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93–599 PDF 2015

THE RAPID ACT; THE SUNSHINE FOR 

REGULATORY DECREES AND SETTLEMENTS ACT 

OF 2015; AND THE SCRUB ACT OF 2015 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

REGULATORY REFORM, 

COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON

H.R. 348, H.R. 712, and H.R. 1155 

MARCH 2, 2015 

Serial No. 114–14 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DAVE TROTT, Michigan 

MIKE BISHOP, Michigan 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas, Vice-Chairman 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DAVE TROTT, Michigan 

MIKE BISHOP, Michigan 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

DANIEL FLORES, Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 2, 2015 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Tom Marino, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law .................................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Henry C. ‘‘Hank’’ Johnson, Jr., a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Georgia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ................................................. 3 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 4 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 5 

WITNESSES 

William L. Kovacs, Senior Vice President, Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

Sam Batkins, Director of Regulatory Policy, American Action Forum 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 35 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 37 

Patrick A. McLaughlin, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at 

George Mason University 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 47 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 49 

Amit Narang, Regulatory Policy Advocate, Public Citizen 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 56 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 59 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Material submitted by the Honorable Doug Collins, a Representative in Congress from the State of Georgia, and Member, Subcommittee on Regulatory 

Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ............................................................ 73 

Material submitted by the Honorable Henry C. ‘‘Hank’’ Johnson, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Georgia, and Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law .......... 81 

Material submitted by the Honorable Tom Marino, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ........................................ 137 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Letter from Blake Hurst, President, Missouri Farm Bureau Federation ........... 144 

Response to Questions for the Record from William L. Kovacs, Senior Vice 

President, Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber 

of Commerce ......................................................................................................... 145 

Questions for the Record submitted to and Response from Amit Narang, 

Regulatory Policy Advocate, Public Citizen ....................................................... 154 
Page

IV 

H.R. 348, the ‘‘Responsibly And Professionally Invigorating Development 

(RAPID) Act of 2015’’ ........................................................................................... 162 

H.R. 712, the ‘‘Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2015’’ 195 

Text of H.R. ll, the ‘‘Searching for and Cutting Regulations that are Unnecessarily Burdensome (SCRUB) Act of 2015’’ ...................................................... 210 

Introduced Version of H.R. 1155, the ‘‘Searching for and Cutting Regulations 

that are Unnecessarily Burdensome (SCRUB) Act of 2015’’ ............................ 239 
(1) 

THE RAPID ACT; THE SUNSHINE FOR REGULATORY DECREES AND SETTLEMENTS ACT 

OF 2015; AND THE SCRUB ACT OF 2015 

MONDAY, MARCH 2, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:01 p.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Tom Marino 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Marino, Goodlatte, Issa, Collins, Ratcliffe, Trott, Bishop, Johnson, Conyers and Peters. 

Staff Present: (Majority) Daniel Flores, Subcommittee Chief 

Counsel; Andrea Lindsey, Clerk; and (Minority) Slade Bond, Counsel. 

Mr. MARINO. Good afternoon. I want to thank you for being here, 

and the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and 

Antitrust Law will come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair’s authorized to declare recesses of 

the Committee at any time. 

We welcome everyone to today’s hearing on H.R. 348, the ‘‘Responsibly And Professionally Invigorating Development Act of 

2015,’’ also known as the ‘‘RAPID Act,’’ H.R. 712, the ‘‘Sunshine for 

Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2015,’’ and H.R. 1155, 

the ‘‘Searching for and Cutting Regulations that are Unnecessarily 

Burdensome (SCRUB) Act of 2015.’’ 

I will recognize myself for my opening statement. The American 

historical record has always been, ‘‘the worse the recession, the 

stronger the recovery.’’ Regrettably for many Americans I think we 

can all agree the recovery from the recession has been anything but 

strong. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in 

the 10 previous recessions since the depression, the economy recovered all jobs lost during the recession after an average of 25 

months from the prior jobs peek. 

Under the current Administration however, it took until June 

2014, 78 months after the prior jobs peek or 6 and a half years 

later for even The New York Times to claim we had recovered all 

of the recession’s job losses. Besides losing paychecks, many of 

Americans have lost the dignity and satisfaction that comes from 
2 

earning a living and supporting a family with a full time job. No 

government benefit can compensate a person for that. 

Americans are ready to work. Employers are eager to create jobs, 

if only the government could just get out of the way. As we will 

hear from the witnesses today the job opportunities are here on 

U.S. soil. A study of proposed projects in just one sector of the economy, the energy sector found that if a modest number of these 

projects were allowed to go forward and break ground and the direct and indirect economic benefits would be tremendous. It identified 351 projects if approved to generate $1.1 trillion and create 1.9 

million jobs annually. 

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s study, Project No Project, 

looked at the potential economic impact of permitting challenges 

faced by U.S. companies attempting to propose new energy 

projects. For example, Penn-Mar Ethanol attempted to construct an 

ethanol reducing plant in Conoy Township Pennsylvania, but 

neighboring Hellam Township sent a letter to—excuse me, Conoy 

Township’s board of supervisors objecting to the ethanol plan. 

Hellam Townships objections included environmental risks to the 

surrounding area and a risk of causing the beautiful area surrounding the Susquehanna River to become an undesirable site. Is 

that when we mean when we talk about negative environmental 

impact and obstructed scenic view? Certainly job creators can’t be 

effective in creating jobs until such an over expansive extreme regime. 

After hearing about the numerous projects currently awaiting approval, many of us might be asking ourselves if the workers are 

here, and the jobs are here, then what’s keeping workers idle? 

Well, I will tell you, it is our outdated, burdensome, convoluted, 

Federal permitting process that has become a hotbed for the environmental extremists looking to hold up infrastructure of building 

and growth that our country so desperately needs. 

Today there is no limit to the objections various agencies can 

raise. Environmental reviews not uncommonly take up to a decade 

or more holding jobs hostage in the process. Antigrowth, 

antipermitting advocates meanwhile can lie in the weeds for another 6 years once a permit is finally granted, before ambushing 

good faith project developers with dilatory job and project killing 

litigation. 

Instead of empowering businesses to be the engine of our economy, we instead tie them up with thousands of pages of decisions 

in interminable administrative and litigation delays. This is incomprehensible to anyone but a specialist, a costly legal team or a socalled advocacy group that seeks to kill economic activity and the 

jobs in growth for hardworking Americans that come with it. 

I introduced the RAPID Act to right the ship, restore balance and 

impose sanity on our Federal permitting system. My esteemed colleague Mr. Collins from Georgia and Mr. Smith from Missouri similarly introduced the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act and the SCRUB Act to achieve the same thing in litigation that seeks to force new regulations in an effort to clear from 

the code of Federal regulations overburdensome regulations we no 

longer need. 
3 

The key to these reforms is balance, and each of these reforms 

has that. My RAPID Act strikes the right balance between conservation, and deployment, and development. 

The Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlement Act strikes 

the right balance between respect for plaintiffs and defendant’s 

right and regulatory litigation in fairness to regulate entities in 

State coregulators that must bear the burden of living under and 

implementing new regulations. 

And the SCRUB Act strikes the right balance between keeping 

regulations we still need in scrubbing from the books regulations 

that are unnecessary obstacles to jobs and growth. I thank our witnesses for attending and sharing their valuable expertise with us 

and look forward to their testimony. 

It is my pleasure now to recognize the gentleman from Georgia, 

the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, 

Commercial and Antitrust Law, Congressman Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In 1981 a professor of law at the University of Chicago described 

the difference between the parties as quite simple, while cautioning 

Republicans against the fervent pursuit of regulatory reform stating, Democrats want to run the country and Republicans don’t 

want them to. Republicans seem delighted in the prospect of legislation that will make change more difficult. Where government action is needed by the private sector as it is for the licensing of new 

nuclear plants, the procedural safeguards and judicial review protections so carefully nurtured in other contexts by the corporate 

bar have proven to be a Frankenstein, affording licensing opponents, unlimited opportunities to impose costly delays. 

The professor concluded that regulatory reform measures do not 

deter regulation, they deter change no matter the cost of inaction. 

That professor would go on to become an Associate Justice of the 

United States Supreme Court and his name, none other than 

Antonin Scalia. It is indeed rare for me to quote Justice Scalia in 

any context, let alone with approval, but I’m struck by the prescience of the Justice over 3 decades ago in describing the shortsighted nature of proponents of regulatory reform. 

During today’s hearing this Subcommittee will consider three 

pieces of legislation that do absolutely nothing to protect the public 

interest, grow the economy or create jobs. The only connection between these bills is their bold corporatism. H.R. 348, the so-called 

Responsibly and Professionally Invigorating Development Act of 

2015 will result in widespread confusion and delay in the review 

and permitting process under the National Environmental Policy 

Act by carving out a separate environmental review process for 

construction projects, which the bill doesn’t even define. And if an 

agency fails to meet the unrealistic deadlines mandated by H.R. 

