Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2796 | April 11, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brian A. Karle

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ralph Lee McKinney,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 11, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A05-1712-CR-2796

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court.

The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, 

Judge.

Trial Court Cause No.

79D02-1708-F4-30

Barteau, Senior Judge
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Statement of the Case

[1] Ralph Lee McKinney appeals his sentence after pleading guilty to one count of 

Level 4 felony child molesting1and admitting to his status as an habitual 

offender2, contending that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and the character of the offender. We affirm.

Issue

[2] The sole issue presented for our review is whether McKinney’s sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Although the factual basis established at the guilty plea hearing contains few 

details surrounding the circumstances of McKinney’s offense beyond those 

necessary to establish the statutory elements of the offense, the trial court at 

sentencing found the seriousness and circumstances of the offense to be an 

aggravating factor. The nature and circumstances of the crime as well as the 

manner in which the crime is committed is a valid aggravating factor. Bethea v. 

State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013). In Bethea, our supreme court held, 

“Unless forbidden by the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court [] may 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (2015).

2

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (2015).
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consider all the evidence before it.” 983 N.E.2d at 1146. The probable cause 

affidavit and McKinney’s version of the offense were included in the 

presentence investigation report which was a part of the record before 

McKinney was sentenced. Because there was no plea agreement, there are no 

restrictions and McKinney was afforded the opportunity to correct or amend 

his presentence investigation report. For those reasons, we recite those 

additional facts. 

[4] McKinney, who was sixty years old at the time of the offense, was a high 

school graduate and had served in the United States Army. However, by the 

time of the offense at issue here, he was also a convicted sex offender. On the 

weekend of June 17, 2017, he asked his pastor if he could stay at her home 

because his home was being fumigated. The pastor agreed and allowed him to 

sleep in the common room. The pastor’s seven-year-old grandson was also 

staying with her that weekend. 

[5] After everyone went to their respective bedrooms to fall asleep, McKinney 

entered the room where the pastor’s grandson was sleeping. McKinney groped 

the grandson under his pajamas and fondled the boy’s penis. When McKinney 

noticed the light from a flashlight in the hallway, he ran quickly from the room, 

passing the pastor, who was using the flashlight, in the hallway. The pastor 

asked McKinney what was happening, but he did not respond to her.

[6] When the pastor entered the room where her grandson had been sleeping, she 

asked him what had happened. Her grandson told her that McKinney had 
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touched his private areas. The pastor left the room, approached McKinney, 

and asked him what had happened. McKinney admitted to fondling the 

pastor’s grandson. The pastor banished McKinney from the home 

immediately, called the parents of her grandson, and contacted police officers.

[7] The State charged McKinney on August 9, 2017. On October 17, 2017, 

McKinney pleaded guilty to the offense, also admitting that he had prior 

unrelated felony convictions for two counts of child molesting on September 29, 

1986, and arson on January 8, 1980. 

Discussion and Decision

[8] McKinney now appeals raising the issue of the appropriateness of his sentence. 

He argues that his twenty-eight-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate and 

asks that his sentence be revised to an aggregate term of eighteen years. 

[9] The sentencing range for McKinney’s child molesting offense is a fixed term of 

imprisonment of between two and twelve years with the advisory sentence 

being six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). With respect to the habitual 

offender status, for a Level 4 felony offender such as McKinney, the trial court 

shall sentence the offender to an additional fixed term between six years and 

twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i) (2015). The trial court sentenced 

McKinney to a fixed term of ten years for his conviction of child molesting, 

enhanced by eighteen years for his habitual offender adjudication. We 

acknowledge that the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has 
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selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress v. State, 

848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006). 

[10] We note as an initial matter that McKinney appears3to argue that the trial 

court erred by imposing an habitual offender enhancement based on charges 

previously used to support an habitual offender enhancement to charges filed 

against him in 1986. We acknowledge our Supreme Court’s holding that,

We have consistently emphasized the unique status of the 

habitual offender statute. This statute has historically provided 

for greater punishment than would ordinarily be imposed upon 

the substantive crime charged. The purpose of the statute is to 

more severely penalize those persons whom prior sanctions have 

failed to deter from committing felonies. Since the additional 

punishment is imposed for each new crime and not for crimes for 

which the defendant has already been convicted and punished, 

prior convictions used to establish the fact of habitual criminality 

at one trial can be used again after a subsequent felony 

conviction. There was no error in sentencing defendant on the 

habitual offender count. 

Williams v. State, 430 N.E.2d 759, 768 (Ind. 1982) (internal citations omitted). 

The trial court did not err here, especially considering McKinney’s admission to 

his habitual offender status.

[11] As for the nature of the offense, we observe that McKinney’s pastor allowed 

him to sleep in her home in his time of need, while his home was being 

 

3 McKinney requests a downward revision of his sentence to eighteen years. The maximum sentence for his 

current offense is twelve years. Therefore, McKinney seems to recognize that some enhancement is 

appropriate due to his habitual offender status to which he admitted at his guilty plea hearing. 
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fumigated. Among others, her seven-year-old grandson, was also sleeping in 

the safety of her home. Despite the charity offered to McKinney, he chose to 

use the opportunity to molest his pastor’s grandson. In pertinent part, the level 

of McKinney’s offense requires that the victim be under the age of fourteen. 

The pastor’s grandson was far younger than fourteen. “Crimes against children 

are particularly contemptible.” Walker v. State, 747 N.E.2d 536, 538 (Ind. 2001) 

(citing Singer v. State, 674 N.E.2d 11, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). 

[12] As for the character of the offender, we acknowledge that he pleaded guilty 

without the benefit of a plea agreement and did so without an agreement 

regarding a sentencing cap. Furthermore, we recognize and commend 

McKinney for his military service following his graduation from high school. 

However, after his honorable discharge from the Army, he was convicted and 

sentenced for Class B felony arson in 1980. The presentence investigation 

report shows that McKinney’s probation for that offense was revoked and a 

sentence was imposed for that violation. He was later convicted of one count of 

Class C felony child molesting in 1984 and two counts of Class C felony child 

molesting in 1986 for which his sentence was enhanced by his status as an 

habitual offender. According to the presentence investigation report, he was 

discharged from the Department of Correction in 2005. His criminal history 

shows that McKinney has a continuing pattern of abusing children and his 

behavior has not been deterred by periods of incarceration.

[13] We observe that the probation department recommended that McKinney serve 

thirty-two years in the Department of Correction. The trial court, however, did 
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not impose the maximum sentence for the offense or impose the most severe 

enhancement of the sentence due to McKinney’s habitual offender status. We 

find that in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender 

the sentence is not inappropriate. 

Conclusion

[14] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

[15] Affirmed. 

Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.