alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Intrepid Electrical Contracting Co., Inc., Respondent, v Theodore Serure, Appellant.

[824 NYS2d 351]

*431In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Demarest, J.), dated October 28, 2005, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Licensing statutes are to be strictly construed, and an unlicensed home improvement contractor cannot recover for services rendered either on the contract or in quantum meruit *(see*Administrative Code of City of NY § 20-387; *B & F Bldg. Corp. v Liebig,*76 NY2d 689, 691-692 [1990]; *Brite-N-Up, Inc. v Reno,*7 AD3d 656 [2004]; *Callos, Inc. v Julianelli,*300 AD2d 612 [2002]; *Todisco v Econopouly,*155 AD2d 441 [1989]; *Bujas v Katz,*133 AD2d 730 [1987]; *Millington v Rapoport,*98 AD2d 765 [1983]). Pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 20-397 (2), however, a duly licensed electrician does not need to obtain a separate home improvement contractor’s license if he or she performs work which is within the scope of his or her license. In opposition to the defendant’s prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff submitted evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether all of the work performed constituted “home improvement” and to what extent the work performed was electrical and/or ancillary to electrical work performed by the plaintiff *(Raywood Assoc. v Seibel,*172 AD2d 154 [1991]; *see Power Cooling, Inc. v Wassong,*5 Misc 3d 22, 23 [2004]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Santucci, J.P., Mastro, Fisher and Dillon, JJ., concur.
### §164. Eliminating private holdings of lands; timber or public lands of equal value in exchange

The Secretary of the Interior, for the purpose of eliminating private holdings within the Glacier National Park and the preservation intact of the natural forest along the roads in the scenic portions of the park, both on patented and park lands, is empowered, in his discretion: (1) To obtain for the United States the complete title to any or all of the lands held in private or State ownership within the boundaries of said park within townships 32 and 33 north, ranges 18 and 19 west of Montana principal meridian, by the exchange of dead, decadent, or matured timber of approximately equal values that can be removed from any part of the park without injuriously affecting the scenic beauty thereof; or, upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture, the timber to be selected or exchanged may be taken from the Government lands within the metes and bounds of the national forests within the State of Montana, or, (2) to obtain for the United States the complete title to any or all of the lands held in private ownership within the boundaries of said park by accepting from the owners of such privately owned lands complete relinquishment thereof and by granting and patenting to such owners, in exchange therefor, in each instance, like public land of equal value situate in the State of Montana, after due notice of the proposed exchange has been given by publication for not less than thirty days in the counties where the lands proposed to be exchanged or taken in exchange are located.

(Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 164, §1, 39 Stat. 1122; Feb. 28, 1923, ch. 144, §1, 42 Stat. 1324.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section is based on section 1 of act Mar. 3, 1917, and section 1 of act Feb. 23, 1923; subdivision (1) being from the former and subdivision (2) being from the latter act. Of the language preceding subdivision (1), that portion from the beginning of the section to the word "and" was common to both of the sections aforesaid, while the remaining portion was derived from section 1 of act Mar. 3, 1917.
Editorial Note on Subpart G of Part 42
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to subpart G of part 42 appear by Order No. 2679-2003, 68 FR 51364, 51365, 51366, Aug. 26, 2003.

§ 42.504 Assurances required. ( a ) *Assurances.* Every application for Federal financial assistance covered by this subpart shall contain an assurance that the program or activity will be conducted in compliance with the requirements of section 504 and this subpart. Each agency within the Department that provides Federal financial assistance shall specify the form of the foregoing assurance and shall require applicants for Department financial assistance to obtain like assurances from subgrantees, contractors and subcontractors, transferees, successors in interest, and others connected with the program or activity. Each Department agency shall specify the extent to which an applicant will be required to confirm that the assurances provided by secondary recipients are being honored. Each assurance shall include provisions giving notice that the United States has a right to seek judicial enforcement of section 504 and the assurance.
( b ) *Assurances from government agencies.* Assurances from agencies of State and local governments shall extend to any other agency of the same governmental unit if the policies of the other agency will affect the program or activity for which Federal financial assistance is requested.
( c ) *Assurances from institutions.* The assurances required with respect to any institution or facility shall be applicable to the entire institution or facility.
( d ) *Duration of obligation.* Where the Federal financial assistance is to provide or is in the form of real or personal property, the assurance will obligate the recipient and any transferee for the period during which the property is being used for the purpose for which the Federal financial assistance is extended or for another purpose involving the provisions of similar benefits, or for as long as the recipient retains ownership or possession of the property, whichever is longer. In all other cases the assurance will obligate the recipient for the period during which Federal financial assistance is extended.
( e ) *Covenants.* With respect to any transfer of real property, the transfer document shall contain a covenant running with the land assuring nondiscrimination on the condition described in paragraph (d) of this section. Where the property is obtained from the Federal Government, the covenant may also include a condition coupled with a right to be reserved by the Department to revert title to the property in the event of a breach of the covenant.
( f ) *Remedies.* The failure to secure either an assurance or a sufficient assurance from a recipient shall not impair the right of the Department to enforce the requirements of section 504 and this subpart.
#### Mozes Fuss v. Juda Kronengold.

