19–20, 30–31, 37, 42–43, 45, 184, 191, 206, 242,

361, 373

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier, 3, 17, 42–44, 46–52, 83, 131–32, 190–91, 194, 242,

361–62, 372–75, 379, 395

McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, 2, 9–12, 17, 361, 371, 374, 402

Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion, 16, 19, 21, 41–42, 143, 153, 162, 184, 190, 200, 204, 207,

249, 266, 268, 361, 371, 373, 393, 401

Sikorsky MH-60 Seahawk, 17

Airfield, U.S.

Bagram, 2, 44, 46–48, 56, 78, 86, 361, 375–6

Camp Bastion, 184, 200, 242, 383

Jacobabad, 17

Jalalabad, 362
410

Kandahar, 20, 32, 127, 183, 197, 205–7

Air-ground combat center, USMC

Twentynine Palms, California, 184

Air station, USMC

Beaufort, South Carolina, 10

Cherry Point, North Carolina, 206

Jacksonville, Florida, 336

Miramar, California, 206–8

New River, North Carolina, 183, 208

Air tasking order (ATO), 17, 78

Alexander, Leroy E. (SSgt, USMC), 95–96

Allen, John R. (Gen, USMC), xiii

al-Qaeda, xi, 2, 5, 8–9, 15, 19, 22, 28, 30, 32,

42–43, 59–60, 66, 70–71, 78, 80–81,

141, 149, 228, 233, 338–43, 365, 371–

72, 378, 389, 396, 407

Altheiser, Chad I. (Capt, USMC), 272

Ameen, Anthony S. (HN, USN), 160–61

Amos, James F. (MajGen, USMC) 52, 201, 311, 324

Anti-Coalition militia (ACM), 56, 79–81, 87–88,

92, 94–95, 128, 376–77

Armored personnel carrier (APC), 12, 161

Army units, U.S.

1st Battalion (Airborne), 501st Parachute

Infantry Regiment, 78

1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 78

2d Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment, 377

2d Battalion, 25th Infantry Regiment, 131,

143

2d Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 79

10th Mountain Division, 42, 78, 128, 375

82d Combat Aviation Brigade, 383

101st Airborne Division, 33, 313

160th Special Operations Air Regiment, 378

503d Infantry Regiment, 381

Combined Joint Task Force, xi. See also U.S.

Army Combined Joint Task Force

XVIII Airborne Corps, 60, 73–74

Asfura-Heim, Patricio, 294–95, 302–3. See also,

religious leader training

Ausley, Patrick D. (LCpl, USMC), 185

Ayala, Juan G. (BGen, USMC), 254

B

Bailer, Brett (Cpl, USMC), 88

Barber, Robert G. (Capt, USMC), 211–25, 393

Barno, David W. (LtGen, USA), 59–75, 396

Bartels, Matthew D. (1stLt, USMC), 86–88, 96

Bases, U.S. 

Bagram Air Base, 2–3, 42, 44–53, 56, 60–61, 

63, 68–69, 71, 78, 86, 128, 143, 361, 374–

75, 395

Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, 86, 143, 199, 207, 377

Lejeune, North Carolina, 144, 199, 224, 232,

244, 260–62, 313, 374–75, 382

Quantico, Virginia, 231, 309

Basic School, The, 13, 112

Bates, Matthew H. (Capt, USMC), 272

Beatie, Jason E. (Cpl, USMC), 185

Bedard, Emil R. (LtGen, USMC), 15–16, 21

Bianca, Anthony J. (LtCol, USMC), 254

Biggio, Frank A. (Capt, USMC), 273–74, 396

bin Laden, Osama, 39, 95, 141, 338, 371

Black Hawk helicopter, 79, 82, 184, 371–72, 377

Bond, Brantley A. (Maj, USMC), 12

Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), 40–42, 361, 373

Bonn Process, 60, 62, 70, 72–73

Boschinski, Joseph M. (LCpl, USMC), 273

Bourne, Christopher M. (Maj, USMC), 117, 348

Bradley, Justin (Cpl, USMC), 88–89

Bricker, Paul W. (Col, USA), 255

Bryan, Michael (Capt), 13

Buegel, Kevin A. (SSgt, USMC), 162, 164, 166–67

Bush, President George W., xi, 2, 5–7, 57, 371, 387

C

Camps, U.S. 

