Leading Marines

3-3

During the afternoon of 12 May 1975, Cambodian forces seized

the Mayaguez. With the recent memory of the North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo, President Ford exercised a military

option on 13 May. Although the Navy-Marine Corps forces that

participated in the evacuation of Saigon 2 weeks earlier could

have reconstituted in a matter of days, Commander-in-Chief

Pacific Command (CINCPAC)4 chose instead an ad hoc rapid

response option consisting of readily available Marine ground

forces supported by Air Force helicopters and close air support. 

Intelligence throughout the operation was faulty. Although a US

Navy P-3 surveillance aircraft tracked the Mayaguez to the island

Marines recapture the Mayaguez.
MCWP 6-11

3-4

of Koh Tang where the ship anchored around noon on 13 May, US

forces never pinpointed the location of the crew. Repeated

requests for photographic reconnaissance were denied. 

The ad hoc nature of the task organization was compounded by an

odd selection of commanders. The CINCPAC designated US Air

Force Lieutenant General Burns, Commander, 7th Air Force, as

the on-scene commander and US Air Force Colonel Anders, Deputy Commander, 56th Special Operations Wing, as the operational

task force commander. The Commanding General, III Marine

Amphibious Force (III MAF), designated Colonel Johnson from

the III MAF G-3 (a spare colonel awaiting PCS orders) as the

Marine Task Group Commander; Lieutenant Colonel Austin,

Commanding Officer, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/9 as the

Koh Tang raid commander; and Major Porter, Executive Officer,

BLT 1/4 as the Mayaguez raid commander. Despite his title, Lieutenant General Burns was never actually on scene. Adding to the

friction, distance and poor communications later cut Colonel

Johnson and Lieutenant Colonel Austin out of the decisionmaking

loop. That these commanders had neither trained together nor had

habitual relationships was a continual source of friction throughout the operation. 

The plan called for 57 Marines from Company D, 1st Battalion,

4th Marines, plus augments, to board and recapture the Mayaguez.

Simultaneously, 8 US Air Force CH/HH-53 helicopters would

land roughly 180 Marines from BLT 2/9 into two zones on Koh

Tang to seize the island and rescue the crew. 
Leading Marines

3-5

The plan went awry as soon as the company commander and one

of the squad leaders leapt from the USS Holt to the Mayaguez.

After the first two jumped, the surge that resulted from the Holt

coming alongside pushed the two ships apart. For the next 5 minutes or so, Captain Wood and Corporal Coker were the only two

Marines on the hostile ship. Sailors on the Holt quickly threw

over lines allowing the men to lash the two ships together. More

friction was generated by the senior level decision to saturate the

Mayaguez with tear gas to incapacitate the expected Cambodian

defenders. This “good idea” forced the boarding party to execute

the difficult task of clearing the ship while wearing gas masks.

The gas masks limited vision, increased exertion, and hampered

communication; however, prior nuclear, biological, chemical

training helped overcome some of the friction. To improve communication, the Marines lifted their masks, shouted orders, and

then replaced and cleared their masks instead of relying solely on

hand and arm signals. Fortunately for the Marines, the Cambodians had abandoned the Mayaguez earlier, which prevented the

friction from becoming catastrophic. In the end, the Marines

recaptured the deserted ship without firing a shot.

While the recapture of the Mayaguez was fortunately anticlimactic, the helicopter assault on Koh Tang, on the other hand, turned

into a blood bath. Problems assaulting Koh Tang began in the

planning phase. The intelligence available to Marine planners

indicated there were 18 to 20 Cambodian irregulars on the island.

Due to security procedures, higher headquarters did not provide

the Marines with intelligence reports that estimated the enemy

strength at 200 fighters armed with 82-mm mortars, 75-mm

recoilless rifles, .30-caliber machine guns, and a rocket propelled
MCWP 6-11

3-6

grenade launcher. In addition to the incorrect intelligence, there

were no tactical maps available. Overhead reconnaissance imagery would have mitigated that shortfall, which was requested by

the 7th Fleet, but higher headquarters repeatedly denied the

request until it was too late to process the film. In the end, the

only reconnaissance available to the BLT commander was an

Army U-21. However, the Air Force restricted the U-21’s flight to

a 6,000-foot altitude and the only camera onboard was a Marine’s

pocket camera. Despite these restrictions, Lieutenant Colonel

Austin identified two sites during the flight that were clear

enough for use as landing zones. 

On 14 May around 0900, an Air Force F-4 pilot spotted and

reported a fishing vessel with what appeared to be Caucasians

aboard heading towards the Cambodian mainland. Despite this

report, Lieutenant General Burns and his staff continued planning

for operations on Koh Tang. 

