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SYRIA AFTER GENEVA: 

NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. POLICY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 26, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee ................................................. 3 

Countryman, Hon. Thomas M., Assistant Secretary for International Security 

and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ................. 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Responses Of Assistant Secretary Thomas Countryman To Questions 

Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin ................................................ 74 

Egeland, Jan, secretary general, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oslo, Norway .... 41 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

Kilcullen, Dr. David J., chairman and founder, Caerus Associates, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 29 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey .................................... 1 

Nasr, Dr. Vali, dean, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC ............................................................................................ 37 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39 

Patterson, Hon. Anne, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ...................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Responses of Ambassador Anne Patterson to Questions Submitted by 

Senator Robert Menendez ............................................................................ 62 

Responses of Ambassador Anne Patterson to Questions Submitted by 

Senator Benjamin L. Cardin ........................................................................ 72 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Letter Submitted by Syrian Opposition Coalition President Ahmad Jarba ....... 75 

Statement Submitted by Save the Children .......................................................... 82 

Statement Submitted by Andrea Koppel, vice president, Global Engagement 

and Policy, MercyCorps ....................................................................................... 83 

Statement Submitted by Dr. Carolyn Y. Woo, president and CEO, Catholic 

Relief Services ...................................................................................................... 85 

Statement Submitted by The Coalition for a Democratic Syria .......................... 87 

(III)

(1) 

SYRIA AFTER GENEVA: 

NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. POLICY 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Corker, and 

McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. 

We are here today with a distinguished panel of experts to hear 

their views and express our concerns about what Congress can do 

about Syria after Geneva. 

At the moment, there is clearly a stalemate at the political level. 

The Geneva II process failed to achieve any forward momentum 

and fell far short of the goal to agree on a transitional governing 

body. The Syrian opposition delegation went to Geneva ready to 

work responsibly on behalf of the Syrian people and Assad’s delegation demonstrated their contempt for international efforts to mediate an end to the violence and preserve what is left of Syria. 

If there was any doubt about the true character of this regime, 

it was brought into sharp focus when Assad went after family 

members of the opposition following Geneva. Meanwhile, the barrel 

bombs continue to drop. The starvation and torture campaign went 

on unabated, even while the delegations were sitting at the negotiating table. 

Assad has shown that he is willing to fight to the last Syrian. 

Meanwhile, the international community seems paralyzed on 

what to do next. This hearing is about exactly that. What is next 

in Syria? And I hope to explore with our panelists new thinking, 

new options, to hear some creative new ideas that answer what is 

next and that can help determine what additional role Congress 

can play. 

2 

The record for this committee for empowering the moderate Syrian opposition and ensuring that a credible military threat is on 

the table has been clear for some time. 

The question before us last week was how to break the stalemate 

on the ground. With recent regime advances, the question may now 

be how to reverse their momentum and shore up opposition forces. 

Our partners in the Syrian Military Council are now fighting a 

two-front war, one against al-Qaeda affiliates and extremists who 

would impose Sharia law, the other against Assad and his security 

forces that remain loyal to him, Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia 

militias trained in Iran with Iranian equipment and funding, military equipment, and international protection supplied by Russia 

and direct guidance training and fighters provided by Iran. 

In conclusion, I would note that on Monday, U.N. Security Council General Ban Ki Moon reported to the U.N. Security Council on 

Resolution 2139 that named areas in Syria where the siege must 

be lifted. Predictably Assad did not meet the demands of the unanimous U.N. Security Council resolution. Hospitals, schools, and 

other civilian areas are still militarized. Areas are blocked from humanitarian aid and the barrel bombs are still falling. 

We need to insist on accountability and make it clear that there 

are consequences for ignoring the U.N. Security Council. Ultimately, the longer the war continues the fewer options we will 

have to end the horrific level of violence and the humanitarian 

nightmare. The loss of an entire generation of Syrian children, the 

collapse of a society that has given tremendous gifts to the world— 

this is not a legacy that anyone wants to live with. 

Clearly the stakes are high and growing higher every day. We 

need concerted, decisive U.S. leadership. The fact is we needed it 

2 years ago. We needed it yesterday and we need it today. 

Before I recognize Senator Corker, I received a letter that both 

he and I received from the Syrian Opposition Coalition President 

Ahmad Jarba. Mr. Jarba’s message is timely and meaningful. And 

without objection, I will add it to the record. 

[The letter referred to can be found on page 75.] 

The CHAIRMAN. In particular, I know Mr. Jarba’s commitment to 

partnering with us on a long-term strategic plan for supporting the 

moderate opposition and the Syrian Opposition Council’s enduring 

commitment to a political solution, countering terrorism, and the 

U.N. Security Council resolutions 2118 and 2139. 

So we support the struggle for a post-Assad Syria that represents 

all Syrians. 

Also, I believe that there are some individuals who are here from 

the Syrian Opposition in attendance at today’s hearing: Dr. Najib 

Ghadbian, the Special Representative to the United States for the 

National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces; Ms. 

Rima Fleihan, a member of the opposition’s delegation negotiating 

team in Geneva; Mr. Qusai Zakarya, a survivor of Assad’s August 

2013 chemical weapons attack and an influential youth activist 

working every day to make sure the world does not lose sight of 

the suffering of the Syrian people. We welcome you to the hearing. 

And now I would like to recognize the distinguished ranking 

member for his remarks. Senator Corker. 

3 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this 

hearing, and I want to thank the witnesses for their service to our 

country and apologize for the five votes that we are going to have 

during this hearing. 

This is our fourth hearing on Syria since the committee voted 

15–3 to jump-start a comprehensive Syria strategy last May, including authorizing meaningful support to the moderate opposition 

and imposing sanctions on those who support Assad. Each of these 

hearings has had a clear, consistent theme. U.S. policy has completely failed to shift the balance of power, improve the humanitarian situation, or achieve the President’s stated goal of removing 

Assad. In fact, I would argue that United States policy in Syria has 

achieved the exact opposite by making promises of support that 

were never fulfilled, and that has occurred and we know that. We 

have allowed Assad to solidify his position, embolden his external 

supporters, and undermine the moderate opposition. 

And in our last hearing on Syria, we heard that this is a civil 

war. Now this civil war threatens regional stability and has allowed terrorists to control more strategic territory in the heart of 

the Arab world than they did prior to 9/11. 

Faced with this failure, the administration is now required by 

law to conduct a comprehensive interagency strategy in order to 

use the funding authorities laid out in the appropriations bill that 

passed in January. I look forward to seeing the results of this review, but I am not confident it will convince the President who appears to fear provoking Russia and Iran and is not committed to 

changing the course of the conflict in any real way. And I hope the 

testimony today will shed light on the Russian-Iranian situation. 

We will, instead, continue along the current course in Syria, which 

leads us to a disaster, to quote the Director of National Intelligence. 

So while it is important for this committee to highlight the failure in this administration’s Syria policy, today I hope we can move 

beyond this. Today I hope we can use this hearing to generate new 

policy ideas on Syria, creative alternative legislative proposals for 

Congress to propose that will move United States policy and, by extension, the future of Syria in a better direction. 

And again I thank you for your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Our first panel. We are pleased to welcome Assistant Secretary 

of State for Near Eastern Affairs Anne Patterson who knows the 

region extremely well from her long service, and Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Tom 

Countryman. 

Let me remind you that both of your statements will be fully included in the record, without objection. 

I would ask you to summarize your statements in about 5 minutes or so, so we can have a full discussion. For the purposes of 

your knowledge, we have four more votes that are pending. So my 

hope is to get your testimony in and then recess until the end of 

those four votes so we can have a continuum of discussion. 

With that, Madam Secretary, we will recognize you first. 

4 

STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE PATTERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Corker, for inviting me here today with Tom Countryman. 

I am aware that members of this committee are not satisfied 

with our progress to date. Neither are we. The administration appreciates the concern and support of this committee, most recently 

expressed in your March 14 letter. 

Today I will supplement testimony provided by Deputy Secretary 

Burns on March 6, and I have provided a full statement for the 

record. 

The popular demands for reform sweeping the Middle East began 

3 years ago in Syria’s peaceful protests. The Assad regime’s response to these demands has torn the nation apart. More than 

146,000 people have been killed since the unrest and violence 

began; 2.5 million people have sought refuge in neighboring countries. Inside Syria, 6.5 million are displaced, and over 9 million in 

need of humanitarian assistance. 

The situation on the ground is constantly in flux. Regime troops 

get critical battle support from Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. They have Iranian and Russian weapons, and they 

resort to barrel bombs or starvation to terrorize civilians. 

But peace will not come to Syria from a military victory, only 

from a negotiated political settlement. 

The conflict has attracted experienced foreign fighters who are 

drawn to the ungoverned regions left by the deterioration of the 

Assad regime. ODNI staff estimates there are 23,000 violent extremist fighters in Syria, including more than 7,000 foreign fighters. The al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant are the largest groups. They offer weapons and 

money to Syrian men who oppose the regime but who might not 

otherwise be drawn to their ranks. 

Mr. Chairman, we are reviewing our policy and identifying priorities for coordinated action, and I would like to share some of those 

with you today. 

In Pakistan, we saw the dangers of ungoverned areas that become terrorist safe havens and how difficult it is to end them. A 

top priority is preventing the establishment of a permanent terrorist safe haven in Syria. In coordination with allies and partners, 

we are organizing to address the extremist fighters in Syria and we 

are working to cut their sources of funding and recruits. 

We are also working to strengthen the moderate Syrian opposition both inside and outside of Syria because they face a two-front 

war against both the Assad regime and the violent extremists. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee have been rightly concerned about the pace and effectiveness of support for the civilian 

opposition. This has been a challenge since we do not have a direct 

U.S. Government presence inside the country, as well as control of 

many border posts by al-Qaeda-linked groups or their offshoots. 

Our strategy has been to use $260 million in nonlethal assistance 

to link the Syrian Coalition to councils and NGOs inside the country, helping to unify and strengthen the opposition. Over half of 

that assistance has been delivered. 

5 

Based on our experience over the past year, we have now begun 

refocusing by directly channeling resources to local governments 

and civil society groups, as well as the SOC, and to trusted commanders, as well the Supreme Military Council. We are focusing on 

helping communities maintain basic public services. This strategy 

allows localities to sustain local institutions that will also be critical to building a post-Assad Syria. 

In towns and cities under opposition control, we are beginning to 

provide cash grants to pay police and teachers. We continue to 

train local councils and civil society organizations in administration 

and we are providing heavy equipment. As part of the $260 million in overall nonlethal assistance, we are providing $80 million in support to the SMC on a very fluid 

battlefield. Nonlethal assistance requirements are identified by 

commanders and include food rations, medical kits, as well as communications and other personal gear. 

In December, an SMC warehouse in Syria containing United 

States supplies was overrun by a faction of extremist fighters. We 

suspended assistance until they reestablished secure supply routes 

and storage facilities. By February, when the SMC regained control 

of its facility, we resumed supplies, this time directly to commanders. We will do more in coming months to support the Syrian 

civilian and armed opposition and civil society groups. 

We are supporting Syria’s neighbors to contain the conflict. We 

are providing humanitarian assistance and other support to Lebanon to address border and internal security issues. We are working with Turkey and Jordan on border security, counterterrorism, 

and humanitarian concerns. We are surging security assistance to 

help Iraq combat ISIL incursions, and we are coordinating with 

Israel to monitor threats and support Israel’s right to defend itself 

from spillover violence. 

The international community is also working to alleviate the suffering caused by this crisis. The Government of Kuwait and the 

United Nations cohosted the most recent donor conference in January which resulted in $2.5 billion in new pledges. The United 

States is the largest single donor, providing more than $1.7 billion 

in humanitarian assistance. Our challenge is the Assad regime’s 

policy of deliberately blocking humanitarian access to people in 

need. 

Transitioning to a representative government is the only way to 

reduce the violence and alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. 

The international community, including Russia, maintains that the 

conflict must end via a negotiated political agreement in line with 

the 2012 Geneva Communique, but the Assad regime has squandered every opportunity. 

The United States and Russia share a common interest in a successful negotiation that prevents the spread of instability and violent extremism beyond Syria’s borders. However, Russia has done 

nothing to pressure the Assad regime to advance the Geneva II negotiations, and they are increasing the quantity and the quality of 

weapons provided to the Syrian regime. We continue to review options for changing President Putin’s calculus. 

Separately, I know that the safety of Syria’s minority communities, including Christians, is a concern for the committee as it is 

6 

for us. We have sought and received assurances from the Syrian 

opposition and moderate rebels that they will protect women and 

minorities and engage them in building Syria’s future. 

Mr. Chairman, even as we pursue all the steps I have outlined 

today, we continue to examine what more we can do to defend U.S. 

interests in Syria and to achieve a political settlement, and we look 

forward to working with the committee in this respect. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Patterson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ANNE W. PATTERSON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, for inviting me today to discuss the crisis in Syria. I am well aware that 

many members of this committee are not satisfied with our progress to date. Neither are we. Let me say that the administration appreciates your concern and the 

support this committee has shown for efforts to address this challenge. 

The committee heard from Deputy Secretary Burns 3 weeks ago on the challenge 

of sectarian and extremist violence related to the conflict. Today I will supplement 

Deputy Secretary Burns’ remarks by describing the coordinated strategy that we are 

developing. I am pleased to be accompanied today by my colleague, Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Tom Countryman, who will 

address the international community’s progress in the removal and destruction of 

Syria’s chemical weapons. 

THE CRISIS

The popular demands for economic and political reform sweeping the Middle East 

began 3 years ago in Syria as peaceful protests. Syria’s large youthful population 

sought an end to oppression and new opportunities. The Assad regime’s response 

to these demands has torn the nation apart, fueling extremism and inflaming 

regional tensions. 

More than 146,000 people have been killed since the unrest and violence began. 

The number of conflict-affected civilians seeking refuge in neighboring countries has 

increased to more than 2.5 million people while, inside Syria, an additional 6.5 million people are displaced and at least 9.3 million people are in need of humanitarian 

assistance. The U.N. Security Council has condemned the denial of humanitarian 

access to civilians in need and has urged immediate steps to facilitate relief operations throughout the country, yet the regime has continued to obstruct humanitarian access. Again last week, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria reported 

on the continuing human rights violations being committed by the regime, as well 

as human rights abuses by the al-Qaeda linked groups and their offshoots that have 

taken root in the ungoverned spaces that Assad’s actions and atrocities have 

created. 

Opposition to the Assad regime in Syria is broad and deep. Most Syrians who side 

with the opposition are moderates. In large areas of the country they have thrown 

off regime control, yet the situation on the ground is constantly in flux. In some 

areas, regime forces—with Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard support— 

have regained control of territory they had lost earlier in the conflict. Syrian troops 

are well armed with Iranian and Russian weapons, and also resort to barrel bombs 

or starvation to terrorize civilians. But peace will not come to Syria from a military 

victory. The only sustainable solution to the Syria crisis is a negotiated political 

settlement. 

The United States is a leader of the ‘‘London 11’’ contact group that has worked 

to move forward the Syrian transition, end the violence, and achieve a political solution. Although the U.N.-sponsored Geneva II negotiations have stalled due to regime 

intransigence aided by the tacit support of Russia, the process served to unify components of the Syrian opposition and to enable it to articulate its vision for a transitional government. 

The continuing civil war has proved a magnet for foreign violent extremists— 

some with substantial combat experience—who are drawn to the ungoverned 

regions left by the deterioration of the Assad regime. Our colleagues at the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence have estimated that there are nearly 23,000 

violent extremist fighters in Syria, including more than 7,000 foreign fighters. They 

represent a minority of the total rebel ranks inside Syria, which are estimated to 

be between 75,000–110,000 fighters. The violent extremist fighters belong to several 

groups but most notably al-Qaeda’s official affiliate in Syria, Nusra Front, and the 

7 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, 

whose new name indicates its growing ambitions. ISIL is responsible for most of the 

violence that has been taking place in Iraq’s Anbar province aimed at destabilizing 

Iraq. These groups offer weapons and money to Syrian men who oppose the regime, 

yet who might not otherwise be drawn to violent extremist causes but for the money 

and avenue for action against the regime they provide. 

Bashar al-Assad bears responsibility for this metastasizing problem. His regime 

has released terrorists from its jails, allowed violent extremist bases to emerge, and 

invited other foreign terrorist organizations including Lebanese Hezbollah, as well 

as Iranian-trained militia fighters from Iraq and Pakistan, to join the fight on its 

side. 

Mr. Chairman, we are reviewing our policy and identifying priorities for coordinated action. 

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITY

In Pakistan, we clearly saw the dangers that arise when terrorists are able to set 

up safe havens—and how difficult and costly in lives and money it becomes to dislodge or destroy them. For that reason, a top priority in the Syria crisis is preventing the establishment of a permanent terrorist safe-haven. In coordination with 

allies and partners, we are now better organizing ourselves to address the growing 

challenge of violent extremist fighters in Syria and the flow of these fighters into 

and out of the country. With our partners, we will apply tools, tactics, and best practices to mitigate potential threats and build upon existing lines of cooperation. 

We are working with members of the opposition, Syria’s neighbors and other 

regional states to cut off their sources of funding and recruits. Saudi Arabia has 

criminalized participation in foreign conflicts by its citizens and is prosecuting individuals who have done so. Our allies in the gulf increasingly, and correctly, see the 

flood of violent extremists from their countries as a threat to themselves. We have 

new initiatives to work with our allies to identify violent extremists who have traveled to the region. 

We are also working to strengthen the moderate Syrian opposition, both inside 

and outside of Syria, because they are now facing a two-front war against both the 

Assad regime and the violent extremists. 

PREVENTING COLLAPSE AND NONLETHAL SUPPORT

In parts of Syria where the regime has been ousted, we want to prevent the 

wholesale collapse of Syria’s institutions and public services and keep regime 

hardliners and violent extremists from asserting control. As the fighting has continued, the regime has increasingly targeted civilian populations by denying basic services and cutting them off from food, fuel, and medical care. But some provincial and 

local councils and civil society organizations continue struggling, against great odds, 

to maintain local government and continue critical services. We need to help them. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee have been rightly concerned about the 

pace and effectiveness of support for the civilian opposition. Without a direct U.S. 

Government presence inside the country—as well as control of many border entry 

points by al-Qaeda-linked groups or their offshoots—it has been difficult to increase 

our assistance to the Syrian opposition. Our strategy had been to use $260 million 

in nonlethal assistance to link the Syrian Coalition (SOC) to councils and NGOs 

inside the country, helping to unify and strengthen the opposition. 

However, based on our experience on the ground over the past year, we have been 

refocusing our activity. Over the past few months the State Department and USAID 

have stepped up efforts to channel resources directly to local and provincial governments and civil society groups, as well as the SOC. 

Our focus is increasingly on ways to help communities maintain basic security, 

keep the lights on, provide water, food and basic medical care—staving off the 

advances of extremist groups who seek to exploit peoples’ desperation. It allows 

these localities to maintain the basic public institutions that will be so critical in 

rebuilding a post-Assad Syria. 

In towns and cities under opposition control, we are beginning to provide cash 

grants to pay local law enforcement and teachers. We continue to train local councils and civil society organizations in administration and local governance. And we 

are providing equipment and supplies to help them, including heavy equipment such 

as generators, cranes, trucks, and ambulances. In one major city, for example, we 

have helped reopen 17 schools serving 9,300 students. In another major city, we 

funded the refurbishment of 60 police stations and are providing nonlethal equipment and basic stipends to 1,300 policemen, who are struggling to maintain order. 

8 

Paying stipends not only helps keep these people on the job, but it also helps 

deprive the extremist groups of the chance to fill the vacuum themselves. 

Make no mistake: this is extremely difficult work and nobody is saying that this 

assistance will turn the tide against what remains an extremely serious and deteriorating situation. As we learned in Iraq—even with 160,000 American troops, 10 

years of effort, tens of thousands of schools refurbished, and hundreds of millions 

of dollars spent-it takes generations to restore stability in societies wrecked by decades of dictatorship and civil wars. We are determined, however, to stand with those 

struggling to rebuild and stabilize their local communities even in the most horrific 

circumstances imaginable. These brave individuals will be the future leaders of 

Syria; they deserve our support, and they will continue to receive it through the 

types of assistance I just described. As part of this $260 million in nonlethal overall assistance, moreover, we are pro- viding $80 million in support to the Supreme Military Command (SMC). Providing 

this support to groups engaged in a highly fluid battle zone has been challenging. 

In December, an SMC warehouse in Syria containing U.S. supplies was overrun by 

a faction of extremist fighters. We suspended SMC assistance until they could reestablish secure supply routes and storage facilities. By February, when the SMC 

regained control of its facility and accounted for its contents, we began sending supplies again—this time directly to trusted commanders. 

In providing nonlethal assistance to the SMC, needs are identified by commanders 

and have included food rations, medical kits, and vehicles—as well as communications and other personal gear. These supplies not only fill gaps identified by opposition troops fighting both the regime and violent extremists, but they are tangible 

evidence of our support for the moderate opposition. 

Although a leadership debate has opened up within the SMC—as the Syrian opposition discusses how to fight the regime more effectively—the dispute has not 

affected our ability to deliver nonlethal assistance to the moderate armed opposition 

through trusted commanders. 

None of the nonlethal assistance we are providing will be determinative in defeating regime forces, nor will it, on its own, force Assad to change his calculus about 

trying to hold on to power. However, our assistance does provide needed equipment 

while sending a signal both to those inside and outside Syria of our strong support 

for the moderate opposition; help maintain basic administrative institutions; help 

prevent the formation of vacuums in services and security that extremists aggressively exploit; and create relationships with moderates who can, when this conflict 

is over, form the basis of a transitional government. 

ELIMINATING THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Assad regime used chemical weapons against its citizens, and its continued 

possession of chemical weapons material represents a sustained danger to Syria’s 

population and all of its neighbors, including Israel. Last year, the international 

community, led by the United States and Russia, united to defend a longstanding 

international norm against the use of chemical weapons. Under a Joint Mission 

organized by the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international community is supporting the safe elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. U.S. assistance includes outfitting a 

vessel to neutralize Syria’s highest priority chemical precursors and agents. 

We are making progress, but there is tough work ahead. To date, the Joint Mission has verified the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons-production equipment, 

the machines that mix the components, and the removal of nearly half of Syria’s 

declared stockpile. All of the sulfur mustard agent and some of the precursors for 

sarin, the highest priority declared chemicals, have now been removed. It is our goal 

to complete the removal of declared chemicals as soon as possible in April and the 

verified destruction of these chemical weapons and materials by June 30. 

PROTECTING OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES

We are committed to helping contain the conflict by bolstering the security and 

stability of Syria’s neighbors. Violence from the ongoing conflict has already spilled 

into Lebanon and Turkey, our NATO ally. Recently, Israel retaliated against Syrian 

Army targets for an attack on an Israeli patrol on the Golan Heights. On Sunday, 

the Turkish Air Force shot down a Syrian plane that had encroached along the border. ISIL has used its position in Syria to pour extremist fighters and weapons into 

Iraq. Lebanon and Jordan are bearing an enormous burden as they work to secure 

their borders and meet the needs of more than 1.6 million refugees from Syria. We 

appreciate the support we have received from Congress as we work directly and 

with our international partners to support Syria’s neighbors: 

9 

• We back the Lebanese Government’s efforts to contain the Syrian conflict and 

strongly condemn Hezbollah’s intervention on behalf of the Assad regime. The 

U.S. has provided additional support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces to help them secure Lebanon’s borders and address internal 

security threats. We are helping the Lebanese Government care for nearly 1 

million refugees from Syria and strengthen the communities that are hosting 

them. We have provided more than $340 million in humanitarian assistance to 

support the needs of these refugees and to reduce the burden on Lebanese communities. In addition, our ongoing bilateral assistance is helping to address 

deteriorating economic conditions and gaps in the delivery of important services, 

particularly in communities impacted by the crisis. 

• Many of you met with Jordan’s King Abdullah when he was here recently and 

can appreciate the contributions that Jordan is making to address this crisis. 

The United States is already working closely with the Jordanian Armed Forces 

(JAF) to address threats emanating from Syria, including providing enhanced 

border security and counterterrorism capabilities. DOD funds also help to assist 

the JAF with providing humanitarian assistance to newly arriving Syrian refugees. Longstanding development programs help relieve the strains on water 

infrastructure, schools, and health facilities in Jordanian communities that support large numbers of Syrian refugees. We have provided $300 million in additional budget support over the last 2 years and will support a $1 billion loan 

guarantee for Jordan as well as the renewal of our bilateral assistance Memorandum of Understanding for an additional 5 years, as announced by the President last month. 

• In regards to Turkey, we are most importantly working with Ankara on a variety of counterterrorism issues to address the growing threat that Syria-based 

terrorists pose to Turkey and the challenge posed by foreign fighters. Additionally, Turkey hosts far more than the 641,000 officially registered refugees from 

Syria, in addition to significant parts of the Syrian opposition leadership. We 

are working to mitigate the Syrian conflict’s spillover on Turkey’s security and 

sovereignty, including through the deployment of two U.S. Patriot batteries in 

southern Turkey, which join four batteries from other NATO allies. U.S. contributions to the international humanitarian response help provide critical support to refugees hosted in Turkish camps and communities. In support of the 

U.N., Turkey is playing an important role in facilitating cross-border humanitarian assistance in northern Syria. 

• Iraq hosts more than 225,000 refugees from Syria, mostly in the Iraqi 

Kurdistan region. Since 2012, the United States has provided more than $90 

million in humanitarian aid to international organizations and NGOs for Syrian 

refugees in Iraq. We are also working with the U.N. and the Iraqi Government 

to ensure that the estimated 350,000 Iraqis displaced by the Anbar conflict are 

getting needed assistance and will be able to vote in Iraq’s upcoming elections, 

which ISIL seeks to disrupt. At the same time, we are in close contact with 

Iraq’s political leaders and security commanders to develop and execute a holistic campaign to isolate ISIL from the population, including through intensified 

information sharing and security assistance. 

• In Egypt, which hosts over 135,000 Syrian refugees, political instability and 

polarization has contributed to a difficult environment and increasing humanitarian needs for refugees. Recognizing the burden that refugee communities can 

pose on host countries, we are continuing to support humanitarian partners in 

Egypt and to engage the government to ensure that refugees receive needed 

support. 

• Israel has not been spared the effects of the conflict. Our governments coordinate closely to monitor violent extremist threats in Syria, and we support 

Israel’s right to defend itself from spillover violence. We applaud Israeli efforts 

to provide medical care to wounded Syrians seeking help. We are also concerned 

that Syria’s instability will continue to threaten the Golan. 

URGENT HUMANITARIAN ACTION

We are coordinating closely with the international community to alleviate the suffering caused by this crisis. The Government of Kuwait cohosted a donor conference 

with the U.N. Secretary General in January, which resulted in $2.6 billion in new 

pledges. The United States is the largest single donor to the Syria humanitarian 

response, providing more than $1.7 billion in humanitarian assistance. Our assistance supports U.N. and other international organizations as well as numerous 

NGOs assisting conflict-affected civilians inside the country and throughout the 

region. We are specifically directing some of our funds to alleviate the growing 

10 

strain on host communities, infrastructure and public services in neighboring countries. Inside Syria, our assistance provides food, basic health care, water and sanitation services, and desperately needed relief supplies. 

The Assad regime continues to deliberately block humanitarian access in Syria, 

citing the uncertain security situation. Last week, the first U.N. convoy reached the 

residents of Qamishli in northern Syria via the Turkish border crossing at 

Nusaybin. Although some supplies will finally reach these people in desperate need, 

one day of U.N. aid convoys crossing one border point is not enough. These convoys 

prove that the Syrian Army can allow humanitarian access when it chooses to do 

so. The Assad regime must approve all U.N. requests for access to areas in need 

immediately as called for by the U.N. Security Council. 

NEGOTIATIONS TRANSITIONING TO A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Transitioning to a representative government that is responsive to the needs of 

the Syrian people is the only way to reduce the violence and alleviate the suffering 

of the Syrian people. While the international community, including Russia, maintains that the conflict must end via a negotiated political agreement in line with 

the 2012 Geneva Communique, the regime has squandered every opportunity for a 

peaceful settlement. At the Geneva II talks, the regime’s negotiator insulted the 

opposition, U.N. Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi and the international community while contributing nothing of substance to the discussion. 

The United States and Russia share a common interest in a successful negotiation 

that fully implements the Geneva Communique and prevents the spread of instability and violent extremism beyond Syria’s borders. To date, this common interest 

has motivated Russia to continue its support to the OPCW mission. However, Russia has done nothing to move its Syrian allies forward in the Geneva II negotiations. 

Moreover, we have seen an increase in both the quantity and the quality of weapons 

Russia has provided to the Syrian regime in recent months. The stability that Russia seeks in Syria will not be achieved by providing planes, tanks, bombs, and guns 

for use against the Syrian people. We continue to review all options for changing 

President Putin’s calculus away from Russia’s support for the Assad regime. 

Ambassador Brahimi told the Security Council on March 13, that he recommends 

against a third round of talks unless the regime commits to discuss substantively 

all elements of the Geneva Communique. In the meantime, the United States 

and its partners will continue to expand our support to the Syrian opposition and 

ratchet up pressure on the regime. 

On another matter, I know that the safety of Syria’s minority communities is a 

key concern for members of this committee, as it is for us. We are troubled by the 

plight of all civilians in Syria, including Christians and other religious minorities. 

Protecting the security and religious rights of these communities, as well as the 

rights of women, is an important element of our policy and will be essential to any 

future political settlement. We have sought and received assurances from the Syrian 

opposition leadership and moderate rebel leaders that they will protect the rights 

of women and minorities, and engage them in plans for building Syria’s future. 

NEXT STEPS

Mr. Chairman, we are actively engaged in trying to bring the Syria crisis to an 

end. 

—We are working with allies and partners to combat the growing threat of violent 

extremists; 

—We are working to prevent a catastrophic collapse of Syrian cities in opposition 

controlled areas; 

—We are providing nonlethal support to the armed opposition; 

—We are working with the international community to end the threat of Syria’s 

chemical weapons; 

—We are taking steps to protect and support our regional friends and allies; 

—We are contributing generously to the humanitarian response both inside Syria 

and among its neighbors; and 

—We are providing support to the Syrian opposition both directly and through the 

London 11. 

Even as we pursue all the steps I have outlined today, we continue to examine 

what more we can do to defend U.S. interests in Syria and to achieve a political 

settlement. We appreciate the support of your committee—most recently in your 

March 14 letter—and will continue to work together with the Congress as we move 

forward. 

The Syrian people reject violent extremism. They want to return home and 

rebuild their country—and we will help them. Thank you. 

11 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Secretary Countryman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I thank the chairman and the ranking member for the opportunity to appear with Assistant Secretary Patterson and to testify on one specific aspect of the Syrian situation, 

that is, the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons. I will 

be brief. 

