Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 53 / Friday, March 18, 2011 / Notices 14997 

Dated: March 15, 2011. 

Susanne E. Bolton, 

Committee Management Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2011–6397 Filed 3–17–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2011–0060; Docket No. 50–271; 

License No. DPR–28] 

In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear 

Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy 

Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont 

Yankee Nuclear Power Station; 

Director’s Decision 

I. Introduction 

By letters dated January 12, 2010, 

from Mr. Michael Mulligan, February 8, 

2010, from Mr. Raymond Shadis, and 

February 20, 2010, from Mr. Thomas 

Saporito, these individuals (collectively 

‘‘Petitioners’’) filed separate petitions 

pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 

2.206, requesting the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC or the Commission) 

take actions with regard to the Vermont 

Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY). 

Mr. Mulligan requested in his petition 

that: (1) The radioactive leak into the 

environment of VY be immediately 

stopped, VY be immediately shut down, 

and all leaking paths be isolated; and (2) 

VY disclose its preliminary ‘‘root cause 

analysis,’’ and the NRC release its 

preliminary investigative report on that 

analysis before plant startup. 

Mr. Shadis on behalf of New England 

Coalition (NEC) requested in his 

petition that the NRC: (1) Require VY to 

go into cold shutdown and depressurize 

all systems in order to slow or stop the 

leak; (2) act promptly to stop or mitigate 

the leak(s); (3) require VY to reestablish 

its licensing basis by physically tracing 

records and reporting physical details of 

all plant systems that would be within 

scope as ‘‘Buried Pipes and Tanks,’’ in 

NUREG–1801, ‘‘Generic Aging Lessons 

Learned (GALL) Report,’’ and under the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54, 

‘‘Conditions of licenses’’; (4) investigate 

and determine why Entergy has been 

allowed to operate VY since 2002 

without a working knowledge of all 

plant systems and why the NRC’s 

Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and 

review process for license renewal 

amendment did not detect this 

dereliction; (5) take notice of VY’s many 

maintenance and management failures 

(from 2000–2010) and the ROP’s failure 

to detect them early and undertake a full 

diagnostic evaluation team inspection 

using NRC Inspection Procedure 95003, 

‘‘Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive 

Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple 

Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple 

Yellow Inputs or One Red Input’’; and 

(6) require VY to apply for an 

amendment to its license renewal 

application that would address both 

aging analysis and aging management of 

all buried piping carrying or with the 

potential to carry radionuclides and/or 

the potential to interact with any safety 

or safety-related system. 

Mr. Saporito requested in his petition 

that the NRC: (1) Order a cold shutdown 

mode of operation for VY because of 

leaking radioactive tritium; and (2) issue 

a confirmatory order modifying the 

NRC-issued license for VY so that the 

licensee must bring the nuclear reactor 

to a cold shutdown mode of operation 

until the licensee can provide definitive 

reasonable assurance to the NRC, under 

affirmation, that the reactor will be 

operated in full compliance with the 

regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, ‘‘Domestic 

Licensing of Production and Utilization 

Facilities,’’ and Appendix A, ‘‘General 

Design Criteria for Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ to 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion 60, 

‘‘Control of Releases of Radioactive 

Materials to the Environment,’’ and 

Criterion 64, ‘‘Monitoring Radioactivity 

Releases,’’ and other NRC regulations 

and authority. 

Mr. Shadis stated during a public 

teleconference with the PRB on March 

3, 2010, that the tritium leak is just one 

example of many maintenance and 

management failures at VY. All three 

petitioners raised a concern regarding 

what they perceive as the NRC’s failure 

to examine the deficiencies at VY in an 

integrated manner. This concern has 

met the criteria for review in accordance 

with NRC’s Management Directive (MD) 

8.11 ‘‘Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 

Petitions.’’ 

In an acknowledgment letter dated 

June 25, 2010, the petitioners were 

informed of the PRB’s decision to deny 

the request for an immediate cold 

shutdown of VY because the PRB did 

not identify any urgent safety concerns. 

