Judge Kelly died on October 21, 1998. This opinion is consistent with the vote 1 he cast at conference on this case.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-2945EM

_____________ Credit Lyonnais, S.A. * * Appellant, * * On Appeal from the United v. * States District Court * for the Eastern District * of Missouri. SGC International, Incorporated, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: September 22, 1998 Filed: November 5, 1998

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, WOLLMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 1

___________ RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Credit Lyonnais, S.A., a French bank, appeals the District Court’s denial of a motion to compel two depositions as part of post-judg ment discovery. We believe that the Dist rict Court erred in denying Credit Lyonnais’s motion to compel, and w e therefore reverse the Court’s decision.-2-

Credit Lyonnais initial ly sought to recover $1,000,000 from SGC International, Inc., money that was sent by a mistaken wire transfer to SGC’s Swiss bank account. When SGC refused to return the money, Credit Lyonnais filed suit against SGC fo r unjust enrichment, money had and received, and conversion. The District Cour t en tered summary judgment in Credit Lyonnais’s favor on the unjust-enrichment an d money-had-and-received claims and dismissed the conversion claim. Since the entry of summ ary judgment awarding Credit Lyonnais $1,411,581.61 on October 25, 1996, Credit Lyonnais ha s unsuccessfully sought to recover the money from SGC. Credit Lyonnais tried to engage in discovery of SGC’s assets in order to execute th e judgment, but SGC failed to respond to Credit Lyonnais’s interrogatories andproduction requests. In a motion to compel filed on December 17, 1996, Credit Lyonnais then asked the District Court to order SGC to respond. The District Court ente red the order on January 17, 1997, but the order failed to elicit a response fro m SGC.
Prior to, and at the time of, the entry of summary judgment, Franz Sedelmayer was S GC’s president. He identified himself as SGC’s chief executive officer as well as its sole director and owner. SGC had no other e mployees, officers, or shareholders, and Se delmayer had sole responsibility for all of SGC’s activities. On December 4 , 1996, however, Sedelmayer claimed to have resigned as SGC’s president. Although Sedelmayer may have resigned as SGC’s president, Credit Lyonnais believes he is still SGC’s secretary. Additionally, Sedelmayer was president at the time of the event s leading up to Credit Lyonnais’s summary-judgment award. Credit Lyonnais then sought to depose both SGC and Sedelmayer, in his official capacity as corporate of

ficer. Prior to serving the deposition notices, Credit Lyonnais h a d not sought to depose either SGC or Sedelmayer following the October 25, 1996, judgment award. Credit Lyonnais had only attempted to en gage in discovery of SGC’s assets onlythrough interrogatories and production requests. The deposition notice toCredit Lyonnais also filed a motion to hold SGC and Sedelmayer in contempt. 2 The Distr ict Court granted the motion as to SGC and denied it as to Sedelmayer

. During oral argument Credit Lyonnais did not raise the contempt issue and indicated t h at it now seeks only the opportunity to depose SGC and Sedelmayer. This opinion therefore addresses only the motion to compel. SGC did not troub le itself to file a brief or appear at oral argument. -3- Sed elmayer

indicated that Credit Lyonnais wanted information about Sedelmayer’ s assets and asset transfers. Credit Lyonnais also sought documents related t o Sedelma yer’s personal assets. SGC and Sedelmayer failed to appear for th e depositions. Credit Lyonnais then filed the motion to compel upon which this appeal is based. 2 We review the District Court’s application of discovery rules under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See National Service Industries, Inc. v. Vafla Corp

. , 694 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir. 1982); Brown v. Arlen Management Corp. , 663 F.2d 575, 580 (5 Cir. th 1981). We b elieve that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Credi t Lyonnais’s motion to compel in its entirety. The rules for depositio ns and discovery “are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. ” Hickman v. Taylor , 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). The right to conduc t discovery applies both before and after judgment. See United States v. McWhirter , 376 F.2d 102, 106 (5 Cir. 1967). Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure th specifically provides the right to post-judgment discovery “[i]n aid of the judgment.” The rule further provides that the judgment creditor “may obtain discovery from any person . . . in the manner provided in these rules or . . . by the practice of the state in which the distr

ict court is held.” Id . Missouri’s Rules of Civil Procedure allow postjudgmentd iscovery of “matters . . . relevant to the discovery of assets or incom e subject to . . . the satis faction of judgments.” Mo. R. Civ. P. 76.28. Additionally, the rule governing depositions provides a broad right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30. A party may-4-

depose almost anyone, includin g corporations, who may provide relevant information.