348, the bill would automatically green light a project regardless of 

whether the agency has thoroughly reviewed the project’s risks. 

This legislation is a solution feverishly in search of a problem. 

The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service reported in 2012 

that project approval delays based on environmental requirements 

are not caused by NEPA, but are more often tied to local, State and 

project specific factors, primarily local state agency priorities, 
4 

project funding levels, local opposition to a project, project complexity or late changes in project scope. 

I also have serious concerns with H.R. 712, the ‘‘Sunshine for 

Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2015.’’ Consent decrees 

and settlement agreements help ensure that agencies take necessary action by a certain date. The Government Accountability Office also reported in December of 2014 that there is zero evidence 

indicating that agencies collude with public interest groups in 

bringing these consent decrees that the Chamber has often 

claimed. 

H.R. 712 would allow for nearly any private party to intervene 

in a consent decree revealing the legislation’s true purpose of stacking the deck in industry’s favor to avoid the enforcement of the law. 

Lastly, H.R. 1155, the ‘‘SCRUB Act’’ is a one-way ratchet with 

the sole aim of prioritizing cost over benefits through the reckless 

elimination of rules without consideration of their benefits. This 

legislation would shift the cost of rules from corporations to consumers while posing substantial burdens and delays to agencies 

undermining public health and safety. It is indeed an act that 

should be scrubbed. 

In closing, I strongly oppose each of these deregulatory train 

wrecks that comprise the subject of today’s hearing. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

It is now my pleasure to recognize the Chairman of the full Judiciary Committee, the gentleman from Virginia, Chairman Bob 

Goodlatte. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

America’s voters sent the 114th Congress to Washington to do 

one thing above all other others, help turn around this Nation’s 

struggling economy. From the outset of the term, the Judiciary 

Committee has responded to that mandate with urgently needed 

reforms of Washington’s regulatory system. A system that virtually 

every day places new obstacles in the path of American jobs and 

economic growth. 

Already the House has passed two critical Judiciary Committee 

regulatory reform bills. The Regulatory Accountability Act to force 

regulators to account for and control far better the excessive cost 

of new regulations and the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility 

Improvements Act to force regulators finally to accommodate better 

the needs of small businesses when they issue new regulations. 

Today’s hearing considers three more integral parts of the Judiciary Committee’s regulatory reform package, the RAPID Act, the 

Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act and the 

Searching for and Cutting Regulations That Are Unnecessarily 

Burdensome or SCRUB Act. 

The RAPID Act contains common sense reform to streamline permitting for Federally funded and Federally permitted construction 

projects. It gives lead agencies more power to conduct and conclude 

efficient interagency reviews of permit requests and requires lawsuits that challenge permitting decisions to be filed within 6 

months of the decisions. These are simple but powerful reforms 

that will allow good projects to move forward more quickly delivering high quality jobs and improvements to American daily lives. 
5 

The Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act curbs 

the abuse of sue and settle consent decrees and settlement agreements to force through new regulations under judicial authority 

without adequate consideration of the views of those who are regulated and of the States who so often must shoulder the hard work 

of implementing Federal regulatory decisions. 

Finally, the SCRUB Act institutes a blue ribbon commission to 

help identify and eliminate costly regulations that can safely be removed from the code of regulations. These include, for example, 

regulations that have achieved their purpose and are no longer 

truly needed, imposed paperwork burdens that can be reduced substantially without significantly undercutting regulatory effectiveness or impede the new introduction of new, safer and more efficient technologies. 

Opponents of these bills contend that there are no problems with 

regulations or that these bills overreact to the problems and would 

bring needed regulatory actions to a halt. The American people 

know better. In the middle of it this winter’s historic cold, ask any 

worker displaced by a new ideologically driven power plant regulation how warm they are as they continue in vain to look for a new 

job. 

Ask any farmer who fears that the Environmental Protection 

Agency’s new Waters of the United States rule will place Federal 

permitting shackles on the use of their property because once in a 

while there is a puddle in a middle of field. 

Ask municipality and manufacturers across the country that will 

not be able to grow because of the EPA’s new ozone rule, the most 

costly single regulation ever issued. Like each bill in the Judiciary 

Committee’s regulatory reform package, each of these bills contains 

well thought out balanced reforms. They allow needed regulatory 

actions to take place but provide for more transparency, more public input and more accountability in the regulatory process. They 

also provide for more efficient decisionmaking and more effective 

tools to prevent or remove from the books regulatory actions that 

are not needed, are ill-considered or are the overreaching fruits of 

back door sweetheart negotiations between regulators and pro regulatory advocates. 

I urge my colleagues to consider well and support these important pieces of legislation. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

And I yield back, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. 

It is new my pleasure to recognize the Judiciary Committee 

Ranking Member, Mr. Conyers of Michigan for his opening statement. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

We seem to have on the Committee very differing views of what 

we’re going to be talking about today, I suppose the witnesses have 

picked up on that already. 

I’d like to describe what I think are three thoroughly flawed bills, 

and I begin with H.R. 348 the misleadingly titled ‘‘Responsibly And 

Professionally Invigorating Development Act of 2015.’’ Rather than 

making real reforms to the process which Federal agencies undertake environmental impact reviews as required by the National En-
6 

vironmental Policy Act, this legislation will make this process less 

responsible, less professional and less accountable. 

I think that will come out during the course of our discussion between us today. But worse yet this measure could jeopardize public 

health and safety by prioritizing speed over meaningful analysis. 

Under the guise of streamlining the approval process, the bill forecloses potentially critical input from various stakeholders, including Federal, State and local agencies for construction projects that 

are Federally funded or that require Federal approval. 

Disturbingly, this measure could even allow such projects to be 

approved before the required review is completed. As a result, H.R. 

348 could allow projects to proceed that put public health and safety at risk. These failings along with many others explain why the 

Administration and the President’s Council on Environmental 

Quality, along with 25 respected environmental groups, including 

the Audubon Society, the League of Conservation Voters, Natural 

Resources Defense Council and the Sierra Club strenuously oppose 

similar legislation considered in the last Congress. 

The next bill, H.R. 712, the ‘‘Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees 

and Settlements Act of 2015,’’ has a simple goal, to greatly discourage the use of settlement agreements and consent decrees by Federal agencies when they fail to meet their regulatory obligations as 

mandated by Congress. 

Why is this bill problematic? Well, here are a few reasons, as 

with the prior bill, H.R. 712 would effectively delay the implementation of regulatory protections, thereby jeopardizing public health 

and safety. For example, the bill gives opponents of regulation multiple opportunities to stifle rulemaking by allowing essentially any 

third party who is affected by the regulatory action at issue in a 

covered civil action to intervene in that civil action subject to rebuttal, to participate in settlement negotiations, and to submit public 

comments about a proposed consent decree or settlement agreement that agencies would be required to respond to before such decree or agreement can be entered in court. 

Remember, Federal agencies are often sued for their failure to 

meet their statutory obligations, including missing rulemaking 

deadlines. Consent decrees and settlement agreements help to enforce the statutory mandates and assure that these agencies meet 

their obligations by a date certain. But, H.R. 712 would needlessly 

impede this enforcement process by imposing an extensive series of 

burdensome requirements on agencies seeking to enter into consent 

decrees or settlement agreements. 

A broad coalition of civil rights, environmental consumer protection, and other public interest groups opposed a substantially similar bill considered in the 112th and the 113th Congresses. These 

organizations include the Alliance for Justice, the American Association for Justice, the Center for Food Safety, the Defenders of 

Wildlife, Earth Justice, the Natural Resources Defense Council and 

the Center for Effective Government and Public Citizen. Additionally, the Administration threatened to veto H.R. 712’s predecessor 

from the 112th Congress, stating that it would spawn excessive 

regulatory litigation and introduce redundant processes for litigation settlements. 
7 

And finally, we have H.R. 1155, the ‘‘Searching for and Cutting 

Regulations that are Unnecessarily Burdensome Act of 2015’’ or for 

short the ‘‘SCRUB Act.’’ Most observers would agree in principle 

that retrospective review of existing regulations is a good idea. 

Agencies should periodically assess whether the rules they have 

promulgated are as effective as they can be or whether they are 

even necessary in light of changed circumstances. Unfortunately, 

the SCRUB Act would not simply require retrospective review, instead it is yet another attempt to hobble the ability of agencies to 

regulate and thereby prevent them from protecting public health 

and safety based on unsubstantiated rhetoric that regulations inhibit economic growth. 

As a threshold matter, the central feature of the bill is the establishment of a commission to identify rules that should be eliminated. The commission would effectively be able to second guess 

the judgments of Congress and the agencies with respect to the 

need for certain rules and the science and analysis warranting such 

rule. 

