About the Report

This report is based on two group meetings and over twenty 

individual interviews with current and former envoys and 

other officials and on their memoirs and published reflections. 

We consulted envoys who had addressed conflicts involving 

Northern Ireland, the Balkans, North Korea, the Middle East, 

Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan/South Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 

and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Literature review 

also covered other situations, including Mozambique, Angola, 

and Sri Lanka. Most interviews were with Americans, although 

UN, European Union, UK, Norwegian, and Chinese envoys 

provided further insights. We also drew on an earlier United 

States Institute of Peace (USIP) study of the use of special 

envoys and other studies of this diplomatic practice. 

About the Authors

Princeton N. Lyman spent forty years in the US diplomatic 

service. Appointments included deputy assistant secretary of 

state for African Affairs, ambassador to Nigeria, director of 

the Bureau for Population and Refugee Affairs, ambassador 

to South Africa, assistant secretary of state for International 

Organization Affairs, and presidential special envoy for 

Sudan and South Sudan. He is currently senior adviser to the 

president of USIP. Robert M. Beecroft is a career ministercounselor (retired) in the US Foreign Service, with posts 

across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and an American 

Academy of Diplomacy member. In 2011, he conducted an 

in-depth report for the American Academy of Diplomacy on the 

professional education and training of American diplomats. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 353 October 2014

© 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 1

SE/SRs: An Ongoing Practice (and Debate) 2

Purpose, Empowerment, and Policy Authority 4

Dealing with “Unfavorables” 7

Structure (and Turf Battles) 10

Outreach 12

Conclusion 14

Policy Recommendations 14

Princeton N. Lyman and Robert M. Beecroft

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Summary

• Special envoys or representatives (SE/SRs) have been used by nearly every administration 

to address high-stakes conflicts. They are most useful when a conflict situation is of major 

importance to the United States, has strong regional as well as bilateral aspects, and 

exceeds the State Department’s capacity to address it.

• To be effective, an SE/SR must be recognizably empowered by the president and the 

secretary of state, have clear mandates, and enjoy a degree of latitude beyond normal 

bureaucratic restrictions.

• While the secretary of state needs to be actively engaged in the conflict resolution process, 

the envoy should be sufficiently empowered to ensure that the secretary’s interventions 

are strategic.

• Chemistry matters: in minimizing tensions between the SE/SR and the relevant State 

Department regional bureau and with ambassadors in the field, in overcoming StateWhite House rivalries over policy control, and in mobilizing support of allies. There are no 

“cookie cutter” solutions to overlapping responsibilities and the envoy’s need for staff and 

resources; rather, mutual respect and flexibility are key.

• Senior State Department officials have the required skills for assignments as SE/SRs. 

Enhancing the department’s resources and reinforcing the ranks of senior department positions would increase such appointments and the department’s capacity to support them.

Introduction

An SE/SR for conflict zones is a unique tool in the foreign policy toolbox, and one that must 

be better understood if it is to be effectively applied against the range of security challenges 

the United States faces today. Most often, SE/SRs are designated as representing either the 

Using Special Envoys 

In High-Stakes Conflict 

Diplomacy
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353

president or the secretary of state. They come from varied backgrounds: retired ambassadors, politicians, military leaders, and regional experts. SE/SRs are asked to address situations with a degree of attention outside the capacity of the State Department and other 

regular bureaucratic structures. While SE/SRs are also designated for other purposes, such as 

climate change negotiations or outreach to the Islamic community, this report focuses on 

those addressing conflicts. Conflict situations are distinctive in their demands and urgency 

(e.g., where large-scale violence and humanitarian crises are occurring or, as in the Middle 

East, where long-standing conflicts pose a continuing threat to national security).

The decision to appoint an SE/SR often comes in response to congressional and public 

demands for special attention to a particular crisis rather than as an element of the State 

Department’s existing diplomatic activities. Not surprisingly, the selection of SE/SRs for 

conflict situations can attract attention and sometimes controversy. Their use poses particular challenges inside the State Department, where crisis management and crisis resolution are integral to the daily work of existing structures and leadership.

The use of SE/SRs will nevertheless very likely continue under future presidents and administrations. Historically, efforts to phase them out in order to signal policy shifts from one 

administration to another give way, over time, to the reality of these envoys’ usefulness, both 

domestically and internationally. Their flexibility (in mandate, bureaucratic structures, resource/

staffing, and timing) can make them an appealing mechanism for an executive or legislative 

branch wishing to signal enhanced attention to a conflict or issue. And even then, there is debate 

around when to deploy SE/SRs and toward what type of objective, how to empower them, and 

what sort of person is best suited for these special diplomatic missions. The objective of this 

report is to address these issues and make the use of SE/SRs most effective.

SE/SRs: An Ongoing Practice (and Debate)

Arguments for and against the use of special envoys have not changed much over the years. 

SE/SRs have several fundamental advantages. They can

• represent directly the views of the president or secretary in unconventional 

situations;

• convey a high level of US interest;

• overcome bureaucratic constraints to mobilize and deploy various elements of US 

power and influence;

• address regional and international aspects of a conflict beyond the reach of any 

one ambassador or regional assistant secretary;

• provide more intense focus on a given issue than an assistant secretary or 

regional bureau can afford;

• in certain circumstances, engage in diplomacy with enemies or other 

“unfavorables” where formal diplomatic contact would be inappropriate; and

• reassure Congress and the public that an issue important to either of these 

constituencies is being adequately addressed.

Opponents of SE/SRs see them as

• undercutting and disempowering the State Department, which should be 

structured and staffed more fully for this purpose;

• unduly increasing the number of senior officials reporting directly to the president 

or secretary;

• responding symbolically to congressional or public pressure rather than 

representing the administration’s serious commitment to address a challenge;

• introducing outsiders with little knowledge of the situation, who are insufficiently 

sensitive to its wider implications;

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, 

Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. 

Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, 

University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, 

School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center 

for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV 

• Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John 

A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council 

on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, 

Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

 • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • 

Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Chuck Hagel, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; 

President, National Defense University
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353 3

• aggravating State-White House rivalry over policy control;

• placing a special interest above other important elements in a bilateral or 

multilateral relationship; and

• creating a freelancing bureaucratic structure that competes with the responsibilities 

of other government entities.1

Some political appointees agree that SE/SRs have been overused but are right and necessary in some cases. In this view, such appointees should be limited to matters of significant 

presidential concern and should report directly to the president. One former senior White 

House official argued that the White House must set policy in these especially important or 

sensitive cases, with the envoy speaking thereafter for the president, since the department 

cannot assume this responsibility.

