§ 16.132 Exemption of Department of Justice System—Personnel Investigation and Security Clearance Records for the Department of Justice (DOJ), DOJ-006. ( a ) The following Department of Justice system of records is exempted from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1),(2),(3),(5) and (8); and (g) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k): Personnel Investigation and Security Clearance Records for the Department of Justice (DOJ), DOJ-006. These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in a record is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k).
( b ) Exemption from the particular subsections is justified for the following reasons: ( 1 ) *Subsection (c)(3).* To provide the subject with an accounting of disclosures of records in this system could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an actual or potential law enforcement or counterintelligence investigation, and thereby seriously impede law enforcement or counterintelligence efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties, civil remedies, or counterintelligence measures.
( 2 ) *Subsection (c)(4).* This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).
( 3 ) *Subsection (d)(1).* Disclosure of records in the system could reveal the identity of confidential sources and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Disclosure may also reveal information relating to actual or potential criminal investigations. Disclosure of classified national security information would cause damage to the national security of the United States.
( 4 ) *Subsection (d)(2).* Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.
( 5 ) *Subsections (d)(3) and (4).* These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).
( 6 ) *Subsection (e)(1).* It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.
( 7 ) *Subsection (e)(2).* To collect information from the subject individual could serve notice that he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to such investigations.
( 8 ) *Subsection (e)(3).* To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal investigation and compromise investigative efforts.
( 9 ) *Subsection (e)(5).* It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.
( 10 ) *Subsection (e)(8).* To serve notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts.
( 11 ) *Subsection (g).* This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
[Order No. 297-2002, 67 FR 70163, Nov. 21, 2002]