The NRC also informed the petitioners 

that their petitions were consolidated 

per the guidance in MD 8.11. The 

consolidated petition was accepted for 

review for the following specific issues 

and concerns stated by the petitioners in 

the petitions and/or supplemented 

during the teleconferences: 

(1) Increasing concentrations of 

radiocontaminants in the soil and 

groundwater at VY, as well as an 

increasing area of contamination, are 

manifest on a daily basis. VY risks 

aggravating the contamination by 

continuing to run the reactor at full 

power while attempting over a period of 

a month to triangulate the location of a 

presumed leak by drilling a series of test 

wells in the affected area. 

(2) During the license renewal 

application proceeding, the licensee 

averred that it was unaware of the 

existence of some buried pipes, now 

uncovered, and it has yet to discover 

their path and purpose. 

(3) Entergy has, in 8 years of 

ownership, failed to learn and 

understand VY’s design, layout, and 

construction. This failure to 

comprehend and understand the layout, 

function, and potentially the interaction 

of the plant’s own piping systems 

constitutes a loss of design basis. 

(4) The NRC’s ROP has apparently 

failed to capture, anticipate, and prevent 

ongoing maintenance, engineering, 

quality assurance, and operation issues 

that have manifested themselves in a 

series of high-profile incidents since 

Entergy took over VY. The agency has 

repeatedly failed to detect root cause 

trends until they have, as in this 

instance, become grossly self-revealing. 

(5) The NRC should ensure that 

Entergy has adequate decommissioning 

funds. The tritium leak will increase 

decommissioning costs because of the 

need for site radiological examination 

and soil remediation. 

Copies of the petitions are available 

for inspection at the Commission’s 

Public Document Room (PDR) at One 

White Flint North, Room O1–F21, 11555 

Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 

Maryland 20852, and from the NRC’s 

Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Public 

Electronic Reading Room on the NRC 

Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html under ADAMS 

Accession Nos. ML100190688, 

ML100470430, and ML100621374. Refer 

to NRC’s Management Directive 8.11, 

‘‘Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 

Petitions,’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML041770328), for a description of the 

petition review process. Persons who do 

not have access to ADAMS or who have 

problems in accessing the documents in 

ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR 

reference staff by telephone at 1–800– 

397–4209 or 301–415–4737, or by e-mail 

to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. 

II. Discussion 

On January 7, 2010, Entergy reported 

to the NRC that water samples taken 

from groundwater monitoring well GZ– 

3 onsite at VY showed tritium levels 

above background. GZ–3 is about 70 feet 

from the Connecticut River. Tritium is 

another name for the radioactive 

nuclide hydrogen-3. Tritium occurs 

naturally in the environment because of 

cosmic ray interactions. It is also 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with NOTICES
14998 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 53 / Friday, March 18, 2011 / Notices 

produced by nuclear reactor operations, 

and can be legally discharged as a 

radioactive effluent under NRC 

regulations. Tritium is chemically 

identical to normal hydrogen (hydrogen1), and, like normal hydrogen, tends to 

combine with oxygen to form water, 

which is referred to as tritiated water. 

The detection of tritiated water in the 

monitoring well indicated abnormal 

leakage from the nuclear plant. The 

Environmental Protection Agency’s 

(EPA’s) regulatory standard for tritium 

in drinking water is 20,000 picocuries 

per liter (pCi/L). Tritium was initially 

measured at levels up to about 17,000 

pCi/L in monitoring well GZ–3, which 

is not used for drinking water. Samples 

at other monitoring wells have also 

shown some tritium. The highest 

reading from any monitoring well has 

been about 2.5 million pCi/L, from 

monitoring well GZ–10. Entergy 

immediately started an investigation to 

identify the source of the tritium, and 

later installed additional monitoring 

wells to help locate the source. 

Upon notification on January 7, 2010, 

of the detection of tritium in the 

monitoring well, the NRC’s staff 

initiated actions to review and assess 

the condition, by reviewing all available 

sampling data, hydrologic information, 

and analyses; conducting an onsite 

inspection and assessment of Entergy’s 

plans and process for investigating the 

condition; and making an independent 

determination of public health and 

safety consequence based on available 

information. NRC inspectors provided 

close regulatory oversight of Entergy’s 

investigation in order to independently 

assure conformance with applicable 

NRC regulatory requirements, assess 

licensee performance, and evaluate the 

condition with respect to NRC’s 

radiological release limits. 

