### In the



# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-2187

U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

J O H N V OL P E NT E S TA

, Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Western Di v i sio n. No. 07 -cr- 50 04 9 — Frederic k J. K apa la , Judg e.
A RGU E D D E C E MB E R 3, 2012

— D E C I D E D A UGUST 14, 2013

Before W OOD and H AMI L TON , Circ uit Judges , and D AR R OW , District Judge. *

D AR R OW , District Judg e. The defendant John V olpentesta

w as convic ted of a numb er of real estate and tax fraud offenses stemming from hi s sch eme to defraud cus tomer s, sub contractor s, and inv estor s in hi s constructi on bus iness
. He appeals on

Of the Central Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, si tting by desi gna tio n. *2 No. 11-2187
three gr ounds: that he w as depriv ed of hi s Si xth Amendment right to effecti v e assi stance of co uns el; that hi s w ai v er of hi s right to couns el w as not knowingly , v oluntarily

, and intelli

gently giv en; and that the di stric t court err oneously deni ed hi s motions to continue the tr i al once he had deci ded to repr esent hi mself

. W

e find no err or on the par t of the di stric t c ourt, and there fore affi rm. I. Backgr ound John V olpentesta owne d and oper ated V olpentesta Constructi on Inc. (“VCI”) from 2003 to 2006 in Mar engo, Illinoi s. It

w as thro ug h VCI that V olpentesta defrauded cus tomer s, inv estor s, sub contracto rs, and ulti mately the government. On October 23, 2007, a federal gr and jury in Rockfor d, Illinoi s, ret urned a n indi ctment chargin g V olpentesta wi th si x counts of mai l and wi re fraud and sev enteen counts o f feder al tax violati ons. V

olpentesta w as arr ai gned on the charges on December 7, 2007, at whi ch tim e the court appointed Assi stant Feder al Defend er P aul Gazi ano to repr esent hi m. Due to the v olume of di scov ery (approximately 11,000 pages of Bates-stamped di scov ery and 40 banker ’ s boxes of documents sei zed by the IRS from VCI’s offi ces) , Ga z ia no made efforts to e ns ur e that V olpentesta could rev i ew the di scov ery electro ni cally at the Ogle County Jai l. When V ol p e nt e sta complained that the computer at the jail w as too slow , Gazi ano relayed hi s concerns to the di stric t c ourt

. As an
accomm odation, Magistrate Judge Mahoney or dered the U.S. Mar shal’s Ser vic e to periodi cally transpor t V olpentesta to the courthouse in Rockfor d to r eview the docu ments.No. 11-2187 3
On Nov ember 17, 2008, V olpentesta fi led the fi rst of what

w ould ev entually be nine motions to sub sti tute couns el. At the sub sequent hearin g, V

olpentesta clai med that he had di ffi culty
rev i ewing di scov ery in electro ni c form and t hat Gazi ano had not prov i ded hi m wi th prin ted copi es of di scov ery
. Gaziano informed the co urt that he had giv en V olpentesta sum mari es of the di scov ery and that V olpentesta had only once take n the court up on i ts offer to rev i ew di scov ery at the courthouse. The court explain ed to V

olpentesta that Gaz iano had already
rev i ew ed the 11,000 pages of d iscov ery , and appointing new
couns el w ould r e su l t in a si gni fi cant delay in the case. V olpentesta stated that he nonetheless desi red new coun se l, and the court gr anted hi s mo tion. Mar k Byrd w as there after appointed to repr esent the defendant. V olpentesta again mov ed for n e w c ounsel on April 22, 2009, clai ming that he st ill had not received hard copi es of the B a t e s- stamped di scov ery and had only seen Byrd once since hi s appointment. At the hearing, Byrd r esponded that he had met wi th V

olpentesta four or fiv e tim es, he w as w or kin g on get tin g V olpentesta prin ted copi es of the di scov ery , and that i t
w ould be “tremendously helpful” i f V olpentesta w ould come to the co ur t house to rev i ew the materials wi th hi m. V olpentesta and Byrd ag r e e d t hat the relat i onshi p could be mended, and the c ourtdeni ed the motion. On July 14, 2009, V

olpentesta mov ed for new couns el, again complaining that he had not y et receiv ed hi s requested di scov ery

. In respo ns e , B yr d fi led a motion to wi thdraw , explaining that he and hi s staff had already spe nt a l arg e
amo un t of tim e and resources tr yin g to accomm odate V olpentesta’s dem ands (su ch as by secu ring CJA fund s for an4 No. 11-2187
outsi de copy service and redacting and sep a r a tely prin tin g gr and jury tr ansc ripts and exhib i ts), and that V olpentesta refused to rev i ew the boxes of sei zed materials wi th hi m. At a sub sequent hearin g, V

olpentesta and Byrd expr essed di ffering view s on Byrd’ s r e p r e se ntation as w ell as hi s reasons for the delay in get tin g prin ted copi es of di scov ery to V olpentesta, but Byrd stated that he and the defendan t w e r e sti ll on speaking ter ms. Appro xim ately tw o weeks later t he court deni ed V olpentesta’s motion to sub sti tute and Byrd’ s motion to wi thdraw

, and instead appointed Rober t Fagan as co-couns el. The judge also no ted the ample accomm odations made to V olpentesta by his atto rneys and the court

. On October 7, 2009, V

olpentesta fi led motions to sub sti tute Fag an and for reconsi derat i on of hi s motion to replace Byrd, ci tin g di ffi culti es in reaching hi s atto r ne ys and concerns ov er their di li gence. After hearin g fro m Byrd and Fag an, and thei r
assu ran ce s t hat the relat i onshi p could be mended, the court deni ed V olpentesta’s mot i ons. On December 14, 2009, now appearin g befo re Judge Kapala, V

olpentesta ma d e hi s fi fth motion for new couns el, ci tin g communi cati on i ssu es and a lack of t r ust betw een hi mself and hi s atto rneys. In response, Byrd and Fagan stated that they had met wi th V olpentesta on numerous occasi ons and w ere doin g their best to acc ommodate hi s stro ng feelings about how the case should be prepar ed and presented at tr i al. The court di d not find that the di spute betw een V olpentesta and hi s atto rneys resulted in a tot al la ck of commu ni cati on prev entin g an adequate defense, and noted the hi gh quali ty of V olpentesta’s repr esent a t io n. The court there fore deni ed hi s motion.No. 11-2187 5
In late Februar y and early Mar ch of 2010, addi tional d isc ov ery w as tendere d to the defendant. After V olpentesta fi led a pro se motion to continue, whi ch the court deni ed, Byrd
mov ed to continue the tr i al. The court gr anted the motion and set tr i al for June 1, 2010. The court also foresaw that V olpentesta mi ght mov e to repr esent hi mself and stro ngly advis ed hi m ag ainst do ing so. V olpentesta responded that he

w as content wi th hi s atto rneys, but then on Mar ch 1 7, 2010, fi led another motion for sub sti tution of couns el along wi th
sev eral pro se p r e t r i al motions. V olpentesta arg ued that Byrd and Fagan should be removed for ineffec tiv eness for fai ling to fi le motions to di smi ss v arious counts of the ind ict ment. In response, Byrd stated th a t such motions w ould hav e been entirely meritless