Since Secretary Kerry negotiated the framework last September 

to eliminate these weapons, we have made important progress, but 

much remains to be done. Thanks to an impressive international 

coalition, almost half of Syria’s declared chemical weapons materials are out of Syria, including the entire declared stockpile of sulfur mustard. International inspectors have conducted full inspections of the declared chemical weapons sites and have verified the 

destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons production, mixing, and 

filling equipment. 

This recent momentum is significant but the most significant moment will be when all of these terrible weapons are out of the 

hands of the regime so they cannot be used again against the Syrian people. 

The task before us remains considerable. Sixty-five percent of the 

most dangerous chemicals—Priority 1 chemicals—have yet to be removed from Syria. We continue to work with the international community to maintain pressure on the regime to move faster. We 

have made clear that the agreed schedules are not up for renegotiation and that the elimination effort must be completed as quickly 

and safely as possible. 

The regime missed the March 15th date for the physical destruction of production facilities. We intend to hold them to this and 

other international obligations. If Syria meets the agreed schedule 

for removal, the overall June 30th target date for the complete 

elimination of the program remains achievable. The next few weeks 

are critical and we and the rest of the world will be watching. 

There are simply no logistical or security reasons that the Assad 

regime cannot complete the removal effort next month. 

As the removal and elimination process continues, we will redouble our support for the OPCW’s verification and inspection efforts 

to ensure the accuracy and completeness of Syria’s declarations. 

The United States approaches this process with our eyes wide 

open. Following removal of declared chemicals, further review and 

verification of Syria’s declaration of its program will be required in 

order to achieve international confidence that the program has 

been completely eliminated. 

I thank you and I look forward to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Countryman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today about international efforts to support 

the United Nations (U.N.) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 

12 

Weapons (OPCW) in the complete and verifiable elimination of the Syrian chemical 

weapons program. While we have made important progress in the past months 

toward the elimination of Syria’s chemicals weapons program, considerable work 

remains to be done to ensure the Assad regime can never again use these terrible 

weapons against its own people, or threaten our regional and international partners 

with them. 

Just last year, the regime did not even publicly acknowledge that it possessed 

chemical weapons, despite having used them on multiple occasions, including in 

attacks that killed over 1,400 people. Today, OPCW inspectors on the ground in 

Syria, with U.N. support, have conducted full inspections of Syria’s declared chemical weapons-related sites, and have verified the functional destruction of the chemical weapons production, mixing, and filling equipment at those sites. In addition, 

as of today, more than 49 percent of Syria’s declared chemical weapons materials 

slated for destruction outside of Syria have been removed, including all of Syria’s 

declared sulfur mustard agent, and the OPCW has verified the destruction in Syria 

of 93 percent of Syria’s declared isopropanol, a binary component of the nerve agent 

sarin. But that’s not good enough. Syria has yet to remove 65 percent of its most 

dangerous (Priority 1) declared chemicals. We must continue to work with the international community to maintain pressure on the Assad regime to remove all of 

these chemicals as urgently as possible. 

The international community has established a firm legal framework, through 

U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2118 and decisions of the OPCW Executive Council, to ensure that this immense undertaking is completed in a transparent, expeditious, and verifiable manner, with a target for destroying all of Syria’s 

declared chemicals by June 30 of this year. 

The progress made in the past months has been achieved by diplomacy backed 

by a willingness to use military force. It remains critically important, as this process 

continues, that members of the international community continue to monitor closely 

the Syrian regime’s compliance with its Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)- 

related obligations. Syria’s obligations are clear, and we will continue to underscore 

the importance of the Assad regime’s continued cooperation. The Security Council 

decided in UNSCR 2118 to impose Chapter VII measures in the event of noncompliance with the resolution. 

While we have made progress, the task before us remains considerable. After 

months of Syrian foot dragging, we have made clear to the Assad regime that the 

internationally agreed upon schedule for chemical weapons destruction is simply not 

up for negotiation; the regime has all the equipment that it needs and has run out 

of excuses. We remain focused on underscoring the need for Syria to move forward 

rapidly with transporting chemical weapons materials to the port of Latakia for 

removal, consistent with its responsibilities under the CWC and UNSCR 2118. The 

next few weeks are critical in the removal effort, and we and the rest of the world 

are watching. We have, of course, also been in contact with Syrian opposition leaders, updating them throughout this process, and confirming their commitment that 

they will not interfere with the activities of the international elimination effort. 

With the continuing support of the international community, and the dedicated 

commitment of the OPCW–UN Joint Mission, we believe the Syrians are capable of 

completing the removal effort by late April. The international community continues 

to work toward the June 30th target date for the complete elimination of the program. While Syrian delays have placed that timeline in some danger, we continue 

to believe they remain achievable. 

The path ahead is not an easy one. Syria has missed several intermediate target 

dates, including most recently the target date for the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities. The regime must meet all chemical weapons destruction 

obligations, including for the physical destruction of chemical weapons production 

facilities, consistent with the CWC. The OPCW is currently advising Syria on an 

appropriate facilities destruction plan. It is essential that Syria accept its recommendations, and submit a revised facilities destruction plan for consideration by 

the OPCW Executive Council at its next scheduled meeting. 

The United States and the international community have provided extensive 

assistance to the international effort to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons program. There are no more excuses on the part of the Assad regime for not meeting 

the agreed timeline. We continue to encourage all countries to make whatever contribution they can to this important undertaking—whether that contribution is 

financial, technical, or in-kind—to enable the OPCW and U.N. to complete their 

missions. The United States has led by example in providing tens of millions of dollars in assistance to the OPCW–UN Joint Mission, including the provision of containers, trucks, forklifts, and other materials necessary for the safe transportation 

of chemical weapons materials in Syria. The State Department’s Nonproliferation 

13 

and Disarmament Fund has provided $8 million in financial and in-kind assistance 

to the OPCW inspection team, including armored vehicles, training, protective 

equipment, and medical countermeasures. Most significantly, the United States is 

also contributing unique capabilities to the elimination effort through the Department of Defense’s provision of a U.S. vessel, the Motor Vessel (M/V) Cape Ray, equipped with deployable hydrolysis technology to neutralize at sea Syria’s highest 

priority chemical weapons materials (sulfur mustard agent and the sarin precursor 

chemical, DF). 

While U.S. contributions to the elimination efforts are significant, this is ultimately a mission that reflects a remarkable international division of labor. Many 

of our international partners are participating and providing financial and in-kind 

assistance that is critical to the effort’s success: Danish and Norwegian ships (with 

Finnish and British support) are removing chemical weapons materials from the 

Syrian port of Latakia. Russia and China are assisting with security in Syrian territorial waters for the port loading operations. Italy has agreed to provide a port to 

allow transloading operations from the Danish cargo ship to the Cape Ray. The 

United Kingdom has agreed to destroy nerve agent precursor chemicals through 

commercial incineration. Germany has agreed to destroy the byproduct resulting 

from neutralization of the sulfur mustard agent aboard the M/V Cape Ray as an in kind contribution. Countries like Japan, Canada, the European Union, and many 

other states have made generous financial contributions. Companies in the United 

States and Finland have been awarded contracts from the OPCW for the destruction 

of the remaining materials. 

As the removal and elimination process continues, we will also continue to fully 

support the OPCW’s verification and inspection efforts, to ensure the accuracy and 

completeness of Syria’s declaration. We have never taken the Assad regime at its 

word, and will continue to press for a robust verification regime to ensure the 

absence of undeclared materials and facilities. We approach this process with our 

eyes wide open, and will insist on international verification. 

The path ahead will not be smooth, given the unprecedented scope and timeline 

for the mission. But we remain resolute in addressing these challenges, given the 

high stakes for the Syrian people, the region, and the world. Thank you again for 

the opportunity to discuss this important issue with you. I look forward to your 

questions and to consulting with you closely as we continue our efforts to verifiably 

eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both. 

It looks like we have not had the second vote yet. So let us start. 

Madam Secretary, United States policy on Syria has been premised on the assessment that there is no military solution to end 

the conflict. However, Assad forces backed, as your own testimony 

says, by Iran, Russia and Hezbollah have made alarming gains on 

the ground in recent weeks and likely believe that military victory 

is possible, as long as United States-backed opposition fighters are 

mired in a two-front war, fighting al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremists, as well as fighting the regime. 

Is the administration considering any military options that could 

change the calculus of the Assad regime that they cannot win militarily? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, I think that would be better 

discussed—I mean, we have always said that all options are on the 

table, but we need to discuss some of these more sensitive issues 

offline. 

The CHAIRMAN. So just the mere fact of answering generically, 

are you considering any military options, is something that would 

have to be classified? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, Mr. Chairman—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get into which ones yet. I just said are 

there any. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I am not at liberty—first of all, I would 

not be at liberty to discuss issues that are in a predecisional stage 

that are under discussion within the administration. And again, 

14 

they would be of a classified nature. So I would prefer to discuss 

them with members of this committee in an offline session. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are going to, obviously, get to that then. 

Let me tell you that I have a problem with a generic answer to 

a generic question that I cannot believe is classified. I go to these 

classified hearings, and sometimes I listen to a hearing that in my 

view should never have been classified because there is nothing 

there of consequence that I do not read before I get there by the 

press. Yet, when you go to a classified hearing, of course, you are 

constrained, but I would not be constrained if what I read in the 

press is largely what I hear in these hearings. So unless I am going 

to get something more in these classified settings, you know, that 

is going to be a problem moving forward. 

What is the view of the administration? You mentioned in public 

testimony that we are helping certain vetted elements of the Syrian opposition. Are we doing enough in this regard? Should we not 

be doing more? Should we consider what we are doing in terms of 

the weapons that we give them in order to be able to truly change 

the calculus? If you cannot stop a helicopter or a plane that is 

bombing you, if you cannot stop a tank that is crushing your community, then I do not know how we ever change the calculus here. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, absolutely we are not 

doing enough to help the moderate opposition, and our deliveries 

certainly of nonlethal equipment have been stymied by a series of 

logistical issues and security issues that have taken place both in 

Turkey and over the border in Syria because it has been at times 

very difficult to deliver this equipment. We are trying to change 

our strategy. We have changed our strategy, at least for one shipment, and delivered medical supplies on February 20 to vetted 

units, to trusted commanders that we have worked with very specifically. So we were trying to get more equipment to these commanders—get it more rapidly. 

And importantly I think we are starting to pay people and municipalities so that will provide some pushback, some counteraction 

to the ability of extremist groups to pay young Syrian men to join 

their ranks. We are trying to support communities more actively. 

We have spent over $60 million in supporting communities. But, 

no, of course, we have not done enough to support the moderate opposition. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Okay. But medical supplies—I am all for 

it. We obviously have to help those who are wounded in the fight, 

but that does not help you stop a tank. It does not help you stop 

a plane. It does not help you stop a helicopter that is barrel bombing you. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, I think you would find 

great unanimity within the administration that what you say is accurate, that they need more support of all sorts. And again, I would 

prefer to discuss that with you or your staff in a more private setting. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go to an area that hopefully you can answer in public. U.N. Special Envoy Brahimi this week suggested 

that proceeding with elections in Syria would end the Geneva II 

process. Is this also the administration’s position? What are the 

prospects that the elections will take place this spring, that Assad 

15 

will run, that he will win, and what is the consequence of that to 

any negotiation? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, the consequence is, I think, that 

these elections will be internally illegitimate. Syria does not exactly 

have a history of free and fair elections. You cannot hold an election with 9 million or 10 million people outside the country and 

where much of the country is cut off so that people could not vote 

freely even if they were so inclined. And I think there will be virtually universal recognition of this by the international community. 

The Geneva II process has faltered, but in our view it is an important element to keep alive because at some point, if the calculus 

or the balance on the battlefield changes, you need essentially to 

have a process that people can resort to. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask Secretary Countryman. I heard your 

remarks about the chemical weapons which I believe—the process 

of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons was made possible by this 

committee’s bipartisan vote for the authorization for the use of 

force for the President, as he was headed to the G20 in Russia. But 

as you yourself acknowledge, Syria’s 12 chemical weapons production facilities were to be destroyed by March 15. They have failed 

to meet this deadline as well, now offering to seal off these facilities instead of destroying them. 

What is the U.S. Government prepared to do to ensure that Syria 

complies with the Chemical Weapons Convention and what is the 

likelihood of Syria’s entire chemical arsenal being destroyed by 

June the 30th? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. First, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you that 

the agreement for the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons was 

achieved only by using a credible threat of force. And I greatly 

value this committee’s role in adding to the credibility of that 

threat. 

In terms of physical production facilities, the equipment that has 

been declared has been destroyed. The facilities themselves, whether they are buildings, tunnels, or hangars, still remains to be destroyed. We have maintained and will continue to maintain that 

destruction means destruction. I think there will be further action 

in the OPCW Executive Council in the next week that will address 

this question. So I am not quite prepared to predict that it will be 

immediately successful, but I can guarantee you of our firm stand 

on this issue. 

In terms of estimating the likelihood of the complete elimination 

of Syria’s program, we are focused at the moment—that is, the 

international community—on the removal and destruction of declared chemicals, and I believe that we can still achieve the target 

date of mid-2014 for that destruction. 

The question of whether the declaration is accurate is, as I indicated, the next question that we will have to take up. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I want to go to Senator Corker, so he can 

get his questions in before we have to go to vote. 

But let me just say what is the consequence if June 30 comes 

and goes and we are nowhere near to achieving what we set out 

to achieve and which the Syrians agreed to. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Very briefly, I would differentiate two situations. 

16 

If by June 30 we have removed all declared chemicals from Syria 

and they are aboard the U.S. vessel that is in the process of destroying those chemicals, I think that we will be successful. And I 

do not know of anyone in the world who would criticize us for not 

completing the destruction process 100 percent when we have 

eliminated those chemicals from the possibility of their use by the 

regime. 

If alternately Syria does not complete the removal process of declared chemicals by that date, it is a very different situation and 

one that will have strong consequences for Syria. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. I still have not heard what they are, but 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I begin, I want to say to Ambassador Patterson that, look, 

I respect you tremendously and have spent a lot of time with you 

in Pakistan and Egypt. And I would imagine being in a position 

you are in right now where you are having to talk in this manner 

relative to Syria is very uncomfortable. Again, I want to say I have 

tremendous respect for you. 

I find the answer that you gave relative to the classified setting 

and potential military efforts major baloney, and if I was in a different setting, I would use different words. I cannot imagine you 

saying that in this setting. That would indicate to people that we 

actually have a military strategy relative to Syria, and that could 

not be further from the truth. 

Now, are you sitting here trying to indicate to the media and 

people listening that you guys have actually developed a military 

strategy relative to Syria and you are going to talk about it in a 

classified setting? Is that what you are doing today? Because if you 

are, that is major news. And I find that answer—a friend, someone 

I respect—to be one of the most major misleading baloneys I have 

heard since I have been in the United States Senate. So please 

clarify that because I am pretty upset, especially after we wrote an 

authorization for the use of force and this administration did everything they could to keep from doing that, jumping in the arms of 

Russia, basically validating Assad through this shiny object issue 

of chemical warfare being removed from the country, which has 

nothing to do with the 40,000 people that have been killed since 

August with barrel bombs. So please clarify what you said. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes. Senator Corker, I am sorry if it 

sounds like baloney, but let me do try and clarify this because perhaps I interpreted Senator Menendez’s question too narrowly. Obviously, our view and often state view is there is no military solution to this conflict. 

Senator CORKER. And there is no military strategy the administration has laid out. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Wait a minute, sir. Wait just a sec. Let 

me get to that. 

So there is no military solution, and there has to be a negotiated 

settlement. 

I thought what Senator Menendez was asking me is were military options under consideration, and no, I am simply not going to 

get to that in this kind of hearing. 

17 

Senator CORKER. Are you going to indicate in this public hearing 

that you are actually considering military options—this administration? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, I am not going to get into that 

and I am not going to be, in effect, bullied into answering this with 

all due respect, sir. 

Senator CORKER. Well, let me explain to the world I assure you 

the administration has no military options on the table. 

And I would just like to ask you what is our strategy. I mean, 

sending in—you know, I sat with Idris last August while he was 

waiting on the trucks to arrive that had been promised for months. 

He is obviously not a part of this anymore. But what is our strategy in Syria? I do not see that we have one other than letting people kill each other off, allowing it to fester. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, I do think we have a strategy. 

Senator CORKER. Please lay it out one, two, three. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Let me try and lay out the components 

of the strategy because I do think we have a strategy here. 

One is diplomatic and that is not zero. We do have—— 

Senator CORKER. Wait a minute. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Wait a minute. 

Senator CORKER. It is pretty zero. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Pretty zero, but—— 

Senator CORKER. Okay. You did say just now ‘‘pretty zero.’’ So 

that is pretty zero. 

What is the next strategy? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. The next strategy is containment, and 

we are working with our allies—— 

Senator CORKER. So we are going to contain all the jihadists 

there and get everybody killed off? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. We are going to work with our allies, 

Senator Corker, to try and improve their border security, to try and 

improve their security, and in other things again I will not mention 

in this classified hearing, to try and help our allies out with both 

security assistance and humanitarian assistance. 

Senator CORKER. And our allies are who again? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, our friends are Jordan in particular, Lebanon—— 

Senator CORKER. And Jordan is inside fighting? I mean, I am 

missing something here. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Jordanians inside—— 

Senator CORKER. So I am talking about inside Syria. I understand about the refugee camps and I understand all those things. 

But inside Syria, what is our strategy? I understand that we are 

trying to keep Jordan stable because we do not have a serious 

strategy and we have people coming into Jordan and that is destabilizing the country. I got that. But what are we doing as far as 

a Syrian strategy goes? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. We are trying to support the moderate 

opposition, and I would—— 

Senator CORKER. Support them how? With food and—— 

Ambassador PATTERSON. With food and with other goods and 

with supplies. And again, let us not get into some of these other 

things here. 

18 

Senator CORKER. Can we have a classified setting immediately 

after this? I mean, would you be open to that, going down to SVC– 

215 and let us just hear some of these details that would be worth 

our while to do? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, we will talk about it. I mean, I 

would certainly be willing. 

But let me go on. Senator Corker, we do have a counterterrorism 

strategy. There is a huge amount of intelligence exchange and 

working with intelligence agencies in the region to get a handle on 

these jihadis who have migrated from all over the world. So we are 

trying to—— 

Senator CORKER. So we are getting intelligence on all these 

jihadis that are flowing in from everywhere that has created a significant threat to the homeland, but we are gathering intelligence. 

What is the next element of that? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, the next step, Senator Corker, 

will be to work with our allies, work with our friends in the region 

to try and reduce this threat. 

Senator CORKER. We have no strategy in Syria. We have not had 

a strategy in Syria from day one. 

And I guess I would ask you what is our relationship, for instance, with Russia and Iran and the other things that we have ongoing with them. How is that affecting the fact that we have no 

strategy, no coherent strategy in Syria whatsoever? I mean, I 

would feel better about it if you would just say that to me. We have 

no strategy. But to act like we have got some classified strategy we 

are going to hear about, I am looking forward to that meeting. But 

does our relationship with Russia and Iran have something to do 

with our lack of strategy in Syria? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, we work closely—certainly 

Secretary Kerry and everybody else who is involved has worked 

closely with the Russians particularly to try and get them to cooperate with us in the diplomatic process. It is a process that has 

largely failed. We have, I think, been successful with the Russians 

in cooperating on the removal of the chemical weapons, and we are 

hopeful that we can engage with them as this process goes forward 

because a destabilized Syria is not just a threat to us and neighbors, but it is also a threat to Russia. 

Senator CORKER. If I could just say one last thing. And I know 

I do not usually show much emotions in these meetings, especially 

to someone who I respect so much and I have to believe has been 

put in an incredibly awkward position being here today. 

But, Mr. Countryman, I will say to you this removal of chemical 

weapons—I would say the reason Assad is dragging his feet, as he 

is, is that is the very thing that has validated him. It is the thing 

that we did to put him in the strongest position he has been in 

since this conflict began. And the reason he is dragging his feet is, 

as long as he is important to that process, he is going to continue 

to be buoyed up. And I think it is a shiny object; 1,200 people were 

killed terribly with chemical weapons; 40,000 people have been 

killed since then with barrel bombs. And to me the whole issue regarding the chemical weapons has been a ruse. It has been a shiny 

object. It has kept us from really having any kind of coherent Syrian policy in the beginning. 

19 

And I am not blaming our country for what has happened in 

Syria. I mean, it is something we did not create. But to act like we 

have some policy that is going to solve this problem when we cannot even get trucks delivered to the head of the opposition on the 

ground in an appropriate amount of time because of the bureaucratic tape that we have here in this country and the fact that we 

really have no commitment to me is very disappointing. 

So I find this portion of our hearing incredibly disappointing. I 

hope that we will never have another hearing like this with you, 

Ambassador. I still call you that because of my great respect. And 

I do look forward to that classified briefing in just a moment that 

is going to be so illuminating on this new Syrian strategy. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Senator, if I could very briefly disagree with 

you with great respect. 

First, I do not agree at all that the agreement to rid Syria of its 

chemical weapons has either validated or strengthened the Assad 

regime. 

Senator CORKER. Has he been strengthened since we began this 

the 1st of September? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Since September, yes, but the question of 

cause and effect of whether the chemical weapons agreement, 

which forced him to give up what he considered his most valued 

strategic deterrent against Israel, which he had used in a tactical 

sense against his own people and which he is now constrained from 

using—these are actual security losses for him. And no amount of 

Russian praise for his so-called wise decision can allow him to regain the credibility that he frittered away, that he destroyed with 

his own people and with the international community. And it does 

not change in any way the United States view that he needs to go 

if Syria is to have a chance. 

Senator CORKER. Well, with great respect, the best thing that 

ever happened to Assad—this sounds really crass. The best thing 

he ever did was kill 1,200 citizens with chemical weapons because 

the United States and Russia and others have now propped him up 

and used that 1,200-person killing to allow 40,000 more people to 

be killed. And it is a shiny object. It was a great way for us to partner with Russia and move away from having any kind of strategy 

on the ground. So I disagree with you strongly. With respect, I 

think you are delusional. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. If I could expand on my delusions, I would 

simply say that chemical weapons were never an important part of 

the military equation causing the tragedy in Syria, and their elimination does not fundamentally alter the military equation that 

causes today’s situation. 

The CHAIRMAN. I will say I understand the ranking member’s 

frustration on the broader question, and I share it with him. I will 

disagree with him on the chemical weapons insofar as it was important to send not only in Syria but internationally a message 

that the use of chemical weapons against all international norms 

would have a consequence. And that is where I would have a difference of opinion, but I strongly respect his overall frustration 

with where we are at on Syria. 

Senator Kaine has been gracious enough to come back, and he 

has his own questions. I am going to ask him to preside. I am going 

20 

to go vote. I am going to come back. There are a couple more questions and a preface that I want to set for that classified setting so 

that it can actually be useful at the end of the day because if we 

cannot meet the standard that I will ask you to meet, then we 

might as well not have it. I will be right back. 

Senator KAINE [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to 

the witnesses. And I apologize for being tardy. We are ‘‘backing and 

forthing’’ on votes. 

By way of comment, strategy conveys a lot of different things. 

Let us just talk about humanitarian efforts. The United States is 

the largest provider of humanitarian relief in the world. That is not 

by accident. It is strategic. That is an important thing. I just returned from visiting Lebanon, and the United States support for 

humanitarian relief for Syrian refugees outside the borders of Syria 

is highly appreciated. We need to do more. We need the other nations to do more. But that is an element of strategy. We want to 

do more with humanitarian relief inside Syria. 

Let me ask a question of both of you. Since the U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 2139, there is a 30-day reporting requirement. 

What do you expect to see in the opening 30 days? I am gathering 

it is not going to be too good. What do you expect to see in the 

opening 30-day report of the U.N. Security Resolution 2139? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

We do not expect to see very much. It has been very hard to implement the resolution and move the humanitarian goods across 

the border. There have been some desultory meetings and there 

has been a plan developed, but in terms of actual delivery to hungry people, there has been very little. So we anticipate that that 

will be the report that is given from the international relief agencies. We have been working with the opposition, of course, to ensure that assistance can get into opposition-held areas. 

Senator KAINE. I am going to introduce a statement to the record 

from Mercy Corps outlining some ideas about humanitarian relief. 

There is no one here to object to my request, so without objection, 

it will be entered into the record. 

[The information referred to can be found on page 83.] 

Senator KAINE. The issue of aggressive insertion of humanitarian 

aid into the country is a huge and important one. In Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon now, we have heard thank you for the United 

States work on humanitarian aid outside. What we need now is humanitarian aid inside. That continues to remain an important area 

for us to focus on. 

The second element of strategy is diplomacy. I share Ambassador 

Countryman’s view that the destruction of one of the largest chemical weapons stockpiles in the world is a very significant diplomatic 

achievement. We are not happy with what is going on in Syria. We 

are not happy with the progress. We are not happy with the civil 

war and the slaughter of innocent people. However, the existence 

of that chemical weapons stockpile would be bad for Syrians today 

and would be bad for Syrians and all neighbors tomorrow and for 

years to come. That destruction is a significant diplomatic gain. 

What is the current status of the destruction of the chemical 

weapons stockpile? We have seen some positive news. We have 

21 

seen some negative news. In particular, with respect to the announced June 30 deadline for destruction, how is it looking? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. In brief—I cover more of this in my written 

statement, but to summarize, nearly half of the chemicals that 

Syria has declared have been unloaded through the Port of Latakia 

onto a Danish vessel. When the loading is complete, they will be 

transferred to a U.S. vessel for destruction. Almost half sounds 

good. One of the things that concerns us is that 65 percent of the 

more dangerous chemicals, the Priority 1 chemicals, have yet to be 

moved out of Syria. The pace has increased dramatically in the last 

3 weeks, and we have solid grounds to believe it can be accomplished in April—100 percent removal. But we need to keep our 

elbow in the back of the Syrians with the help of the joint mission 

of the U.N., the OPCW, and the international community. Once it 

is all loaded onto the U.S. ship for destruction, we believe that we 

will either meet or come very close to the June 30 target date for 

destruction of declared chemicals. 

Senator KAINE. And then let me ask about declared. What is our 

assessment of whether the declaration of chemical weapons—how 

close does it match reality, and are there significant questions we 

have about the extent of the declaration whether there are 

undeclared weapons we need to isolate and identify? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Having great concern for the frustration that 

the chairman has already expressed, I can only offer to brief you 

on that in a closed session. 

Senator KAINE. Well, that is a question that is very important for 

us to know. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. It will be illuminating. 

Senator KAINE. Okay, thank you. 

So diplomacy is an element of strategy. Chemical weapons we 

have discussed. 

The second element of diplomacy is the talks in Geneva. Those 

are desultory. They are not achieving what we hope. But we do 

know if we do not continue talking, we know what the answer will 

be. There will not be the negotiated political end to this civil war 

that we all think is necessary. So we have to undertake continuing 

efforts to engage the parties in dialogue. 

The third element of strategy is obviously military. That is probably the area that has excited the frustration I was hearing as I 

came in the door, and that is one, look, we can all share. We were 

around this table together—members of the Foreign Relations 

Committee—voting for a request for limited military action in 

Syria. It was essentially a 10–8 vote, very divided, not a partisan 

division, but very divided. Most would acknowledge that Congress 

was not going to support that. Certainly the House was not going 

to. It would have been very difficult for the Senate to support it. 

So it is understandably frustrating if you think the United States 

should have a clear military policy as a third element of strategy. 

Congress has pretty much spoken that they were not in support of 

military action even for the limited use of deterring and degrading 

the capacity to use chemical weapons. So if we are going to be frustrated, we can be frustrated, but it should not be just why is the 

administration not doing better when Congress had a chance to 

vote and express their support or lack of support for military option 

22 

and pretty much said they did not support it. So we can all be frustrated by that. 

But I will leave questions about the military discussion for a 

closed session. 

Let us go to the refugee crisis in the neighboring countries. 

Clearly, Jordan, Turkey, as recent events have shown with the 

shooting down of the Syrian aircraft, Lebanon where I recently visited—I feel like the Lebanese story has sort of been an undertold 

story and the effect of the refugees on Lebanese life, about 4 million Lebanese, over a million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The Syrian civil war is the dark star of gravity that is altering every fact 

of Lebanese life, economy, education, tourism, extremist violence 

perpetrated against largely Shia sites because of Hezbollah’s decision to go into all-in for Assad in Syria. 

What more can we be doing to help our allies and countries that 

are neighboring countries? I failed to mention Iraq, but the challenges are significant there. What more can we be doing to help 

these countries who are allies of ours deal with these refugee flows, 

which are continuing? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, Senator Kaine. I think the Lebanon story is sort of underplayed in this narrative because they 

certainly have the most refugees, and they are in host communities, which means local municipalities are bearing the burden. 

We need to step up humanitarian assistance particularly in Lebanon and Jordan where the situation is acute. 

And in Iraq, in particular, where the security implications have 

really been more severe than the refugee flow, we have tried and 

again need to do more to accelerate shipments of military equipment to Iraqi forces. And we have begun to train Iraqi special 

forces again in Jordan. So we are trying to help the Iraqi Government meet the spillover effect—counter the spillover effect from the 

Syrian crisis. 

So a combination I think of security assistance—certainly we are 

upping that to Lebanon this year. We are upping our assistance to 

Jordan and increased humanitarian assistance. We are very mindful of the challenges that that presents to the neighbors. 

Senator KAINE. I am going to ask—Senator Coons will now take 

questions. I will go cast a vote and return. 

Senator COONS [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

If I could first, before welcoming our witnesses, I just want to 

thank Chairman Menendez for chairing this important hearing and 

our witnesses for sharing their insights into what is an ongoing crisis. 

I joined my colleagues, including Chairman Menendez, Ranking 

Member Corker, in sending a letter to the President expressing bipartisan support for seeking a new strategy that will break the 

stalemate on the ground and enable a meaningful political solution 

that paves a new way for leadership in Syria. In my view, we cannot afford to sit on the sidelines as innocent civilians are killed and 

have to take steps to diminish the huge amount of suffering that 

has already happened in Syria while preventing the establishment 

of safe havens for al-Qaeda-related extremists. And I believe we 

need to recalibrate our policy in Syria. 

23 

We have met a number of times, Madam Assistant Secretary, 

and I have always been impressed with your leadership, your insight, and your capabilities, especially in this most difficult of 

fields. 

So if you will forgive me for a moment, given that I have literally 

just returned from casting a vote. I was particularly interested in 

the impact of refugees on host countries in the region and in particular what you thought are the potential challenges for our most 

vital ally Jordan and other allies in the region. Forgive me if this 

has already been addressed. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Senator Coons. 