Barber, 216, 223

Blessing, 85–89, 93, 398

Covington, 30
411

Lejeune, 144, 199, 232, 313, 374–75, 382

Pendleton, 166, 177–78, 290, 380

Shorabak, 244, 318, 321, 397. See also, Joint

Security Academy Shorabak

Teufel Hunden (Devil Dog), 48

Carl Vinson (CVN 70), 11

Carroll, Patrick J. (LtCol, USMC), 294–95, 302, 

317, 321, 397. See also, religious leader training

Cashman, Patrick J. (LtCol, USMC), 273

Cassa, Chris (LCpl, USMC), 25

Central Command, USMC (CentCom), 16, 18,

29, 41, 43, 61, 64, 71, 127, 333, 373, 387

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, 234–39, 258, 265–69,

303, 331–35, 397

Christmas, Brian S. (LtCol, USMC), 252

Citations

Medal of Honor, 385. See also, Meyer, Dakota L.

Navy Unit, 77–83

Silver Star, 178–79, 381–82, 393, 404

Clark, Thomas S. (LtCol, USMC) 11

Clemons, Edwin T. (SSgt) 12

Clinton, Thomas, Jr. (Maj, USMC), 111–25, 393

Close air support (CAS), xi, 2, 12, 17, 42, 47, 51,

56, 78, 81–82, 131, 137, 143–44, 183–84,

190, 208, 254, 361, 374–75, 401, 403, 408

Coletta, Michael R. (Capt, USMC), 13

Combat outposts, 217–18, 252–53

Combined and Joint Civil-Military Operations

Task Force (CJCMOTF), 60, 69

Combined arms exercise (CAX), 184, 189, 192–

94, 405

Combined forces air component commander

(CFACC), 46

Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A), 71, 253, 358–59

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), U.S. Army, 

xi, 92

CJTF–76, 56, 69, 73–74, 77, 80, 86, 94–95,

109, 131, 133, 143, 303, 357–58, 361

CJTF–180, 56–57, 60–61, 68–69, 73–74,

77–78, 127–29, 132–33, 356–57, 361, 375–76

CJTF–Mountain, 2, 42–43, 356, 374

Command and General Staff College, U.S. 

Army, 112

Commanders Emergency Response Program

(CERP), 68, 101, 282, 319

Commanders in chief (CINCs), 16, 20

Conway, James T. (Gen, USMC), 146, 148–49, 

200, 228, 252, 333, 379, 392

Cooke, Leonard W. W. (LCdr, USN), 29–33,

347, 398

Cooling, Norman L. (LtCol, USMC), 97, 350, 398

Counterinsurgency (COIN), 59–75, 148, 169–

75, 277–85, 293, 313–15, 331–35

Operations, xii, 60–61, 153, 187, 197, 201,

205, 217, 257. See also Operation Azada Wosa; 

Operation Gateway II; and SPMAGTF–A

and religion, 293–303

Strategy, xii, 57, 61–70, 75, 162, 228, 265,

 271, 332, 334

Culliver, Joseph S. (Cpl, USMC), 163–66

D

Damm, Ray C. (LtCol, USMC), 10, 12–13

Daniel, Eddie (HN, USN), 161–64

Daniel, Edwin L. (PO3, USN), 163

Darack, Ed, 85–89, 91–97, 387, 389, 398

Decotiis, Art (2dLt, USMC), 23–27, 399

Delgado, Frankie P. (Maj, USMC), 200

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA),

116, 121

Demuro, Daniel J., Jr. (SSgt, USMC), 76

Department of State, 64, 68, 100, 107, 109, 319

DeSantis, Carlo (1stLt, USMC), 144

Dickerson, Robert C., Jr. (BGen, USMC), 16, 19–20

Direct air support center (DASC), 192–94

Dixon, James A. (LtCol, USMC), 46–47, 49–51

Donnellan, James E. (LtCol, USMC), 97, 351, 398

Doran, Simon M. (Capt, USMC), 10, 13

Dressler, Jeffrey, 177
412

Driscoll, Jack (HN, USN), 160–61

E

Eggers, Keith (SSgt, USMC), 88

Eikenberry, Karl W. (U.S. ambassador), xiii, 67,

75, 239, 332

Elections, Afghan, 57, 59, 62–63, 70, 81–82, 92,

108, 127–28, 132–33, 228, 235, 240, 249, 

280, 363, 376, 378, 383, 396–97

Embassy interagency planning group, 65, 74

Embedded training team (ETT), xi, 56, 111, 152,

324, 328, 362, 398. See also Clinton, Thomas, Jr.

