About the Report

This report examines the 2004 Afghan constitution as a point of 

negotiation in a prospective conflict settlement process between 

the Afghan government and the Taliban. Because changes to the 

constitution’s core principles are frequently cited as a major risk 

of a potential peace process, the report seeks to examine various 

ways in which Afghans might approach the issue. 

About the Author

Sean Kane worked on elections and reconciliation related issues 

for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan from 

2012 to 2014. He has also worked on issues of constitutional 

reform in Iraq, where he helped advise the Iraqi parliament 

on its 2006–07 constitutional review, and in Libya, where he 

facilitated discussion among representatives of twenty-six towns 

on the constitutional drafting process. The report was written by 

Kane in his personal capacity; any errors or factual inaccuracies 

are solely his responsibility, and the views expressed are those 

of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United 

Nations or any other organization. He thanks Nicholas Haysom, 

Joanna Nathan, Jason Gluck, and the United States Institute 

of Peace (USIP) for their helpful comments.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 356 January 2015

© 2015 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

Constitutional Talks and Ending Insurgencies 4

What Would the Taliban Want to Change? 7

Amending the Afghan Constitution: Can It Be Done? 11

Conclusion: Questions for Afghans to Consider 14

Sean Kane

Talking with the Taliban

Should the Afghan Constitution Be a Point 

of Negotiation?

Summary

• Insisting that the Taliban accept the Afghan constitution is understandable insofar as the 

risks that peace talks could pose to Afghanistan’s post-2001 achievements. Nonetheless, a 

periodic assessment of this condition is healthy, especially given the human toll of the ongoing insurgency and acknowledged shortcomings in the charter. 

• To help Afghans make an informed choice on this dilemma, lessons can be drawn from other 

countries currently in talks to end decades-long insurgencies. Understanding the Taliban’s 

possible constitutional demands as well as the Afghan constitution’s amendment rules is 

also necessary.

• A comparison of the Afghan constitution and the Taliban’s 2005 Order of the Islamic Emirate 

provides clues on what changes the movement might seek. The Taliban also have an overarching “ownership problem” with the constitution because of their exile from Afghan political life at the time it was drafted.

• Key divergences between the Taliban order and the constitution relate to the sources of 

legitimacy for government and laws and marked differences on women’s and minority rights. 

The two documents also contain more overlap than might be assumed.

• The Afghan constitution requires public input on proposed amendments through the convening 

of a popular assembly, or loya jirga. The constitution further designates fundamental aspects 

of the political system and Afghans’ rights as unamendable. These rules could be strategically 

applied to constrain Taliban efforts to use negotiations to completely remake the current 

constitutional order.

• Debate over peace talks with the Taliban has tended to be framed in terms of potential risks. 

Negotiations could also present an opportunity to challenge the Taliban to justify some of its 

more unpopular constitutional positions to other Afghans and, in the best case, to help the 

Afghan government seize the political high ground.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356

Introduction

One of the most vexing and consequential dilemmas on ending the fighting between the 

Afghan government and the Taliban is whether to include the Afghan constitution as a point 

of negotiation in potential peace talks. The 2004 charter is a signal achievement of the post2001 era and a symbolic bulwark on minority and women’s rights. Should Afghans consider 

amending it if doing so might help bring about a negotiated political solution to a brutal 

and deadly conflict that is also blocking the country’s economic and human advancement?

Until recently this difficult question was off the table, with the Afghan government and 

its international partners insisting that the Taliban end violence, break ties with al-Qaeda, and 

accept Afghanistan’s constitution prior to any formal peace talks. However, in January 2013, 

a joint statement by then Afghan president Hamid Karzai and U.S. president Barack Obama 

indicated that the Taliban should meet these demands as “part of the outcome of any [peace] 

process” [emphasis added]1. This evolution suggests that the constitution could be discussed 

in peace talks. Others have been more explicit. For example, Russia’s special envoy for Afghanistan recently stated, “We’ve never said the existing Constitution...is ideal. ...We’re doing our 

best to convince the Taliban to change the Constitution [using] due process of law.”2

Senior Afghan leaders themselves have since suggested that they do not consider the constitutional text sacrosanct. Both Karzai and members of the Afghan High Peace Council have 

said that they are open to constitutional amendments that follow the charter’s own rules and 

safeguard the rights of Afghans.3 The demand from parts of Afghan society for peace is clear, 

as demonstrated by a March 2014 petition to the Afghan government and Taliban. Signed by 

more than 250,000 Afghan women, it called for peace talks to begin without delay.4

The prominence that constitutional issues took on during Afghanistan’s long presidential 

contest is also noteworthy. At a televised presidential debate, the initial five leading candidates discussed the suitability of the constitution and changes they might make to it.5 Constitutional issues later took center stage in the political agreement reached to overcome the 

impasse between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah following the second round of the election. In this agreement, the two committed to convene a popular assembly within two years 

to consider amending the constitution to establish the post of an executive prime minister. A 

natural question is therefore whether constitutional reform could also be used to help address 

one of the country’s other major security and political challenges?

This question has no simple answer, but it is clear that the Taliban and other armed 

groups reject the current Afghan constitution.6 In a December 2012 Track 2 meeting,7

representatives of the Taliban characterized the document as “illegitimate” because it was 

“written under the shadows of [U.S.] B-52 aircrafts.” The need for a constitution “written by 

Afghan scholars in a free atmosphere and...presented to the nation for approval” was the 

first priority in the Taliban statement.8 Along with demands for access to power in Kabul, 

the Taliban would likely put changes to the constitution at the forefront of their agenda in 

any peace talks.

The debate on peace talks and the constitution tends to be framed exclusively in 

terms of the risks it poses to Afghanistan’s current system. These concerns are valid, but 

it is also important for Afghan negotiators to consider how talks could be used to their 

advantage. Prior to being squandered during the ensuing electoral impasse, the turnout of 

almost fourteen million Afghans across the two rounds of the 2014 elections was widely 

interpreted as a genuine political setback for the Taliban that led it to sack several of its 

military commanders. Similarly, peace talks could present the armed movement with the 

political challenge of having to justify some of its more unpopular constitutional positions 

to other Afghans.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, 

Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the 

President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George 

W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, 

University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, 

School of International Service, American University, Washington, 

DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for 

Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, 

President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • 

Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International 

Relations at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. 

Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council 

on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • 

J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • 

Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Chuck Hagel, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; 

President, National Defense University • William B. Taylor, 

Acting President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356 3

Can the Taliban Be Engaged?

Given that Afghanistan is in the midst of complex political, security, and economic transitions, full-fledged negotiations with the Taliban do not appear imminent. The uncertainty 

the country faces also leads to several well-founded questions on the practicality of peace 

talks. These include whether the movement is actually unified enough that it can be meaningfully negotiated with, whether those Taliban figures who could agree to negotiate with 

the Afghan government exercise real influence over the movement’s hard-line battlefield 

commanders, whether the movement and its external backers have the incentive to negotiate or to respect and implement the results of any talks, and whether the gulf between 

Taliban’s world view and the Afghan constitution principles is simply too wide to be effectively bridged.

