Practices Related to Naked Short 

Selling Complaints and Referrals 

 March 18, 2009 

 Report No. 450 
 
Practices Related to Naked Short Selling 

Complaints and Referrals 

Executive Summary 

Background 

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC or Commission) Division of 

Enforcement (Enforcement) has received a great deal of complaints and related 

information during the past several years from issuers and investors about a type 

of trading called “naked” short selling, which has become an issue of increasing 

concern to both issuers of securities and investors.1

 Some of the complaints 

received by Enforcement concerned the general impact of naked short selling on 

the market. Many complaints requested that Enforcement investigate specific 

instances of naked short selling. Other complaints concerned the perceived 

failure on the part of the Commission and others, including Enforcement, to 

address the harmful effects of naked short selling. 

The SEC’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) has also received numerous 

complaints, particularly since December 2007, alleging that Enforcement has 

failed to take sufficient action regarding naked short selling. Many of these 

complaints asserted that investors and companies lost billions of dollars because 

Enforcement has not taken sufficient action against naked short selling practices. 

These complaints further indicated a lack of confidence on the part of some 

members of the public in Enforcement’s ability to protect investors. 

Naked short selling has been a controversial practice for several years and, while 

not illegal per se, abusive or manipulative naked short selling (e.g., intentionally 

failing to borrow and deliver shares sold short in order to drive down the stock 

price) violates the federal securities laws. The Commission initially responded to 

concerns about abusive naked short selling in 2004 by adopting a short sale 

regulation, Regulation SHO, that included provisions specifically designed to 

address naked short selling.2

 The recent financial crisis, including claims that 

aggressive short selling played a role in the failure of Lehman Brothers in 

September 2008, renewed the public’s concerns about naked short selling. From 

July through October 2008, the Commission undertook a number of measures, 

including emergency orders temporarily restricting short selling in the stock of 

certain financial companies and adopting amendments to Regulation SHO, that 

 

1

 Naked short selling involves a practice whereby short sellers of securities do not borrow 

securities in time to make delivery to the buyer within the standard three-day settlement period. 

See infra pp. 6-7 for additional explanation. 

Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

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2

 See infra pp. 9-11 for additional discussion of Regulation SHO. 
Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

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were designed to prevent abusive naked short selling and restore investor 

confidence in the markets.3 

Because Enforcement does not have separate procedures and processes for 

handling complaints about naked short selling, our audit examined Enforcement’s 

general complaint receipt and processing procedures as they applied to the 

receipt and referral of naked short selling complaints. 

Objectives 

The OIG received numerous complaints alleging that Enforcement failed to take 

sufficient action regarding naked short selling. Many of these complaints 

asserted that investors and companies lost billions of dollars because 

Enforcement has not taken sufficient action against naked short selling practices. 

In light of these complaints and based on our audit plan, we conducted an audit 

to assess whether Enforcement: 

1. Established policies and guidelines that enabled Enforcement to respond 

appropriately to complaints and referrals, including those involving naked 

short selling; and 

2. Followed existing policies and procedures for responding to complaints 

and referrals, including those pertaining to naked short selling. 

We also followed up on the status of pertinent findings and recommendations 

contained in a prior OIG report, and we reviewed a Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) report related to Enforcement’s policies and procedures for 

complaints and referrals.4

 Additionally, we coordinated our audit efforts with the 

GAO, which has an ongoing review of the implementation of the Commission’s 

short sale regulation, Regulation SHO. Specifically, the GAO is studying the: 

1. Extent to which Regulation SHO has reduced the number of failures to 

deliver of stocks that might impact the market for these securities; 

2. SEC’s oversight of the clearing and settlement processes for securities 

trades, particularly for identifying and addressing failures to deliver; and 

3

 See infra pp. 11-14 for additional discussion of these emergency orders and amendments. 4

 These reports are SEC OIG Audit No. 352, Enforcement Internet Program, January 13, 2003, 

and GAO-08-33, Securities and Exchange Commission: Opportunities Exist to Improve 

Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organizations, November 15, 2007. During the previous OIG 

audit, we were informed that Enforcement’s Office of Internet Enforcement was about to 

implement a database to track referrals of complaints for further investigation. During the 

current audit, however, we found that Enforcement is no longer using this database. See infra 

Finding 6. The prior GAO audit found that Enforcement’s system for receiving and tracking 

referrals from the Self-Regulatory Organizations (SRO) needed improvements and 

recommended enhancements that would facilitate the monitoring and analysis of trend 

information and case activities. Enforcement’s Office of Market Surveillance informed us that it 

has requested enhancements for the SRO referral tracking system that are pending. We found 

no prior GAO or OIG reports specifically related to processing naked short selling complaints. 
Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

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3. Efforts made by the SEC and Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) to 

enforce compliance with Regulation SHO in connection with abusive short 

selling. 

Results

Our audit disclosed that despite the tremendous amount of attention the practice 

of naked short selling has generated in recent years, Enforcement has brought 

very few enforcement actions based on conduct involving abusive or 

manipulative naked short selling. We also found that Enforcement generally 

received complaints, including naked short selling complaints, by one of three 

methods: 

1. E-mail complaints received by the Enforcement Complaint Center (ECC) 

within the Office of Internet Enforcement (OIE); 

2. Complaints, Tips and Referrals (CTR) that are received by Headquarters 

or Regional Office Enforcement staff outside of normal complaints 

channels (i.e., the ECC); and 

3. Referral of complaints to Enforcement’s Office of Market Surveillance 

(OMS) by SROs, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 

(FINRA).5

 

However, during the period of our review we found that few naked short selling 

complaints were forwarded to Headquarters or Regional Office Enforcement staff 

for further investigation. Of approximately 5,000 naked short selling complaints 

received in the ECC between January 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008, only 123 

(approximately 2.5 percent) were forwarded for further investigation. Moreover, 

we found that these complaints were forwarded only because the complaint 

subjects were involved in ongoing Enforcement investigations. None of the 

forwarded complaints resulted in enforcement actions, though one of the 

complaints referenced a pending enforcement action involving naked short 

selling. Furthermore, only six of the approximately 1,900 complaints entered into 

Enforcement’s CTR database during the period we examined, alleged naked 

short selling. Based on the data available to us, these complaints led to no 

enforcement actions.6

 Also, we were informed that none of the approximately 

900 SRO referrals received by OMS between January 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008 

involved naked short selling. 

Our audit determined that Enforcement’s existing complaint receipt and 

processing procedures hinder Enforcement’s ability to respond effectively to 

naked short selling complaints and referrals. We found that the ECC’s written 

5

 FINRA was formed in July 2007 as a result of the merger of regulatory arms of the National 

Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). See infra n.10 

for an explanation of the SROs. 6

 During the audit, we learned that Regional Offices have inconsistent approaches for entering 

data into the CTR database. See infra Finding 3. 
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policies and procedures do not include specific triage7

 steps for naked short 

selling complaints, while they do include procedures for the in-depth analysis of 

several other categories of complaints, e.g., spam driven manipulations, 

unregistered online offerings and insider trading. These procedures, we believe, 

have the effect of naked short selling complaints being treated differently than 

other types of complaints. 

Moreover, the ECC’s policies and procedures expressly instruct staff, as a 

general matter, not to forward for further investigation complaints based on data 

obtained from “Level II” trading terminals.8 Because many investor complaints of 

naked short selling are based on information obtained from Level II trading 

screens, no triage is performed on these complaints and they are automatically 

not forwarded to Enforcement staff, unless they pertain to an existing 

Enforcement matter. Our audit also disclosed a risk that naked short selling 

complaints with potential merit may be eliminated from further consideration 

during the initial complaint screening process because no supervisory review is 

performed of the initial screening. 

Enforcement maintains that naked short selling complaints are not being treated 

differently than other types of complaints and that the naked short selling 

complaints it receives generally do not provide sufficient information to warrant 

pursuit of the complaint. Enforcement, therefore, states that it is reluctant to 

expend additional resources to investigate such complaints and indicated that the 

high volume of incoming complaints precludes supervisory review of the initial 

screening of all e-mail complaints. (Enforcement has indicated, however, that it 

is willing to perform supervisory sampling and review of complaints that are 

eliminated at the initial screening stage.) Given the heightened public and 

Commission focus on naked short selling and guidance provided to the public 

leading them to believe these complaints will be taken seriously and 

appropriately evaluated, we believe the ECC’s current policies and procedures 

should be improved to ensure that naked short selling complaints are addressed 

appropriately. 

Our audit also disclosed that improvements are needed to the CTR process both 

at Headquarters and the Regional Offices to ensure the appropriate handling of 

incoming complaints, including those involving naked short selling. We found 

that there is currently no uniform set of procedures for the receipt and processing 

of CTRs and no division-level oversight of the CTR program. Presently, there 

are two separate sets of procedures for processing CTRs, one for Headquarters 

and one for the Regional Offices. In addition, some Regional Offices also have 

their own written CTR procedures, while others have informal, unwritten CTR 

7

 “Triage” is the process of research and analysis used by OIE staff to determine which investor 

complaints are likely to be of sufficient interest to Enforcement staff to warrant the opening of 

an informal inquiry or formal investigation. See infra pp. 3-4 for additional explanation. 8

 Level II data shows the best bid (buy) and ask (sell) prices and the number of shares available 

for every market maker and electronic communications network (ECN). GAO/GGD-00-61, 

Securities Operations: Day Trading Requires Continued Oversight, February 24, 2000. 
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practices. We also found that Regional Office procedures are inconsistent as to 

when and whether complaints are entered into the CTR database. The lack of 

uniform procedures and Division-level oversight can lead to the inconsistent 

treatment of complaints, including those involving naked short selling, depending 

on where within the Commission the complaint is received. 

Moreover, our audit found that neither the Headquarters nor the Regional Offices 

are complying with the existing written CTR policies and procedures. We 

reviewed 82 Headquarters CTR packages for the period from January 1, 2007 to 

June 1, 2008, to test for compliance with the Headquarters CTR policies and 

procedures. According to those procedures, a complaint package should include 

the original complaint, a copy of the response sent to the complainant and a 

completed CTR data form. The majority of the CTR packages we reviewed were 

incomplete: Sixty-seven percent (55 of 82) were missing the response to the 

complainant; forty percent (33 of 82) were missing the CTR data form; and ten 

percent (8 of 82) were missing the original complaint itself. We also found that 

one of these CTRs was not entered into the CTR database, and another CTR 

was only partially entered. We learned during our audit that OIE does not follow 

up with Enforcement staff to ensure the CTR package is complete, resulting in 

OIE oftentimes lacking adequate documentation of a complaint. 

In order to determine compliance with Regional Office CTR procedures, we sent 

a questionnaire to all 11 Commission Regional Offices. Existing CTR policies 

and procedures applicable to the Regional Offices require the performance of 

monthly reviews of a Regional Office’s CTRs by supervisors at the Senior Officer 

(SES-equivalent) level. The responses to our questionnaire revealed that, of the 

11 Regional Offices, only five Regional Offices performed the required monthly 

CTR reviews. Two Regional Offices performed the reviews on a less frequent 

basis. Three Regional Offices did not perform the monthly reviews because 

senior officials were involved with the CTRs throughout the process, or lower 

level officials were considered to be responsible for CTR judgments. One 

Regional Office (which was previously a District Office) forwarded its CTRs to 

another Regional Office for review. 

Our audit also found that Enforcement’s current automated complaint tracking 

systems, primarily the ECC complaint mailbox and the CTR database, require 

improvements to ensure the appropriate processing and tracking of complaints. 

In addition, we learned during our audit that a database previously developed by 

OIE to track the results of complaint referrals was no longer in use due to 

technical difficulties encountered with the system. As a consequence, OIE has 

no current ability to track electronically which types of complaints referred to 

Enforcement staff result in the opening of an informal inquiry or a formal 

investigation. 
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Summary of Recommendations 

Our audit determined that several improvements are needed to Enforcement’s 

procedures for the receipt and processing of complaints, including those 

pertaining to naked short selling. 

Specifically, our audit determined that the ECC should revise its current written 

policies and procedures to: 

1. Include in-depth triage analysis for naked short selling complaints, similar 

to the detailed triage steps currently specified for other types of 

complaints, such as those about spam-driven manipulations and insider 

trading; and 

2. Ensure that investor naked short selling complaints based on information 

obtained from certain types of less sophisticated computer terminals are 

given a proper level of scrutiny and referred for further investigation where 

appropriate. 

The audit also found that the ECC should include naked short selling in the 

categories of complaints listed on the Complaint Center page of the SEC’s public 

website. In addition, we recommend that the ECC enhance its supervision of the 

initial screening of complaints to ensure the appropriateness of these important 

initial decisions about complaints. 

Our audit further found that a number of improvements are needed to the 

Enforcement’s CTR program, both at Headquarters and in the Regional Offices. 

Specifically, the Division should develop uniform written policies and procedures 

for the CTR program at Headquarters and the Regional Offices and should 

designate an office or individual at Headquarters to oversee the program on a 

nationwide basis. In addition, Enforcement should ensure that CTRs forwarded 

to OIE contain complete complaint documentation and that Regional Office 

senior officials perform monthly CTR reviews, as required by existing policies and 

procedures. 

Finally, our audit found that Enforcement should make improvements to its 

existing information technology systems for the receipt and processing of 

complaints, primarily the ECC complaint mailbox and the CTR database, to 

increase their functionality and analytical capabilities. We are also 

recommending that OIE update and resume its previously-developed complaint 

referral tracking system, or develop a new system to track information concerning 

the results of complaint referrals. 