ETT 2-8, 324, 328, 384–85, 403

ETT 5-3, 381, 392, 404

Esok, Mohammed (Col, ANA commander), 115,

122–24

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), 24, 202, 214–

15, 220, 224, 274, 393

F

Fanning, R. Brian (Capt, USMC), 42

Fay, Michael D. (SSgt, USMC), 34, 388

Faye, Patrick T. (Capt, USMC), 116

Female engagement team (FET), 214, 218–19,

229, 258–59, 304–11, 334, 396, 405, 408. 

See also Watson, Julia

FGM–148 Javelin antitank missile, 24–26

Fire support coordination center (FSCC), 191–93

Fire support team (FiST), 24, 26

Flanagan, Ryan P. (1stLt, USMC), 47

Flying Nightmares, 44, 46, 50, 52

Foreign object damage (FOD), 46–48, 53

Forward air controller (FAC), 12–13, 47, 137,

186, 191

Forward air controller airborne (FAC[A]), 12,

79, 191

Forward Operating Base (FOB)

FOB Asadabad, 78, 93, 375

FOB Bala Baluk, 154, 168

FOB Cafferetta, 184

FOB Chapman, 79

FOB Dwyer, 247, 268

FOB Fiddler’s Green, 271–72, 275

FOB Geronimo, 275

FOB Golestan, 297

FOB Jaker, 267, 273, 276, 285

FOB Jalalabad, 78

FOB Lwara, 80, 82

FOB Mahtar Lam, 292

FOB Orgun–e, 61, 95

FOB Pico, 272

FOB Rhino, 2, 18–19

FOB Ripley, 129–30, 135–38, 376

FOB Salerno, 76, 78–80, 82–83

FOB Shkin, 61, 74

FOB Wright, 93

Franks, Tommy R. (Gen, USA), 16–19, 21

Franzah, Michael V. (Maj), 52

G

Gavrilis, James A., 169–75, 277–85, 390

Gibbs, Jason R. (1stLt, USMC), 135–39, 404

Gilham, Nathan (Cpl, USMC), 26

Gregson, Wallace C., Jr. (LtGen, USMC), 119

Ground-based operational surveillance system

(GBOSS), 250, 259–60

Ground Combat Element (GCE), 110, 126, 131,

186, 189, 191–92, 199, 201, 203, 206, 210,

222, 231. See also Nicholson, Lawrence D.

Guerrant, Peter J. (Capt, USMC), 13

Guest, Gabriel G. (SSgt, USMC), 156–62

H

Hagan, Jeffery A. (LtCol, USMC), 207

Hagee, Michael W. (Gen, USMC), 51

Hailston, Earl B. (LtGen, USMC), 51

Hall, Richard D. (LtCol, USMC), 156, 158, 

182, 352

Hancock, James L. (LtCol, USMC), 156

Haney, Shawn D. (Maj, USMC), 178
413

Hazlet, Clintt F. (Cpl, USMC), 209

Hejlik, Dennis J. (LtGen, USMC), 201, 232

Helland, Samuel T. (LtGen, USMC), 201, 203, 380

Helmand River valley, xi–xii, 99, 252, 265–66, 274

Henderson, Anthony M. (LtCol, USMC), 254, 351

Henderson, Kristin, 155–67, 400

High-mobility multipurpose vehicles (HMMWVs

or Humvee), 19–20, 101, 120–21, 129–31,

137–38, 157, 165–66, 178–79, 204, 220, 249,

325–26

High value target (HVT), 80, 92, 381

Higgins, Patrick M. (Col, USA), 114

Hogberg, James A. (Col, USMC), 98–109, 400

Holt, Jeffrey C. (LtCol, USMC), 198, 200, 352

Hoopii, Earnest K. (SgtMaj, USMC), 236, 352

Howell, Stuart H. (Maj, USMC), 207

Huly, Jan C. (LtGen, USMC), 142–44

Human intelligence (HUMINT), 100, 219, 299,

310

Huysman, Brian P. (Cpt, USMC), 273–74

I

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR), 191–92, 194, 250, 259–60

Individual training standards (ITS), 136, 139

Information operations (IO), 56, 63, 65, 70, 87,

106, 258, 284, 302, 307, 311, 403

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),

xii–xiii, 60, 71–73, 143, 149, 158, 189–93,

202, 206, 228, 246, 293–96, 299–302, 306,

310, 338, 359, 362

Iraqi Women’s Engagement Program (IWE), 306.