Many of these questions merit full studies in their own right, and several have in fact 

received them.9 This report does not attempt an in-depth analysis of internal Taliban dynamics, 

decision making, or incentives. Rather, it focuses on key political issues related to the nature of 

the Afghan state and public life that would necessarily arise in any talks between the Afghan 

government and the Taliban. If it is taken as given that there is no purely military solution to 

the Afghan insurgency, this forward thinking can help the Afghan government develop political 

stratagems for confronting the Taliban. Such guidelines will undoubtedly be required in what 

must be expected to be long, hard negotiations with a group that has a history of both honoring agreements and cynically exploiting talks to gain tactical advantage.10

Nonetheless, a few basic points on the feasibility of negotiating with the Taliban are 

warranted. The Taliban are not a single homogenous entity but rather a collection of semiautonomous networks. But were a political understanding to be reached with the relative 

moderates in the Taliban’s Political Committee (whose presentation at the Chantilly Track 2 

meeting was authorized by the Taliban’s Supreme Quetta Shura), it would be significant. To be 

sure, not all or perhaps even a plurality of Taliban fighters would reconcile in such a scenario. 

But the political and military dynamics of the Afghan conflict would be fundamentally changed 

by any political agreement reached with the movement’s formal leadership.

Whether the Taliban’s leadership will ever calculate that reaching and honoring a political deal with Kabul is in fact in their interest depends on a complex constellation of factors. 

These include Afghan leaders consolidating the new Afghan unity government and delivering improved governance, effective political leadership over the Afghan security forces, and 

securing long-term support from the international community. Such steps would shape not 

only Taliban decision making but also calculations by the country’s neighbors, which might 

otherwise engage in hedging strategies. But the incentive for serious talks may not fully be in 

place until a military stalemate is perceived on both sides, which could take several years to 

emerge.11 It is therefore clear that no single political issue, such as the government’s signaling 

of openness to discussing the constitution, should be considered a panacea as opposed to a 

component of a larger overall approach to the Afghan conflict.

It may also ultimately be true that the gap between the Afghan constitution and the Taliban’s worldview cannot be closed. But in the context of a grinding, decadelong conflict in 

need of fresh thinking, a conclusion to this effect should not simply be assumed but rather 

arrived at following thorough investigation. To make an informed choice as to whether 

including constitutional issues in peace talks is in their national interest, Afghans could 

learn from the experiences of the Philippines, Myanmar, and Colombia, whose governments 

are considering constitutional changes as part of peace talks to end seemingly intractable, 

decades-long insurgencies. Understanding both the constitutional changes the Taliban 

might demand and the Afghan constitution’s amendment rules is also important.
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356

Constitutional Talks and Ending Insurgencies

An exhaustive review of the practice of constitution-making published by the NGO Interpeace 

finds that the extent to which peace processes are linked to constitutional issues varies and 

notes both risks and opportunities to including the constitution in peace talks.12 On the 

opportunities side, reviewing the constitution in peace talks forces leaders of armed groups 

to develop political platforms and confront the interests of other groups in society. In the 

case of Afghanistan, the Taliban straightforwardly reject international standards on democracy 

and human rights as an imposition of Western values. However, justifying some of their more 

extreme positions to other Afghans in a political negotiation would be less straightforward.

Especially in urban areas, Afghan society has changed significantly since Taliban rule 

ended in 2001: popular support for a democratic system of government, significant growth 

in access to education and health care, the development of a vibrant media sector, and an 

increased role of women in public life. As seen in the changing Taliban views on issues such 

as “modern education” 13 and possible reluctance to attack Afghan voters during the 2014 

elections,14 standard Taliban positions on these issues are unpopular and could be forced to 

further evolve as a result of formal political talks.

The Interpeace study also identifies potential drawbacks to including constitutional 

reform in peace talks. The tendency to limit peace negotiations to warring groups often 

relates to the need to ensure the confidentiality of talks in environments of severe mistrust 

and to a sense of urgency to quickly conclude negotiations so as to curtail the ongoing violence. But several problems can arise from amending the nation’s social charter under such 

rushed and opaque circumstances. Most notably, the revised constitution could lack broader 

societal support, given its dependence on secret talks between combatant groups who may 

have alienated a war-weary population. It is also possible that the new charter would seek 

to protect belligerents at the expense of victims and other parts of society.

Interpeace therefore suggests a rule of thumb that the greater the constitutional changes 

contemplated in peace talks, the greater the public participation in the process should be. 

One way to accomplish this is through a two-stage process. The first and frequently confidential stage between the warring parties is intended to lead to a cessation of hostilities 

and possibly develop proposals for constitutional changes. The second and more participatory stage sees the constitutional changes being finalized and typically provides openings 

for inputs from democratically elected institutions, civil society, and the public.

With this context, this section examines current conflicts where peace talks between the 

government and armed groups have involved the possibility of changes to an existing constitution. Some caution on the applicability of this comparative research is required, however. The 

typical insurgency’s demands relate to regional autonomy for an ethnic or religious minority. 

In contrast, the Taliban formerly ruled Afghanistan and are associated with ethnic Pashtuns, 

the country’s largest and traditionally politically dominant community. The movement claims 

to be interested not in a mini-Islamic Emirate in southern Afghanistan but rather in power in 

Kabul and a say over how all Afghans’ political, social, and religious lives are ordered. These 

distinctions and the still fluid military balance of power between the Taliban and the Afghan 

government are germane because they shape and inform the constitutional changes the movement might demand.15

The Philippines

In March 2014, the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 

signed the final part of a peace agreement aimed at ending more than four decades of 

violence that killed more than 120,000 Filipinos and displaced two million people on the 

southern Philippine island of Mindanao. The main features of the peace deal relate to the 

As seen in the changing 

Taliban views on issues such as 

“modern education” and possible 

reluctance to attack Afghan 

voters during the 2014 elections, 

standard Taliban positions on 

these issues are unpopular 

and could be forced to further 

evolve as a result of formal 

political talks.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356 5

creation of an autonomous Muslim-majority region in the south of this Christian-majority 

country. The framework agreement underlying the peace deal establishes a Transition Commission to work on proposals to amend the Philippine constitution in order to entrench the 

agreements of the Philippine government and MILF.16

Constitutional issues have been a central and controversial feature of the Philippine peace 

talks. They also present a clear example of the risks of negotiating constitutional reform 

via secret talks. Specifically, the lack of public consultation on confidential proposals to 

change the constitution preliminary agreed to in August 2008 led to “indignation rallies” 

by Christian settlers in Mindanao and a petition to the Philippine Supreme Court to review 

the secret text of the agreement.17 By the time the court rendered its verdict on the MOA’s 

constitutionality two months later, up to 650,000 people had been displaced by rising tensions and intercommunal violence in Mindanao.