From another point of view, it is worth noting that in two prominent conflict situations 

that might have merited the appointment of an SE/SR—the three-year conflict in BosniaHerzegovina, brought to an end by the Dayton Peace Accords, and the complex ending of 

South African control of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola—the 

intense and ultimately successful US diplomacy was directed by the regional assistant secretaries.2 And several SE/SRs have been retired ambassadors—a recognition of the skills of 

the career service. Despite these examples, some see reliance on SE/SRs as a reflection of 

the department’s dysfunctional structure. As one respondent said, “You want to cut down 

the number of special envoys? Strengthen the assistant secretaries.” Another experienced 

diplomat saw a need for the department to establish undersecretaries with broad regional 

responsibilities akin to the regional authority of US military commanders. This would address 

the department’s limitations when addressing conflicts with broad regional reach, especially 

where close coordination with the Department of Defense and other agencies is required.

This debate will surely continue, but the reality is that administrations have made 

frequent use of special envoys in the past and will almost surely continue doing so in the 

future. This practice has been true even amid policy pronouncements about limiting them. 

For example, George W. Bush’s administration announced in its first year that it would 

eschew the use of special envoys. Half of those established under the Clinton administration were abolished. But by the end of Bush’s second administration, the number of such 

positions had ballooned to the same number as under Clinton. Despite frequent commentary 

that the Obama administration had “restored” the practice, the numbers of such positions 

under Obama and at the end of the preceding administration are roughly the same, suggesting that the practice transcends partisan lines.

Obviously, administrations find the practice useful or at least politically desirable. In 

nearly every case we examined, over several administrations, the impetus to appoint an 

SE/SR was a combination of congressional pressure and the administration’s readiness 

to give the matter higher-level attention. Sometimes, the decision originated with the 

president’s personal interest in an issue. The decision whether to make the appointment 

presidential, by the secretary, or, in some cases, from within the regional bureau varied 

with the intensity of both pressure and interest. These pressures and responses will 

undoubtedly continue.

The priority should be to make the practice as effective as possible. Special envoys can 

continue to be a valuable diplomatic lever. This report focuses on their use in conflicts 

because such appointments share a number of special characteristics and challenges, 

respond to matters of urgency and loss of life, and are most often presidential. This narrowed focus enables us to identify specific commonalities and recommend constructs for 

those situations. Nevertheless, some of our recommendations would also pertain to these 

other categories. 
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353

Purpose, Empowerment, and Policy Authority

The mandate. Several interviewees stressed the need to define in detail the focus and purpose 

of the US role when planning to establish an SE/SR. One interviewee advised that envoys are 

needed precisely because focus is needed in a complex situation with many moving parts. 

What is the US interest? Is the focus the conflict per se, or are deeper problems within countries at the root of the conflict? Is the US role one of mediation or facilitation? Will it lead to 

a broader multilateral effort? Once these questions are answered, the SE/SR and ambassadors 

in the field should, in the words of experienced envoy Daniel Kurtzer, “be empowered to act 

flexibly, creatively, and boldly.” 3

Developing an SE/SR’s mandate can also be a valuable process for revealing and resolving 

serious policy differences that may exist within the administration. A mandate that covers up 

policy differences only hamstrings the SE/SR’s efforts. We found several cases where acting 

to resolve policy differences inside the administration was one of the SE/SR’s more valuable 

contributions, whereas failure to do so undercut the mission. In one case, the SE/SR found 

that key policymakers in Washington had already picked the “winners” in the conflict he was 

assigned to and resisted his efforts to widen the dialogue. In the end, the putative winners 

proved to be a liability rather than an asset. In another case, an SE/SR dealing with security 

arrangements found himself undercut by a senior National Security Council (NSC) staff member 

who had policy objectives inconsistent with the security initiative.

Even when policy is agreed upon, defining the scope of an SE/SR’s mandate is not always 

easy. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) James Dobbins argued, while 

serving in another capacity, that a peacekeeping operation should be judged not by whether 

the country’s underlying problems are solved but by the degree to which political, ethnic, or 

other rivalries are channeled into political processes rather than into violence. The countries 

in question may at this point still be poor, undemocratic, or otherwise troubled, but dealing 

with such challenges is the province of other processes.

Other cases of relatively narrow mandates proved effective. Daniel Serwer served in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina under Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke as the special envoy for the 

Muslim-Croat Federation. Serwer felt he was successful in part because his mandate was narrow, 

consisting of working with Bosnia’s Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats to create a viable political 

entity. He was not caught up in broader (and sometimes competing) aspects of US policy in 

resolving the Balkan conflict. Under Holbrooke’s “protection,” he had latitude to act quite 

freely within his mandate.4

Defining the mandate narrowly may nevertheless be difficult where there are multiple 

sources of actual and potential conflict even after a peace agreement has been reached. The 

underlying problems of governance and tribal or religious discrimination often reignite conflict 

and may require attention as intensive and sustained as that needed to end the violence. By the 

spring of 2013, the United States could look back at a successful multiyear effort to implement 

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan, which had involved no fewer than six SE/

SRs. South Sudan had emerged peacefully as a new state in 2011, and by early 2013 the major 

issues between the two countries had largely been settled. But less than a year later, South 

Sudan’s fragile political system collapsed and the country fell into civil war, with not only the 

peace with Sudan but the stability of the entire region threatened. South Sudan’s internal weaknesses were clearly a continuing threat to peace and needed much greater focus. In the current 

situation, the SE/SR’s role has been revitalized as part of a complex regional mediation effort.

An excessively narrow mandate can have other downsides. In one case, a senior diplomat 

was offered an SE/SR position with responsibility for working with only one party in the 

conflict. Such a situation would have been not only limiting but almost surely a potential 

source of conflicting agendas within the administration. He turned it down.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353 5

Richard Haass cautions that an envoy assigned to pursue only one facet of the US relationship with a country or region can have an impact on other US equities. “Double-hatting”—

combining the designation of SE/SR with related responsibilities within the department—is 

one way to avoid this. Haass, for example, served as special envoy for Cyprus in 1983-85 and 

was given wide leeway and authority. But he was also in charge of Greece’s and Turkey’s bilateral relations with the United States, as well as policy planning with Europe and US-European 

cooperation beyond the continent, for the State Department’s European Bureau. Though 

congressional opinion ran heavily in favor of the Greek side in the Cyprus crisis, other equities 

were involved. US-Greek bilateral relations were strained, while relations with Turkey were more 

favorable. EU interests were also important in the equation. An envoy dealing with the Cyprus 

situation alone would not have been empowered to draw on multiple levers of influence and, 

hence, would not have served US policy as effectively.