On 15 May, expecting little resistance, eight Air Force helicopters

flew toward the island. The first two helicopters that approached

the eastern landing zone were hit by enemy fire. One helicopter

crashed in the ocean; killing the copilot, 10 Marines, and 2 corpsmen. The other helicopter crash landed on the beach. In the western landing zone, the first helicopter landed unopposed and the

Marines exited the first aircraft, whereupon the enemy opened

fire with small arms, rocket, and mortar fire. The damaged helicopter barely made it out of the zone before ditching in the ocean.

From that point, the situation continued to deteriorate. After the
Leading Marines

3-7

insertion of the first wave, the Marines found themselves separated into three groups, struggling to coordinate their action. 

Further complicating matters was the release of the Mayaguez’s

crew on the morning of 15 May. Concurrent with the launching of

the second assault wave, the USS Wilson recovered the Mayageuz’s crew from a Thai fishing boat. Upon learning of the recovery, authorities in Washington ordered an immediate cessation of

offensive operations on Koh Tang. As a result, the airborne mission commander ordered the second assault wave to return to base.

Desperate for reinforcement, the commander on the ground finally

convinced Lieutenant General Burns to allow the second wave to

land. For the rest of the day, the Marines worked through interService friction to coordinate Air Force close air support missions

and the Marines’ withdrawal. By 2010 that evening, the last

Marines to make it off the island lifted out of the landing zone.

Several hours later, the Company E commander discovered three

of his Marines were missing. The fates of Lance Corporal Joseph

N. Hargrove, Private First Class Gary C. Hall, and Private Danny

G. Marshall remain unknown. Additionally, the body of Lance

Corporal Ashton N. Looney was unintentionally left on the beach.

The cost of recovering the Mayaguez was 15 killed, 3 missing

(later declared dead), and 49 wounded.5 

Friction is inevitable and Marines must learn to deal with it; however, Marine leaders can minimize its effects. The Mayaguez incident makes it clear that senior leaders should establish command

relationships that facilitate operations. Additionally, forces should

be task-organized to take advantage of unit capabilities and habitual
MCWP 6-11

3-8

relationships. Senior leaders should also be aware of the effect of a

“good idea,” such as saturating a ship with tear gas, and the friction

it induces into tactical operations. Finally, leaders at all levels can

reduce friction through realistic training and rehearsals.

Among the many factors that cause friction, perhaps the moral

and physical challenges to leading are the hardest to overcome.

Together, they can produce obstacles that may prevent leaders

and units from accomplishing their mission. Although they affect

us in very different ways, the moral and physical elements cannot

be separated. Moral factors play an important role in developing

the physical capacity of individuals and units.

MORAL CHALLENGE

Leaders overcome moral challenges by exercising moral courage.

As explained in Chapter 2, moral courage is the mastery of the

fear of social consequences such as being perceived as disloyal,

alienation, ridicule, punishment, job loss, or loss of social status.

In some cases, the right choice is crystal clear. In other cases, the

correct course of action is not so clear. In the end, leaders must

always accept full responsibility for their actions. The following

vignettes illustrate the actions of morally courageous leaders.

Gaining moral ascendancy requires that subordinates feel that

their leaders genuinely care for them, that they are fighting for a

worthy cause, and that their sacrifices are not made in vain. Acting
Leading Marines

3-9

as a buffer to protect subordinates is a key responsibility of any

leader. Consider the actions of the Second Division’s Commanding General, during World War I.

One evening in November 1918, Major General Lejeune

overheard one of his watch officers talking on the phone with

higher headquarters. When queried, the watch officer told

General Lejeune that Third Corps gave orders for Second

Division to march the next morning. Knowing that his men

where exhausted, he immediately got on the phone with the

Third Corps staff officer. The staff officer told General

Lejeune that Field Marshal Foch had directed the Second

Division to begin the attack from Stenay, which required the

Division to march 60 kilometers: 40 kilometers to cross the

river at Dun-sur-Meuse and then 20 kilometers to Stenay.

General Lejeune pointed out that the Division could cross at

Pouilly, which would considerably reduce the marching distance. The staff officer countered that the Division could not

cross there because it would require passage through German

lines. General Lejeune then suggested the Division repair the

bridge at Stenay, which would significantly reduce the length

of the movement. The lieutenant colonel from Third Corps

stated that he did not have the authority to change the order.