The court ultimately found the draft agreement unconstitutional because no public 

consultation had been held in its development and because it sidestepped constitutional 

amendment procedures by, in effect, guaranteeing the MILF that the constitution would 

be changed. The ruling resulted in a wave of counterprotests by Moros and further MoroChristian violence in Mindanao. Informal peace contacts did continue, but formal talks, were 

only restarted some three years later.

The Filipino experience suggests two possible lessons for Afghanistan. The first is that if 

the Afghan government agrees to discuss constitutional changes in peace talks, it may wish 

to demand matching concessions from the Taliban. This was the basic equation for talks in 

the Philippines: Manila agreed to consider regional autonomy arrangements for Mindanao 

beyond what was currently permitted under the constitution in exchange for the MILF abandoning its decades-long fight for the complete independence of the island.

Second, Afghan negotiators should take note of how the lack of public input into confidential talks on constitutional changes led to a popular backlash among Filipino nationalists 

and renewed violence. The Philippine government and the MILF appeared to learn from this 

setback, establishing formal mechanisms for civil society and public consultation into the 

process that led to the landmark 2014 peace agreement.18

Myanmar

In 2011, parallel to a remarkable and ongoing transition toward a more democratic system, 

Myanmar launched an ambitious effort to end over six decades of ethnic conflict that 

predate even the country’s independence in 1948. Some believe this battle between the 

Myanmar state and multiple ethnic insurgencies to be the world’s longest-running civil war.

Since 2011, bilateral ceasefire agreements have been reached between the government 

and fourteen of the sixteen major ethnic armed insurgent groups. These preliminary agreements are intended as confidence-building measures to allow each ethnic group and the 

national government to discuss the underlying issues fueling their specific conflict. The final 

phase intends to convene a national conference to reach permanent agreement on ethnic 

issues and a universal ceasefire. The Myanmar government has expressed openness to this 

final agreement including constitutional reform to provide ethnic minorities with increased 

autonomy, more equal resource sharing, and greater protection of their cultural rights vis-àvis the Myanmar majority.19

The seeming understanding by government officials, including President Thein Sein, that 

the country’s long-running ethnic conflicts cannot be reduced to a security problem gives 

cause for cautious optimism. However, even with this institutional backing, the path to constitutional reform is complex. Amending the Myanmar constitution requires the support of 

more than 75 percent of the legislature. The more conservative Myanmar military, however, 

The Afghan government agrees 

to discuss constitutional changes 

in peace talks, it may wish to 

demand matching concessions 

from the Taliban.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356

holds 25 percent of the body’s seats under existing constitutional provisions. Additionally, the 

ethnic armed groups are not currently allowed to form political parties and therefore only have 

indirect representation in the legislature. Thus, despite a preference to amend the constitution 

using existing procedures, other options were debated, including replacing the constitution or 

amending without following constitutional procedure.20 These options might have been more 

expedient but would have resulted in a break in the country’s constitutional continuity.

The current approach therefore starts with a national dialogue outside the legislature, 

which includes the government, the military, and the ethnic armed groups. It aims at producing a national accord that will be presented to the legislature for ratification through 

the passage of laws and amendment of the constitution.21 In parallel, the parliament is 

already considering a large number of constitutional amendments, including some devolution of powers to the states and changing the constitution’s amendment rules themselves. 

The entire process, if it succeeds, is anticipated to take several years.

Afghanistan could face certain analogous procedural complications should it wish to 

amend its constitution. The Taliban does not have direct representation in the loya jirga, the 

popular assembly mandated by the Afghan constitution to enact amendments to the charter. This could potentially limit the movement’s political buy-in to anything the jirga might 

approve. Afghanistan could also face certain procedural difficulties in actually convening a 

loya jirga according to the letter of the constitution. This means that even if an agreement 

were reached with the Taliban to change the constitution, Afghanistan might face its own 

continuity challenge in trying to enact the amendments. Afghan peace negotiators could 

therefore benefit from continuing to monitor Myanmar’s peace process.

Colombia

After decades of failed negotiations and attempts to militarily defeat the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas, the October 2012 launch of formal peace talks 

between the Colombian government and the FARC provide hope for a political solution to 

the Western Hemisphere’s longest running internal conflict. Motivated by a military stalemate—the government is ascendant but seems to appreciate that it cannot decisively defeat 

the FARC, and the FARC appears to recognize that armed struggle permits little more than 

survival—the political will for talks to succeed may finally exist.22

Before this suspension, FARC negotiators repeatedly made it clear that they want a constitutional convention to enshrine an eventual peace accord into permanent law. “For more 

than 30 years the FARC have awaited the convening of a National Constituent Assembly to 

find a true solution to the conflict,” read a FARC statement dated June 11, 2013. The principal 

political reason the guerrillas seek a new constitution, rather than the Colombian government’s 

preferred option of ratifying the peace agreement through a public referendum, relates to 

Colombia’s last successful peace process with an insurgency. After it concluded negotiations 

in 1990, the M-19 guerrillas won more than a quarter of the seats in the constituent assembly 

that redrafted Colombia’s 1886 constitution into the 1991 charter now in force. For FARC leaders, achieving less than this would be difficult to explain to its cadres.23 The issue remains 

unresolved and has been set aside to be reconsidered when ratification and implementation of 

the peace agreement is discussed.24 In Afghanistan, Taliban leaders, like the FARC, might also 

struggle to justify to their rank and file what their long insurgency has accomplished if they 

are not able to play a role in changing Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution.

In contrast to those in the Philippines and Myanmar, the Colombian talks have been 

primarily enabled by a military stalemate rather than any signals from the government 

on its openness to a ceasefire and constitutional changes. This offers an alternative type 

of approach for Afghans to consider. Rather than proactively pursue peace talks, the new 

In Afghanistan, Taliban leaders 

might also struggle to justify to 

their rank and file what their 

long insurgency has accomplished 

if they are not able to play 

a role in changing Afghanistan’s 

2004 constitution.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356 7

Afghan government could predicate its negotiating strategy on achieving a battlefield stalemate between its security forces and Taliban fighters (even if this might take several years 

and depends on a series of complex factors). At this point, negotiations could be pursued 

that include discussion of Taliban political demands. However, as in Colombia, it could be left 

up for deliberation in the talks themselves as to whether the eventual peace accord should 

be codified into the Afghan constitution or instead ratified by ordinary law or public referendum. In this respect, Article 65 of the Afghan constitution provides the Afghan president 

with the power to call for a referendum on important national matters.

What Would the Taliban Want to Change?

The Taliban did not formally adopt a constitution during their administration of Afghanistan, 

holding that the Holy Quran and sharia provided sufficient guidance. In 2005, however, it 

issued its Order of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This document is the nearest to a 

constitution the movement has produced and provides a window into their thinking about 

Afghanistan’s constitutional order.

In 2011, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) Human Rights 

Unit compared the Taliban’s 2005 order with the 2004 Afghan constitution.25 This section 

draws on and supplements the comparison to identify major areas of divergence between the 

two documents, which could be expected to become areas of possible future negotiations. 