The bill reflects a blatantly one sized, unbalanced approach to 

retrospective review. For example, virtually all of the bills objectives and mechanisms are one-way ratchet. The measure is designed to result in the repeal or amendment of a rule only to eliminate or reduce costs regardless of the rules benefits. Tellingly, H.R. 

1155 does absolutely nothing to promote actions that would enhance the benefits of rules. 

In closing these measures threaten critical public health and 

safety protections. It’s a shame that the majority has chosen to 

largely ignore the concerns of my colleagues and I have previously 

identified with these bills. 

I thank the witnesses for appearing today and look forward to 

their testimony. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. 

Without objection, other Members opening statements will be 

made part of the record. 

We have a very distinguished panel before us today. 

And I will begin by swearing in our witnesses before introducing 

them. 

If you would please rise and raise your right hand. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the 

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Please let the record reflect that all the witnesses have responded in the affirmative, and you may be seated, gentlemen. 

Our first witness is Mr. William Kovacs. Mr. Kovacs provides the 

overall direction, strategy and management for the environment, 

technology and regulatory affairs division as senior vice president 

of the division at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Since he joined 

the Chamber in March 1998, Mr. Kovacs has transformed a small 

division, concentrated on a handful of issues in Committee meetings into one of most significant in the organization. His division 

initiates and leads campaign issue campaigns on energy, legislation, complex environmental rulemaking, telecommunications reform, emerging technologies and applying sound science to the Federal regulatory process. 
8 

Mr. Kovacs previously served as chief counsel and staff director 

for the House Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce. He 

earned his J.D. from the Ohio State University College of Law and 

a Bachelor’s degree of science degree from the University of Scranton magna cum laude. 

Welcome, sir. 

Mr. KOVACS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MARINO. Sir, I’m going to introduce everybody and then we 

will come back, do it that way. 

Our second witness is Mr. Sam Batkins. Mr. Batkins is director 

of regulatory policy at the American Action Forum. Mr. Batkins research focuses on the rulemaking efforts of administrative agencies 

and related efforts of Congress. His work has appeared in The Wall 

Street Journal, The New York Times, the Hill, National Review 

Online, Reuters, the Washington Post among other publications. 

Prior to joining the Forum, Mr. Batkins worked at the U.S. 

Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform and National 

Taxpayers Union. At the U.S. Chamber he focused on lawsuit 

abuse, tort reform and Federal regulations. At the National Taxpayers Union he focused on State and Federal spending. Mr. 

Batkins received his B.A. in political science summa cum laude 

from Sewanee, University of the South. He received his J.D. from 

Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. Welcome, 

sir. 

Our next witness is Dr. Patrick McLaughlin. Am I pronouncing 

that correctly? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Yes. 

Mr. MARINO. Dr. McLaughlin is senior research fellow at the 

Mercatus Center for George Mason University. His research focuses on regulation and the regulatory process with additional interest in environmental economics, international trade, industrial 

organization, and transportation economics. And his research is 

regularly published. 

Prior to joining Mercatus, Dr. McLaughlin served as a senior 

economist at the Federal railway administration in the United 

States Department of Transportation. Dr. McLaughlin has published in the fields of law and economics, public choice environmental economics and international trade. He owns a Ph.D. in economics from Clemson University, and welcome to you, sir. 

And our final witness is Mr. Amit Narang. 

Mr. NARANG. Very good. 

Mr. MARINO. Good. Mr. Narang is the regulatory policy advocate 

for Public Citizen and specializes on issues related to the Federal 

regulatory process. Prior to working for Public Citizen, Mr. Narang 

worked at the Administrative Law Review as an articles editor. 

Mr. Narang has many media appearances, including quotes in 

The New York Times and Bloomberg BNA, formerly the Bureau of 

National Affairs, Mr. Narang is a graduate of the American University, Washington College of Law. And thank you, sir. 

Each of the witnesses’ testimonies or written statements will be 

entered into the record in its entirety. I ask that each witness summarize his testimony in 5 minutes or less. And to help you stay 

within that time, there is a timing light in front of you. The light 
9 

will switch from green to yellow, indicating that you 1 minute to 

conclude your testimony. 

And when the light turns red it indicates that your 5 minutes 

have expired. And if you go over that a little bit, that’s not a real 

problem, I’ll just tap to give you an indication that perhaps you 

could wrap up for us. 

With that, I’m going to call on Mr. Kovacs for his opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. KOVACS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENT, TECHNOLOGY & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 

Mr. KOVACS. Thank you, Chairman Marino and Ranking Member 

Johnson and Members of the Committee for inviting me here today 

to testify on H.R. 348, currently known as RAPID, which addresses 

permit streamlining, and H.R. 712, which we refer to as the Sunshine Act, and that would bring transparency to the sue and settle 

process which enables interest groups to set agency priorities. 

When we discuss regulatory reform it is usually about Federal 

agency accountability, transparency, public participation and efficiency, but one of the points that we’ve been making lately is regulatory reform is also about Article I of the Constitution and Congress’ ability to hold agencies accountable for the intent of Congress. 

The primary goal of RAPID is to bring good management practices, and I repeat that just good management practices, to the 

process of issuing infrastructure permits by requiring Federal 

agencies to do a few simple things. One, designate a lead agency 

to coordinate and manage the environmental review process within 

specified time frames. Two, manage Federal and State environmental reviews concurrently rather than sequentially. And three, 

establish a 6-month statute of limitations for bringing suit against 

the project, a time period Congress has similarly set for legal challenges in Federal construction projects and water construction 

projects. 

Passage of RAPID is essential if this Nation is to foster job creation. RAPID does not and I want to repeat this, does not mandate 

that any particular project be built, but it does require Federal 

agencies to provide the developer with a decision within a fixed period of time. Moreover, when RAPID was deployed in transportation construction projects in SAFETEA-LU, it cut the time to 

complete a NEPA statement from 73 months to 37 months. The 

concept of permit streamlining has been supported in various 

amendments in the House and the Senate by the Administration 

and by Senators as diverse as Boxer and Barrasso and governors 

across the Nation. This is a bipartisan issue that this Congress 

should be capable of enacting. 

Turning now to H.R. 712, the Sunshine Act, this addresses the 

issue of sue and settle, a situation which occurs when an agency 

agrees to the demands of an interest group by voluntarily entering 

into a court approved consent decree. The process has resulted in 

over 100 regulations being issued in the last 5 years, many of them 

imposing costs over a $1 billion per regulation. 
10 

The Sunshine Act and I am going to use the word merely again, 

the Sunshine Act, merely requires that an agency seek public comment from the public prior to the filing of a consent decree and provide the comments to the court. 

Second, it allows interested parties to seek to intervene if they 

can establish that their rights are not being adequately protected. 

The Chambers’ interest in these issues grew out of the fact that 

the regulations were being imposed both on States and our members as a result of settlements that they had no knowledge of. We 

discovered that neither EPA nor the Department of Justice even 

maintained a database of such lawsuits but we were assured there 

were very few. We therefore undertook the research that culminated with a very extensive inventory of sue and settle amendments and it lists well over 100 new regulations that have resulted 

in the last 6 years from sue and settle agreements. 

Bringing a management process to the issuance of permits, a 

management process, none of the substances changed. And bringing transparency to the filing of consent decrees that are going to 

bind the agency for years can only describe as good government, 

I’m sure I’ll have some questions on it. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kovacs follows:] 
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Mr. MARINO. Mr. Batkins. 

TESTIMONY OF SAM BATKINS, DIRECTOR OF 

REGULATORY POLICY, AMERICAN ACTION FORUM 

Mr. BATKINS. Thank you, Chairman Marino, Ranking Member 

Johnson and Members of the Subcommittee. 

The Federal Government should endeavor to remove outdated 

regulations that stifle job creation and make our economy less competitive. That was President Obama echoing similar statements 

made from every President since Jimmy Carter. Both Presidents focused on regulatory accumulation and both tasked their agencies to 

look back at their existing regulatory slate and reform rules. 

Yet more than a generation later, here we are again discussing 

reform regulation. And it is because regulatory reform has failed so 

often in the past that we continue to talk about its place in the future. When we say past reform has failed, it is not just a cavalier 

opinion, it is a fact. The agencies and the Administration tell us 

reform has failed. Every year the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs OIRA discloses hundreds of paperwork violations. 

HHS alone was responsible for 80 violations last year. 

When Congress amended the Paperwork Reduction Act in the 

1990’s, OIRA set a goal to reduce cumulative regulatory burdens by 

35 percent, a reduction of 4.6 billion hours. Instead regulators increased paperwork hours by 17 percent. 

Then, Congress passed the Congressional Review Act the CRA, 

they instructed agencies to send all rules including major regulations to Congress and the Government Accountability Office, they 

haven’t. In a recent report Curtis Copeland, at the Administrative 

Conference of the United States found thousands of rules that violated the CRA, including 43 major rules. 

