Docket Nos. 101011, 101014 cons. 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

JAMES WISNIEWSKI, Appellee, v. REVEREND RAYMOND 

 KOWNACKI et al., Appellants. 

Opinion filed June 2, 2006.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion. 

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, McMorrow, 

Fitzgerald, Kilbride, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment 

and opinion. 

OPINION
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In October 2002, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendants 

alleging that defendant Kownacki, a priest within the Catholic 

Diocese of Belleville, sexually abused him between 1973 and 

1978. Among other allegations, plaintiff alleged fraud and 

conspiracy against the Diocese, alleging that the Diocese knew 

that Kownacki had molested a child at another parish before 

transferring him to St. Theresa=s School and Church in Salem, 

Illinois. Plaintiff also alleged that prior to the transfer, Kownacki 

received mental-health treatment and/or alcohol-abuse 

counseling. Relevant to this case, plaintiff sought discovery of 

the records of this treatment. Defendants objected to their 

disclosure, asserting that the records were privileged under the 

Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality 

Act (Confidentiality Act) (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2002)) 

and the Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse and Dependency 

Act (Dependency Act) (20 ILCS 301/30B5 et seq. (West 2002)). 

The circuit court of St. Clair County concluded that neither 

statute applied to records created prior to the effective dates of 

the statutes. The court further decided that the Confidentiality 

Act did not cover records of alcohol counseling or treatment. 

Defendants persisted in their refusal to turn over the records, 

as ordered by the trial court. The court held defendants in 

contempt, fined them, and awarded attorney fees to plaintiff. 

Defendants appealed the contempt finding to the appellate 

court. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(5). The appellate court affirmed the 

trial court=s order compelling defendants to produce Kownacki=s 

treatment records, but vacated the order of contempt. No. 

5B04B0205 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 

We granted defendants= petitions for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 

2d R. 315) and consolidated the cases. 

BACKGROUND 

Following defendants= refusal to comply with plaintiff=s 

discovery requests, plaintiff filed motions to compel 

compliance. The trial court held hearings on these motions and 

examined documents in camera to which defendants claimed 

privileges under the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency 

Act. The court ordered defendants to turn over those 

documents that predated the effective dates of the statutes. 
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The court also held that the privilege granted by the 

Confidentiality Act did not apply to Kownacki=s alcohol-abuse 

treatment records that predated the Dependency Act. 

Defendants continued to refuse to comply with the trial court=s 

order regarding the production of preenactment treatment 

records. Plaintiff filed another motion to compel. The trial court 

held defendants in contempt, fined them $2,000, and ordered 

them to pay plaintiff=s attorney fees attributable to the discovery 

dispute. 

The appellate court affirmed the trial court=s discovery 

rulings, holding that the nondisclosure privileges found in the 

Confidentiality Act and the Dependency Act do not apply to 

treatment records created prior to the effective dates of the 

Acts. The court rejected defendants= arguments that the plain 

language of the statutes evinced an intent that the statutes 

apply retroactively to preenactment records. Further, applying 

this court=s prospectivity/retroactivity analysis in 

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 

27 (2001), and Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82 (2003), the 

appellate court held that applying the statutes to preenactment 

records would have a retroactive impact. The court also 

affirmed the trial court=s holding that the Confidentiality Act 

does not protect alcohol-abuse treatment records that predate 

the Dependency Act. The appellate court vacated the trial 

court=s order of contempt, finding that defendants= refusal to 

comply with the trial court=s discovery order was a good-faith 

effort to secure an interpretation of an issue without direct 

precedent and defendants= conduct could not be viewed as 

contumacious. 

ANALYSIS 

I. Standard of Review 

A trial court=s discovery order is usually reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 70 (2001). 

However, the issues in this case concern whether Kownacki 

may prevent the disclosure of his mental-health treatment and 

alcohol-abuse treatment records. The applicability of such a 
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right to confidentiality is a question of law that we review de 

novo. See D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill. 2d 551, 559 (1997). 

II. Scope of the Statutes 

In this appeal, defendants argue (1) that the Confidentiality 

Act and the Dependency Act afford Kownacki a privilege of 

nondisclosure of his mental-health treatment and alcoholabuse treatment records, even though the dates of treatment 

predate the effective dates of the statutes; and (2) that the 

Confidentiality Act protects from forced disclosure Kownacki=s 

alcohol-abuse treatment records that were created prior to July 

1, 1988. 

We first note the posture of this case. Defendants have 

been held in contempt for failure to comply with the trial court=s 

discovery order. It is well settled that the correctness of a 

discovery order may be tested through contempt proceedings. 

Accordingly, when an individual appeals contempt sanctions for 

refusing to comply with a discovery order, the discovery order 

itself is subject to review. Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 70. 

The Confidentiality Act became effective on January 9, 

1979. 740 ILCS 110/1 (West 2002). It is a comprehensive 

revision of Illinois law on the subject of the confidentiality of 

psychotherapeutic communications. Laurent v. Brelji, 74 Ill. 

App. 3d 214, 216 (1979). AAll records and communications@ are 

confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in 

the Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/3(a) (West 2002)). 

ARecipient@ is defined as Aa person who is receiving or has 

received mental health or developmental disabilities services.@

740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2002). ATherapist@ means a psychiatrist, 

physician, psychologist, social worker, or nurse or other person 

not prohibited by law from providing such services if the 

recipient reasonably believes that the person is permitted to do 

so. 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2002). The Act affords recipients a 

privilege against the disclosure of their mental-health treatment 

records in civil, criminal, and other proceedings, subject to 

certain exceptions. 740 ILCS 110/10 (West 2002). Exceptions 

to nondisclosure are narrowly crafted and disclosure is 

restricted to that which is necessary to accomplish a particular 
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purpose. Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 71. The Confidentiality Act 

constitutes a Astrong statement about the importance of 

keeping mental health records confidential.@ Mandziara v. 