Before delving into these issues, it is also important to appreciate the political significance of 

those aspects of the constitutional system that the Taliban might not want to change.

Over the last century, all of Afghanistan’s constitutions have established a highly centralized state (at least on paper) and, with two brief exceptions, the country has had a Pashtun 

leader. The 2004 constitution is in fact largely modeled on the 1964 charter, substituting an 

elected president for the previous executive—a (Durrani Pashtun) constitutional monarch 

and his prime minister. This traditional centralization of power in the person of the president and the locus of authority in Kabul has periodically been a source of discontent among 

Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun political class, some of whom during the drafting of the 2004 

constitution championed a parliamentary system of government and greater decentralization of authority to the provinces. At the time the 2004 constitution was drafted however, 

researchers observed support for a strong central government and executive among the 

country’s Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek communities. This was due to concerns over fragmentation of the country and interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs by its neighbors.26

These two issues returned to the fore in Afghanistan’s long 2014 elections crisis, which 

resulted in President Ashraf Ghani appointing Abdullah Abdullah as chief executive officer 

and an agreement to subsequently hold a loya jirga to consider establishing the permanent 

post of an executive prime minister. Some political actors see the establishment of this 

post as an opening toward further dispersal of power in Afghanistan’s political system. For 

example, Abdullah Abdullah’s campaign platform included calls for statutory decentralization of powers to the provinces and constitutional amendments to replace Afghanistan’s 

presidential system of government with a parliamentary one. It is also conceivable that the 

prospect of a reconciled Taliban joining the Afghan political system might increase support 

for decentralization to limit the scope for Taliban social and religious mores and traditional 

Pashtun tribal codes to be applied to other groups across the country.

Conversely, because of its largely Pashtun membership and desire to take up the reins of 

power in Kabul, the Taliban would likely support a continuation of Afghanistan’s traditional unitary system and resist a diminution of the current strong executive. On these specific issues, 

President Ghani and the Taliban may counterintuitively have greater common ground than the 
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356

president and some of his government of national unity partners. It is therefore important 

that Afghanistan’s political leaders and communities approach any peace talks with a common 

understanding on the appropriate distribution of power within the Afghan state. A decade after 

the drafting of the constitution, the question of whether there is now popular support among 

non-Pashtuns for the decentralization of Afghanistan’s political system is not fully understood. 

Without better clarity on these issues, a future loya jirga could open a Pandora’s box of 

controversial and divisive issues that the Taliban could potentially seek to exploit.27

Ownership of the Afghan Constitution

By way of preface, it needs to be clear that the Taliban have an “ownership” problem with 

the current charter. The Taliban’s self-perceived need to respond to evolving Afghan society 

is demonstrated by the issuance of the Order of the Islamic Emirate. Despite not having a 

formal constitution when actually ruling Afghanistan, by 2005 the movement apparently felt 

it necessary to make a political riposte to the 2004 Afghan constitution.

Taliban representatives at the December 2012 Track 2 Chantilly conference did not voice 

opposition to the concept of a constitution. Instead they stated that every government 

needs a “complete and clear constitution” to organize its affairs. The Taliban’s opposition 

to the 2004 charter focused on its origins, labeling it as “illegitimate” because it had been 

written under the “shadow” of U.S. B-52 bombers. The representatives further highlighted 

the need for a constitution written by Afghan scholars in a “free atmosphere” and then 

presented to the nation for its approval.

These remarks should be interpreted in the context of the Taliban’s exile from Afghan 

political life during the drafting of the constitution in 2003. In a potential parallel to the 

FARC in Columbia, the Taliban leadership may need to demonstrate to their cadres that a 

decade of insurgency has resulted in redrafting Afghanistan’s constitution.

Although reluctance to cater a constitutional amendment process to the Taliban’s needs 

is understandable, a basic tenet of sustainable conflict resolution involves appreciating that 

the other side’s political problem is also your problem. The possible benefit to the Afghan 

government of taking this perspective relates to the ongoing evolution in Taliban views on 

constitutionalism. A process of constitutional reform that integrates Taliban representatives 

and scholars into a loya jirga carries definite risks for Afghanistan’s political and human 

rights achievements from the last decade. At the same time, it could also force further 

development in Taliban positions on constitutionalism.

The Taliban’s Possible Negotiating Agenda

In its survey report on national arrangements for changing constitutions, the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) divides constitutional amendments 

into two main categories: those related to institutional rules of the government and those 

related to the bill of human rights.28 A comparison of the Afghan constitution to the 2005 

Order of the Islamic Emirate suggests that the Taliban would likely seek changes in both areas.

Institutional Rules of Government

The UNAMA Human Rights Unit’s comparison of the two texts finds the biggest points of 

divergence between the Afghan constitution and the Taliban order relate to the political 

systems they establish. These significant divergences cover the status of the head of state, 

the structure and separation of powers in the government, and sources of legislation.

The Afghan constitution establishes a democratic system of government in which a popularly elected president is the head of state and government. The Taliban order, by contrast, 

proclaims Afghanistan as an Islamic Emirate under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad 

It is important that Afghanistan’s 

political leaders and communities 

approach any peace talks with 

a common understanding on the 

appropriate distribution of power 

within the Afghan state.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356 9

Omar, the self-designated Amir ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful). The order does not 

describe how the Amir ul-Momineen is selected nor how long an individual may serve in this 

role. (Omar himself was elevated to this role in 1996 by the acclamation of Taliban followers 

after he appeared on the roof of a mosque in the city of Kandahar wearing Afghanistan’s holiest relic, the Cloak of the Prophet Muhammad.29 ) The document does, however, specify that 

this person must be a male Muslim follower of the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence.30

Both documents describe similar duties for the president and the Amir ul-Momineen, but 

the latter is not the formal head of government. Instead, the Islamic Emirate is led by the 

Council of Ministers, whose chair is the head of government and must also be a male follower 

of the Hanafi school. The documents also envisage similar duties for the government, including implementing laws, maintaining public order, preparing the budget, and implementing 

social and economic programs.

The legislative and judicial branches of the two systems, meanwhile, differ significantly. 

The Afghan constitution establishes a bicameral National Assembly in which the lower house is 

directly elected and the upper house consists of a mix of indirectly elected and presidentially 

appointed senators. The Taliban order, by contrast, establishes a single chamber Islamic Council as the highest legislative organ, whose members are appointed by the Amir ul-Momineen 

based on their familiarity with the principles of jihad and sharia. The assembly and the council 

do have similar functions, such as approval of laws, the state budget, and treaties. Both the 

constitution and the order also recognize the judiciary as an independent branch of government with comparable duties and functions. However, under the Afghan constitution, laws are 

reviewed for their compatibility with the charter by the Supreme Court.31 The Taliban order 

gives this responsibility to the Islamic Council, blurring the separation of powers between the 

legislature and the judiciary.