See the Findings and Recommendations section for a detailed discussion of the 

audit’s findings and recommendations. A detailed list of our recommendations is 

located in Appendix IV. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Executive Summary....................................................................................................... i 

Table of Contents.........................................................................................................vii 

Background...................................................................................................................1 

Overview of the Division of Enforcement............................................................1 

Enforcement’s Complaint Process .....................................................................2 

The Enforcement Complaint Center................................................... ......2 

Complaints, Tips and Referrals System .............................................................4 

Referrals from the Self-Regulatory Organizations..............................................6 

Concerns about Naked Short Selling and the Commission’s Response ...........6 

Short Selling in General .....................................................................................6 

The Practice of Naked Short Selling ..................................................................7 

Outside Concerns about the Abusive Effects of Naked Short Selling ................8 

The Commission’s Views on Naked Short Selling..............................................9 

Regulation SHO .................................................................................................9 

Recent Emergency Orders and Amendments to Regulation SHO...................11 

Enforcement Actions Against Manipulative Naked Short Selling......................14 

Receipt and Processing of Complaints about Naked Short Selling..................15 

Objectives ...................................................................................................................16

Findings and Recommendations.................................................................................18 

Finding 1: The Enforcement Complaint Center’s Policies and Procedures 

Do Not Provide Specific Triage Steps for Naked Short Selling Complaints 

and Appear to Result in These Types of Complaints Not Being Forwarded 

for Further Investigation ...................................................................................18 

Recommendation 1.....................................................................22 

Recommendation 2.....................................................................22 

Recommendation 3.....................................................................23 

Finding 2: The Enforcement Complaint Center Does Not Perform 

Supervisory Review of Its Initial Screening of Complaints ...............................23 

Recommendation 4.....................................................................24 
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Finding 3: Enforcement’s Procedures for Processing Complaints, Tips and 

Referrals Differ and There is Insufficient Division-Level Oversight of the 

CTR Program...................................................................................................25 

Recommendation 5.....................................................................26 

Recommendation 6.....................................................................27 

Finding 4: Headquarters and the Regional Offices Do Not Consistently 

Follow Existing Complaint, Tips and Referrals Processing Procedures ...........27 

Testing of Headquarters CTR Procedures .......................................................27 

Questionnaires about Regional Office CTR Policies and Procedures..............28 

Recommendation 7.....................................................................28 

Recommendation 8.....................................................................28 

Finding 5: Enforcement’s Complaint Tracking Systems Need 

Improvement ....................................................................................................29 

The ECC’s Mailbox Functions..........................................................................29 

CTR Database Capabilities..............................................................................30 

Recommendation 9.....................................................................30 

Recommendation 10...................................................................31 

Finding 6: The Office of Internet Enforcement Does Not Track the Results 

of Referrals of Complaints................................................................................31 

Recommendation 11...................................................................32 

Appendices 

Appendix I: Abbreviations and Acronyms......................................................33 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology.............................................................34 

Appendix III: Criteria........................................................................................36 

Appendix IV: List of Recommendations ..........................................................38 

Appendix V: Management Comments............................................................40 

Appendix VI: OIG Response to Management Comments ...............................44 
Background and Objectives

Background 

Overview of the Division of Enforcement 

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC or Commission) Division 

of Enforcement (Enforcement) is responsible for overseeing the Commission’s 

enforcement activities at the SEC’s Headquarters located in Washington, D.C. 

and 11 Regional Offices located throughout the country. The Enforcement staff 

conducts investigations into possible violations of the federal securities laws, and 

prosecutes the Commission’s civil suits in the federal courts, as well as its 

administrative proceedings before administrative law judges and the Commission 

itself.9

Enforcement receives information on potential securities law violations from a 

variety of sources, including: 

• Members of the public; 

• Press articles; 

• Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs)10; and 

• Other Commission Divisions and Offices. 

In addition, Enforcement’s Office of Market Surveillance (OMS)11 proactively 

conducts surveillance of the markets and develops leads to identify potential 

securities law violations. 

 

9

 About the Division of Enforcement, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm. In civil 

suits, the Commission seeks injunctions (orders prohibiting future violations), civil monetary 

penalties and the disgorgement of illegal profits. Id. The courts may also bar or suspend 

individuals from acting as corporate directors or officers. Id. The Commission can bring a 

variety of administrative proceedings seeking different types of remedies, including cease and 

desist orders, disgorgement and the payment of civil penalties, the revocation or suspension or 

registration, and bars or suspensions from employment. Id. 

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10 An SRO is a membership-based organization that creates and enforces rules for its members 

based on the federal securities laws, and is the frontline in regulating broker-dealers. Division 

of Market Regulation: Key Points About Regulation SHO, 

http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm, April 11, 2005, at n.11. The SROs include, 

among others, the national securities exchanges and securities associations registered with the 

SEC, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which was formed in July 

2007 through a merger of the regulatory arms of the NYSE and the NASD. GAO-08-33, 

Securities and Exchange Commission: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight of SelfRegulatory Organizations, at 1. The SROs are responsible for conducting surveillance of the 

trading activity on their markets. Id. at 8. 
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Enforcement staff performs preliminary research to determine if further 

investigation would be appropriate. This research generally includes reviewing 

information in Enforcement databases for prior or current enforcement activity, as 

well as sources such as LEXIS and SEC filings. Enforcement staff may also 

research related news articles and stock trading information. 

Based on this research, Enforcement staff at Headquarters and the Regional 

Offices may open an informal inquiry, which is initially referred to as a “Matter 

Under Inquiry,” or “MUI.” Generally, MUIs are approved at the Associate Director 

level at Headquarters and at the Associate Regional Director level in the 

Regional Offices. Enforcement staff may also recommend that the Commission 

order a formal investigation into a matter. In addition, Enforcement refers 

evidence of violations of the criminal laws to the Department of Justice for 

prosecution. 

Enforcement’s Complaint Process 

The Enforcement Complaint Center. Enforcement receives the majority of 

public complaints through its Enforcement Complaint Center (ECC). The ECC is 

located within Enforcement’s Office of Internet Enforcement (OIE).12 The ECC is 

an important source of investigative leads for Enforcement, and complaints sent 

to the ECC have led to criminal arrests, trading suspensions, temporary 

restraining orders, as well as civil enforcement cases.13 The ECC is staffed by 

four members of the OIE, including three attorneys and a program analyst, who 

screen incoming complaints and then forward them to Headquarters or Regional 

Office Enforcement attorneys for further investigation. 

The ECC receives complaints both through online complaint forms, available on 

the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml (which the ECC staff receive 

in e-mail form), and an electronic mail box accessible via the Internet e-mail 

address, enforcement@sec.gov.14 The Commission’s website instructs the 

public to report a potential violation of the securities laws directly to 

enforcement@sec.gov, and not to use this e-mail box for general comments or 

questions.15 The website also instructs the public to forward investment-related 

spam e-mails to enforcement@sec.gov.16 In addition, complaints may be 

11 OMS receives advisories (information on suspicious trading activity) and referrals of possible 

securities law violations from the SROs, which may lead to investigations and enforcement 

actions. Id. at 6. 

12 The OIE was created in 1998 as a specialized unit designed to combat securities fraud 

occurring over the Internet. SEC Press Release 98-69, SEC Creates Office of Internet 

Enforcement to Battle Online Securities Fraud, July 28, 1998, 

http://www.sec.gov/es/press/pressarchive/1998/98-69.txt. 

13 Memorandum Re: Enforcement Complaint Center/How To, September 17, 2007, at 1. 14 Id. 

15 SEC Center for Complaints and Enforcement Tips, http://www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml. 16 Id. 
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submitted to the SEC Complaint Center by fax or mail.17 The SEC’s website also 

informs potential complainants: “We thoroughly review and evaluate your 

information so that we may refer to the appropriate SEC office.”18 In addition, 

potential complainants are informed that “[a]ttorneys in the Enforcement evaluate 

information and tips concerning violations of the federal securities laws.”19

According to ECC information available as of 2007, the ECC typically received 

between 5,000 and 7,000 e-mail complaints per day.20 The number of 

complaints received in the ECC greatly increased beginning with the Enron 

accounting scandal in the fall of 2001.21 While the number of complaints per day 

subsequently began to level off, the “fluctuations in complaint volume typically 

depend on the SEC’s profile in the news.”22 Based on information the Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) obtained from Enforcement, we found that the ECC 

received approximately 1.38 million complaints via e-mail from January 1, 2007 

to June 1, 2008, which were handled by a staff of four persons. 

After complaints are received in the ECC, they go through a three-step process. 

First, an initial coordinator review is conducted on the morning of each business 

day “to cull out a) extraneous e-mails not involving securities matters; and b) 

large-scale spam (10, 20, 50 or more) involving pending investigations of which 

the coordinator is aware.”23 Also, at this initial stage, to the extent possible, 

certain “consumer” matters, i.e., investors’ private disputes with brokers – are 

sent to the Office of Investor Education and Advocacy (OIEA) for review.24 

Second, a second-level coordinator review is conducted on the remaining 

complaints to determine if they: 

• Relate to pending investigations; 

• Describe conduct better handled by OIEA; 

• Relate to situations more appropriately handled by other agencies; or 

• Should be sent to state regulators.25

Third, complaints that remain after the first and second level reviews are 

forwarded to OIE staff every ten days to conduct a “triage.”26 Triage is “the 

17 Id. 

18 Id. 

19 Id. 

20 Memorandum Re: Enforcement Complaint Center/How To, September 17, 2007, at 1. 21 Id. 

22 Id. at 1 n.1. 

23 Id. at 3. 

24 OIEA is a separate office within the Commission that handles certain general questions about 

the securities laws, as sell as “complaints relating to financial professionals or a complainant’s 

personal financial matters.” SEC Center for Complaints and Enforcement Tips, 

http://www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml, at 2. OIEA also has an online complaint form for use by 

investors. See Investor Information, http://www.sec.gov/investor.shtml. 25 Memorandum Re: Enforcement Complaint Center/How To, September 17, 2007, at 3. 26 Id. 
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process of research and analysis used to determine if an incoming investor 

complaint is likely to trigger sufficient staff interest to entail the opening of” a MUI 

or formal investigation.27 Essentially, “it is a series of steps designed to assess 

what type of wrongdoing is being alleged, what the market impact of that 

wrongdoing is, who may be involved in the conduct, and who the most 

appropriate persons are to look into that conduct.”28 

The triage process includes obtaining information pertinent to a complaint from a 

variety of public and internal sources. OIE staff are provided with guidance on 

the basic tools of triage generally and are instructed how to perform in-depth 

analysis of specific types of complaints, such as spam-driven manipulations, 

unregistered online offerings and insider trading.29 If, after the triage process, 

the OIE staff determines that a referral is warranted, he or she prepares a refer

memorandum forwarding the complaint to investigative staff located at 

Headquarters or a Regional Office.30 Under the ECC’s procedures, complaints 

pertaining to existing Enforcement matters are always forwarded to the 

Enforcement attorneys working on those matters.31 

Complaints, Tips and Referrals System. In addition to complaints received 

through the ECC, Enforcement receives complaints that do not come through 

normal complaint channels, such as the ECC. These include complaints 

received by Headquarters or Regional Office staff from a member of the public 

via letter, e-mail, telephone, walk-in, or otherwise.32 These complaints are 

referred to as complaints, tips and referrals or “CTRs.” 

The Commission implemented the CTR system in 2005 to improve recordkeeping and follow-up for complaints.33 CTRs received by Enforcement 

Headquarters staff, as well as CTRs that Enforcement occasionally receives from 

another Commission Division or Office, are collected in a CTR database 

maintained by OIE staff.34 Copies of CTR reports are also maintained within OIE 

in certain Outlook folders that have been set aside for this purpose.35 In addition, 

27 Memorandum Re: Review of ECC Triage Guidelines/Procedures, September 17, 2007, at 1. 28 Id. 

29 Id. at 1-9. 

30 Memorandum Re: Enforcement Complaint Center/How To, September 17, 2007, at 11. 31 Id. at 7. 

32 Home Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals (CTR’s), updated October 6, 

2005; Field Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals (CTR’s), updated 

September 1, 2005. 33 According to Enforcement, the CTR computer database remains a “temporary” system that is 

being used until modifications are completed on a new replacement system that Enforcement 

anticipates launching. In addition, the Chairman recently announced that the Commission has 

enlisted a contractor to conduct a comprehensive review of internal procedures used to 

evaluate tips, complaints, and referrals for the entire agency. SEC Press Release No. 2009-44, 

SEC Revamping Process for Reviewing Whistleblower Complaints and Enforcement Tips, 

March 5, 2009, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-44.htm. 34 Memorandum Re: Enforcement Complaint Center/How To, September 17, 2007, at 12. The 

Office of Information Technology developed this database for OIE in 2005. 35 Id. 
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each Regional Office maintains its own complaint information on the CTR 

database. 

Enforcement has separate written procedures for CTRs received by 

Headquarters staff and those received by Regional Office staff. Headquarters 

staff are instructed to perform the review, research and analysis steps deemed 

appropriate by their branch, and to forward the CTR to or consult with 

supervisory staff as appropriate.36 Staff are instructed to ensure that a response 

is sent whenever the staff are not planning to contact the complainant for further 

information.37 The procedures also advise staff that if the CTR describes 

potential violations of the federal securities laws remediable by enforcement 

action, they should complete a CTR form and forward it to OIE.38 The 

procedures further provide guidance on certain types of CTRs that should be 

sent expeditiously, e.g., whistleblower complaints, allegations made by the 

directors, officers or counsel of public companies or accounting firms, credible, 

documented allegations of material fraud on the securities markets, etc.39 

Finally, the procedures specify that certain types of matters should NOT be 

forwarded to OIE, including consumer matters that should be forwarded to OIEA, 

non-securities-related matters, etc.40

The procedures for Regional Office CTRs state that each Regional Office has its 

own procedures for handling CTRs and do not recommend “that those processes 

be scrapped or significantly modified,” recognizing that many Regional Offices 

have good systems already in place and experienced investor affairs specialists 

on staff.41 Hence, the Regional Office procedures do not provide for a specific 

method by which CTRs should be referred to OIE.42 Rather, they focus on 

supervisory review, recognizing “that an initial decision as to what type of 

complaint has enforcement implications often comes down to a matter of 

judgment on the part of the person receiving the CTRs.”43 According to the 

procedures, “[t]his fact makes it imperative that there be a regular review by a 

more senior staff member of the judgments being made by the recipients of a 

CTR in terms of how it should be addressed....”44 

36 Home Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals (CTR’s), updated October 6, 

2005, at 1. 