I know that many of you spoke to King Abdullah when he was 

here, and he was extremely eloquent about the challenges that Jordan is facing in this respect, not only in the refugee camp, which 

can become certainly a hot bed of its own resentments and insurgency, frankly, but also in the host communities because it has put 

a huge burden on Jordanian public services, as well as in Lebanon 

and elsewhere in the region. 

So in Jordan, in particular, we are increasing our humanitarian 

assistance. We are increasing our economic assistance, and we are 

increasing our assistance to Jordanian military and security forces, 

including on the border so they have a better capacity to patrol the 

border and prevent spillover, in effect, and also to train their irregular forces in a more aggressive way. 

In Lebanon, we are going to increase security assistance there as 

well. That really in numbers the most severely affected country. 

Trying to increase our humanitarian assistance there. In Lebanon, 

they are entirely in host communities. So it has put an enormous 

burden on the local population. 

Senator COONS. I have previously met with the Ambassadors 

from both Jordan and Lebanon in my Appropriations Committee 

role and was struck both at their gratitude for and their intense 

need for additional humanitarian assistance from the United 

States. 

I visited last year a Syrian refugee camp in Jordan, and the refugees expressed extreme frustration and anger at delays in the 

promised delivery of U.S. assistance and support. 

What can we do to express in any meaningful way a sense of 

abandonment by the United States felt by Syrians within the country and in the region? And how has that, in your view, manifested 

itself in terms of radicalization of the opposition forces? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, I think one huge attraction to the 

opposition forces inside of Syria or the more extremist elements of 

the opposition forces is they pay money. They essentially pay salaries. So as I mentioned earlier, we are going to try and counteract 

that, at least within Syria, to try and pay police, sanitation workers, teachers, taxi, deliverer of public services and provide some 

balance to that respect. 

In the camps, Senator Coons, I think perhaps we have not done 

a very good job of identifying where the assistance comes from. 

Most of our assistance in these camps is channeled through very 

worthy international organizations, but sometimes the sources of 

funds is a little obscure, at least to the recipient. And we need to 

do a better job of articulating that because we are by far the largVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Apr 23, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE HE
24 

est donor and frankly a donor that delivers on our promises, unlike 

some of the others. But I must say the international community 

has been responsive in great measure to this crisis. 

Senator COONS. What more can we do to ensure that the assistance that we are providing goes to the intended beneficiaries and 

through channels that we expect, particularly with regard to lethal 

aid? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, we are handling nonlethal, Senator Coons, and there were some issues with that in December 

where a warehouse was overrun by other elements. But now we are 

sending materials directly to trusted commanders, and the SMC 

has been very helpful in that respect because they have helped us 

identify commanders in whom they have confidence. So we are delivering goods directly to them, vetted commanders. 

Senator COONS. I am also, before I turn it over to another Senator, particularly interested in the progress toward the chemical 

weapons commitments that were made. How likely is it in your 

view that Syria will meet the June deadline for the removal and 

destruction of much of the chemical weapons stockpile? If Secretary 

Countryman would like to speak to that. Forgive me. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

We believe that there are no obstacles to completing the removal 

of the declared stockpile from Syria in the month of April, and it 

will require constant attention from the international community 

to make sure that happens. Assuming for a moment that it happens, we will be either on time or very close to on time to completing the destruction of those chemicals aboard the U.S.-outfitted 

ship. But the key point is that the most dangerous chemicals, those 

that the regime has used against its people, will be out of the 

hands of the regime well before June. 

Senator COONS. Last, if I could, as you go through a review, what 

do you think should be the overarching goal of United States policy 

toward Syria, and how do we execute on that? If you would both 

answer that, and then I will—— 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, the overarching goal at this 

point is to change the calculus on the battlefield so that the Assad 

regime has an incentive to negotiate, and we have not yet reached 

that point. 

The other, frankly, extreme concern of the administration is the 

growing terrorist threat emanating from Syria not just with individuals, although that is severe enough, but the possible establishment of a safe haven, semipermanent safe haven, in northeastern 

Syria. 

And those are two issues that need to be addressed urgently. 

Senator COONS. I agree with the urgency. 

Mr. Assistant Secretary. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Nothing to add, sir. 

Senator COONS. Great. Thank you both. I appreciate your testimony. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you, Senator. 

I thank the witnesses. 

So if I heard you right, we are going to change the calculus on 

the battlefield. Is that one of our policy goals? 

25 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Our policy goal, Senator, is to move toward a negotiated settlement. 

Senator MCCAIN. Can that happen without changing the calculus 

on the battlefield? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Oh, of course, we will have to change 

the calculus on the battlefield because—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. We once had the calculus on the 

battlefield about 2 years ago before Hezbollah, Russian arms, Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and others. 

So tell me when I am wrong here. The Geneva gathering was a 

total and abysmal failure. The only concrete thing I have seen out 

of Geneva is that the families of the people who went there have 

been kidnapped by Bashar al-Assad. So they have paid a pretty 

heavy price to go to Geneva, as nice as it must have been that time 

of year. 

Syria-Iraq border is now a haven for al-Qaeda where they are 

moving back and forth. 

The weapons from Russia continue to flow in even according to 

a story I have here that they have even increased their arms supplies. Please correct me if I am wrong. 

Robert Ford, the former Ambassador to Syria, America alone 

cannot solve the Syrian crisis. 

We now see a front page story this morning about the fact that 

the Syrian resistance are now giving up because of the failure to 

achieve success where they now have a program to amnesty for 

these people supposedly. 

Maybe you can help me out here. How is that policy that you just 

articulated—how is that doing? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Not very well, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Not very well. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. And I said that sort of front-up, right 

up front. Can I address the points you raised? 

Senator MCCAIN. Sure. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Look, on the Geneva process, I think we 

totally admit that these talks have faltered, and there is no process 

underway right now. 

But I think if you talk, Senator, to members of the opposition, 

first of all, it is sort of to unify the opposition and give them more 

credibility within Syria. And I think if you talk to them—and we 

are hoping they can come here soon—I do not think they would say 

that they were sorry they went, despite the enormous personal cost 

that some of them have endured, because it was a process that 

gave them legitimacy and also exposed the regime on the international stage. 

On the Syria-Iraq border, Senator—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Let me just respond to that assertion. So really, 

the purpose of Geneva was not to arrange the transition out of 

power of Assad. It was to give the opposition more legitimacy even 

though many of them had their family members kidnapped by 

Assad. I got that. Okay. 

What is the next point? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, that is not right. 

Senator MCCAIN. It was a failure. It was a failure and it was 

doomed to failure because we knew that without the battlefield faVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Apr 23, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE HE
26 

voring Bashar al-Assad, he was not going to negotiate his departure. A first-year cadet at West Point knows that, Madam Secretary, that when they are winning on the battlefield, which 

Bashar al-Assad is, he is not going to negotiate his transition from 

power. So it was all Assad and a joke. Now, whether it helped some 

with the legitimacy of the opposition or not, I mean, that is a reason to have gone to Geneva? 

Go ahead. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Again, Senator, I think you should, as 

we have and you will soon I am sure, talk to some of these individuals. 

Senator MCCAIN. I have talked to them, by the way. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I know. Okay. 

Senator MCCAIN. I have talked to them. Please. I have been in 

Syria, ma’am. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I know, Senator. 

And I would agree with you about the Syria-Iraq border. That 

border is beginning to disappear because of the presence of insurgence and extremists on both sides of the border. 

There is a constant flow of arms from Russia. I believe that they 

probably have increased recently. But it has been constant over 

quite a long period of time. 

I think you are referring to the article in the ‘‘Wall Street Journal’’ today about the cease-fires. The battlefield situation ebbs and 

flows, but yes, these are basically areas that have been defeated by 

the regime and basically develop a temporary cease-fire so food and 

supplies can get in. 

So I, frankly, would agree with much of what you said. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, you know the sad part about all this, 

Madam Secretary, is that those of us who observed Syria and saw 

what was happening there and said we must help these people and 

watched the 5,000 Hezbollah come in at the demand of Iran and 

watched the increased arms flows from Russia while we trumpeted 

the fact that we were arranging for the departure of the chemical 

weapons after, of course, we said we were going to strike them and 

did not, which reverberated around the world and still does—and 

we watched the slaughter take place and we knew what they needed. And they needed antitank and antiair capability even though 

there is always a risk with any weapons you give them. And we 

watched Bashar al-Assad succeed and consolidate his power. 

Meanwhile, it went from basically a civil war to now what is a 

regional conflict, destabilizing the neighbors, mass exoduses of refugees, and we decided the policy of this Government and this 

President was basically to do nothing. In fact, I remember it was 

said, well, we are keeping Iran pinned down. And the slaughter 

goes on—150,000 people. 

So our redline—it was not any of this, but the redline was that 

if Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons, we would strike. So the 

President of the United States, I guess, according to media reports, 

took a walk and then came back and said, well, we are going to 

have to go to Congress, knowing full well that Congress would not 

agree. He never made the case to the Congress and the American 

people. 

27 

So sometimes I apologize for getting a little emotional about this. 

This is a colossal failure of American ability to help people who are 

struggling for freedom. It is a colossal failure. 

Again, I guess what you just said is really the best example I can 

think of of the way we just practice this foolishness. The reason 

why Geneva was a success is because it gave legitimacy to the opposition who got their family members kidnapped? You know, it 

was advertised as a way to arrange Bashar al-Assad’s departure 

from power, and anybody knew that as long as Bashar al-Assad 

was winning, they would not agree to transition from power. 

So, you know, it is really one of the great tragedies of the 21st 

century and maybe even in some ways the 20th. While the greatest 

nation in the world sat by and watched this genocide taking place 

and the spread of it and these thousands of al-Qaedas who will 

now, after this conflict is over or maybe before, go back to the countries they came from and practice the things they have learned, 

and we will again have sat by and watched. 

And no one that I know of wanted American boots on the ground. 

That is the favorite administration response. Well, I guess they 

want American boots on the ground. No, we never said that. We 

wanted to give them what they needed to defend themselves and 

win, which they were doing 2 years ago. 

So I thank you for your service. You and I have known each 

other for many, many years, but I have to be honest with you. You 

are here defending the indefensible and you still have not articulated a policy that the United States of America has. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am glad to hear a response if you want to. 

Senator COONS. If I might, Madam Secretary, by way of inviting 

that response, you agree with some of the factual predicates Senator McCain laid out about what has happened. In your opening 

statement, you suggested we are reviewing our policy and identifying priorities for coordinated action. Given where we are, how do 

you believe we can change the dynamics on the battlefield and lay 

the groundwork for a better path forward? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Senator Coons. 

And let me try and answer that, Senator McCain, because of 

course, I disagree that we do not have a policy. I would agree that 

many elements of our policy have not been successful, and I would 

also agree with you that the results on the ground are extremely 

distressing and of enormous long-term concern. 

But I think we are trying to revise our policy now. We are trying 

to accelerate equipment and goods to the opposition. We are trying 

to step up security assistance to the neighbors to allow them to better defend themselves against the spillover. We are trying to step 

up the humanitarian assistance elements of this. And we do have 

a diplomatic strategy that is not solely related to Geneva II. With 

the Contact Group and the international allies, we are working 

very closely on the CT area, in the counterterrorism area, with the 

other countries and intelligence-sharing. So we are trying to 

change the policy to address some of these issues that you so very 

eloquently laid out. 

28 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I thank you. I guess my only response is 

facts are stubborn things. This conflict has been going on for over 

3 years, 150,000 people dead, and we are now revising our policy. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Well, seeing no other member, here 

is the following thing. I think we want to get to the heart of the 

information, and so an immediate briefing I do not think would 

produce what the ranking member and I want to hear. So the 

ranking member and I have agreed to the following. We will have 

a classified hearing. Here is what we expect, and if you cannot do 

this, then let us know so none of us are wasting our time. 

Number one, what are all the military options being considered, 

and whether or not they have been chosen as it relates to assisting 

the vetted Syrian rebels inside of Syria? 

Two, what are all the actions, overt and covert, being taken at 

this time with elements of the vetted Syrian rebels? 

Three, what happens to undisclosed elements of chemical weapons that we may subsequently become aware of? 

Four, what is the consequence of Syria not meeting its obligations under the agreement to remove all of its—to destroy all of its 

chemical weapons by June the 30th? 

So that is what we want to know. I do not want to go to a classified hearing with what I read in the New York Times. If you cannot do that—and I want anyone and everyone who is in a capacity 

and at a level to answer those questions. Now, that may be you, 

Ambassador, which is fine. But I do not want to hear that it is 

somebody else. I want whomever is necessary to answer all of those 

questions. 

Senator Corker, is there anything you wanted to—— 

Senator CORKER. I think I was listening closely, and I like everything that you have said. I would like to end this hearing [in a 

classified session], if it occurs, hearing of every degree of assistance 

that we are giving the opposition. I want to hear every cell, decimal 

point. I want to hear every description of what we may or may not 

being doing relative to the opposition. 

And I want to say in my earlier comments my staff is a little concerned about one statement I made relative to Assad. My point is 

that from the standpoint of him being where he is today strategically, what he did with the chemical weapons while crass, while 

something that violates every international norm that we have, the 

way we have responded to that or the way we responded to him 

doing that has validated his position, caused him to be stronger, 

and actually caused him to garner support and be in a position 

where he is actually looking now at running for President again 

this summer. And that is my point relative to him strategically 

from his own survival standpoint making a decision that from his 

own survival standpoint was the smartest thing he possibly could 

have done because of the way we have responded and the fact that 

we have no strategy. We have done nothing to change the balance 

on the ground, nothing whatsoever. And in the interim, he has become validated in the process. 

So I thank you for that. I thank you for having this hearing. I 

am looking forward to this classified setting where, quote, all of 

this new information is going to be coming forth. 

29 

The CHAIRMAN. And I would add one final thing for that setting, 

although I do not really think it is necessary for that setting, but 

in order to get the fullness of the answer, I want to know what role 

do we think that Russia and Iran, if any, will play as it relates to 

changing the dynamic in Syria. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I am sorry, sir? 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know what role, if any, do we think 

that Russia and Iran might play in changing the dynamic is Syria. 

Okay. With the thanks of—Senator Murphy, do you have a question for this panel? I was just about to excuse them. 

Senator MURPHY. No. 

The CHAIRMAN. With the thanks of the committee, we look forward to seeing you in a classified setting. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me call up our second panel: Dr. David 

Kilcullen, Chairman and Founder of Caerus Associates; Dr. Vali 

Nasr, Dean of the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies; and Jan Egeland, the Secretary General of the 

Norwegian Refugee Council. We invite our panelists to come on up. 

As I said to our previous panel, your full statements will be included in the record, without objection. 

I would ask you to summarize them in around 5 minutes or so 

so that we can enter into a dialogue with you. As a very prestigious 

panel, I think you can provide a lot of insights to us, and we look 

forward to your testimony. 

Dr. Kilcullen, we will start with you and then Dr. Nasr and then 

Mr. Egeland. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID J. KILCULLEN, CHAIRMAN AND 

FOUNDER, CAERUS ASSOCIATES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. KILCULLEN. Senator Menendez, Senator Corker, members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on this very 

important but also, as we have just seen, very controversial issue 

about options post-Geneva II for United States policy in Syria. 

I am going to confine my remarks primarily to things that have 

not already been discussed in detail, if that is okay. I agree with 

many of the factual points put forward by both the previous panel 

and the members of the committee in the discussion. We can elaborate some of those issues if you would like to. 

I would slightly differ with the point of view that the regime is 

winning the conflict on the ground. So with your permission, I will 

just talk a little about that. 

The regime at this point does not entirely control any city with 

the exception of downtown Damascus. In every other major population center, it has either been replaced by rebel governance structures or it is heavily contested by rural guerillas and urban resisters. And in fact, the Syrian countryside and smaller towns are very 

heavily contested, and even in formerly regime-controlled areas, we 

see significant opposition to the regime from the community. 

At this point, the regime has lost control of roughly 75 percent 

of Syrian territory, and although rebel groups had fractured along 

ideological and sectarian lines in the past, in the last 4 months, we 

have actually started to see a drop in that degree of fragmentation. 

30 

We have seen greater unity emerging within the opposition. We 

have seen, for example, the formation of the Islamic Front, which 

is comprised of seven Islamist factions that are working together, 

and the Southern Front, which just emerged several weeks ago, 

which has almost 50 more moderate factions working together. And 

as a result, even though the regime has mounted some relatively 

successful military operations in the last couple of months, we have 

actually seen three separate and actually quite successful rebel operations against the regime in the same time. 

In general terms, I do not think that the regime is winning. I 

think that we are in what I would call an escalating stalemate. The 

conflict is getting more violent. It is not static. The degree of violence is ratcheting up, but at this point neither the rebels nor the 

regime is in a position to achieve outright military victory. And 

agreeing with former speakers on the panel, I think that that is, 

in fact, the key problem, that neither side at this point can actually 

win militarily but both sides, particularly the regime, still think 

that they can. And that has resulted in a fairly significant surge 

of violence this spring. 

So the regime’s Qalamoun offensive, which I know you have been 

referring to indirectly, is focused on cementing control, although a 

very narrow triangle of territory from Aleppo in the north to Damascus in the south, and then west to the coast. And since January, government forces have, indeed, captured the town of Yabroud 

on the Lebanese border. They have advanced west of Homs. They 

have captured Krak des Chevaliers, the old crusader castle. They 

have killed a very large number of rebels recently in Ghouta, which 

is the same part to the east of Damascus where the chemical attack happened last August. So they have made some military 

progress on the ground. 

They have also consolidated the various nonprofessional irregular 

military groups that were working, known sometimes as shabiha, 

thugs, or ghosts, to oppress the population. They have consolidated 

them into the national defense forces, a force of about 60,000 fighters, which has become very important to them in holding ground. 

So there is some progress on the regime side. 

But just in the last month, insurgents seized districts on the 

north and east of Aleppo. They have increased their control in 

Aleppo province and in Idlib province. They have now cut off a very 

substantial number of regime outposts in the north. And in the 

northeast, a separate rebel offensive has been clearing regime positions in Deir ez Zor and along the Euphrates River, and a third offensive in the south mounted by the Southern Front has expelled 

the regime from most towns and villages in the Quneitra area 

closed to the Israeli border. And the rebels recently seized the central prison in Daraa, freed hundreds of prisoners, and cleared regime checkpoints in the city. 

Perhaps the most strategically damaging offensive to the regime 

right now, however, is the Latakia offensive that has been mounted 

by the Islamic Front in the northwest of the country along the 

coastal strip in the mainly Alawite pro-regime province of Latakia. 

They have quickly seized the Kasab border crossing. They are 

fighting for control of Kasab town right now and for a series of key 

observatories and observation posts around the area. This is the 

31 

same province that includes the Russian naval base of Tartus, 

which is now, to some extent, under threat. And we have seen 

some significant and very fierce fighting in just the last 24 hours, 

which has improved the rebels’ position and actually brought them 

onto the Mediterranean coastline in control of a small town on the 

coast for the first time in the history of the war. And they have 

also killed President Assad’s cousin, Hilal Assad, who was the head 

of the Syrian National Defense Forces. 

So I think the issue is not that the regime is winning. The issue 

is that neither side is winning. They are both very much in the 

fight. They all believe that they can still win, provided they just 

ratchet up the violence enough. And what we need to do—and I 

fully agree with Assistant Secretary Patterson on this—is we need 

to change the facts on the ground. We need to change the military 

calculus of the regime by altering its belief that it can win militarily. 

I am over time. So I will stop with my initial remarks, but I am 

very happy to talk in detail about all of those issues and also military options going forward. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kilcullen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID J. KILCULLEN

Mr Chairman (Senator Menendez), Ranking Member (Senator Corker), members 

of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on options for future 

U.S. policy on Syria. I’d like to offer an assessment of the conflict, and of actions 

the United States might take—alone or with allies—to improve the prospects for a 

peaceful and strategically acceptable solution. With your permission I plan to limit 

my initial remarks to three issues: an overview of the current situation in and 

around Syria; a discussion of realistic goals; and an outline of policy options. 

CURRENT SITUATION: AN ESCALATING STALEMATE

The civil war in Syria entered its fourth year this month. Since March 2011, the 

conflict has escalated from initial mass uprisings by an unarmed, diverse collection 

of nationalist, pro-democracy and dissident groups, into a fragmented, complex, and 

increasingly violent sectarian insurgency against an entrenched regime. 

The regime doesn’t entirely control any major city except downtown Damascus. 

In every other major population center it has either been replaced by rebel governance structures, or rural guerrillas and urban resisters are contesting its control. 

The Syrian countryside, outlying districts, and smaller towns are heavily contested, 

and even in formally regime-controlled areas there are active resistance groups and 

asymmetric attacks against the government. 

Even as the regime has lost control of roughly 75 percent of Syria’s territory, rebel 

groups have fractured along sectarian, ideological, regional, or ethnic lines. This 

fragmentation has begun to reverse itself in recent months, with the emergence of 

the Islamic Front (composed of seven Islamist factions), the Southern Front comprising a loose alliance of almost 50 local groups in the south, and the reinvigoration 

of the Syrian Military Council with new leadership in recent weeks. 

In general terms, the conflict is in what we might call an ‘‘escalating stalemate.’’ 

Neither the regime nor the rebels can achieve outright military victory, yet both 

sides still believe they can win, and are escalating violence to improve their position. 

This has resulted in spring offensives by both the regime and the rebels, a surge 

of violence against civilians, and increased flows of refugees and internally displaced 

persons. Neither side can win under present circumstances, but that doesn’t mean 

the conflict is static or winding down—on the contrary, all sides are ratcheting up 

the violence. 

The regime’s Qalamoun offensive is focused on cementing control of a triangle of 

territory from Aleppo in the north, to Damascus, and west to the Lebanese border 

and the Mediterranean coast. Since January, government forces have captured the 

town of Yabroud near the Lebanese border, advanced west of Homs to seize three 

towns and clear a rebel stronghold in the Crusader castle of Krak des Chevaliers, 

and killed a large number of rebels in Ghouta, on the eastern edge of Damascus 

(where the regime used chemical weapons to kill up to 1,400 people in August 2013). 

32 

Over the past year the government has also consolidated and professionalized dozens of irregular groups (including the shabiha gangs active early in the fighting, and 

numerous local sectarian and militia groups), unifying them into the National 

Defense Forces, a force of 60,000 fighters which has become an important regime 

tool in holding ground, providing local security garrisons, and guarding supply lines 

and installations, freeing up the Syrian Arab Army for major combat operations. 

But, in my view, recent media reports that ‘‘the regime is winning’’ significantly 

overstate the case. In the same timeframe as the government offensive, the rebels 

have mounted three successful major offensives of their own. 

Just in the last month, insurgents seized districts on the outskirts of Aleppo City, 

while increasing their control in the wider Aleppo and Idlib provinces, allowing 

them to cut off regime outposts in the north. In the northeast, a separate rebel 

offensive has cleared regime positions in Deir ez Zor and along the Euphrates River, 

while in the south, the Southern Front has expelled the regime from most towns 

and villages in the Quneitra area near the Israeli border. The rebels seized the central prison in Daraa, freed hundreds of prisoners, and cleared regime checkpoints 

in the city. 

Perhaps most strategically threatening to the regime, the Islamic Front, Jabhat 

al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham launched a joint offensive last week in the northwest, 

in the mainly Alawite pro-regime Latakia province. They quickly seized the Kasab 

border crossing and are fighting for control of Kasab town, potentially opening up 

a new rebel supply line from Turkey, threatening regime control of a key coastal 

province that includes the Russian naval base at Tartus, and (in fierce fighting this 

past Sunday) killing Hilal Assad, head of the Syrian National Defense Forces—the 

regime’s paramilitary forces—who is also President Bashar al-Assad’s cousin. 

So, despite regime successes, and a surge of violence that has seen almost 2,500 

civilians killed in barrel bombings of residential areas since last November, and has 

pushed total deaths in the conflict to more than 146,000, neither the regime nor the 

rebels have the upper hand, both are still in the fight, and the war is—if anything— 

ramping up into an increasingly bloody guerrilla conflict. 

The inability of each side to prevail outright in military terms is reflected in the 

numbers, particularly the correlation of forces. Syrian regime forces of all kinds, 

including foreign allies, number between 190,000 and 341,000, while opposition 

forces (both Arab and Kurdish, and including foreign fighters) number between 

135,000 and 211,000. Based on these ranges, the best-case force ratio for the regime 

is roughly 2.5 to 1, and the best case for the rebels is about 1.1. Given Syria’s overall population size of 22 million, this leaves the government far short of the traditional 3:1 superiority for victory in a conventional conflict, and with only about half 

the ratio of 20 counterinsurgents per 1,000 population that is traditionally expected 

for success in a counterinsurgency campaign. The rebels have even less ability to 

prevail in a conventional conflict, though they are somewhat more likely to achieve 

success via a protracted insurgent strategy. Clearly, numbers are not everything 

and do not predict a particular outcome—in this case, however, they suggest that 

the regime’s confidence in a military victory is sorely misplaced. 

Further afield, the conflict is de-stabilizing Syria’s neighbors. Lebanon, Turkey, 

and Jordan have been swamped by more than 4 million refugees, an influx that has 

created stresses on public health, water, public safety, electricity, and food and medical supplies. Syria is now the largest source of refugees on the planet, with 2.5 million refugees overseas, on top of another 6.5 million internally displaced persons. I 

should point out that 1.2 million of these refugees and IDPs are children, 425,000 

of them under 5 years old, while boys as young as 12 have been forced to fight as 

child soldiers or deliberately targeted for torture and execution in order to punish 

and coerce their communities. 

The water shortage created by the refugee crisis has made Jordan the third-most 

water-insecure country in the world, and has posed severe humanitarian challenges 

for Turkey and Lebanon. Lebanon has experienced internal conflict, as Hezbollah 

has sent 3,000–5,000 fighters to support the Assad regime, undermining its claim 

to put Lebanon first and to act as protector of Sunni as well as Shia communities. 

In Iraq, we’ve seen a reemergence of AQI, in part because of a spillover of conflict 

from Syria, and the movement of both pro-regime and pro-rebel fighters and supplies through Iraq into and out of Syria. 

The fighting threatens to draw in Syria’s neighbors more directly: Syrian aircraft 

have recently been shot down by Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey; there’s been an 

Israeli strike on Syrian territory near Quneitra, and Syria’s relations with its neighbors (excluding Iraq) are at an all-time low. 

At the same time, the regime’s loss of control in Kurdish regions has contributed 

to the appearance of a de facto autonomous region of Syrian Kurdistan, centered 

on Hassakeh and linked both to the PKK in southern Turkey via the PYD, and to 

33 

Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government via the Kurdish National Council. We’re seeing 

PYD begin to come out on top in an internal struggle for control in Kurdish regions 

of Syria, establishing its own local governance structures, and excluding the regime 

from large parts of the country. PYD’s control is contested (both by other Kurdish 

groups and Islamist groups such as ISIL) but it’s not beyond the bounds of possibility that one outcome of the Syrian conflict may be the emergence of an independent Kurdistan, which—while it might be welcomed both by Kurds and by some 

countries in the region—would fundamentally affect the geostrategic balance in this 

part of the middle east. 

Inside Syria, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been pushed 

back by the Islamic Front and other rebel groups from its high-water mark of late 

2013, so that it is now concentrated in Raqqa City in the northeast, where its support is steadily eroding due to its policy of beheadings, kidnappings, public torture, 

and the imposition of extremely strict Islamic codes. But the group still fields 6,000– 

7,000 fighters, many of them foreigners from Iraq and the wider region. 

Further afield, we’re seeing vast numbers of foreign fighters coming from as far 

away as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, the Gulf States, the Caucasus, Western 

Europe, and Southeast Asia. The scale of foreign fighter flows into Syria is now 

approximately 10 to 12 times the size of what we saw in Iraq, and involves fighters 

coming into the country to support both the regime and rebel groups. As Matthew 

Levitt recently testified before this committee, many of these fighters can eventually 

be expected to return to their home countries, with a significant regional destabilizing effect. 

For its part, the regime is increasingly dependent on foreign fighters from 

Hezbollah, on advisers and technical support from Iran (including the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Quds Force) and on technical support, financial 

assistance, logistics and maintenance from Russia—especially for its air force. Russia also continues to provide armored vehicles, precision munitions (in limited numbers) and remotely piloted aircraft to the regime. Iran provides subsidized fuel, 

ammunition, and weapons, and has sent military advisers to train the paramilitary 

National Defense Forces, collect intelligence, and assist in command and control. 

Hezbollah special troops have been advising and leading Syrian military units, and 

showed their familiarity with urban guerrilla operations during the regime’s Qusayr 

offensive last summer. 

One group of foreign fighters is especially worth noting—Chechens from the 

Caucasus, Uzbeks from Central Asia, and Tatars from the Crimea have traveled to 

Syria in recent years to fight a key Russian ally, learn military skills and participate in the jihad at a time when Russian operations, and those of Russia’s local 

allies, have made it harder to operate in the Caucasus. The Chechen military commander Muhammad al-Shishani, killed earlier this year, commanded roughly 400 

Chechen fighters of the Jaish al-Muhajirin wal Ansar (the Army of Emigrants and 

Supporters), a group owing allegiance to the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, which 

fights under Jabhat al-Nusra within the Islamic Front. Other well-known fighters 

include Omar al-Shishani, a commander within ISIL, and Abdul Karim Krymsky, 

a Crimean Tatar from Ukraine, who is deputy emir of the Army of Emigrants and 

Supporters. Given recent developments in Crimea, it’s an open question as to 

whether these fighters may now see an opportunity to return to Russian-controlled 

territory in the Caucasus and Ukraine. 

WHY SHOULD THE UNITED STATES CARE, AND WHAT CAN WE DO?

It’s worth pausing to ask why any of this matters to the United States, why we 

ought to consider doing anything about it, and if so what we can do. 

I think there are three main reasons why the situation in Syria matters to us: 

First and most importantly, the conflict is a massive humanitarian tragedy, and 

one that is escalating—the violence is ratcheting up, and it can go up a lot further 

before the parties to the conflict accept the need for a negotiated settlement, if they 

ever do. Genocidal sectarian and ethnic rhetoric is coming from several rebel groups, 

backing Syria’s large Alawite community into a corner and leaving them little current option but to support the regime, despite feelings of resentment and disillusionment against the government among many. The regime has killed thousands of 

innocent civilians with chemical weapons and barrel bombs, and through denial of 

basic services like food, water, and medical assistance to civilians in rebel-controlled 

areas. It has also tortured something like 11,000 detainees to death over the course 

of the conflict. Things could still get much, much worse, with enormous humanitarian impact, but also with the potential to create a longstanding, violent, 

ethnosectarian conflict across the whole region for decades to come. 