. Byrd, wh o ha d prev i ously agr eed to w or k
on unrelated cases of V

olpentesta’s at hi s request, also sai d that V olpentesta had recently or dered hi m not to w or k on any other cli ent’s case b efore t he Jun e 1 tr i al. Byrd and Fagan explained to the court that their efforts to repr esent V olpentesta w ere
sev erely hampered by his exo rbi tant demands and refusal to assi st them in hi s own defense. As Byrd stated: The problem, in my increasing frustrat i on w i th thi s i s that in tw o months, we’re going to be expected to tr y to sell to a jury Mr

. V olpentesta’s v eraci ty a nd that he’s an indi vidu al that should be beli ev ed, that hi s testim ony should be beli ev ed, y et w e hav e to keep coming in here tim e and again and addressing what are blatant and [si c] misrepresentations by hi m. It’ s becoming increasingly diffi cult to, in goo d fai th, be able to make those types of repr esentations to t he jury

. At thi s poin t, I beli ev e that t hey can sti ll6 No. 11-2187
be made, but thi s i s t a xin g on ev ery one’s patien ce, Y our Hono r
. The court deni ed the motion, noting that the case w as already
more than tw o y ears old a nd t hat appointing new couns el

w oul d r e sult in si gni fi cant delays. The court found that Byrd and Fagan w ere prov i ding competent repr esentation and that V olpentesta’s complaints d id no t amount to a tot al lack of
commu ni cati on. V olpentesta fi led another motion to sub sti tute on Mar ch 31, 2010 , voi cing si mi lar complaints as before again st Byrd and Fagan. When questi oned by the court, Byrd stated that their problems boi led down to di sagreements ov er tr i al st r ateg y , and both atto rneys sai d they were sti ll wi lling to commu ni cate and cooper ate wi th the defendant. The court d e nied V olpentesta’s motion, not ing : “[T] he focus of a justifi able di ssati sfac tion inqui ry i s the adequacy of the repr esentation of t he atto rneys in an adv ersarial process. It doesn’t hav e to d o wi th y our rela t ionshi p wi th y our atto rneys, whether y ou get along wi th them, whether y ou li ke t hem, wh ether y ou hav e a cordial [ relat i onshi p][.] ” At that poin t V

olpentesta told the court that he w ould fi le

a motion to repr esent hi mself

. The court then co nducted an inqui ry to asses s whether V olpentesta’s w ai v e r o f his right to
couns el w as being made knowingly , intelli g e nt l y

, and v oluntar i ly

. In response to the court ’s questi ons, V olpentesta stat ed tha t he w as 52 y ears old, had a hi gh sch ool degr ee and had take n some co mm uni ty college clas ses in bus iness management, and had owned sev eral bu siness es. He sai d that he w as
no t taking any medi cati on and had nev er been tr eated forNo. 11-2187 7
mental i llness

. He also stated that he had been a party to three bench tr i als and a bankruptcy , and had prev i ously been convic ted of bank fraud in a federal cr imin a l case. When the court inqui red into hi s understanding of the charges a g a inst hi m, how ev er

, V olpentesta sai d that he di d not under st and how he could be “charged wi th multi ple cri mes in one count.” The court ther efore denied hi s moti on to repr esent hi mself

. On April 20, 2010, V

olpentesta again mov ed to proceed pro
se
. At the colloquy wi th the court that follow ed, V olpentesta affi rmed the answers reg ardin g his backg ro und that he had giv en at the prev i ous hearin g. The cour t then addressed in detail V olpentesta’s prior clai m that he di d not understand the indi ctment, and after a thor ough inqui ry V olpentesta ass ured the court that he di d understand the charges again st hi m but

w as merely challen gin g their legal suffi ci ency
. The co ur t also asked whether hi s deci si on w as entirely v oluntary , t o which V olpentesta answered in the affi rmativ e. How ev er , shortly there after V

olpentesta sai d: “[M]y hand is being forced to do thi s, y our Hono r . I s till w ant to assert that ... . [T] he only w ay I feel I can get relief i s i f I repr esent myself and do thi s myself.” The court responded that he could not allow V olpentesta to repr esent hi mself i f the deci si on w as not v oluntarily made. The defendant then elected to withdraw hi s moti on. At that tim e the court also addressed V olpentesta’s motion for reconsi derat i on of the court’s prev i ous deni al of hi s motion to sub sti tute couns el. In supp or t of hi s motion, V olpentesta alleged that hi s atto rneys had mi ssed court deadlines, had not sub poenaed recor ds and wi tnesses, and had not y et completed their rev i ew of the box e s o f ma ter i als sei zed by the IRS

. In response, Byrd stat ed that he w ould be fi ling motions s hort ly8 No. 11-2187
and that he had spent 50 hours rev i ewing the search materials

. He also sai d that recor ds from V olpentesta’s bank and title company had been prov i ded in di scov ery and V olpentesta had not explain ed what usef ul doc um ents could be gained by sub poena. B yr d further stated that V olpentesta refused to say what relev ant tes t imo ny he hoped to eli ci t from the 92 wi tness es he w anted hi s atto rneys to su bp o e na, and that he w as concerned that their potent i al testim ony could act ua l l y hurt V olpentesta’s case (a prophesy whi ch w as realized when V olpentesta ev ent ually proceeded to tr i al pro se ). The court deni ed V olpentesta’s motion, ag a in no tin g that hi s atto rneys
we re p roviding competent and zealous repr esenta ti on an d th a t V olpentesta’s di sagreements ov er tr i al strat egy did not merit another sub sti tution of couns el. On May 10, 2 0 1 0 , V

olpentesta again mov ed to repr esent hi mself

. At t he hearin g on May 21, 2010, V olpentesta reaffi rmed hi s answers to the questi ons the court ha d prev i ously
as ke d hi m re ga rd in g hi s s e l f