37 Id. 

38 Id. 

39 Id. 

40 Id. at 2. 

41 Field Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals (CTR’s), updated September 1, 

2005, at 2. 

42 The Regional Office CTR procedures do point out the particular importance of CTRs from 

employees of issuers and various financial services firms, outside attorneys or accountants or 

referrals from other local and federal law enforcement and regulatory organizations. Id. at 1. 

Further, similar to the Headquarters CTR procedures, the Regional Office CTR procedures 

advise staff of the types of complaints that are not Enforcement-related. Id. 

43 Id. 

44 Id. 
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The Regional Office CTR procedures also require that on a monthly basis, a 

senior member of the Regional Office’s Enforcement staff review that month’s 

CTRs for their office, “including the evaluation of the judgments made as to how 

the matter would be handled and how timely the disposition of the matter was 

implemented.”45 The procedures further request that each Regional Office 

designate a supervisor at the Senior Officer level to serve as the office’s contact 

person on the CTR initiative and to be responsible for the monthly review of the 

office’s CTRs.46

Between January 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008, approximately 1,900 complaints 

received by Enforcement Headquarters and Regional Office staff were entered 

into the CTR database. 

Referrals from the Self-Regulatory Organizations. Enforcement also receives 

referrals from the SROs. The SROs send these referrals to Enforcement through 

the automated SRO Market Referral System (SMRS), which is monitored by 

OMS. Enforcement regards these referrals to be more reliable than complaints 

received directly from the public because the referrals are based on 

investigations conducted by SRO staff, who have access to state-of-the art 

market monitoring resources. Based upon information obtained during our audit, 

we determined that OMS received approximately 900 referrals from the SROs 

between January 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008. 

Concerns about Naked Short Selling and the Commission’s Response 

Short Selling in General. The practice of short selling “involves a sale of a security 

that the seller does not own or a sale which is consummated by the delivery of a 

security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller.”47 A short seller believes that 

the price of the stock will fall, or is seeking to hedge against potential price volatility in 

securities he or she owns.48 If the price of the stock falls, the short seller buys back 

the stock at a lower price and makes a profit.49 If the stock price rises, however, the 

short seller will incur a loss.50 In the typical short sale transaction, the seller borrows 

stock from his or her brokerage firm and delivers the borrowed shares to the buyer 

45 Id. at 1-2. 

46 Id. at 2. 

47 Amendments to Regulation SHO, Interim final temporary rule, Release No. 34-58773, October 

14, 2008, at 5. 

48 Division of Market Regulation: Key Points About Regulation SHO, April 11, 2005, 

http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm, at 1. 49 Id. 

50 Id. 
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within the standard settlement period (currently three business days).51

The Practice of Naked Short Selling. A “naked short sale” occurs when “the 

seller does not borrow securities in time to make delivery to the buyer within the 

standard three-day settlement period.”52 “As a result, the seller fails to deliver 

securities to the buyer when delivery is due (known as a ‘failure to deliver’ or 

‘fail’).”53 Failures to deliver may result from either short or long sales.54 In 

addition, failures to deliver may be caused by legitimate reasons, such as human 

or mechanical errors or processing delays.55 A fail may also result from naked 

short selling, e.g., where a market maker who sells short thinly traded illiquid 

stock in response to customer demand encounters difficulty in obtaining 

securities at the time for delivery.56

Naked short selling is not necessarily a violation of the federal securities laws or 

the Commission’s rules.57 According to guidance of the Division of Market 

Regulation, now the Division of Trading and Markets (Trading and Markets), on 

the Commission’s website regarding Regulation SHO, in certain circumstances, 

naked short selling contributes to market liquidity.58 Nonetheless, Trading and 

Markets has recognized that abusive naked short selling can have negative 

effects on the market, as fraudsters may use naked short selling to engage in 

illegal market manipulation, e.g., by selling stock short and failing to deliver 

shares at the time of settlement with the purpose of driving down the stock 

price.59 According to Trading and Markets, such manipulative activity would 

violate various securities laws and regulations, including Rule 10b-5 promulgated 

under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.60 

51 Investors must generally complete or settle their security transactions within three business 

days (known at T+3 or “trade date plus three days”). “T+3 means that when a trade occurs, the 

participants to the trade deliver and pay for the security at a clearing agency three business 

days after the trade is executed.” Amendments to Regulation SHO, Final rule, Release No. 34-

58775, October 14, 2008, at 2 n.4. Commission Rule 15c6-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1, prohibits 

broker-dealers from effecting or entering into contracts for the purchase or sale of securities 

that provides for payment of funds and delivery of securities later than three business days 

after the date of the contract, unless otherwise expressly agreed to by the parties at the time of 

the transaction. Id. 

52 Division of Market Regulation: Key Points About Regulation SHO, April 11, 2005,at 2 (footnote 

omitted). 53 Division of Market Regulation: Key Points About Regulation SHO, April 11, 2005, at 2 (footnote 

omitted). 54 Id. 

55 Id. 

56 Id. 

57 Id. 

58 Id. 

59 Id. at 7-8. 

60 Id. at 8. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. In addition, the Commission has recently adopted a 

naked short selling antifraud rule, Rule 10b-21, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21. See infra pp. 13-14. 
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Outside Concerns about the Abusive Effects of Naked Short Selling. A 

large number of individuals and entities have become concerned about the 

abusive effects of naked short selling and the harm caused to the markets as a 

result of that practice. In fact, there are a number of websites devoted to this 

topic.61 Some critics of naked short selling believes that this practice causes the 

number of shares trading to exceed the number of shares outstanding, allowing 

broker-dealers to trade shares that do not exist.62 “Others believe that the United 

States clearance and settlement system, and specifically National Securities 

Clearing Corporation’s (NSCC) Continuous Net Settlement System (CNS), 

produces ‘phantom’ or ‘counterfeit’ securities by accounting for fails to deliver.”63 

Some groups believe that people who buy these phantom or counterfeit shares 

from naked short sellers are, in effect, involuntarily loaning the stock to the short 

seller, and are also deprived of voting rights they would have if they possessed 

the stock.64 

Many individuals and entities have complained that the SEC has not taken 

sufficient action to enforce against naked short selling.65 For example, former 

SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt said the SEC has not done enough to curb naked 

short selling practices, but did praise the SEC for recent constructive steps. 

Speaking at a “Coalition Against Market Manipulation” event, former Chairman 

Pitt stated: “Naked shorting is a situation in which someone is gambling but they 

have no skin in the game. They are not required to make any effort to deliver the 

shares.”66 Former Chairman Pitt has also stated that the “agency must make it 

extremely clear that any naked short selling is illegal and it has to remove the 

ambiguities so the rules are very clear.”67 

61 See, e.g., http://www.investigatethesec.com; http://www.deepcapture.com; 

http://www.stopmarketmanipulation.org. 62 Division of Market Regulation: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning 

Regulation SHO, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm, Answer to 

Question 7.1, at 20. 63 Id. NSCC, a subsidiary of Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), see infra n.70, 

provides a variety of clearing, settlement, risk management and related services for virtually all 

broker-to-broker trades. http://www/dtcc.com/about/subs/nscc.php. NSCC “generally clears 

and settles trades on a T+3 basis.” Id. 

64 Comments submitted by Washington Legal Foundation, Re: File No S7-08-08, Release No. 34-

57511, Proposed “Naked” Short Selling Anti-Fraud Rule, May 20, 2008, at 4. 65 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Washington Legal Foundation, File No. S7-08-08; 

Release No. 34-57511, Proposed “Naked” Short Selling Anti-Fraud Rule, May 20, 2008, at 3 

(claiming that “the SEC has been woefully remiss in its duties to enforce the law”). 66 SEC urged to do more to curb naked short selling, by Rachelle Younglai, December 9, 2008, 

Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN0926750020081209. It should be 

noted that former Chairman Pitt is currently the Chief Executive Officer of Kalorama Partners, 

LLC, a global business consulting firm. Mr. Pitt has also launched a website, 

http://www.regsho.com. The website offers an automated Regulation SHO compliance tool for 

a monthly fee of $995. 67 Obama adviser: Short selling must be disclosed, by Ronald D. Orol, Market Watch, 

http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/Short-selling-must-publiclydisclosed/story.aspx?guid=%7B4269F7F7-FB08-4766-A5DD-53453B95A17A%7D. 
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The Commission’s Views on Naked Short Selling. The Commission has 

repeatedly recognized that naked short selling can depress stock prices and may 

have harmful effects on the market. For example, in initially proposing its short 

sale regulation, Regulation SHO, the Commission specifically stated: 

Naked short selling can have a number of negative effects on the 

market, particularly when the fails to deliver persist for an extended 

period of time and result in a significantly large unfilled delivery 

obligation at the clearing agency where trades are settled. At 

times, the amount of fails to deliver may be greater than the total 

public float. In effect the naked short seller unilaterally converts a 

securities contract (which should settle in three days after the trade 

date) into an undated futures-type contract, which the buyer might 

not have agreed to or that would have been priced differently. The 

seller’s failure to deliver securities may also adversely affect certain 

rights of the buyer, such as the right to vote. More significantly, 

naked short sellers enjoy greater leverage than if they were 

required to borrow securities and deliver within a reasonable time 

period, and they may use this additional leverage to engage in 

trading activities that deliberately depress the price of a security.68

According to guidance provided by Trading and Markets, however, “[n]aked short 

selling has no effect on an issuer’s total shares outstanding. There is significant 

confusion relating to the fact that the aggregate number of positions reflected in 

customer accounts at broker-dealers may in fact be greater than the number of 

securities issued and outstanding.”69

Similarly, Trading and Markets has stated that the U.S. clearance and settlement 

system, and specifically NSCC’s CNS system, does not create counterfeit shares. 

According to Trading and Markets, CNS is essentially an accounting system that 

indicates delivery and receives obligations among its members, but these obligations 

do not reflect ownership positions until the delivery of shares are actually made, as 

reflected in the records of The Depository Trust Company (DTC).70

Regulation SHO. The Commission adopted regulation SHO “to update short 

sale regulation in light of the numerous market developments since short sale 

68 Short Sales, Proposed rule, Release No. 34-48709, October 29, 2003, at 6-7. 69 Division of Market Regulation: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning 

Regulation SHO, Answer to Question 7.1, at 20. 70 Id. The DTC, another subsidiary of DTCC, was established in 1973 “to reduce costs and 

provide clearing and settlement efficiencies by immobilizing securities and making ‘book-entry’ 

changes to ownership of securities.” http://www.dtcc.com/about/subs/dtc.php. In 2006, The 

DTC settled transactions worth almost $445 trillion, and processed over 290 million book-entry 

deliveries. Id. DTCC, which through its subsidiaries provides clearing, settlement and 

information services for various types of securities, has been criticized for its approach to naked 

short selling. DTCC, however, has disagreed with the criticisms. See DTCC Press Release, 

DTC Responds to the Wall Street Journal Article, “Blame the ‘Stock Vault?’”, 

http://www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2007/wsj_response.php. 
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regulation was first adopted in 1938.”71 Regulation SHO became effective on 

September 7, 2004, and compliance with the regulation began on January 3, 

2005.72 Regulation SHO established a new regulatory framework governing the 

short selling of securities, including naked short selling.73 Among other things, 

Regulation SHO established “uniform locate and delivery requirements in order 

to address problems associated with failures to deliver, including potentially 

abusive ‘naked’ short selling . . .”, and created uniform marking requirements for 

sales of equity securities.74 Under Rule 203 of Regulation SHO, a broker-dealer, 

prior to effecting a short sale in an equity security, must locate securities 

available for borrowing in order to be able to deliver the securities on the 

transaction settlement date.75 Rule 203 also imposed additional requirements on 

broker-dealers for securities in which a substantial amount of failures to deliver 

occurred.76

Under Rule 203(b)(3) of Regulation SHO, a “threshold security” is an equity 

security that has an aggregate fail to deliver position for: 

• Five consecutive settlement days at a registered clearing 

agency (e.g., the NSCC); 

• Totaling 10,000 shares or more; and 

• Equal to at least 0.5 percent of the issuer’s total shares 

outstanding.77

Regulation SHO requires that each SRO provide a threshold securities list for those 

securities for which the SRO is the primary market.78 In addition, Regulation SHO 

requires that broker-dealers close out all failures to deliver that exist in threshold 

securities for 13 consecutive settlement days by purchasing securities of like kind 

and quantity.79 Until the position is closed out, the broker-dealer, and any brokerdealer for which it clears transactions, may not effect further short sales in that 

threshold security without borrowing or entering into a bona fide agreement to 

71 Division of Market Regulation: Key Points About Regulation SHO, April 11, 2005, at 2. See 

Short Sales, Final rule; Interpretation, Release No. 34-50103, July 28, 2004. 72 Division of Market Regulation: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning 

Regulation SHO, at 1. 73 Id. at 2. 

74 Id. 

75 Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 242.203. 76 Division of Market Regulation: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning 

Regulation SHO, http, at 2. 77 Division of Market Regulation: Key Points About Regulation SHO, April 11, 2005, at 3. 78 Id. at 4. 