On February 27, 2010, following 

excavation and leak testing of the 

Advanced Off Gas (AOG) system pipe 

tunnel, Entergy reported that it had 

identified leakage into the surrounding 

soil, and therefore to the groundwater, 

from an unsealed joint in the concrete 

tunnel wall. The AOG pipe tunnel is 

located about 15 feet underground. 

Also, piping inside the tunnel had 

previously been found to be leaking, 

and the drain inside the tunnel had 

been found to be clogged. Soil samples 

in the vicinity showed traces of 

radioactive isotopes. Entergy reported 

that the leakage to the environment had 

been stopped by isolating piping and 

containing the water leaking from the 

AOG pipe tunnel. However, on May 28, 

2010, Entergy reported a second leak 

from AOG piping into the soil. Entergy 

quickly isolated this leak and has sealed 

off that piping to prevent further leaks 

in that area. The contaminated soil was 

removed from the excavated area and is 

being stored in containers onsite for 

eventual disposal in accordance with 

NRC regulatory requirements. 

As part of its oversight effort, NRC 

staff conducted an evaluation in 

accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 

0309, ‘‘Reactive Inspection Decision 

Basis for Reactors,’’ from January 25 to 

April 10, 2010, to determine if the 

occurrence with the AOG piping 

constituted a significant operational 

event (i.e., a radiological, safeguards, or 

other safety-related operational 

condition) that posed an actual or 

potential hazard to public health and 

safety, property, or the environment. 

The evaluation reviewed the condition 

against the specified deterministic 

criteria that are based on regulatory 

safety limits, and determined that none 

of the criteria were met. 

Notwithstanding that determination, the 

NRC staff continued its review, 

oversight, and assessment of the 

condition, including an independent 

evaluation of any potential public 

health and safety consequences. The 

staff’s activities included: 

1. Several onsite inspections and 

reviews to assess radiological and 

hydrological data to establish reasonable 

assurance that members of the public 

were not, nor were they expected to be, 

exposed to radiation in excess of the 

dose limits for individual members of 

the public specified in 10 CFR 20.1301, 

(i.e., 100 millirem in a year) or the As 

Low As Is Reasonably Achievable 

(ALARA) dose objectives specified in 10 

CFR Part 50, Appendix I. 

2. Engagement of hydrological 

scientists from NRC’s Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, Office of Regulatory 

Research, and the U.S. Geological 

Survey to independently assess the 

licensee’s hydrological and geological 

data and conclusions on groundwater 

flow characteristics of the area. 

3. Inspection in accordance with NRC 

Temporary Instruction TI–2515/173, 

‘‘Review of the Implementation of the 

Industry Ground Water Protection 

Voluntary Initiative,’’ to determine the 

licensee’s implementation of the 

specifications in the industry’s 

groundwater initiative document NEI– 

07–07, ‘‘Industry Ground Water 

Protection Initiative—Final Guidance 

Document,’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML072610036). 

4. Confirmation of the basis, 

calculational methodology, and results 

obtained by the licensee to estimate a 

contaminated groundwater effluent 

release and off-site dose consequence to 

members of the public. 

5. Analysis of selected ground water 

and environmental samples to aid in 

determining the adequacy of the 

licensee’s analytical methods. 

6. Approval for additional NRC 

inspection resources above the baseline 

inspection program to fully evaluate and 

provide continuing regulatory oversight 

of the licensee’s investigation and 

remediation activities. 

7. Documentation of the inspection 

scope and conclusions in publicly 

available NRC Inspection Reports. 

As a result of these activities, the NRC 

established reasonable assurance, in a 

timely manner, that this groundwater 

condition would not result in any dose 

consequence that would jeopardize 

public health and safety. To date, 

information and data continue to 

support that the dose consequence 

attributable to the groundwater 

condition at VY remains well below the 

‘‘As Low As Reasonably Achievable’’ 

(ALARA) dose objectives specified in 10 

CFR Part 50, Appendix I; and that the 

NRC regulatory criteria of 10 CFR 

20.1301, ‘‘Dose limits for individual 

members of the public,’’ was never 

approached. 