Mandates can atrophy. Use of SE/SRs, especially in protracted situations, can sour over time 

when there are no new initiatives or other steps to revitalize the mission. When the seventh 

consecutive SE/SR was appointed to Sudan and South Sudan in 2013, the Sudanese government objected. It linked the SE/SR’s role to issues between Sudan and South Sudan, which 

Sudan considered no longer relevant after South Sudan’s independence and the settling of 

most issues between them. Moreover, previous envoys had not delivered what Sudan wanted 

most from the United States: the lifting of sanctions and removal of Sudan from the list of 

state sponsors of terrorism. Sudan preferred a fully accredited ambassador. Similar problems 

have arisen concerning SE/SRs for the Middle East. In some cases, the appointment of an SE/

SR, especially when below presidential level, makes foreign government officials question 

whether the appointment signifies increased US attention or a diversion.

In summary, objectives and scope need to be determined carefully at the outset, examined 

regularly in light of the situation, adapted to reflect changing US priorities, and reassessed 

when they seem to be losing credibility. But before ending the appointment, it is better not to 

rush judgment. Peace processes ripen slowly and are susceptible to sharp reversals.

Empowerment. Authority comes first from empowerment. Foreign governments (and, 

indeed, many people within the USG) are keen to gauge whether an SE/SR is truly important. 

The SE/SR title can convey some of this authority, but not all envoys are empowered purely by 

the title. Direct access to the president is one sign that foreign governments look for, manifest 

through the SE/SR’s being able to speak on the president’s behalf, the SE/SR’s presence at 

relevant meetings between the president and foreign officials, and presidential statements 

on the conflict that emphasize the SE/SR’s role. Regional and country experience is a factor. A 

positive reputation in the region can also be empowering.5

Several envoys told us that being seen as the president’s envoy made a difference in 

their work. Special Envoy to the Sudan John Danforth felt that he spoke for the president. 

A department official who worked closely with Danforth commented that when he arrived 

at a negotiation, he had the “presence” of a presidential envoy and knew how to use it.

Failure to empower undercuts an envoy and works against the interests of the policy. 

In one case, the secretary of state, accompanied by a newly appointed SE/SR, was having 

a first meeting with the foreign minister of a country. The secretary began by inviting the 

foreign minister to step into another room for a one-on-one chat, leaving the SE/SR outside. 

It was deadly to the SE/SR’s future efficacy. The SE/SR never gained sufficient attention 

or credibility with that government, whose foreign minister saw himself as having a direct 

relationship with the secretary.

Symbolic gestures are important, but in the end, empowerment comes from the commitment and direct engagement of the president or secretary of state. Aaron Miller, with 

years of engagement in Middle East diplomacy, argues that envoys are necessary but not 

Foreign governments are keen to 

gauge whether an SE/SR is truly 

important. Direct access to the 

president is one sign that foreign 

governments look for.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353

sufficient without the secretary’s direct engagement. The secretary of state must become 

“the repository of the confidences of the parties.” A balance must be struck, however. The 

secretary must retain an appropriate distance and detachment to avoid being taken for 

granted. In Miller’s words, the secretary must retain the “mystique and authority” required 

for key negotiations. To protect that distance while keeping a full-time connection to the 

parties is the task of a senior envoy reporting directly to the secretary. The secretary, in turn, 

must have the full confidence of the White House.6

There are good examples of timely high-level support backing the work of an SE/SR. 

Secretary Clinton clinched the agreement with the Government of Sudan for an all-Ethiopian peacekeeping force to be sent to Sudan’s disputed Abyei region, ending a dangerous 

standoff. She later secured the agreement of South Sudanese president Salva Kiir to an oil 

agreement with Sudan, ending a yearlong shutdown of South Sudan’s oil production. More 

recently, Secretary Kerry worked out an agreement between Afghanistan’s two presidential 

election rivals on how to address charges of election rigging.

Of course, Miller, Kurtzer, and others are talking of crisis situations that demand attention from the highest levels of the US government (USG) and from senior-level SE/SRs (e.g., 

for the Middle East, Afghanistan, Sudan). It is important to note other successful efforts at 

lower levels of presidential or secretarial engagement. Ambassador Howard Jeter, with little 

support from the department and backed primarily by the NSC senior adviser on Africa, succeeded in engaging the West African heads of state, in particular the leader of Nigeria, in 

bringing an end to the terrible civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Envoys appointed at lower levels are often the administration’s or the bureau’s way to deflect 

congressional pressure for high-level “special envoys” outside bureau control. In both the Bush 

and Obama administrations, partly with this in mind, bureau-level envoys were designated to 

deal with the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the surrounding 

Great Lakes region. But these appointees, though dedicated and hardworking and with strong 

support from their assistant secretaries, were not empowered to have the needed impact. More 

than five million people have died in the DRC’s wars, and a horrendous level of sexual violence 

has elicited the direct concern of Secretary Clinton. But Ambassador Barrie Walkley, appointed 

in 2012, as a part-time envoy living in California, could not play a serious role in policy formulation, found some of the field ambassadors fiercely resistant to his role, and only partly assuaged 

congressional concern. In 2014, Senator Russ Feingold was appointed as a full-time presidential 

SE/SR for the African Great Lakes, giving this situation higher-level focus.

Policy Authority. Most SE/SRs interviewed felt that they had a role in policy formulation. 

But the roles varied. Some were clearly the leading voice in policy formulation, advancing those 

policies within the US government and mobilizing resources behind them. They were given 

considerable leeway. Others were more restrained, participating in the policy process but not 

leading it substantively or bureaucratically. Sometimes, the difference concerned the SE/SR’s 

seniority and authority; other times, it reflected the SE/SR’s own perceptions of his or her role.

A problem arises when serious policy differences are not resolved. Usually, NSC staff act 

as mediators on policy issues through various interagency groups and subgroups. When the 

NSC structure or personnel cannot forge consensus, the vacuum creates a feeding frenzy as 

interested players throughout the bureaucracy compete for input into the policy. The result 

is endless meetings, papers, and inconclusive debates. Such situations also contribute to 

State-White House rivalry over policy direction. Even without major policy differences, peace 

processes can stall if bureaucratic consensus remains low, allowing for no new thinking or 

initiatives. Such problems have arisen over time regarding Rwanda’s role in the peace process 

in the DRC, negotiating with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and defining a path to normalization 

of relations with Sudan.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353 7

This is where leadership from the SE/SR is most valuable. We have found cases where SE/

SRs were skillful and credible in achieving an agreed policy or even producing agreement on 

bold policy initiatives. Examples include SE Dennis Ross’s ability to keep Israel-PLO negotiations alive amid repeated security crises and SE Feingold’s role in ending a rebellion in 

eastern DRC and obtaining agreement on principles for regional cooperation.