34 

Secondly, the conflict in Syria is destroying stability in Iraq. Syria is not the only 

cause of instability in Iraq, but the conflict has revived AQI, has contributed to a 

collapse in relations between the KRG and Baghdad, and has launched several new 

Sunni Arab rebel groups who are now holding territory in areas that were cleared 

of the insurgency back in 2007–2008. Violence in Iraq is now at levels not seen since 

the worst days of the war in 2006. There’s a very real risk that a continued escalation in Syria could fatally undermine everything that we worked for: the relative 

stability and safety that 1.5 million Americans fought for in Iraq over the last decade (and for which 4,500 Americans died and 30,000 were wounded) rendering the 

whole massive Iraq effort for naught. 

Finally, the conflict threatens key allies—Jordan, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, and 

countries further afield are all experiencing the spillover of violence, refugee movement, and overstress that the war has created, and they could either be drawn into 

the conflict or have their stability and security significantly undermined by it. The 

conflict in Syria not only harms millions of innocents, but it also undermines our 

whole strategic position in the broader region. 

I think these facts suggest that we should do something, but it’s worth asking if 

there’s anything that we can do, beyond what we are already doing. The national 

mood is clearly against another war, but the American people have often been 

offered a false choice between doing nothing, and committing ground combat forces 

to a full-scale invasion (‘‘boots on the ground’’). I don’t believe such an all-or-nothing 

approach is helpful, and indeed there are several options short of major conflict that 

are worth considering. Before looking at policy options, however, we need to consider 

what our goals should be. 

POLICY GOALS

Current U.S. policy goals, to the extent that they’ve been clearly articulated, seem 

to be to offer humanitarian assistance inside Syria; to contain regional conflict; and 

to disrupt foreign fighter flows further afield. Our actions to date have sought to 

ameliorate conditions on the ground, contain regional destabilization by reassuring 

partners and friends, and disrupt flows of foreign fighters, military material, illicit 

goods and finances into and out of the conflict. 

U.S. policymakers have previously suggested that President Assad needs to step 

down, but with a fragmented and increasingly radicalized opposition our leaders 

have often seemed to shy away from that goal, for fear of what a successor regime 

might look like. And, perhaps sensing our ambivalence, in the Geneva talks the Syrian negotiators rejected even the notion of a transitional government: the regime 

instead is planning to hold national elections in June to cement President Assad in 

power for another term. 

The United States also backed away from our own announced redline in September 2013, when we failed to follow through on previous threats to act against 

regime targets in the wake of the Ghouta chemical attack, and instead allowed the 

regime to negotiate for a gradual dismantling of its weapons stocks. To date only 

about 50 percent of Syrian chemical weapons have been transported to Latakia for 

destruction, the Syrian Government has missed several deadlines set by OPCW, and 

it is currently negotiating for a further extension of the handover deadline. The 

weapons destruction process is on hold because of the breakdown in cooperation 

between the United States and Russia after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and the 

regime seems in no hurry to complete the dismantling of its weapons, since once 

the weapons are no longer there, and the regime is no longer needed to safeguard 

them, the Syrian Government’s leverage with the international community will be 

dramatically eroded. Meanwhile our own diplomatic leverage is negligible, in part 

because of our demonstrated lack of willingness to back diplomacy with action. In 

effect, in 2013, we called our own bluff, and our interlocutors—Iran, Russia, and the 

Syrian Government—are treating us accordingly. 

FUTURE POLICY OPTIONS

I want to suggest that the goals that have animated U.S. policy to date, far from 

being overly ambitious, have actually been too minimalist. We’ve sought to contain 

and manage the conflict, but not to end it. Unsurprisingly, we’ve found it extraordinarily difficult to rally allies or the American people around such a minimal goal, 

which offers little positive result to offset its undeniable costs. 

I would argue that our approach should instead be to seek an end to the conflict 

via a negotiated settlement, and to increasingly telegraph our willingness to use 

military means to force that outcome. Our use of force in this case would serve the 

strategic purpose of convincing the regime that it can’t win militarily and needs to 

seek a peaceful solution. Our preference would be for indirect means where possible, 

35 

but our policy would contemplate direct military action if needed. If the problem is 

that both sides still think they can win militarily, and thus don’t feel that they need 

to negotiate, then the solution is to convince one or both sides that it cannot win 

and that its best option is to talk. Without that willingness to negotiate, founded 

on a realization that there’s no chance of military victory, the conflict is likely to 

just keep ratcheting up, with all the negative consequences discussed already. 

Some specific policy recommendations, then: 

1. Ignore the June elections. We should ignore the regime’s planned elections 

scheduled for this summer, which will certainly result in a manipulated landslide 

vote in President Assad’s favor. The regime’s strategy at present seems to be to use 

the Geneva II process to buy time, while it ramps up military operations in Syria 

to expand the territory and population it controls, using its military success to set 

the conditions for the Presidential elections, which are the key to President Assad’s 

medium-term strategy to stay in office. We need to let it be known now that any 

election result achieved under these conditions would be illegitimate and invalid. 

And when the elections do inevitably take place, we should treat the result as null 

and void. 

2. Exploit linkages with other issues. We should exploit linkages between Syria 

and other issues: particularly, Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine and the increasing economic cost and political isolation that Moscow will experience as a result. 

With several hundred fighters from the Caucasus, including Crimean Tatars, operating in Syria, and the recent rebel offensive in Latakia threatening Russia’s naval 

presence, there’s a clear potential for violence in Syria to spread to Russiancontrolled territory. Over time, establishing a linkage between Russia’s actions in 

Ukraine and its support for the Assad regime may offer an opening to convince Russia to cease its active support and perhaps even to help convince the regime that 

a negotiated solution is in all parties’ best interest. 

3. Focus on peace-building at the local level. As we think about what a negotiated 

solution might look like, one key element is to build local momentum toward a 

peaceful settlement of the conflict. A striking aspect of the Geneva II talks (mentioned in the attached research paper prepared by our Syria field research team) 

was how few Syrians saw either the regime, or the representatives negotiating in 

Geneva on behalf of the rebels, as legitimate representatives of the Syrian people. 

In a series of surveys conducted in Aleppo—Syria’s largest city and one of the most 

heavily affected by conflict—the most common response to question ‘‘Who is the 

legitimate representative of the Syrian people?’’ was ‘‘No one.’’ The combined total 

of support for both the rebel negotiators and the regime across all surveys conducted 

was never higher than 12 percent, suggesting that almost 9 out of 10 Syrians had 

no faith in (and therefore very low expectations of) the Geneva process. If subsequent peace talks are to succeed, Syrians at the local level must develop crosscommunity interest in a peaceful settlement. 

4. Expand assistance programs to the opposition. Ultimately, however, if a peace 

process is to have any chance, it must begin from a different set of facts on the 

ground than currently exist and, in particular, the Syrian regime must realize that 

it has no chance of a military victory. To underline this point, the international community—including the United States—should continue and, if possible, expand 

assistance to the opposition, across four dimensions: humanitarian assistance; nonlethal technical support; training and advisory support; and lethal technical weapons systems: 

• Humanitarian assistance (including food, water, medical support, and education) is key to defeating the regime’s strategy of denying essential humanitarian supplies and services to opposition areas. We can therefore expect continued regime opposition to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, but this 

provides an opportunity not only to assist Syria’s civilian population but also 

to break the regime’s stranglehold on besieged areas. • Nonlethal technical support to rebel forces, including communications equipment, medical supplies, clothing and equipment, vehicles and logistics has been 

a key motivator for rebel groups to join together into more cohesive organizations such as the Southern Front. For most of the conflict, a unifying factor 

among regime supporters has been the centralization of funding and assistance 

through the Syrian Government, which has tended to draw groups together. As 

the formation of the Southern Front shows, it’s possible for international assistance to the opposition to have a similar unifying effect. As new rebel offensives 

along Syria’s borders open up more access points, we should expand this assistance—in geographical spread, in volume, and in quality. 

• Training and advisory support, whether delivered directly by U.S. personnel or 

by allies or civilian contractors, has the potential to raise the fighting quality 

of rebel forces. This is important not only because it helps them combat the 

36 

regime more effectively, but because one of the key aspects in the attractiveness 

of extremist jihadi groups is their reputation for greater military competence, 

skills, and effectiveness in the field. To the extent that we can help improve the 

command and planning skills, tactical quality and operational effectiveness of 

nonjihadist rebel groups in Syria, we can not only help redress the unfavorable 

correlation of forces vis-a-vis the regime, but can also strengthen secular, 

nationalist, pro-civil society groups in relation to more extreme factions of the 

insurgency. 

• Lethal technical weapons support—including small arms and light weapons, 

heavier artillery/mortars and their associated technical fire control systems, and 

(most importantly) advanced man-portable and vehicle-mounted air defense systems capable of defeating regime air platforms and helicopter-launched ‘‘barrel 

bomb’’ attacks on civilians, would make a critical difference in the conflict. As 

experience in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq and elsewhere has shown, with appropriate safeguards and oversight, and with careful selection of weapon types and 

management of ammunition availability, the threat of terrorist acquisition of 

such weapons is relatively manageable. 

5. Plan for limited military strikes. No option—including military options—should 

be off the table at this point. The policy options I have suggested here work best 

when they work together, where the threat of force increases the leverage of our 

diplomats while diplomatic efforts toward a peaceful settlement help improve the 

chances of a successful military action. We should initiate planning toward a campaign—focusing on limited air strikes supported by airborne and ground tactical 

effects controllers, with limited special operations forces advisory support, intelligence support and naval operations offshore—designed to simultaneously guarantee the protection of at-risk civilians via safe zones, no-fly areas and humanitarian corridors, and to target critical regime capabilities in order to convince the 

regime that its best option is to negotiate an end to the conflict, most likely via a 

transitional coalition government under international supervision. Extremist groups 

undermining such a peaceful outcome would become legitimate targets in a subsequent phase of such a campaign. We may, for example, publish a list of regime targets and capabilities, several of which may be struck in retaliation for attacks on 

civilians, while simultaneously opening up humanitarian corridors or safe zones and 

denying the regime the ability to move armored units, mount air strikes or receive 

resupply via sea and air from its allies. 

This would entail planning for the possibility of a coalition military campaign on 

roughly the scale of the Kosovo or Libya interventions, and would undoubtedly not 

be without human and financial cost, but it would have the advantage of promoting 

a clear and achievable political goal, after repeated attempts at negotiations and 

other peaceful means had failed, and would avoid the scenario of regime collapse 

and the emergence of a jihadi state in Syria. 

I want to emphasize in closing that I’m not suggesting we immediately jump to 

a military option, nor that such an option would be cost-free or guaranteed to work. 

My point is merely that we do have a range of options short of a major ground operation, that we need to demonstrate a willingness to consider military action if we 

are to restore some leverage to our diplomatic efforts in the wake of last year’s loss 

of credibility, and that (given the increasing international isolation and economic 

strain experienced by Syria’s major ally, Russia) this may be an opportunity to push 

for a peaceful, negotiated outcome to the conflict, rather than the present escalating 

stalemate. Ultimately, we should continue to seek a peaceful solution through diplomacy, but paradoxically the effectiveness of our diplomatic initiatives (and hence the 

prospects for peace) may depend on our willingness to plan for, and ultimately use, 

a measure of military force. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The research paper mentioned above was too voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be retained in the permanent record of the committee.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We will look forward in the Q&A to picking up 

on your last statement, which is how does one change those calculations. 

Dr. Nasr. 

37 

STATEMENT OF DR. VALI NASR, DEAN, JOHNS HOPKINS 

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. NASR. Good afternoon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Corker, and members of the committee, for giving me this 

opportunity to testify before you about this very important issue. 

I will limit my testimony to a discussion of our diplomatic strategy. 

Since 2011, the crisis in Syria has evolved from an uprising of 

the people in a quest for freedom into a civil war which has now 

broad international and regional implications. I agree with Dr. 

Kilcullen that there is no immediate sign of an end to the fighting, 

that neither the Assad regime nor the opposition is currently 

strong enough to win, and the civil war is bound to continue moving toward what looks like an intractable stalemate. 

I think this poses some serious national security challenges to 

the United States and a threat to global security, first, because I 

think the humanitarian crisis has evolved into a regional security 

issue; secondly, the proliferation and entrenchment of extremism is 

now a major concern; and thirdly, because the Syria conflict has 

evolved into a regional struggle for power on the one side between 

Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia and, much more importantly, between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 

Now, the international effort led by the United Nations in two 

rounds of talks in Geneva have failed to end the war. I think those 

efforts were primarily focused on reaching an agreement between 

the United States and Russia, which actually has strategic, economic, and historical motivations to support the Assad regime in 

power. 

The United States went to Geneva II believing that Assad’s removal from power is essential to ending the conflict, whereas Russia’s position is based on the fact that Syria is a case of a global 

threat by Islamic terrorism and extremism and that is the primary 

issue to be discussed. 

However, it is important to note that the United States and Russia are not the main outside actors in Syria. Rather, both the 

Assad regime and the opposition are armed, financed, and supported by regional actors. The Assad regime owes its survival not 

to Russia but to Iran and its regional allies, Hezbollah and Iraqi 

militias whose military and intelligence support has kept the Assad 

regime from crumbling and then taking the offensive. Similarly, it 

is Turkey, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia that have financed 

and armed the opposition fighters, keeping up the pressure on Damascus. 

I do not see any evidence of a United States military strategy. 

So as a result, all the focus is on a diplomatic strategy. I think repeating Geneva II will not achieve the intended result of ending 

the stalemate in Syria. First of all, United States-Russia dynamics 

have become more complicated by the Ukraine crisis. If these two 

nations could not agree on Syria before, it will be much more difficult to do so following the Russian annexation of Crimea. 

Now, treating Russia as a partner from this point forward will 

actually cause resentment and cynicism in the Middle East. It will 

actually show that the United States is determined not to act in 

38 

Syria, even at the cost of aligning itself with Russia, despite what 

has happened in Ukraine, and it will also will give Russia an 

added opportunity to use Syria as a way of managing the Ukraine 

crisis. 

Secondly, even if there was a United States-Russia agreement on 

Syria, it could not be implemented without the support of regional 

actors which have a stake in the conflict. 

So I think there is need for a new approach to the diplomatic resolution of the Syria crisis, I think one that starts with the following 

assumption. 

One is that regional actors now have far more at stake in this 

conflict than the United States or Russia. 

The Syrian civil war is now integral to a regional struggle for 

power, the outcome of which will decide the balance of power between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar on the one side, as I mentioned, Saudi Arabia and Iran. These regional powers are acting 

with the understanding that the future of the Middle East is being 

decided in Syria. 

The Middle East, in the meantime, lacks any regional mechanisms that would allow these regional actors to resolve the conflict 

through any form of negotiations. 

As a result, given these assumptions, the time has come for the 

United States and the international community to consider an approach that would actually take into account the interests and 

stakes of the regional actors. 

Now, the Syrian conflict is happening at a time of big change in 

the region. We are seeing a collapse and inclusion of Egypt, traditionally the most important and influential Arab country. We are 

seeing and intensification of conflict between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. We are seeing a chilling of relations between Turkey and Saudi 

Arabia, and we are seeing an escalation of regional rivalry between 

Iran and Saudi Arabia. 

Now, a diplomatic solution, nevertheless, would require the acquiescence and support of these powers, and therefore, the task I 

think before the international community as a first step is to bring 

an alignment between the positions of Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi 

Arabia, three American allies in the region that have enormous influence on both the political opposition and fighters on the ground 

but actually lack coordination, and their policies are not aligned together. Creating an alignment between these powers will actually 

help unify the Syrian opposition, which was one of the reasons why 

the Geneva talks was not taken seriously by Iran, Russia, and the 

Assad government and actually, in and of itself, is a changing of 

the facts on the ground short of military intervention. 

I think it is much more important in the short run that the 

United Nations and the United States focus on shuttle diplomacy 

in the Middle East rather than convening a large-scale Geneva-like 

conference. 

I will conclude my remarks at this point. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Nasr follows:] 

39 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. VALI R. NASR

INTRODUCTION

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee 

for this opportunity to testify before you on options for addressing the crisis in Syria 

after the Geneva II talks, and in particular on the geopolitical implications of the 

conflict. 

My name is Vali Nasr and I am the Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 

International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. 

Since 2011, the crisis in Syria has evolved from an uprising of the people in a 

quest for freedom into a civil war with broad international and regional implications. There is no sign of an end to the fighting. Neither the Assad regime nor the 

opposition is strong enough to win, and the civil war is bound to continue, moving 

toward an intractable stalemate. 

The international effort led by the United Nations in two rounds of talks in 

Geneva failed to end the war. Those efforts focused primarily on bringing about an 

agreement between the United States and Russia, which has strategic, economic, 

and historical motivations to support the Assad regime. That goal proved elusive 

because 

—The United Nations failed to bridge the gap between the United States and Russia. The United States sees Assad’s removal from power as essential to ending the 

conflict, and therefore saw Geneva talks as the mechanism for replacing the 

Assad regime with a transitional government. Russia sees the problem in Syria 

as one of extremism and Islamic terrorism. Furthermore, Russia does not envision 

an outcome in which Assad steps down; in the unlikely event that Assad ever did 

step down, Russia does not believe it would lead to a viable government that can 

rule Syria. 

—The Geneva talks downplayed the importance of regional actors. The United 

States and Russia are critical to galvanizing the international community around 

a solution to the Syrian crisis. Cooperation between the two is important in the 

United Nations Security Council, as was evident in securing an agreement to dismantle Syria’s stockpile of chemical weapons. 

However, the United States and Russia are not the main outside actors in 

Syria. Rather, both the Assad regime and the opposition are armed, financed, and 

supported by regional actors. The Assad regime owes its survival not to Russia 

but to Iran and its regional allies, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraq’s Shia militias 

whose military and intelligence support has kept Assad’s forces from crumbling 

and then taking the offensive. Similarly, it is Turkey, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi 

Arabia that have financed and armed the rebels, keeping up the opposition’s pressure on Damascus. 

Repeating Geneva II will not achieve the intended result of ending the stalemate 

in Syria. First, U.S.-Russia dynamics have become more complicated by the crisis 

in Ukraine. If the two nations could not agree on Syria before, it will be all the more 

difficult to do so following the Russian annexation of Crimea. Second, even if there 

was a U.S.-Russian agreement on Syria, it could not be implemented without the 

support of regional actors with stakes in the conflict. 

There is need for a new approach to Syria, one that starts with the following 

assumptions: 

—The regional actors have far more at stake in this conflict than the United States 

or Russia. 

—The Syrian civil war is integral to the regional struggle for power. Its outcome 

will decide the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Saudi Arabia 

and Qatar, and most significantly, Saudi Arabia and Iran. These regional powers 

are acting with the understanding that the future of the Middle East will be 

decided in Syria. 

—The civil war has touched off regionwide sectarian tensions that have polarized 

opinion on Syria and cast the conflict as a zero-sum struggle for power between 

Shias and Sunnis. 

—The Syrian refugee crisis has become a regional security challenge. The number 

of refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey is an economic burden and political threat to those countries—and this problem will only grow as more refugees 

escape the fighting. 

—The Middle East lacks any regional mechanisms that would allow regional actors 

to resolve this conflict. 

40 

Given these assumptions, the time has come for the United States and the international community to consider a new diplomatic approach that incorporates the 

interests and stakes of all regional powers heavily invested in Syria. 

THE REGIONAL ACTORS’ STAKE IN SYRIA

The Syrian conflict is happening at a time of geostrategic change, domestic turmoil, and rebalancing of power in the Middle East. Egypt, the largest and traditionally most influential Arab country, is preoccupied with internal problems. Meanwhile, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran have all amplified their engagement 

in Syria to tilt the balance of power in favor of their particular geopolitical interests. 

Qatar 

Qatar has intensified its regional role, and that has been an irritant to its old 

rival, Saudi Arabia. Qatar sees its role in Syria as part of its broader design to 

influence regional trends, which also includes deep engagement in Libya and Egypt. 

Qatar’s support in Syria has been important to key elements of the political opposition and fighters on the ground. 

Turkey 

Turkey shares a long border with Syria and is now home to a large Syrian refugee 

population. Turkey’s policy toward Syria was premised on the assumption that the 

Assad regime would fall quickly. Three years on, this assumption is no longer selfevident, and Turkey finds itself threatened by chaos and growing extremism next 

door. Turkey is worried that Syria’s sectarian tensions would spill over into Turkey, 

and also that the impact of the fighting on Syrian Kurds would impact Turkey’s own 

delicate Kurdish situation. 

Turkey no longer has influence with the government in Damascus, and it has had 

to compete with Saudi Arabia and Qatar for influence over the opposition. In addition, preoccupation with domestic issues has limited Turkey’s ability to exercise control over developments in Syria. These circumstances are pushing Turkey to look 

for a strategy to end the Syrian civil war. 

Saudi Arabia 

Saudi Arabia has been unhappy with Turkey’s growing influence in the Middle 

East. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey have been competing for influence over the 

Syrian opposition—which explains in part the opposition’s inability to put up a 

united front before the Assad regime. 

More important, Saudi Arabia sees the outcome in Syria as critical to checking 

and even reversing Iran’s regional influence. If the Assad regime falls, Iran would 

suffer a strategic blow that could also weaken its position in Lebanon and Iraq. 

Iran 

Iran by the same token sees the survival of Assad’s regime as a vital strategic 

imperative. The appearance of defeat in Syria would weaken Iran’s regional influence, but also make it more difficult for Iran to continue negotiations with P5+1— 

for fear that its perceived weakness would make the international six-party team 

unyielding. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The time when the Syria conflict could have ended with an agreement between 

the United States and Russia has passed. 

Currently the four Middle East powers—Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran— 

have far higher stakes in Syria than the United States and Russia, hence their 

heavy investments in deciding the outcome. A diplomatic solution must have their 

acquiescence and support. 

The task remains before all of us to facilitate an agreement to end this war. The 

United States and the international community could provide the necessary link to 

get the regional backers of the warring factions to start a diplomatic process. In particular, the United States has strong ties with Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia and 

should use that influence to bring their positions in Syria into alignment. 

As a first step, the United States and its European allies should focus diplomatic 

attention on 

—Bringing Saudi, Qatari and Turkish positions on Syria into alignment; 

—Unifying the Syrian opposition; 

—Laying the groundwork for a regional diplomatic framework for ending the war 

in Syria. That framework could set the parameters for Iran and Iraq’s participation in the process. 

41 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Egeland. 

STATEMENT OF JAN EGELAND, SECRETARY GENERAL, 

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, OSLO, NORWAY 

Mr. EGELAND. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez, 

Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee. 

I am the Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council. 

We have 1,000 staff members on the ground in and around Syria. 

We assist 700,000 Syrian displaced and refugees. 

Through 30 years of humanitarian work, I have visited most of 

the major war zones and disaster zones of the past generation. I 

have never, ever before witnessed the kind of suffering that we now 

see in Syria. 

Last month, when I visited Syria and Lebanon this time—it was 

my sixth visit to the region since the war started—I met Myriam, 

this 8-year-old girl, who told me that her home was destroyed by 

rockets 1 year ago. Then her family joined the 6.5 million internally displaced in Syria. Twice more, their improvised homes were 

destroyed by the fighting, and in the end, they ended up—the family—among the 1 million refugees in Lebanon. Myriam has one big 

dream, and that is to become a medical doctor because she wants 

to return to her country and treat the injured and the ill. 

I would like now, since I did a detailed written testimony, only 

to make four following points in answering to the questions I got 

in the e-mail beforehand. 

First, we need the United States to pursue political dialogue with 

all sides and push for respect of the laws of war and for conflict 

resolution talks. With Russia, the United States brought about an 

agreement to destroy the chemical weapons. We have not had any 

commensurate humanitarian agreement or humanitarian cease-fire 

reached. It should not be more easy to reach and retrieve chemical 

weapons than it is to reach and help evacuate women and children 

from besieged cities. As humanitarians, we see the horrible effects 

of political paralysis every day. We ask that all countries with leverage on the parties, on their sponsors, or on their suppliers must 

put pressure where they can. 

Second point. The U.S. policy needs to work for unimpeded aid 

delivery to all civilians caught in the cross-fire or caught in the 

many besieged towns. Millions with unmet needs can most directly 

be reached from across Syria’s borders. The time has come, in our 

view, for the U.S. Government, other donors, the United Nations, 

and neighboring countries to put their full weight behind full-scale 

and effective cross-border relief. And the U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 2139 and international law give a clear legal basis for 

such cross-border relief. 

My third point. The U.S. policy must ensure that all humanitarian assistance to Syria is, and is perceived to be, impartial, neutral, and independent from political agendas. I repeat. The humanitarian relief needs to be impartial and neutral and independent 

from political agendas. It is dangerous for the civilians we help and 

for our fieldworkers on the ground if humanitarian relief is politicized or militarized. So, for example, counterterror laws must not 

be applied in this case in a way that harms our ability to provide 

impartial relief to women and children in disputed areas. 

42 

Finally, the United States is, indeed, the world’s greatest donor 

and we thank you for that. But increased funding is needed with 

the dramatic increase in refugees, displaced, and war-affected. 

Only 12.5 percent of the overall U.N.-led appeals for the region and 

for Syria of $6.5 billion has been met for 2014—12.5 percent so far. 

Syria’s neighbors have so far generously accepted 2.5 million refugees and more come every single day. The region faces instability 

and social and economic collapse. Increased aid is urgently needed 

in particular to Lebanon and Jordan. And the United States, European countries like my own must allow more Syrian refugees to 

cross their borders. 

So, Mr. Chairman, we need to provide hope to the 6 million affected Syrian children. If they lose all hope, we will not only end 

up with unspeakable misery, but with a more unstable Middle East 

and a world community that is unstable. It is, therefore, in keeping 

with our values and in our interests to do more to help a future 

for the children of Syria. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Egeland follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAN EGELAND

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

I thank you for this opportunity to input into your deliberations on the next steps 

for U.S. Policy. Let me also applaud the efforts you have made to bring attention 

to the plight of millions of Syrians, who continue to suffer as a result of this appalling conflict, now entering its 4th year. 

I am the Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), an independent, humanitarian nongovernment organization that assists and protects millions of displaced people worldwide, including more than 700,000 Syrians across the 

Middle East. 

I have been active in humanitarian and human rights work for more than 30 

years and have visited many of the worst war- and disaster-zones of this past generation. I have never before seen the scale of suffering now present in Syria. Syrian 

families, and in particular the Syrian youth, are losing hope fast. We must restore 

hope, rebuild schools and provide a future for Syria’s children. 

I have previously had the opportunity to come to Congress to discuss the humanitarian challenges we have faced elsewhere in the world. I have seen how bipartisan 

support in and from this Senate has helped mobilize relief and hope for societies 

plagued by war and repression—from Darfur to northern Uganda and eastern 

Congo. Your support can help us again as we face even greater challenges in Syria. 

Last month I was back in Syria and Lebanon—my sixth visit to this region since 

the war broke out. I saw once more the extreme challenges faced by the U.N., 

NGOs, and the Red Cross/Crescent in accessing the millions of people denied food, 

water, and medical supplies across the country. While I was there, extremely challenging negotiations to evacuate civilians from the besieged Old City of Homs were 

taking place. Painstaking efforts to agree a local cease-fire with a multitude of warring parties did not prevent U.N. and Red Crescent colleagues being shot at while 

entering Homs. 

With the heroic efforts of Syrian and expatriate humanitarian workers operating 

across the country, assistance is reaching many parts of Syria and lives are being 

saved. However, it is nowhere near enough. Too many defenseless and suffering 

civilians are not being reached and the risks that humanitarians are forced to take 

in their daily work are totally unacceptable. 

And the situation is not getting better. A year ago I traveled to the city of Aleppo 

and witnessed how desperate mothers, fathers, and neighbors were searching with 

their hands through the rubble of their destroyed apartment, trying desperately to 

find their own children, relatives, or friends. Missiles had hit heavily populated 

civilian areas the night before. After seeing the scale of suffering, I could not believe 

that the conflict could get any worse—but it has. Twice as many people in Syria 

are now dead or in urgent need of aid as when I was in Aleppo. 

43 

The stories I hear from Syrians who have fled the violence and from aid-workers 

are horrific: With active conflict, widespread disregard for basic moral and ethical 

standards, as well as the excessive restrictions imposed by the Syrian Government 

and opposition forces on humanitarian operations, millions of Syrians continue to 

be denied access to lifesaving humanitarian aid. The bureaucratic hurdles of some 

neighboring countries are further complicating our ability to operate. We request 

your further support to compel the Government of Syria and warring parties to 

remove all barriers to our operations so that millions of people can access the aid 

they urgently need and are entitled to. With your assistance, NRC and other dedicated aid agencies stand ready to cross battle lines, cross borders, cross rivers and 

mountains—whatever is required so that we can end the human suffering in Syria. 

The crisis has seriously impacted Syria’s regional neighbors, now hosting more 

than 2.5 million men, women, and children who have fled their homes. This equates 

to a population four times that of the District of Columbia. I have visited Lebanon 

and Jordan regularly over the last 2 years. Each time humanitarians, the people 

and authorities tell me that they have reached a breaking point. Yet, the flow of 

refugees keeps coming. I have spent time in Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, which 

is one of the world’s largest. No Syrian would choose to live there. But they have 

nowhere else to go. They have lost their homes, their jobs, and their loved ones. 

They have often suffered atrocities and unspeakable violence. A generation of Syrian 

children is growing up about to lose hope—and we risk losing them to poverty and 

despair. 

Refugees in Zaatari and the millions more spread across the region need your 

help. As do the governments and communities who continue to demonstrate extraordinary generosity by hosting them. Lebanon is particularly in need of more direct 

financial and infrastructure support, and the U.S. can play an important part. By 

the end of next week, Lebanon will be hosting 1 million refugees, 230 refugees for 

every 1,000 Lebanese—the highest number of any country in recent history. Proportionally this equals 80 million refugees crossing the U.S. border in 18 months. 

I want to take this opportunity to thank members of this committee, particularly 

the bipartisan leadership of Senators Kaine (D–VA) and Rubio (R–FL) for introducing Senate Resolution 384, which calls for the immediate and full implementation of U.N. Security Council 2139, including unimpeded humanitarian access, both 

across conflict lines and borders. 

In this testimony, I will make four points to inform future U.S. policy: 

• The U.S. should continue to pursue political dialogue with all sides in order to 

ensure respect for the Laws of War and ultimately resolve this senseless conflict. With Russia, the U.S. brought about an agreement to destroy Syria’s 

chemical weapon stockpiles. We require this same leadership to uphold the 

humanitarian imperative and alleviate the suffering of the Syrian population, 

including the 9 million displaced. All countries with leverage over the parties 

to the conflict must put pressure where they can in order to seek a resolution 

to the crisis and respect for the Laws of War. 