In addition, representatives from the 

State of Vermont observed NRC 

inspection activities and conducted 

independent analyses of collected 

groundwater samples. 

As discussed in Section I, the specific 

concerns raised by the petitioners which 

are used as the basis for their requests 

are discussed in the following 

paragraphs. 

A. NRC Response to the Consolidated 

Petition 

1. Concern 1—Increasing 

Concentrations of Radiocontaminants in 

the Soil and Groundwater at VY 

In order to address/remove the onsite 

contamination, Entergy installed an 

extraction well (GZ–EW1) on March 23, 

2010. On April 7, 2010, Entergy placed 

into service a second extraction well 

(GZ–EW1A), with a higher flow 

capacity. As the plume progressed 

toward the Connecticut River, the 

extraction wells were sited accordingly, 

with GZ–15 being utilized for 

groundwater extraction at various times 

starting on July 28, 2010, followed by 

installation of extraction well EW–2 

which began operation along with GZ– 

14 on September 13, 2010. As of 

December 21, 2010, Entergy has 

pumped approximately 307,000 gallons 

of groundwater out of these wells in 

order to reduce the amount of tritiated 

water in the groundwater. About 9,000 

gallons of the extracted water was 

recycled to the facility, and about 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 53 / Friday, March 18, 2011 / Notices 14999 

298,000 gallons of the extracted water 

has been shipped off-site for processing. 

Data indicates that the remaining 

residual plume of tritiated groundwater 

is currently migrating from the source of 

the leak to the Connecticut River, which 

is the direction of flow for the 

groundwater in this location. 

Notwithstanding the hydrology, no 

detectable tritium has been found in the 

Connecticut River. The NRC’s 

inspections to date confirm that no 

Federal regulatory limits have been 

exceeded, and public health and safety 

remain unaffected. 

The soil in the vicinity of the leak was 

contaminated with small amounts of 

radioactive particulates associated with 

nuclear plant operations, including 

manganese-54, cobalt-60, zinc-65, 

strontium-90, and cesium-137. 

Sampling indicated very little migration 

in the immediate area, which is typical 

for these radionuclides. Entergy has 

removed about 150 cubic feet of 

contaminated soil and packaged it for 

eventual disposal in accordance with 

NRC regulatory requirements. Although 

some minor amounts of contaminated 

soil may remain, NRC inspections 

indicate that this soil poses no threat to 

public health and safety. Areas of 

remaining minor contamination are 

expected to be evaluated, and as 

appropriate, remediated during plant 

decommissioning. The NRC’s 

experience with decommissioned 

nuclear plants such as Maine Yankee, 

Haddam Neck, and Yankee Rowe 

indicates that these areas can be 

successfully remediated during 

decommissioning. The NRC’s 

inspections indicate that no Federal 

regulatory limits have been exceeded, 

and there are no health or safety 

concerns for members of the public or 

plant workers. The initial NRC 

inspection covered the period of January 

25 through April 14, 2010. Inspection 

results were initially discussed in an 

NRC inspection report with preliminary 

results, dated April 16, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML101060419). The NRC 

issued its completed report on May 20, 

2010 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML101400040), and continued to 

inspect the licensee’s actions in these 

areas. The follow-up NRC Inspection 

Report 05000271/2010010 was issued 

on January 7, 2011, ADAMS Accession 

No. ML110070085. 

As part of its corrective action 

program, Entergy performed a root cause 

analysis (RCA) of the leakage event. The 

NRC assessed the comprehensiveness of 

this analysis and documented this 

review in NRC Inspection Report 

05000271/2010009 dated October 13, 

2010 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML102860037). The NRC concluded 

that Entergy’s root and apparent cause 

evaluations for the tritium ground water 

leakage events were appropriate and no 

violation of NRC requirements was 

identified. 

As discussed, Entergy has identified 

the source of the leak and stopped it, 

and has reduced the onsite 

contamination by pumping out 

contaminated groundwater and 

removing about 150 cubic feet of 

contaminated soil. The NRC’s 

inspections confirm that no Federal 

regulatory limits have been exceeded, 

and the public health and safety 

remains unaffected. Thus, no 

enforcement action is warranted for this 

concern. 