We also found cases where the system failed. Sudan is an example. In the summer of 

2010, a paralyzing difference over policy existed within the USG. The problems in this case 

derived early on from the lack of agreement on policy when the SE/SR was selected and from 

the absence of assurances that the right chemistry and trust would exist between the SE/

SR and key policymakers. When the SE/SR tried to stake out one position, he was opposed 

at high levels within the administration and by outside advocacy groups. Only when NSC 

Deputy Director Denis McDonough, at the president’s behest, presided over a long, intensive, 

and sometimes contentious process of hammering out an agreed position were the differences resolved and a “road map” for normalizing relations with Sudan approved. Sudan is not 

the only instance of personality-charged challenges: Differences within the Obama administration over Middle East diplomacy appear to have led to George Mitchell’s resignation as 

envoy in May 2011. “Later reports suggest there was tense discord at the time within the 

administration, including deep divisions between Mitchell and [Dennis] Ross.”7

To lead, the SE/SR must have earned and must continue to display the skills of building 

consensus and trust with US colleagues, important public constituencies, and counterparts 

abroad. These criteria must go into the SE/SR’s initial selection. Then the SE/SR’s authority 

must be consistently supported by the president and the secretary. Policy, chemistry, leadership, and collaboration are all critical elements in the success of an SE/SR.

Dealing with “Unfavorables”

One potential advantage sometimes ascribed to SE/SRs is that they can be allowed a degree of 

leeway in dealing with foreign individuals or groups that are considered war criminals, “rogues,” 

or terrorists, if such contact is valuable in resolving the conflict. Because SE/SRs may at times 

operate outside normal diplomatic channels, this contact could be considered exceptional or 

even irregular. These actions do not confer any formal recognition of such groups or individuals 

or provide assurance that regular diplomatic contacts might be established in the future, but 

to ignore the roles these actors can play in conflict resolution would be counterproductive.

Not everyone agrees that dealing with “unfavorables” is desirable. One former senior 

official argued that since the SE/SR speaks for the president, she or he should not engage 

in outreach inconsistent with the president’s policy regarding such people. Others suggest 

caution. Engagement could, in some cases, undermine rather than advance the SE/SR’s 

objectives. Although General James Jones had no official restrictions placed on outreach 

when he was developing security arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza, he determined 

that engagement with Hamas while serving as envoy would subvert his efforts to empower 

the Abbas regime as the sole Palestinian political interlocutor. The SE/SR should have good 

reason, with the risks carefully assessed, before contacting unfavorables.

The arguments for and against such contacts are fairly obvious. In favor: To end a conflict 

with an outcome that does not demand total victory of one side over the other, one must 

deal with those who are fighting. Put bluntly by one CIA officer in Mitchell Reiss’s book 

Negotiating with Evil, “Everyone has blood on their hands, if they matter. If you want to talk 

to people without blood on their hands, then they don’t matter.” 8 Haass, addressing the 

situation in Northern Ireland, made a distinction between current and former terrorists: “I 

wasn’t going to meet with terrorists any way. Ex-terrorists, sure. A lot of my career is in the 

To lead, the SE/SR must have 

earned and must continue to 

display the skills of building 

consensus and trust with 

US colleagues, important 

public constituencies, and 

counterparts abroad.
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353

‘dialogue with former terrorists’ business. I’m okay with that.” 9 There can be more nuanced 

reasons for such contacts: to understand the nature and objectives of the organization in 

question, to make clear the principles on which the peace process can proceed, to encourage 

those more willing to compromise, and, when the prospects for serious negotiations are real, 

to help move the peace process forward. These were among the points in Marc Grossman’s 

case for being willing to talk to the Taliban.10 As James Dobbins points out, understanding 

the people involved in the conflict matters; to be successful, an envoy needs to know “how 

they see the world...their visions, views, and concerns.” 11

At the same time, the risks are real. Such contacts can appear to confer legitimacy on an 

unsavory individual or group, can be used to embarrass the US government or allies, or can 

lead negotiators down false paths with people unable to deliver on their promises.

Reiss proposes some guidelines for maintaining the integrity of such contacts, including full 

transparency and a serious assessment of the risks such talks pose within the USG, red lines 

or principles that must not be compromised, good intelligence about the interlocutors and 

the local situation, and recognition that the results of such outreach may be slow in coming. 

“Patience,” he advises, “is more than a virtue.” Grossman laid out clear principles to the Taliban 

that would guide further negotiations with them. It was evident then, and remains so now, 

that such principled peace arrangements in Afghanistan may still be years ahead.

Even with all these precautions, the risks are still significant when such talks reach the 

political level. Reiss, again speaking more specifically of terrorists but with relevance to 

other unfavorables, notes, “Once the government publicly announces a negotiation, the 

negative aspects of talking are almost always booked immediately. And because no one 

knows at the start if the talks will ultimately be successful, any future benefits are unrealized gains. The government is betting that the benefits will outweigh the liabilities, but the 

full and accurate accounting may not be possible for many years. In the meantime, it has to 

reassure the public that the risks are worth taking.” 12

Valuable as they are, these guidelines are not necessarily applicable in cases where circumstances may demand greater flexibility.

SE/SRs and other high-level officials have responded to individual situations accordingly, 

making judgments on the basis of the particular situation. These included Mitchell’s and Haass’s 

contacts with the IRA/Sinn Fein, a US ambassador’s contacts in Iraq with Iran about regional 

security issues, Grossman’s outreach to the Taliban, Princeton Lyman’s meetings with Sudanese 

civilian and military officials who have histories of brutality, and other less publicized contacts. In most (but not all) cases, such contacts were approved by the NSC and in line with an 

agreed policy. Where red lines were not sharply drawn, several SE/SRs did not feel constrained 

and could make necessary decisions largely on their own. Those dealing with the Balkans have 

worked with a great number of unsavory characters, later indicted by the International Criminal 

Court (ICC), who were nevertheless key to the peace process. In these cases, the SE/SR saw it 

as a priority to bring the people—even the “bad” people, as one former envoy bluntly put it—

together. As a US ambassador who was appointed as an administrator in the Balkans said, the 

envoy in these instances is not employed to “act a judge” about his or her contacts’ previous 

misdeeds but rather to reach a peaceful resolution, consistent with US interests, to an ongoing 

conflict. Justice often, as in the Balkans, comes later.