See also, female engagement teams

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), 197–

98, 294–99, 301–2, 308, 317–21

J

Jernigan, Michael J. (LtCol, USMC), 199, 212,

215, 225, 352

John C. Stennis (CVN 74), 17, 356

Johnson, Andrew S. (Capt, USMC), 222

Johnson, Michael E. (1stLt, USMC), 325–26

Johnson, Ronald J. (Col, USMC), 16, 19, 21

Joint direct attack munition (JDAM), 11, 18, 87

Joint Security Academy Shorabak, 229, 318, 397.

See also, Camp Shorabak

Joint surveillance target attack radar system

(JSTARS), 242

Joint tactical air controller (JTAC), 47, 52, 79,

81, 194, 225

Jones, James L. (Gen, USMC), 16–17, 21, 373

K

Kabul, 14, 60–62

U.S. embassy at, 35–39, 71, 374–75, 406

See also Task Force Kabul

Kandahar International Airport, 2, 17, 19–20,

23–27, 372–73, 393, 404

Karell, Arthur E. (1stLt, USMC), 155–67

Katt, Megan, 169–75, 277–85, 390

Kelly, John F. (MajGen, USMC), 232, 401

Kenefick, Aaron M. (GySgt, USMC), 325–26

Kinser, Patrick E. (1stLt, USMC), 87–89, 97

Krulak, Charles C. (Gen, USMC), xi, 74, 236.

See also three-block war

L

Landis, Jeff (1stLt, USMC), 41–43, 403

Lang, Kristoffer R. (Cpl, USMC), 199

Laughlin, Bruce W. (Capt, USMC), 43

Layton, James R. (HM3, USN), 326

Lecher, Louis B. (Capt, USMC), 203

Lee, T. Curtis (LtCol, USMC), 269

Lee, William Sean, 300, 302–3. 

See also, religious leader training

Lemmond, John P. (SCPO, USN), 31

Lewis, Frederick L. (Capt, USMC), 11

Lewis, James (LtCol, USMC), 271–72

Light armored vehicle (LAV), 19–20

Lioness Program, 218–19, 306. 
414

See also, female engagement training

Litening II targeting pod, 18, 46, 51–52

Litkenhus, David W. (1stLt, USMC), 135–39

Logistics support area (LSA), 244

Lone Survivor, 95–96, 389. See also, Luttrell, Marcus

Long, Robert A. (1stLt, USMC), 97

Lottinger, Matthew F., 219

Lowe, Christian, 141–45, 403

Lowrey, Nathan S. (Col, USMC), 3, 389

Lubin, Andrew, 271–75, 403

Luck, Joshua L. (Capt, USMC), 43

Luttrell, Marcus (PO2, USMC), 95, 389

M

MacDonald, John A. (MajGen, USA), 255

MacFarland, Sean B. (Col, USA), 149

MacMannis, Andrew R. (LtCol, USMC), 97, 

351, 404

Manning, Michael A. (LtCol, USMC), 253

Man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS),

192

Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), 148,

189–95

Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MarCent), xii, 119, 153, 202–3, 213

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command

(MARSOC), 152, 287–91, 308, 311, 379, 402

Marine Corps units, U.S.

Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), 16–18, 21, 

41, 372

Antiterrorism brigade (AT), 37, 143, 152, 361,

374. See also 4th MEB(AT)

Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) 

 BLT 1/1, 355

 BLT 1/4, 349

 BLT 1/6, 126, 130–31, 135, 190, 350–51,

 356, 359, 377

 BLT 3/6, 349, 355, 405

Fighter Squadron 102 (VF–102), 10

Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB)

 2d MEB, xii, 203, 209, 228, 230, 232,

 265, 267–68, 274, 294, 296, 306, 318, 352,

 360, 363, 382. See also, Nicholson, 

 Lawrence D.