In 2012, only 71.6 percent of Federal rules followed CRA procedure. I am sure regulators expect better compliance rates from 

companies and that Congress expects better performance from regulatory agencies. The history of regulatory reform instructs the debate today. It is clear that given the current resources at agencies, 

regulatory reform and looking back at existing rules might not be 

a major priority. And that’s understandable, but just look at the 

retrospective reports that claim that new ACA rules or the regulation on for-profit colleges universities is somehow considered a regulatory lookback. 

Either agencies examine past regulations and seek to improve 

their effectiveness or they implement rules that to add to the cumulative regulatory burden. Too often agencies practice the latter. 

If that’s retrospective review, then everything is. Asking agencies 

to issue new regulations and examine the cumulative impact of existing rules appears to be asking for too much. This is why scholars 

from across the political spectrum have endorsed the idea of an 

independent commission charged with reviewing the regulatory 

burden. A body charged with conducting a comprehensive analysis 

of the regulatory state while ensuring that our regulations remain 

effective could yield tremendous benefits. 

The goal is not to undue the regulatory state, the goal is to improve it. There is so much we simply don’t know about the 175,000 

pages of Federal regulation. This ignorance doesn’t help us ensure 
36 

the health and safety of Americans and it doesn’t help us promote 

economic growth. 

As President Carter and President Obama understood, there 

have been tremendous benefits to regulatory reform, and there are 

additional cost savings that could be achieved here today. According to our estimates, it’s successful. It could generate approximately 1.5 billion hours of less paperwork for Americans, anywhere 

from 48 billion to 90 billion in reduced regulatory costs. 

The dual goals of a thorough review of the entire regulatory system and reducing burdens by 15 percent are ambitious, but so were 

the initial executive orders on regulatory reform. While past attempts at reform might have been unsuccessful, there is no reason 

policymakers can’t learn from previous mistakes and establish a 

balanced system that increases transparency, evaluates the regulatory slate and reduces burdens and rules all while protecting 

health and safety. These are bipartisan principles, standard practice internationally and not controversial ideas. 

Thank you for the time. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Batkins follows:] 
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Mr. MARINO. Dr. McLaughlin. 

TESTIMONY OF PATRICK A. McLAUGHLIN, Ph.D., SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON 

UNIVERSITY 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Chairman Marino, Ranking Member Johnson 

and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me. 

As an economist and senior research fellow at the Marcatus Center at George Mason University, my primary research focuses on 

regulatory accumulation legislation and the regulatory process so it 

is my pleasure to testify on today’s topic. 

In previous testimony, I have highlighted the fact that regulatory 

accumulation creates substantial drag on the economic growth by 

impeding innovation and entrepreneurship. Today, I have two 

other points that may happen help in examining the reforms under 

consideration. 

First, I will discuss the affects of regulatory accumulation or to 

put it another way, why retrospective analysis of regulations can 

result in what amounts to a tax refund with benefits going largely 

to lower income Americans. 

My second point is that not all attempts at regulatory reform are 

equal. Several factors tend to contribute to meaningful and successful regulatory reform efforts. The most important of these is the 

use of an independent body to identify regulations that need to be 

modified or eliminated. Any retrospective analysis efforts that 

leaves this task in the hands of the same agencies that created the 

regulations in the first place is unlikely to succeed. 

Regulations can be regressive, particularly in their affects on the 

prices paid by consumers. A regressive regulation is one whose burden disproportionately falls on lower-income individuals and households. When regulations force producers to use more expensive production processes, some of those production cost increases are 

passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices. For example, in 2005 the Food and Drug Administration banned the use of 

chlorofluorocarbons as propellants in medical inhalers, like the inhalers millions of Americans use to treat asthma. Since then the 

average price of inhalers has tripled. While individuals with high 

incomes might be able to absorb this price increase, people with 

low incomes may have to choose not to buy an inhaler and instead 

leave the asthma untreated. 

The cumulative costs of regulations amounts to a hidden regressive burden, but it is a burden that could be lightened. In fact, one 

way of viewing that burden is as an opportunity, retrospective 

analysis that eliminates a portion of the regulatory cost burden 

would act like a progressive tax refund. Let me explain with an example. The regulatory cost burden can be viewed as a tax form by 

all households. For illustrative purposes, suppose the regulatory 

cost burden equals about $8,000 per household. 

Now consider a regulatory reform that would reduce this cost 

burden by 15 percent, which would be $1,200 per household per 

year, this is effectively an annual regulatory cost refund. 

This reduction in regulatory burden would have a much larger 

affect on the purchasing power of the low-income household than 

the high-income end household. To the low-income household the 
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*Note: Supplemental material submitted with this witness statement is not included in this 

printed record but is on file with the Subcommittee and the statement can be accessed, in its 

entirety, at: 

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20150302/103063/HHRG-114-JU05-WstateMcLaughlinP-20150302.pdf. 

regulatory cost refund would equal nearly 5 percent of 1 year’s 

household income. To the high income household, it would equal 

only.4 percent of 1 year’s income. This shows that a regulatory cost 

refund of any amount would work just like a progressive tax cut. 

Even better, unlike one-time tax rebates this regulatory cost refund 

would repeat year after year. 

So what makes for a successful retrospective analysis? I discuss 

several key factors for success in my written testimony as well as 

in my research and I would like to highlight just two of them here 

today. First, we need to establish criteria for identifying unwanted 

regulations, I suggest a test of whether a regulation is functional. 

Functional rules address current significant risks, mitigate some 

amount of those risks and do not have significant unintended consequences or excessive compliance costs relative to their benefits, 

non functional rules are missing one or more of these features. 

The key to achieving significant improvement of the problem of 

regulatory accumulation is first identifying as many nonfunctional 

rules as possible and then either eliminating them or changing 

them so that they become functional. 

Second, the task of identifying nonfunctional rules should be 

placed in the hands of an independent body. The reason for that 

is to achieve as objective an assessment as possible. If the body 

tasked with the analysis of a rule has incentive to find that the 

rule is functional or has insensitive to find that it is non functional, 

the review risks becoming exercise in advocacy rather than an objective analysis. This is a primary reason why I recommend that 

retrospective analysis of regulations should not be left in the hands 

of agencies that have incentives find specific results. We should not 

expect agencies to give any better assessment of their own rules 

than professors would expect of students grading their own tests 

students. 

In conclusion, regulatory accumulation with its adverse impact 

on economic growth by impeding innovation and entrepreneurship 

is now a widely recognized problem. Furthermore, the costs of regulation are disproportionately born by low income households. Retrospective analysis of regulations is an opportunity to improve our 

economy to facilitate innovation and to create a progressive regulatory cost refund. Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any 

questions. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin follows:]* 
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Mr. MARINO. And sir, again I want to be sure I’m pronouncing 

you name correctly, is it Narang. 

Mr. NARANG. It’s Narang. 

Mr. MARINO. Narang. 

Mr. NARANG. Although you give it a much better first try than 

most. 

Mr. MARINO. Narang, okay. Mr. Narang, would you please give 

your opening statement. 

And I apologize. 

TESTIMONY OF AMIT NARANG, 

REGULATORY POLICY ADVOCATE, PUBLIC CITIZEN 

Mr. NARANG. Chairman Marino, Ranking Member Johnson and 

Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today on the three legislative proposals that are the subject 

of today’s hearing. 

I am Amit Narang, regulatory policy advocate of Public Citizen’s 

Congress Watch. Public Citizen is a national public interest organization with more than 350,00 members and supporters. For more 

than 40 years we have successfully advocated for stronger health, 

safety, consumer protection and other rules, as well as for a robust 

regulatory system that curtails corporate wrongdoing and advances 

the public interest. 

I’d like to first address the proclaimed rationale for this legislation which is the claim that regulations hurt the economy. This 

rhetoric is simply not supported by reality. All studies that have 

attempted to demonstrate this falsehood have been thoroughly discredited by credible independent and in certain cases nonpartisan 

observers such as the Congressional Research Service. None of 

these studies have been subjected to peer review and none would 

pass scrutiny under peer review. 

I want to focus on one report in particular by the Competitive 

Enterprise Institute which asserts that regulation costs our economy $1.8 trillion annually, which breaks down to about $15,000 per 

household. The CEI report is readily cited by lawmakers and by a 

fellow witness at this hearing written testimony. And yet The 

Washington Post found the study ‘‘misleading’’ and worthy of two 

Pinocchios. The reports authors themselves claim it is ‘‘not scientific’’ and ‘‘rather back of the envelope.’’ 

This report and others relying on similar discredited and methodology can not and should not inform critical policy debates and 

certainly should not be the primary justification for any legislation. 

Turning to the legislation itself, let me start with the SCRUB 

Act. The SCRUB Act presumes there are volumes of outdated and 

unnecessary regulations ripe for repeal. But this presumption is 

problematic given the lack of any concrete and tangible examples 

of outdated or unnecessary regulations cited by my fellow witnesses 

in their testimony. 