The choices are more difficult where red lines have been drawn. Sudan offers one such 

example. The United States takes the position that it will not have direct diplomatic contact 

with those indicted by the ICC. Sudan’s president Omar Al-Bashir has been indicted on counts 

of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This limitation reduced the US role 

from leadership, as in negotiations over the 2005 CPA, to support for the African Union’s 

mediation. Currently, the United States must rely on others to convey its positions to, and 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353 9

exert leverage with, the leader of Sudan. There was periodic frustration in the White House 

over the pace of negotiations under the African Union mediation, but it was impossible for 

the United States to reassert a leadership role without being allowed to talk to one of the 

key decision makers (i.e., the president of Sudan).

Lyman, when assuming the position of SE/SR for Sudan in 2011, reserved the right to seek 

an exception to this limitation from the NSC if he deemed it essential to getting an overall 

peace agreement, but he never reached that point. The prospects of success from such contacts never outweighed the risks of the meeting going bad. Potential fallout included US 

embarrassment by a public rejection of our approach and Sudan’s trumpeting a US “retreat” 

from our principles regarding the ICC. Nevertheless, Lyman believed that if the calculations 

were to change, the SE/SR would be the right person to have such a meeting, reinforcing 

that the purpose of the meeting concerns the urgency of peace and does not involve other 

issues or change our position on principles of accountability.

With lower-level contacts, an argument can be made for allowing SE/SRs greater leeway. 

One SE/SR believed that only through contacts with persons not approved by Washington 

was he able to travel to conflict-related areas. In one instance, it enabled him to broker a 

key part of a peace agreement. In these cases, the meetings did not become known publicly, were not authorized (giving Washington deniability), and were productive. The SE/SR 

also felt that had he sought approval from Washington when these opportunities arose, the 

debate would have been so long-drawn-out that the opportunities would have been lost. 

The SE/SR in this case chose to assume the risks, accepting the possible outcome that if the 

meetings became a public embarrassment or caused the United States other difficulties, the 

SE/SR would bear the responsibility. Indeed, in one of these instances, the SE/SR kept the 

meeting hidden from his staff to avoid compromising them should it go bad.

Good SE/SRs must be allowed some discretion for making such decisions and should be 

backed up when they do. Being too constrained in interactions undermines the very value of 

having an SE/SR. But that leeway, and the risks involved, should be discussed as part of the 

SE/SR’s mandate, as well as in assessing the qualifications, skills, and judgment of the SE/

SR being selected. And an SE/SR must be prepared to take the risks associated with making 

those decisions and understand the consequences of judging badly.

Aside from dealings with terrorists or other “unfavorables,” viewing the SE/SR as the 

appropriate person to separate America’s peace objectives from other objectives can have 

wider implications. The United States frequently has multiple—and sometimes conflicting—objectives in a region or with a particular country. Separating the various messages 

can move the peace process, especially where regional peace processes compete with bilateral issues. There are instances where the SE/SR has been able to play exactly this role. 

Ambassador Jeter engaged with Nigeria’s dictator, Sani Abacha, with a view to maintaining 

Nigerian peacekeepers’ presence in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Jeter and the administration 

correctly perceived Abacha as a key actor in ending this conflict, but he was also a particularly harsh and corrupt leader who had virtually shut down engagement with the resident US 

ambassador and had spurned US efforts to engage bilaterally, including on Nigeria’s human 

rights situation. Confining his discussion with Abacha to the regional peace processes 

enabled Jeter to get agreement for Nigerian peacekeepers in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and—

though only a small victory—made possible some of the rare meetings between Abacha and 

the bilateral US ambassador, who always accompanied Jeter. But during these meetings, no 

separate bilateral matters were discussed, by mutual consent.

Haass’s admonition that an SE/SR’s mandate should be within the context of overall US 

policy in the region is relevant here. Washington has to decide when such compromises or 

competing messages are justified. The United States had such a debate before asking Ethio-
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353

pia to contribute peacekeepers for a contested and unsettled region in Sudan, recognizing 

that this would elevate Ethiopian support in the region vis-à-vis our bilateral concerns. The 

decision was that the crisis in Sudan justified making the request. But keeping the messengers separate in such cases can help make clear that one US interest does not necessarily 

cancel out the other. It also empowers SE/SRs by enabling them to advance the mandate 

that is the basis of their mission.

The bottom line is that competing objectives must be carefully balanced. That includes 

how the conflict itself is brought to conclusion. The United States must ensure that temporary compromises supporting conflict termination do not undermine longer-term objectives 

of accountability, democracy, and human rights. Peacebuilding experiences in Sudan, South 

Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq all serve as good examples of how difficult this balance can be 

to achieve. As noted earlier, these considerations need to be part of the SE/SR’s mandate.

Structure (and Turf Battles)

Aaron Miller asserts that “form has to follow function.” If you get the objective and purpose 

right, the rest will follow. But the line from purpose to form has not always been clear or 

consistent. The bureaucratic structure for SE/SRs has varied depending on the issue, the SE/

SR’s preferences, the availability of resources, and the attitudes of the White House and State 

Department. Unsatisfactory experience with one structure often led to a sharply different 

structure in the next administration.

In almost every case, SE/SRs are physically located at the State Department and depend to 

one degree or another on its support. The most predictable problem that arises with SE/SRs is 

friction with the assistant secretary and others in the regional bureau. Few assistant secretaries relish seeing one of their most important issues delegated out to others.13 When an SE/

SR is presidential, with direct oversight from the NSC, this can exacerbate the rivalry between 

State and the White House over policy control. How serious these issues have been depended 

in part on the personalities of those involved and on the nature of the issue. Johnnie Carson, 

as assistant secretary for Africa, faced the challenge of having to increase the authority and 

the number of senior staff for the SE/SR for Sudan and South Sudan, thereby reinforcing the 

SE/SR’s role, which was heavily under White House direction. To deal with this situation, for 

the SE/SR and other senior roles, Carson recruited retired ambassadors whom he knew and 

could trust to respect the department’s role and coordinate closely with him on policy and 

administrative matters. He assigned to the Office of the US Special Envoy for Sudan and South 

Sudan (USSESSS) an office director who saw it as his duty to keep the bureau and USSESSS in 

close working harmony.

Several retired ambassadors who became SE/SRs felt that such problems were manageable 

because they understood the department and were personally respected within it; some, as 

retirees, felt that they also benefited from not being competitors for follow-on assignments. 

Overall, structure mattered less than understandings and commitments to coordinate. When 

those were absent, structures became more important.