• U.S. policy needs to prioritize measures that ensure unimpeded aid delivery 

inside Syria. Syrians urgently need to be able to access more and better assistance and protection in or close to their homes. Government, donors and countries neighboring Syria must urgently facilitate the delivery of humanitarian 

assistance, across front-lines and across borders. As recognized by UNSC Resolution (S/RES/2139), International Humanitarian Law provides an unequivocal 

legal basis for undertaking cross-border operations, to all areas within Syria. 

• U.S. policy should ensure that all humanitarian assistance to Syria is, and is 

perceived as impartial, neutral and independent from political agendas. Among 

related concerns, counterterrorism laws must not impact negatively on humanitarians’ ability to maintain independence and ensure impartial provision of aid. 

• The U.S., along with the international community, has a responsibility to help 

address the enormous challenges faced by Syria’s neighbors. By generously 

accepting 2.5 million refugees, the region is facing the prospect of regional instability, and social and economic collapse. Increased humanitarian and development assistance is urgently needed. Furthermore, the U.S., Europe and other 

countries must share the responsibility and allow more refugees across their 

borders. 

1. The U.S. should continue to pursue political dialogue 

Our relief workers see each day the impact of the political stalemate on Syria. 

Syria is the worst humanitarian crisis in the 21st century. We all know the figures—more than 9 million people displaced, well over 100,000 killed, more than 5.5 

million children at risk. During the 2 hours of this Senate hearing alone, 120 families will have been forced from their homes. These numbers are unfathomable when 

44 

we consider that each individual represents immense human tragedy. Yet, the collective response of the international community remains woefully inadequate. A 

solution that ends this crisis must be your unequivocal priority. 

As your former colleague in this committee, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry and 

other world leaders have repeatedly made clear; ‘‘There is no military solution to 

Syria, there is only a political solution and that will require leadership to bring people to the negotiating table.’’ 

Yet Geneva II generated no tangible results: No political solution, no lasting 

cease-fire, no end to the bloodshed and no alleviation of the unbearable suffering 

of the Syrian people. In spite of the enormous efforts of Special Envoy Brahimi, no 

concrete results were achieved. The millions of people who have been driven from 

their homes have had their hopes betrayed. We see shocking echoes of the horrors 

of Bosnia and Rwanda—and therefore a moral obligation to prevent a return to 

those dark days. 

Only 6 month ago, the U.S., alongside Russia, led peaceful efforts to agree to a 

process to destroy Syria’s weapons of mass destruction. Political progress is therefore possible—if there is enough political will. I call on the U.S. to resume this leadership role, for the Syrian people to realize their dream of a peaceful life. Syrians 

must be protected from all forms of violence, including the use of conventional weapons and barbaric ‘‘barrel bombs,’’ which are responsible for the vast majority of the 

killings. To this end, I urge you to work with Russia and other members of the 

international community, and to use your influence with the warring parties and 

their allies, to ensure respect for international law and put an end to the conflict 

once and for all. 

As urgent as political progress is, the millions of Syrians denied humanitarian aid 

cannot wait for negotiations to bear fruit. The humanitarian imperative to meet the 

immense needs and alleviate the suffering of ordinary Syrians cannot be a pawn 

traded within negotiations, or held hostage to political posturing. I urge you to do 

your uttermost to support the humanitarian endeavor in Syria, irrespective of political progress. There will be no winners at the end of this war, and whatever political 

end goals the international community has, the protection of civilians and respect 

for international humanitarian law cannot be compromised. 

It is the persistent denial of humanitarian aid that I will now move on to address. 

2. U.S. policy needs to prioritize measures to ensure unimpeded aid delivery 

I have seen for myself how the Syrian Government and opposition forces impede 

the delivery of life-saving assistance on a daily basis, and how countries neighboring 

Syria place unreasonable administrative constraints on reputable NGOs. These 

practices have to end immediately. 

I appeal for your help to ensure all parties to the conflict, particularly the Government of Syria, actively facilitate the delivery of life-saving assistance and protection. 

To be effective, this has to include ensuring humanitarian access from across Syria’s 

borders—which is so often the most efficient route. 

2.1 Impediments and denial of humanitarian access 

There are countless examples of the deliberate and shameful denial of humanitarian assistance and protection. A few examples to illustrate: 

• Aleppo governorate in northern Syria continues to experience air raids by the 

Syrian air force and clashes between military and armed opposition groups, as 

well as among the opposition groups, forcing more than 750,000 people to flee. 

The Government of Syria and some armed groups actively harass and sometimes even appear to target aid convoys. They stop humanitarian agencies at 

checkpoints, demand money and threaten aid workers with violence and illegal 

detention. They also attempt to divert humanitarian goods. The close proximity 

between southern Turkey and northern Aleppo means that assistance can and 

is being delivered from across the Syrian border, but delays and blockages at 

both sides of the crossings mean enough aid is not getting through. 

• Many parts of Damascus and the surrounding rural areas have been entirely 

cut off from humanitarian assistance for up to a year due to the abhorrent use 

of siege tactics by government and some armed opposition forces and because 

of the ongoing active conflict. The barriers put in place by the Syrian Government, including restrictions on working with national NGOs, the refusal to let 

aid convoys travel and the ban on allowing agencies operating from Damascus 

to also deliver aid across borders, seriously inhibit the ability of aid agencies 

to realize the rights of those in need. Even areas located only a couple of miles 

from where aid agencies are based cannot be reached. 

• Dar’a and Quneitra governorates in southern Syria have seen fierce fighting 

between Government and armed opposition groups. Shelling and aerial bomVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Apr 23, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE HE
45 

bardments continue to intensify throughout both governorates, leaving more 

than 245,000 people without access to even basic humanitarian assistance. Aid 

operations into southern Syria are considered dangerous due to the ongoing 

fighting. However, they would be possible if the Syrian Government gave permission for aid convoys to travel from Damascus or if cross-border aid routes 

could be utilized more effectively. 

2.2 Besieged communities 

Beyond these examples, an estimated 240,000 peoplex continue to be trapped in 

besieged communities, some for more than 1 year. 

The use of medieval siege tactics and the deliberate starvation of hundreds of 

thousands of people have come to epitomize the brutality of the conflict. The recent 

evacuation of many civilians from the besieged areas of Homs has rightly received 

significant attention. More than 4,000 people faced deliberate starvation and had 

been trapped, without even basic supplies, for more than 600 days. While the media 

attention has died away, this crisis is not yet over. Fighting and shelling is ongoing 

and approximately 2,000 people remain in the Old City. 

But, of Syria’s many besieged civilians, 99 percent are not in Homs. 

• In Nabul and Zahraa villages outside of Aleppo, an estimated 45,000 people continue to be effectively imprisoned, without food or drinking water. Despite multiple attempts at cease-fires, mediation has failed and these locations remain 

besieged by armed opposition groups and foreign fighters. 

• In the Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus, some 18,000 mainly Palestinian 

refugees remain under siege. 

• In rural areas outside Damascus, an estimated 160,000 people are besieged. 

With the exception of some polio vaccines delivered by Syrian Arab Red Crescent, no aid has entered these areas since the siege began over 1 year ago. 

These are just some of the gross violations of the Laws of War that continue 

unabated across Syria. 

I appeal to you today to use your influence with all parties to prevent the continuation of these practices. Besieged populations must be set free and attacks on civilians, schools, and hospitals must stop. Cease-fires need to be supported and 

strengthened so that people can access assistance and humanitarian workers can 

operate. And governments’ restrictions on humanitarian access, including from 

across borders, must end to enable those who need assistance to access it. 

It is this last point that I would want to underline below, as an indispensable part 

of a future U.S. policy on Syria: 

2.3 Improving humanitarian access 

If we are to end to the humanitarian freefall in Syria the numerous constraints 

on access imposed by the Syrian authorities and armed groups must be reversed 

immediately. The intermittent refusal by neighboring governments to facilitate 

humanitarian access by reputable NGOs through the most efficient routes is also 

unacceptable. We urgently need the U.S. Government to use its influence with governments to ensure cross-border operations are better coordinated, funded, and implemented so that these vital operations can be expanded to assist the millions of 

people currently not receiving aid. 

Millions of people who live in areas that are currently in need of aid can most 

directly be reached from across Syria’s borders. To give one example, when I traveled by car to Aleppo from Turkey 1 year ago, it took me just over an hour to reach 

the city. It now can take days for U.N. convoys to reach Aleppo from Damascus, 

passing multiple checkpoints. The time has therefore come for the U.S. Government, 

international donors and countries neighboring Syria to urgently put their full 

weight behind the delivery of cross-border humanitarian assistance. The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/2139) and International Humanitarian Law provide the firm legal 

framework for implementing these operations. Humanitarian assistance is not a 

right that may be arbitrarily denied to Syrians in need, by their own government. 

The onus should therefore be on the Syrian Government to justify its rejection of 

cross-border humanitarian operations, including to opposition controlled areas, 

rather than on the need for the U.N. to obtain its permission. 

I welcome the recent decision by the Syrian Government to allow the U.N. to 

restock aid supplies using the Nusaybin crossing from Turkey into north eastern 

Syria. This has the potential to allow tens of thousands of people (living in areas 

under the government’s influence) to access aid. However, it falls far short of what 

is needed. The Nusaybin crossing is just one of many that need to be fully opened. 

The Syrian authorities must also allow humanitarian assistance to reach millions 

of civilians living in locations controlled by opposition forces. The use of the 

46 

Nusaybin border crossing by aid convoys is positive, but it can hardly be viewed as 

substantial progress toward the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2139. 

There is no excuse for not facilitating a lot more cross-border aid operations. The 

registration processes for reputable aid agencies must be streamlined, existing border crossings must remain permanently open and new crossing points should be 

established for aid convoys. Setting up low-cost, fast-tracked system for granting 

residency and work permits for humanitarian staff in Turkey and other neighboring 

countries would greatly facilitate aid delivery. 

Providing assistance from neighboring countries does not absolve the Syrian Government of its legal and moral responsibilities to ensure that aid delivered inside 

Syria, across battle lines, reaches all parts of the country. Having been to Damascus 

recently, I can tell you that humanitarian agencies are unable to operate freely from 

the capital. Delays with NGO registration, impediments to working with local aid 

agencies and severe travel restrictions are unacceptable and must be addressed 

urgently. 

3. U.S. policy should ensure that all humanitarian assistance to Syria is, and is perceived as impartial, neutral, and independent from political agendas 

Irrespective of how aid is delivered—whether from neighboring countries or from 

Damascus—access must be granted based on the humanitarian needs of the Syrian 

population, without political interference. The U.S. and other governments should 

ensure that humanitarian aid is easily identified as separate from other forms of 

nonhumanitarian supplies entering Syria. 

Aid agencies in Syria face severe challenges with perception. Armed actors are 

suspicious and the population is increasingly impatient after 3 years of suffering. 

It is crucial that the U.S. Government ensures that its funding is provided in a 

manner that both is, and is perceived to be, impartial. The use of humanitarian aid 

by actors to gain influence, control, or buy the loyalty of civilian populations in order 

to further political goals cannot be tolerated. And aid which seeks to portray 

humanitarians or link humanitarians to any side of the conflict or to a political 

agenda is dangerous. 

Respecting humanitarian principles also requires an honest discussion about the 

unintended harm being done to emergency aid operations by laws intended to target 

terrorists. The U.S. has put in place some of the most stringent counterterrorism 

laws and controls on humanitarian organizations globally. While recognizing the 

responsibility and necessity of protecting U.S. citizens and people around the world 

from acts of terror, these measures could have severe detrimental impacts on 

humanitarian operations if implemented to their full force in Syria. I urge you to 

support the Humanitarian Assistance Facilitation Act (HAFA) introduced in the 

House of Representatives late last year. This Act can help us to both safeguard 

against terror and save lives in Syria and in humanitarian crises elsewhere in the 

world. Humanitarian organizations need your help to safely operate in these contested and extremely dangerous contexts without the misperception of taking sides, 

or compromising the needs of conflict affected populations. 

Counterterrorism laws have implications for aid operations not only inside Syria 

but also in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region. 

4. U.S. policy should address the enormous burden and long-term challenges faced 

by Syria’s neighbors 

I commend the Governments of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt for 

their immense efforts in hosting millions of refugees. I urge the U.S. and Europe 

to respond with similar hospitality in terms of increased resettlement for Syrians. 

The U.N.’s Refugee Agency (UNHCR) aims to resettle over 100,000 Syrian refugees 

between 2015 and 2016. Syrians who need it should receive temporary protection 

outside of the Middle East. 

Lebanon, in particular, has been extraordinarily generous in providing safety for 

families fleeing the horrors of the conflict. Lebanon is now the highest per capita 

refugee-hosting nation on earth. The crisis in Syria has cost the country more than 

$7.5bn, with municipal budgets, infrastructure and basic services facing total collapse. Jordanxix and Turkey have also been severally affected, as have Iraq and 

Egypt, which risk being forgotten by the world’s media, donors, and governments. 

There are millions of personal tragedies behind these statistics. 

4.1 Growing harassment and exploitation 

While most host communities are exceptionally welcoming of refugees, there are 

signs of growing discontentment and discrimination against people who have fled 

Syria’s violence. They face increasingly severe restrictions on their ability to register 

as refugees, access basic services, earn an income, and receive protection from harassment and exploitation. 

47 

Host populations and refugees alike face rising food and rental prices, overcrowding in schools and increased competition for paid work. Daily labor wages in 

Lebanon and elsewhere have hit rock bottom. Refugees in Jordan are not allowed 

to work at all. Rental prices have risen 300 percent in some parts of Jordan, while 

170,000 Lebanese have been pushed into poverty by the Syrian crisis. This risks further destabilization of the entire region. 

Syrian families are increasingly pressing their young sons to work or their daughters into early marriage to support the family economically. I saw children as young 

as 5 packing fruit or picking vegetables, often for 8 hours or more a day, instead 

of going to school. Every 10th child is estimated to be working—often in dangerous 

conditions—while one in every five registered marriages of Syrian refugees in Jordan involves girls under the age of 18. 

These are just some the problems Syrian children must routinely endure. 

4.2 Finding homes and schools for children 

As the conflict in Syria continues, children who have fled the fighting continue 

to miss out on an education—1.2 million children now live as refugees in host countries, but only half attend school, most often in overcrowded classrooms. Some of the 

Lebanese public schools I visited have more Syrian refugee children than Lebanese 

children attending their classes. 

Syrian refugee children still tell me about their dreams of becoming teachers, carpenters, engineers, and doctors. They want to help their families and contribute 

positively to their society. We have a responsibility to give them the chance to fulfill 

their dreams. To prevent the loss of an entire generation of children, much greater 

support is urgently needed to ensure there are adequate schools and teachers for 

the millions of Syrian children and children in host communities in need of an education. Informal tuition and vocational training programs provided by NGOs are 

essential programs which require the support of governments so these children can 

become positive members, even future leaders, of their society. We cannot forget 

that one day they will lead the rebuilding of their country. 

Parents struggle not only to cover the cost of schoolbooks, tuition, and transport; 

they are increasingly unable to afford homes for their families to live in. 

On a recent visit I heard stories of countless families facing eviction and growing 

debt. I met some Palestinian families in Lebanon who had fled the fighting in Syria 

a year ago. After long and dangerous journeys—often in the dark, with small children and only some bags of clothes—they finally managed to cross into Lebanon. 

All other borders were closed to them. Eventually, shelter was found for them in 

small, one-room flats that the Norwegian Refugee Council was able to add to existing, crowded homes in preexisting Palestinian refugee camps. As additional families 

keep coming across the border to escape the violence in Syria, refugees already living in Lebanon have had to share their meagre accommodation with the new arrivals. Some families are now living 10 or 12 to a room. 

The lack of affordable shelter in Jordan and Lebanon is an alarming problem. 

More than 80 percent of refugees live outside formal refugee camps, often residing 

in rundown and overcrowded flats, rudimentary structures, tents, or in abandoned 

or partially constructed buildings. With hundreds of thousands of refugees unable 

to repay debts or afford rising rental prices, large parts of the Middle East face an 

unprecedented housing crisis that requires your urgent attention. 

Addressing this housing crisis will not be easy. The governments of Lebanon and 

Jordan require significant technical and financial support to help them develop 

more comprehensive shelter strategies. These strategies need your backing to ensure more homes are available on the market and rental price inflation is tackled. 

The growing social and economic problems in countries hosting refugees can create pressure to close borders to new refugees fleeing Syria or introduce forced 

encampment. 

4.3 Keeping borders open 

Neighboring countries have absorbed a huge burden on behalf of the international 

community. The solidarity shown toward the Syrian refugees is admirable. Whilst 

it is difficult to ask, we need your help to ensure borders remain open to refugees— 

including Palestinians who face systematic discrimination. The creation of so-called 

‘‘safe zones’’ and camps along the Syrian side of borders could be a recipe for increased violence against civilians, making matters worse, not better, for Syrian men, 

women, and children. 

Governments beyond the region, including in the U.S., must also significantly increase the number of refugees they are willing to host or resettle to ease the pressure on neighboring countries. The meagre responses from nearly all Western 

nations, including my native country Norway, are simply not good enough. Media 

48 

reports suggest that at least 135,000 Syrians have applied for asylum in the United 

States. However, the current immigration policies have kept almost all of them out. 

To help keep borders open and share the overwhelming burden, countries neighboring Syria will need both short- and long-term financial assistance. 

4.4 Meeting long- and short-term needs 

The United Nations has launched the largest appeal in its history, for $6.5bn. 

This sounds like a vast amount of money, but it is the same as Harvard University 

is asking for in its current fundraising drive. To date, only 12.5 percent of the U.N. 

appeal has been funded. Furthermore, this appeal does not include the millions 

more needed to fund cross-border humanitarian operations. 

The United States and ordinary Americans have given extremely generously and 

this assistance has provided protection and life-saving aid for millions of Syrians. 

I would like to thank you for your efforts in this regard. Yet, with the region becoming increasingly unstable and the number of refugees expected to almost double by 

the end of 2014, even more resources will be needed. I am therefore asking you to 

dig even deeper and to consider all options, including pressing for greater backing 

from gulf donors and international financial institutions. 

4.5 Supporting refugee-hosting governments 

As an experienced humanitarian, I have seen that the average refugee crisis lasts 

more than a decade. And there is no end in sight to the fighting in Syria. When 

it does end, reconstruction will likely take decades. We will likely be responding to 

the Syria crisis for the next generation. 

In order to deal with Syria’s ‘‘protracted crisis,’’ U.S. and other donors will need 

to provide much-needed emergency response together with longer term development 

and macroeconomic assistance. Years of experience demonstrate that this must be 

done in parallel to ensure that immediate needs are met and that refugees and host 

communities have sustained access to health, education, and other services as well 

as viable livelihoods. 

This comprehensive approach will require support by the international financial 

institutions, and much greater support to national development frameworks such as 

Jordan’s national resilience plan and Lebanon’s stabilization plan. It will also 

require greater funding to local authorities providing housing, access to health, 

water, education, and employment to both poor local people and refugees across the 

region. 

The task at hand for the U.S. Government and the entire international community is therefore not only to meet the obligation set by the U.N. appeals—though 

this will remain critical. It is also to help support those communities and governments that will continue to bear the brunt of the refugee crisis for years to come. 

If we do not act now to protect the region’s future, the fallout from this conflict 

will be felt for generations. 

CONCLUSION

The humanitarian free-fall experienced in Syria and across the region over the 

past 3 years must end now. Syria is testing our commitment to ensure the horrors 

of Srebrenica and Rwanda are not repeated and so far we are failing. 

As with the conflicts raging now in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, 

and elsewhere, which should not be forgotten, the United States has the opportunity, and responsibility, to show real leadership to end the suffering in Syria. Together with the international community, I urge you to ensure that the United 

States makes use of all peaceful means to ensure that those in urgent need can 

access humanitarian assistance using the most direct routes, that cease-fires are 

negotiated and respected, that Syria’s neighbors receive the support they require to 

prevent a societal breakdown, and that a political solution to the conflict is found 

without further delay. 

For the Syrians who have fled the violence and will be unable to return to their 

homes for years to come, the right kind of short- and long-term assistance is 

required for them and for the communities and countries that host them. The Syrian children I have met across the region demand to know; when will they return 

home, go back to school and be reunited with their families. The international community, led by the U.S., has an obligation to find the answers to these questions, 

and urgently. 

If there is no hope for Syrian youth, we will all see a more unstable future. If 

there are no schools and no jobs or new homes, we will see fertile grounds for extremism, violence, and terrorism. It is therefore both in line with our values and our 

interests to act now to protect and assist civilians caught in the crossfire. 

49 

I would like to thank you again for inviting me to testify and would welcome any 

questions you may have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you all for your testimony, and there 

are many questions that are raised in my mind listening. So let me 

start with Dr. Kilcullen. I want to pick up where we left in your 

testimony. 

So what are the options? Because even accepting your view that 

no one is winning—I personally did not think that I was suggesting 

anyone was winning. I just think the regime made advances from 

where it was at one point that has changed its calculus about 

whether or not it can sustain itself and its patrons’ calculus as 

well. 

What are some of the policy considerations that you think we 

should be considering in order to create the dynamic that can lead 

us to the political solution that we all seek? 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I have five specific things to suggest. But to start 

with, I think that one of the observations that is worth making is 

that the policy goals that have animated our approach to date, I 

would argue, have actually not been overly ambitious. Rather, they 

have been too minimalist. And one of the reasons why we have had 

trouble rallying the Congress, allies, and the American people behind strong action is because what we have sought to do is to manage and contain the conflict rather than to end it. And people do 

not want to support such a minimal goal when the costs are very 

clear but the benefits are not necessarily so clear. 

So I agree that our approach should be to pursue a negotiated 

solution. I think the chance that that will ever happen without us 

telegraphing an intent and a willingness to use military force in 

order to generate that peaceful solution is next to zero. So I think 

that we should prefer indirect means where possible, but indirect 

means will not necessarily get us to the point where the regime 

feels that it has no option but to talk. 

As I interpret the Syrian regime’s strategy at this point, I believe 

that the regime is using the Geneva II process to buy time while 

it ramps up its military operations, tries to get into a better military situation ahead of the June elections, and then use the June 

elections to cement the regime for another term. And the reason 

that it is slow rolling on the handover of chemical weapons is the 

regime is currently the guarantor of those chemical weapons not 

falling into dangerous hands. If it gives up the chemical weapons, 

it loses that leverage and then there is no reason why we would 

keep the dialogue going with the Syrian regime. So they want to 

preserve the chemical weapons until such time as the election can 

take place, and then they will be set up for another period in office. 

So my first recommendation should be that we should just ignore 

those June elections. We should say, yes, we know you have scheduled these elections. They are null and void. They are illegitimate. 

They have no force. And if you do persist in going ahead and carrying out the elections, they will have no bearing on international 

policy. I completely agree with what Ambassador Patterson said 

earlier, that to try to hold the elections under the current circumstances would be a complete joke, and we need to emphasize 

up front that we are not going to accept those results. 

50 

The second option that I suggest is we need to start exploiting 

linkages with other issues, and in particular, I think that Russia’s 

intervention in Ukraine and the Crimea creates an opportunity as 

well as a challenge here. In my written testimony, I have gone into 

some detail on the very significant numbers of fighters from the 

Caucasus and from the Ukrainian Crimea who are currently operating in Syria as part of number of groups that are fighting right 

now under the authority of the Islamic Front. And in addition, as 

I mentioned earlier, there is now an offensive that is very close to 

the edge of the Russian naval base in Tartus. So it is, in fact, not 

at all beyond the realms of possibility that with several hundred 

fighters from the Caucasus who may, at some point, decide to go 

home to Russia and with threats to Russia’s position in Syria, that 

the invasion of Ukraine and the international isolation and the economic pain that the Russians are going to increasingly be feeling 

as a result of that is linked to their support for the Assad regime 

in Syria. And if we play that linkage correctly in a diplomatic 

sense, it is entirely possible that we may be able to convince the 

Russians to cease their active support for the regime and perhaps 

even convince the regime that a negotiated settlement is in its best 

interest. 

I agree with Dr. Nasr that the Iranians are, in fact, a more important supporter of the regime, but one thing that the Russians 

provide that is extraordinarily critical is maintenance support on 

a limited number of precision guided munitions and other support 

for the helicopters and other air assets that the regime is currently 

using to carry out its barrel bombs. So if you want to stop the barrel bombing offensive and you want to limit the ability of the regime to use its air to punish the population, then in fact attacking 

the Russian support is a way to do that. 

The third point—and I agree with Mr. Egeland on this—is we 

need to focus on peace-building at the local level. Included in my 

written testimony is a report that my teams on the ground in Syria 

produced over the past 4 months which shows that of the two sides 

negotiating in the Geneva II process, there was never greater than 

12 percent of Syrian respondents in any of the surveys conducted 

who had any degree of belief in the legitimacy of either the regime 

or the Itlaf, the group that was negotiating on behalf of the rebels. 

So almost 9 out of 10 Syrians thought that the process in Geneva 

was a waste of time because they did not believe that the sides 

that were negotiating were legitimate. If we want a future negotiated settlement to work, we have to start building cross-sectarian 

and cross-community interests at the local level in achieving a 

peace settlement. It cannot be something that comes in on top. 

The fourth recommendation is to expand significantly our assistance programs to the opposition across four dimensions, nonlethal 

technical support, humanitarian assistance, training and advisory 

support, and I believe lethal technical weapons systems. 

So the first point is humanitarian assistance. While I agree that 

we should avoid politicizing humanitarian assistance, the fact is it 

has already been politicized by the regime. It is not us who is denying humanitarian assistance to people in regime-controlled areas. 

It is the regime who is denying basic human services to people in 

besieged areas and areas that are rebel-controlled. So to the extent 

51 

that we can put a greater degree of humanitarian assistance into 

the country, that breaks the regime’s stranglehold on the population that it is currently trying to deny access. 

We have just seen a successful U.N. Office of the Coordinator for 

Humanitarian Affairs convoy go into the Qamishli area in northeastern Syria and deliver assistance to the population of a Kurdish 

majority region. We need to be enforcing humanitarian corridors, 

access of humanitarian convoys, and the transportation of humanitarian assistance to the community. That will have an effect that 

is not only of benefit to the community, but it will also help to undermine the regime’s strategy. 

Nonlethal technical support. Sorry. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have given you all of my time to answer the 

question. So I will read the rest of the testimony, but I think those 

are essential points. 

Before I turn to Senator Corker, Mr. Egeland, what countries— 

I listened to both what you said and in your written statement 

about United States prioritizing efforts to ensure unimpeded aid 

delivery into Syria. What countries are blocking delivery of crossborder humanitarian assistance and to the extent do we know why? 

Mr. EGELAND. Well, there are many hurdles to get across the 

borders. The first and most difficult is the security concerns inside. 

We go into areas where there is cross-fire and we need to negotiate 

with multiple opposition groups when we go into the oppositionheld areas where we do cross-border which rightfully constitutes 

cross-border relief. 

But there are from the neighboring states a number of bureaucratic hurdles, registration hurdles, et cetera, that we should not 

meet when we try to help and assist civilians on the other side. 

And very few donors have basically come up front and said, of 

course, we do cross-border. We support it. We fund it. We help it. 

We push it. Now there is also a Security Council resolution clearing that, giving a legal basis. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all 

for your outstanding testimony and for being here today. 

Mr. Egeland, I appreciate what you are doing. I doubt there are 

many people on this committee that have not visited the refugee 

camps and seen the tremendous distress that people are going 

through. After a few trips, you get to recognize the same people, 

meet with them, and nothing is changing much except that I know 

you all are providing a tremendous service and I appreciate you 

doing what you do. 

Dr. Kilcullen, we spent a lot of time today talking about the administration versus the opposition, the Assad regime versus the opposition. But the opposition, as we know, is what is creating over 

time the threat to the homeland here. And you spent a lot of time 

in Iraq. I know you helped us develop strategies there. And I wonder if you might help us. You did such a great job there, but think 

about now just the opposition on the ground and help us think 

about down the road how we are going to need to deal with that 

and the differing strategies that they are using there. 

Dr. KILCULLEN. Thank you, Senator. That is a very, very important question and I think it lies behind our reluctance to use miliVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Apr 23, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE HE
52 

tary force because we worry that should we successfully topple the 

regime, what comes next. And one of the concerns is that not only 

would we see the emergence of a potential terrorist safe haven in 

Syria, but we may see the expansion of foreign fighters coming out 

of the country to Europe and elsewhere. 

On the foreign fighter question, there are between 10 and 12 

times as many foreign fighters going into and out of Syria as we 

saw even at the height of the war in Iraq. So it is an incredibly 

large flow of foreign fighters. They come from all over north Africa, 

from Western and eastern Europe, from Southeast Asia. They come 

from, of course, across the wider Middle East. 

When we look at the opposition specifically, there are two groups 

that I think have been primarily of concern to this committee. One 

is Jabhat al-Nusra, the official al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. The 

other is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which is in fact 

a successor organization to Al Qaeda in Iraq. 

Right now, ISIL, as we call it, is in fact, I think, on something 

of a back foot. And again, I have included this in my written testimony. But in September 2013 in the town of Aleppo, which is Syria’s largest city, at the beginning of our period of detailed research 

on that city, ISIL controlled no districts in the area. By the end of 

the year, they controlled about a quarter of the city, and it looked 

particularly bad. It looked as if the Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant was going to take over a very leading role in the opposition. 

But three things have really changed that. 

Firstly, ISIL has not done very much to fight the regime. In fact, 

they have spent a lot of their time taking over districts that are 

away from the front line that are weak because who are fighting 

the regime are, in fact, not there because they are busy fighting the 

regime. 

Secondly, they have imposed some extraordinarily negative consequences on the population in the areas where they live, 

kidnappings, tortures, beheadings, public execution of children. All 

the sorts of things that we became all too familiar with from these 

guys in Iraq we are still seeing in the area of Syria, and that has 

generated a very significant pushback against them from the local 

community. 

So in the last 2 months, we have seen their support crash from 

controlling a quarter of the town to controlling next to no areas 

within Aleppo. And in fact, the position of ISIL is that they have 

withdrawn to the area of Raqqah on the Euphrates River and then 

creating a fairly geographically defined safe haven that is in a strip 

along the riverbed on either side of this area, a very localized area 

and, frankly, not in any way challenged to remove that area in the 

event of a large-scale military operation. 

I think that in terms of foreign fighters, as I mentioned earlier, 

there is a lot of Chechens and Caucasian and Crimean fighters, but 

there are also a lot of fighters from Western European countries 

carrying Western European passports who have the ability to move 

back into the homeland over time. And we know that al-Qaeda has 

sent a very senior member that used to be its leader in Iran into 

Syria specifically to recruit and train Western European foreign 

fighters to reinsert into the west. 

53 

So I think it is an area of extraordinary concern that we need 

to be focusing on, but I think it is probably not the best solution 

to say that the real problem is ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra. The real 

problem is the regime, and in fact, if we can create a more stable 

and peaceful environment in Syria, it is not beyond the realms of 

possibility that a significant number of fighters particularly within 

Jabhat al-Nusra would reintegrate within that process. I do not regard Jabhat al-Nusra as being in any way in the same category as 

ISIL. 