79 Id. at 5. 
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borrow the security.80

Under Regulation SHO, threshold securities only include issuers that are registered 

or are required to file reports with the Commission.81 However, non-reporting 

securities are covered by SRO rules. According to Enforcement, NASD (now 

FINRA) Rule 3210 provides that non-reporting threshold securities shall be closed 

out in the same manner as reporting securities would be closed out under 

Regulation SHO.82 Under this Rule, non-reporting threshold securities are defined 

as securities with aggregate fails to deliver for five consecutive settlement days of 

10,000 or more shares that are valued at $50,000 or more.83 

In adopting Regulation SHO, the Commission stated its belief that the threshold 

level “characterizes situations where the ratio of unfulfilled delivery obligations at 

the clearing agency at which trades are settled represents a significant number of 

shares relative to the company’s total shares outstanding.”84 According to the 

Commission, “such circumstances warrant action designed to address potential 

negative effects,” and “Rule 203(b)(3) is intended to address potential abuses 

that may occur with large, extended fails to deliver.”85

According to Trading and Markets, “[a] security’s appearance on a threshold list 

does not necessarily mean that any improper activity has occurred or is 

occurring”.86 At the same time, “[w]hether or not a security is a threshold security 

does not affect the Commission’s ability to prosecute manipulative or fraudulent 

activity that may have occurred before or after adoption of Regulation SHO.”87

Recent Emergency Orders and Amendments to Regulation SHO. In 

response to the financial crisis that began with the collapse of The Bear Stearns 

80 Id. As originally enacted, Regulation SHO contained two exceptions to its mandatory close-out 

requirement: a grandfather provision and an options market maker exception. The grandfather 

provision, which exempted positions that were established before a security became a 

threshold security from the requirement to close-out fail to deliver positions that remained for 13 

consecutive settlement days, was eliminated by a rule amendment that was adopted effective 

October 15, 2007. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Release No. 34-56212, August 7, 2007. 

The options market maker exception, “which excepted any fail to deliver in a threshold security 

resulting from short sales effected by a registered options market maker to establish or 

maintain a hedge on options positions that were created before the underlying security became 

a threshold security,” was eliminated temporarily effective September 17, 2008, and then 

permanently effective October 17, 2008. See infra p. 13. 81 Division of Market Regulation: Key Points About Regulation SHO, April 11, 2005, at 3. 82 SROs; FINRA; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change 

Relating to Amendments to NASD Rule 3210 in Light of Amendments to the SEC Regulation 

SHO Delivery Requirements, Release No. 34-56682, October 22, 2007. 83 SROs; FINRA. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 

thereto Relating to Short Sale Delivery Requirements, Release No. 34-52752, November 8, 

2005. 

84 Short Sales, Final Rule; Interpretation, Release No. 34-50103, July 28, 2004, at 15. 85 Id. 

86 Division of Market Regulation: Key Points About Regulation SHO, April 11, 2005, at 5. 87 Id. 
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Companies Inc. in March 2008, the Commission instituted a number of 

emergency orders and amendments to Regulation SHO. Initially, on July 15, 

2008, the Commission issued a temporary emergency order providing that no 

short sales could be effected in the securities of certain financial firms unless the 

seller or its agent has borrowed or arranged to borrow the security or otherwise 

has the security available to borrow in its inventory prior to effecting the short 

sale and delivers the security on settlement date.88 In imposing the initial 

emergency order, the Commission recognized that false rumors can lead to a 

loss of confidence in the markets, which in turn can lead to panic selling and may 

be further exacerbated by naked short selling.89

Subsequent to the initial emergency order in July 2008, the Commission 

continued to be “concerned about the possible unnecessary or artificial price 

movements based on unfounded rumors regarding the stability of financial 

institutions and other issuers exacerbated by ‘naked’ short selling.”90 The 

Commission’s concerns, however, were no longer limited to the financial 

institutions that were the subject of the July Emergency Order.91 In addition, the 

Commission became “concerned that some persons may take advantage of 

issuers that have become temporarily weakened by current market conditions to 

engage in inappropriate short selling in the securities of such issuers.”92 

As a consequence, on September 17, 2008, the Commission took a number of 

coordinated actions designed to strengthen investor protections against “naked” 

short selling.”93 According to former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, “[t]hese 

several actions today make it crystal clear that the SEC has zero tolerance for 

abusive naked short selling. The Enforcement Division, the Office of Compliance 

Inspections and Examinations and the Division of Trading and Markets will now 

have [additional] weapons in their arsenal in their continuing battle to stop 

unlawful manipulation.”94 As part of the emergency measures taken on 

September 17, 2008, the Commission imposed “enhanced delivery requirements 

on sales of all equity securities, by adding and making immediately effective a 

temporary rule to Regulation SHO, Rule 204T.”95 The temporary rule imposed “a 

penalty on any participant of a registered clearing agency, and any broker-dealer 

88 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58166, July 15, 2008. The initial emergency order 

became effective on July 21, 2008, and was subsequently extended until August 12, 2008. 

See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58248, July 29, 2008. 89 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58166, July 15, 2008, at 1. 90 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58572, September 17, 2008, at 1. 91 Id. 

92 Id. 

93 SEC Issues New Rules to Protect Investors Against Naked Short Selling Abuses, Press 

Release 2008-404, September 17, 2008, www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-204.htm, at 1. 94 Id. 

95 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58572, September 17, 2008, at 2. See 17 C.F.R. § 

242.204T. 
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from which it receives trades for clearance and settlement, for having a fail to 

deliver position at a registered clearing agency in any equity security.”96 

In addition, in its September 17, 2008 Emergency Order, the Commission 

concluded that it was necessary to make immediately effective amendments to 

“eliminate the options market maker exception from Regulation SHO’s close-out 

requirement.”97 The Commission made immediately effective a naked short 

selling antifraud rule, Rule 10b-21.98 In another emergency order entered on 

September 18, 2008, the Commission temporarily prohibited any short selling in 

the publicly traded shares of certain financial firms.99

Subsequently, on October 14, 2008, the Commission adopted final rule 

amendments that eliminated the options market maker exception to the close-out 

requirement of Regulation SHO.100 As a result of these amendments, “fails to 

deliver in threshold securities that result from hedging activities by options market 

makers will no longer be excepted from Regulation SHO’s close-out 

requirement.”101 In adopting the rule amendments, the Commission observed: 

“[A]s we have stated on several prior occasions, we are concerned about the 

negative effect that fails to deliver may have on the markets and 

shareholders.”102 In addition, the Commission pointed to the concerns 

repeatedly expressed by issuers and investors “about fails to deliver in 

connection with manipulative ‘naked’ selling.”103 The Commission then 

recognized that “[t]o the extent that fails to deliver might be part of manipulative 

‘naked’ short selling, which could be used as a tool to drive down a company’s 

stock price, such fails to deliver may undermine the confidence of investors.”104 

Also on October 14, 2008, the Commission adopted a final “antifraud rule, Rule 

10b-21, aimed at short sellers, including broker-dealers acting for their own 

accounts, who deceive specified persons, such as a broker or dealer, about their 

intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement and that fail to deliver 

the securities by settlement date.”105 The Commission recognized that although 

96 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58572, September 17, 2008, at 2 (footnotes omitted). 

According to Enforcement, Rule 204T covers all equity securities regardless of whether they 

are reporting or non-reporting (as the threshold securities concept no longer applies under Rule 

204T); hence, SRO rules are not used in conjunction with Rule 204T. 97 Id. at 2-3. 

98 Id. at 3. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21. 99 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-58592, September 18, 2008. Yet another emergency 

order issued on September 18, 2008 temporarily imposed certain reporting requirements 

concerning daily short sale of securities by institutional investment managers. See Securities 

Exchange Act Release No. 34-58591, September 18, 2008. 100 Amendments to Regulation SHO, Final rule, Release No. 34-58775, October 14, 2008. 101 Id. at 1. 

102 Id. at 4. Specifically, for example, the Commission recognized that “fails to deliver may 

deprive shareholders of the benefits of ownership, such as voting and lending.” Id. 103 Id. 

104 Id. at 5. 

105 “Naked” Short Selling Antifraud Rule, Final rule, Release No. 34-58774, October 14, 2008, at 

2. 
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abusive naked short selling as part of a manipulative scheme is always illegal 

under the general antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, Rule 10b-21 

will further evidence the liability of persons who deceive others about their 

intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement.106 Also, on October 

14, 2008, the Commission adopted an interim final temporary rule enhancing the 

delivery requirements for sales of all equity securities.107 The Commission 

solicited comments on all aspects of Rule 204T, which is effective until July 31, 

2009.108

Enforcement Actions Against Manipulative Naked Short Selling. 

Historically, Enforcement has brought few enforcement actions based on 

manipulative or abusive naked short selling. In one settled civil action brought in 

2003, the Commission alleged that a money management firm and its president 

engaged in a manipulative short selling scheme in the stock of Sedona 

Corporation.109 The Commission alleged that the defendants profited from 

engaging in a massive naked short selling scheme that flooded the market with 

Sedona stock and depressed its price.110 The defendants in that action 

consented to the entry of an injunction for violations of Section 17(a) of the 

Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 

and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.111 The defendants also agreed to pay a civil penalty 

of $1 million.112 

The Commission also settled charges against a hedge fund adviser, its chief 

executive officer and two firm employees for engaging in improper short sales 

transactions, including representing to broker-dealers executing trades on their 

behalf that they had located stock to borrow, when they had not in fact done 

so.113 In an administrative proceeding, the Commission censured the 

respondents, ordered that the firm cease and desist from future violations of 

Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, imposed civil penalties of 

106 Id. 

107 Amendments to Regulation SHO; Interim final temporary rule; request for comments, Release 

No. 34-58773, October 14, 2008. 108 Id. at 1, 3. 

109 See Litigation Release No. 18003, February 27, 2003, SEC v. Rhino Advisors, Inc., and 

Thomas Badian, Civ. Action No. 03 civ 1310 (RO)(Southern District of New York). 110 Short Sales, Proposed Rule, Release No. 34-48709, October 28, 2003, at n.31. 111 Ligation Release No. 18003, February 27, 2003, at 1. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 

1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q, prohibits the use of interstate commerce for the purpose of fraud or 

deceit in the offer or sale of any security or any security-based swap agreement. Section 10(b) 

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), makes it unlawful to use interstate 

commerce to use or employ a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 

of the Commission’s rules in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 112 Id. The SEC has a pending related action pending in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York as a result of the defendants’ failure to abide by the Court’s 

previous judgment. See SEC v. Andreas Badian, et al., Civil Action No. 06 CV 2621 (S.D.N.Y, 

filed April 4, 2006). 113 SEC Charges New York Hedge Fund Adviser with Short Sale Violations in Connection with 

Hibernia-Capital One Merger, Press Release 2007-116, October 10, 2007, 

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-216.htm. 
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$840,000, and ordered disgorgement of approximately $6.7 million, plus over 

$730,000 in prejudgment interest.114 In another matter, the Commission brought 

and settled charges against a unit of Goldman Sachs for allowing customers to 

engage in an illegal short selling scheme that allegedly included naked short 

selling.115

In a few other matters, the Commission has brought and settled cases in which 

naked short sale activity was part of the conduct charged in connection with 

illegal trading schemes designed to evade the registration requirements of the 

Federal securities laws in connection with securities offerings involving Private 

Investments in Pubic Equity (PIPE).116 

The Commission has recently “announced a sweeping expansion of its ongoing 

investigation into possible market manipulation in the securities of certain 

financial institutions.” 117 The Commission has also approved a formal order of 

investigation that will allow SEC Enforcement staff to obtain additional 

documents and testimony by subpoena and is working jointly with NYSE 

Regulation and FINRA.118 According to the Enforcement Director: “Abusive 

short selling, market manipulation and false rumor mongering for profit by any 

entity cuts to the heart of investor confidence in our markets. Such behavior will 

not be tolerated. We will root it out, expose it, and subject the guilty parties to the 

full force of the law.”119 

Receipt and Processing of Complaints about Naked Short Selling 

Of the approximately 1.38 million email complaints the ECC received between 

January 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008, approximately 5,000 of these complaints 

114 In the Matter of Sandell Asset Management Corp., et al., Securities Act Release No. 8857, 

October 10, 2007. 

115 SEC and NYSE Settle Enforcement Actions Against Goldman Sachs Unit for Role in 

Customers’ Illegal Trading Scheme, Press Release 2007-41, March 14, 2007, 

www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-41.htm.; In the Matter of Goldman Sachs Execution & 

Clearing, L.P., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 55465, March 14, 2007. 116 See, e.g., Litigation Release No. 19956, January 4, 2007, SEC v. Joseph Spiegel, Civil Action 

No. 1:07CV00008 (RCL)(D.D.C.); In the Matter of Spinner Asset Management, LLC, et al., 

Securities Act Release No. 8763, December 20, 2006; Litigation Release No. 19607, March 14, 

2006, SEC v. Langley Partners, L.P., et al., Civil Action No. 1:06CV00467 (JDB)(D.D.C). See 

also Litigation Release No. 19942, December 12, 2006, SEC v. Edwin Buchanan Lyon, et al., 

Civil Action No. 06 CV 14338 (S.D.N.Y.) for a pending case involving a PIPES trading scheme 

that included alleged naked short selling. A “PIPE” involves the selling of publicly traded 

common shares, or some form of preferred stock or convertible security, to private investors. 

The PIPE offering may consist of shares registered with the SEC or may be completed as an 

unregistered private placement capital. See PIPE Offerings, 

http://www.sec.gov/answers/pipeofferings.htm. 117 SEC Press Release No. 2008-214, SEC Expands Sweeping Investigations of Market 

Manipulation, September 19, 2008, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-214.htm. 

118 Id. 

119 Id. 
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pertained to naked short selling. Based on our review, the naked short selling 

complaints received by Enforcement generally fell into three categories: (1) 

general statements about the impact of naked short selling on companies and 

the markets; (2) complaints about the perceived lack of action by the 

Commission, and in particular Enforcement, to combat naked short selling; and 

(3) specific complaints about naked short selling in the shares of specific 

companies.120 The complaints about naked shorting of the shares of specific 

companies often included information about the securities’ decline in price after 

high trading volume, as well as the securities’ appearance on the threshold list. 