Several SE/SRs operated with quite limited staff—sometimes no more than one or two. In 

some cases, this was satisfactory, especially when the regional bureau provided additional support when needed. Sometimes, however, it was a source of frustration. This was especially true 

when the SE/SR felt that the bureau was not supportive on policy or logistics. As a condition 

for assuming an SE/SR role for Middle East diplomacy, Ross made it a condition that he would 

have an independent staff and far-reaching policy authority. Some others sought support from 

the NSC when not satisfied with support from the regional bureau.

Competing objectives must 

be carefully balanced. The 

United States must ensure 

that temporary compromises 

supporting conflict termination 

do not undermine longer-term 

objectives of accountability, 

democracy, and human rights. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353 11

There are three instances when SE/SRs have established significant, largely autonomous 

offices. One was the Office of the Special Middle East Coordinator (SMEC), headed by Ross 

in the Clinton administration. SMEC was not large, did not supervise the desks, and did not 

administer financial resources in the region. At Ross’s request, however, it was more autonomous and had more independent policy authority than the office Ross had directed in the 

previous administration. It was also notably less integrated with the department. A second 

autonomous SE/SR office has been the Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan 

(SRAP), created under Secretary Clinton and headed first by Richard Holbrooke. SRAP sought to 

illustrate the “whole of diplomacy” approach advocated in the Quadrennial Development and 

Diplomacy Review that Secretary Clinton initiated. It brought under one office the diplomatic, 

aid, and security elements of policy and extended its purview over bilateral, regional, and 

peace issues. The third such structure is the USSESSS in the Obama administration. This, too, 

was a sharp departure from the past. After considerable friction between Sudan SE/SRs (most 

of whom had been part-time) and the Africa Bureau in the George W. Bush administration, and 

the lack of SE/SR authority over staff or resources, the USSESSS brought the Sudan and South 

Sudan desks under the direction of the SE/SR.14 It contracts through the Bureau of Conflict 

and Stabilization Operations (CSO) for a cadre of conflict-resolution specialists drawn from academia and the private sector to augment its Foreign Service officer (FSO) staff, administer tens 

of millions of dollars of aid resources voted specifically for Sudan/South Sudan by Congress, 

and exercise considerable policy authority over the embassies.

Each of these arrangements has pluses and minuses. Respected policy leadership, direct 

access to the president and the secretary, and the ability to work with relative freedom 

undoubtedly added to SMEC’s capabilities. Over time, however, some believe that SMEC 

became too isolated from the department, especially depriving itself of the department’s 

expertise on Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic needs.15 Department resources were often 

ignored. Embassies were not brought into the ongoing negotiations. The process became 

too exclusive, cutting out ambassadors in the field whose judgments were important to 

managing and succeeding in the negotiations.

SRAP has the advantage of taking a broad regional approach to the problems it 

confronts. It contains representatives of many relevant agencies as part of its whole-ofgovernment approach and exercises policy authority with the field. “The embassies work for 

me,” said one SRAP director. Thus, SRAP can address both the regional dimensions and those 

underlying causes of conflict and instability that a narrower approach might overlook. But 

SRAP’s mandate was controversial, and its work was often seen as too far-reaching. Delving 

deep into bilateral development issues was one example cited. Also, liaison officers in an 

office such as SRAP do not have the authority to commit their agencies on major policies or 

programs and do not substitute for higher-level coordination. To be effective, the whole-ofgovernment process must operate at several levels. SRAP has had some serious differences 

with USAID and, sometimes, other agencies and the NSC, where such policy differences 

might have been resolved. SRAP, under Holbrooke in particular, was seen as overly aggressive and was therefore held at arm’s length. One NSC official said, “With Holbrooke, it was 

like holding a runaway chariot back... he was creative in his own way.” As noted earlier, 

Holbrooke’s successor, Grossman, pruned back SRAP’s focus, and apparently so did SRAP 

Dobbins, though the office retains considerable authority.

USSESSS was formed not only with the previous administration’s difficulties in mind but 

also to reflect intensified US attention to a peace process that appeared to be losing steam. 

The significantly autonomous structure is a good example of form following function. Policy 

and bilateral matters so overlapped in the Sudan/South Sudan case that the integration of 
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353

the desks into USSESSS, authority and collaboration with the embassies, and some financial 

capability made USSESSS far more effective both in the field and in the deliberations in 

Washington than if these authorities had been divided. Financial resources allowed USSESSS 

to fund politically oriented projects (diaspora radio, for example) and some security and 

stabilization projects that embassies and USAID could not have handled. Access to CSO 

specialists on multiyear contracts was critically important for USSESSS, given the rotation 

demands on FSOs and the value of these specialists. CSO, in fact, provided much of the 

initial field staff for the fledgling consulate, later embassy, in South Sudan. This experience 

serves, perhaps, as a model of how to give the department surge capacity for such complex, 

long-standing diplomatic processes.

With all these advantages, problems arose nevertheless. The first SE/SR for USSESSS made 

poor use of the embassies, cutting them out of both the policy and negotiating process and 

Washington policy debates. They were asked, in effect, to serve simply as travel and logistics 

support for the SE/SR and were often not included in meetings in the country. This lowered 

morale in the embassies and bifurcated reporting and analysis channels. The next SE/SR 

reversed this practice and brought the embassies fully into both policy and on-the-ground 

diplomatic processes. In programming resources, USSESSS was not structured well to oversee 

all the projects it initiated, some of which were ill conceived and poorly supervised. Over 

time, USSESSS also strayed into areas better handled by USAID. FSO and contract staff in 

USSESSS didn’t always get along well until their assignments were realigned and responsibilities and opportunities better shared.

Even when integrated into policy, ambassadors under SE/SR authority, like SRAP and 

USSESSS, are in a difficult position. Their policy direction may come from the SE/SR, but 

their careers lie with the assistant secretary. When policy differences arise between the 

SE/SR and the assistant secretary, the ambassadors can get caught in the middle. SE/SRs 

need to be conscious of this and not force ambassadors to “choose” whose position to follow. 

Those differences have to be worked out between the assistant secretary and the SE/SR.

State-NSC rivalry has occurred in almost all these cases. But it can also enhance the role 

of the SE/SR in helping manage this issue. State rather cleverly co-opted the SE/SR for Sudan 

to help address its rivalry with the NSC over day-to-day policy direction. The secretary’s 

office, bothered by the demands on so many senior State staff to attend weekly NSC meetings on Sudan at the White House, asked the SE/SR to coordinate State’s position in advance 

on any matter coming up at the meeting. Thus, only the assistant secretary and the SE/SR 

need attend. The process worked well and enhanced the SE/SR’s relations and coordination 

throughout the department.