Senator CORKER. I want to chase that in a minute, but I want 

to make sure we get to Dr. Nasr, and I do not know if we are going 

to have another round or not. But I appreciate you being here and 

I appreciate the time we spent yesterday elaborating a little bit on 

what you were going to say today and hearing more about it. 

I wonder, for the committee, if you would talk a little bit about 

the shuttle diplomacy and what that actually means versus another Geneva-type conference and who the players would be, what 

you would think we want those players to try to achieve, or what 

we would want to achieve with them over a period of time. 

Dr. NASR. Well, Senator, first of all, referring to what Dr. 

Kilcullen was saying, part of the problem of extremism is the support that goes from some of our allies toward groups that we would 

categorize as extremists or undesirable. I think, first of all, we 

would like our diplomacy to be directed toward this issue, namely 

where the funding for the fighters go, what might be the strategy 

for either both the moderate political force and the fighters that we 

want to see actually gain ground within Syria. There is a gap between the objectives of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and to some 

extent Iraq, politicians that they support and fund, groups within 

the opposition they back, and also the fighting groups on the 

ground that they give money to. 

So our shuttle diplomacy, first and foremost, should be directed 

at creating some kind of a common position among these regional 

powers around what the end game in Syria is, who they back, and 

actually work with them to create a credible opposition. I mean, 

the fact that the opposition does not have the support on the 

ground, does not have credibility with the infighting that it has 

had, in the eyes of the regime also, it does not have credibility and 

uniformity. 

Secondly, I think all the regional actors have an interest in the 

fighting to come to an end. Even I think Iran’s position is very different from Russia’s because largely Iran is also suffering a loss of 

status in the region. It is fairly expensive for the Iranian Government to invest in supporting the Assad regime given the pressure 

of sanctions and the economic issues that they have. There is an 

incentive to find some kind of a solution out there. 

The United States does not deal with Iran, but the United Nations does and also some of the regional allies do. For instance, 

Turkey and Qatar are dealing with Iran on a variety of these 

issues. 

But ultimately a political settlement would require that the Iranians decide that it is not worth supporting Assad, that there 

might be solutions around Assad and without Assad in Syria and 

that the Turks, Saudis, and the Qataris agree to a political force 

54 

that would be taking over in Syria in some capacity when Assad 

goes. I mean, currently if you looked at it, even if Assad left, there 

is no agreement on the other side what the successor regime would 

look like and who would take over. You are going to have immediately a confrontation between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar 

as to whose clients will dominate a post-Assad scenario there. And 

so I think we have to put our shoulder to creating some kind of a 

framework, a basic framework, at least among our allies as a starting point which could provide some kind of credibility for a diplomatic process. 

Senator CORKER. I know it is time for someone else to ask questions. I know you know this and I know you know it better probably than anybody up here, but we had sort of that strategy in the 

beginning. We were going to work with the neighborhood. And it 

appears to me the reason the neighborhood split was we never delivered on our side, and so they all went their own way, again because we said what we were going to do. We did not do it. People 

split apart. Now they are supporting different groups that are warring with each other. But you believe we can put that back together with the appropriate amount of effort. 

Dr. NASR. Well, I fully agree with you. I think we gave a signal 

to the neighborhood that we are going to take care of this crisis 

and then we did not. And then when the neighborhood witnessed 

that we were not participating in the crisis—and also I agree with 

you that through the chemical weapons deal, essentially we turned 

Assad into a partner in an international agreement that requires 

his acquiescence. The region decided that they have to take care of 

their own interests on their own. So they began funding different 

groups. They do not have a mechanism for cooperation. I think 

Egypt’s solid relations between Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia— 

in some ways Syria is paying a price for what happened in Egypt, 

and therefore we have now a much more complicated situation. 

I actually do not think it is as simple as we think in terms of 

changing the military calculus on the ground anymore or necessarily to fix it ourselves with shifting certain strategies. We have 

to deal with the fact that the region has now invested heavily in 

the future of Syria. They view this as a zero sum game, and this 

requires a diplomatic effort of rolling back this involvement. We 

have to gain the trust of the region that actually we mean business, that this time we are going to deliver, that we are not going 

to come up with grandiose solutions for the region but rather actually start by listening to the actors in the region in terms of what 

they see and try to work to get them to talk to one another and 

come up with a position that we could then support. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Nasr, just to continue on that line of thought, 

your written testimony says that the region, quote, ‘‘lacks any regional mechanism that would allow regional actors to solve this 

conflict.’’ Now, this is thinking way down the road, but ‘‘regional 

mechanism’’—what kind of a mechanism are you envisioning or 

should be in place, should be part of a long-term strategy for future 

conflicts here? 

55 

Dr. NASR. Well, I mean, if you looked at this region, as troubled 

as it is, it does not have anything equivalent to an ASEAN or Organization of American States or Organization of African Union. It 

has an Arab League, but the two biggest other players in Syria, 

Turkey, and Iran, do not belong to the Arab League. And for a very 

long time, the United States has played a very important role in 

this region in terms of coordinating relations between countries, 

filling the vacuum when the region itself has not been able to address its problems. And all of a sudden, I think in the past 4 or 

5 years, we have backed away from playing that role in the region. 

And, therefore, you are seeing that the region cannot cope with an 

issue like Syria. There is no conversation—actually Syria’s conversation going around in the region around how do you bring even 

a cease-fire to Syria. Let us even forget about Iran. Among our allies, there is not a conversation. 

Senator KAINE. Is it your opinion that the U.S. activity in the 

past in the region has been in lieu of a regional mechanism or has 

it actually been harmful to the creation of a regional mechanism? 

Dr. NASR. Well, we could say that we never actually really invested in creating a mechanism like we did in other parts of the 

world, but in reality, it is we are where we are and creating mechanisms going forward I think is useful to the region. It is the best 

way of allowing us to leave the region. But as Syria shows, a sudden U.S. lack of interest in a major regional issue could be quite 

devastating because it actually worsens the problem. Syria has suffered because of American neglect. It has become a larger problem, 

which I think down the road will exact a higher cost from us to 

solve than had we paid attention to it 2 years ago when it was less 

complicated. 

Senator KAINE. Is the Arab League capable of being that mechanism? Is it capable of ever gaining significant participation by Turkey or Saudi Arabia, or is that just not possible for a variety of cultural or other reasons? 

Dr. NASR. Well, Turkey is not a member of the Arab world. 

Senator KAINE. I understand. 

Dr. NASR. They are not in. 

Senator KAINE. But even as a partner, we have non-NATO members that are partners with NATO. 

Dr. NASR. That is possible down the road. But the bigger problem 

right now is that the two biggest Arab participants in Syria, both 

of whom are Arab, have opened a cold war between them. I mean, 

Saudi Arabia engineered an expulsion of Qatar from GCC, which 

is quite significant given that GCC was supposed to be the main 

anti-Iran containing mechanism in the Persian Gulf region. It has 

been broken up. 

Senator KAINE. And that cold war—and this is helpful to me. 

That cold war is exacerbated by Syria but not purely caused by the 

situation in Syria. Correct? 

Dr. NASR. Well, it was actually caused largely by Egypt, by a 

major disagreement over the fate of President Morsi’s government. 

But Syria is where the disagreement is playing out in a very lively 

manner. 

Senator KAINE. I may have missed this when I was voting, but 

talk a little bit about the role of Hezbollah in Syria. I think your 

56 

testimony—I cannot remember which testimony was about 3,000 to 

5,000 Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon into Syria, and that has 

created huge challenges in Lebanon. In the pantheon of support for 

the Assad regime, Iran, Russia, Hezbollah, what has been the impact of Hezbollah’s support? 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I will pick that up, Senator. That was in my testimony. 

So I fully agree with you in your take on the effect of Hezbollah 

ramping up its operations in Syria on the situation in Lebanon. 

Hezbollah has had a reputation of protecting both Sunni and Shia 

communities against, for want of a better term, infidel groups, and 

it has had a reputation for being focused on putting Lebanon first. 

That is now in tatters because it sent about 5,000 fighters to the 

western part of Syria where they have been participating in some 

of the most significant regime offenses that have no benefit to the 

Lebanese people but have, of course, benefited their ally in Syria. 

In addition, there are specialist units working as advisors and 

leaders with not so much the regular Syrian forces but with the 

Syrian National Defense Forces, which is the unified group of all 

the irregular and militia fighters that, until he was killed on the 

weekend, worked under President Assad’s cousin. 

The Hezbollah participation I think is important because not 

only are the numbers significant, 5,000 fighters, but also because 

these are people who have a lot of experience in urban irregular 

warfare against Israel and against other players, and they have 

brought a lot of those skills to bear in training and lifting the capability of the Syrian forces that they are working with. Hezbollah is 

a small but important player. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Kilcullen, you say that the reputation for 

putting Lebanon first and being a little bit of a protector of both 

Sunni and Shia is in tatters. Is there any indication that you have 

seen or that anybody on the panel has seen that suggests that 

Hezbollah’s political influence is being degraded within Lebanon 

because of this decision to go all in with Assad in Syria? 

Dr. KILCULLEN. I will defer to my colleagues. 

I would just offer one observation up front which is that we saw 

Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, actually make an appeal 

on Lebanese television last year to say, look, we know that we do 

not like each other. We are in Syria. We are going to be in Syria. 

If we hate each other, let us kill each other in Syria instead of here 

in Lebanon. For a guy who was the cock of the walk at the end 

of the war against Israel in 2006, was in an extraordinarily dominant political position through 2007 and 2008, for him now to be 

reduced to basically begging off a fight against his political foes in 

Lebanon I think is suggestive of how damaging it has been. 

But I will defer to the others. 

Senator KAINE. Other thoughts on that question? 

Dr. NASR. I think the mood has changed. I think Hezbollah’s 

rhetoric is much more self-confident and bullish than it was a year 

ago. It very much sort of tracks with Assad’s rhetoric. I think the 

way Nasrallah has pitched this is that if the Sunnis won in Syria, 

then Lebanon would be next, and the best way of protecting the 

Shias’ position in Lebanon was to keep Assad where he is or at 

least prevent Assad from falling. I think they have achieved that. 

57 

I think mostly the Iranian and the Hezbollah position is not that 

they are going to give a knockout blow and actually win in Syria, 

but because the perception was that Assad was going to fall for a 

very long time in the next 2 months and he has not, by just staying 

in the fight, they basically have the fight both regional and international expectations. And that gives them an aura of the glass 

being half full rather than being half empty. 

Senator KAINE. One last point. I just want to thank Mr. Egeland. 

I was in Lebanon recently, and the NRC folks were very helpful 

and I was very impressed with their work. 

What did, Mr. Egeland, you and Dr. Nasr think? Dr. Kilcullen 

was, I think, at least a little provocative compared to some of what 

I have heard by starting his testimony challenging the notion that 

the regime is winning. He pointed out that 75 percent of the country is now not controlled by the regime, and he put appropriate caveats on that. But I just am curious as to each of your thoughts. 

Is his challenging of the notion that the regime is winning—do you 

see it the same way or do you see it in a different way? 

Dr. NASR. I think technically, factually Dr. Kilcullen is right, but 

politics also is about perception. And I think in the perception 

game, Iran, Hezbollah, Assad are doing better than they were a 

year and a half ago, 2 years ago. For instance, the Prime Minister 

of Turkey multiple times said Assad will be gone within 2 months. 

He is still there. And I think that basically among their ranks 

translates into having been able to withstand the worst of it. They 

are still standing, and it is more a perception than the fact. So I 

think Dr. Kilcullen is right, but we have to take that dimension 

into account, particularly when people come to a negotiating table. 

Are they coming feeling there is wind in their sails or are they feeling deflated and defeated? 

Mr. EGELAND. If I may say, as a humanitarian, the following. 

There is a strong sense that everybody is losing. Nobody is winning, and especially the civilian population is losing more and 

more. There are now, I think, 2,000 opposition groups with a name. 

There is very much a stalemate in very many places except internal battles on either side, all making international or national local 

relief work very difficult. And the total disregard for human rights, 

humanitarian law of armed conflict, for the rights of civilians for 

basic principles like sparing the wounded, sparing civilians, women 

and children, safe passage is not really there. 

However, I would say that one of the reasons that we are—I 

think Dr. Kilcullen said, I mean, we are losing the public on this. 

I have been an aid worker now, a humanitarian, for 30 years. We 

do not have the popular engagement as we had during the Bosnia 

period or Rwanda period and so on. And I think the wrong narrative many have is that it is bad guys against bad guys. So why 

should I be involved? I think the right way of seeing this is it is 

bad guys against very good civilians, and we need to help these civilians. You know, civilians down there are being kicked out. 

Of course, there are also very honorable people fighting there, 

but first and foremost, it is a lot of civilians and we can help them. 

We do help them all the time. You should be proud of U.S. money 

going to keep up a very, very significant humanitarian effort. If we 

had not had it, hundreds of thousands would have died. And the 

58 

resolution that you, Senator Kaine, and Senator Rubio has introduced helps us in this because it is a question of lack of access. We 

need access. We have a right of access, and they have a right to 

receive our assistance. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this has been very helpful. 

I just have one final set of questions to tie all of this testimony 

together in my own mind. 

So, Dr. Nasr, in your testimony, your recommendations—basically what you have voiced here is the United States and its European allies should focus diplomatic attention on bringing Saudi, 

Qatari, and Turkish positions on Syria into alignment, unifying the 

Syrian opposition and laying the groundwork for a regional diplomatic framework for ending the war in Syria. 

Now, is it possible to bring the allies into alignment without ultimately part of that changing the military equation? Are they not 

out of alignment because they came to the conclusion that we were 

not going to do what was necessary to get rid of Assad and therefore they took it upon their own, understanding their individual interests? And I am not condoning some of the actions that our allies 

have taken here. But the question is how does one bring them into 

alignment unless they know that there is a plan in which you are 

going to ultimately achieve changing the battlefield equation to 

then create the political dynamic as you are working to unify the 

Syrian opposition. 

Dr. NASR. I think, Senator, your point is well taken. I think 

something worse than not having a military strategy is that everybody on the ground believes that you do not have it. And I think 

we have gone out of our way to convince everybody that we do not 

have a military strategy and we do not want one. I think at the 

time of the chemical weapons agreement, we made a very strenuous case for why we were not going to contemplate any kind of 

military action. I think you are correct that everybody in the region 

understood exactly what we were saying and therefore took matters into their own hands. 

I approach this testimony realistically, that I do not see any evidence of a change of heart on the military question. So considering 

that we are not going to go out there and argue that we are willing 

to actually have some kind of a military threat on the ground, the 

next best thing is to change at least the existing diplomatic scenario. There could be a far more credible diplomatic approach 

which could also be construed in some ways as not changing the 

facts on the ground, the military reality on the ground, but changing, if you would, the diplomatic, now very comfortable diplomatic, 

scenario in which the Assad regime operates. So having Russia as 

a partner creates a situation in which Syria is protected internationally in a major way. You have to put Russia aside. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me refine this then. How would you get the 

allies that you referred to in your testimony to be aligned with us 

if they do not feel that ultimately Assad will be out of the picture? 

Dr. NASR. Well, actually because we have not had a policy for a 

long time and they do have a policy, it is more getting them to be 

aligned with one another and for us to commit that we will be 

aligned with a sensible policy that they develop. I do not think anybody is going to be basically very quickly abandoning their own poVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Apr 23, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE HE
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sitions in order to array behind the United States unless we are 

going to basically take over this conflict. So largely it is that they 

already have policies on the ground, and it is possible to get them 

to, for instance, back one set of actors within the Syrian opposition 

around a single platform to begin to coordinate their funding on 

the ground around a particular set of groups and around a particular objective, both militarily and politically, and then the 

United States would make a commitment that it is going to support what that platform would be. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kilcullen, I cut you off because my time had 

expired, and I am reading your testimony, point number 5, plan for 

limited military strikes. And you have caveats in there about what 

you mean by that, but could you synthesize that for the record here 

for me? 

Dr. KILCULLEN. Yes, sir. I wanted to say that we can do a limited 

amount of very good work by supporting the opposition, but at 

some point, we need to start taking the regime down if we are 

going to change the correlation of forces. So when we talk about the 

military calculus on the ground, what we are really talking about 

is numbers. So in terms of forces, the regime right now has something between about 200,000 and 340,000 troops of all kinds in the 

field, including both foreign fighters who have come to support the 

regime and the irregulars and the regime’s own troops. The rebels 

have about 200,000 at most. So neither side has the sort of 3-to1 classic advantage that you would expect in a conventional fight 

as a precursor to victory. The regime is certainly nowhere close to 

the roughly 10-to-1 ratio that we expect in a counterinsurgency environment. 

There is no way that the regime can win. But as President Assad 

said, they think they can. They have the wind behind them. They 

have a degree of confidence that is actually unfounded. So it is very 

important that we convince the regime that they actually cannot 

win, and I believe that to do that, we need to telegraph our willingness to use direct military force, not just indirectly supporting the 

rebels. 

So what I have suggested in my written testimony is the idea of 

a campaign of roughly the size of Kosovo or of being a fight protector in Libya, so predominantly an air campaign. I would not rule 

out a limited number of specialist personnel, whether civilian or 

military, on the ground to assist in targeting and directing of air 

strikes. But I suggest that what we want to do is craft a campaign 

around the idea of protecting at-risk civilians in safe zones, creating no-fly areas to deny the kinds of barrel bombing attacks that 

we are seeing, and establishing humanitarian corridors to allow civilians to move to those safe zones, and particularly targeting critical regime capabilities, air, artillery, long-range rockets, chemical 

weapons perhaps to convince the regime that its best option is to 

negotiate an end to the conflict, most likely via a transitional government under international supervision. 

Extremist groups that sought to undermine that kind of peaceful 

solution would then become legitimate targets of a subsequent 

phase of that operation. So it is not a question of taking down the 

regime only to see extremist groups step into its place. It is about 

60 

creating the conditions in which the regime comes to the table 

knowing that it has to talk because that is its best option. 

I should emphasize that military operations are never predictable. The outcome is always in doubt, and it sometimes looks clean 

and simple but it never is. So I am very conscious that this is perhaps an extreme suggestion, but I think if we are not at least 

thinking about this and at least planning for it, it is extraordinarily unlikely that the regime will ever see us as being strong 

enough to be worth talking to, even in a diplomatic sense. 

Effectively my view of what happened last September was that 

we called our own bluff. We said we were going to strike. The regime did what we said was crossing the redline. We did not strike 

at that time. If we are going to have any leadership role in a future 

diplomatic engagement, we need to reestablish that credibility, and 

at this point I am afraid I do not think that is possible without 

showing the willingness to use force. 

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, Mr. Egeland, it struck me when in your 

oral testimony you said in 30 years of humanitarian work, that this 

is the worst set of circumstances that you have seen. I can imagine 

30 years’ worth of work and some of the challenges that have existed and the humanitarian crises that existed in the world. That 

is an incredibly strong and profound statement. Why do you say 

that this is the worst? 

Mr. EGELAND. Because of the sheer scale really—6.5 million displaced inside plus more than 2.5 million outside. Nine million people have been driven out of their homes, another 3 million in absolute miserable situations as war victims inside. So that is 12 million people. But even the Balkans was never like that with 12 million people in that kind of a situation. 

Of course, in the central African region, many more people were 

killed, but not even there either were there 12 million people who 

had the lives devastated. 

So I really have struggled with how to get the message out to 

people, to parliaments, to journalists or policymakers that it does 

not get bigger than this. 

On your call here in Congress, it has not gotten bigger anytime 

and it will not probably. And at the same time, I have the hope 

that we can change it. We can provide hope to these children. I 

mentioned this Myriam who wants to be a doctor. The children of 

Syria have not given up. It is not like they want to flock to extremism. They hope to become teachers. And that is the narrative we 

have to get through. It is huge, this thing, and we can change it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Just two questions. And again, thank you all 

for your testimony. I think it has been very enlightening. 

When you said extreme relative to the military option, I do not 

think it is extreme. I just think that we missed the opportunity 

when the opportunity was right, and I agree with you. We called 

our own bluff, and I think we hurt ourselves tremendously not just 

in Syria but candidly in other parts of the world. 

So I do not think it is going to happen that way. I do not think 

there is going to be a military option, and I think all three of us 

here supported the AUMF and hoped that at the window in time, 

61 

that very short involvement that was going to degrade significantly 

was going to happen. 

But as you mentioned, Mr. Egeland, I mean, the country obviously was in a different place at that time. There was not a case 

made for it in fairness, and there is not a case being made for the 

humanitarian crisis that is happening there. 

But just as a humanitarian, when you hear potentially about a 

military option that is not likely to occur now—I think that time 

has come and gone—how does that affect you? I mean, when you 

see the crisis there, do you think it is something that warrants 

some type of activity in that regard to change the dynamic as a humanitarian? 

Mr. EGELAND. As humanitarians, we do not call for military action. Of course, there is under the rubric of the responsibility to 

protect, agreed by heads of states from all of the U.N., that military means is the last resort when there are no other options. 

I personally think we can do as an international community 

more diplomatically, politically, humanitarian-wise, sanctions-wise, 

in many ways. And I agree with Dr. Nasr. One can put leverage 

on the sponsors and suppliers on all sides to try to avoid the escalations that we have seen every single month now for a very long 

time. And those supporting the government side are always referring to supplies coming to the other side, and those on the other 

side, the supplies coming to the government side. It can easily become an arms race and the civilians in the middle, and we who are 

the suppliers of humanitarian relief come in the middle. But I 

would not rule out anything. 

What we are asking for in the cross-border and so on is, of 

course, that even the cross-border thing is sort of hush-hush. We 

do not want to provoke anybody. I think one should go massively 

across the Turkish, Iraqi, Jordanian borders to civilians in great 

need, and it should be facilitated by the donors. It should be facilitated by neighboring countries, and there is a Security Council resolution on the table, and even that is not happening. 

Senator CORKER. And facilitated with security forces making that 

happen. Is that what I am hearing you say? 

Mr. EGELAND. No. As I say in my statements, I mean, the border 

crossings frequently are not open, and I am talking about neighboring states even. Those groups on the inside that are supported 

by gulf countries are not really helping us very often and they 

could. There is too little funding for these operations. They are not 

coordinated well. The U.N. is not behind it or pushing or helping 

this because they are on the government side. So that will be a 

very easy way to say we can reach millions of people in that simple 

way, and it does not need military force. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of questions. I saw 

Dr. Kilcullen looking at his watch. I have a feeling he has a 5 

o’clock appointment. So I am going to stop. I thank you, and we are 

going to follow up with both of you by telephone. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate it. The insights of this panel 

have been extraordinarily helpful. 

I will say, as I was listening to your response, Mr. Egeland, to 

Senator Corker, that our way to create pressure with other countries is either, to the extent that they are subject to being moved 

62 

by international opinion, that will make them act in certain ways, 

that is one way. The other ways are when we use our aid and our 

trade to induce them to act in a certain way. The third way is 

when we deny them our aid or our trade or have another arsenal 

of what we would call economic sanctions. And after that, there is 

not much left to use in the arsenal of peaceful diplomacy tools. 

And so we are talking about Russia and Iran here as two patrons 

and entities engaged and involved in the Syria issue. I can just see 

as we are negotiating with the Iranians on their nuclear weapons 

program that when we lift the sanctions on them, they will have 

a lot more money and a lot more resources to continue to be engaged in Syria. So these are some of the challenges that we face 

when we are thinking about this broader question. 

But I appreciate all of your work, all of your insights. 

And this record will remain open until the close of business tomorrow. 

And with the gratitude of the committee, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ANNE PATTERSON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. What is the worst case outcome for the Syrian war? What is the best 

case? In which direction is the current state of affairs trending? 

♦ Based on this assessment, are there specific areas of U.S. policy that the administration is reevaluating in order to increase the likelihood that we can avoid 

a worst-case scenario? 

Answer. Circumstances in Syria continue to deteriorate. While we regularly reexamine and challenge the core assumptions that inform our policymaking process, 

the administration has not changed its fundamental policy on Syria. Our goals 

remain to: (1) counter violent extremism and prevent the establishment of a terrorist safe-haven in Syria; (2) avoid the collapse of the Syrian state and its institutions; (3) prevent the transfer or use of chemical weapons (CW); (4) support and bolster the security of Syria’s neighbors; (5) alleviate humanitarian suffering resulting 

from the conflict; and (6) help foster a negotiated transition leading to a representative government that is responsive to the needs of the Syrian people. 

We continue to believe that the Assad regime is a magnet for terrorism and that 

the best, most durable resolution to the conflict is a mutually agreed-upon political 

transition. We are considering a range of policy tools that would bring us closer to 

achieving this transition. 

Question. How has the regime’s recapture of Yabroud and ongoing infighting 

among opposition groups in northern Syria affected the prospects for each side in 

the conflict? 

Answer. The regime’s recapture of Yabroud was undoubtedly a setback for the 

opposition forces, but this is a bloody war of attrition and we do not believe it can 

be resolved on the battlefield. 

We continue to encourage the moderate opposition, both political and armed, to 

be more unified, to coordinate more effectively, and to build better connections with 

civilian Syrian populations. I would cite the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s (SOC) 

expected visit to Washington, DC, in the coming months as evidence that the moderate opposition has made strides in that direction. Nevertheless, the degree to 

which the moderate opposition continues to face challenges in coalescing around a 

shared political platform is a distraction from its efforts to rid Syria of violent 

extremists and a despotic regime. 

Question. In your testimony, you said that ‘‘we are reviewing our policy and identifying priorities for coordination action.’’ What is the status of this policy review? 

Will you consult with Congress on the priorities you identify for coordinated action? 

63 

Answer. The process to which I referred is ongoing and fluid, as is the conflict 

itself. We are not currently in a position to brief the Congress on any new policy 

shift or initiative, but if, and when, any new steps are pursued, the administration 

will consult with Congress. 

Question. Despite working admirably and in good faith to seek a political solution 

to end the violence in Syria, the Syrian opposition has had difficulty building broad 

support among communities inside Syria. 

♦ (a) What is the U.S. doing to help the Syrian opposition build legitimacy? 

Answer. Through senior-level meetings and other symbolic—but important—acts, 

we are attempting to help the SOC effectively represent the aspirations of the Syrian people. We expect to receive a senior SOC delegation in Washington, DC, in 

May, during which we hope to have productive discussions that further deepen our 

cooperation and understanding of one another. 

We also seek to strengthen the SOC through our foreign assistance programs, 

which encourage it to strengthen ties with communities inside Syria. In this vein, 

we have successfully facilitated multiple SOC meetings with local councils, media 

outlets, and grassroots organizations over the past year. 

We continue to provide assistance to local councils across Syria, an initiative 

implemented in close coordination with SOC’s Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU). 

Our assistance helps the ACU strengthen its ability to respond to the needs of Syrians and conduct outreach inside Syria. With our help, the ACU has taken a lead 

role in determining the distribution of urgent equipment such as fire trucks, water 

bladders, ambulances, food baskets, and school supplies. The United States also provides operational support and resources to increase the SOC’s connectivity to constituents, civil society, and local authorities, including funding to support their participation in the Geneva II process as well as outreach events such as townhall 

meetings, travel into Syria, and the establishment of satellite offices across Syria. 

♦ (b) Does the administration still believe that the SOC has the credibility, capability, and commitment to lead the post-Assad transition? 

Answer. As an entity, the SOC does not seek, nor do we encourage it, to lead the 

post-Assad transition. Rather, we believe that an inclusive, representative, and 

capable political body like the SOC is needed to negotiate on the behalf of the Syrian people for the creation of a post-Assad transitional governing body. We assess 

that the SOC has the credibility, capability, and commitment to represent Syrians 

in these efforts. It has already taken important steps to coordinate efforts with other 

opposition groups and international partners. The SOC has started institutionalizing mechanisms to consult and cooperate more formally with the broad spectrum 

of Syrian society, all of which will be needed to make a transition succeed. 

♦ (c) Are Syrian opposition forces receiving U.S. assistance capable of shifting the 

stalemate on the ground in Syria and pushing back both extremist groups and 

Assad’s Iran and Russia-backed forces? Are fighters with the Free Syrian Army 

compliant with international humanitarian law and human rights standards? 

Answer. Despite the asymmetry of forces on the ground, the opposition has been 

able to maintain and hold territory, even after 3 years of fighting. They spearheaded 

the initiative to fight extremists, even while continuing to fight the regime. 

Nevertheless, we recognize that they are facing an uphill battle. We understand 

that our nonlethal assistance will not directly determine outcomes on the battlefield 

nor will it, on its own, force Assad to change his calculus about retaining power. 

However, our assistance does provide needed financial support, equipment, and supplies, while sending a signal both to those inside and outside Syria of our strong 

support for the moderate opposition. 

The Supreme Military Council (SMC) has repeatedly reiterated to us its commitment to abiding by international law and the SOC has condemned the violations 

committed by opposition forces. I would be happy to refer you to SMC and SOC documents that affirm these commitments. Moreover, the USG supports the documentation of violations on all sides for future transitional justice measures. 

♦ (d) The State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations has 

been focused on helping to build ties between the Syrian opposition and communities inside Syria. How does the CSO Bureau evaluate the effectiveness and 

progress in these programs? 

Answer. In October 2013, CSO initiated an impact review after the first fiscal 

year (FY 2013) of its programming in support of the Syrian opposition. In FY 2014, 

CSO began conducting quarterly impact assessments of its programming in Syria. 

These assessments use a maturity model approach (a framework that sets benchVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Apr 23, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE HE
64 

marks for comparison of progress) to evaluate effectiveness based on outcomes 

related to: 

• Building cohesion of the moderate opposition (internally and externally); 

• Strengthening media and civil society linkages to prepare the Syrian people for 

a political transition; and 

• Promoting an inclusive, pro-democratic Syrian society that counters violent 

extremism (CVE). 

Cohesion: Based on its analysis, CSO has determined that it has had some success 

increasing cohesion between the Syrian opposition and local communities inside 

Syria that it targets with its programming. Provincial-level coalitions are emerging 

(mainly in Northwest Syria) around consensus-based governance that seeks to 

provide real benefit and a voice to local communities. This can be seen in the 

expanding ties between local and provincial councils, the development of provinciallevel structures for civil defense and policing, and in the slowly expanding ties 

between provinces. 

Political Transition: After 40 years of regime-dominated media, CSO is working 

to foster a pro-democratic media network out of small, disparate activists, primarily 

through radio and TV. These media outlets—11 FM radio and two satellite television stations—aim to hold the regime, opposition, and extremists accountable for 

their actions; mobilize and inform local populations; and provide a conduit for the 

moderate opposition to reach wider audiences. 