Supporters may point to the Obama administration’s retrospective review process as proof that such regulations exist. Actually, 

this compounds the SCRUB Act’s problematic premise. If the Administration has and is continuing to take these regulations off the 

books, what is there really left for the commission to do? 
57 

The commission would be better titled the retrospective regulatory reduction commission since the commission only promotes 

deregulation with no corollary mission to strengthen regulatory 

standards that are too weak or identify gaps in our regulatory protections that could prevent the next massive chemical spill like the 

one we tragically saw occur in West Virginia last year. 

This lack of balance carries over to Title II of the bill, which requires agencies to repeal commission identified rules before issuing 

new ones. Here the repeal of rules would not undergo cost benefit 

or any regulatory impact analysis nor would the public be allowed 

to comment both of which would still pertain to the issuance of new 

rules. 

Potentially even more troubling in this double standard is the 

lack of any exceptions to one in, one out scheme for emergency 

rules, addressing urgent public health and safety crisis. This could 

endanger the public by forcing agencies to repeal rules before they 

can issue new health and safety regulations to address a public 

health emergency, such as an Ebola outbreak. 

Now let me turn to the Sunshine Act. The Sunshine Act reveals 

one of the most troubling aspects of our current regulatory system. 

The fact that agencies routinely miss explicit and mandatory congressional deadlines to issue new rules. One quick glance at Public 

Citizens’ visual depiction of the regulatory process explains why. 

The current process is a paragon of inefficiency with a maze of redundant requirements for agencies to complete before finalizing 

any rules. It’s no wonder given dwindling resources that agencies 

often fail to meet congressional deadlines. 

Congress should be making it easier to enforce the law when 

agencies miss congressionally-mandated deadlines. The Sunshine 

Act unfortunately does the opposite. The GAO’s recent report on 

the so called sue and settle phenomenon put to bed any claims of 

impropriety in the process. And for the sake of brevity I refer you 

to my written testimony for a fuller explanation. 

Finally, the RAPID Act represents a very different approach to 

the previous two bills expediting agency action regarding permit 

approvals for large infrastructure projects including energy 

projects. It does this by dramatically scaling back the process agencies must undertake for determining the environmental impacts, 

meaning the costs and the benefits of these—to the environment 

that such a project would pose. 

The National Environmental Policy Act or NEPA requires agencies to conduct this important analysis in order to minimize the environmental footprint of the proposed energy or infrastructure 

project. In perhaps the most troubling reform, the bill allows 

project developers themselves to prepare the environmental impact 

statements, allowing those developers to decide the impact on the 

environment its own proposed project will have. This is akin to letting, for example, the big banks on Wall Street decide the costs and 

benefits of new Wall Street reforms. 

Finally, it is important to step back and take stock of the stark 

double standard created by enactment of all three legislative proposals here, along with other so-called regulatory reform measures 

the House has already passed such as H.R. 185, the ‘‘Regulatory 

Accountability Act.’’ 
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I am a sports fan and I hope many of you are too, but with apologies to non-sports fans, allow me to use a baseball analogy to illustrate this double standard. In a baseball game each team gets a 

chance to bat nine times in nine innings, just a little asterisk there, 

but let’s say the rules were changed to allow one team to bat 12 

times, and the other team to only bat six times. While this would 

not ensure that the team that bats more often would always win, 

it would make it far more likely by making the rules unfairly advantage one team over the other. This unfair advantage due to a 

double standard in the procedural rules is exactly what will occur 

by expediting permit approvals to the RAPID Act while further delaying and impeding new rules to protect the public through the 

Sunshine and SCRUB Acts. 

The Chamber of Commerce is explicit about supporting this double standard advocating for one process when agencies approve permits and a very different one when agencies approve new regulatory standards. If the Regulatory Accountability Act ‘‘improves 

the rulemaking process’’ as the Chamber claims, wouldn’t it make 

sense for the Chamber to support approving permits through that 

process as well? 

Why shouldn’t agencies use the same process when establishing 

measures to protect servicemembers from predatory lending, as 

they do when approving new permits. By manipulating the process, 

these legislative measures pick winners and losers thereby making 

our government work for corporate special interests and against 

protecting the public. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Narang follows:] 
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Mr. MARINO. One of my colleagues, Mr. Collins, must get to another hearing. 

Mr. COLLINS. The Rules Committee. 

Mr. MARINO. So I am going to recognize Mr. Collins for 5 minutes of questions. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize, I have got rules starting at 5 and I’m trying to do 

both. 

This is very important to me, and I appreciate you holding this 

hearing today and going forward. 

Before we start, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record 

a written statement from the Attorney General of the State of 

Georgia, Sam Olens. Mr. Olens is unable to be here today, but he 

continues to be a leader on the sue and settle issues and I appreciate his support. 

Mr. MARINO. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
73 

Prepared Statement of Sam S. Olens, 

Attorney General of the State of Georgia 

House Resolution 712, the ‘‘Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act’’ 

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author alone and do not 

necessarily represent those of the State of Georgia. 
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Mr. COLLINS. I introduced the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees 

and Settlements Act because too often, especially under this Administration, we have seen pro-regulatory plaintiffs sue sympathetic agencies to enact regulations in the dark, absent public input 

and often at the expense of affected parties. It is unacceptable for 

taxpayers hard-earned dollars to fund backroom deals to support 

the rulemaking process. 

These type of settlements have tangible affects and they affect 

the industries across the country, including the thriving agricultural community in the Ninth District of Georgia. The hardworking 

men and women in Georgia and across the country are trying to 

make an honest living and have a problem with special interests 

threatening their livelihood. Moreover, under sue and settle they 

are not even allowed to participate in the negotiations that will ultimately and directly impact them. 

In short, sue and settle agreements create regulation through 

litigation. The potential for abuse and the lack of transparency in 

the system is why I believe so strongly in the need for this legislation. My builder will restore transparency and increase public participation and input. H.R. 712 addresses weaknesses in the current 

system while preserving consent decrees as an important mechanism for settling legal disputes. The ability to have citizens to hold 

government accountable is an important part of administrative 

law, but it must be appropriately carried out with transparency 

and full public participation. 

Before I get started, and I know your coworker or someone you 

had holding a sign today, Mr. Narang, came—I couldn’t think of a 

better witness for us. If he can stand there, and I know his arms 

would give out after a while, and he could hold that up there and 

explain. 

The general public could just watch and say, is this place broken? And all I have to do is take to your poster and say, yes, it’s 

broken. Can you imagine what small big, big business and anywhere in the country looks at the rulemaking process that affects 

their lives when they look at that poster. If you’re having to sit 

here and think that we need not be involved in this and get the 

Federal Government streamlined out of this, I’m not sure what 

we’re doing here. 

But I hold a real question you, because you brought up baseball, 

I like baseball. Let me ask you something, in your baseball analogy 

you talked about fairness. And in sue and settle what we’re dealing 

with here is we are not stopping access to courts, we’re not stopping the process of somebody being able to sue because they missed 

a deadline. What we are saying here though is you have got to be 

transparent about it. You’ve got to open it up and before the ruling 

comes down you have to hear from affected parties. 

So using your baseball analogy, can you tell me if it would be fair 

that if the—in a process that we put that the one team could always have a runner starting their batting series at third base, is 

that fair? Where they—and the other team cannot know who it’s 

going to be and then also that if they can’t get it in three outs, we’ll 

actually maybe give them one more, do you think having that participation would be fair? 

Mr. NARANG. Thank you for the question. 
79 

So one runner’s starting at third base is essentially what Congress dictates. All the settlement is trying to do is enforce the law 

that has already been decided by—— 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, I’m going to reclaim my time here for a second. Because what this actually does is is that if you and I have 

a disagreement—I’ll be the EPA and you your organization—you 

find the time, you want to sue me, you say because we didn’t get 

this time because I want to see agreement get set and there is 

plenty in the record that talks about these sue and settle agreements. 

But unfortunately, it affects Mr. Ratcliffe. Under the current way 

it is set up, is we could go into our agreement, I agree with you 

and I say, okay, let’s get a dissent decree and then put it out there, 

but he never gets an input. Is that fair? Is that really fair? 

Mr. NARANG. So the situation that you’re referring to here is entirely based on the fact that Congress has mandated legal requirements. The fairness or lack of fairness probably accrues to the fact 

that these legal requirements exist in the first place. 

And when an agency because of the enormous process that I 

pointed out earlier misses a deadline, that shouldn’t be very surprising to anybody looking at the process and an agency like the 

EPA missing a deadline ascribed by in law by Congress. It’s a very 

simple case. There is not very many issues of fairness when essentially in court all you have to prove is an agency was supposed to 

issue, you know, a regulation by say March 2nd and they don’t 

issue it by March 2. 

Mr. COLLINS. And I understand. My time is going to end and I 

hate to stop you here, because I would continue this because you 

make our case for us and I know didn’t come here to do that, because you said the whole process is so messed up this is why it’s 

not fair and Congress did it. It is now time for Congress not to do 

it. 