- re p re s entation. The court inqui red into V olpente st a ’ s understanding of the charges again st hi m, and asked hi m whether hi s deci si on to p r o ce ed pro se w as being made v oluntarily , to whi ch he responded in the affi rmativ e. V olpentesta also confi rmed that he w ould be prepar ed to go to tr i al in one-and-a- half w eeks as sch eduled. After further questi oning and w arnin gs from the court a bo ut t he ris ks of repr esenting hi mself

, the court accepted V

olpentesta’s w ai v er of hi s ri ght t o counsel and granted hi s moti on. Th ree days later

, on May 24, 2010, V

olpentesta mov ed for

a 90-day continuanc e in or der to complete hi s prepar ation for tr i al. I n a d etailed wri tte n or der the court gr anted hi m a three -week continuanc e th a t i t beli ev ed w ould suffi ci entlyNo. 11-2187 9
sati sfy V

ol p e ntesta’s needs, and set tr i al for June 21. V olpentesta fi led addi tional motions for continuanc es on June 8 and Ju ne 17, 2010, whi ch the court deni ed. On June 18, 2010—the Fr i day before the Mo nd a y tr i al date—V olpentesta again mov ed to continue the tr i al, arg uing that he had not been prov i ded wi th i mage fi les o f VC I ’ s computers, whi ch he clai med may hav e contained exculpator y evidenc e. The court, in another wri tte n or der , analyzed V

olpentesta’s cl ai ms and rej ected them. V olpentesta’s tr i al began on June 21, 2010, a nd o n July 19, 2010, the jury convic ted hi m of tw enty-one of the tw enty-thr ee counts. On May 9, 2011, the tr i al court sentenced hi m to a tot al of 133 months in pr iso n a nd or dered hi m to pay ov er one mi lli on dollars in restituti on to the vic tim s of hi s fraud sch eme. V olpentesta now appeals. II. Di scu ssi on V olpentesta challen ges hi s conv i cti on on sev eral gr ounds. First, he contends that the di stric t co urt err ed in denying hi s motions to appoint a fourth attor ney as sub sti tute coun sel for Byrd and Fagan. Second, he clai ms that hi s w ai v er of hi s right to couns el w as not knowing, v oluntary , and intelli gent. Thi rd, he arg ues that the di stric t judge abus ed hi s disc ret i on by denying hi s motions to continue the tr i al by ninety days whi le g r anting hi m a three -week continuanc e. W e consi der ea ch arg ument in turn.10 No. 11-2187
A. V olpentesta’s Mo tions for New Counsel V olpentesta sub mits that the di stric t court commi tte d
rev ersible err or when i t deni ed each of V olpentesta’s mot i ons to replace Byrd and Fagan wi th new couns el. V olpentesta puts fort h three theor i es as to why the court err ed: be caus e i t abus ed it s d iscret i on in denying hi s motions to sub sti tute; becau se i t err ed as a matter o f law by applying the wrong st a nd ard; and becau se i t fai led to remove Byrd and Faga n becau se they had confli cts of intere st. W e fir st address whether the di stric t court abus ed i ts di screti on in deny ing V olpentesta’s motions for new counsel. See Martel v
. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1287 (2012); see also United States v
. Hor to n , 845 F .2d 1414, 1417 (7th Ci r
. 1988) (abu se of di screti on standard appli es so long as defendant w as giv en the oppor tuni ty to explain the reasons for hi s request). In deci ding whether a di stric t court abus ed i ts di scre t io n in denying a motion for sub sti tute couns el, w e consi der a numb er of factors inclu ding the t i meliness of the motion, the adequacy of the court’s inqui ry into the motion, and whe ther the confli ct w as
so gr eat that i t re su l t e d in a tot al lack of commu ni cati on prev entin g an adequate defense. U n ited States v
. Harris , 394 F .3d 543, 552 (7th Ci r
. 2005); United States v
. Bjorkman , 270 F .3d 482, 500 (7th Ci r
. 2001). If w e fin d an abus e of di screti on, w e wi ll nev ert heless uphold the di stric t court’s deci si on unles s the defendant establi shes that he w as deprived of hi s Sixth Amendment right to effecti v e assi stance of couns el. See United States v. Zillges , 978 F .2d 369, 372-73 (7th Ci r . 1992). As to t he tim elinessof V olpentesta’s mot i ons, V olpentesta fi rst mov ed for new couns el in April of 2009 and continuedNo. 11-2187 11
making simi lar motions—nine in all—unti l he deci ded to
r e p r e sent hi mself in M ay 2010. But i t i s unnecess ary for us t o pars e o ut whi ch motions w ere tim ely and whi ch w ere not, becau se ev en i f the motions w ere tim ely i t does not necess arily
mean th e d i stric t court err ed in denying them. See Bjorkman , 270 F .3d at 501 (“[E] v en i f w e find B j o r kman’s r equest tim ely , a consi derat i on of the tw o remaining factors convin ces us that the di stric t co ur t di d not abus e i ts di screti on in denying i t.”). Because t he remain der of our analysi s supp or ts the di stric t court’s findings th a t s ub s titu ti on of couns el w as not w arr anted, the tim eliness of V

olpentesta’s motions i s not cri tic al to our deci si on. Next, turnin g to the adequacy of th e court’s inqui ry , w e find that the di st r i ct court’s inqui ries into V olpentesta’s repeat ed motions to sub sti tute couns el w ere more than adequate. Each tim e, the court questi oned V olpentesta and hi s atto rneys at length about t he i r relat i onshi p, the v ali di ty of V olpentesta’s complaints, and the efforts Byrd and Fagan w ere making to accomm odate V olpentesta’s conce r ns
. For each of V olpentesta’s repeat ed motions, the court gav e ample consi derat i on to hi s doubts reg ardin g Byrd and Fagan’s di li gence in repr esenting hi m, and di d not merely s eek to “elic i t a ge neral expr essi on of sati sfac tion” by V olpentesta, see Zillges , 978 F .2d at 372, or to di smi ss the ma t t e r in a conclu sory fash i on, Bjorkman , 270 F .3d at 501. Accordingly , we find that the di stric t court’s inqui ries into V olpentest a’s motions w ere more than suffi ci ent. Fin ally , w e consi der whether a tot al breakdo wn in commu ni cati on betw een V

olpentesta and his atto rneys prev ented an adequate defense. Whi le i t i s a p p a rent from the recor d that12 No. 11-2187
V olpentesta and hi s atto rneys frequently butted heads, there i s
scan t evidenc e that the gulf o f communi cati on so wi dened as to co nsti tute a tot al breakdo wn. The fact i s that V olpentesta, Byrd, and Fagan were commu ni cating, but si mp ly d i s a gr e eing. They di sagreed about whether Byrd and F a g an should interv i ew wi tne ss es, how much V olpentesta should ai d Byrd and Fagan in prepar ing hi s defense, and when V olpentesta should r ecei v e paper copi es of di scov ery
. They di sagreed about V olpentesta’s percei v ed delays and hi s complaints t hat Byrd and F agan fail e d t o fi le the motions he w anted them to. But as the di st r ict court noted in denying V olpentesta’s
mo t i ons for sub sti tution, the di sagreements be t w e e n V olpentesta and hi s atto rneys were in essenc e arg uments ov er tr i al strat egy (wh i ch li kely dev eloped into personali ty confli cts
ov er tim e as well ), wh i ch do not consti tute gr ounds for sub sti tution of couns el. United States v
. Horton , 845 F