Inclusion/CVE: CSO’s Syria programming seeks to (a) increase inclusion and 

empowerment of women, minorities, and other vulnerable groups; and (b) enable the 

moderate opposition and individual communities to more effectively resist extremism (largely through support to media and police forces). The capacity to resist 

extremism is particularly important as many of the groups CSO is working with are 

prime targets for extremist attacks as a result of their moderate political messaging 

and initiatives. 

♦ (e) In your opening statement, you say that State and USAID have started to 

channel resources directly to local and provincial governments and civil society 

groups. Why are resources being sent directly rather than through the SOC? 

Answer. U.S. nonlethal assistance to the Syrian opposition is closely coordinated 

with the Syrian Opposition Council’s (SOC) Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) to 

ensure that U.S. Government assistance is meeting emerging needs in Syria. In 

some instances, we have refocused our assistance to areas where moderates are 

maintaining control. In areas where extremists have been ejected, we have moved 

to boost moderates’ ability to govern and provide basic services to fill the vacuum. 

Implementing this strategy necessitates that we sometimes engage directly with 

moderate and capable councils, and civil society groups, inside Syria that are in 

need of international support. 

In addition to our coordination with the SOC and ACU in our overall assistance 

efforts, we provide assistance directly to these organizations. For instance, the SOC 

recently held its first outreach activity supported by U.S. funding, a large-scale 

gathering of activists and local council members from inside Syria. At the event, the 

SOC assured civil society and local authorities of its commitment to being inclusive, 

transparent, and engaged. The United States has also provided nearly $1 million 

in direct assistance to the ACU to support its operational, programmatic, and outreach capabilities. This type of assistance is critical to our larger policy goal of 

achieving a negotiated political solution that puts an end to the violence and ultimately leads to a representative government that is responsive to the needs of the 

Syrian people. 

♦ (f) How does the administration view recent leadership disputes within the 

Supreme Military Council and what criteria will the administration use to 

assess the potential value of providing further support to armed opposition 

groups? 

Answer. We view the recent ascendance of Gen. Abdul-Ilah al-Bashir as an attempt by the SMC to build stronger ties between the armed and political opposition, 

a goal that we have long supported. 

We are in constant contact with opposition leaders in order to learn about the 

challenges faced by Syrian communities and consider their specific requests. We 

assess the value of our assistance according to the feedback we receive from opposition leaders and regular monitoring and evaluation practices. 

Question. Assad has been spending unsustainably to fight this civil war. He has 

secured some financing in the shape of loans from Iran and barter contracts with 

65 

Russian banks exchanging Syrian oil for staple commodities but his financial 

reserves continue to dwindle as he spends more money that he takes in. 

♦ How much money does Assad have left? 

♦ Where is his outside funding coming from and what forms do that funding or 

assistance take? 

♦ How is Assad sustaining operations in the face of dwindling reserves? 

♦ You said in your testimony that the U.S. is working with members of the opposition, and other states in the region to cut off sources of funding and recruits 

for violent extremists in Syria. Please describe how the U.S. Government is 

doing this. 

Answer. The United States is committed to increasing pressure on and isolating 

the Assad regime and its supporters until they recognize that the best resolution 

to this conflict is a negotiated political transition. The State Department, along with 

Treasury, is bringing significant diplomatic weight to bear in order to pressure companies around the world to cease their dealings with the Assad regime. 

The combined effects of U.S. and international pressure and sanctions on Syria 

have placed a considerable toll on Assad’s financial reserves and sources of funding. 

This pressure has forced the regime to take extraordinary steps—including harmful 

inflationary measures—to secure the funds that maintain its war effort, which it 

prioritizes over all else. 

With respect to the activities of violent extremists, the U.S. Government leverages 

diplomatic engagement, information-sharing, technical assistance, and sanctions to 

cut off funding to extremists in Syria. The United States is working with countries 

in the region to strengthen their ability to detect and interdict financial flows to 

extremists. The United States has also designated several key terrorist financiers 

and facilitators, effectively cutting off their access to the U.S. financial system. 

Multilateral diplomacy will also continue to be crucial in the context of preventing 

and interdicting foreign extremist travel to and from Syria. We are working with 

members of the opposition, Syria’s neighbors, and other regional states to interdict 

and encourage prosecution of these extremists, cut off their financial resources, and 

prevent radicalization and recruitment to their cause. Ambassador Robert Bradtke, 

the Department of State’s Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement on Syria Foreign 

Fighters, is leading the Department and interagency efforts in engaging foreign 

partners on this issue. 

Question. Our partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are supporting elements of the Syrian Opposition and providing humanitarian aid, nonlethal and 

lethal assistance. Saudi Arabia has reportedly been in talks with Pakistan to purchase man-portable antiaircraft (MAN–Pad) and antitank missile systems, which 

the administration has objected to as recently as February. 

♦ Are you satisfied by the level of coordination on Syria with GCC partners? 

♦ Is coordination better with some GCC members? If so, which countries are more 

difficult to coordinate with? How can the U.S. improve its coordination with 

GCC members on Syria? 

♦ What is your view on the provision of missile systems to Syrian opposition 

groups? 

Answer. As we focus and improve our own assistance channels, we are working 

more closely with regional partners to maximize the impact of our collective assistance. We share a common understanding with our gulf partners regarding the importance of ensuring that violent extremists not benefit from external assistance. 

We will continue to improve coordination through regular consultations with our 

partners. 

We have not changed our position on providing missile systems to the Syrian 

opposition. We continue to have concerns about the attendant proliferation risk that 

could provide terrorist groups with the capability to threaten civilian aviation. 

Question. The Russian state arms manufacturer Rosoboronexport has been the 

Pentagon’s supplier of Mi-17 helicopters to the Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF) but has also been selling arms to the Assad regime. Some have advocated 

for cancelling our contracts with Rosoboronexport and sanctioning the company for 

Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 

♦ (a) What military equipment has the Assad regime acquired from Rosoboronexport? How has the quantity and quality of Russian weapons shipments to 

Syria changed over the last 3 years? Over the last few months? 

Answer. The answer was submitted under separate cover to the Chairman (prepared by INR). 

66 

♦ (b) Would sanctions on Rosoboronexport related to Ukraine impact Assad? If so, 

how? 

Answer. Rosoboronexport is a Russian state-owned arms exporter involved in Russian international arms trade to Syria. As you know, U.S. involvement with 

Rosoboronexport exists primarily to meet an urgent need to field Mi-17 military-use 

helicopters for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). While any U.S. sanctions on Rosoboronexport regarding events in Ukraine would likely impact 

Rosoboronexport’s overall operations, it may not directly impact the company’s dealings with Syria. 

The President has announced a series of measures that will continue to increase 

the cost to Russia for its actions in Ukraine. The President’s Executive Orders 

13660, 13661, and 13662 authorize sanctions on individuals or entities involved in 

certain prohibited actions, including entities operating in the defense and related 

materiel sector in the Russian Federation. This authority is currently being used as 

part of a calibrated response to the Russian actions in Ukraine. The administration 

continues to be committed to resolving the situations in both Ukraine and Syria. 

♦ (c) Under the current contract with Rosoboronexport, how many Mi-17s have 

been delivered to the ANSF? How many are remaining to be delivered in the 

contract? 

Answer. There are 30 total Mi-17s under the current contract for the Afghan 

Special Mission Wing. Twenty-one Mi-17s have been delivered; nine remain to be 

delivered. 

Question. What effect has the confrontation with Russia over Ukraine had on the 

willingness of Russian officials to work productively and cooperatively with their 

U.S. counterparts on issues relating to Syria? 

♦ Has the level of Russian cooperation changed in recent weeks and if so, have 

these changes had any negative effects on U.S. interests? 

♦ Do Russia’s interests regarding Ukraine present opportunities for U.S. diplomacy vis-a-vis Syria? 

Answer. Russia’s actions in Ukraine do not appear to have had any effect on Russia’s actions regarding Syria or its officials’ willingness to work productively and cooperatively with the U.S. on issues relating to the Syria chemical removal effort. 

The level of Russian cooperation has not changed in recent weeks. The U.N./OPCW 

joint mission has removed 92 percent of Syria’s declared chemical weapons and Russia has continued to encourage Syria to complete the removal of its chemical weapons from the remaining site. 

It is in our own national interests to complete the removal of all chemical weapons from Syria, to work with the international community to respond to and prevent 

attacks on civilians, and to help bring an end to the bloodshed by assisting the Syrian people develop a political solution to the crisis. That said, Russian and U.S. 

views on broader Syria policy remain divergent. Russian support for the Assad regime has continued. Russia has been unable to convince the Assad regime to engage 

in direct negotiations that would lead to a Transitional Governing Body according 

to the Geneva Communique and the agenda set out for the Geneva II negotiations 

on a political solution to the Syrian conflict. 

Question. Last year the U.S. took in 36 Syrian refugees, which is such a small 

number given the gravity and scale of this humanitarian crisis. The U.S. must 

accept significantly more, especially if we are to credibly ask other countries to 

accept more Syrian refugees as well. 

♦ How will the State Department work with the Department of Homeland Security to significantly increase the number of Syrian refugees accepted by the 

United States? 

Answer. UNHCR has begun to refer an increased number of Syrian refugee cases 

to the United States—the first step necessary to begin the resettlement process for 

any refugee. The pace of those referrals will increase in coming months and total 

thousands by the end of 2014. Refugees who are deemed eligible for admission to 

the United States will begin to arrive in 2015 and 2016. In line with U.S. policy, 

we expect we will accept a significant number of Syrian refugees over the next few 

years. 

The Department of State directs, under established cooperative agreements, 

Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs) in Amman, Beirut, Istanbul, Baghdad, and 

Cairo that will process Syrian refugee referrals upon receipt from UNHCR. The U.S. 

Refugee Admissions Program is a deliberate process that involves many required 

steps, including an in-person Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) interview, security checks, medical exams, 

67 

and sponsorship assurance. DHS/USCIS adjudicating officers travel to most of these 

locations on a quarterly basis to adjudicate refugee cases in a timely fashion. The 

average processing time for a refugee resettlement case from referral to arrival in 

the United States is approximately 18–24 months. 

It is important to note that any Syrian refugee who might be considered for 

admission to the United States will undergo the same intensive security screening 

that is applied to all refugees under consideration for U.S. resettlement. Refugee applicants are currently subject to more security checks than any other category of 

traveler to the United States, with security screening conducted by DHS and multiple U.S. Government intelligence, law enforcement, and defense agencies. 

The Department of State works closely with DHS and the U.S. Government’s law 

enforcement and intelligence vetting partners to ensure that only applicants who 

pass the rigorous security screening are admitted into the United States, that cases 

on security hold receive a timely review, and that those applicants who do not pass 

the security screening check are informed of their ineligibility to resettle in the 

United States. 

Question. How does the administration hope to use the authority granted by Public Law 113–76 to support the Syrian opposition and pursue other Syria-related priorities? What amount of FY 2014 and prior year funding is currently available in 

the ESF account to support these efforts pursuant to the new authority? What 

tradeoffs and constraints does the administration face when considering the use of 

these funds? How does the administration plan to engage Congress regarding these 

funds? 

Answer. The United States is providing nearly $287 million in nonlethal assistance to the Syrian opposition, drawing on existing accounts and authorities. The administration appreciates Congress’ inclusion of expanded authority in the FY 2014 

Appropriations Act (Public Law 113–76) which increases our ability to support the 

range of nonlethal support to civilian opposition groups. For example, we relied on 

this authority for our recent allocation of $26 million in FY 2013 ESF, notified to 

Congress on March 8. This funding will assist the Syrian opposition by expanding 

ongoing programs that support the SOC and its Assistance Coordination Unit’s 

(ACU) priority campaigns inside Syria, including activities like the Syria In Green 

initiative, and those that provide critical search and rescue kits, civil defense materials, and communications equipment to support civil defense efforts in hard hit 

areas such as Aleppo City. (The Syria in Green initiative delivers urgently needed 

equipment and supplies like food baskets, generators, trucks, and school supplies.) 

Our programs will also provide financial and technical assistance to strengthen Syrian independent media, including 13 radio and television outlets. 

The Department of State and USAID are currently assessing global funding availability through our FY 2014 allocation process, which seeks to balance our limited 

resources against our ongoing global commitments and priorities to determine how 

we will support key policy goals, such as those related to the Syria crisis. We will 

continue to engage and consult with Congress as these decisions are made. 

Question. When does the administration expect to expend the remainder of the 

funds notified to the committee to date for assistance in Syria? For what purposes? 

In general terms, how will the $155 million in funds requested for FY 2015 assistance in Syria be used? How, if at all, will FY 2015-funded programs be different 

from programs implemented to date? 

Answer. To date we have notified approximately $287 million in funding to support the Syrian opposition, of which approximately 65 percent has been delivered 

or is in-train. The spend rate for the remaining assistance depends on a variety of 

factors including access at the borders and other security considerations that are beyond our control. I therefore cannot speculate at exactly what point the remaining 

funds will be expended. 

The administration’s FY 2015 request for $155 million in funding to support the 

U.S. response to the Syria crisis will be used to continue ongoing opposition support 

efforts, including support to national- and local-level opposition groups as they 

strive to achieve and implement a negotiated political solution. Should a transition 

occur, U.S. assistance will help consolidate the political transition, support democratic processes, strengthen criminal justice institutions within Syria, and enable 

reconstruction and recovery efforts, in coordination with the other international 

donors. Some of these funds may also be used to help mitigate the economic, security, and infrastructure impacts of the ongoing crisis as well as the demands created 

by refugee flows into neighboring countries. 

Question. What specific changes have been made to the oversight and implementation of U.S. assistance programs in Syria in light of the seizure of facilities held 

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by U.S.-backed opposition groups in December 2013? What ‘‘mission-specific’’ activities will be carried out at U.S. facilities in Gaziantep and Adana, Turkey in line 

with the administration’s request for $46.9 million in D&CP–OCO funding? 

Answer. Since the December 2013 seizure of the Atmeh warehouse, we have been 

providing our nonlethal assistance for the moderate armed opposition directly to vetted unit commanders in the field rather than first warehousing equipment for later 

distribution. For our nonlethal assistance to civilian actors, our grantees and the 

final recipients of assistance, such as local and provincial councils and the ACU, we 

are constantly reevaluating routes and crossings to determine the safest options. 

After assistance is brought into Syria, opposition authorities often hire trucks to retrieve it, allowing councils to assess the checkpoints and actors along their routes 

and determine whether the roads are secure enough to return with the assistance. 

In one recent case, a relief committee from Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus 

was scheduled to send trucks to pick up supplies but notified the ACU that they 

had to turn back after news of clashes en route to Homs. The trucks returned 2 

days later and successfully collected the supplies. Councils and the ACU have also 

negotiated agreements with armed groups in the past to allow assistance to pass 

without interruption. 

The Syria Transition Assistance Response Team (START), an interagency response team comprised of six offices and bureaus from State and USAID and which 

operates out of Mission Turkey, is responsible for coordinating and synchronizing 

U.S. assistance efforts given the fluid situation in Syria. It coordinates the planning 

and delivery of all nonlethal transition and humanitarian assistance and works with 

international organizations, NGOs, the Government of Turkey, and the Syrian opposition to ensure U.S. assistance effectively addresses Syria’s needs. The FY 2015 

D&CP–OCO funding request supports the personnel and operational cost components of the START. 

Question. How are Function 150-funded programs coordinated with the Syriarelated activities of other government agencies? How does the State Department 

view the prospect of using title 10 authorities and funds to support an overt trainand-equip mission for Syrian opposition-affiliated security personnel? 

Answer. The Department of State and USAID regularly coordinate with our interagency colleagues in Washington, on both assistance and diplomatic efforts. Likewise, in the field, there is extremely close coordination among the various interagency elements providing assistance. 

The President has repeatedly stated that no options have been taken off the table 

in our pursuit of a political settlement and a durable end to the violence in Syria, 

and I will work to preserve his flexibility and policymaking prerogatives as we 

evaluate the numerous options under discussion. 

The administration acknowledges that the only durable solution to the crisis is 

a political transition. Until that happens, we are working with our partners to ensure that Syria’s moderate opposition gets the help it needs to protect civilian populations from regime assault, enable civilian governance and service delivery, and 

contradict the influence of extremists. For the Department of State’s part, we are 

providing approximately $80 million in nonlethal assistance to vetted, moderate 

armed groups in coordination with the Supreme Military Council (SMC). To date 

this aid has included cargo and pickup trucks, ambulances, food, communications 

gear, generators, tents, blankets, mattresses, medical kits and equipment, and specialized equipment such as forklifts and backhoes to units in both the north and 

south of Syria. 

Question. Last week, Special Envoy Daniel Rubenstein announced that the U.S. 

Government notified the Syrian Government to suspend all operations at its Embassy and consulates in the United States, and that all diplomatic personnel must 

leave our country. However, Special Envoy Rubenstein’s statement went on to say 

that, ‘‘despite the differences between our governments,’’ this announcement did not 

constitute a formal break in diplomatic relations because of ‘‘our long-standing ties 

to the Syrian people.’’ This announcement appears to recognize the Assad regime 

as the Syrian Government, however, in December 2012 Deputy Secretary Bill Burns 

recognized the Syrian Opposition Council as the legitimate representative of the 

Syrian people during the Friends of the Syrian People gathering in Morocco. 

♦ Can you clarify the seeming contradiction between Special Envoy Rubensteins’ 

statement and that of Deputy Secretary Burns? 

♦ What effect will this action have on the millions of Syrians suffering inside and 

outside Syria? 

♦ What actions is the administration taking to ensure that the SOC is viewed inside and outside Syria as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people? 

69 

Answer. The Friends of the Syrian People’s recognition of the SOC as the sole 

legitimate representative of the Syrian people in December 2012 was a political step 

to underscore that we fully support it—not tantamount to recognition of the SOC 

as the new Government of Syria. 

The Embassy had not been performing consular work for a long time when we 

decided to suspend its operations; we do not anticipate that it will have an operational impact on Syrians residing in the United States. We intend for the suspension to reinforce our public message that the Assad regime, which is waging war 

against its own people, is illegitimate. 

Through senior-level meetings and other symbolic—but important—acts, we are 

trying to help strengthen the SOC. For example, we are expecting to receive a senior SOC delegation in Washington, DC, in the coming months, during which we 

hope to have productive discussions that further deepen our cooperation and understanding. 

In addition to our ongoing diplomatic initiatives, the United States also seeks to 

help the SOC through our foreign assistance programs, which encourage it to 

strengthen ties with communities inside Syria. In this vein, we have successfully 

facilitated multiple SOC meetings with local councils, media outlets, and grassroots 

organizations over the past year. 

We continue to provide assistance to local councils across Syria, an initiative that 

is implemented in close coordination with SOC’s Assistance Coordination Unit 

(ACU). Our assistance helps the ACU strengthen its ability to respond to the needs 

of Syrians and conduct outreach inside Syria. With our help, the ACU has taken 

a lead role in determining the distribution of urgent equipment such as fire trucks, 

water bladders, ambulances, food baskets, and school supplies. The United States 

also provides operational support and resources to increase the SOC’s connectivity 

to constituents, civil society, and local authorities, including funding to support their 

participation in the Geneva II process as well as outreach events such as townhall 

meetings, travel into Syria, and the establishment of satellite offices across Syria. 

Question. To what extent do the constituent members of the Syrian Opposition 

Coalition hold varying views on questions of inclusiveness, protection of minorities, 

women’s participation, disarmament, and relations with the United States and 

Israel? How have armed Islamist groups reacted to the coalition’s participation in 

the Geneva discussions? What effect has the recent leadership changes and disputes 

in the Supreme Military Council had on the effectiveness of SMC-affiliated forces 

on the ground? 

Answer. The SOC has made clear its views on the importance of political inclusiveness, protection of minorities, and women’s participation. I would encourage you 

to review its proposal for a Transitional Governing Body, which it tabled at the second round of Geneva negotiations this past February, for insight into its commitment to these tenets. The SOC also presented a political platform of core principles 

which includes these elements. 

We expect that a successor government will encourage widespread disarmament 

when the time comes for rebuilding. Many armed opposition figures have told us 

that they have no military background; their reason for fighting is self-defense, and 

they look forward to a period that will allow them to return to their prerevolution 

lives. 

The SOC looks to the U.S. as a partner. We believe the SOC’s legacy as represented in a successor government will work to curb violent extremism, bring stability and peace to the region, and normalize relations with neighbors. 

There has been a mixed reaction across society regarding the proposition of Geneva Two negotiations. The Islamic Front, a conglomeration of the largest and most 

influential Islamist groups on the ground, met immediately before the Geneva talks 

began last January and decided not to criticize the process despite its reservations 

about the regime’s intentions to negotiate. The SOC saw a surge of public support 

and was largely seen by its constituents and international partners alike as having 

effectively spoken for the Syrian people. 

We do not believe that the SMC’s leadership changes are likely to have a very 

significant impact on the ground. We have not seen any significant impact so far. 

Question. What specifically is the U.S. doing now to use its influence with governments bordering Syria to ensure cross-border operations are better coordinated and 

implemented, so that these vital operations can be expanded to assist millions of 

people now not receiving aid? 

Answer. As the Secretary noted during the May 15 London 11 meeting, the key 

obstacle to cross-border humanitarian assistance provision remains the Syrian Arab 

Republic Government (SARG). The SARG continues to prevent humanitarian aid 

70 

deliveries, besiege villages, and bomb its own people in complete disregard of the 

unanimous demands in U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2139 and the 

demands of the international community. Despite these overwhelming obstacles, the 

U.N. and other humanitarian organizations are reaching millions in Syria each 

month, saving lives and providing medical care, food, clean water, and shelter in 

all 14 governorates. The United States commends the valiant efforts of these organizations and is committed to supporting their work. 

The United States provides aid through all available channels—including U.N., 

international (IO), nongovernmental (NGO) and local humanitarian organizations— 

to those in need in Syria, no matter where they reside. As the single largest donor 

to the Syria humanitarian crisis, the United States is providing more than $1.7 billion in humanitarian assistance for those affected by the Syria crisis. Of this 

amount, we are providing nearly $340 million to support the work of NGOs inside 

Syria. The United States continues to work closely with humanitarian partners and 

other donors to determine the best ways to scale up humanitarian assistance in 

Syria, and continues to call on the SARG to fulfill its obligations under UNSCR 

2139 and allow U.N. convoys to provide cross-border and cross-line aid. 

Engaging the Governments of Turkey and Jordan 

The U.S. Government works closely with the Government of Turkey (GOT) and 

the Government of Jordan (GOJ) in a joint effort to get aid to the 9.3 million people 

who need it in Syria. Our shared humanitarian goals include full implementation 

of UNSCR 2139 and increasing the amount of aid being brought into Syria. GOJ 

and GOT support has been essential in facilitating aid deliveries into Syria. We 

have also asked the Government of Turkey to expand registration for international 

NGOs that are involved in, or considering, cross-border assistance efforts (from Turkey into Syria). 

Scaling Up Assistance to Syria 

The Department and USAID continue to look for ways to get aid to as many people as possible inside Syria, particularly the 3.5 million people in hard-to-reach or 

besieged areas. To expand our reach, we want to increase the number of aid agencies with whom we work and expand our programs. We also continue to engage in 

robust discussions with IOs, NGOs, and other donors on how to deliver more assistance to those in need. 

Question. The UNSC Resolution (S/RES/2139) and international humanitarian 

law provide the firm legal framework for implementing cross border operations. Last 

week, a U.N. convoy was able to restock aid supplies using the Nusaybin crossing 

into Northern Syria. 

♦ (a) What do you see as the impact of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2139 

(2014) to increase humanitarian access and aid delivery in Syria? 

Answer. The unanimous adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 

2139 sent a strong signal to the Syrian Government that the Council wants to see 

action to address this catastrophic humanitarian crisis. The resolution has provided 

a stronger political basis for encouraging the U.N. to push harder for cross-border 

and cross-line assistance and established a process of monthly reports by the U.N.’s 

leading humanitarian coordination official to the Security Council. 

The resolution calls for specific and concrete action from all parties to improve the 

humanitarian situation in Syria. Specifically, it calls for all parties to immediately 

lift the sieges on named populated areas, and demands that all parties, in particular 

the Syrian Government, promptly allow rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian 

access, including across borders, as well as immediately cease the indiscriminate use 

of horrific weapons, like barrel bombs, in populated areas. 

At the same time, due to Russian opposition, the resolution was not adopted pursuant to the Council’s authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and does 

not impose consequences for the government if it continues to block access. Russia 

continues to insist on using language in the Council that is strongly rooted in 

respect for state sovereignty and may be invoked to limit cross-border assistance in 

particular. 

Humanitarian access inside Syria continues to be challenging The U.N. has 

repeatedly pressed for more cross-border access, particularly from specific crossing 

points in Jordan and Turkey, to deliver life-saving aid to populations that cannot 

be reached easily from Damascus. Most of these requests have been denied or gone 

unanswered by the government, depriving millions of people of desperately needed 

food, medical care, and supplies. In addition to the government, other armed 

groups—especially extremists—also bear responsibility for blocking aid delivery into 

some parts of Syria, and they, too, must be held accountable for their actions. 

71 

♦ (b) Please identify possible next steps by the Security Council. 

Answer. The U.N. Security Council made clear its intent to consider further steps 

in the case of noncompliance with UNSCR 2139. U.N. Secretary General Ban Kimoon has stated that failure to comply with the resolution’s demands constitutes 

arbitrary denial of access and that the Security Council must take action. More than 

2 months have gone by since the adoption of UNSCR 2139, with minimal progress 

in reaching millions of innocent civilians. The United States is actively involved in 

Council discussions regarding possible additional action to advance humanitarian 

access inside Syria, including a possible follow-on resolution. 

♦ (c) What prevents the United Nations from sending more convoys into Syria? 

Answer. The U.N. is limited in its ability to send additional convoys into Syria 

from neighboring states absent authorization from the government. The U.N.’s provision of international humanitarian assistance is guided by U.N. General Assembly 

Resolution 46/182 which states, among other things, that ‘‘the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance 

with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance 

should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the 

basis of an appeal by the affected country.’’ This resolution was adopted by consensus with support of the United States. 

In addition, parts of Syria are controlled by terrorist and extremist groups who 

target international humanitarian aid workers and others seeking to provide assistance. General insecurity and the lack of guarantees by armed groups to safely enter 

areas make it very difficult for the U.N. to send convoys into the country. 

♦ (d) Why does the U.N. continue to refuse to scale up its cross-border humanitarian operations given the massive scale of the civilian need, while smaller 

nongovernmental aid agencies routinely—and bravely—make cross-border deliveries to populations in desperate need? 

Answer. Despite these real challenges, the U.N. continues to push the government 

to permit additional cross-border and cross-line access to people in need of aid and 

has sought to advance its work in every way possible. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are able to more easily provide cross-border assistance to some 

parts of the country because they are not required to strictly follow the U.N.’s procedures for delivery of humanitarian assistance, although they also face significant 

challenges. The U.S. is the largest humanitarian donor to Syria, providing $493.5 

million to the U.N. and $384.5 million to NGOs, International Organizations and 

others working inside of Syria. We continue to push for greater coordination of the 

overall humanitarian effort to get us as much aid to the Syrian people as possible. 

Question. What diplomatic efforts is the administration engaged in with regional 

states that have a role with respect to the current situation inside Syria to encourage the parties of the conflict to agree to allowing more humanitarian aid into 

Syria? 

Answer. The administration is engaged in a broad range of diplomatic efforts with 

states that have influence over parties to the conflict inside Syria to work toward 

changing the situation on the ground and improving humanitarian assistance provision inside Syria. These diplomatic engagements include the United States robust 

participation in the High Level Group (HLG) on Syria Humanitarian Challenges. 

The Department also maintains continuous engagement at the highest levels with 

nongovernmental organization (NGO) and international organization (IO) partners 

involved in direct assistance provision. 

The High Level Group (HLG) on Syria Humanitarian Challenges, initiated by 

U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos, was created shortly after the 

adoption of the October 2, 2013, U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement 

(PRST) on humanitarian access in Syria. The HLG, which currently has 31 member 

states, aims to mobilize member states with influence over the parties to the conflict 

to expand access for humanitarian actors to deliver aid to those in need in Syria, 

particularly the 3.5 million people trapped in besieged and hard-to-reach areas. The 

HLG has held seven plenary sessions, and the HLG subgroups have met regularly 

at the technical level in Geneva on a weekly or biweekly basis. 

The subgroups have focused on seven priority areas including: increasing access 

to besieged areas; increasing access to hard-to-reach areas; expanding medical 

assistance and vaccination campaigns; demilitarizing schools, hospitals, and other 

civilian sites; streamlining administrative hurdles; increasing funding for U.N. 

humanitarian appeals; and working toward a political solution to the conflict 

through the Geneva II negotiations. While the group’s efforts have not resulted in 

major access breakthroughs, it now serves the function of documenting noncompliVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Apr 23, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE HE
72 

ance with UNSCR 2139, passed in February 2014, and keeping the international 

community focused on a specific set of tangible priority actions. The HLG is equally 

useful in publicly documenting the Syrian Government’s responses (or lack thereof) 

to specific requests made by the U.N. for access to areas in need. The HLG thereby 

is building a body of evidence which, by determining that the SARG has ‘‘arbitrarily 

denied humanitarian aid’’ and committed violations of international humanitarian 

law, could pave the way for further steps in the Security Council that could ultimately break the impasse on access. 

Most recently, at the May 15 London 11 Ministerial, Secretary Kerry joined fellow 

London 11 members to condemn the Assad regime for preventing the delivery of 

humanitarian assistance in Syria, particularly cross-border and cross-line access, 

and called for additional efforts by the international community to scale up humanitarian aid delivery into Syria, irrespective of the regime’s consent. 

Question. How many rounds of 30-day reporting does the administration expect 

the Secretary General to provide the Security Council to determine that humanitarian access is/is not improving? What sort of ‘‘further steps in the case of noncompliance’’ (per the language at the end of the UNSCR) will be discussed should 

the situation continue to remain the same (or deteriorate)? 

Answer. The Secretary General has reported twice to the Security Council since 

the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2139. During each session the United States has highlighted the Syrian Government’s failure to fully and 

expeditiously implement the resolution. As the Secretary General stated in his recent report, 3.5 million people remain without access to essential goods and services. 

This is unacceptable. We are actively engaged in negotiations at the highest level 

to discuss possible next steps in case that the Syrian authorities continue to act inconsistently with UNSCR 2139. We want to ensure that further Security Council 

action would have a positive, tangible impact on humanitarian operations on the 

ground. 