When General Lejeune said that he would take it up with

someone more senior, the staff officer replied that all the

senior officers were asleep. General Lejeune then replied, “It

is better to wake up one General than to have twenty-five

thousand sick and exhausted men march sixty kilometers, and

I will do so myself.” In the end, Third Corps modified the
MCWP 6-11

3-10

orders and the Division engineers repaired the bridge, saving

many tired Marines and Soldiers unnecessary hardship.6

In another instance, this time in Vietnam, all that stood

between the North Vietnamese Army 308th Division and

Quang Tri Province was the bridge at Dong Ha, defended by

a company of Vietnamese Marines. Realizing that the company would not be able to hold the bridge, the senior American advisor to the 3d ARVN Division (Forward), Lieutenant

Colonel Gerald H. Turley, determined that the bridge had to

be destroyed. The Deputy ARVN Division Commander

would not give permission to destroy the bridge. Lieutenant

Colonel Turley conferred with the VNMC Brigade 258 Commander who had local responsibility. The Brigade Commander said the decision would have to come from I Corps.

Lieutenant Colonel Turley radioed the First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC) G-3 to gain permission. The FRAC

G-3 denied permission and said permission would have to

come from Saigon. Realizing the dire consequences of not

taking action and knowing the career risk he was taking,

Lieutenant Colonel Turley ordered Major James E. Smock,

US Army, and Captain John W. Ripley, USMC, to blow the

bridge. His decision to act prevented a regimental sized armor

force from crossing the river, which blunted the North Vietnamese advance.7

The ancient philosopher Confucius phrased it this way, “To see

what is right and not to do it is want of courage.”8 Moral courage

is a private courage, a form of conscience that can often be an
Leading Marines

3-11

even tougher challenge than physical courage, especially in

peacetime. It serves not only as a foundation of our leadership

philosophy; it is also a challenge that Marine leaders must face

every day. If Marines do not have the moral courage in peacetime

to meet consistently the high standards and expectations of the

Marine Corps, then they are not likely to have the moral courage

to make the difficult decisions that may determine the outcome of

a battle or a campaign. 

The following vignette highlights that moral dilemmas often are

about conflicting loyalties that cause Marines to delay doing the

right thing. As leaders, we must resolve these internal battles

quickly to arrive at the right decision and must not be blinded by

misplaced loyalty. If these dilemmas were easy, it wouldn’t be

called moral courage. 

Note: The following is based on a true story; the names have

been changed to protect privacy.

Sergeant Parilla was a member of an Inspector-Instructor

administrative section along with two other sergeants. One

day, Sergeant Parilla complained to Sergeant Adkins that

Sergeant Vickers had never run a unit diary entry in all of

their time together. Sergeant Adkins replied that it was just

as well, since Sergeant Vickers would probably run illegal

entries on himself. Those remarks seemed odd to Sergeant

Parilla, so he checked the record. He discovered Segeant

Vickers entered basic allowance for housing (BAH) for

San Francisco, CA, in the amount of $2,100 for himself,

which was well over the BAH for their area which was
MCWP 6-11

3-12

$780. Sergeant Vickers also backdated the entry, embezzling $15,840 from the United States Government. 

Upon discovering Sergeant Vicker’s transgression, Sergeant

Parilla told Sergeant Adkins that he would personally confront Sergeant Vickers and tell the First Sergeant. Sergeant

Adkins asked him not to report the false entries, because he

had run falsified diary entries on himself. In fact, Sergeant

Adkins had run family separation allowance on himself and

backdated it two years, defrauding the United States Government of $6,000. Sergeant Parilla confronted the two sergeants. They told him not to worry and that no one would

find out because they were about to get out of the Marine

Corps. When Sergeant Parilla pushed the issue, the two sergeants threatened to kill him and later gave him $2,000 to

keep quiet. He didn’t want the money, but he took it to buy

time to figure out what to do. 

Sergeant Parilla was conflicted. These Marines were his

buddies. They worked as a team, their families shared

meals, and they often went hunting together. They shared

tough times, to include conducting more than 100 funerals.

They looked out for each other. Sergeant Adkins had a wife

and a 1-week-old baby. Sergeant Vickers had a wife and two

children. Growing up, Sergeant Parilla learned not to “rat

out” his buddies. He wrestled with what he should do. He

knew what the two Marines had done was wrong. If he did

nothing, the theft would likely remain undetected. If he told

his chain of command, then two wives and three children

would suffer and his fellow Marines would think he was
Leading Marines

3-13

disloyal. He talked through these conflicting thoughts with

his wife. Sergeant Parilla decided he needed to report the

crimes, so he went for a drive to collect his thoughts and figure out how to tell his command. 