. 2 d 1414, 1418 (7t h C i r
. 1988); United States v
. Hills ber g, 812 F .2d 328, 333-34 (7th Ci r . 1987). The c ourt ’s questi oning of V olpentesta, Byrd, and Fagan shows that they were meetin g reg ularly to di scuss the case, and when pressed by the court the parties stated that they had been commu ni cating and felt the relat i onshi p coul d be mended. Whi le V olpentesta places much emphas i s on the language used by hi s atto rneys to describe their cli e nt ’s demanding behavi or (e.g. “Kafkaesque”), such exag ger ated w or d choi ce i s merely symptomatic of a confli ct betw een a demanding cli ent and atto rneys who felt they w ere doin g their best—not betw een pa r ties whose commu ni cati on had so tot ally brok en down as to preclude an adequate defense.No. 11-2187 13
V olpentesta makes another arg ument in supp or t o f hi s contention t hat the di stric t court abus ed i ts di screti on in denying hi s motions to sub sti tute. He a ss e rt s that the court made a mi stake of law by finding the relev ant inq uiry to be li mi ted o nl y to the adequacy of V olpentesta’s repr esentation but not the degr ee of commu ni cati on betw een the parties. In denying V

olpentesta’s mot i ons, the court stated: “[T] he focus
o f a justifi able di ssati sfac tion inqui ry i s the adequacy of t he rep r e se ntation of y our atto rneys in an adv ersarial process. It doesn’t hav e to do wi th y our relat i onshi p wi th y our atto rneys, whether y ou get along wi th them , wh ether y ou li ke them, whether y ou hav e a cordial [relationsh i p][.] ” The questi on, as t he court put i t at one poin t, i s “whether the atto rneys ar e prov iding competent repr esentation, whether they’ re doin g what they need to do to present an adequate defense, and I beli ev e they a r e.” In contrast wi th V olpentesta’s ov erly selecti v e interpr etat i on of the di str i ct court, the court w as si mply expr essing what w e hav e sta t e d abov e: clas hes of persona l ity are insu ffi ci ent to merit a sub sti tution of couns el. Furt her , V olpentesta’s asserti on that the di stric t court err ed by focus ing the inqu i ry on the effecti v eness of Byrd and F agan’s repr esentation i s mi sgui ded giv en that effecti v e assi stance of
couns el i s pr e cisely what the Sixth Amendment guarante es. McMa n n v
. Richardson , 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970) (“It has long been recog ni zed that the right to couns el i s the right to the effecti v e assi stance of couns el.”). The amount and quali ty of
c om muni c a ti on betw een V olpentesta and hi s atto rneys (wh i ch , w e note, the di stric t court di d adequately address) i s i tself but
one facet of the ge ne ral inqui ry into whether couns el w as
e ff ecti v e. V

olpentesta’s atte mpts to pi ck apart the di str ict14 No. 11-2187

co urt’s entirely corr ect appli cati on of the law are wi t ho ut merit.

***** V ol p e nt esta makes one final arg ument reg ardin g the court’s deni al of hi s motions to sub sti tute. He contends that the court should hav e appointed hi m new atto rneys becau se Byrd and Fagan had confli cts of intere st. W e rev i ew a judge’ s deci si on not to remove couns e l o n the basi s of a confli ct of intere st de novo
. Cabello v
. United States , 188 F .3d 871, 875 (7th Ci r
. 1999); Spreitzer v
. Peters , 114 F .3d 1435, 1450 (7th Ci r
. 1997). A cri minal defendant is entitled to couns el whose undivided loy alties li e wi th hi s cli ent, United States v
. Jeffers , 520 F .2d 1256, 1263 (7th Ci r
. 1975), and an atto rney who has an actual confli ct of intere st breaches hi s duty of loy alty , Strickland v
. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (ci tin g Cuyl er v
. Sul livan , 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980))

. In arg uing that Byrd and Fagan had actual confli cts of int e r e st, V

olpentesta ci tes statements they made when called upo n to answer V olpentesta’s clai ms of ineffec

tiv eness: “[I]n tw o m onths, w e’re going to be expected to try to sell to a jury Mr

. V

olpentesta’s v eraci ty and that he’s an indi vidual that should be beli ev ed, that hi s t esti mony should be beli ev ed, y et w e hav e to k e e p coming in here tim e and again and addressing what are blatant and [si c] mi srepresentat i ons by hi m. It’ s becoming increasingly diffi cult to, in goo d fai th, be able to mak e those types of repr esentations to the jury

. At thi s poin t, I beli ev e that they can sti ll beNo. 11-2187 15 made, but thi s i s taxing on ev ery one’s patien ce, Y our Hono r .” “Judge, the only thing I w ould add i s that i f w e’v e been ineffec tiv e at all i t’s in not motioning the Court t o h a v e [ V o l p e n t e s t a ] a n a l y z e d b y a psychologis t ... .” “Judge, i f I may

, I w ould li ke ev ery one to back [u p] and just observ e what’s taking place here. W e are
now li tigating the case for the g ov ernment. I mean,

w e’re r e sp onding to a motion that w e nev er fi led and are presentin g to the Court our justifi cati ons for not fi ling i t. The government mi ght as w ell step out. I mean, we’v e arg ued their case for them. I mean, thi s i s somewhat Kafkaesque, Judge.” Byrd and Fagan had confli cts of intere st, V olpentesta asserts, becau se they w ere force d t o accu se their cli ent of deliberate falseh oods in or der to defend themselv es again st allegatio n s of ineffec tiv eness. V olpentesta there fore clai ms that Byrd and Fagan breached their duty of loy alty to hi m by acting
as “both couns elor and wi tness for th e prosecuti on.” United States v
. Ellison , 798 F .2d 1102, 1107 (7th Ci r
. 1986 ). But V olpentesta’s relianc e on Ellison i s mis placed. In t hat case the defendant alleged that hi s atto rney advis ed hi m to plead gui lty in or der to curry the atto rney’ s fav or wi th the “federal people.” Id