I’m sorry I’m not going to get to the Chamber because the GAO 

report has a lot of problems. And also I see my friend in the back 

Jason Smith from Missouri, his drawback is not about outdated 

regulations, it is about cleaning up the process, and I appreciate 

him. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, the 

Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Congressman Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d ask unanimous consent to insert the following materials into 

the record: a December 2014 report commissioned by the American 

Conference of the United States on Retrospective Review discussing 

the shortcomings of the square back, also testimony of Dinah Bear, 

the former general counsel of the Council on Environmental Quality in opposition to the RAPID Act. 

The testimony of John Walke, clean air director for Natural Resources Defense Council, in opposition to the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act. Also letters from the Coalition 

for Sensible Safeguards, an alliance of more than 70 public interest 

consumer advocacy civil rights and justice groups in opposition to 
80 

**Note: The submitted document from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) is not included in this printed record but is on file with the Subcommittee and can be accessed at: 

http://www.crs.gov/pdfloader/R42479. 

***Note: The submitted document from the United States Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) is not included in this printed record but is on file with the Subcommittee and can be 

accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667533.pdf. 

 Note: The submitted documents from the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) are not 

included in this printed record but are on file with the Subcommittee and can be accessed at: 

http://progressivereform.org/articles/Regulatory_Pay-Go_1214.pdf 

http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/RegBenefits_1109.pdf 

H.R. 712 and H.R. 1155, also a 2012 Congressional Research Service report on the NEPA approval process.**  

Also, a 2014 GAO report entitled ‘‘Impact of Deadline Suits on 

EPA’s Rulemaking is Limited.’’*** And last but not least, two reports by the Center for Progressive Reform on regulatory cut-go 

and the benefits of regulation.**** 

Mr. MARINO. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
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Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Kovacs, in your written testimony, it appears that you blame 

the delay in the Savannah River dredge project on the NEPA approval process, when in fact the delay was caused by funding that 

was not in place, and also a 2-year lawsuit by the State of South 

Carolina, which denied the permit to deepen the river channel. And 

that deepening had already been approved by the Army Corps of 

Engineers the lead agency overseeing the NEPA process. 

So those things being true, how would the RAPID Act expedite 

the completion of the Savannah Harbor expansion project given the 

lack of Federal and State funding and the blocking of the project 

through the State regulatory action issues which were wholly unrelated to the NEPA approval process? 

Mr. KOVACS. Well, that’s an excellent question, thank you. One 

of the things that RAPID does and it—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. How would it how would it—the Savannah River 

project, how would it—— 

Mr. KOVACS. Savannah River, what happens in RAPID is by putting a time limit on it, 2 years, 3 years, whatever it is, a decision 

has to be made so that the developer can either decide to stay or 

go. One of the things—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. And so that decision would have to be made within the 2-year period regardless of what it was that was holding up 

the project moving forward, whether or not it be lack of funding, 

whether or not it be—— 

Mr. KOVACS. Well, for the environmental impact statement. I 

mean, for example, if you can’t get through the environmental review process, you’re not even going to even seek a permit. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But I mean, assuming you get through the environmental review process, if there is some another reason that 

hangs the project up, the RAPID Act would force approval of the 

project. 

Mr. KOVACS. Yeah, RAPID does not change any substantive law. 

What it does—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Other than perhaps cause it not to be fulfilled. 

Mr. KOVACS. Well, it sets up timeframes of 2 years or 3 years, 

depending upon how it is, and then it sets up—if the project is approved, it sets up the 6 months statute of limitations like you did 

in SAFETEA-LU and MAP-21 and the WRDA bill. 

So as I understand what the Committee’s trying to do with this 

legislation is to take existing structures that have worked, like 

SAFETEA-LU, that’s been here now for 7, 8 years. It’s worked. 

There have been no problems. It incorporated it in MAP-21, and it 

incorporated it in WRDA, and they’re trying to put the timeline on 

it for the very simple reason—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, and—— 

Mr. KOVACS [continuing]. That the developer’s spending hundreds of millions of dollars just developing a project. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And regardless of the cost to the—to the developer, there are some societal costs that would be incurred by failing 

to adhere to laws already in place, other laws that need to be followed, and the RAPID Act would be a super mandate that overrides all other laws imposing deadlines relating to project reviews 

by automatically approving any permit or license relating to a 
129 

major Federal project if the onerous requirements are not met 

within 1 year. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. KOVACS. No. That’s not correct. If it’s—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask Mr. Narang, then. Do you agree 

that that is correct, Mr. Narang? 

Mr. NARANG. That’s the way I read the bill. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

I’ll yield back. 

Mr. MARINO. Gentleman’s time is expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the Congressman from Michigan, Congressman Trott. 

Mr. TROTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of the witnesses for their testimony. 

Mr. Narang, have you ever run a business before? 

Mr. NARANG. I have not, no. 

Mr. TROTT. Okay. So let’s set up a hypothetical here. Let’s say 

you’re a home builder in Detroit and you buy 5 acres of land, and 

you’re going to build 20 homes in Detroit. You spend $500,000 to 

buy the land, and you borrow that money from the bank and you’re 

paying interest on it. Do you think your business would be more 

or less successful if it took the City of Detroit 3 years to issue the 

building permits or 3 weeks? 

Mr. NARANG. Well, I would assume that it would be easier for 

the home developer if, of course, it was issued in 3 weeks. I don’t 

know that I’d agree that that would be a sensible decision given 

the speed at which it was made. 

Mr. TROTT. Well, so if it took 3 years, which it did for many 

years in Detroit, what—would you be hiring people during that 

time, or what would you be doing with—a, would you be able to 

repay that 500,000, or would you be able to stay in business? 

Would you be hiring people? 

Mr. NARANG. Thank you, Congressman. As you know, I am not 

someone with experience in managing a business. So I don’t think 

that my insight would be very helpful. 

Mr. TROTT. Well, it’s a real common sense question. You borrow 

500,000, you buy five acres of land, you’re going to build 20 houses, 

but for some reason it takes the governmental unit 3 years to issue 

the permits so you can start building and put the roads in and the 

sewers. How is your business going to do during those 3 years, and 

how many jobs are you going to create? That’s a common sense answer. Wouldn’t you think? 

Mr. NARANG. I think these issues are very complicated, and the 

hypothetical doesn’t include potential environmental considerations 

from that development. 

Mr. TROTT. Okay. So in your statement you said that the tradeoff 

between—there’s no evidence to support the argument that there’s 

a tradeoff between economic growth and strong and effective regulatory standards. So do you believe all of the regulations in the 

code are strong and effective standards? 

Mr. NARANG. I didn’t say that. No. 

Mr. TROTT. So you think some of the regulations should be revisited? 
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Mr. NARANG. I think many could be strengthened, and they are 

too weak and ineffective currently. Unfortunately, the SCRUB Act 

doesn’t allow for that. 

Mr. TROTT. Could some of them be streamlined? 

Mr. NARANG. Could some of the regulations themselves be 

streamlined? 

Mr. TROTT. Right. 

Mr. NARANG. It’s unclear. I’d have to look at each specific regulation, of course. I do think that the regulatory process for new public 

health and safety regulations can definitely be streamlined. It just 

takes one look at our chart for that to be apparent. 

Mr. TROTT. So but you seem hesitant to acknowledge that maybe 

there’s some need in the Federal Government to streamline regulations. I mean, you think most of the regulations are pretty efficient 

as they relate to business? 

Mr. NARANG. I assume there could be, but unless I’m given—— 

Mr. TROTT. Do you think the RAPID Act and the SCRUB Act 

help us try and streamline some of the regulations that are undermining business? 

Mr. NARANG. So I’m a little hesitant to respond, Congressman, 

only because of the way that you use streamline. You know, a regulation is—sometimes has certain components in order to be effective, and it may not be possible to streamline certain regulations. 

I would be very comfortable speaking to streamlining processes for 

adopting regulations. 

Mr. TROTT. So when I—at a very high level, when I speak to a 

small business owner in my district, and in which I spoke to many 

during the campaign, and they—he has eight employees, it’s a oil 

change business in Canton, Michigan, and he tells me that Federal 

regulations are crunching his margins and causing him not to be 

able to open another store, should I say: Well, there’s no evidence 

that Federal regulations are undermining your business or causing 

you an inability to create jobs, and just tell him to kind of hunker 

down and get it done? What should I say to that person? 

Mr. NARANG. Congressman, you’re misconstruing what I was trying to say. So let me actually clarify. Maybe it’s my own fault. 

I am talking about studies that claim in the aggregate, in a macroeconomic sense, that regulations are harming the economy. Those 

studies are baseless. 

Mr. TROTT. Okay. 

Mr. Kovacs, how many jobs, do you think, could be created by the 

enactment of the RAPID Act? 