The SE/SR in turn insisted that there be only one reporting channel from his office, not 

one for the NSC and another for State. Officially reporting to the president through the secretary of state, he regularly sent a single report to the secretary, copying the senior levels of 

the NSC, senior levels of the department, and both embassies. SE/SR papers for a deputies’ 

meeting for State and the NSC were identical. Everyone was literally on the same page. 

There are no cookie-cutter ways to address these inevitable problems involved in structure, rivalry, and turf. Rather, they require sensitivity and quick, innovative action from 

senior officials to resolve them.

Outreach

Congress. Most SE/SRs briefed Congress often, sometimes in hearings but more frequently in 

informal briefings. Only a few did not think that was part of their mandate. On the whole, SE/

SRs report good relations with Congress. That should not be surprising, given that Congress 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353 13

was often instrumental in their appointment. But none felt that they worked for Congress. They 

believed they could relay administration positions and their personal views of the situation.

Advocacy Groups. Advocacy groups are an important part of American democracy and 

represent citizens’ deep feelings about aspects of foreign policy. Most SE/SRs found it valuable to stay in touch with advocacy groups. The influence of such groups varies. In some 

cases, they are influential with Congress and have a broad national constituency. This is 

certainly the case with Sudan and South Sudan, where religious groups, conflict resolution 

groups, and antigenocide groups have all been active and have coalesced. The White House 

frequently calls on the SE/SR on Sudan to participate in conference calls with these groups, 

as it does with other SE/SRs where public interest is high. Special interest groups made up 

of diaspora, as seen in the Northern Ireland conflict and in the Balkans, were identified by 

SE/SRs as influential. On the whole, because these groups are also often instrumental in calling 

for the appointment of an SE/SR, their relations with the envoy are reasonably good. Only when 

they feel that the SE/SR has gone down the wrong track is there serious friction.

But SE/SRs have often had to deal with advocates’ biases. In the case of Cyprus, they 

were overwhelmingly sympathetic to the Greek side when the United States had other 

equities at stake. Haass managed these differences well. But with Sudan, the results were 

mixed. In the summer of 2010, the groups reinvigorated high-level focus on a stalled peace 

process, and they have kept a focus on the horrific events in Darfur. But their demand for 

strong and consistent denunciations of the Sudan government for its human rights deprivations, together with their passionate defense of the south, may well have inhibited more 

even-handed administration criticism of southern leaders when the latter, too, were violating 

human rights and stumbling into a civil war of their own. The administration took a dimmer 

view of the South Sudan leadership but did so more behind the scenes than publicly. For the 

SE/SR, that was a constant concern and a long-standing debate with both the advocacy groups 

and their congressional supporters.

Civil Society in the Conflict Areas. Almost universally, SE/SRs regretted being unable 

to get civil society more directly involved or influential in the peace process. The practice 

of “the people with the guns sit at the table” has prevailed in many peace processes. The 

United States Institute of Peace has focused much attention on this subject and on ways to 

empower civil society. The subject deserves more attention than it can receive here, but a 

few comments from the experience of SE/SRs are in order.

Almost all the SE/SRs reported meeting regularly with civil society groups, and the US 

government has provided financial and technical support to civil society in many conflict situations (e.g., women’s groups, human rights organizations, think tanks, universities).16 But bringing civil society into the actual peace negotiations is harder. In many cases, the belligerents 

resist civil society involvement. The matter was put before the parties negotiating the Sudan 

post-CPA arrangements by the African Union’s chief mediator, but the parties rejected the idea 

of including civil society. They argued that the CPA specifically mandated that the two political 

parties negotiate the peace. They employed a common argument: that adding significantly to 

the number of parties at the table would only prolong the process. The parties to the conflict 

in South Sudan are similarly maneuvering to keep civil society out of the decisions on the 

mandate and authorities of a proposed transitional government. In other cases civil society 

could not mobilize sufficient on-the-ground strength to demand such a role.

More fruitful in these situations has been the work of SE/SRs to keep civil society and 

the public informed of the negotiations through public statements and meetings with civil 

society. This has been particularly important in situations where neither party made an 

effort to keep the public informed (or informed accurately), as in Sudan. Most SE/SRs we 

interviewed used access to the media in this way.
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353

Haass, who returned to chair the Northern Ireland peace process in his private capacity 

in 2013, was particularly pleased to work more with civil society than when he had been 

a formal mediator. It was a different situation, however. The basic agreements had been 

negotiated; the challenge this time was to have them respected and implemented by the 

parties and their supporters. At this stage, civil society had an essential role in mobilizing 

popular support for having the parties develop and keep to the peace agreements.

Conclusion

SE/SRs have played, and will continue to play, a major role in the USG’s efforts to bring an 

end to conflict. They are a valuable means of signaling that the White House and, often, the 

secretary of state are paying high-level attention to a particular conflict, especially when 

pressed by the Congress and the public. The appointment of an SE/SR can also strengthen 

White House control over a particular policy or situation that is important to the president. 

But the SE/SR can be fully effective only if sufficiently empowered by the president and 

the secretary of state. SE/SRs offer another advantage if the United States wishes to reach 

out to unfavorable persons or organizations outside normal diplomatic channels to test 

prospects for further negotiation and peace.

Recognizing the elements that make for success in the SE/SR model—empowerment, 

authority, and staff and resource support—assistant secretaries could more often play this 

role, especially when the president is not directly or personally engaged. But in recent years, 

shortages of staff and of time to develop the necessary skills have limited the department’s 

number of senior diplomats available for this role. The past success of at least two assistant 

secretaries in doing this should demonstrate that this is a role that the department can play 

and should be resourced and empowered to play more in the future.

Policy Recommendations

• Selection of an SE/SR is most useful when a conflict situation (a) reaches a 

high level of interest and concern within the USG, including Congress; (b) has 

strong regional as well as bilateral aspects; and (c) exceeds the capacity of the 

normal State Department system to address on its own. Envoys selected simply 

to respond to congressional or public pressure, and are not given high-level 

support within the administration to do the job, are less effective and can 

burden the system.

• The mandate should be clear and limited. Whether through public policy, 

a clearly written policy paper, or explicitly enunciated guidance from the 

president or the secretary of state, the mandate should be well defined and 

should specify both the intent and level of the US engagement and the scope 

of the envoy’s responsibilities.

• Senior-level envoys must be empowered, and recognized as such, by the 

president and the secretary of state. That means having direct access to the 

president or secretary as needed and making it clear, both within the USG and to 

foreign counterparts, that the envoys possess such status and authority. Timely 

direct support from the president or the secretary is essential.