In a point of commonality, both documents recognize Islam as the state religion and 

require that no law should conflict with its tenets and beliefs. With the exception of the 

Communist-era 1980 constitution, all Afghan constitutions have had a similar repugnancy 

clause. Over the last century, however, the country’s myriad charters have consistently swung 

between traditional and reformist impulses on this exact point. Amanullah Khan’s reformist 1923 constitution, Zahir Shah’s modernizing 1964 constitution, and the 2004 charter all 

acknowledge sources of legislation other than sharia. Meanwhile, Nadir Shah’s traditionalist 

1931 constitution and the Mujahadin leaders (1992–96) and Taliban Emirate (1996–2001) 

declared sharia as the sole basis for organizing their respective states. Afghan scholar Mohammad Hashim Kamali describes the 2004 constitution as not only overall more conservative than 

its 1964 predecessor but also as maintaining that charter’s major innovation of resolving the 

formal order of priority between sharia and statutory law in favor of the latter.32 Article 6 of 

the Taliban order would appear to seek to reverse this priority by stating that the law-making 

process and arrangement of Afghan life shall be “regulated” by “customary law in accordance 

with Hanafi jurisprudence.”

The Taliban order also demonstrates the movement’s support for a continuation of the 

country’s political tradition of a highly unitary state. In fact, the first article of both the 

Afghan constitution and the Taliban order describe Afghanistan as an “independent, unitary, 

and indivisible state.” The Afghan constitution in its chapter on administration describes a 

need to “preserve the principles of centralism” but does proceed to establish provinces as local 

administrative units as well as provincial and municipal councils to promote local developmental objectives. In Article 137, it also requires the national government to transfer the powers 

necessary to achieve these outcomes to local administrations. The Taliban order’s discussion 

of subnational governance is almost nonexistent. It is limited to two articles (83 and 84), 

which merely note that the Emirate shall be divided into provinces, districts, and subdistricts 

“controlled and financed” by the national government.
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356

The Venice Commission report notes that constitutional provisions on institutional rules 

of government need to be detailed and specific in order to create political stability and 

predictability. With this in mind, in-depth discussions would be required to ascertain what 

precise demands the Taliban might have on the structure of the state and to understand 

what was meant by Taliban remarks at the 2012 Chantilly conference to the effect that a new 

constitution should make clear “relations between the government and people...shed light 

on balance of government three structured powers...[and] determine government’s type, 

administration and powers.” On these scores, this initial review suggests that discussions 

on the role of the Amir ul-Momineen and differing provisions on the sources of legislation 

could be fraught.

Bill of Rights

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the UNAMA Human Rights Unit’s comparison finds areas 

of convergence between Afghan’s constitution and the Taliban’s order in their respective 

bills of rights. This is explained by the common grounding of human rights in the two documents in classical Islamic jurisprudence. The Afghan bill of rights include those to liberty, 

a presumption of innocence, due process of law, vote and run for elected office, freedom 

of expression, assembly, holding property, education for both men and women, access to 

health care, and work. The chapter also prohibits torture and forced confessions, provides 

protections against discrimination, and establishes an independent human rights commission to promote these rights.

The Taliban order, meanwhile, contains presumption of innocence, prohibition of torture and forced confession, rights to due process of law, legal representation, freedom of 

expression (within the limits of sharia), peaceful assembly, property, and work, as well as 

mandatory primary education (although it is not clear whether this applies to girls). The commonalities between the two documents may also be explained by the tradition and presence 

of bills of rights with roughly similar protections in earlier Afghan constitutions, including 

the 1931 and 1964 charters.

Areas of convergence aside, differences between the documents are marked on political, 

women’s, and minority rights. Furthermore, no body is established in the Taliban order to 

protect and promote human rights, as the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission is in the Afghan constitution.

The 2004 constitution provides a right for Afghan men and women to vote and be elected 

for office. It further provides guarantees for women’s representation in both houses of the 

National Assembly and approximately one hundred women delegates participated in the drafting of the document.33 In contrast, all of the government positions mentioned in the Taliban 

order are reserved for men. Moreover, despite Afghanistan’s tradition of elected legislative 

bodies dating back to the 1923 constitution, the order makes no mention of the right of citizens to elect their representatives. In addition, although Article 22 of the constitution’s bill of 

rights explicitly recognizes that men and women have equal rights and duties before law, in 

a number of provisions the Taliban document denies women fundamental rights on the same 

basis as men. For example, whereas the constitution specifically mentions an obligation of the 

state to foster education for women, the Taliban order states that education for women will be 

regulated through a separate “special law” within the limits of sharia.

The constitution also provides greater recognition and protection of minority rights. As 

mentioned, the Taliban order joins earlier Afghan constitutions to make extensive references 

to the Hanafi school to the exclusion of other schools of Sunni and Shia Islamic jurispruDifferences between the 

documents are marked on 

political, women’s, and minority 

rights. No body is established in 

the Taliban order to protect and 

promote human rights, as the 

Afghanistan Independent Human 

Rights Commission is in the 

Afghan constitution.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356 11

dence. The constitution, by way of comparison, makes a single reference to the Hanafi 

school and explicitly approves the use of Shia schools of jurisprudence among Afghan Shia 

for personal status cases. Like the 1964 constitution, it also recognizes the rights of the 

small number of non-Muslim Afghans to practice their faiths within the bounds of law. 

The constitution specifically mentions minority languages other than Pashto and Dari and 

promotes the teaching of mother tongues in the areas where they are traditionally spoken.

Confounding expectations, this introductory review suggests that the Taliban might not 

necessarily seek as far reaching changes to the constitution’s bill of rights as commonly feared. 

This perception is perhaps reinforced by the remarks of the movement’s representatives at 

Chantilly who said that “the personal, civil, and political rights of all citizens of Afghanistan,” 

including those of “brother ethnicities,” should be regulated through a new constitution that 

abides by the principles of Islam, human rights, and Afghan national values.

In the absence of serious negotiations, this positive sounding rhetoric has never been 

put to the test. Several important key areas of divergence between the two documents are 

also obvious. These principally relate to political rights in the form of elections (which the 

Taliban order does not expressly prohibit), equal treatment of women in areas such as political life and education, and recognition of minorities. These are no small matters, but the 

Venice Commission provides some comfort in its findings that amendments to bills of rights 

are often constrained by many constitutions’ references to international human rights conventions. The Afghan constitution is not an exception in this respect and states in Article 

7 that it will “observe” the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

Amending the Afghan Constitution: Can It Be Done?

Constitutions are by definition intended to be difficult to change. This is because they provide basic rules for ordering the state, regulating the sharing of power and resources, and 

safeguarding the basic rights of citizens. To protect against these fundamental principles 

being changed by transient political majorities, constitutions are usually protected against 

amendment by special mechanisms and supermajority requirements.