2. Concern 2—VY Was Unaware of the 

Existence of Some Buried Pipes During 

License Renewal Application 

Proceeding 

On February 24, 2010, Entergy 

informed the NRC that some employees 

at VY had been removed from their site 

positions and placed on administrative 

leave. Entergy took these actions as a 

result of Entergy’s independent internal 

investigation into alleged contradictory 

or misleading information provided to 

the State of Vermont that was not 

corrected. On May 27, 2010, an NRC 

audit team completed an onsite audit to 

independently verify that information 

provided by Entergy material to the 

renewal of the VY operating license was 

complete and accurate. The NRC staff 

reviewed the VY yard piping drawings 

to independently identify buried and 

underground piping located onsite. The 

NRC staff performed walk-downs of 

yard areas and conducted interviews 

with the buried piping program 

engineer. The NRC staff also reviewed 

the results of system walk-downs 

previously performed by NRC 

inspectors during the performance of 

NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71002, 

‘‘License Renewal Inspection,’’ as 

documented in NRC Inspection Report 

05000271/2007006, dated June 4, 2007 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML071550330). 

Additionally, the NRC staff had the 

opportunity to observe exposed portions 

of buried piping that had been 

previously excavated by Entergy in 

conjunction with actions taken to 

investigate the cause of a leak from an 

underground portion of piping in the 

AOG system. The NRC staff compared 

the results of this review to a list of 

buried and underground piping Entergy 

had provided in preparation of the 

audit. The NRC staff did not find any 

discrepancies between Entergy’s current 

accounting of buried and underground 

safety-related piping and the description 

contained in the license renewal 

application, and so concluded that all 

information provided to the NRC in the 

license renewal application was 

complete and accurate in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.9. Note that non-safety 

underground piping is excluded from 

the license renewal process. The 

complete audit report dated September 

3, 2010, may be found under ADAMS 

Accession No. ML102070412. Because 

the NRC staff did not identify a 

violation of NRC requirements, no 

enforcement action is warranted for this 

concern. 

3. Concern 3—Entergy’s Failure To 

Comprehend and Understand the 

Layout, Function, and Potentially the 

Interaction of the Plant’s Own Piping 

Systems Constitutes a Loss of Design 

Basis 

The design basis for VY is the 

information that ‘‘identifies the specific 

functions to be performed by a 

structure, system or component of a 

facility, and the specific values or 

ranges of values chosen for controlling 

parameters as reference bounds for 

design.’’ The design basis is submitted to 

the NRC and is approved by the NRC by 

issuance of the facility operating 

license. Any changes to the facility as 

described in the final safety analysis 

report (FSAR) must be either submitted 

to the NRC for approval through a 

license amendment, or changed in 

accordance with the provisions of 10 

CFR 50.59. Licensees are required under 

10 CFR 50.71(e) to update the FSAR, 

which was originally submitted as part 

of the application for the license, to 

assure that the information included in 

the FSAR contains the latest 

information developed. These 

submittals contain all the changes 

necessary to reflect information and 

analyses submitted to the Commission 

since the last update to the FSAR. The 

submittal includes the effects of all 

changes made in the facility or 

procedures as described in the FSAR 

and all safety analyses and evaluations 

performed by the licensee in support of 

approved license amendments or in 

support of conclusions that the plant 

design change did not require a license 

amendment. 

As discussed in previous Section A.2, 

an NRC audit team compared the 

information Entergy provided in the 

license renewal application to the VY 

Technical Specifications and the FSAR. 

The NRC staff determined that the 

information in the FSAR would meet 

the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e) 

regarding maintenance of design basis 

information, consistent with the 

definition of ‘‘design bases’’ in 10 CFR 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with NOTICES
15000 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 53 / Friday, March 18, 2011 / Notices 

50.2, and reflects current plant design. 

Both safety and non-safety underground 

yard piping are depicted on drawings in 

the VY’s controlled drawings system. 

The staff concluded that the information 

reviewed was accurate and complete 

and the NRC staff did not identify any 

loss of the design basis. Because no 

violations of NRC requirements were 

identified, enforcement action is not 

warranted for this concern. 