Mr. KOVACS. Well, I don’t think we know how many jobs would 

be created by this because projects are going on and off the books 

all the time, but what we did do is in Project No Project we looked 

at a series of projects that were seeking to get a permit over a 1- 

year time period, and there were 351 projects that produced electricity, and we picked that because we could get good records on 

it, and as the Chairman had stated in his initial—in his initial 

statement, it was roughly about a 1.9 million jobs on 351 projects 

and about a billion dollars—$600 billion in investment. 

Mr. TROTT. Okay. Thank you, sir. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 
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The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Congressman Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Marino. 

Let me ask Attorney Narang this question: Is there any empirical evidence not regulation—that regulations depress jobs development? Is there any empirical evidence that regulations depress job 

development? 

Mr. NARANG. Thank you, Congressman. So in the aggregate from 

a macroeconomic standpoint, there’s no empirical evidence—credible empirical evidence to support that claim. 

Mr. CONYERS. That’s what I’ve been thinking, but I’d like to explore it a little further. Is there any empirical evidence that regulations adversely impact our Nation’s economy? 

Mr. NARANG. Again, in the aggregate or macroeconomic 

sense—— 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes. 

Mr. NARANG. There is none. 

Mr. CONYERS. And what is your response to the allegations that regulations impose a $15,000-a-year tax on every American family? 

Mr. NARANG. Well, Public Citizen noted almost immediately 

when the report came out that it was baseless, that it was using 

a flawed methodology, and that it was the same flawed methodology that other studies, including one that was adopted by the 

SBA and subsequently disavowed by the SBA also used. 

I will say that Public Citizen saying it is one thing, but the 

Washington Post saying it is definitely another thing, and so I do 

want to also emphasize that credible, independent, nonpartisan 

sources have also echoed our criticism of the studies. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Now, under H.R. 712, the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and 

Settlements, it appears that any private third party could weigh in 

on a proposed consent decree or settlement agreement pertaining 

to a regulatory action that affects the rights of private parties. 

Hypothetically, under H.R. 712, if the regulatory action involved, 

for example, the Clean Air Act, could a private third party include 

someone who breathes air? 

Mr. NARANG. So you’re right that H.R. 712 massively expands 

standing to engage in settlement discussions, and I think your 

question—the answer to your question is I don’t necessarily read 

it as such, but potentially it could. 

Mr. CONYERS. Okay. Attorney Narang, what are some of the 

problems with the proposed regulatory cut-go requirements contained in Title II of the SCRUB Act? 

Mr. NARANG. So one thing with—just with respect to the last 

question, you know, the proposed expansion under H.R. 712 is very 

different than what you get in the RAPID Act. So I know this is 

not directly responsive to your question, but the RAPID Act, of 

course, only allows parties that have commented in the RAPID Act 

to participate in a judicial challenge of that. 

With respect to the SCRUB Act, the cut-go provisions, this is, I 

would say, a fairly Draconian piece of the bill in that there are very 

few exceptions to allow agencies to address emergency issues. You 

know, we saw one last year with the Ebola outbreak. If regulations 

arenecessary in that instance, I don’t see a, you know, any kind of 
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emergency exception, and then again, what I pointed out in my testimony. 

There’s a really stark double standard. It doesn’t make sense to 

me to require rules, essentially, to be repealed by agencies within 

60 days in order to allow agencies to go forward with rules that 

would then have to go through the very lengthy process, in most 

cases, to issue new rules, and would have to go through all of the 

regulatory impact analyses, cost benefit analyses, public comment 

participation that is advocated by my fellow witnesses as the hallmarks of a good process, a good regulatory process. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. 

I’m sorry I couldn’t get to you other three gentlemen. I have 

questions for you as well, but I thank the Chairman for the time. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Ratcliffe. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all the 

witnesses being here today. 

Two weeks ago I spent a week back in my district representing 

the 18 counties of Northeast Texas, and in traveling that district, 

one of the things I heard over and over again from constituents as 

a primary concern was the growing size of our Federal Government. Most of the 700,000 Texans that I have the privilege to represent are angry at the growth of government in this country and 

the impact that decisions being made by unelected bureaucrats in 

those agencies are having on their everyday lives. 

They see the effect of these decisions in the lunches that their 

kids eat at school, in the requirements for their dishwashers and 

for their ice makers and for their air conditioners. They’re outraged 

by a proposed rule from the EPA which would turn the puddles in 

their back yards into the waters of the U.S., and now last week 

they saw a government takeover of the Internet through new net 

neutrality regulations. 

Every one of these regulations is an abridgement of some freedom, and it comes with a price tag. In fact, the Competitive Enterprise Institute estimates that the cost of these mandated regulations is $15,000 per household, which is a staggering 23 percent of 

the average household income in the United States. Twenty-three 

percent of the income of average Americans shouldn’t be held hostage by unelected bureaucrats. 

Consistent with some of these excesses that I’ve mentioned, Mr. 

Batkins, you noted in your testimony that since 2008 regulators 

have added more than $107 billion in annual regulatory costs. Did 

I had hear that correctly? 

Mr. BATKINS. Correct. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. All right. And did I also hear you today say that 

the number of hours spend of Federal regulatory paperwork has expanded to $9.3 billion with a b hours per year? 

Mr. BATKINS. As of today, I think it was 9.98 billion. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Well, I think you’d agree with me that’s an outrageous number, whether it’s 9.3 or 9.9. 

Well, I think that we’re like minded on this issue, Mr. Batkins, 

and I think we’re also both encouraged based on your testimony 

about some of the legislation that we’re looking at, and you com-
133 

mented on Congressman Smith’s SCRUB Act and the Sunshine for 

Regulatory Decrees and Settlement Act, that if it was implemented, it would result in savings of billions of dollars in possible 

benefits, and 1.5 billion hours less of paperwork. Did I hear that 

correctly? 

Mr. BATKINS. Correct. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. So my question to you is this, though: In your 

opinion, why would the regulatory reform efforts in these bills succeed when so many others have failed to result in real reform on 

these issues? 

Mr. BATKINS. Well, part of the problem is that real reform in the 

past has been left entirely to the discretion of agencies and with 

no penalty or judicial review component at all. An agency can violate the Paperwork Reduction Act generally without penalty. They 

could not submit rules to GAO or Congress under the Congressional Review Act without penalty, and the executive orders are 

not subject to judicial review either. 

It’s my understanding that SCRUB—the SCRUB Act does contain that judicial review component, and here we’re actually taking 

away a lot of what is supposedly a burden on regulators currently, 

which is to review the cumulative stock of regulations. We’re taking that off of the agency’s plate and putting it in the SCRUB Commission. So I think establishing a separate commission and including those judicial review components is something that will make 

sure this reform lasts. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Terrific. Thank you, Mr. Batkins. 

Mr. McLaughlin, you noted in your testimony that burdensome 

regulations are effectively a hidden tax on Americans. That is 

something that my constituents have heard me say often when 

talking about regulations in this country. 

You went on to say that regulatory reform, if done well, could result in a tax return that benefits most lower-income Americans. 

Can you speak to the broader effect that such a—well, I’ll call 

it a tax refund would have on our economy? Specifically on family 

purchasing power on—and on overall job creation? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Certainly, and thank you for the question. 

There have actually been several studies published in peer-reviewed economics journals that have come to a consensus, contrary 

to my fellow witness’ statement that macroeconomic effects of regulation are negative. There was a study in the Journal of the Economic Growth, and in several studies put out by the World Bank 

were published in some top journals as well, and the consensus result of these studies is that we slow economic growth, and the primary mechanism that forces that to happen is through the hindrance of innovation. 

So if you think about your constituents and a small business 

man, perhaps, there, if he has a set of choices with which to make 

his business work and as the—as regulations build up those choices 

are more and more constricted, more and more constrained, then 

by definition he will be less able to innovate. That’s the primary 

mechanism, and whenever innovation is hampered, you’re going to 

see negative effects on job growth. 

In fact, there was a recent survey done of Silicon Valley CEOs, 

one of the great engines of our economy, and it asked them what 
134 

they think the biggest problem is for their business is, and they 

said number one is regulation. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you. 

My time has expired. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

I’m going to ask that Mr. Conyers make a statement at this 

point. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Marino. 

Mr. MARINO. Or introduce someone, I think. 

Mr. CONYERS. I really wanted to give a welcome and a shout out 

to Attorney Scott Peters, who in a second term, has joined the 

House Judiciary Committee, and we’re very proud of him. He’s 

from California, I think the San Diego area, and we all look forward to working with you, and welcome aboard. 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. MARINO. You are welcome. 

Now the Chair recognizes the newest Member, Mr. Peters from 

California, who is under no pressure to perform now since he got 

those glowing remarks from Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Conyers, for the very kind comments. 