Unde r these rules, Credit Lyonnais has a right to conduct reasonable post

ju dgment discovery and to inquire into SGC’s assets. Credit Lyonnais “is entitled to a very thorough examin ation of the judgment debtor.” Caisson Corp. v. County West Bui lding Corp. , 62 F.R.D. 331, 335 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The District Court recognize d this right when it granted the January 17, 1997, order to SGC to respond to Credi t Lyonnai s’s written discovery requests. SGC, however, failed to respond. Credi t Lyonnais then sought to depose both SGC and Sedelmayer, in his ca pacity as corporate officer. Credit Lyonnais presented evidence depicting the close relationship between Sedelm ayer

and SGC. This evidence suggests that the inquiry into SGC’s asset s requires deposing both Sedelmayer and SGC.
The law allows judgment creditors to conduct full post-judgment discovery t o aid in executing jud gment. See White v. General Motors Corp. , 1990 WL 47437 at * 1 (D. Kan. 1990) (citing Caisson , 62 F.R.D. at 335). The District Court, however , denied all of Credit Lyonnais’s motion to compel the depositions. The Court based its denial on the scope of th e subject matter identified in the deposition notices. Some of the subjects identified in the deposition notice rel ate to Sedelmayer’s personal finances
an d assets. Credit Lyonnais also seeks information related to transfers of asset s between Sedelmayer and SGC.
Credit L yonnais wants to examine the relationship between Sedelmayer an d SGC. As SGC’s sole officer, director, shareholder, and decision-maker, Sedelmayer is closely linked to SGC. Additionally, both SGC’s and Sedelmayer’s failure t o comply with the District Court’s earlier discovery order, as well as the failure to pay the judgment, lend support to Credit Lyonnais’s motion to compel. The relationship between Sedelmayer and SGC “is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the bona fides of [any] transfer of assets between them.” Magnaleasing, Inc.v. Staten Island-5-

Mall , 76 F.R.D. 559, 562 ( S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Caisson , 62 F.R.D. at 335). Credit Lyonnais believes it should be allowed to inquire into the relationship betwee n Sedelmayer and SGC. We agree. Although Sedelmayer may no longer be the president of SGC, the circumstances of his resignation, and his role at SGC after his resignation, remain unclear

. Sedelmayer cannot use his resignation as a complete excuse to avoid the deposition

. Credit Lyonnais has good reason to want to kno w about the relationship between SGC andSedelmayer in order to execute its judgment against SGC. Inquiring into th e circumstances of Sedelmayer’s resignation will help shed light on the relationship.
The District Court does have discretion to limit the scope of discovery. Se e Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co. , 585 F.2d 877 , 898 (8 Cir. 1978). The th Court denied the motion to compel because it found the sco pe of the subjects identified in the depos ition notices objectionable. We see no indication that any of the subjects included fa ll outside the scope of what the law allows. The District Court can , however, limit the scope of the material about which Credit Ly onnais may depose SGC and Sedelmayer, if it has a good reason to do so. We leave this sort of fine tuning to the District Court o n remand, but we stress that the presumption should be in favor of full discovery of any matters arguably related to Credit Lyonnais's efforts to trace SGC assets and otherwise to enforce its judgment. Matters relating to Sedelmayer's personal f inances seem to us -- subject to such further reasonable inquiry as the District Court may think proper -- to be proper subjects of discovery.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.-6-

A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.