Enforcement does not have any separate procedures that are specifically tailored 

to complaints involving naked short selling, but processes these complaints 

through the procedures generally applicable to complaints received in the ECC or 

to CTRs. Of the approximately 5,000 naked short selling complaints received in 

the ECC during the period reviewed, only 123 were forwarded to Enforcement 

staff for further investigation. We found that no Enforcement actions were 

brought based on these naked short selling complaints, although one of the 

referred complaints referenced a pending Enforcement action involving naked 

short selling.121 

In addition, we found that of the approximately 1,900 complaints that were 

entered into the CTR database during the period from January 1, 2007 through 

June 1, 2008, only six of these complaints alleged naked short selling. We also 

found that no Enforcement actions were brought based on these complaints. 

Based on information provided by the OMS, none of the approximately 900 

referrals received from the SROs during the period from January 1, 2007 to June 

1, 2008 involved naked short selling. 

Objectives 

Objectives. The OIG has received numerous complaints alleging that 

Enforcement has failed to take sufficient action regarding naked short selling. 

Many of these complaints asserted that investors and companies lost billions of 

dollars because Enforcement has not taken sufficient action against naked short 

selling practices. 

In light of these complaints and based on our audit plan, we conducted an audit 

to assess whether Enforcement: 

120 The 5,000 complaints included multiple complaints sent by the same individuals about the 

same securities. 

121 This complaint expressed concerns about the lack of oversight in the daily trading of the stock 

of Sedona Corporation and referenced the two actions that had been brought in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging a massive naked short 

selling scheme involving Sedona stock. See supra p. 14 and n.112. 
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• Established policies and guidelines that enabled Enforcement to 

respond appropriately to complaints and referrals, including those 

involving naked short selling; and 

• Followed existing policies and procedures for responding to 

complaints and referrals, including those pertaining to naked short 

selling. 

We also conducted follow-up on the status of pertinent findings and 

recommendations contained in a prior OIG report. We further reviewed a 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) report related to Enforcement’s policies 

and procedures for complaints and referrals.122 Additionally, we coordinated our 

audit efforts with GAO, which has an ongoing review of the implementation of the 

Commission’s short sale regulation, Regulation SHO. Specifically, GAO is 

studying the: 

1. Extent to which Regulation SHO has reduced the number of failures to 

deliver of stocks that might impact the market for these securities; 

2. SEC’s oversight of the clearing and settlement processes for securities 

trades, particularly for identifying and addressing failures to deliver; and 

3. Efforts made by the SEC and Self-Regulatory Organizations to enforce 

compliance with Regulation SHO in connection with abusive short selling. 

122 These reports are SEC OIG Audit No. 352, Enforcement Internet Program, January 13, 2003, and GAO08-33, Securities and Exchange Commission: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight of SelfRegulatory Organizations, November 15, 2007. During the previous OIG audit, we were informed that the 

Office of Internet Enforcement was about to implement a database to track referrals of complaints for 

further investigations. During the current audit, however, we found that Enforcement is no longer using 

this database. See infra Finding 6. The prior GAO audit found that Enforcement’s system for receiving 

and tracking referrals from the Self-Regulatory Organizations needed improvements and recommended 

enhancements that would facilitate the monitoring and analysis of trend information and case activities. 

Enforcement’s Office of Market Surveillance informed us that it has requested enhancements for the SRO 

referral tracking system that are pending. We found no prior GAO or OIG reports specifically related to 

processing naked short selling complaints. 
Findings and Recommendations

Finding 1: The Enforcement Complaint 

Center’s Policies and Procedures Do Not 

Provide Specific Triage Steps for Naked Short 

Selling Complaints and Appear to Result in 

These Types of Complaints Not Being 

Forwarded for Further Investigation. 

The ECC’s written policies and procedures do not 

include specific triage steps for naked short selling 

complaints. Moreover, many naked short selling 

complaints fall into a category of complaints that the 

ECC’s written procedures describe as “problematic.” 

The written procedures, therefore, advise that these 

complaints should generally not be referred for 

investigation. In addition, the ECC does not have an 

online complaint form that is specifically designed for 

naked short selling complaints. 

Our review of the ECC’s written complaint processing procedures indicated that 

they do not provide specific triage steps for the in-depth analysis of naked short 

selling complaints. In contrast, however, the ECC’s triage guidelines provide 

steps for in-depth analysis of other specific types of complaints, such as spamdriven manipulations, unregistered online offering, insider trading, 

whistleblowers/ accounting or other fraud, and advance free frauds and offshore 

boiler rooms.123 

In fact, cautionary language in the ECC’s complaint handling procedures appears 

to result in naked short selling complaints not being forwarded to Enforcement 

staff for further investigation. Those procedures state, in part, as follows: 

Each day, we get a significant number of complaints from 

individuals who claim they, from observing price/volume information 

found on “Level II” trading terminals,[124] have found evidence of 

market manipulation or other suspect behavior by broker-dealers, 

market makers or other market participants. These complaints are 

 

123 Memorandum Re: Review of ECC Triage Guidelines/Procedures, September 17, 2007, at 6-9. 

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124 According to information OIE obtained from OMS, “[c]asual observers of the market using 

Level II terminals typically obtain only a snapshot of a particular segment of market activity and 

lack the breadth of vision to really make substantive evaluations of market conduct.” E-mail 

dated October 17, 2003, Subject: Important Guidelines Re: Investor “Level II” Complaints. 
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problematic. While malfeasance by market participants is a serious 

matter, we have conferred extensively with [OMS] to determine how 

these should be handled. In general, OMS feels that the average 

Level II user lacks a sufficiently broad view of the market to make 

the kinds of general allegations regarding manipulation more 

appropriate to FINRA, the regulatory body with primary 

responsibility for market surveillance.125

The procedures advise that complaints based on Level II data should not be 

referred for further investigation, although they do provide that complaints that 

describe “certain very specific market practices” should be sent to OMS 

supervisory staff.126 Otherwise, specific allegations against specific market 

makers should be passed on to certain mailboxes within the Office of 

Compliance Inspections and Examinations, “which factors these complaints into 

its consideration of broker-dealer examinations.”127

During our audit, ECC staff informed us that the typical naked short selling 

investor complaint is based on data obtained from a Level II trading terminal. 

The ECC staff further explained that they were troubled by these complaints and 

consulted with OMS to make sure they were handling them properly. According 

to ECC staff, OMS advised the ECC that while complaints alleging naked short 

selling, as well as all manners of short-selling conspiracies, should be taken 

seriously, such activity generally cannot be observed from a Level II computer 

screen, which does not provide information about delivery of shares or the 

covering of short positions.128 As a consequence, OMS advised the ECC that 

naked short selling complaints based upon data from Level II terminals typically 

lacked a specific, substantial factual foundation and were unlikely to lead to a 

successful investigation.129

However, the delivery and settlement information that Enforcement claims is 

missing from many investor naked short selling complaints is frequently 

proprietary information that is not available to an individual complainant or the 

general public. Oftentimes, a member of the public can only point to the fact that 

shares are on a threshold list, which in itself is not probative of naked short 

selling. We observed that the Commission’s public webpage for soliciting 

complaints from the public does not currently specifically list naked short selling 

under the categories of conduct that best describe a complaint.130 By adding a 

125 Memorandum Re: Enforcement Complaint Center/How To, September 17, 2007, at 6. See 

also Memorandum Re: Review of ECC Triage Guidelines/Procedures, September 17, 2007, at 

14. 

126 Memorandum Re: Enforcement Complaint Center/How To, September 17, 2007, at 6. These 

specific market practices do not include naked short selling. See E-mail dated October 17, 

2003, Subject: Important Guidelines Re: Investor “Level II” Complaints. 127 Memorandum Re: Enforcement Complaint Center/How To, September 17, 2007, at 6-7. 128 E-mail dated October 17, 2003, Subject: Important Guidelines Re: Investor “Level II” 

Complaints. 129 Id. 

130 See Tell Us About Your Complaint, http://www.sec.gov/complaint/selectconduct.shtml. 
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specific category for naked short selling complaints and linking this category to a 

form specifically designed to elicit information pertinent to such complaints, the 

Commission may be able to improve the quality of the naked short selling 

complaints it receives. 

Moreover, the ECC’s policies that result in no triage steps being performed on 

naked short selling complaints appear to be inconsistent with the SEC’s guidance 

to the public for submitting complaints, which states that “[a]ttorneys in 

Enforcement evaluate information and tips concerning violations of the federal 

securities laws.”131 In addition, Trading and Market’s guidance regarding 

Regulation SHO, under the heading, “Reporting Alleged Abusive Naked Short 

Selling Activity,” states that “[t]he SEC takes information alleging violations of the 

federal securities laws very seriously,” and advises the public to send “specific 

enforcement-related information” in an e-mail to enforcement@sec.gov.132 The 

information available on the Commission’s website suggests to the public that 

Enforcement will develop the facts necessary to evaluate appropriately all types 

of complaints alleging violations of the securities laws, including naked short 

selling complaints. 

Based on our audit work, we determined that the ECC’s current policies and 

procedures appear to be significantly limiting the referral of naked short selling 

complaints. Between January 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008, fails to deliver 

averaged approximately 20.3 billion shares per month, according to data 

maintained on the Commission’s website.133 During this same period, however, 

we found that of the approximately 5,000 e-mail complaints about naked short 

selling received by the ECC, only 123 (2.5 percent) were forwarded for further 

review by Enforcement staff. Moreover, ECC staff informed us that these 

complaints were not referred because they involved potentially illegal naked short 

selling, but rather because the subjects of the complaints were already involved 

in ongoing Enforcement matters. In addition, we found that Enforcement 

attorneys who received these referrals involving naked short selling complaints 

did not always review the naked short selling allegations during their existing 

inquiries or investigations. 

Our audit also found that the ECC’s written policies and procedures result in 

naked short selling complaints being treated differently from other types of 

complaints of securities law violations, such as insider trading complaints. Under 

the ECC’s written policies and procedures, in-depth triage steps are performed 

for many types of complaints, even if these complaints do not initially include all 

of the information needed to decide whether to refer them.134 In comparison to 

the low percentage of referrals of naked short selling complaints between 

131 SEC Center for Complaints and Enforcement Tips, http://.sec.gov/complaint.shtml. 132 Division of Market Regulation: Key Points About Regulation SHO, April 11, 2005, at 12. 133 Frequently Requested FOIA Document: Fails-to-Deliver Data – Archive Data, 

http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata-archive.htm. 134 Memorandum Re: Review of ECC Triage Guidelines/Procedures, September 17, 2007, at 6-9. 
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January 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008, the ECC referred 169 (approximately 12.5 

percent) of the 1,346 insider trading complaints it received during this period. 

ECC and OMS staff indicated that naked short selling complaints were not being 

treated differently. Rather, they claimed that the naked short selling complaints 

typically received do not include useful information on individual trades, such as 

proof of fails to deliver or the absence of locate documentation. According to 

Enforcement, the presence of a security on the threshold list does not 

necessarily mean naked short selling has occurred, as there are other 

explanations for a failure to deliver. Enforcement staff further opined that 

violations of Regulation SHO are considered to be technical rule violations that 

are better addressed by inspections and examinations, or the rulemaking 

process. As a consequence, Enforcement stated that it was not inclined to invest 

the substantial resources that would be required to investigate the naked short 

selling complaints it receives by examining broker-dealer records for individual 

trades, pointing out that, even after such an expenditure of resources, there 

might be no illegal naked short selling. 

Enforcement acknowledged that in recent months a small but vocal cadre of 

advocates has emerged decrying the practice of naked short selling and 

suggesting that it has damaging market effects. However, Enforcement 

maintained that there is hardly unanimity in the investment community or the 

financial media on either the prevalence, or the dangers, of naked short selling 

and noted that some view the threat posed by naked short selling as wildly 

exaggerated. 

Enforcement also pointed out that as the Commission has observed in its 

releases, NSCC reports that 99 percent of all trades settle on time, or within the 

standard T+3 settlement cycle, and noted that a fail to deliver occurs even where 

a security settles one day late. Further, Enforcement stated that more than half 

of all fails to deliver and 70 percent of all fails to deliver positions are closed out 

within two settlement days after T+3 (two days late), and the vast majority of fails 

to deliver are closed out within five days after T+3. According to Enforcement, 

therefore, the Commission’s recent rulemaking in the area of naked short selling 

recognizes that trades do fail, but that the fails should not persist. 

Accordingly, Enforcement stated that given that it is called upon to police the 

massive U.S. securities markets with decidedly limited resources, it prioritizes the 

complaints that it passes on for further investigation. It therefore focuses on 

complaints with a high likelihood of accuracy and credibility (like those of 

purported insiders or scam victims), those containing information that can be 

readily vetted (i.e., visible price swings in a possible manipulation or insider 

trading allegation), or those involving demonstrated, immediate investor hazard 

in the current market environment (e.g., Ponzi schemes, improper sales of 

auction-rate securities). 

The Commission, however, has considered naked short selling to be an issue 

that warranted its attention. In adopting the naked short selling antifraud rule, 
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Rule 10b-21, in October 2008, the Commission stated, “We have been 

concerned about ‘naked’ short selling and, in particular, abusive ‘naked’ short 

selling, for some time.”135 And in amending Regulation SHO to eliminate the 

options market maker exemption from Regulation SHO’s close-out requirement, 

the Commission recognized as follows: 

Although high fail levels exist only for a small percentage of issuers, 

we believe that all sellers of securities should promptly deliver, or 

arrange for delivery of, securities to the respective buyer, and that 

all buyers of securities have a right to expect prompt delivery of 

securities purchased. . . . [A]s we have stated on several prior 

occasions, we are concerned about the negative effect that fails to 

deliver may have on the markets and shareholders. . . . In 

addition, issuers and investors have repeatedly expressed 

concerns about fails to deliver in connection with manipulative 

‘naked’ short selling. . . . To the extent that fails to delver might be 

part of manipulative ‘naked’ short selling, which could be used as a 

tool to drive down a company’s stock price, such fails to deliver 

may undermine the confidence of investors. . . . Unwarranted 

reputational damage caused by fails to deliver might have an 

adverse impact on the security’s price.136

Hence, we conclude that in light of the serious concerns expressed by many 

individual entities and the Commission itself about abusive naked short selling 

and its harmful effects on the markets, the ECC should modify its current policies 

and procedures to inquire into naked short selling complaints more thoroughly 

and to increase the number of referrals of these types of complaints. 