The Venice Commission highlights the danger posed by rules on constitutional change 

being too flexible. Such flexibility can lead to a lack of protection for democratic procedures and basic minority and human rights. Along these lines, some of the opposition in 

Afghanistan to talks with the Taliban is animated by a fear that core constitutional values 

could be sacrificed in the name of stability. But the Venice Commission also finds that strict 

amendment procedures can go too far. This report has already explored how the desire to 

preserve constitutional continuity can lead in practice to what the commission terms excessive constitutional rigidity. In Myanmar, current constitutional amendments procedures risk 

a lock-in of that country’s constitutional text, potentially blocking changes needed to end 

decades of ethnic conflict. This section examines the extent to which Afghanistan’s constitution poses either of these risks.

The Venice Commission also holds that the procedure by which a constitution is changed 

is of great importance. Rather than mere legal technicality, how constitutional reform is carried out in response to changed national circumstances can be vital in shaping the political 

norms. The Venice Commission stresses that the best guarantee of the legitimacy of constitutional change is to follow “prescribed formal amendment procedures.” Such procedures 

are to ensure that reform and, by extension, the overall political system have broad public 

backing. The commission notes that this is especially important in young democracies like 

Afghanistan, where nascent political institutions often remain fragile.

Some of the opposition in 

Afghanistan to talks with the 

Taliban is animated by a fear 

that core constitutional values 

could be sacrificed in the name 

of stability. 
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356

Although it might be argued that maintaining constitutional continuity is a legal nicety 

that can be disregarded if sufficient Afghan political consensus is achieved, a more principled approach also has certain strategic benefits. That the Afghan constitution’s amendment rules render certain features of the current system unamendable, for example, could 

be strategically deployed to strengthen the hand of Afghan negotiators in potential talks 

with their Taliban counterparts.

The 2004 Constitution’s Amendment Procedures

Article 150 of the Afghan constitution describes a process whereby via presidential decree, 

a commission comprising members of the government, National Assembly (Parliament), and 

Supreme Court create a draft set of proposed constitutional amendments. This proposal must 

then be approved by a two-thirds majority of a loya jirga. Following approval, the amendments are enacted after their formal endorsement by the president.

The loya jirga is separately described in Article 110 of the constitution as “the highest manifestation of the will of the people of Afghanistan.” It consists of the members 

of Afghanistan’s National Assembly and the heads of the country’s provincial and district 

councils. Loya jirgas are well known in Afghan history as ad hoc bodies that bring the nation 

together for critical decisions in time of crisis or political transition and were convened to 

approve the country’s 2004 constitution as well as its twentieth-century predecessors.34

On the surface, Afghanistan’s amendment mechanism does not seem to lock in the existing constitutional text and is grounded in the country’s political traditions. It would appear 

to enable a two-step process in which a set of proposed constitutional changes might first be 

directly negotiated between the government and the Taliban. At the conclusion of talks, the 

president could issue a decree that tasks the country’s legal experts to formulate the results 

of negotiations into a formal set of proposed constitutional amendments to be debated and 

approved by a loya jirga acting as the will of the people.

If the loya jirga process does not appear to lock in the current constitutional text, does 

it adequately safeguard the core values of the current political order? Although Article 150 

requires a two-thirds supermajority of the loya jirga to approve constitutional amendments, 

some may not be satisfied with this protection given the experience of how the 2004 

constitution was endorsed. Specifically, some observers saw the 2004 process as marred 

by bias and secrecy in the preparation of the draft constitutional text. The workings of the 

constitutional loya jirga were also openly influenced by armed powerbrokers, and the charter 

itself was adopted by a show of consensus rather than a formal vote.35

The amendment rules also create some procedural questions, especially given that Afghan 

history suggests that the most predictive element of how a loya jirga will act depends on who is 

present.36 For example, the Taliban do not have direct representation in Afghanistan’s National 

Assembly or provincial and district councils. It is therefore unclear whether the amendment 

process of convening a loya jirga can address the armed movement’s described ownership problem with the Afghan constitution. Would the Taliban agree to have the loya jirga review and 

possibly alter the package of amendments it negotiated with the government? Should potential 

constitutional reform therefore be sequenced to occur after a peace deal with the Taliban first 

enables their participation in the district council and parliamentary elections scheduled for 

2015? Alternatively, could supplementary representation for the militant group in the loya jirga 

somehow be arranged? These are not easy questions but are likely best answered by Afghans 

before rather than after peace talks.

The timing of local elections is also important in the context of legally convening a loya 

jirga that includes the heads of Afghanistan’s approximately four hundred district councils. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356 13

Since the adoption of the constitution in 2004, Afghanistan has not held district council elections due to political disputes and a lack of clarity on district boundaries. District council elections are scheduled for 2015, but if they again are not held it may not be possible to convene 

a loya jirga in full accordance with the constitution.37 In the sensitive environment that would 

surround likely any accord with the Taliban, this seemingly obscure technical question could 

take on political significance if it detracts from the legitimacy of the loya jirga. Moreover, the 

country’s political leadership seems to view the participation of district council heads in the 

loya jirga as necessary. The new national unity government has committed to hold district 

council elections as soon as possible, “as this is necessary for the convening of the loya jirga,” 

to consider the question of whether to establish the post of executive prime minister.38

Given that members of the National Assembly and district council heads together make up 

the bulk of the membership of the loya jirga, Ghani and Abdullah’s agreement to convene this 

assembly in 2016 greatly raises the stakes of Afghanistan’s 2015 parliamentary and district 

council elections. These polls would be of even greater consequence if prospective peace 

arrangements with the Taliban might also be up for inclusion on the loya jirga’s agenda.

Unamendable Features of the 2004 Constitution

The Afghan constitution’s principles for its own amendment possibly offer greater reassurance for those concerned about the risks posed by talks with the Taliban. In keeping with 

international practice, the Afghan charter renders a number of its principles and provisions 

unamendable. Specifically, in discussing principles for its amendment, Article 149 reads in 

part as follows:

The principles of adherence to the tenets of the Holy religion of Islam as well as Islamic 

Republicanism shall not be amended. Amending fundamental rights of the people shall 

be permitted only to improve them.

These principles are important and sweeping. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, an influential 

Afghan expert on Islam and legal issues, describes the constitution as manifesting Islam 

as the “most visible basis of national identity, reflecting also an entrenched social reality 

and a source of guidance for law and government.” 39 As implied by Article 149, Afghan laws 

cannot be contrary to tenets of Islam, and—critically—this principle cannot be changed 

by amendment. The Taliban of course would be unlikely to object to this, but the concept of 

Islamic Republicanism would surely prove more contentious.

Under the theocratic vision of the state set out in the Taliban order, sovereignty belongs 

to God and the state exists to implement God’s orders. In contrast, the Afghan constitution’s Islamic Republicanism can be inferred to relate to a combination of a system in which 

Islam is the state religion, laws are based on the tenets and beliefs of Islam, but sovereignty 

belongs to the Afghan nation as manifested through its elected representatives.

The second sentence of the citation from Article 149 concerns the fundamental rights of 

the Afghan people, which are principally set out in chapter 2 of the charter.40 According to 

Article 149, these rights cannot be amended, except to “improve” them. Admittedly, many of 

these rights remain aspirational. However, for present purposes, the significance of Article 

149 is that by insisting on the principle of constitutional continuity Afghan negotiators could 

constrain Taliban demands to rewrite fundamental aspects of the current constitutional order. 