 4th MEB(AT), 37, 56, 143, 152, 374, 361

Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU)

 13th MEU (SOC), 41, 349, 356

 15th MEU (SOC), 18, 31, 348, 355, 371, 

 400

 22d MEU, 56, 126, 143

 22d MEU (SOC), 127, 350, 356

 24th MEU, xii, 153, 183, 198, 208, 359

 24th MEU (SOC), 351

 26th MEU, 2, 34, 372

 26th MEU (SOC), 12, 348, 355, 405

Marine All–Weather Fighter Attack Squadrons (VMFA[AW])

 VMFA(AW)-121, 3, 355, 374

 VMFA(AW)-332, 361

Marine Attack Squadron 

 VMA-513, 3, 46–53, 355–56, 375

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons (MALS)

 MALS-12, 361

 MALS-13, 47–48

 MALS-16, 208–9, 360

 MALS-26, 208–9, 362

 MALS-40, 209, 361–2

 MALS-42, 362

Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons (VMFA)

 VMFA-212, 3, 355, 361, 374, 402

 VMFA-232, 358

 VMFA-251, 2, 8–13, 17, 355, 358, 379–

 80, 395

 VMFA-314, 17, 356

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrons (HMM) 

 HMM-163, 348, 355

 HMM-165, 2, 349, 356, 361

 HMM-266, 130, 350, 356

 HMM-365, 183, 349, 351, 355, 358–9,

 362
415

MEU Service Support Groups (MSSG) 

 MSSG-13, 349

 MSSG-15, 348, 355

 MSSG-22, 129, 350, 356

 MSSG-26, 349, 355

Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOB)

 1st MSOB, 152, 380

Marine Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) 

 MWSS-371, 360–1

 MWSS-373, 47

 MWSS-374, 47

 MWSS-471, 362

 MWSS-472, 362

 MWSS-473, 362

 MWSS-474, 47

Task Forces (TF).

 TF-31, 113

 TF-58, xi, 2, 18, 30–31, 33, 141, 143, 347,

 355, 388–89, 396, 398, 408

 TF-64, 347

 TF-82, 60

 TF-165, 42, 361, 373–74

 TF-2/7, xii, 152–53, 156, 158, 162, 183–

 84, 198–99, 208, 352, 359, 362, 382, 390,

 400, 403, 406–7

 TF Bayonet, 109

 TF Bobcat, 350, 377

 TF Helmand, 251

 TF India, 37, 374

 TF K-Bar, 347

 TF Koa, 56, 362

 TF Kabul, 56, 361

 TF Leatherneck, 271–2, 274

 TF Linebacker, 367–7

 TF Mountain, 2, 42

 TF Nawa, 278

 TF Pheonix, 113–14, 121

 TF Red Dog, 78–79, 82–83, 375

 TF Saber, 87

 TF Sledgehammer, 20

 TF Victory, 376

Marineistan, xii, 229, 236, 238–39, 332, 397

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), 20

Mattis, James N. (BGen, USMC), xi, 2, 18–20,

141, 347, 392

Maz, Matthew M. (Capt, USMC), 135–39, 404

Mazar–e Sharif, 60, 69, 125

McArthur, Christopher B. (Maj, USMC), 272

McChrystal, Stanley A. (Gen, USA), xii, 228, 

239–40, 246, 323–4, 339, 406

McCullough, William F. (LtCol, USMC), 238,

241, 274

McKenzie, Kenneth F. (Col, USMC), 127–33,

143–44, 350, 404

McKiernan, David D. (Gen, USA), 200, 228, 233, 

235, 240–41, 246, 255, 333

McKissock, Gary S. (LtGen, USMC), 21

McNeil, Dan K. (Gen, USA), 52, 75, 149

Medals

Air Medal, 374

Army Commendation, 374

Bronze Star, 178

Medal of Honor, 322–29, 384–85. See also, 

Meyer, Dakota L.