In the meantime, his wife, concerned for her family’s safety,

called the training chief, Master Sergeant Powers, who immediately phoned Sergeant Parilla to confirm the facts. Together,

they determined that calling the Naval Criminal Investigative

Service was the best course of action. Agents arrested the two

sergeants who were later court-martialed and sent to the brig.

In the end, Sergeant Parilla realized that his loyalty belonged

with the Marine Corps and his unit. By stealing, Sergeants

Adkins and Vickers were the ones being disloyal.

PHYSICAL CHALLENGE

The physical demands of battle encompass more than being fit

and these demands influence both the leader and the led. The

effects of sleep deprivation, poor diet, poor hygiene, and, most

importantly, fear have to be understood and must be a part of

training. No one is immune to fatigue. As Marines become

increasingly tired, they often lose the ability to make sound,

rapid decisions and are susceptible to being confused, disoriented, and ultimately ineffective. Guts, pride, and energy drinks

are not substitutes for fitness. A leader must be fit to concentrate

fully on the mission or task at hand.
MCWP 6-11

3-14

The exact limits of endurance cannot be determined,

but physical conditioning is

one method of reducing the

effects of fatigue, increasing

self-confidence, and reducing stress. The physical

development of Marine leaders must include dealing with

the natural fear of violence,

which contributes significantly to the fog and friction

of combat. Units, and unit

leaders, that do not have the

mental and physical strength

to overcome fear will not be

able to fight effectively and

overcome friction. Captain

John Ripley’s actions at

Dong Ha vividly depict the

physical demands sometimes placed on individuals.

As you may recall from the moral challenge vignette, as the

North Vietnamese 308th Division pressed its attack south, Lieutenant Colonel Turley ordered Captain Ripley and Major Smock

to blow the bridge at Dong Ha. Captain Ripley determined that

500 pounds of explosives would have to be placed under the girders of the bridge. A chain link fence, topped with German steel

tape, surrounded the base of the bridge. The two Americans

Captain John Ripley’s heroic action at the

bridge at Dong Ha. (Photo courtesy of

David Burnett/Contact Press Images.)
Leading Marines

3-15

quickly devised a plan. Captain Ripley would climb over the

fence and emplace the explosives that Major Smock passed to

him. Emplacing the explosives required Captain Ripley to handwalk along the beams, exposing his dangling body to the enemy.

For 2 hours, in the face of enemy small arms and tank fire, he set

the charges. Finally, using the battery from a destroyed jeep, Captain Ripley detonated the charges, destroyed the bridge, and

stopped the enemy armor in its tracks.9 Captain Ripley’s superb

physical conditioning allowed him to pull off this amazing feat.

First Lieutenant Kenneth A. Conover, during 6 days of intense

combat in Afghanistan, demonstrated the physical stamina

required of leaders under stress. 

On 22 June 2012, First Lieutenant Conover led 1st Platoon,

Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines on a night air assault

into the enemy stronghold of Qaleh Ye Gaz, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. As the platoon established its patrol base,

the enemy attacked with medium machine gun fire, automatic rifle fire, and 10 rounds of 82-mm mortars. During the

engagement, a mortar round landed 15 feet from First Lieutenant Conover. Luckily, the soft earth absorbed most of the

blast. For the next 6 days, multiple waves of fanatical enemy

fighters attacked the platoon. Within the first 2 days, First

Lieutenant Conover led his platoon through the loss of two

Marines, the serious wounding of another one, and the evacuation under fire of all three. He continued to lead his

Marines through 23 direct fire engagements, 1 grenade

attack, 2 indirect fire attacks, and 10 enemy attempts to

overrun his position. In relentless pursuit of the enemy, he
MCWP 6-11

3-16

directed the employment of 38 tank main gun rounds, 4 artillery rocket strikes, 4 close air support strikes, 5 AT-4 rockets, and 2 anti-personnel obstacle breaching systems. His

efforts resulted in clearing 2 square kilometers of enemy

fighters and the capture of a high-value Taliban leader along

with two other fighters.10

Not every Marine will face the same physical challenge as Captain Ripley nor will every Marine lead a platoon in combat like

First Lieutenant Conover, but some will. Marine leaders understand this and work continuously to condition the Marines under

their charge so that they overcome the physical challenges presented to them. A critical responsibility of every leader “is to

ensure that members of his or her command have every survival

First Lieutenant Kenneth Conover on patrol in Afghanistan.
Leading Marines

3-17

edge that can be provided. If people lack the coordinated

response that comes only from long, varied and rigorous exercise,

they will lack cohesion in action, have much higher combat

losses and uselessly expend much of their initial velocity. . . . The

gain in moral force deriving from all forms of physical training is

an unconscious gain. Will power, determination, mental poise and

muscle control all march hand in hand with the general health and

well-being of the individual.”11

ADAPTABILITY

Adaptability has long been our key to overcoming challenges.