. at 1104. Becaus e hi s cli ent’s statements to the court exposed hi m to malpracti ce, the atto rney could only defend hi mself by contradic tin g hi s cli ent. W e held that, in being called to testif y at hi s cli ent’s Rule 32 motion hearin g, the att o r ne y had an actual confli ct of intere st becau se he w as “not able to pursue16 No. 11-2187
hi s cli ent’s best intere sts free from the influ ence of hi s concern about possi

ble self- incri minati on.” Id

. at 1107. Therefore , w e sai d, in testif

yin g again st hi s cli ent, the atto rney “acted as both
couns elor and wi tness for the pro secu tion.” Id

. These concerns are not present in thi s case. The statements made by Byr d and F agan, whi le certainly bor n o f fr ustration, do not evinc e confli cts of intere st. What V olpentesta character

i zes as a “breach of loy alty” i s in tr uth hi s atto rneys’ exasperation wi th their demanding cli ent. Furt hermor e, V olpentesta’s
ov erly broad reading of Ellison w ould effecti v ely allow cli ents to “create” a confli ct merely by accu sing their atto rneys of ineffec tiv eness and there by forcing them to defend themselv es to the court. Giv en the frequency wi th whi ch cli e nt s r e quest
su bs titute couns el, such a broad rule w ould hav e sweep ing and unwelcome implic ations for the abi li ty of appointed atto rneys to defend their cli en t s. W e agr ee wi th courts that hav e had occasi on to addre ss thi s i ssu e, see United States v
. Whi te , 174 F .3d 290 (2d Cir

. 1999), in r ejecting such an unw arranted change in t he l a w
. W e affi rm the di stric t court’s deci si on not to remove couns e l o n the basi s of a confli ct of intere st. B. V

olpentesta’s W

ai v er o f hi s Ri ght t o Co uns el W e now turn to V

o l pentesta’s asserti ons that he di d not kno win g ly

, v oluntarily

, and intelli gently w ai v e hi s right to
couns el. It i s w ell-establi shed that a cr imin al defendant may forg o repr esentation and conduct hi s own defense, no matter how unw i se that deci si on may be. Faretta v
. California , 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). Whi le the Constituti on “does not force a lawy er upon a defendant,” Adams v

. United States ex rel. McCann , 317No. 11-2187 17
U.S. 269, 279 (1942), the dist r i ct judge mus t ensure that the defendant’s deci si on to w ai v e hi s right to couns el i s knowing,
v oluntary

, and intelli gent, Iow a v
. T ovar , 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004) (ci tin g Johnson v
. Zerbst, 30 4 U

. S

. 458, 464 (1938))

. W e rev i ew the di stric t court’s finding of knowing and v oluntary w ai v er for an abus e of di screti on. United States v
. T odd, 424 F

. 3 d 525, 530 n. 1 (7th Ci r . 2005). V olpentesta first argues that t he di stric t court, by deny ing hi s repeat ed motions to sub sti tute atto rneys, r e nder ed V olpent e st a ’ s w ai v er of hi s right to couns el inv oluntary

. He clai ms that he w as effecti v el y coerced into w ai ving couns el becau se Byrd and Fagan refused t o subpoena the wi tnesses and documents he requested and other wi se meet hi s expectations of perfor manc e. Therefore , V olpentesta arg ues, he felt he had no choi ce but to repr esent hi mself in or der to put fort h an adequate defense. I nd e e d , t he di stric t court deni ed V olpentesta’s second motion to repr esent himself after V olpentesta made comments that hi s “hand w as being forced” by the court ’s refusal to replace hi s attor neys. But V olpentesta mi sch aracter i zes hi s deci si on to proceed pro se by incorre ctly arg uing t ha t he w as presented wi th the i mpossi ble choi ce of ei ther acceptin g the services of incompetent atto rneys or forg oin g repr esentation a l t o g ether

. As di scu ssed supra , V

olpentesta’s atto rneys w ere entirely competent and V

olpentesta’s di sagreement wi th them w as a matter of strat egy

. In no w ay w as V

olpentesta “forced” to repr esent hi mself in or der to obtain competent repr esentation. Rather , he

v oluntarily elected to do so in or der to pursue hi s own uni que vis i on o f ho w the case should be defended. W e rej ect hi s18 No. 11-2187

current efforts to characterize as “inv oluntary ” a choi ce that

w as enti rely of hi s own m akin g. W e also note that ev en i f the co ur t had presented V olpentesta wi th the choice o f accepting Byrd and Fagan’s competent ser v ices or proceeding pro se —whi ch i t di d not—t hat does not mean t ha t V olpentesta’s deci si on w as inv oluntary

. W e hav e prev i ously sai d that where a defendant repeat edly complains of hi s appointed counse l t he di stric t judge may giv e hi m an ulti matum t o e i ther w or k wi th hi s
a tto rneys or repr esent hi mself

. See United States v
. Alden , 527 F .3d 653, 661 (7th Ci r
. 2008), and United States v
. Oreye, 263 F .3d 669, 670 (7th Ci r
. 2001) (di stric t judge’ s ulti matum to defendant to a cc ept hi s atto rney’ s services, hi re priv ate couns el, or proceed pro se di d not effecti v ely coerce defendant into repr esenting hi mself ); United States v
. Irorere, 228 F .3d 816, 826 (7 t h Ci r
. 2000) (defendan t’s conduc t consti tuted a deci si on t o repr esent hi mself after refusing to w or k wi th four appointed

a tto rneys). Becaus e Byrd and Fagan prov i ded compet e nt repr esentation to V

olpentesta in spi te of V olpentesta’s r efus al to cooper ate wi th them , p erhaps such an ulti matum w ould hav e been appropr i ate here. But w e only rais e t he p oin t to emph asi ze that the defendant who refuses to w or k wi th competent appointed couns el does so at hi s own ri sk. W e are also sati sfi ed by the di stric t court ’ s t ho ro ugh questi oning to ensure that V olpentesta di d not feel compelled
or pressured into foreg oin g repr esentation

. I t w as not unti l V olpentesta’s thi rd motion for self- repr e se nt ation that the court, after havin g made exhausti v e inqui ries and receiving V olpentesta’s un equiv ocal affi rmation that hi s deci si on w asNo. 11-2187 19

v oluntary

, gr anted hi s moti on. W e find no ab use of di screti on on the part of the di stric t court in find ing a v oluntary w ai v er
. V olpentesta further asserts that hi s w ai v er o f co uns el w as not knowing and intelli gent. In or der to ensure a knowing and int elli gent w ai v er