Navy Cross, 176, 178–79

Silver Star, 392–93

Medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR), 

129–30, 220–1, 249

Mellinger, Eric M. (Col, USMC), 267, 353

Mennecke, Matthew A. (Cpl, USMC), 273

Meyer, Dakota L. (Sgt, USMC), 322–9, 385

Meyer, Samuel L. (Maj, USMC), 189–95, 405

Meyerle, Jerry, 169–75, 277–85, 390

Mihocko, Melissa D. (LtCol, USMC), 211–25

Mills, Richard P. (MajGen, USMC), xii, 231, 

235, 251, 262

Ministry of Defense (MOD, Afghanistan), 66,

117, 321

Missiles

Hellfire, 43, 273
416

Javelin antitank, 24

Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided

(TOW), 43, 81, 83

Mitchell, Jason E. (Capt, USMC), 200, 207

Moffett, Michael (LtCol, USMC), 231–63

Moore, Charles W., Jr. (VAdm, USN), 18

Morales, Nathan O. (Capt, USMC), 202–3

Morgan, Joel (SSgt, USMC), 24

Moseley, T. Michael (Gen, USAF), 46

Moss, Thomas A. (Cpl, USMC), 201

Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC),

85, 144

Mullen, Michael G. (Adm, USN), 57, 200

Murphy, Caleb (1stLt, USMC), 272–73

Murphy, Michael (Lt, USN), 95

N

Natonski, Richard F. (MajGen, USMC), 238

Naval Special Operations Forces (NavSOF), 

91–93, 96

Navy units, U.S.

Carrier Air Wing One (CVW)

 CVW-1, 10, 12–13, 355, 358, 362

 CVW-9, 356

 CVW-11, 358

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB, 

Seabees)

 NMCB-133, 28–33, 213, 347, 398

SEALs, 19, 56, 87, 93–96, 290, 378, 389. 

See also, Operation Red Wings; Luttrell, 

Marcus

Naylor, Sean D., 147–49, 390, 405

Newman, Randall P. (Col, USMC), 236, 252–53

Nicholson, Lawrence D. (BGen, USMC), xii, 228–

30, 231–63, 266–9, 295–6, 318, 332–5, 352,

383, 393. See also 2d MEB

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), xi,

60–61, 71–75, 141–5, 170, 189–90, 193–4,

200, 202, 206, 209, 265–7, 296, 332, 334–

5, 338, 341, 344, 362, 380, 389, 403. 

See also, International Security Assistance Force;

McChrystal, Stanley A.

Nusbaumer, Stewart, 287–91, 406

O

Obama, Barack H. (President), xii, 163, 207, 228,

265–6, 318, 322–9, 332–3, 336–45, 384–

5, 390, 402, 406, 408. See also, Medal of

Honor citation; Meyer, Dakota L.