4. Concern 4—The NRC’s ROP Failure 

To Detect Root Cause Trends of a Series 

of High-Profile Incidents 

While a failure of the NRC’s ROP is 

not something for which the NRC could 

take enforcement action against VY, the 

NRC staff is responding to the 

petitioners’ concern. Objectives of the 

ROP include: (1) Improving the 

objectivity of reactor oversight so that 

subjective decisions and judgment are 

not central process features; (2) 

improving the scrutability of reactor 

oversight so that NRC actions have a 

clear tie to licensee performance; and (3) 

risk-informing reactor oversight so that 

NRC and licensee resources are focused 

on those aspects of performance having 

the greatest impact on safe plant 

operation. 

The ROP evaluates plant performance 

using objective, risk-informed 

thresholds, which include the safety 

significance of inspection findings and 

performance indicators (PIs). Objective 

performance thresholds are intended to 

help determine the level of regulatory 

engagement appropriate to licensee 

performance in each cornerstone area. 

The thresholds were established so that 

sufficient margin existed between 

nominal performance bands to allow for 

licensee initiatives to correct 

performance problems before they 

warrant escalated regulatory 

involvement. Sufficient margin exists to 

allow for both NRC and licensee 

corrective actions to be taken in 

response to declining performance 

before plant operation becomes unsafe. 

Under the ROP, performance 

deficiencies that have no impact on 

safety are considered minor and are 

entered into a licensee’s corrective 

action program for appropriate 

attention, but they do not result in any 

specific action by the NRC. However, 

the NRC reviews the licensee’s 

corrective action program on a routine 

basis while performing the baseline 

inspection program, and the staff 

performs more in-depth reviews on a 

periodic basis while performing the 

inspection procedure, ‘‘Problem 

Identification and Resolution.’’ 

In addition to continuous inspection 

and assessment of VY performance, 

annual and mid-cycle assessments of 

VY performance are conducted. Annual 

and mid-cycle assessments involve 

review of the safety significance and 

common factors associated with 

inspection findings, and review of 

licensee objective performance 

indicators. The results associated with 

the last several reviews indicate that VY 

is being operated in a manner which 

preserves public health and safety. The 

high profile events referenced by the 

petitioners were inspected by a 

combination of specialist inspectors 

from both the NRC regional office and 

NRC headquarters, and by the onsite 

resident inspector staff. These events 

were determined to either not involve 

systems important to plant safety, or 

involved performance deficiencies of 

very low safety significance. In June 

2009, the NRC conducted a Problem 

Identification and Resolution inspection 

at VY. The results of this inspection 

indicated that VY was generally 

effective in the implementation of its 

corrective action program; additionally, 

the safety culture of station employees, 

including station management, 

indicated that personnel had a 

willingness to identify, evaluate, and 

resolve plant deficiencies. The current 

and past performance information, 

including the Mid-Cycle and Annual 

Assessment Letters and inspection 

reports issued to VY and other 

licensees, are publically available and 

presented on the NRC’s public Web site. 

The ROP Action Matrix is used to 

determine the level of regulatory 

oversight warranted for varying levels of 

performance. VY is in Column 1 

(Licensee Response Column) of the ROP 

Action Matrix because all inspection 

findings and PIs at this site have very 

low (i.e., green) safety significance. In 

accordance with Inspection Manual 

Chapter (IMC) 0305, ‘‘Operating Reactor 

Assessment Program,’’ plants in Column 

1 meet all cornerstone objectives and 

receive the NRC’s baseline inspection 

program. 

The deviation process described in 

IMC 0305 is used to address unique 

situations where the oversight defined 

by the ROP Action Matrix column might 

not be appropriate or sufficient. Even 

though performance at VY had not 

crossed any thresholds warranting 

additional regulatory oversight, the staff 

considered it appropriate to apply 

additional resources to monitor the 

licensee’s efforts to address the onsite 

groundwater contamination and to 

follow up on the licensee’s response to 

the NRC’s Demand for Information 

dated March 1, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML100570237). The staff 

requested and received authorization 

from the NRC’s Executive Director for 

Operations (EDO) on April 5, 2010 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML100960321), 

to deviate from the ROP Action Matrix 

to apply additional resources in these 

areas of licensee performance. 