, the di stric t court mus t make a defenda nt “aw are o f the dangers and di sadv antages of self- repr esentation, so that the recor d wi ll establi sh that ‘he knows what he i s doin g and hi s choi ce i s made wi th ey es open.’” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quot ing Adams , 317 U.S. at 279). W e consi der four f a c tor s to deter mine whether a defendant’s deci si on to proceed pro se w a s k no wing and informed: (1) whether and to what ext ent the di stric t court co nducted a formal inqui ry into the defendant’s deci si on to repr esent hi mself ; (2) other evidenc e in the recor d that establi shes whether the defendant understood the dangers and di sadv antages of self- repr esentation; (3) the backgro und and exper i ence of the defe nd ant; and (4) the context of the defendant’s deci si on to w ai v e hi s right to
co un sel. United States v
. Sandles , 23 F .3d 1121, 1126 (7th Ci r
. 1994). All four of these facto rs conclu si v ely show that V olpentesta’s w ai v er w as knowing a nd intelli gent. First, the di stric t judge conduc ted sev eral i mpressi v ely detailed di scu ssi ons wi th V

olpentesta that establi shed the defendant under

stood the ris ks of proceeding pro s e
. The court questi oned V olpentesta about hi s educati on, hi s legal exper i en ce , hi s understanding of the charges again st hi m, and hi s understanding of the penalti es he faced i f convic ted. It w as on thi s la st poin t that the judge deni ed V olpentesta’s fir st motion to repr esent hi mself

, as he w as not sati sfi ed that V olpentesta fully understood the indi ctment

. The di stric t judge only gr anted20 No. 11-2187
V olpentesta’s thi rd motion a ft er further inqui ry defini tiv ely sh ow ed that V

olpentesta di d understand the charges again st hi m but w as merely challen gin g the suffi ci ency of th e ind i ctment. V olpentes t a ’ s current asserti ons that he di d not in fact understand the indi ctment are unav ai ling. Second, other evidenc e in the recor d further e s ta b l i she s th at V olpentesta fully comprehended the dangers of repr esenting hi mself

. When questi oned by the judge reg ardin g hi s second motion to repr esent hi mself , V olpentesta stated: “I understand that i t’s not a goo d i dea for me to repr esent myself, and I understand that counse l

– it w ould be better for couns el to be here before me to repr esent me.” There i s nothin g in the recor d that indi cates V

olpentesta di d not completely unde r st a nd his right to couns el or what w ould happen should he proceed pro
se
. Thi rd, V

olpentesta’s backgro und and exper i ence furt her suppor t the di stric t judge’ s finding of a knowing and intel l igent w ai v er
. Backgro und and exper i ence inclu des educati onal achi ev ements, prior exper i ence wi th the legal system, and perfor manc e at tr ia l in the case at bar

. Sandles , 23 F .3d at 1128-29. W

e consider the backgro und and exper i ence of the defendant not in hopes of finding adequate legal tr aining, but
mer ely to gauge whether he appreci ated the gr avity of his

w ai v er
. United States v
. England, 507 F .3d 581, 587 (7th Ci r
. 2007). Here, in response to the di stric t court’s que st ioning, V o lpentesta stated that he had gr aduated from hi gh sch ool wi th a “C” av erag e a nd ha d take n some commu ni ty college cl asses in bus iness
. He also sai d he had owned and oper a t e d
sev eral constructi on bus iness es and had been inv olv ed in approx i mately three bench tr i als as w ell as a bankruptcy

.No. 11-2187 21
V olpentesta had also been a defendant in a federal cri minal
case for bank fraud and the subsequent proceeding for
rev oc ation of hi s supervis ed release. Although V olpentesta di d not r epresent him self in any prior proceedings, a defendant’s prior exper i ence wi th the judi ci al system “t ends to show that he understood the charge again st hi m w as seri ous and that he

w as acc eptin g a r i sk by repr esenting hi mself .” United States v
. T odd, 4 2 4 F .3d 525, 533 (7th Ci r
. 2005) (ci tin g United States v
. Egwao je, 335 F .3d 579, 585-86 (7th Ci r . 2003)). V olpentesta also indi cated hi s fami li arity wi th the statutes charged, the Feder al Rules of Eviden ce, and the Feder al Rule s of Criminal Procedure. T aken in sum, the court’s inqui ry into V olpentesta’s backgro und and exper i ence shows that he w a s w ell aw are of the co ns e quences of hi s w ai v er and that he w as proceeding wi th ey es open to the di ffi culti es he w ould face wit hout
couns el. Fin ally , the context of V

olpentesta’s d e cis i on to repr esent hi mself supp or ts the di stric t judge’ s finding of a knowing
w ai v er
. As di scu ssed abov e, the recor d shows that V olpentesta di sagreed wi th hi s a tto rneys ov er tr i al strat egy : speci fi cally , their refusal to fi le certain motions the y d e e med fri v olous, interv i ew the l a r g e numb er of wi tnesses V olpentesta requeste d , and i mmedi ately prov i de V olpentesta wi th prin ted copi es of di scove r y materials

. The recor d indi cates that V olpentesta’s w ai v er of hi s right to co un sel w as a strat egic d e cis io n he made so that he could pursue the case as he desi red. W

e hav e held th a t a defendant’s tactic al deci si on to proceed pro se supp or ts a finding of a knowing w ai v er
. United States v
. B e ll , 901 F .2d 574, 579 (7th Ci r
. 1990) (defendan t’s

w ai v er of right to couns el w as kn o wing where he elected to22 No. 11-2187
repr esent hi mself becau se hi s atto rney w ould not present an alibidefense) . W

e find nothin g in the c ontex t of V olpentesta’s deci si on to repr esent hi mself that indi cates that hi s w ai v er w as anythin g but knowin g and informed. For these reasons, the di stric t co ur t d i d not abus e i ts di screti on in finding that V olpentesta made a v oluntary , knowing, and intelli gent w ai v er o f hi s ri ght t o counsel.