Observation post, 24

Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan

(OMC–A), 60, 67, 71, 73–74

O’Hanlon, Richard (Capt, USN), 11

O’Grady, Scott F. (Capt, USAF), 16

Operational Detachment–Alpha (ODA), 57, 

81–82, 114

Operations 

al-Fajr, 234, 319

Anaconda, 2, 40–43, 80, 144, 149, 361, 373–

4, 388–90, 396, 401–3

Asbury Park, 126, 130, 132, 134, 377

Avalanche, 78, 375

Azadi South, 384

Azada Wosa, xii, 153, 190, 193, 380

Bladerunner II, 130

Celtics, 92, 378

Cobra’s Anger, 228–9, 254, 260, 309, 384

Dragonfly, 79, 81, 376

Eastern Resolve, 228, 383

El Dorado, 376

Gateway, 200, 202, 207, 210, 217–8, 222–3

Khanjar, xii, 228, 241, 245, 247, 264, 271, 

274, 279, 363, 383, 393–4, 397

Mavericks, 84, 90, 92, 140, 142, 378

Moshtarak, 228, 233–4

Mountain Blizzard, 376

Mountain Lion, 61, 379

Mountain Resolve, 78, 375

Mountain Storm, 57, 127, 376

Pathfinder, 218
417

Pil, 378

Red Wings, 56, 89, 91–97, 378, 387, 389, 398,

404

Ring Road, 375

Shamshir, 362

Sorkh Khan, 378

Southern Watch, 46

Spurs, 92, 377

Stars, 92

Thunderball, 130

Thunder Road, 131, 138

Valdez, 87

Verendrye, 79

Whalers, 378, 387

Winter Strike, 376

Ostergard, Brad (Cpl, USMC), 26

Osterman, Joseph L. (BGen, USMC), 235, 251

Ostermeyer, Richard T. (LtCol, USMC), 199, 352

Owen, Byron J. (Capt, USMC), 177–79

P

Pelikan, Philip J., 295–96, 301–3. See also, religious leader training

Perry, Brian D., Sr., (LtCol, USA), 35–39, 406

Petraeus, David H. (Gen, USA), xi, xiii, 200,

333, 389

Petronzio, Peter (Col, USMC), 241, 254, 351, 382

Petry, Leroy (SFC, USA), 324

Peak, Robert L., III (GySgt, USMC), 11

Peleliu (LHA 5), 16, 18–19, 372

Phelps, Christopher L. (Maj, USMC), 127–33,

350, 404

Pierce, Scott W. (LtCol, USMC), 244

Piper, Christopher N. (SSgt, USA), 96

Pollander, John (Cpl, USMC), 90

Predeployment training phase (PTP), 47, 133, 191,

193–4, 199, 213, 224, 307–8

Priddy, Andrew T. (Maj, USMC), 97

Proctor, Mike M. (Capt, USMC), 206

Provinces (Afghanistan)

al-Anbar, xi, 14, 142, 149, 237, 309, 320, 333, 

389, 404

Farah, 14, 169–75, 296, 381

Ghazni, 14, 235, 241

Helmand, xi–xii, 14–15, 99–100, 104, 108, 

155, 170, 182, 184, 190, 193, 228, 234, 237, 

244, 251, 261, 265, 277–85, 296, 313–5, 333, 

335, 363

Herat, 74, 115, 125, 172, 287–91, 406

Kandahar, xi, 2, 19–20, 23–27, 30–33, 

115, 127–33, 183, 197–203, 214–5, 240, 

242. 

See also, Kandahar International Airport

Khost, 143–4

Kunar, 56, 86, 92, 328, 376, 378–9, 384–5

Laghman, 292, 378

Nimroz, xiii, 14–15, 271, 318

Nuristan, 392

Oruzgan, 56, 128–33

Paktika, 95–96

Parwan, 376

Warduk, 14, 234, 376

Zabul, 377

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), 60, 68, 

74, 99–109, 175, 235, 243, 267, 282, 285, 

298, 306, 319, 362, 391–2, 394, 404

Q

Quick reaction force (QRF), 2, 41, 56, 78, 93,

138, 152, 221, 223, 250, 314, 361, 375–6. 

See also, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines; 4th

MEB(AT); 13th MEU (SOC); CJTF-180; 