Recommendation 1 

The Division of Enforcement should develop written in-depth triage analysis 

steps for naked short selling complaints, as it has for complaints involving other 

types of securities law violations, such as spam-driven manipulations and insider 

trading. 

Recommendation 2 

The Division of Enforcement should revise its written guidance to the 

Enforcement Complaint Center staff to ensure that naked short selling complaints 

based on information obtained from “Level II” computer screens are given a 

proper level of scrutiny and referred for further investigation where appropriate. 

 

135 “Naked” Short Selling Antifraud Rule, Final rule, Release No. 34-58774, October 14, 2008, at 

7. 

136 Amendments to Regulation SHO, Final rule, Release No. 34-58775, October 14, 2008, at 3-6. 
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Recommendation 3

The Division of Enforcement should add naked short selling to the list of 

categories of complaints on the Commission’s public webpage that solicits 

complaints from the public and should develop an online complaint form 

specifically tailored to naked short selling complaints. 

Finding 2: The Enforcement Complaint Center 

Does Not Perform Supervisory Review of Its Initial 

Screening of Complaints. 

The ECC does not forward for further investigation the majority of 

the e-mails reviewed during the initial screening process. While 

many of these e-mails are spam and many of them do not involve 

violations of the securities laws, no supervisory review is performed 

of the initial screening results. Supervisory review would provide 

an important internal control over the initial decision not to forward 

e-mails received by the ECC. 

Based on data provided by the ECC, on average the ECC received 

approximately 2,700 e-mails per day, on a calendar day basis, during the period 

we reviewed (from January 1, 2007 to June 1, 2008). Based on our review, the 

e-mails received in a typical day include: various advertisements and “junk” emails, investor complaints, and allegations of possible violations of the federal 

securities laws. 

During our audit, we observed an OIE initial coordinator conduct a review of the 

emails the ECC had received on a given day. On that occasion, the initial 

coordinator reviewed approximately 3,600 incoming e-mails. At the end of the 

initial screening process, approximately two percent of these emails (77 of 3,600) 

were forwarded for review by the second-level coordinator. No supervisory 

review was performed on the approximately 3,500 emails that were not 

forwarded for further review, and the ECC’s current policies and procedures do 

not require such a supervisory review. 

Supervisory review is an important internal control that provides ongoing 

monitoring of activities to ensure that applicable policies and procedures are 

followed.137 In fact, Enforcement’s Regional Office CTR procedures (see 

description of CTR process on pages 4-6) recognize the importance of 

supervisory review of the handling of complaints received by Enforcement. 

According to these procedures, because “an initial decision as to what type of 

 

137 Internal Control – Integrated Framework, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 

Treadway Commission, July 1994, at 69-70. 
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complaint has enforcement implications often comes down to a matter of 

judgment on the part of the person receiving” the complaint, it is “imperative that 

there be a regular review by a more senior staff member of the judgments being 

made . . ..”138 The reasons warranting supervisory review of initial decisions 

made on CTRs by Regional Office staff would equally seem to apply to the initial 

screening decision on e-mail complaints received by the ECC. 

An ECC supervisor informed us that he did not perform supervisory reviews of 

the initial coordinator analysis of incoming e-mail complaints primarily because 

he had previously performed the initial coordinator screening himself and was 

aware of the kinds of e-mails that were typically received. The supervisor also 

indicated that the sheer volume of e-mails received on a daily basis precluded 

supervisory review of the e-mails that were not forwarded for further review. 

Notwithstanding the fact that a significant percentage of the e-mails received by 

the ECC were spam or did not relate to the securities laws, the initial screening 

process serves to eliminate complaints from any further consideration by 

Enforcement, and the initial coordinator thus exercises a significant amount of 

authority. We believe, therefore, that it is important that supervisory review of emails eliminated during the initial coordinator review be conducted, at least on a 

test basis. Enforcement has indicated that it will draft and implement policies and 

procedures for supervisory sampling and review of complaints that do not survive 

the initial review. 

Recommendation 4

The Division of Enforcement’s Enforcement Complaint Center should develop 

and implement policies and procedures providing for supervisory review of a 

sample of e-mails that are not forwarded for further review as a result of the initial 

screening process. 

 

138 Field Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referral (CTR’s), updated October 6, 

2005. 
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Finding 3: Enforcement’s Procedures for 

Processing Complaints, Tips and Referrals 

Differ and There is Insufficient Division-Level 

Oversight of the CTR Program. 

Enforcement’s written procedures for processing 

CTRs at Headquarters and the Regional Offices are 

different. In addition, there appears to be little, if any, 

overall Division-level oversight of the CTR program. 

Currently, there are two separate sets of written procedures that were developed 

by Enforcement for processing CTRs that are received directly by Enforcement 

attorneys and do not come through the ECC. One set of procedures applies to 

Headquarters,139 while another set of procedures applies to the Regional 

Offices.140 

The Headquarters CTR procedures focus on the processing of CTRs by 

Enforcement staff. These procedures instruct staff to: 

• Review, research and analyze complaints as deemed appropriate 

by their branch; 

• Consult with their supervisor about the CTR; 

• Send a response to the complaint if no further contact with the 

complainant is planned; and 

• If the CTRs describe a potential violation of the Federal securities 

laws, send a completed CTR form, the original CTR and the 

response to OIE.141

In contrast, the Regional Office CTR procedures do not include specific 

procedures for processing CTRs, as they recognize that many Regional Offices 

have good systems in place for handling CTRs.142 Instead, the Regional Office 

CTR procedures focus on supervisory review of the staff’s initial judgment as to 

whether a CTR should be forwarded to an Enforcement attorney or accountant 

for further consideration.143 To ensure the appropriate level of supervisory 

139 Home Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals (CTR’s), updated October 6, 

2005. 

140 Field Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals (CTR’s), updated September 

1, 2005. 141 Home Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals (CTR’s), updated October 6, 

2005. 

142 Field Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals (CTR’s), updated September 

1, 2005. 

143 Id. 
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oversight, the procedures require regular review of the judgments made on CTRs 

by a more senior staff member.144 The procedures further require monthly 

reviews of an office’s CTRs by a supervisor at the Senior Officer level that should 

evaluate the judgment made on how the matter should be handled, as well as the 

timeliness of the initial decision.145

Our audit also found that in addition to the two sets of written CTR procedures 

described above, three Regional Offices have developed their own written CTR 

policies and procedures. These individual Regional Office written procedures 

generally appear to supplement the CTR procedures applicable to all Regional 

Offices. Other Regional Offices informed us that while they follow Enforcement’s 

written Regional Office CTR procedures, they also have their own informal, 

unwritten procedures for handling CTRs. 

As a result, Regional Offices handled their CTRs differently. For example, we 

found that two Regional Offices input CTRs after a decision has been made 

whether to pursue or close the complaint. These Offices do not log the complaint 

into the CTR system while it is undergoing an initial research or inquiry. Other 

Regional Offices input CTRs upon receipt. Another Regional Office informed us 

that it commonly does not input complaints into the CTR database if a MUI is 

immediately opened on the complaint. 

The absence of uniform set of policies and procedures for processing CTRs 

leads to inconsistencies regarding the entering of complaints into the CTR data 

base. In fact, we found that differences in Regional Offices practices result in 

complaints being entered into the CTR database at various stages in the 

process, e.g., upon receipt, after initial inquiry, or not being entered at all. 

Moreover, the likelihood of inconsistent treatment of complaints is increased by 

the absence of any Division-level oversight of the CTR program. OIE staff 

informed us that they were not responsible for overseeing the CTR program at 

Headquarters, and that the Regional Offices implemented their own CTR 

programs as they deemed appropriate for their offices. 

Recommendation 5 

The Division of Enforcement should develop uniform written policies and 

procedures for the Complaints, Tips and Referrals (CTR) Program at 

Headquarters and the Regional Offices. These policies and procedures should 

include a requirement for when complaints should be entered into the CTR 

database, e.g., upon receipt, and should provide for consistent, periodic 

supervisory reviews of CTRs. 

 

144 Id. at 1. 

145 Id. at 1-2. 
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Recommendation 6

The Division of Enforcement should designate an office or individual at 

Headquarters to provide nationwide oversight for the Complaints, Tips and 

Referrals program. 

Finding 4: Headquarters and the Regional Offices 

Do Not Consistently Follow Existing Complaint, 

Tips and Referrals Processing Procedures. 

Enforcement’s CTR procedures applicable to 

Headquarters and the Regional Offices are not being 

followed on a consistent basis. 

During our audit, we performed testing of CTRs processed by Enforcement staff 

at Headquarters during the period of our examination and reviewed the results of 

questionnaires we submitted to the Regional Offices. Based on the results of this 

testing and questionnaires, we found that the CTR procedures for Headquarters 

and the Regional Offices were not consistently being followed. 

Testing of Headquarters CTR Procedures. We requested documentation 

related to the CTRs that were received by Headquarters Enforcement staff 

between January 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008. We received and reviewed 

documentation related to 82 CTRs to determine whether they complied with the 

Headquarters CTR procedures. According to the Headquarters CTR procedures, 

the CTR materials that are sent to OIE should include the original complaint, the 

response and a CTR form.146 

Of the 82 CTR packages we reviewed, 90 percent (74 of 82) included a 

complaint, 60 percent (49 of 82) included the CTR data form, and only 33 percent 

(27 of 82) included a response that was sent to the complainant.147 Our review 

also disclosed that OIE does not follow up with Enforcement staff to ensure that 

the CTR package is complete and, as a consequence, oftentimes lacked 

complete documentation of a complaint. In addition, we found one complaint that 

was not entered into the CTR database and, for another complaint, only one of 

the five entities named in the complaint appeared in the CTR database. OIE 

management indicated that it was just a repository for the CTR data and was not 

responsible for overseeing the CTR program at Headquarters.

 

146 Home Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals (CTR’s), updated October 6, 

2005, at 1. 147 We noted two instances where OIEA had informed Enforcement that no response to the 

complaint was necessary because OIEA had already responded. However, OIEA’s response 

was not included in the CTR package. 
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Questionnaires about Regional Office CTR Policies and Procedures. We 

issued an e-mail questionnaire to all 11 Commission Regional Offices to obtain 

information about their CTR policies and procedures and to determine whether 

and how its monthly CTR reviews were conducted. Based upon the responses 

we received to the questionnaire, we determined that: 

• Five Regional Offices performed monthly CTR reviews; 

• One Regional Office sometimes performed its reviews every six weeks, 

rather than monthly; 

• One Regional Office reviewed its CTRs on a quarterly basis; 

• Two Regional Offices did not perform the monthly reviews of CTRs 

because senior officers were involved with CTRs throughout the process; 

• One Regional Office did not perform monthly reviews because the Branch 

Chiefs and their staff were viewed as responsible for their judgments on 

CTRs; and 

• One Regional Office (which was previously a District Office and reported 

to a Regional Office) did not perform its own CTR reviews, but rather 

forwarded its complaints to another Regional Office for review. 

Thus, the responses to our questionnaires disclosed that only five of eleven 

Regional Offices were regularly performing monthly CTR reviews, as required by 

the Regional Office CTR procedures, despite the emphasis that these 

procedures place on supervisory review.148

Recommendation 7

The Division of Enforcement should require that the Office of Internet 

Enforcement (OIE) performs the necessary follow-up to ensure that all 

Complaints, Tips and Referrals (CTR) packages forwarded to OIE contain 

complete documentation concerning a complaint, and that all CTRs are entered 

into the CTR database. 

Recommendation 8 

The Division of Enforcement should require that Regional Office senior officials 

perform monthly reviews of Complaints, Tips and Referrals (CTR), as is required 

by the Regional Office CTR procedures. 

 

148 See Field Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals (CTR’s), updated October 

6, 2005. 
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Finding 5: Enforcement’s Complaint Tracking 

Systems Need Improvement. 

Enforcement’s complaint tracking systems do not 

provide the capabilities that Enforcement needs to 

manage effectively the large volume of complaints 

that it receives. 

Enforcement uses several automated systems to track complaints. The ECC 

uses dedicated folders in the Commission’s e-mail system to receive and 

maintain complaints sent to the Enforcement’s complaint mailbox, 

enforcement@sec.gov. Enforcement also uses the CTR database to track 

complaints that Enforcement Headquarters and Regional Office staff receive by a 

variety of methods, including telephone, letter, fax and e-mail.149 

Data tracking systems should identify, capture and communicate information to 

enable the users of the systems to carry out their responsibilities efficiently and 

effectively.150 As the information generated by these systems assists 

management in making crucial decisions regarding its operations, data systems 

should include adequate controls to ensure, among other things, the 

completeness of data.151 As discussed below, our audit found that the ECC and 

CTR systems currently in use by Enforcement to track complaints are insufficient 

in several important respects. 

The ECC’s Mailbox Functions. The ECC’s complaint mailbox serves more as a 

repository for e-mails than as a complaint management information system. The 

e-mail folders the ECC uses to organize the e-mails it receives have basic sort 

capabilities. However, the ECC’s e-mail system has several limitations: (1) it 

lacks the ability to translate e-mails submitted in foreign languages; (2) it has 

limited report generation capability; (3) complaints cannot be tracked through the 

different levels of review; and (4) there is no ability to link complaints received 

with subsequent related investigations or enforcement actions. 

