took no further action to pursue the matter, but appellant, through her 

own counsel, filed a motion to compel arbitration in the district court. The 

district court denied the motion on the grounds that the collective 

bargaining agreement was between the City and the Association, and 

therefore appellant, as an individual employee, did not have standing to 

compel arbitration. This appeal followed. 

Whether standing exists is a question of law subject to de novo 

review. Ruiz v. City of N. Las Vegas, 127 Nev. „ 255 P.3d 216, 219 

(2011). Additionally, a determination as to whether a dispute is arbitrable 

involves questions of contractual construction, which this court also 

reviews de novo. Clark Cnty. Public Emps. Ass'n v. Pearson, 106 Nev. 587, 

590, 798 P.2d 136, 137 (1990). 

On appeal, this court is asked to determine whether appellant, 

as an individual employee member of the Association, has standing to 

move to compel her employer to arbitrate under the collective bargaining 

agreement between the employer and the Association. We agree with the 

district court's determination that she does not. The collective bargaining 

agreement provides that if, after the Association submits the grievance on 

behalf of the employee, the city manager and the Association cannot reach 

a "mutually satisfactory settlement," then "the Association shall have the 

right to submit the matter to arbitration." This language indicates that 

only the Association, and not its individual members, has the right to 

pursue arbitration. Cf. Ruiz, 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 220-21 

(concluding that an individual employee member of the Association is not 

a "party" to the arbitration based on the language of the collective 

bargaining agreement). 

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Moreover, the Association cannot assign its right to pursue 

arbitration to the individual employee because doing so would materially 

increase the City's obligations under the collective bargaining agreement 

in situations where the Association has decided, at any point during the 

grievance process, not to pursue arbitration. See id. at , 255 P.3d at 

221-22 (explaining that under the traditional principles of contract law, 

the union could not assign its right to challenge an arbitration decision 

because doing so would increase the city's obligations or risks and the 

collective bargaining agreement did not expressly provide for assignment). 

To the extent that appellant attempts to distinguish Ruiz as involving 

different factual circumstances and a different point in the arbitration 

process, we note that other jurisdictions have rejected the proposition that 

an employee may compel arbitration under circumstances similar to the 

ones presented here. See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co., Inc. v. Int'l Ass'n of 

Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1962) (concluding 

that when the terms in the collective bargaining agreement do not give an 

individual employee the right to compel the employer to arbitrate, that 

employee has no standing to do so); Thomas v. Thompson Sch. Dist. R2-J, 

749 P.2d 966, 967-68 (Colo. App. 1987) (concluding that only the union, 

and not an individual teacher, has standing pursuant to the terms of the 

collective bargaining agreement to compel the school district to arbitrate 

the grievance, even if the union initially requested arbitration); see also 

Wilcoxson v. Tackett, 41 P.3d 1024, 1027 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) 

(recognizing that language in a collective bargaining agreement that 

limits the right to compel arbitration to the parties is not unusual). And 

in responding to the City of North Las Vegas's arguments in this regard, 

appellant fails to cite to any contrary authority allowing an employee to 

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compel arbitration under circumstances similar to those presented here. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.' 

cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge 

Craig A. Hoppe, Settlement Judge 

Law Office of Daniel Marks 

North Las Vegas City Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

'To the extent that appellant's arguments have not been addressed, 

we conclude that they lack merit. Further, to the extent that appellant 

has inquired as to what alternative remedies are available to the 

individual employee if the court denies standing to individual employees 

to compel arbitration, this court does not issue advisory opinions. See 

Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. „ 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010) 

(explaining that "[t]his court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but, 

rather, to resolve actual controversies by an enforceable judgment"). 

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