HMLA-773; Operation Dragonfly; Operation Mountain Resolve

R

Ratkowiak, Casmer J. (Capt, USN), 97

Reed, Shane (Sgt, USMC), 24

Regional Command–East (RC–East), 91–92, 

238, 255
418

Regional Command–Southwest (RC–SW), xii–xiii,

15, 390, 392, 394

Religious leader engagement, 292–303, 407

Ripley, John W. (Col, USMC), 129. See also,

FOB Ripley

Robinson, Charles D. (Capt, USMC), 95–96

Robinson, Patrick, 95–96, 389. See also, Lone Survivor; Luttrell, Marcus

Roberto, Andrew T. (LtCol, USMC), 201

Robling, Terry G. (BGen, USMC), 3

Rochefort, Jason R. (SSgt, USMC), 208

Rodriguez, David M. (LtGen, USA), 75, 239

Roe, Christopher W. (Capt, USMC), 43

Rosenau, William, 313–15, 390–91

Rumbles, Brian (HA, USN), 154

S

Schaffer, Johanna (Lt, USMC), 214, 218. See also,

female engagement teams

Schellhaas, Richard (Capt, USMC), 159, 162, 165

Schrey, John J., Jr. (LCpl, USMC), 158–61, 165

Scott, Robert M. (LtCol, USMC), 86

Scott, Robert R. (Maj, USMC), 94, 96–97, 351

Security, cooperation, education, and training

(SCET), 113

Senecal, Marc A. (GySgt, USMC), 40

Sensenig, Joel (Lt, USN), 32

Shah, Ahmad, 56, 92–96, 116, 378. See also, Lone

Survivor; Luttrell, Marcus

Shea, Roberta L. (Maj, USMC), 127–33, 350, 404

Shiels, Kevin M. (Capt, USMC), 206

Short-term holding facility, 28, 32. See also,

NMCB-133

Simmons, Franklin M. (Sgt, USMC), 178–79, 382

Simmons, John W. (Col, USMC), 249, 353

Smith, Sir Rupert (Gen, British Army), 66, 74

Special Operations Command, U.S. (SOCOM), 

21, 96, 152, 290

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–

Afghanistan (SPMAGTF–A), xii, 110, 153,

182–7, 197–203, 211, 228, 232, 352, 362, 382, 

408. See also, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines; 3d

Battalion, 8th Marines; 24th MEU; Barber,

Robert G.; CLB-3; HMLA-269; TF 2/7;

White, Duffy W.

Status of resources and training system (SORTS),

220

Steele, Jeanette, 177–79, 407

Stehman, Christine R. (Lt, USN), 208

Stickles, Thomas (Cpl, USMC), 90

Stone, Jashua E. (Sgt, USMC), 185–86

Strickland, Christopher D. (SSgt, USMC), 159

Sturdevant, Gregg A. (LtCol, USMC), 42, 349, 374

T

Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP),

16, 374

Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), 61,

95, 118, 121–2, 124, 137, 186, 191, 393, 408

Target reference points (TRPs), 25–26

Task Force (TF). See also Marine Corps units

Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), xi,

197–203

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–

Afghanistan (SPMAGTF–A), xii, 110, 153,

182–7, 197–203, 211, 228, 232, 352, 362, 382, 

408. See also, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines; 3d

Battalion, 8th Marines; 24th MEU; Barber,

Robert G.; CLB-3; HMLA-269; TF 2/7; 

White, Duffy W.

Tauyan, Craig T. (Cpl, USMC), 199

Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), 2, 9–10, 13, 17, 

355, 371, 395, 407

Thiel, Benjamin (S, USN), 168

Thomason, Gary W. (Maj, USMC), 208

Thompson, Alexs, 293–303, 407

Three-block war, xi, 74, 66. See also, Krulak,

Charles C.

Thunderbolts, 9–13, 379, 395

Tombleson, Aaron W. (Cpl, USMC), 159–61
419

Troops in contact (TIC), 223, 237

Tryon, Richard T. (MajGen, USMC), 231–32

Timms, Willie J., Jr. (SSgt, USMC), 11

Trapp, Michael D. (Capt, USMC), 52

Turner, Regan C. (2dLt, USMC), 97

U

Unit Deployment Program (UDP), 144

United Nations (UN), 62, 72–74, 130, 135, 139, 

158, 338, 341, 344, 391. See also, International

Security Assistance Force

UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA),

60–61, 65, 128, 130, 132

Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 218, 220, 223, 260

Unmanned aircraft system (UAS), 192

U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), xi, 68, 74, 102–3, 106–7, 109, 237, 

274, 278, 319, 321

V

Valdez, Steven A. (LCpl, USMC), 87. See also,

Operation Valdez

Voetsch, Steve (Capt, USMC), 12

W

Wade, Leaf H. (Capt, USMC), 42

Walker, Terry L. (CWO-5, USMC), 317–21,

334, 397

Walsh, John Scott (LtCol, USMC), 17

Watkins, Michael E. (LtCol, USMC), 199, 209, 352

Watson, Julia L. (MSgt, USMC), 258–9, 305–

11, 334, 408

Welan, Justin M. (Capt, USMC), 181–87, 408

West, Francis J. (Bing), 235, 237–38, 392

Westbrook, Kenneth W. (SFC, USA), 326

White, Duffy W. (Col, USMC), 153, 197–98,

230, 232, 242, 249, 253, 262, 352–53, 383–

83. See also, Special Purpose Marine AirGround Task Force–Afghanistan

Whittington, Scott A. (Sgt, USMC), 197–203, 408

Williams, Anthony (CPO, USN), 33

Wilson, Ivan I. (PFC, USA), 156–60

Wood, Thomas D. (Maj, USMC), 94, 96–97

Wood, Wayne A. (1stLt, USMC), 135–39, 404

Worth, Calvert L. (LtCol, USMC), 237, 252

X

Y

Yarnell, Edward (Col, USMC), 259. See also,

Female Engagement Teams