C. V olpentesta’s Mo tions for a Co ntinuanc e V olpentesta ’ s final arg ument on appeal i s that the di stric t court abus ed i ts di screti on by denying hi s motion for a 90-day continuanc e. T

rial w as ini tiall y sch eduled for Ma r ch 22, 2010. On Mar ch 5, 2010, the di stric t court gr ant e d V o lpentesta’s motion to continue and reset the tr i al date for June 1, 2010. On May 2 1 , 2 010—11 days before tr i al—the court gr anted V olpentesta’s motion to proce e d pro se
. V olpentesta then
mov ed to continue the tr i al for 9 0 d ays. The di stric t judge gr anted V

olpentesta’s motion in part, permi tting hi m a three -week continu an c e
. V ol p e nte s ta n onetheless arg ued, as he does now

, that three w e e ks w as insu ffi ci ent tim e for hi m to prepar e for t rial. W e allow tr i al courts broad di screti on in matter s of continuances and rev erse a di stric t court’s deni al of a continuanc e only upon a finding of an abus e of di screti on a nd a showing of actual prej udi ce. United States v
. Price, 520 F .3d 753, 759-60 (7th C ir

. 2008) (ci tin g United States v
. Miller, 327 F .3d 598, 601 (7 t h C ir

. 2 0 0 3 )). W

e are particu larly reluctant to find an abus e of di screti on where, as in this case, a court deni es a continuanc e to a defendant who deci des to p r o ceed pro se but then complain s of not being prepar ed for tr i al. See United States v
.No. 11-2187 23 Egwao je, 335 F .3d 579, 587-88 (7th Ci r
. 2003). N o ne theless, w e wi ll consi der the following non-exhausti v e li st of factors when deter mining whether a di stric t court abus ed i ts di scr e t ion in denying a motion to continue: (1) the amount of tim e av ai lable for prepar ation; (2) the li kelih ood o f prej udi ce from deni al of the continuanc e; (3) the defendant’s ro le in shortening the effecti v e prepar ation ti me; (4) the degree o f complexi ty of the case; (5) the av ai labi li ty of di scov ery from the prosecuti on; (6) the li kelih ood a continuanc e w ould hav e sati sfi ed the mov ant’s needs; and (7) the inconv eni ence to the di stric t court in li ght of i ts pending case load. Un i te d States v
. W illiams , 576 F .3d 385, 388 (7th Ci r
. 2009). Whi le a tr i al date mus t be adhered to unles s there are “compelling reasons” for gr anting a continuanc e, U n i te d States v
. Reynolds , 189 F .3d 521, 527 (7th Ci r
. 1999), “my opic insi stence” on proceeding to tr i al in the face of a v ali d request for a continuanc e i s not appropr i ate, United States v
. Farr, 297 F .3d 651, 655 (7th Ci r . 2002). Th e di stric t court, after carefully consi dering the above factors, held t hat a three -week continuanc e struck t he proper balance betw een V

olpentesta’s need for addi tional tim e to prepar e for tr i al, the rights of the vic t ims t o be free from further delay

, and the court ’ s calendar

. The di stric t judge found that the thi rd factor—t he defendant’s ro le in shortening the effecti v e prepar ati on tim e—w ei ghed again st a continuanc e becau se V

olpentesta had shortened hi s prepar at io n tim e by decid ing to repr esent hi mself on the ev e of tr i al. Whi le V olpentesta should surely not be penalized for w ai ving hi s right to couns el, the court reasoned, he should li kewi se not be
rew arded for di smi ssing hi s atto rneys who w ould hav e been

r e a dy to proceed to tr i al on tim e. How ev er , the court furthe r24 No. 11-2187
found that the other s i x f actor s w ei ghed in fav or of a continuance and that delayin g th e t rial by three w eeks w ould suffi

ci ently addr ess V

olpentesta’s concerns. V olpentesta now arg ues, as he di d before the di stric t court, that the schedule the judge adopted was unreali sti c in li ght of the v olu minous di scov ery V olpentesta receiv ed in Februar y and Mar ch of 2010. Becaus e approx i mately 9,000 pages of di scov ery were tendere d to hi m in the month s l e a d ing up to tr i al, V olpentesta clai ms that i t w as unreasonable to expect hi m to be prepar ed by the June 21 tr i al date. But thi s beli es the fact that V olpentest a a l r eady used thi s di scov ery as the basi s for asking the court to continue the case from March 22 to June 1, which the court gr anted. V olpentesta also personally repr esented to the court on May 21—one-and-a- half w eeks befo re the June 1 trial date—that he w as fully prepar ed to go to t rial
as sch eduled a nd rais ed no concerns about the di scov ery he receiv ed. Furt her

, V olpentesta does l ittl e more than poin t to the large numb er of documents produced and does not i denti fy any speci fi c di ffi culty he had rev i ewin g t hem. W e find V ol p entesta’s arg uments unav ai ling, and reiterat e what w e hav e sai d befo re: a defendant who elects to proceed pro se on the ev e of tr i al does so at hi s o wn per i l. United States v. Avery, 208 F .3d 597, 603 (7th Ci r
. 2000). An y d iff icul ty V olpentesta had in prepar ing for tr i al w as entirely of hi s own making, and

w e find no abus e of di screti on in the di stric t judge’ s or der gr anting V

olpentesta a t hree-w eek continuan ce. After hi s ini tial motion for a 90-day continuanc e w as deni ed, V

o l p e nt e sta fi led a motion to reconsi der in whi ch he clai med that he had receiv ed further di scov ery that w arr anted

a continuanc e and that he had mi scell aneous tr i al prepar ationNo. 11-2187 25

to complete before the tr i al date. The di stric t judge a g ain consi dered the relev ant factors and deni e d V olpentesta’s motio n, finding that i ts prev i ous deter minati on w as not
err oneous and that ci rcums tances ha d no t changed so as to
w a r r ant an addi tional continuanc e. The court noted that the di scov ery di scl os ur e s V olpentesta complained of w ere not sub stanti v e, but were prim arily the result of p r e -trial inter

view s conduc ted b y the government that were turned ov er to V olpentesta “in an abund ance of cauti on” again st any clai m that Brady or Giglio material had not been di scl osed. The court also stated that the tasks V olpentesta complained of needing to complete had already been tak en into accoun t by t he court in gr anting hi s earli er mot i on to continue. Although i t i s not clear from V olpentesta’s present appeal whether he asks us to rev erse the di stric t court’s deni al of hi s motion to reconsi der

, w e wi ll presume that he does

. W e find
no fault in the di stric t court’s analysi s, howev er , and there fore affi rm i t. First, the di stric t court had already giv en V olpentesta addi tional tim e to complete hi s tr i al prepar ation (putting tog ether a wi tness li st, responding to the government’s motion in limin e, et c. ), so another continuanc e w as not w arr anted on that front. Second, the government’s di scov ery di scl osures (wh i ch amounted to a 78 -p a g e government exhib i t li st and a wi tness li st) di d not merit a continuanc e
. B y r d and Fagan, whom he di smi ssed, w ould almost certainly hav e been prepar ed for t r ial ev en accoun tin g for those new di scl osures, and w e find no abus e of di screti on in t he di stric t court’s judgment that V

olpentesta should hav e been prepar ed as w ell. Follo w in g the d i s tr i c t c ou rt’s deni al of V olpentesta’s motion to reconsi der