In addition to efforts in the Security Council, where Russian obstructionism may 

prevent further action, we are also engaged in other diplomatic efforts to improve 

people’s access to humanitarian aid inside Syria. These diplomatic engagements include the United States active participation in the High Level Group (HLG) on 

Syria Humanitarian Challenges. The HLG was created by U.N. Emergency Relief 

Coordinator Valerie Amos shortly after the adoption of the U.N. Security Council 

Presidential Statement (PRST) on humanitarian access in Syria, issued October 2, 

2013. The HLG aims to mobilize member states with influence over the parties to 

the conflict to expand access for humanitarian actors to deliver aid to those in need 

in Syria, particularly the 3.5 million people trapped in besieged and hard-to-reach 

areas. The HLG has held seven plenary sessions, and the HLG subgroups have met 

regularly at the technical level in Geneva on a weekly or biweekly basis. 

While the group’s efforts have not resulted in major access breakthroughs, the 

group serves a useful purpose in documenting nonimplementation of UNSCR 2139 

and in keeping the international community focused on a specific set of tangible priority actions. The HLG is equally a useful exercise to publicly document the Syrian 

Government’s responses (or lack thereof) to specific requests made by the U.N. for 

access to areas in need in order to build a body of evidence needed to determine 

the Syrian Government has violated international humanitarian law. Such a determination could pave the way for further steps in the Security Council or other fora. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ANNE PATTERSON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. The most recent U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria report indicates 

that grave breaches of international humanitarian law and significant violations of 

human rights law occur at an alarming frequency in Syria. Indiscriminate shelling, 

torture, massacres, blatant disregard for civilian immunity in warfare and other 

brutal acts are frequently reported. Many analysts have suggested that such patterns will continue until a political settlement is reached. Yet, with little progress 

having been achieved at the recent Geneva II talks, a political deal seems increasingly elusive. 

♦ In your view, what can be done now to ensure accountability for crimes against 

humanity and war crimes committed during the Syrian conflict? 

Answer. The United States has and will continue to call for accountability in 

Syria. For more than 3 years, we have consistently demanded a Syrian-led transitional justice and accountability process for atrocities in Syria, and supported institutions that are helping to build the foundation for future accountability efforts. We 

73 

have encouraged other nations to highlight accountability in Syria and to support 

efforts to document abuses. 

We have supported and engaged the independent international Commission of 

Inquiry on Syria (COI), which was established in 2011 by the U.N. Human Rights 

Council with a mandate to investigate violations of international human rights and 

war crimes in Syria. The COI is working to establish the facts and circumstances 

of such violations, which may include war crimes and crimes against humanity, and, 

where possible, to identify the perpetrators with a view to ensuring that they are 

held accountable. 

We have also been instrumental in standing up the of the Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC), which was established with the support of 40 countries 

to coordinate documentation on ongoing human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict. The SJAC is an independent, Syrian-led organization that collects, preserves, 

and analyzes information on alleged human rights violations and other relevant 

data to inform and contribute broadly to future transitional justice processes for 

Syria. Through a subgrant to the Syrian Commission for Justice and Accountability 

(SCJA), hundreds of thousands of documents and photos have been assembled to 

form the basis for a secure database for future use. 

The United States maintains extensive sanctions on the Syrian regime, including 

sanctions targeting those responsible for human rights abuses. 

Question. What mechanisms do you have in place to help appropriate Syrian 

stakeholders and other relevant parties identify and report on gross violations of 

human rights and war crimes in Syria? 

Answer. The United States gives financial and material support to the Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC). The SJAC was established with the support 

of 40 countries to coordinate documentation on ongoing human rights abuses on all 

sides of the conflict. The SJAC is an independent, Syrian-led organization that collects, preserves, and analyzes information on alleged human rights violations and 

other relevant data to inform and contribute broadly to future transitional justice 

processes for Syria. The SJAC is working with a network of Syrian human rights 

activists largely within Syria working on human rights documentation. 

The SJAC’s efforts are designed to contribute to all possible transitional justice 

mechanisms including truth-seeking, reparations, prosecution, reconciliation efforts, 

and memorialization, with the recognition that all of these efforts will be important 

in supporting the country’s eventual recovery from this conflict. 

The SJAC has also made a subgrant to the Syrian Commission for Justice and 

Accountability (SCJA). SCJA is currently reviewing hundreds of thousands of videos 

and Syrian regime documents for content related to chain of command and other 

factors that will assist accountability efforts. This information is being deposited 

into a secure database for future use. 

In addition, the United States also supports organizations like Physicians for 

Human rights, which is training Syrian medical professionals to document sexual 

and gender-based violence and torture. 

Question. What efforts has the United States taken to ensure accountability, 

including documenting, investigating and developing findings for war crimes committed during the atrocity for future prosecution? 

Answer. The United States helped to establish the Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC). The SJAC was established with the support of 40 countries 

to coordinate documentation on ongoing human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict. The SJAC is an independent, Syrian-led organization that collects, preserves, 

and analyzes information on alleged human rights violations and other relevant 

data to inform and contribute broadly to future transitional justice processes for 

Syria. The SJAC is working with a network of Syrian human rights activists largely 

within Syria working on human rights documentation. 

The SJAC has also made a subgrant to the Syrian Commission for Justice and 

Accountability (SCJA). SCJA is currently reviewing hundreds of thousands of videos 

and Syrian regime documents for content related to chain of command and other 

factors that will assist accountability efforts. This information is being deposited 

into a secure database for future use. 

The United States has supported the establishment and mandate renewal of the 

independent international Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Syria, which was established in 2011 by the U.N. Human Rights Council with a mandate to investigate 

violations of international human rights and war crimes in Syria. The COI is working to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations, which may include 

war crimes, atrocities, and crimes against humanity, and, where possible, to identify 

the perpetrators with a view to ensuring that they are held accountable. 

74 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS COUNTRYMAN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

On February 27, 2014, the United States Department of State issued its 2013 

Human Rights Report on Syria, which described President Bashar al-Assad’s use of 

‘‘indiscriminate and deadly force’’ in the conflict , including the August 21, 2013, use 

of ‘‘sarin gas and artillery to target East Ghouta and Moadamiya al-Sham, suburbs 

of Damascus, and killed over 1,000 people.’’ 

Question. What other types of weapons, conventional and unconventional, have 

been used to perpetrate war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria? 

Answer. We continue to be gravely concerned by the Assad regime’s indiscriminate attacks against the Syrian people. The Assad regime has engaged in unlawful 

attacks using a variety of means, including aerial bombing, artillery strikes, small 

arms fire, and, of course, chemical weapons. 

Question. Are you tracking the origins of specific weapons? If so, what can you 

tell us about the origins? 

Answer. We are following the support countries are providing to Syria, including 

weapons. The Russian Government continues to supply the Syrian regime, noting 

it is fulfilling its contracts with the government. Iran also continues to be a source 

of weapons. Separately, several countries in the region are providing assistance to 

the opposition. In addition, weapons have been smuggled out of Libya to Syria. 

If you would like additional, more detailed information, we would be pleased to 

arrange a classified briefing. 

75 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Letter Submitted by Syrian Opposition Coalition President Ahmad Jarba 

76 

77 

78 

79 

STATEMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES SUBMITTED BY

THE SYRIAN OPPOSITION DELEGATION

80 

81 

82 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY SAVE THE CHILDREN

Syria’s three year civil war has had a devastating impact on children. At least 

1.2 million children have fled the conflict and become refugees in neighboring countries, while another 4.3 million children in Syria are in need of humanitarian assistance. Children have witnessed and experienced extreme violence, and more than 

10,000 young lives have been lost. 

It is not just the bullets and the shells that are killing and maiming children. 

They are also dying from the lack of basic medical care. As documented in Save the 

Children’s report entitled, ‘‘A Devastating Toll,’’ Syria’s health system has been devastated by the war. As a result, increasing numbers of children are suffering and 

83 

dying from diseases that would previously either have been treated or prevented 

from taking hold in the first place. 

Across Syria, hospitals, clinics and pharmacies have been attacked and destroyed. 

Sixty percent of hospitals and 38 percent of clinics are no longer functioning. In 

Aleppo, a city that should have 2,500 doctors, only 36 remain. Production of lifesaving medicines has fallen by 70 percent. 

The few remaining facilities struggle to cope with the large number of patients 

who need treatment. Health workers, medical staff and patients, including children, 

have come under attack either en route to or inside medical facilities themselves. 

Homes are being used as makeshift hospitals, even turning living rooms into operating theaters. 

The impact on children is horrific. Children are having limbs amputated because 

the clinics don’t have the equipment to treat them. Newborn babies are dying in 

incubators due to power cuts. Doctors are reported to be knocking out patients with 

metal bars for lack of anesthetics. 

Deadly diseases, such as measles and meningitis, are on the rise. Even polio, 

which was eradicated across Syria almost 20 years ago, is now being carried by up 

to 80,000 children across the country. Moreover, since the outbreak of the war, far 

too many children have died because they can’t get treatment for life-threatening 

diseases such as cancer, epilepsy, diabetes and kidney failure. 

Serious steps must be taken to relieve the suffering of children in this conflict. 

To this end, we urge policymakers to take the following actions: 

1. Ensure that United Nations Security Council Resolution 2139 on humanitarian 

access is implemented immediately, to provide vaccines, food, water, medicines and 

other life-saving assistance. Humanitarian organization must have freedom of 

access in all areas. Aid must be allowed to cross conflict lines, enter besieged areas, 

through humanitarian pauses if necessary, and cross borders where this is the most 

direct route. 

2. Use diplomatic pressure to urge all parties to the conflict to cease targeting 

health facilities and to cease attacks on medical personnel to ensure that children 

can access medical treatment. 

3. Provide immediate investment in, and access to, child-focused health services 

to ensure that children are not dying from preventable and treatable injuries and 

illnesses. 

The international community is failing Syria’s children, even as they are injured 

and wounded and are unable to access treatment, as they contract polio and other 

preventable diseases that kill and disfigure them, and as they suffer and die from 

not being able to get the right medicine. World leaders must stand up for the smallest victims of this conflict and send a clear message that their suffering and deaths 

will no longer be tolerated. 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY ANDREA KOPPEL, VICE PRESIDENT, 

GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT AND POLICY, MERCYCORPS

Mercy Corps is an Oregon-based humanitarian and development nonprofit organization working in over 40 countries. Our mission is to alleviate suffering, poverty 

and oppression by helping people build secure, productive and just communities. For 

over 30 years, Mercy Corps has had a presence in the Middle East, working together 

with local partners to address humanitarian and protection needs, build the capacity of local and national governments, mitigate violence, and address the specific 

needs of children and youth. 

We greatly appreciate the attention this committee has paid to the Syrian crisis, 

and particularly, Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Corker, for their leadership in highlighting the issues facing Syria, as well as its neighbors. As the crisis 

enters its fourth year, and as refugees continue to leave Syria en masse, the fabric 

of the Middle East is being dramatically altered. The number of Syrian refugees is 

estimated to reach 4 million by the end of 2014. One in four people living in Lebanon is already a Syrian refugee. And, Jordan’s scarce natural and financial 

resources have been stretched to a breaking point. 

From our experience working in Syria and the refugee hosting countries of Iraq, 

Jordan and Lebanon, we believe it is imperative that the U.S. assistance policies 

shift gears and develop an integrated strategy that moves beyond basic provision 

of humanitarian assistance. The gravity of the challenge, and the shortage of 

funds,1 require that donor resources are spent smarter and more efficiently. To 

address the impact that this protracted crisis is having on the region, we urge you 

to support the following recommendations: 

84 

(1) Recalibrate the response strategy to strategically fund and integrate relief and 

development 

To date, the bulk of the response efforts have focused on quick impact humanitarian response efforts, often at the detriment of development goals and the ability 

of refugee hosting communities to address and plan for the long-term consequences. 

Moving forward, the U.S. Government must align and equally prioritize development and humanitarian accounts and ensure they complement each other. 

Mercy Corps’ recently released paper, ‘‘Tapped Out: Water scarcity and refugee 

pressures in Jordan,’’ provides a good case study to illustrate the pressures that the 

crisis is placing on the resources—both natural and financial—of countries and communities throughout the region. Prior to the crisis Jordan’s water supply was 

already on the edge of crisis and the country had been over-exploiting groundwater 

basins for a generation. Aquifer levels were declining at a rapid rate—over two 

meters a year in some places. Population growth, economic development, and climate change had placed dangerous burdens on precious supplies. Due to aging 

infrastructure, 76 billion liters of water a year—enough to meet the needs of 4 million people—are lost to leakage. Now, Jordan is running out of water. Refugee pressures have accelerated and complicated this trend and Jordan is drying up more 

quickly. As competition for scarce resources rises, tensions are also on the rise—both 

between refugees and hosts, as well as between host communities and their own 

governments. While recognizing the significant contributions the U.S., including the 

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), has made to Jordan, we would recommend future U.S. investments scale-up in the following areas: (a) infrastructure 

improvements that focuses on needed repairs to key service sectors like water and 

health facilities; (b) repairs of existing infrastructure and training for maintenance 

personnel to preserve investments; (c) capacity building at the local, regional and 

national level for joint planning and community outreach; and (d) application of a 

conflict lens to all new initiatives. These types of interventions require long-term 

investments and funding. If done smartly, development support can mitigate the 

need for costly short-term fixes. 

(2) Build the resilience of refugees and host communities 

As part of the U.S. response, we must emphasize ‘‘resilience’’ that is, building the 

capacity of communities to learn, cope, adapt, and transform in the midst of this 

crisis. Increasing the ability of communities to adapt and respond to shocks and 

stresses requires more than simply digging a well or building a new school. A cornerstone of the U.S.’s policy in responding to the Syria crisis must be a focus on 

supporting local institutions and build cross-community partnerships between refugees and host-communities. The U.S. Congress should encourage USAID, State, and 

other donors to invest in programs that support local actors who can ultimately 

manage, design, and implement programs that work in tandem with national 

response plans, and programs that strengthen partnerships between government 

and civil society. This will ensure that U.S. interventions are not just Band-Aids, 

but have a sustainable impact in the region. 

(3) Invest in adolescents 

From our grassroots experience—and based on the findings of a recent Mercy 

Corps assessment on adolescents in Lebanon—we are seeing an entire generation 

of young people’s dreams and opportunities for the future placed at risk. According 

to UNICEF, the crisis inside Syria affects 4.65 million children and an additional 

1 million children have fled their country because of the violence, now living as refugees in camps and host communities in neighboring countries. Many of these refugees are in their adolescence, a time of life-changing biological and psychosocial 

events, and face uncertain futures because of the shocks and stresses of war, educational disadvantages, exposure to violence, and gender discrimination. 

Mercy Corps is concerned the growing number of adolescent refugees are not supported adequately by assistance programs. We call on Congress to increase funding 

for programs targeting adolescent refugees to address their unique psychosocial and 

developmental needs, including through programs that promote tolerance, build conflict mitigation and management skills, and strengthen young people’s community 

engagement through involvement in quick-impact community projects. 

We appreciate the opportunity to present these recommendations, drawn from our 

on-the-ground experiences in the region, recent policy papers and assessment 

reports.2 Thank you again for the much-needed attention this committee has paid 

to the crisis and for your efforts to improve the lives of the Syrian people and their 

neighbors. 

85 

———————— 

Notes 1For details on the most recent consolidated appeal, see online at: http://www.data.unhcr.org/ 

syria-rrp6/regional.php. 2Mercy Corps recent policy papers include: ‘‘Rethinking the Syrian Refugee Response’’ available online at: http://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/charting-new-course-re-thinkingsyrian-refugee-response and ‘‘Tapped Out: Water Scarcity and Refugee Pressures in Jordan’’ 

available online at: http://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/tapped-out-water-scarcity-andrefugee-pressures-jordan. Mercy Corps’ assessment on adolescents is forthcoming and will be 

published and available online in April, 2014. 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY DR. CAROLYN Y. WOO, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

‘‘Too many lives have been shattered in recent times by the conflict in Syria, fueling 

hatred and vengeance. Let us continue to ask the Lord to spare the beloved Syrian 

people further suffering, and to enable the parties in conflict to put an end to all violence and guarantee access to humanitarian aid.’’ 

Pope Francis’ Christmas day message Urbi et Orbi. 

As President and CEO of Catholic Relief Services, I provide this written statement today to share the perspective of Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the official 

humanitarian agency of the Catholic community in the United States. 

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, thank you for holding the hearing 

‘‘Syria after Geneva: Next Steps for U.S. Foreign Policy.’’ With the Church across 

the globe, we solemnly mark the third anniversary of the beginning of this war and 

call for a renewed diplomatic effort to end the horrific bloodshed that has killed 

more than 130,000 people. While our staff and partners in the region are heroically 

responding to the human needs on the ground, their courage and commitment must 

be matched by an equal resolve to end this conflict. 

CRS and our partners are privileged to serve more than 350,000 beneficiaries in response to the Syrian conflict, programming over $60 million in assistance. About 

one-quarter of those funds are from U.S. Government agencies, and another quarter 

from private U.S. individuals and foundations. This testimony is based on CRS’ 

experience responding to human needs throughout the region. 

As you consider next steps in U.S. foreign policy, CRS makes three main recommendations: 

(1) Recommit to serious negotiations to find a political solution to the crisis, 

ensure impartial and neutral humanitarian assistance, and seek to rebuild an 

inclusive society in Syria that protects the rights of all its citizens, including 

Christians and other minorities. 

(2) With donor governments and refugee host countries, develop and fund a 

coordinated, long-term humanitarian and development strategy for the region, 

including a contingency plan and a plan for the resettlement of refugees. 

(3) Continue to prioritize adherence to international humanitarian law, especially to protect civilians, lift all sieges, and facilitate humanitarian access. 

RECOMMIT TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION

The conflict in Syria is among the worst in more than a generation. More than 

130,000 people have been killed. The use of chemical weapons, barrel bombs, systematic torture, and violence against women has cause extreme suffering among 

countless victims. Traumatized, as many as 2.6 million people have fled Syria. More 

than 9 million people are in need. 

With Pope Francis, we believe pursuit of military solutions is futile and will distract from serious diplomatic and political solutions. I reiterate the policy of the U.S. 

Conference of Catholic Bishops: ‘‘The longstanding position of our Conference of 

Bishops is that the Syrian people urgently need a political solution that ends the 

fighting and creates a future for all Syrians, one that respects human rights and 

religious freedom.’’ 1

The Bishops continue to ‘‘ask the United States to work with other governments 

to obtain a cease-fire, initiate serious negotiations, provide impartial and neutral 

humanitarian assistance, and encourage building an inclusive society in Syria that 

protects the rights of all its citizens, including Christians and other minorities.’’ 2

It is CRS’ experience that Syrians are proudly moderate, educated, and cultured; 

a peaceful solution is possible. The solution, of course, lies within Syria, but the 

United States and the international community must do all we can to help. 

As a critical component of a diplomatic framework on Syria, the donor community 

must work with donor governments and refugee host countries to develop and fund 

86 

a coordinated, long-term humanitarian and development strategy for the region, 

including a contingency plan and a plan for refugee resettlement. 

Outside of Syria, the region remains relatively stable given the enormous movements of people it is experiencing. The United Nations Office for the Coordination 

of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) put forth its largest humanitarian appeal ever 

in December, with $6.5 billion for the Syria response. Since the Kuwait Donor 

Pledging Conference in January, where $2.3 billion was pledged for Syria, only 14 

percent of the appeal has been funded. The United States has been generous, but 

needs continue to grow. Through the FY 2015 appropriations process, Congress 

should provide robust humanitarian assistance to Syria at no less than FY 2014 

levels. 

By coordinating assistance with other donors, the international community can 

improve the efficacy of assistance. U.S. Government assistance to date has been critical, and it must continue to lead, given the immense need. The U.S. Government 

should particularly engage Gulf States and other donors who could help fund the 

scale-up of programming. Donors should scale-up program funding to help restore 

livelihoods of refugees who will likely not return home soon; educate children who 

have already lost so much; and restore psycho-social support and peacebuilding programming to respond to emotional needs. As the United States own history with 

conflict has taught us, often the least visible wounds take the longest to heal. 

In addition to much needed humanitarian assistance, bilateral and development 

assistance will help neighboring countries to keep their borders open. While Jordan, 

Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and other countries have been extremely generous and 

hospitable to their Syrian neighbors fleeing the conflict, these societies are under 

extreme strain from the added burden of serving refugees, most of which are not 

in camps, but are living amidst the local population. 

Even when the conflict ends, the humanitarian need will be serious for years. The 

United States must support local institutions in refugee hosting countries, such as 

the schools and hospitals, both public and private, which have expanded services to 

accommodate refugees from Syria. Each country situation is different, but the consistent theme is that schools and hospitals cannot handle both the local population 

and the continued influx of refugees. Integration of humanitarian and development 

funding can ensure that needs of both vulnerable host communities and refugees 

from Syria are met. 

This long-term strategy should include a commitment to resettle refugees, especially vulnerable populations. Women and children are at risk for trafficking. As 

many as 4,000 unaccompanied refugee minors are in Jordan and Lebanon. Religious 

minorities, who have played a moderating role in the politics of the region, feel 

caught. And thousands of Iraqis who fled to Syria are now displaced a second time. 

These groups require particular attention which can be difficult to come by in communities accommodating so many refugees. 

The U.S. Government should resettle its fair share of refugees as part of this 

strategy, including 15,000 this year alone. We urge the Department of Homeland 

Security, in consultation with the Department of State and the Department of Justice, to remove expeditiously unjust impediments to U.S. resettlement by implementing discretionary authority to grant exemptions from overly broad terrorism 

related inadmissibility grounds (TRIG) of U.S. immigration law. I recommend to you 

the testimony by Most Reverend Eusebio Elizondo, M. Sp. to the Subcommittee on 

the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights on January 7, 2014, on behalf of 

the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. 

Diplomatic efforts must continue to exhort parties to the conflict to adhere to 

international humanitarian law, especially to lift sieges, protect civilians, and facilitate humanitarian access. 

Humanitarian assistance should not require negotiation, but the dignity and very 

lives of people on the ground require that any party with the power to ensure 

humanitarian access does all it can. Since the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2139 in late February, parties to the conflict continue to impede humanitarian assistance. 

Hundreds of thousands of people remain under siege in cities across Syria. No 

diplomatic means should be spared to exhort parties to the conflict to lift sieges. 

Until sieges are lifted, it is critical to secure safe and unhindered evacuation of 

those who wish to leave. Convoys with food and critical medicines must be allowed 

unfettered access to those under siege. And vaccination campaigns must be permitted to continue. 

Even in areas not under siege, humanitarian access remains byzantine. The 

Assad regime must make good on its commitment to streamline processes for 

humanitarian assistance. The U.S. Government and other donors must work closely 

with countries neighboring Syria to provide cross-border access to millions of people 

87 

in hard to reach places. Days of truce and pauses in fighting to allow for humanitarian assistance would help immensely. 

Dozens of humanitarian workers and medical care providers have been killed in 

Syria. To avoid more deaths, humanitarian assistance must remain impartial and 

neutral. Exemptions for humanitarian organizations to U.S. branding requirements 

are critical. Even the perception of affiliation of humanitarian assistance with the 

West can endanger humanitarian workers. The perception of biased aid emboldens 

the Assad regime to encumber aid. 

Finally, all diplomatic means must be undertaken to recover the civilian nature 

of key institutions. Schools and hospitals have been militarized and therefore targeted. The lives of Syrians are at risk, as is the future of those fortunate enough 

to survive. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you for your attention to the concerns 

of Catholic Relief Services and our partner agencies. I join the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in urging you to recommit to serious negotiations toward 

a political solution to the conflict in Syria. To help our international assistance 

reach more people, I recommend that you work with other donors to develop a 

longer term regional strategy. I ask you to work with the Committee on Appropriations subcommittees for State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs and Agriculture to adequately fund the humanitarian response in Syria. And I urge you to 

work with the Judiciary Committee so that the United States can do its part to 

resettle the neediest refugees. Please exhort parties to the conflict, and those who 

influence them, to adhere to international humanitarian law and protect civilians 

and humanitarian workers. The very stability of the entire region requires us to 

achieve these goals. 

In closing, I echo the words of Pope Francis’ Vigil for peace, ‘‘. . . I think of the 

children: look upon these . . . look at the sorrow of your brother, stay your hand 

and do not add to it, rebuild the harmony that has been shattered.’’ When we look 

back at our response to the crisis in Syria, let us say we did all we could. 

———————— 

Notes 

1Most Reverend Richard E. Pates, Bishop of Des Moines and Chair of the Committee on International Justice and Peace of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, August 29, 2013. 2 U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Administration Committee Statement on Syria, September 10, 2013. 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE COALITION FOR A DEMOCRATIC SYRIA

RUSSIA WILL NOT PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE DIPLOMATIC ROLE

On February 3, 2012, the Assad regime unleashed an unprecedented artillery 

bombardment on the Baba Amr area of Homs, then the power center of the Syrian 

opposition. Two days later, after the bloodiest 48 hours of the Syrian Revolution to 

date, Russia and China vetoed action on the United Nations Security Council to stop 

the slaughter. 

In the aftermath of this infamous double-veto, President Barack Obama declared 

‘‘Any government that brutalizes and massacres its people does not deserve to govern.’’ However, the statement of then-U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice better encapsulates U.S. policy since February 2012. Referring to the decisions of Russia and 

China to veto, she stated, ‘‘Any further bloodshed that flows will be on their hands.’’ 

The primary component of U.S. policy toward Syria since 2012 has been to shame 

Russia into easing its client dictator out of power, by reminding Russian President 

Vladimir Putin that the blood of Syrians lies on his hands. Since Ambassador Rice’s 

statement, the death toll in Syria has risen from 7,500 to nearly 150,000. The Assad 

regime’s crackdown has escalated to include aerial bombardments, Scud missiles, 

and chemical weapons. Syrians have suffered a historic humanitarian crisis worse 

than that of the Rwanda Genocide, including the first major chemical weapons 

attack in 25 years. 

Through all this, Russia has continued to back Assad to the hilt, even shipping 

offensive weapons to the regime on the eve of Geneva II talks this January. Yet 

Obama administration policy has relied, against all logic, on the hope that Putin 

could be shamed into abandoning his client in Damascus. 

EVENTS IN CRIMEA HAVE ORIGINS IN SYRIA

It took the massacre of peaceful protesters in Kyiv by Putin’s client Viktor 

Yanukovych, followed by the brazen Russian annexation of Crimea, for administraVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:08 Apr 23, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE HE
88 

tion officials to finally grasp what Syrians have known for three years: Putin has 

no shame, and has no qualms supporting bloodshed on a massive scale. 

Syrian Americans were not surprised when Putin shrugged off the U.S.’s stern 

diplomatic warnings against aggressive action in Ukraine. The U.S. had delivered 

similar diplomatic warnings to the Assad regime before, and the regime had safely 

ignored each one, crossing red line after red line. In fact, each major diplomatic initiative on Syria has ended with an unprecedented military escalation by the Assad 

regime: 

• From November 2011–January 2012, Arab League observers entered Syria to 

help implement a cease-fire agreement between the regime and the Syrian 

opposition. The following month, Assad forces commenced unprecedented artillery assaults on Bab Amr. 

• From April 2012–May 2012, rebel Free Syrian Army forces observed a ceasefire 

as part of the Geneva Plan negotiated by UN–Arab League envoy Kofi Annan. 

In late May, Assad’s ‘‘Shabiha’’ paramilitaries killed over 100 civilians at Houla 

in the worst massacre to date. 

• In May 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry attempted to revive diplomatic 

talks in what was then dubbed ‘‘Geneva II.’’ That same month, Hezbollah forces 

openly invaded Syria for the first time to overtake the city of Qusair. Hezbollah 

has since deployed throughout the country, tipping the balance of the war and 

enflaming sectarian tensions across the region. 

• On August 18, 2013, U.N. inspectors arrived in Damascus to investigate prior 

small-scale chemical weapons attacks. Three days later, the Assad regime killed 

over 1,500 civilians in its infamous Ghouta chemical attacks. 

• During ‘‘Geneva II’’ transition talks from January 22–February 17, Assad forces 

escalated their attacks with unprecedented barrel bombings. The three weeks 

of Geneva II talks were the bloodiest period in the history of the Syrian Revolution. 

By the time Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled Kyiv on February 22, 

his backer Vladimir Putin knew that Russia could annex Crimea without risk of a 

damaging response from the United States. If Iran and its Hezbollah proxies could 

safely invade Syrian territory at Qusair with no penalty, why would it be any different for Russia in Crimea? 

THE UNITED STATES NEEDS A MORE ASSERTIVE POLICY

By centering its Syria policy on Assad and Putin, in the futile hope that one or 

both would respond to diplomacy, the U.S. has lost a great deal of global credibility. 

The consequences of this lost credibility can be expected to increase, as 

transnational extremists flood into Syria and Russian troops mass in western Crimea. Yet the U.S. can begin to restore its lost credibility by revamping its Syria policy, and taking the following steps: 

1. Withdraw legal recognition from and sever diplomatic ties to the Assad dictatorship 

Withdrawing diplomatic ties would send a firm statement to the international 

community that war crimes like Assad’s have consequences, and would encourage 

defections from regime forces. 

The Syrian American community encourages Congress members to support H. 

Res. 520, which urges the Administration and U.S. allies to ‘‘formally withdraw 

their recognition of Bashar al-Assad’s regime as the rightful Government of Syria, 

unless and until the Assad regime and its supporting militias discontinue their barbaric slaughter.’’ We also encourage the introduction of a companion bill in the 

Senate. 

2. Demand that the Obama administration explain its plan to address the deteriorating situation 

The lack of a clear U.S. policy on Syria in the face of escalating violations by 

Assad, Hezbollah, Iran and Russia gives these violators a dangerous sense of impunity with far-reaching implications. Syrian Americans wish to see the formulation 

of such a policy as soon as possible. 

We urge Congress Members to support H. Res. 520 and S. Res. 384, each of which 

calls on the President to develop and submit to Congress within 90 days ‘‘a strategy 

for United States engagement on the Syria crisis, with a specific focus on humanitarian assistance and development, and protecting human rights in Syria and in the 

region.’’ 

89 

3. Use H. Res. 520, S. Res. 384, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2139 to pressure both Assad and Russia on the provision of humanitarian access to besieged 

areas 

Both H. Res. 520 and S. Res. 384 urge ‘‘unfettered access to humanitarian aid 

throughout the Syrian Arab Republic, respecting the safety, security, independence, 

and impartiality of humanitarian workers and ensuring freedom of movement to 

deliver aid.’’ UNSC Resolution 2139 demands that ‘‘all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, allow rapid, safe, and unhindered U.N. humanitarian access for 

U.N. humanitarian agencies across conflict lines.’’ 

UNSC 2139 is of particular note because even Russia endorsed it, yet Assad continues to deny humanitarian assistance. The United States can restore some of its 

lost international credibility by pressuring Russia to live up to its word. Congress 

can push the Administration to back enforcement of UNSC 2139 by passing H. Res. 

520 and S. Res. 384. 

Æ