When I practiced law, I represented a lot of large and small businesses and government agencies trying to get through the permit 

process, and I’m actually very sympathetic to the notion that we 

should set high stands and we should respond in a timely way because in a microeconomic sense you talk to these businesses that 

are really affected by the carrying costs of regulation, and actually 

I was one of the Democrats that actually voted for this RAPID Act 

last time, but I have an issue with it this time which is the subsection K prohibition of any consideration of the social cost of carbon, which is the economic, environmental, and social costs of carbon dioxide emissions by agencies in an environmental review or 

decision making, and it applies to all Federal agencies by the terms 

of this bill. 

Accounting for the social costs of carbon and preparing for climate change, according to Mayor Bloomberg’s Report, which is a bipartisan report, it is a smart business practice, with greenhouse 

gas driven changes in temperature will necessitate the construction 

of new power generation capacity that the report estimates will 

cost residential and commercial rate payers up to $12 billion per 

year, and in 2014 the Pentagon also issued a report on the security 

risks of climate change, finding that climate change poses an immediate threat to national security due to increased risks of terrorism, food shortage, poverty, and infectious diseases. 

So I guess I’d ask Mr. Kovacs, Mr. Batkins, and Mr.—Dr. 

McLaughlin, if any of you sees this ban on considering the social 

costs of carbon as necessary to achieving the regulatory reform of 

this act, and if you do see it as important, where would we evaluate as a Nation the costs of carbon issues that the business community and the Pentagon have raised? 

Mr. KOVACS. Sure. Well, first of all, I’m honored to get your first 

question. So I thank you very much. 
135 

The issue with social—first of all, I don’t know how it even got 

in the bill. I think was an amendment so—— 

Mr. PETERS. It was an amendment. Right. 

Mr. KOVACS. Because it wasn’t in the original bill. 

I think that the issue, and I’m just talking about from the outside, that it’s been used roughly by 62 times, and I don’t think anyone has a problem with that, but it’s never gone through either the 

Data Quality Act peer review or any type of the public comment, 

and I think that if you could work out a way in which to send it 

through public comment so people know what the assumptions are 

that they’re using and how it’s being factored in, that the way it 

is now is it could be set at $5 or it could be set at 50 or 100. 

Mr. PETERS. Would—Mr. Kovacs, wouldn’t the NEPA process by 

its process be a process in which we could evaluate that and—— 

Mr. KOVACS. No. Because it’s more of a—I think it’s more of an 

economic issue, and there may be ways in which the agency that 

uses it could do it. I think it’s easy, and we’d be—I mean, that’s 

one we would—— 

Mr. PETERS. But it doesn’t have to be in this bill, does it, to 

achieve the regulatory reform? 

Mr. KOVACS. I didn’t even—really, until today I didn’t even know 

it was in the bill. 

Mr. PETERS. Okay. Good. Either of you think it’s important to 

this bill to achieve regulatory reform? 

Mr. BATKINS. The RAPID Act wasn’t something I specifically address in my testimony. From just my initial—I know that social 

cost of carbon has been a part of Federal rule making, I think, 

since 2009, 2010, varying every year and depending a lot on discount rate, but I haven’t evaluated its—— 

Mr. PETERS. Okay. 

Mr. BATKINS [continuing]. Impact on RAPID. 

Mr. PETERS. Dr. McLaughlin? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I’m afraid I don’t really have an opinion on 

this. 

Mr. PETERS. Okay. So I would just make the comment, I—Mr. 

Trot’s example, he’s left now, but it’s an example that I’ve given for 

my clients many times. You know, you have—you make an investment, you have to carry the cost of the—of the debt on that investment if you borrowed money for a period of time, and you can’t get 

a return until you can get your permits, and so I’m very sympathetic to working on this, but it does strike me that this ban on 

the considering the social costs of carbon, even as part of a quicker 

reduced tighter regulatory process is gratuitous, it’s unnecessary, 

and I’m going to ask my—at appropriate time I’ll ask my colleagues 

to amend the bill to remove that prohibition. It will certainly make 

it much more attractive to me to vote for it, and I think to a lot 

of my colleagues on this side of the aisle. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

I’m now going to recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning, 

and first of all I would like to enter into the record an article dated 

Tuesday, January 18, 2011, in the Wall Street Journal states that 

‘‘President Obama announced that he will be signing an executive 

order to review regulations with an eye toward getting rid of 
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unneeded regulations and making existing regulations less intrusive and more flexible,’’ and he goes on to say that the costs will 

be a factor that’s considered in this as well as environmental issues 

and seeing that we can get regulation in permits submitted much 

sooner than we’re doing at this point. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
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138 
139 
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Mr. MARINO. So with that, Mr. Kovacs, if there are true environmental problems with a project, with a given project, will the 

RAPID Act prevent Federal officials from assuring that those problems are dealt with before a permit is granted? 

Mr. KOVACS. Yes. I mean, all of the—all of the problems, all of 

environmental commitments and all of the permit requirements 

have to be complied with. There is—there is no substantive change 

anywhere in Federal law. This is purely—and I keep on saying 

this—this is purely a management bill where you have a lead agency coordination with the states, and you have some timeframes, 

and that’s all this bill does. 

And if you look at what CEQ is doing, the President’s executive 

orders, what they’ve done in the Senate on safety, the Republicans 

and the Democrats have been on the same side of the page on this 

type of an issue for a while. 

Mr. MARINO. Some have suggested, again, Mr. Kovacs, that the 

RAPID Act would gut NEPA. Would it or would it not? 

Mr. KOVACS. No. It doesn’t do anything to the substance. 

Mr. MARINO. Okay. Dr. McLaughlin, Mr. Narang made an assertion that arguments linking regulations to job losses and depress 

economic growth are pure fiction. Would you like to respond to 

that? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Certainly. There was a article in the highly respected journal, the Journal of the Economic Growth, a peer-reviewed economics journal by Professors John Dawson and John Cedars that found the accumulation of regulation hinders economic 

growth by about 2 percent per year. There have been other studies 

that have found similarly large hindrances of economic growth 

from regulatory accumulation published in such respected journals 

as the Quarterly Journal of Economics, it’s one of the top journals 

that there is in economics, as well as in economics letters from 

such esteemed bodies as the World Bank. 

So I think it’s patently false to say that there is no evidence that 

the accumulation of regulation harms economic growth. 

Mr. MARINO. Again, Mr. McLaughlin, the SCRUB Act also authorizes the Retrospective Regulatory Reform Commission to recommend to Congress whether statutory authority to promulgate 

regulation should be repealed. 

Why is that feature of the bill important? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I’m sorry. Could you repeat that. I couldn’t 

quite catch it. 

Mr. MARINO. Yeah. The SCRUB Act also authorizes the Retrospective Regulatory Review Commission to recommend to Congress 

whether statutory authority to promulgate regulations should be 

repealed. 

Why is that feature of the bill important? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Thank you. That’s actually quite important 

because the source of a problem—regulations come from statutes. 

The Congress requires regulators to make rules. But if Congress 

required that in such a way that the regulator is limited in his 

choices, in other words, that the regulator has to make a rule that’s 

not effective, for example, then we need to point back to the source 

of the problem itself. 

Mr. MARINO. Okay. Mr. Narang, again, is that correct? 
141 

Am I pronouncing your name correct? I apologize. I’ve been trying to get this straight for a couple minutes. 

Mr. NARANG. Thank you. There’s a far more direct way also for 

Congress to do that same act—take that same action, which would 

be to directly repeal statutes. So, for example, if Congress wants 

to directly repeal the Clean Air Act, it can do so in a very direct 

way. We don’t need a commission—a taxpayer-expensed commission to make those recommendations. 

Mr. MARINO. But do you agree with me that the RAPID Act does 

not tell any agency how to go through the permitting process and 

how to do their evaluations? 

Mr. NARANG. I think also taking into consideration what Congressman Peters just pointed out, that the social costs of carbon is 

not to be incorporated into these environmental impact statements, 

it puts a very heavy thumb on the scale in favor of projects that 

would emit large amounts of carbon in the atmosphere and contribute to climate change. 

Mr. MARINO. But do you know the argument and the climate 

change issue has been going on for years and years, and it’s apparent that each side can bring in all kinds of witnesses to counter the 

other side, but don’t you think that 15 years is way too long for 

the Federal Government and other governments to determine 

whether a permit should be issued? 

Mr. NARANG. I would agree with that, and I’d also say that 15 

years is far too long for—in critical public health and safety measures. Unfortunately, at Public Citizen we have a quite a few examples of public health and safety measures that took longer than 15 

years to protect the public. 

Mr. MARINO. And I see that, you know, my time has expired. 

And I want to thank everybody for being here today. I know 

we’re going to vote. I don’t think it’s going to be in the next couple 

of minutes, but it’s closely coming. 

This concludes today’s hearing, and thanks to all of our witnesses 

for attending, and without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses 

or additional materials for the record. 

And the hearing is adjourned, and thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 5:29 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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