, on June 17, 2010, V olpentesta fi led another26 No. 11-2187
motion to continue the tr i al by at least 30 day s. The di stric t court deni ed thi s motion too

. It i s again unc lear from V olpentesta’s bri efing whether he appea l s t he judge’ s or der

. W e wi ll presume that he does, and w e again affi rm the di stric t
co ur t. In supp or t of hi s June 17, 2010 motion to continu e , V olpentesta arg ued that he receiv ed addi tional di scov ery from the government, he needed more tim e to prepar e for tr i al, and he di d not hav e enough acces s to di scov ery materials

. Th e
co urt analyzed the relev ant factors set forth in thi s Court ’s precedent and found a continuanc e to be ina p propr i ate. W e find no err or in the dist r ict court’s or der

. As to V olpentesta’s fi rst complaint, the new di scov ery th a t V ol p e nte s ta c om p l a ined of w as a tw o-page lette r descri bing statements wi tnesses made in p r e-trial interv i ews. V olpentesta’s other concerns had already been adequately consi dered by the court in i ts prev i

ous order denying hi s moti on to reconsi der

. T rial was thus set to commenc e on Mo nday , June 21, 2010. On June 18, V

olpentesta once again mov ed to contin ue
. Th i s tim e, he arg ued t hat the government had not turned over the i maged copi es of hard driv es take n from hi s offi ces—c opies whi ch he clai med contained exculpator y evi d e n c e
. V ol p e ntes ta asserted that the i mage fil e s w e re cruci al to hi s defense and that he needed tim e to examine them before he could proceed t o t r ia l. The di stric t court deni ed V olpentesta’s motion to continue, and we affi rm. In i ts or der denying V

olpentesta’s motion the di stric t judge
once again thor oughly analyzed the sev en factors a court mus t
co nsi der when ev aluating a motion t o continue. As the ju d g e explain ed in hi s or der

, V olpentesta w as entirely responsible for shortening the effecti v e prepar ation tim e wi th re sp e ct to theNo. 11-2187 27
i mage fi les. V

olpentesta w ai ted unti l the li ter al e ve of tr i al to bring the fi les to the court’s atte nti on despi te ample ev i dence that he w as aw are much earlier that the fi les w ere no t in hi s possess i on. In hi s briefing, V olpentesta clai ms that he di d not
r a ise the i mage fi le i ssu e wi th the court prior becau se he
assu med that the fi les w ere in the di sks hi s atto rneys gav e hi m when he elected to proceed pro se, and he di d not di scov er that the i mages w ere mi ssing unti l June 17, 2010. How e v er , as the di stric t court not e d, V olpentesta adv anced the hard driv e i mage i ssu e in hi s May 24, 2010 motion to continue. The court gr anted V

olpentesta a three -week continuanc e so that he could take care of necess ary tr i al prepar atio n, and assu med that i f V olpentesta desi red the fil es he w ould hav e made a Feder al Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)( 1)(E) requ e st to copy the mi rr or ed hard driv e in the government’s possess i on. V olpentesta made no such request, nor di d he bring the mi ssing fi les to the di stric t court’s atte nti on in hi s June 8, 2010 motion to reconsi der or hi s June 17, 2010 motion to continue. N o t only are V

olpentesta’s clai ms that he w as ignorant of the mi ssing fi le s un t i l June 17 sus pi ci ously dev oid of corr obor ation, but i t defi es reason that V olpentesta w ould not notic e that the fi les w ere mi ssing unti l the Fr i day before hi s Monday tr i al date i f they w ere a s cr i tic al as he clai ms. W e there fore agr ee wit h the di stric t court that V olpentesta’s fai lure to rais e the i ssu e earlier shorte ned hi s effecti v e prepar ation ti me. The di stric t court also deter mined that V olpentesta had not adequately shown how he w ould be prej udi ced by the court’s deni al of hi s motion for a continuanc e or how a continuanc e
w ould sati sfy hi s need s. V olpentesta clai med that the i mage fi les could contain emai ls showing hi s goo d fai th efforts to28 No. 11-2187
resolv e i ssu es wi th h ome b uy ers, excu lpator y ph oto s of w or k done p ro perly

, and payment recor ds. Bu t V olpentesta has y et to offer more than conjecture at what c ou ld be in t he fi les, not what he knows them to contain. E ven now , in hi s bri efing be fo r e thi s Court, V

olpentesta states that he had “hoped to find” the i tems li ste d a bo ve in the i mage fi les, and that he “beli ev ed that the computers contained” thi s v aguely exculpator y evidenc e. Gi v en the hi gh degr ee of unc ert ainty that these fi les contained anything that w ould hav e ai ded V olpentesta’s defense, w e find no a buse of di screti on in the di stric t court’s finding that a co nt inuanc e w ould do li ttle to sati sfy V olpentesta’s needs and that denying V olpentesta’s las t-di tch effort t o delay t rial w ould not pr ejudic e hi m. The di stric t court further deter mined that the complexi ty of the case and the av ai labi li ty of di scov ery from the prosecuti on di d not wei gh in V

olpentesta’s f av or

, and we do notdi sagree. W e also agr ee in full wi th the court’s judgment that gr anting V olpentesta another continuanc e w ould i mpose a si gni fi cant burden on t he court’s sch edule as well as on the rights of vic tim s to pro ceedings free from unreasonable delay

. T aken insum, w e find that the di stric t c ourtdi d not abuse i ts di screti on in gr a nt ing V olpentesta a continuanc e and denying hi s three sub sequent motions. The d i stric t court ensured that V

olpentesta had suffi ci ent tim e to prepar e for hi s tr i al whi le also giving proper consi derat i on to th e r ig ht s of vic tim s and the needs of the court. In addressing V olpentesta’s motions for continuanc es, the di stric t judge nev er chose a ny option th a t w as “not wi thin the range of permi ssi ble options from whic h w e w ould expect the tr i al judge to choose underNo. 11-2187 29
the ci rcums tances.” United States v
. Depoister, 116 F .3d 292, 294 (7th Ci r . 1997). W

e ther efore affi rm.

III . Conclus i on For the abov e reasons, w e AFF IR M V olpentesta’s convic

tion.