Withdrawing the popular franchise, removing recognition of minority languages or religions, or 

no longer requiring the Afghan government to promote women’s education would be unlikely 

to meet the Article 149 test of an improvement. Former president Karzai suggested something 

similar in a speech to the National Assembly, in which he was explicit that some constitutional 

change is needed but also that any amendments had to follow Article 149.41
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356

Conclusion: Questions for Afghans to Consider

This report identifies strategic issues on which Afghans need to make informed choices 

regarding a fundamental aspect of potential peace talks with the Taliban. Insisting that 

the Taliban accept the Afghan constitution as a precursor for talks is understandable given 

the real risks to Afghanistan’s democratic and human rights standards of opening up the 

constitution to change. But a periodic assessment by Afghans of the continuing suitability 

of this condition is logical and healthy, especially when a spectrum of the country’s political 

leaders have acknowledged that the charter has shortcomings. A focus on protecting core 

constitutional principles rather than rigid adherence to the current text might therefore be 

a more strategic approach.

Taking a broader view, the international cases reviewed here provide examples of differing approaches Afghans could consider. In the Philippines and Myanmar, government 

openness to constitutional change was held out to armed groups to enable ceasefires and 

find a political formula for peace talks. In Colombia, no formal ceasefire has been called and 

whether the peace accords will result in constitutional change has been left up for deliberation in the talks.

These and other international cases of constitutional changes being negotiated as 

part of a peace deal with an armed insurgency suggest some important principles worth 

restating. The first is that the more extensive the constitutional changes contemplated in 

peace talks, the greater the ultimate public participation in the process should be. One way 

this could be achieved in Afghanistan is through a two-stage process of confidential talks 

between the warring parties being followed by a more participatory loya jirga to endorse 

constitutional changes.

However, based on experience with how difficult it is to manage a loya jirga, Afghan leaders would likely do well to only convene this traditional assembly with a coherent and unified 

strategy.42 Such a strategy would require some forward thinking as to whether, if peace talks 

bear fruit, their results should be included on the agenda of the planned 2016 loya jirga 

agreed to by Ghani and Abdullah or be put to a separately called assembly. The alternative 

could see any future loya jirga open a Pandora’s box of controversial issues regarding executive powers and decentralization that the Taliban could seek to promote and exploit.

The second principle from international practice holds that the legitimacy of constitutional change is best guaranteed by following existing formal amendment procedures. This 

process would help ensure that any amendments and hence the reformed political system 

itself has broad popular backing. In Afghanistan’s case, the important question arises of how 

the Taliban could be represented in a loya jirga so that their ownership issue with the current 

constitution might be addressed as well as the need for district council elections so that the 

constitution could be amended according to the letter of its own provisions.

Afghans would also benefit from research into the specific constitutional changes the 

group might demand. Afghan authorities would also be well advised to consult with a wide 

range of Afghan stakeholders on possible red lines in peace talks. The constitution’s prohibition of changes to the principle of Islamic Republicanism and the fundamental rights of 

the Afghan people provide a possible starting point for this exercise. In fact, insisting on 

constitutional continuity would strengthen the negotiating hand of the Afghan government 

by binding it to Article 149’s requirement that certain fundamental principles cannot be 

changed except to improve them (as well as to Afghanistan’s current constitutional commitment to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights).

Finally, debate over whether to discuss the Afghan constitution with the Taliban has 

tended to be framed in terms of the risks it poses to Afghanistan’s democratic system and 

human rights protections. To be sure, these are valid concerns that must be satisfactorily 

The more extensive the 

constitutional changes 

contemplated in peace talks,

the greater the ultimate 

public participation in the 

process should be.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 356 15

addressed, but it is also important for Afghan negotiators to consider how they could use 

such a political dialogue to their advantage. As with the Philippines case, in return for putting the constitution on the table, the Afghan government could pursue a concession of 

matching symbolic magnitude from the Taliban. For example, an acknowledgment from the 

Taliban that sovereignty in Afghanistan is exercised on behalf of the Afghan nation—the 

foundation of many aspects of the current Afghan political system and certain basic rights.

In the best case, the Afghan government could proactively use talks with the Taliban to 

seize the political high ground by putting the armed movement in the position of having 

to justify some of its more out of date and unpopular positions on constitutional issues to 

other Afghans. Taking this type of an approach to peace negotiations could also perhaps 

force a more rapid evolution of the Taliban’s political views than would be otherwise possible 

if the conflict simply persists in its current form.

Notes

1. Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by President Obama and President Karzai,” January 11, 

2013, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/11/joint-statement-president-obama-and-president-karzai. 

2. See “Russia Ready to Talk with Taliban Movement to Convince It to Reach Reconciliation,” ITAR-TASS News 

Agency, February 19, 2014, http://en.itar-tass.com/world/719847.

3. See former president Karzai’s 2013 speech to Parliament on the peace process where he said he was “absolutely 

ready” for reform to the political system made “based on the constitution.” Statement by H.E. Hamid Karzai at 

the Inaugural Session of the Fourth Legislative Year of the Parliament, March 7, 2013, http://president.gov.af/

en/documents?page=1. 

4. See “Afghan High Peace Council Members Present 250,000-Signature Petition Calling for Peace to UN,” March 6, 

2014, http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=12254&mid=15756&ItemID=37747. 

5. Clark B. Lombardi and Shamshad Pasarlay, “Might Afghans Amend the 2004 Constitution? Hints from a 

Televised Presidential Debate,” I-CONnect Blog, www.iconnectblog.com/2014/04/might-afghans-amend-the2004-constitution-hints-from-a-televised-presidential-debate/. 

6. The focus of this article is the Afghan Taliban. However Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan, the second largest Afghan 

insurgent group, published “New National Covenant for Peace” in May 2011 recommending the withdrawal of 

international military forces from Afghanistan and the establishment of an interim government that should 

“study” and make a “final decision” on the Afghan constitution, www.larawbar.net/26831.html.

7. Track 2 diplomacy involves unofficial contacts between nongovernmental groups, private citizens, and even 

government officials acting in a personal capacity. Its purpose is to explore possible solutions to conflicts outside 

the restrictions of formal negotiations.

8. Taliban Voice of Jihad website, “Text of Speech Enunciated by Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan at Research 

Conference in France,” December 24, 2012, http://shahamat-english.com/index.php/paighamoona/28777-textof-speech-enunciated-by-islamic-emirate-of-afghanistan-at-research-conference-in-france. 

9. On Taliban structures and policymaking, see, for example, Antonio Guistozzi, “The Taliban and the 2014 Elections in 

Afghanistan,” USIP Peaceworks no. 94, April 3, 2014, www.usip.org/publications/the-taliban-and-the-2014-electionsin-afghanistan; and on the Taliban’s past negotiating behavior, see Michael Semple, “Talking to the Taliban,” Foreign 

Policy Online, January 10, 2013, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/10/talking_to_the_taliban. 