Although tritium has been found in 

onsite monitoring wells, the staff has 

not identified a hazard to public health 

and safety, and the staff expects any offsite radiological releases to be very 

small (i.e., off-site doses, if any, would 

be negligible with respect to those 

received from normal background 

radiation levels). Nevertheless, as noted 

in the Action Matrix deviation 

memorandum, increased NRC oversight 

of the characterization, mitigation, and 

remediation of the tritium 

contamination was warranted given the 

extraordinary level of interest and 

concern by stakeholders. Although there 

is not currently, nor is there likely to be, 

a public health and safety issue, the 

NRC is conducting additional 

independent inspections and 

assessments of the licensee’s activities, 

and has increased external stakeholder 

communications and outreach, to 

respond to stakeholder concerns and 

maintain public confidence. 

The NRC staff considers the ROP 

adequate for ensuring public health and 

safety and notes that the groundwater 

contamination at VY does not pose a 

public health or safety hazard. 

The staff further notes that it has 

exercised its authority to deviate from 

the ROP Action Matrix to be responsive 

to unique circumstances and 

stakeholder concerns. The NRC staff 

conducts annual ROP self-assessments, 

which include evaluations of deviations 

from the Action matrix to see if 

improvements are warranted in the 

ROP. The results of the calendar year 

2010 self-assessment will be included in 

the annual Commission paper and 

metric report, which will be issued in 

early April of 2011 and discussed 

during the Agency Action Review 

Meeting (AARM): a meeting of senior 

NRC managers to confirm the results 

and effectiveness of the ROP. The 

results of the AARM will be presented 

to the Commission in a public meeting 

in May 2011. 

5. Concern 5—VY’s Decommissioning 

Fund Is Inadequate Due to the Increase 

in Decommissioning Costs 

NRC establishes requirements for 

licensees to provide reasonable 

assurance that funds will be available 

for the decommissioning process. 

Reasonable assurance consists of a 

series of steps outlined in 10 CFR 50.75, 

‘‘Reporting and record keeping for 

decommissioning planning.’’ VY must 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 53 / Friday, March 18, 2011 / Notices 15001 

file an annual report to the NRC 

containing a certification that financial 

assurance for decommissioning will be 

or has been provided in an amount 

which may be more, but not less than, 

the amount stated in the regulations, 

adjusted as appropriate for changes in 

labor, energy, and waste burial costs. 

The formula for adequate 

decommissioning funds includes an 

estimated waste disposal volume based 

on the plant design. The actual waste 

disposal volume may increase due to a 

leak or spill at a level that requires 

remediation. The licensee is responsible 

for payment of any increased waste 

disposal costs, whether paid for out of 

the allocated funds from the 

decommissioning fund or other assets. 

The current remediation of the tritium 

in soil and groundwater at VY has been 

funded as an operating expense and no 

money was used from the 

decommissioning trust fund. VY 

previously submitted a site-specific 

decommissioning cost analysis, which 

was approved by the NRC by letter 

dated February 3, 2009 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML083390193). VY must 

address any required changes in their 

next annual report. Because no 

violations of NRC requirements were 

identified, enforcement action is not 

warranted for this concern. 

B. Additional NRC Actions Pertaining to 

Groundwater Contamination 

In March of 2010, NRC’s EDO 

established a Groundwater Task Force 

(GTF) to review the NRCs approach to 

ground water contamination conditions, 

given the recent incidents of leaking 

buried pipes at commercial nuclear 

power plants. The charter of the Task 

Force was to reevaluate the 

recommendations made in the Liquid 

Radioactive Release Lessons Learned 

Task Force Final Report dated 

September 1, 2006 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML062650312); review the actions 

taken in Commission Paper SECY–09– 

0174 ‘‘Staff Progress in Evaluation of 

Buried Piping at Nuclear Reactor 

Facilities’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML093160004); and review the actions 

taken in response to recent releases of 

tritium into groundwater by nuclear 

facilities. 

The GTF completed its work in June 

2010 and provided its report to the EDO. 