Our audit disclosed that the limitations of the ECC’s e-mail system hamper OIE’s 

ability to manage the e-mail complaints it receives effectively. For example, due 

to the high volume of e-mails maintained in the ECC’s system, basic analysis of 

the e-mails has to be conducted through a sort, and is very difficult and timeconsuming to perform. In addition, because the ECC cannot translate e-mails 

that are submitted in foreign languages, the ECC initial review coordinators 

149 In addition, OMS receives referrals of complaints from the SROs through its SMRS interface. 

During our audit, we learned that OMS has requested enhancements of the SMRS system that 

are pending. 150 Internal Control – Integrated Framework, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 

Treadway Commission, July 1994, at 59. 151 Id. 
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e 

bering 

. 

automatically discard these emails, unless they include a section in English that 

contains information in which Enforcement is interested. 

CTR Database Capabilities. Overall, the CTR database has greater capabilities 

than the ECC e-mail system has. For example, the CTR database has basic 

sorting and searching functions, as well as an add-on program that is available 

for generating reports. The CTR database also appears to generate sequential 

numbers for each record. We further found that the CTR system includes useful 

information about the nature of the complaint, its source, its disposition, and the 

name of the staff who performed the initial review of the complaint. 

Nonetheless, we found that improvements could be made to enhance the 

effectiveness of the CTR system. The CTR system does not record the name of 

the supervisor or senior staff member who reviewed the complaint. This 

information would be useful to document the supervisory and senior staff reviews 

required by the Regional Office CTR procedures. In addition, staff in two 

Regional Offices who used the CTR database stated that improved data search 

and report generating capabilities would be helpful.152 We also learned that 

three Regional Offices developed their complaint tracking systems to obtain 

some of the capabilities lacking in the Headquarters' CTR database. Finally, w

found that the reliability of the CTR system could be questioned because 

duplicate records exist and there appear to be gaps in the sequential num

of complaints

In addition, it recently came to our attention that three Regional Offices have 

experienced difficulties accessing the CTR system to input information into the 

database for the past few months. 

During our audit, we learned that OIEA uses a complaint tracking system that 

captures correspondence, analysis and disposition information used for tracking 

public and investor complaints and inquiries. This system provides many of the 

capabilities that Enforcement’s CTR system lacks (e.g., better searching and 

report generation capabilities). Enforcement may wish to use OIEA’s system as 

a model for improving the CTR system. 

Recommendation 9

The Division of Enforcement should improve the analytical capabilities of the 

Enforcement Complaint Center’s e-mail complaint system, including its search 

and report generation capabilities, as well as its ability to translate foreignlanguage e-mails. 

 

152 We were informed during the audit that reports were previously generated from the CTR 

system for Headquarters management review, but that this process was discontinued due to a 

lack of interest in the information. 
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Recommendation 10

The Division of Enforcement should improve the Complaints, Tips and Referrals 

database to include additional information about, and to better track, complaints, 

e.g., by adding data fields to document supervisory and senior staff review, and 

improving its searching and report generating capabilities, and should resolve 

problems with Regional Office access to the database. 

Finding 6: The Office of Internet Enforcement 

Does Not Track the Results of Referrals of 

Complaints. 

OIE had developed a database to track the results of its 

referrals of complaints to Enforcement staff for further 

investigation. However, OIE discontinued use of this 

database in 2007 due to problems encountered with the 

system. As a consequence, OIE does not currently track the 

results of complaint referrals. 

During an audit the OIG conducted in 2003 of Enforcement’s Internet program,153

we learned that OIE was developing a new database to track the results of 

complaints that OIE referred for further investigation. This database was 

intended to enhance OIE’s complaint tracking abilities by reflecting whether a 

MUI or investigation was opened based upon a complaint referral from OIE. 

While conducting our current audit, we inquired about the status of this database 

and were informed that it was discontinued in 2007, as a result of technical 

difficulties encountered with the system, such as communicating with other 

systems. 

Information systems are an integral part of operational activities, and should 

provide management with reports on performance relative to established 

objectives.154 Because OIE discontinued use of its previous referral tracking 

system, OIE currently has no system that tracks information on the results of its 

referrals of complaints. As a consequence, OIE is not collecting in any 

formalized manner information showing whether complaint referrals led to the 

opening of a MUI or investigation. Such information would assist OIE staff in 

understanding what types of complaints Enforcement staff have found warranted 

the opening of a MUI or investigation, and determining what types of complaints 

should be referred in the future. A complaint referral database would also be 

 

153 Internet Enforcement Program, OIG Report No. 352, January 13, 2003. 154 Internal Control – Integrated Framework, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 

Treadway Commission, July 1994, at 59. 
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useful to generate statistical information concerning the results of complaint 

referrals and could serve as a useful management tool. 

Recommendation 11

The Division of Enforcement should ensure that the Office of Internet 

Enforcement updates and resumes using its previous complaint referral tracking 

system, or develops a new system for tracking information on the results of 

complaint referrals. 
Appendix I 

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CNS Continuous Net Settlement 

CTR Complaint, Tip, and Referral 

DTC Depository Trust Company 

DTCC Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 

ECC Enforcement Complaint Center 

Enforcement Division of Enforcement 

FINRA Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

MUI Matter Under Inquiry 

NYSE New York Stock Exchange 

NSCC National Securities Clearing Corporation 

OCIE Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations 

OIE Office of Internet Enforcement 

OIEA Office of Investor Education and Advocacy 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PIPE Private Investment in Public Equity 

OMS Office of Market Surveillance 

SEC/Commission U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 

SMRS SRO Market Referral System 

SRO Self-Regulatory Organization 

Trading and Division of Trading and Markets (formerly the Division of 

 Markets Market Regulation) 

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Appendix II 

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Scope. We obtained data from Enforcement’s ECC e-mail system, CTR 

system, and SRO Market Referral System for the period from January 1, 2007 to 

June 1, 2008. We conducted our fieldwork from May 2008 to January 2009. 

Methodology. We interviewed staff and managers in Enforcement, Trading and 

Markets, OIEA, OCIE, and several Regional Offices to obtain an understanding 

of the issues pertinent to naked short selling, as well as complaint receipt and 

processing procedures. We requested and obtained copies of the naked short 

selling complaint e-mails received by the ECC, the CTRs received by 

Enforcement’s OIE, and a list of the SRO referrals received by OMS for the 

period from January 1, 2007 through June 1, 2008. We used this information to 

estimate total naked short selling complaints received and to test compliance 

with applicable policies and procedures. 

In addition, we submitted a questionnaire, in June 2008, to the Commission’s 11 

Regional Offices to obtain information about their complaint processing 

procedures. We received responses from all 11 Regional Offices and followed 

up on the responses received as appropriate. We also reviewed selected 

information concerning naked short selling that was generated by the 

Commission or outside parties, including numerous complaints about naked 

short selling that the OIG received. 

Internal/Management Controls. We reviewed internal controls that were 

considered significant within the context of the audit objectives. We interviewed 

Enforcement management and staff, identified and reviewed applicable policies 

and procedures, obtained and reviewed complaints and complaint tracking data, 

and tested the data for compliance with selected policies and procedures. We 

identified areas for improvement, as listed in Appendix IV. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We used computer-processed data such 

as e-mails, Excel spreadsheets, and Commission database information. To the 

extent practical, we compared the data we received with the source documents, 

such as complaints or data input forms. We did not perform extensive tests of 

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Appendix II 

Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

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system general or application controls. While we found some discrepancies in 

the CTR database, including duplicate records, gaps in the sequential record 

numbering, and inconsistent procedures for data input, these errors did not 

preclude our use of the computer-processed data to meet our audit objectives or 

change our conclusions. Also, we are making recommendations to address the 

issue of inconsistent procedures for CTR data input. 

Judgmental Sampling. Due to the relatively small universe of Headquarters 

CTRs submitted to OIE between January 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008, rather than 

selecting a judgmental sample, we reviewed the entire universe in order to test 

for compliance with Enforcement’s established policies and procedures for 

Headquarters CTR complaint processing. Specifically, we requested and tested 

documentation related to 82 CTR packages that were submitted to OIE between 

January 1, 2007 and June 1, 2008 (which should consist of a complaint, 

response and CTR form). 

High-Risk Areas. GAO has not specifically identified naked short selling 

complaint processing as a high-risk area at the agency. However, this issue has 

generated a great deal of attention from Congress, GAO, and the public, and the 

GAO is currently conducting a review of the implementation of Regulation SHO. 

Additionally, in the wake of the recent financial crisis and increased concerns 

about abusive naked short selling, the Commission entered an initial temporary 

emergency order that required all persons to borrow or arrange to borrow 

securities of certain financial institutions prior to affecting an order for a short sale 

of those securities. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-58166, July 

15, 2008. The Commission subsequently entered additional temporary 

emergency orders that, among other things, prohibited short selling in the 

publicly traded shares of certain financial firms, imposed enhanced delivery 

requirements on the sales of all equity securities by amending the Commission’s 

short selling regulation, Regulation SHO, the options market maker exception 

from Regulation SHO’s close-out requirement, and implementing a naked short 

selling antifraud rule. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-58572, 

September 17, 2008; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-58592, 

September 18, 2008. 

Prior Audit Coverage. We found no prior audit coverage of the issue of naked 

short selling complaint processing. However, we noted that a recent GAO report 

addressed needed improvements in Enforcement’s electronic system for the 

receipt of referrals of potential securities law violations from the SROs. See 

GAO-08-33, Securities and Exchange Commission: Opportunities Exist to 

Improve Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organizations, November 15, 2007. 

We also followed-up on the status of findings and recommendations contained in 

SEC OIG Enforcement Internet Program, Report No. 352, issued January 13, 

2003, regarding OIE, which is responsible for the ECC. We determined that all 

the recommendations were properly closed. 
Appendix III 

Criteria 

Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q. Prohibits the use 

of interstate commerce for the purpose of fraud or deceit in the offer or sale of 

any security or any security-based swap agreement. 

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 

Prohibits the use of interstate commerce to use or employ a manipulative or 

deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of the Securities and Exchange 

Commission’s rules in connection with the purchase of sale of a security. 

SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Prohibits the employment of 

manipulative and deceptive devices by using interstate commerce, or the mails 

or facilities of any national securities exchange in connection with the purchase 

of sale of any security. 

SEC Rule 10b-21, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21, SEC Release 34-58774 (Oct. 14, 

2008). Recently adopted anti-fraud rule specifically aimed at fails to deliver 

securities associated with naked short selling. 

SEC Rule 15c6-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1. Prohibits broker-dealers from 

effecting or entering into contracts for the purchase or sale of securities that 

provide for payment of funds and delivery of securities later than three business 

days after the date of the contract, unless otherwise expressly agreed to by the 

parties at the time of the transaction. 

SEC Rule 203, 17 C.F.R. § 242.203. Initially adopted in 2004 as part of 

Regulation SHO, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s short sale 

regulation. Requires broker-dealers, prior to effecting short sales in all equity 

securities, to locate securities available for borrowing in order to deliver securities 

on the settlement date of the transaction. It also imposes additional 

requirements on broker-dealers for securities in which a substantial amount of 

fails to deliver have occurred. 

SEC Rule 204T, 17 C.F.R. § 242.204T, SEC Release 34-58773 (Oct. 14, 2008). 

Recently adopted interim final temporary rule amendment to Regulation SHO. 

Requires that securities be purchased or borrowed to close out any fail to deliver 

position in an equity security by the beginning of regular trading hours on the 

settlement day following the date on which the fail to deliver position occurred. 

This temporary rule is effective through July 31, 2009. 

July 15, 2008 SEC Emergency Order, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 

58166. Temporary emergency order providing that no short sale could be 

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Appendix III 

Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

Report No. 450 

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effected in the securities of certain financial firms unless the seller or its agent 

borrowed or arranged to borrow the security or otherwise had the security 

available to borrow prior to effecting the short sale and delivers the security on 

the settlement date. The order took effect on July 21, 2008, and was 

subsequently extended until August 12, 2008. 

September 17, 2008 SEC Emergency Order, Securities Exchange Act 

Release No. 34-58572. Imposed a number of additional emergency measures, 

that included adding a temporary rule to Regulation SHO, Rule 204T; temporarily 

eliminating the options market maker exception from Regulation SHO’s close-out 

requirement, and making immediately effective Rule 10b-21, a naked short 

selling antifraud rule. The order was effective from September 18, 2008 until 

October 1, 2008. 

September 18, 2008 SEC Emergency Order, Securities Exchange Act 

Release No. 34-58592. Temporarily prohibited any short selling in the publicly 

traded shares of certain financial firms. The order was effective until October 2, 

2008. 

Enforcement Complaint Center Policies and Procedures. Prescribe policies 

and procedures for the receipt and processing of incoming complaints by 

Enforcement’s ECC. Include Memorandum Re: Enforcement Complaint 

Center/How To, September 17, 2007; Memorandum Re: Review of ECC Triage 

Guidelines/Procedures, September 17, 2007; and E-mail dated October 17, 

2003, Subject: Important Guidelines RE: Investor “Level II” Complaints. 

Enforcement’s Complaints, Tips and Referrals Procedures. Prescribe 

policies and procedures for the processing CTRs received by Division of 

Enforcement staff outside normal complaint channels. Include Home Office 

Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals, updated October 6, 2005; 

and Field Office Procedures for Handling Complaints/Tips/Referrals, updated 

September 1, 2005. 
Appendix IV 

List of Recommendations

Recommendation 1:

The Division of Enforcement should develop written in-depth triage analysis 

steps for naked short selling complaints, as it has for complaints involving other 

types of securities law violations, such as spam-driven manipulations and insider 

trading. 

Recommendation 2:

The Division of Enforcement should revise its written guidance to the 

Enforcement Complaint Center staff to ensure that naked short selling complaints 

based on information obtained from “Level II” computer screens are given a 

proper level of scrutiny and referred for further investigation where appropriate. 

Recommendation 3: 

The Division of Enforcement should add naked short selling to the list of 

categories of complaints on the Commission’s public webpage that solicits 

complaints from the public and should develop an online complaint form 

specifically tailored to naked short selling complaints. 