10. The most notorious example of this came during the Taliban’s 1995 offensive where the movement ostensibly 

agreed to an alliance with Abdul Ali Mazari, a Hazara leader, only to renege on the deal, arrest Mazari, and have 

him killed. See Semple, “Talking to the Taliban.”

11. See Jonathan Schroden et al., “Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces,” CNA Strategic 

Studies, January 2014. The study forecasts that the Afghan security forces may need to withstand increased 

insurgency attacks until at least 2018 to create the conditions for an enduring political settlement to the conflict.

12. Michele Brandt, Jill Cottrell, Yash Ghai, and Anthony Regan, “Constitution-Making and Reform: Options for 

Process,” Interpeace, November 2011.

13. Mullah Mohammad Omar’s 2013 Eid-al-Fitr message postulates that a “modern education is a fundamental 

need of every society” and says that the “emerging generation will have both religious and modern education.” 

See “Message of Felicitation of Amir-ul-Momineen on the Occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr,” Taliban Voice of Jihad, 

August 6, 2013, www.shahamat-english.com/index.php/paighamoona/35234-message-of-felicitation-of-amir-ulmomineen-may-allah-protect-him-on-the-occasion-of-eid-ul-fitr. 

14. Some Taliban commanders indicate that they received orders not to attack civilians during Afghanistan’s 2014 

elections, probably because such violence would damage the Taliban’s public standing. See Azam Ahmed, “Lull 

Prompts Question: What Are Taliban Up To?” New York Times, April 28, 2014.

15. A recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate forecast that military gains made by U.S. and Afghan security 

forces against the Taliban could be reversed if international security and financial assistance is withdrawn. See 

Ernesto Londoño, Karen DeYoung, and Greg Miller, “Afghanistan Gains Will Be Lost Quickly after Drawdown, U.S. 

Intelligence Estimate Warns,” Washington Post, December 28, 2013.

16. See Framework Agreement on the Bangsomoro, in particular Article 4.b under “VII. Transition and 

Implementation.” 

17. Timothy Williams, “The MoA-AD Debacle—An Analysis of Individuals’ Voices, Provincial Propaganda and National 

Disinterest,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, no. 1 (2010): 121–44.
18. This revamped process has been called one of the most “participation-friendly” in the world. See Kristian 

Herbolzheimer and Emma Leslie, “Innovation in Mediation Support: The International Contact Group 

in Mindanao,” Conciliation Resources Practice Paper Series, www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/PracticePaper_

MindanaoICG_ConciliationResources_0.pdf. 

19. See International Crisis Group (ICG), “Reform in Myanmar: One Year On,” Asia Briefing no. 136–11, April 2012.

20. See, for example, the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, “Constitutional Reform in Myanmar: Priorities and 

Prospects for Amendment,” working paper no. 2014/01, January 2014.

21. Jim Della-Giacoma and Richard Horsey, “A House Divided: Finding Peace in Multiethnic Myanmar,” World Politics 

Review, September 10, 2013, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13200/a-house-divided-finding-peace-inmultiethnic-myanmar. 

22. See ICG, “Colombia: Peace at Last?” Latin America Report no. 45–25, September 2012.

23. Ibid.

24. Washington Office on Latin America, “Colombia Peace Process Update,” November 15, 2013, www.wola.org/

commentary/colombia_peace_process_update_november_15_2013. 

25. The author would like to thank UNAMA for providing access to this unpublished comparison.

26. See for example, Chris Johnson, William Maley, Alexander Thier, and Ali Wardak, “Afghanistan’s Political and 

Constitutional Development,” Overseas Development Institute, January 2003, 19–21.

27. This consensus building does not necessarily have to be constitutional. For example, substantial power has now 

been delegated by President Ghani via presidential decree to Abdullah’s newly created Chief Executive Officer post. 

Candidate Ghani also spoke of leaving provinces free to tailor national policies to local needs and allocating 40 

percent of the national budget to provincial authorities. See Lombardi and Pasarlay, “Might Afghans Amend the 

2004 Constitution?”

28. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), “Report on Constitutional Amendment,” 

Study no. 469/2008, Strasbourg, January 19, 2010.

29. The Cloak of the Prophet also has symbolic ties to the founder of modern Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Durrani, who 

brought it to Kandahar almost three hundred years ago.

30. The Hanafi school is the most widely subscribed of the four major Sunni schools of jurisprudence of Islamic law 

and the predominant school in Afghanistan. The 1964 constitution required the king of Afghanistan to be a 

male follower of the Hanafi school, but the 2004 constitution contains no such requirements for the president.

31. Article 157 of the Afghan constitution also describes a Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation 

of the Constitution, the constitutional powers of which are vague but also plays a role in constitutional 

interpretation.

32. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “References to Islam and Women in the Afghan Constitution,” Arab Law Quarterly

22, no. 3 (2008): 270–306. 

33. It is sometimes claimed that this was the first time Afghan women had participated in constitutional drafting, 

but Louis Dupree reports that six Afghan women were in fact delegates to the 1963 constitutional loya jirga.

34. See J. Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan,” New York Law School Law Review 51 

(2006/2007): 557–74.

35. Ibid.

36. Louis Dupree describes loya jirgas as historically being handpicked bodies of “king’s men” intended to rubberstamp policy decisions. He describes the 1963 constitutional loya jirga as breaking with this tradition by including 

ex officio members from the national assembly and judiciary as well as persons elected from the provinces. See 

Louis Dupree, Constitutional Development and Cultural Change, South Asia Series vol. 9 (American Universities Field 

Staff, 1965). The 2004 loya jirga was also regarded by Thier and others as generally representative.

37. Some legal scholars have argued that the quorum for convening a loya jirga could be met without its district 

council representatives, but Afghanistan’s Commission for Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution 

has taken the position that the loya jirga requires the participation of district council representatives’ 

participation. See, for example, Tom Ginsburg, “Comparative Constitutional Review,” USIP memo, www.usip.org/

sites/default/files/ROL/TG_Memo_on_Constitutional_Review for 2011_v4.pdf.

38. Copy of political agreement on file with the author.

39. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Afghanistan’s Constitution Ten Years On: What Are the Issues?”

40. Thirty-eight articles covering the “Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens.”

41. Daily Outlook Afghanistan, “Constitution Needs Amendments: Karzai,” March 16, 2014, http://outlookafghanistan.

net/national_detail.php?post_id=9649. 

42. This approach is suggested by one of Afghanistan’s foremost legal scholars. See Kamali, “Afghanistan’s 

Constitution Ten Years On.”

Of Related Interest

• Getting It Right in Afghanistan by Moeed Yusuf, Scott Smith, and Colin Cookman, editors (USIP 

Press, 2013)

• How We Missed the Story, Second Edition by Roy Gutman (USIP Press, 2013)

• The Taliban and the 2014 Elections in Afghanistan by Antonio Giustozzi (Peaceworks, February 2014) 

ISBN: 978-1-60127-276-8

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

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