The report characterized a variety of 

issues ranging from policy issues to 

communications improvement 

opportunities. The complete report may 

be found under ADAMS Accession No. 

ML101740509. The GTF determined 

that the NRC is accomplishing its stated 

mission of protecting public health, 

safety, and protection of the 

environment through its response to 

groundwater leaks/spills. Within the 

current regulatory structure, the NRC is 

correctly applying requirements and 

properly characterizing the relevant 

issues. However, the GTF reported that 

there are further observations, 

conclusions, and recommendations that 

the NRC should consider in its oversight 

of groundwater contamination 

incidents. 

The EDO appointed a group of NRC 

senior executives to review the report 

and consider its findings. The group 

reviewed the GTF final report, including 

the conclusions, recommendations, and 

their bases. They identified conclusions 

and recommendations that do not 

involve policy issues, and tasked the 

NRC staff to address them. They have 

also identified policy issues, and a 

policy paper has been sent to the 

Commission discussing those issues. 

A public workshop was held on 

October 4, 2010, with external 

stakeholders to discuss the findings of 

the GTF Report and to receive input on 

the potential policy issues. In addition, 

a request for public comment was 

published in the Federal Register (75 

FR 57987). These efforts help to ensure 

the NRC is considering the right issues 

on which to focus its attention as it 

moves forward. The transcript from this 

meeting is available on the NRC’s Web 

site at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

doc-collections/fact-sheets/buriedpipes-tritium.html. 

III. Conclusion 

As summarized above, the NRC staff 

did not identify any violations and the 

public health and safety remains 

reasonably assured. Thus, no 

enforcement action against VY is 

warranted. The NRC staff concludes that 

the petitioners’ concerns have been 

addressed and resolved such that no 

further action is needed in response to 

the petitions. 

As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a 

copy of this Director’s Decision will be 

filed with the Secretary of the 

Commission for the Commission to 

review. As provided for by this 

regulation, the Decision will constitute 

the final action of the Commission 25 

days after the date of the Decision 

unless the Commission, on its own 

motion, institutes a review of the 

Decision within that time. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day 

of March 2011. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Eric J. Leeds, 

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2011–6401 Filed 3–17–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–271; NRC–2011–0060] 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc,. 

Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, 

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 

Station; License No. DPR–28, Receipt 

of Request for Action 

Notice is hereby given that petitions 

dated January 12, 2010, from Mr. 

Michael Mulligan, February 8, 2010, 

from Mr. Raymond Shadis, and 

February 20, 2010, from Mr. Thomas 

Saporito, have requested that, under 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) 2.206, ‘‘Requests 

for Action under this Subpart,’’ the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

take action with regard to the Vermont 

Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY). 

Mr. Mulligan requested in his petition 

that (1) the radioactive leak into the 

environment of VY be immediately 

stopped, VY be immediately shut down, 

and all leaking paths be isolated, and (2) 

VY disclose its preliminary root cause 

analysis and the NRC release its 

preliminary investigative report on this 

analysis before plant startup. 

Mr. Shadis requested in his petition 

that the NRC (1) require VY to go into 

cold shutdown and depressurize all 

systems in order to slow or stop the 

leak, (2) act promptly to stop or mitigate 

the leak(s) and not wait until all issues 

raised by New England Coalition are 

resolved, (3) require VY to reestablish 

its licensing basis by physically tracing 

records and reporting physical details of 

all plant systems that would be within 

scope as ‘‘buried pipes and tanks’’ in 

NUREG–1801, ‘‘Generic Aging Lessons 

Learned (GALL) Report,’’ and under the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54, 

‘‘Conditions of Licenses,’’ (4) investigate 

and determine why Entergy has been 

allowed to operate VY since 2002 

without a working knowledge of all 

plant systems, and why the NRC’s 

Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and 

review process for license renewal 

amendment did not detect this 

dereliction, (5) take notice of Entergy 

Nuclear Vermont Yankee’s many 

maintenance and management failures 

(from 2000 to 2010) and the ROP’s 

failure to detect them early and 

undertake a full diagnostic evaluation 

team inspection or NRC Inspection 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with NOTICES