Recommendation 4: 

The Division of Enforcement’s Enforcement Complaint Center should 

develop and implement policies and procedures providing for supervisory 

review of a sample of e-mails that are not forwarded for further review as a 

result of the initial screening process. 

Recommendation 5: 

The Division of Enforcement should develop uniform written policies and 

procedures for the Complaints, Tips and Referrals (CTR) Program at 

Headquarters and the Regional Offices. These policies and procedures should 

include a requirement for when complaints should be entered into the CTR 

database, e.g., upon receipt, and should provide for consistent, periodic 

supervisory reviews of CTRs. 

Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

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Appendix IV 

Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

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Recommendation 6: 

The Division of Enforcement should designate an office or individual at 

Headquarters to provide nationwide oversight for the Complaints, Tips and 

Referrals program. 

Recommendation 7: 

The Division of Enforcement should require that the Office of Internet 

Enforcement (OIE) performs the necessary follow-up to ensure that all 

Complaints, Tips, and Referrals (CTR) packages forwarded to OIE contain 

complete documentation concerning a complaint, and that all CTRs are entered 

into the CTR database. 

Recommendation 8: 

The Division of Enforcement should require that Regional Office senior officials 

perform monthly reviews of Complaints, Tips and Referrals (CTR), as is required 

by the Regional Office CTR procedures. 

Recommendation 9: 

The Division of Enforcement should improve the analytical capabilities of the 

Enforcement Complaint Center’s e-mail complaint system, including its search 

and report generation capabilities, as well as its ability to translate foreignlanguage e-mails. 

Recommendation 10: 

The Division of Enforcement should improve the Complaints, Tips and Referrals 

database to include additional information about, and to better track, complaints, 

e.g., by adding data fields to document supervisory and senior staff review, and 

improving its searching and report generating capabilities, and should resolve 

problems with Regional Office access to the database. 

Recommendation 11: 

The Division of Enforcement should ensure that the Office of Internet 

Enforcement updates and resumes using its previous complaint referral tracking 

system, or develops a new system for tracking information on the results of 

complaint referrals.
Appendix V 

Management Comments 

Division of Enforcement March 5, 2009 

Thank you for the latest draft of the report. Our formal written comments remain the 

same. As to the specific recommendations: 

• Recommendations 1-3: We do not concur. 

• Recommendation 4: We concur. 

• Recommendations 5-11: In light of the Chairman's efforts in this area, as shown 

in the Commission's release today, we wonder whether now is the appropriate 

time for recommendations that approach referrals in a fragmented manner. We 

therefore would prefer to take no position until after the Commission's 

comprehensive review is done. If we do not have that option then we should be 

put down as not concurring. 

Enforcement’s Comments: February 17, 2009 

This letter is in response to Audit Report No. 450, regarding Practices Related to Naked 

Short Sale Complaints and Referrals. 

Market manipulation effected by abusive “naked” short selling (“NSS”) -- like 

manipulation in all its other forms -- is an issue that the Enforcement Division takes very 

seriously. However, as the Report confirms, “naked” short sales, i.e., selling short 

without having borrowed the securities to make delivery, can occur for legitimate 

reasons, without any sort of manipulative intent. In addition, the mere fact that a stock 

may experience “failures to deliver” does not imply a violation of the federal securities 

laws. Indeed, a fail may occur as a result of a long sale (i.e., a sale of owned securities) 

as well as a short sale. 

In recent months, a small but vocal cadre of advocates has emerged decrying the practice 

and suggesting that it has damaging market effects. But there is hardly unanimity in the 

investment community or the financial media on either the prevalence, or the dangers, of 

“naked” short selling. The Commission has repeatedly stressed the fact that the practice 

can provide needed market liquidity in certain circumstances. For instance, market 

makers sometimes engage in legitimate “naked” short selling when there is high buying 

demand in a security.155 Still others view the threat posed by “naked” short selling as 

wildly exaggerated, and point to instances in which allegations of abusive “naked” short 

 

155 If a market maker fails to deliver securities by settlement date (T+3), Commission rules require that such 

fails to deliver be closed out promptly. 

Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

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Appendix V 

Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

Report No. 450 

Page 41

 

selling were used to cover up other management malfeasance, like the dumping on the 

market of large blocks of unregistered shares. We have recently alleged such behavior in 

the widely-discussed CMKM Diamonds litigation. Other fraud defendants have also 

attempted to portray depressed stock prices as the work of clandestine short sellers. 

Despite its assertions regarding the potential danger of “naked” short selling and the 

growing interest in the subject, the Report can cite to no bona fide studies or empirical 

data regarding the practice’s market impact. The Division of Trading and Markets 

debunks the theory that NSS creates “counterfeit” or “phantom” shares.156 The Report 

cites to the emergency orders, final rules, and interim final temporary rules addressing 

short selling, including “naked” short selling that the Commission issued in July, 

September, and October of 2008. When it issued each of these rules, the Commission 

noted in its releases that the purpose of the emergency actions was to address the lack of 

market confidence and investor fears that short selling, including legitimate short selling, 

could exacerbate the current financial crisis by creating downward price momentum 

unrelated to the fundamental financials of issuers. 

As the Commission has noted in its releases, NSCC reports that 99% (by dollar value) of 

all trades settle on time, or within the standard T+3 settlement cycle. It is important to 

note that a fail to deliver occurs even where a security settles one day late. As the 

Commission noted in its October interim final temporary rule release adopting Rule 

204T, more than half of all fails to deliver and 70% of all fails to deliver positions are 

closed out within two settlement days after T+3 (two days late). The vast majority of 

fails to deliver are closed out within five days after T+3. While the Commission recently 

strengthened the close-out requirements because it is concerned about the impact of 

persistent fails on market confidence, these fails to deliver are not necessarily the result 

of illicit activity, such as abusive “naked” short selling. As noted above, there may be 

legitimate reasons for fails to deliver, including mechanical errors or processing delays. 

Thus, while the Commission has recognized that timely settlement of trades is important 

for market integrity and investor confidence, the Commission’s recent rulemaking in this 

area recognizes that trades do fail (whether from long sales or short sales) but that fails 

should not persist. 

The Division of Enforcement is called upon to police the massive U.S. securities markets 

with decidedly limited resources and, in order to fulfill our mission of investor protection, 

we must intelligently leverage those resources. As manager of the Enforcement 

Complaint Center (ECC), the Office of Internet Enforcement (OIE) is under the same 

mandate with respect to its limited staff.157 

156 See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm, Question 7.1 157 While OIE manages the ECC and is responsible for training staff that review complaints, OIE’s 

responsibilities do not extend to tracking or stipulating investigative follow-up to complaints referred to 
Appendix V 

Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

Report No. 450 

Page 42

 

In order to derive the maximum value from the investor complaints it handles, OIE is 

charged with prioritizing and passing on for further investigation complaints that contain 

the most facially compelling information regarding possible violations of the federal 

securities laws, the material most likely to trigger Enforcement investigations leading to 

filed actions. This is accomplished by focusing on complaints with a high likelihood of 

accuracy and credibility (like those of purported insiders or scam victims), those whose 

information can be readily vetted (i.e., visible price swings in a possible manipulation or 

insider trading allegation), or those involving demonstrated, immediate investor hazard in 

the current market environment (Ponzi schemes, improper sales of auction-rate 

securities). 

The ECC receives all sorts of communications. Investor complaints run the gamut from 

the painstakingly specific and well-researched to the speculative and fanciful. So-called 

“Level II” complaints – that is, assertions of market manipulation or distortion from retail 

investors based purely on observations of private computer terminals – rely on simple 

trading snapshots and are really no more reliable an indicator of fraud than a dart tossed 

at a dartboard full of company names. Other types of complaints, like those based on 

direct in-person or electronic solicitation, for example, are far more likely to paint a 

coherent picture for investigators. 

As the Report notes, a large number of the complaints received provide no support for the 

allegations. For instance, some complaints merely state that no one should be permitted 

to sell stock that they do not own. However, legitimate short selling by definition is the 

sale of a security that the seller does not own. Other complaints allege that a specific 

issuer’s price has declined and the complainant believes the decline must be the result of 

“naked” short selling, even though the complainant cannot know if the price decline is 

due to “naked” short selling, legitimate short selling where the seller has borrowed and 

timely delivered securities, or other legitimate price discovery mechanisms. For instance, 

price declines may occur because owners of the security may have sold their securities in 

response to unfavorable financial information or unfavorable news about the issuer or the 

issuer’s particular industry. 

The best sources for information on violations relating to “naked” short selling is the 

SRO, which has primary responsibility for surveillance of its trading. And we receive a 

large number of referrals from the SROs, addressing all forms of alleged investment 

misconduct. It is telling that, of the 900 SRO referrals Enforcement received during the 

Report’s 18-month survey period, none involved the practice of “naked” short selling. 

That is to say, the people closest to the trading, with the deepest understanding of and 

Regional or Home Office attorneys. Similarly, OIE has not been charged with approving, or supervising 

compliance with, CTR procedures in the regions. 
Appendix V 

Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

Report No. 450 

Page 43

 

access to the data, did not see and refer any of the large-scale, damaging “naked” short 

sale abuse about which the Report hypothesizes. That having been said, as the Report 

notes, the Commission has brought Enforcement actions for conduct including “naked” 

short selling, where violations have occurred.158

Consequently, with respect to Recommendations 1-3 contained in the Report (specific 

triage steps for NSS complaints, revision of OIE training materials to mandate enhanced 

scrutiny for Level II complaints, creation of specific NSS complaint form), the Division 

believes that these are not optimal uses for Commission resources and are not calculated 

to yield a higher quality of investigative referrals to Enforcement attorneys in the Home 

Office and Regions. 

With regards to Recommendation 4, suggesting supervisory sampling and review of 

complaints that do not survive “first stage” triage review, we concur and will draft and 

implement suitable policies and procedures. 

The remaining Recommendations relate to suggested modifications to the Division’s 

general complaint-handling systems, both those handling (i) information that flows 

directly to OIE from the public (the ECC), and (ii) information received by non-OIE 

attorneys in the regions and Home Office, reviewed, resolved and catalogued by OIE (the 

CTR program). 

As you know, a new Chairman has taken office, and her staff is currently engaged in an 

agency-wide effort to determine how tips and complaints are handled in the various 

Divisions and Offices. No doubt this effort will result in important changes to the 

agency’s approach, and will likely address the principles discussed in the Report. 

Considering that such an effort is underway, the Division believes that the best way 

forward on Recommendations 5-11 is to cooperate fully in the Commission’s review, and 

to implement its recommendations, along with the rest of the agency, in a coordinated 

fashion. 

158 See, e.g., In re Sandell Asset Management, et al., Securities Act Rel. No. 8857 (October 10, 2007). 
Appendix VI 

OIG Response to Management Comments 

We are disappointed that the Division of Enforcement (Enforcement) only 

concurred with one of the 11 recommendations in this audit report. We are 

particularly concerned that Enforcement did not concur with the report’s first 

three recommendations that it develop written in-depth triage analysis steps for 

naked short selling complaints, as it has for other complaints; that it revise its 

written guidance to the Enforcement Complaint Center staff to ensure that naked 

short selling complaints are given a proper level of scrutiny and referred for 

further investigation; and that it add naked short selling to the list of categories of 

complaints on the Commission’s public webpage and develop an online 

complaint form specifically tailored to naked short selling complaints. 

As we discussed in our report, the SEC has repeatedly recognized that naked 

short selling can depress stock prices and have harmful effects on the market. In 

adopting a naked short selling antifraud rule, Rule 10b-21, in October 2008, the 

Commission stated, “We have been concerned about ‘naked’ short selling and, in 

particular, abusive ‘naked’ short selling, for some time.” In this report, we 

determined that Enforcement’s current policies and procedures appear to limit 

significantly the referral of naked short selling complaints, and that its written 

policies and procedures result in naked short selling complaints being treated 

differently from other types of complaints of securities law violations. 

Notwithstanding the Commission’s previous statement and our findings, 

Enforcement responded to our report by stating that “there is hardly unanimity in 

the investment community or the financial media on either the prevalence, or the 

dangers, of ‘naked’ short selling,” and references the view held by some that “the 

threat posed by ‘naked’ short selling is wildly exaggerated . . . .” Accordingly, 

Enforcement concludes that the report’s recommendations, which are intended to 

allow for more thorough investigations of naked short selling complaints, are not 

optimal uses of Commission resources. We would hope that Enforcement 

reconsiders this position in light of the Commission’s stated concerns about the 

effect of naked short selling on the market. 

We are also disappointed that Enforcement does not intend to implement 

immediately our specific recommendations (Nos. 5-11) designed to improve its 

complaints, tips and referral process. We understand that the SEC’s new 

Chairman has announced the enlisting of a contractor to conduct a 

comprehensive review of internal procedures used to evaluate tips, complaints, 

and referrals for the entire agency, and we will certainly work closely with the 

contractor to assist with this review. Nonetheless, we believe that 

implementation of our recommended improvements should begin now, in 

coordination with the contractor’s review, to ensure that the implementation of 

necessary improvements to Enforcement’s complaint system is not unduly 

delayed. 

Practices Related to Naked Short Selling Complaints and Referrals March 18, 2009 

Report No. 450 

Page 44 
Audit Requests and Ideas

The Office of Inspector General welcomes your input. If you would like to 

request an audit in the future or have an audit idea, please contact us at: 

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 

Office of Inspector General 

Attn: Assistant Inspector General, Audits (Audit Request/Ideas) 

100 F Street, N.E. 

Washington D.C. 20549-2736 

Tel. #: 202-551-6061 

Fax #: 202-772-9265 

Email: oig@sec.gov 

Hotline 

To report fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement at SEC, 

contact the Office of Inspector General at: 

Phone: 877.442.0854 

Web-Based Hotline Complaint Form: 

www.reportlineweb.com/sec_oig