Present — Martin, P. J., Townley, Glennon and Dore, JJ.
#### Theresa Scrimenti, Appellant, v Dry Harbor Nursing Home et al., Respondents.

[823 NYS2d 516]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kitzes, J.), dated June 23, 2005, as granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) as abandoned.

*440Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff failed to seek entry of a default judgment within one year following the defendants’ default in answering the complaint. Thus, the complaint was subject to dismissal unless the plaintiff could establish a reasonable excuse for the delay and the existence of a meritorious cause of action (see *McGovern v O’Connor,*256 AD2d 501 [1998]; *Blades v Butler Cab Corp.,*176 AD2d 698, 699 [1991]; *Rendelman v Southside Hosp.,*141 AD2d 521, 522 [1988]). The plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable excuse for the more than six-year delay in seeking to enter a default judgment (see *Perricone v City of New York,*62 NY2d 661, 663 [1984]; *Wilson v Massapequa Gen. Hosp.,*180 AD2d 791 [1992]; *Rafiq v Weston,*171 AD2d 783, 784 [1991]; *Monzon v Sony Motor,*115 AD2d 714 [1985]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) as abandoned. Schmidt, J.P, Ritter, Mastro, Fisher and Dillon, JJ., concur.
Did You Wash Your Hands?

Students: Let’s work together to stop the spread of COVID-19

If you can’t wash your hands, 

ask your teacher or another 

adult for hand sanitizer. 

Ask yourself:

Did I just go to the bathroom?

Am I about to eat?

Did I just eat?

Did I cough or sneeze?

Did I touch supplies or objects 

that other people have touched?

Did I touch garbage?

Did I touch my cloth face cover?

?

CS 317831-A July 20, 2020 9:09 AM

cdc.gov/coronavirus

stop

think

wash hands
#### Gitel Fischer, Respondent, v Sadov Realty Corporation et al., Defendants, and Independence Community Bank, Appellant.

[824 NYS2d 434]

In a shareholder’s derivative action, inter alia, to cancel several mortgages and for an accounting, the defendant Indepen*631dence Community Bank appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (F. Rivera, J.), dated April 21, 2005, which denied its motion to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (5), and (7).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly determined that the statute of limitations contained in Business Corporation Law § 909 (c) does not apply to the plaintiffs third cause of action to cancel certain mortgages. That statute applies to actions to set aside a deed, lease, or other instrument of conveyance; a mortgage is not such a conveyance *(see Rols Capital Co. v Panvaspan Realties,*157 Misc 2d 449, 450 [1993]).

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the allegations in the complaint should be accepted as true *(see Leon v Martinez,*84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Such a motion should be granted only where, even viewing the allegations as true, the plaintiff still cannot establish a cause of action *(see Cayuga Partners v 150 Grand,*305 AD2d 527 [2003]). The standard is not whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action, but whether the plaintiff has a cause of action *(id.).*The court should “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” *(Leon v Martinez, supra*at 87-88).

“Pursuant to Real Property Law § 266, a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for value is protected in his or her title unless he or she had previous notice of the alleged prior fraud by the seller” *(Karan v Hoskins,*22 AD3d 638 [2005]; *see Miner v Edwards,*221 AD2d 934 [1995]; *Emerson Hills Realty v Mirabella,*220 AD2d 717 [1995]; *see also Anderson v Blood,*152 NY 285 [1897]). “It is only if the ‘facts within the knowledge of the purchaser are of such a nature, as, in reason, to put him upon inquiry, and to excite the suspicion of an ordinarily prudent person and he fails to make some investigation, [that] he will be chargeable with that knowledge which a reasonable inquiry, as suggested by the facts, would have revealed’ ” *(Miner v Edwards, supra*at 934, quoting *Anderson v Blood, supra*at 293).

The amended complaint alleged that the appellant possessed facts of such nature that would have “excite[d] the suspicion of an ordinarily prudent person” *(id.).*Therefore, the amended complaint stated a cause of action against the appellant.

Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court properly denied the motion to dismiss the amended complaint insofar asserted *632against the appellant pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (5), and (7).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Adams, J.E, Skelos, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.
### §3506. Certification of compliance

#### (a) Regulations

Not later than 12 months after November 16, 1990, the head of each Federal agency affected by this chapter shall promulgate regulations to assure compliance with the provisions of this chapter.

#### (b) Certification

The head of each Federal agency affected by this chapter shall report and certify that each such agency is in compliance with the provisions of this chapter. Such reports and certifications shall be submitted annually to the Committees and the Secretary.

(Pub. L. 97–348, §7, Oct. 18, 1982, 96 Stat. 1657; Pub. L. 101–591, §14, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 2941.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1990—Pub. L. 101–591 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, section read as follows: "The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall, on behalf of each Federal agency concerned, make written certification that each such agency has complied with the provisions of this chapter during each fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1982. Such certification shall be submitted on an annual basis to the House of Representatives and the Senate pursuant to the schedule required under the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974."

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Termination of Reporting Requirements

For termination, effective May 15, 2000, of provisions in subsec. (b) of this section relating to annually submitting reports and certifications to the Committee on Resources of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate, see section 3003 of Pub. L. 104–66, as amended, set out as a note under section 1113 of Title 31, Money and Finance, and page 42 of House Document No. 103–7.
§ 16.26 Considerations in determining whether production or disclosure should be made pursuant to a demand. ( a ) In deciding whether to make disclosures pursuant to a demand, Department officials and attorneys should consider: ( 1 ) Whether such disclosure is appropriate under the rules of procedure governing the case or matter in which the demand arose, and
( 2 ) Whether disclosure is appropriate under the relevant substantive law concerning privilege.
( b ) Among the demands in response to which disclosure will not be made by any Department official are those demands with respect to which any of the following factors exist: ( 1 ) Disclosure would violate a statute, such as the income tax laws, 26 U.S.C. 6103 and 7213, or a rule of procedure, such as the grand jury secrecy rule, F.R.Cr.P., Rule 6(e),
( 2 ) Disclosure would violate a specific regulation;
( 3 ) Disclosure would reveal classified information, unless appropriately declassified by the originating agency,
( 4 ) Disclosure would reveal a confidential source or informant, unless the investigative agency and the source or informant have no objection,
( 5 ) Disclosure would reveal investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, and would interfere with enforcement proceedings or disclose investigative techniques and procedures the effectiveness of which would thereby be impaired,
( 6 ) Disclosure would improperly reveal trade secrets without the owner's consent.
( c ) In all cases not involving considerations specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6) of this section, the Deputy or Associate Attorney General will authorize disclosure unless, in that person's judgment, after considering paragraph (a) of this section, disclosure is unwarranted. The Deputy or Associate Attorney General will not approve disclosure if the circumstances specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section exist. The Deputy or Associate Attorney General will not approve disclosure if any of the conditions in paragraphs (b)(4) through (b)(6) of this section exist, unless the Deputy or Associate Attorney General determines that the administration of justice requires disclosure. In this regard, if disclosure is necessary to pursue a civil or criminal prosecution or affirmative relief, such as an injunction, consideration shall be given to: ( 1 ) The seriousness of the violation or crime involved,
( 2 ) The past history or criminal record of the violator or accused,
( 3 ) The importance of the relief sought,
( 4 ) The importance of the legal issues presented,
( 5 ) Other matters brought to the attention of the Deputy or Associate Attorney General.
( d ) Assistant Attorneys General, U.S. Attorneys, the Director of the EOUST, U.S. Trustees, and their designees, are authorized to issue instructions to attorneys and to adopt supervisory practices, consistent with this subpart, in order to help foster consistent application of the foregoing standards and the requirements of this subpart.
### §284g. Cooperation of government agencies

#### (a) Protection of park

The Secretary shall cooperate with, and seek cooperation from, other Federal, State, and local agencies (including the Federal Aviation Administration) to protect the park from undue noise intrusions, air pollution, and visual degradation.

#### (b) Monitoring and notification of noise pollution; conforming to noise pollution standards; enjoinder of easement violations

The Secretary shall monitor noise pollution which is associated with the Dulles road corridor (including the airport access and toll roads) and shall notify the Federal Aviation Administration, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the appropriate committees of Congress if, after conferring with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, the Secretary finds that such noise pollution is exceeding the standards set forth in section 284c(e) of this title. Within sixty days after any such notification, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall take steps to reduce noise pollution so as to conform to such standards. The Secretary or the Foundation may bring an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin any violation by the Commonwealth of Virginia of the easement referred to in section 284c(e) of this title.