Although it is synonymous with flexibility, adaptability also

embraces the spirit of innovation. Marines constantly seek to adapt

new tactics, organization, and procedures to the realities of the

environment. Marines identify deficiencies in existing practices,

discard outdated structure, and make modifications to maintain

function and utility. The ability to adapt enables Marines to be

comfortable within an environment dominated by friction. Experience, common sense, and the critical application of judgment all

help Marine leaders persevere.

Marines have long known how to adapt and overcome: 30 December 1927, a Marine patrol near Quilali, Nicaragua, engaged a large

Sandinista force and suffered heavy casualties. The patrol was in

desperate need of supplies and 18 Marines required medical evacuation. Marine pilots airdropped the equipment that was needed to
MCWP 6-11

3-18

clear a 500-foot-long makeshift

airstrip. Between 6 and 8 January 1928, First Lieutenant

Christian F. Schilt risked his

life to make 10 flights onto the

airstrip in the besieged town

carrying in a replacement commander and critical medical

supplies. He also evacuated

the 18 wounded Marines by

strapping them to the wings in

order to fly them out. His feat

is even more incredible since

the Vought O2U biplane had no brakes, which required Marines to

arrest it by grabbing onto the wings and dragging the aircraft to a

stop as soon as it touched down.12

Another example of innovation born out of the need to adapt was

the use of Navajo Code Talkers. In the days before portable, tactical cryptographic devices, radio operators either had to transmit

messages unencrypted risking enemy interception or laboriously

encode, transmit, and decode messages. During World War I and

after Pearl Harbor, the Army made limited use of Choctaw and

Comanche speakers to transmit messages. Always on the lookout

for innovative ideas, the Marine Corps followed the Army program

with great interest. After a successful proof of concept, the Marine

Corps enlisted 29 Navajo men for service as communicators. In

keeping with Marine tradition, Commandant Thomas Holcomb

insisted that the recruits receive the same basic training as other

First Lieutenant Christian Schilt.
Leading Marines

3-19

Marines. In other words,

they were Marines first

and specialists second. It

turned out that the cryptographic solution was not

as simple as speaking

Navajo on the radio. The

Navajo language didn’t

have an alphabet or words

for military terms. The

task of creating an alphabet and code words for

military terminology fell

on the new Marines. In

the end, they created a

code in their native language that reduced the time required to encode, transmit, and

decode messages from 4 hours to about 2 minutes. As a result, the

Navajo Code Talkers were combat multipliers in every campaign in

the South Pacific, from Guadalcanal to Okinawa.13

Many years later, as Marine forces began to expand their lodgment

during Operation Desert Shield, one of the greatest concerns was

overland transportation. Faced with an acute shortage of trucks and

other vehicles, Marine logisticians applied an unconventional

approach to motor transportation. In addition to receiving 246

trucks from the Army, the Marines began leasing as many civilian

vehicles as they could. In the end, they obtained 1,414 assorted

trucks, which included 50 colorfully decorated 10-ton lorries

Privates First Class Preston Toledo and

Frank Toledo, Navajo Code Talkers,

attached to a Marine artillery regiment in

the South Pacific.
MCWP 6-11

3-20

that the Marines dubbed “circus trucks.” Additionally, the

Marines used 214 commercial

buses and 465 sport utility vehicles to transport personnel.14

Adaptation happens most frequently at the small unit level.

During early August of 2010,

Company L, 3d Battalion, 1st

Marines attacked to clear the

Taliban stronghold of Safar

Bazaar in the Garmsir District

of Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The Taliban who defended the bazaar saturated the

area with IEDs. The lightweight, compact metal detector soon proved utterly useless

against nonmetallic IEDs.

Prior to the execution of the operation, the company came up

with multiple nonstandard solutions to clearing the bazaar, one of

which was water hoses. Safar Bazaar was conveniently located on

a canal off the Helmand River so a nearly unlimited supply of

water was available. The S-4 procured water pumps and hoses. It

took 2 weeks to completely clear the bazaar using multiple

kinetic and nonkinetic techniques, each complementing the other:

line charges, Holley sticks (a field expedient stick and hook

devised by Gunnery Sergeant Floyd Holley), and water hoses.

“Circus Truck” pressed into service

during Operation Desert Storm.