• SE/SRs require a certain degree of latitude. Their ability to operate outside normal 

bureaucratic restrictions, including restrictions on whom they contact, is one of 

their potential strengths. This latitude should be established at the outset or 

through policy-level agreement when needed.

• In the case of presidential envoys, it is essential that the secretary of state remain 

engaged and that the State Department be adequately involved. One means for 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 353 15

achieving this is for a presidential envoy to report to the president through 

the secretary of state. Properly empowered, the SE/SR also acts as a buffer 

between the secretary and day-to-day negotiations, allowing for the secretary 

to intervene selectively when such high-level action is most needed.

• Chemistry matters. The appointment of an SE/SR can infringe on the role of an 

assistant secretary of state or ambassador in the field or even create fissures 

between the White House and State Department over policy direction. These 

problems have no cookie-cutter solution, but mutual respect and flexibility 

can forge paths around them. An especially close working relationship must 

be established at the outset between the SE/SR and the relevant assistant 

secretary of state and with the ambassadors in the field. Our interviewees 

saw failure to do this as the most significant cause of bureaucratic problems. 

Our research shows that envoys, whether coming from the Foreign Service or 

elsewhere, were less encumbered by these problems when they demonstrated 

respect for the systems, responsibilities, and capacities of the State Department 

and drew upon the support that the department could provide. In some cases, 

the assistant secretary was directly involved in the SE/SR selection process.

• Envoys need staff support, whether by dedicated staff from the regional 

bureau or through assignment of other department personnel. The CSO is well 

equipped to provide such expertise, as it has for Sudan, Afghanistan, and other 

conflict situations. The size and scope of such support can vary depending on 

the mandate and complexity of the conflict, the views of the SE/SR, and the 

regional bureau’s readiness to dedicate sufficient bureau support. In some 

cases, the SE/SRs benefit from having control over financial resources. This is 

especially true when politically sensitive programs are needed, including those 

that USAID may not be prepared to undertake. Autonomous structures created 

under the SE/SR must avoid losing appropriate contact and coordination with 

the rest of the foreign policy structure.

• Reinforcing the department’s senior ranks and the capacity of its senior officers 

to serve in SE/SR positions should be one of the objectives in addressing 

conflict situations in the future. Assistant secretaries who have carried out 

diplomatic efforts as SE/SRs, and several presidential SE/SRs who are retired 

ambassadors, confirm that the skills and capacities for such assignments exist 

within the State Department. But because of past gaps in recruitment and 

hiring, such people are in short supply at the senior level today. If assistant 

secretaries or other high-level career Foreign Service officers are given the 

same support accorded to “outside” SE/SRs, State Department personnel could 

perform effectively as SE/SRs in conflict situations.

• Criteria defining the end of an envoyship must be defined. A few such positions 

have lingered well beyond their relevance or morphed and expanded to fold in 

additional functions. In some cases, the long-term existence of such special 

offices may have impaired the effective development and management of policy, 

keeping them too long from integration into broader objectives and operations.
Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the American Academy of Diplomacy for their joint 

sponsorship of this project. This partnership represents both organizations’ commitment to conflict resolution and the 

advancement of US diplomacy. In addition to professional support and guidance, USIP provided the bulk of financial 

support, while the American Academy provided both managerial and material support. Our assistants, Hanne Bursch at 

USIP and Aimee Stoltz at the American Academy of Diplomacy, were tireless in arranging and transcribing interviews 

and making valuable substantive recommendations. Finally, we thank the many distinguished diplomats and officials 

who gave of their time, experience, and expertise and provided many insights into how to make our nation’s diplomacy 

even more effective in the future.

Endnotes

1. See for example, Michael Fullilove, “All the President’s Men: The Role of Special Envoys in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 

Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005): 13; John K. Naland, “U.S. Special Envoys: A Flexible Tool,” USIP Peace Brief no. 

102, Aug. 15, 2011; American Foreign Service Association’s QDDR Special Envoys Working Group, “Special Envoys 

Recommendations,” April 2014, www.afsa.org/Portals/0/qddr_special_envoys.pdf.

2. Both were, however, political appointees with connections to political leadership, which may well have enhanced 

their authority to carry out negotiations.

3. Daniel C. Kurtzer, Pathways to Peace: America and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 201.

4. Daniel Serwer, author interview, Nov. 2013, Washington, DC.

5. Zalmay Khalilzad notes than when he was appointed US ambassador to Afghanistan, President Karzai thought his 

previous title of special envoy conveyed more authority and a more direct link to the US president. So he asked 

Khalilzad if he could retain both titles, which Khalilzad did. 

6. Aaron David Miller, “Memorandum to the President,” in Kurtzer, Pathways to Peace, 142-43.

7. Daniel Kurtzer, Scott Lasensky, William Quandt, Steven Spiegel, and Shibley Telhami, The Peace Puzzle: America’s 

Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 262.

8. Mitchell Reiss, Negotiating with Evil: When to Talk to Terrorists (New York: Open Road Media, 2010), 244. 

9. Richard Hass, author interview, April 2014, New York.

10. Marc Grossman, “Lessons from Negotiating with the Taliban,” Cohen Group, Oct. 6, 2013, http://cohengroup.

net/news/op_ed/op_ed10082013.cfm

11. James Dobbins, author interview, Nov. 2013, Washington, DC.

12. Reiss, Negotiating with Evil, 243.

13. A notable exception occurred when Grossman was appointed assistant secretary for Europe. He insisted on a 

special envoy for the Balkans, recognizing that that issue alone would take too much of his time from other 

critically important responsibilities.

14. Initially, the envoy was designated for “Sudan,” thus, USSES. When South Sudan became independent, the title 

was amended to include “Sudan and South Sudan,” adding “SS.” This report uses the current acronym “USSESSS” 

throughout.

15. Kurtzer, The Peace Puzzle, 128-29.

16. Princeton Lyman, “Women’s Role in Bringing Peace to Sudan and South Sudan” (unpublished article submitted 

to State Department, March 2013), available from the author.

Of Related Interest

• The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation by Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen 

(USIP Press, 2010)

• The Diplomat’s Dictionary, Second Edition by Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. (USIP Press, 2010)

• American Negotiating Behavior by Richard H. Solomon and Nigel Quinney

• Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 

Hampson, and Pamela Aall (USIP Press, 1999)

• Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 

Hampson, and Pamela Aall (USIP Press, 2004)

• Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy by Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. (USIP Press, 1997)

ISBN: 978-1-60127-238-6

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

United States 

Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

@usip