(Pub. L. 89–671, §8, as added Pub. L. 97–310, Oct. 14, 1982, 96 Stat. 1457.)
III 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 113 

Designating March 25, 2019, as ‘‘National Cerebral Palsy Awareness Day’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 14, 2019 

Mr. ISAKSON (for himself, Mr. CASEY, and Ms. HASSAN) submitted the 

following resolution; which was considered and agreed to 

RESOLUTION 

Designating March 25, 2019, as ‘‘National Cerebral Palsy 

Awareness Day’’. 

Whereas a group of permanent disorders of the development 

of movement and posture that are attributed to nonprogressive disturbances that occur in the developing 

brain is referred to as ‘‘cerebral palsy’’; 

Whereas cerebral palsy, the most common motor disability in 

children, is caused by damage to 1 or more specific areas 

of the developing brain, which usually occurs during fetal 

development before, during, or after birth; 

Whereas the majority of children who have cerebral palsy are 

born with cerebral palsy, but cerebral palsy may be undetected for months or years; 

Whereas 75 percent of individuals with cerebral palsy also 

have 1 or more developmental disabilities, including epiVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:30 Mar 14, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\SR113.ATS SR113

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•SRES 113 ATS 

lepsy, intellectual disability, autism, visual impairment, or 

blindness; 

Whereas, according to information released by the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention— 

(1) the prevalence of cerebral palsy is not changing 

over time; and 

(2) an estimated 1 in 323 children has cerebral 

palsy; 

Whereas approximately 764,000 individuals in the United 

States are affected by cerebral palsy; 

Whereas, although there is no cure for cerebral palsy, treatment often improves the capabilities of a child with cerebral palsy; 

Whereas scientists and researchers are hopeful for breakthroughs in cerebral palsy research; 

Whereas researchers across the United States conduct important research projects involving cerebral palsy; and 

Whereas the Senate can raise awareness of cerebral palsy in 

the public and the medical community: Now, therefore, be 

it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) designates March 25, 2019, as ‘‘National 

3 Cerebral Palsy Awareness Day’’; and 

4 (2) encourages each individual in the United 

5 States to become better informed about and aware 

6 of cerebral palsy. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
§ 115.151 Detainee reporting. ( a ) The agency shall provide multiple ways for detainees to privately report sexual abuse and sexual harassment, retaliation by other detainees or staff for reporting sexual abuse and sexual harassment, and staff neglect or violation of responsibilities that may have contributed to such incidents.
( b ) The agency shall also inform detainees of at least one way to report abuse or harassment to a public or private entity or office that is not part of the agency, and that is able to receive and immediately forward detainee reports of sexual abuse and sexual harassment to agency officials, allowing the detainee to remain anonymous upon request.
( c ) Staff shall accept reports made verbally, in writing, anonymously, and from third parties and promptly document any verbal reports.
( d ) The agency shall provide a method for staff to privately report sexual abuse and sexual harassment of detainees.
#### The City of Lincoln, Plaintiff-Appellant, *v.*Victor E. Thudium, Defendant-Appellant.

(No. 11334;

Fourth District

August 27, 1971.

Warren Peters, City Attorney, of Lincoln, for appellant.

Edwin C. Mills, of Lincoln, for appellee.
### §361g. Modification of park boundary

The boundary of Hot Springs National Park is modified as depicted on the map entitled "Proposed Boundary Map", numbered 128/80015, and dated August 5, 1985.

(Pub. L. 103–58, Aug. 2, 1993, 107 Stat. 280.)
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 96-40057

(Summary Calendar)

_________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MICHAEL EDMOND SWISHER,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________________________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

(6:90-CR-71-4)

__________________________________________________ July 5, 1996

Before JOLLY, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Swisher app e als the district court’s denial of his motion to reduce sentence pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(2). A district court has discretion concerning whether to reduce a sentence under

§3582(c)(2). U

nited States v. Shaw

, 30 F.3d 26, 28-29 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court’s factual

findings in a proceeding under §3582 are reviewed for clear error. U nited States v. Mimms

, 43 F.3d

217, 220 (5th Cir. 1995). The district court found that Swisher’s conduct clearly involved the

unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance because he was arrested at a residence where both

precursor chemicals and lab equipment were present. With reference to sentencing, a defendant is

accountable for all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,2

procured, or willfully caused. U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Therefore, although Swisher was convicted

for possession of a listed chemical with knowledge that it would be used to manufacture a controlled

substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2), the circumstances of his offense necessarily indicated that he was

involved in the unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance. Thus, it was within the district

court’s discr e tion to deny Swisher’s motion to reduce his sentence because the application of

U.S.S.G. §2D1.11(c) would preclude reduction of the sentence. As the district court did not commit

clear error in denying Swisher’s motion, that decision is AFFIRMED.