Canulli, 299 Ill. App. 3d 593, 599 (1998). 

The Dependency Act became effective on July 1, 1988. 20 

ILCS 301/1B1 (West 2002); Pub. Act 85B965, eff. July 1, 1988; 

see Pub. Act 89B374, eff. January 1, 1996 (title amended). The 

provisions of the Dependency Act are to be liberally construed 

to enable the Department of Human Services to carry out the 

objectives and purposes of the Act. 20 ILCS 301/1B5 (West 

2002). The Dependency Act contemplates a broad range of 

treatment services, including Aemergency, outpatient, 

intermediate and residential services and care (including 

assessment, diagnosis, medical, psychiatric, psychological and 

social services, care and counseling, and aftercare).@ 20 ILCS 

301/1B10 (West 2002). 

Defendants first argue that the appellate court ignored the 

plain language of the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency 

Act in making its determination that neither Act applies to 

records and communications that predate their effective dates. 

With regard to the Confidentiality Act, they rely on section 3(a), 

which provides that Aall@ records and communications are 

confidential. Defendants believe that the use of the word Aall@

has a temporal meaning and that it should be construed to 

include every record and communication, regardless of date. 

Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the phrase Aall records 

and communications@ refers to the types of records at issue, 

not the date on which the records and communications were 

created. 

With respect to the Dependency Act, defendants focus on 

the comprehensive nature of the Act, as expressed in section 

30B5(bb): 

ARecords of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis or 

treatment of any patient maintained in connection with 

the performance of any program or activity relating to 

alcohol or other drug abuse or dependency education, 

early intervention, intervention, training, treatment or 

rehabilitation which is regulated, authorized, or directly 

or indirectly assisted by any Department or agency of 
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this State or under any provision of this Act shall be 

confidential and may be disclosed only in accordance 

with the provisions of federal law and regulations 

concerning the confidentiality of alcohol and drug abuse 

patient records as contained in 42 U.S.C. Sections 

290ddB3 and 290eeB3 and 42 C.F.R. Part 2.@ 20 ILCS 

301/30B5(bb) (West 2002). 

Further, defendants note the Dependency Act provides that 

restrictions on disclosure and use of patient information shall 

apply to Arecords concerning any person who has been a 

patient, regardless of whether or when he ceases to be a 

patient.@ (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 301/30B5(bb)(4) (West 

2002). Defendants argue that the emphasized language means 

that the nondisclosure provisions apply to all records of any 

person who has ever received treatment at any time in the 

past. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that, rather than 

referring to preenactment treatment records, this section 

expresses the intention of the legislature to keep 

postenactment records and communications privileged under 

the Dependency Act even after treatment ends. 

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to 

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. 

Andrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 217 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (2005). 

The best indication of that intent is the language of the statute, 

given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. 

Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). Where the language is 

clear and unambiguous, we must apply it without resort to 

other aids of statutory construction. In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d 306, 

313 (2005). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 

that we review de novo. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 

444 (2002). 

As stated, the appellate court, in resolving the question of 

the applicability of the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency 

Act to Kownacki=s treatment records, looked to this court=s 

retroactivity analysis as set forth in Commonwealth Edison Co. 

v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27 (2001), and Caveney v. 

Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82 (2003). 

The appellate court found that the General Assembly 

intended both statutes to apply prospectively only, noting that 
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there was no express command in either statute calling for 

retroactive application. The appellate court also found it 

significant that neither statute was to become effective 

immediately. The court rejected defendants= argument that the 

statutes should be considered procedural in nature, noting that 

neither statute was related exclusively to evidentiary concerns 

and both statutes were comprehensive new enactments which 

should not be given retroactive effect. 

This court has not previously addressed the specific 

question raised in this appeal. Defendants cite cases they 

believe support their position that the Confidentiality Act was 

intended to apply to preenactment treatment records. For 

example, in Maxwell v. Hobart Corp., 216 Ill. App. 3d 108 

(1991), a case dealing with both the Confidentiality Act and the 

Dependency Act, the issue was whether the plaintiff=s 

alcoholism-treatment records were protected from disclosure 

by either statute. In 1986, the plaintiff injured his hand while 

working. A blood-alcohol test indicated that the plaintiff was 

intoxicated at that time. The defendant sought disclosure of the 

plaintiff=s alcohol-abuse treatment records. The appellate court 

determined that the records were not protected by the 

Confidentiality Act, but even if they were, an exception to 

nondisclosure applied because the plaintiff placed his condition 

in issue by filing his lawsuit. As to the Dependency Act, the 

court held that the Agood-cause@ exception to nondisclosure 

applied and the plaintiff=s records were therefore subject to 

disclosure. Maxwell, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 115-16. Maxwell is of 

limited applicability to the question of the coverage of treatment 

records predating either the Confidentiality Act or the 

Dependency Act. No issue was raised in Maxwell as to whether 

either Act applied to records created prior to the effective dates 

thereof and the court did not discuss that question. 

The same is true of other cases cited by defendants. In 

Laurent v. Brelji, 74 Ill. App. 3d 214 (1979), the proceeding at 

issue was commenced in March 1979. The opinion does not 

disclose the dates on which mental-health treatment was 

rendered. No issue as to retroactive application of the 

Confidentiality Act was raised, as the appellate court seemed 

to assume that the Act applied. The court found the records 
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were discoverable under an exception to nondisclosure. 

Laurent, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 219. 

We note that this court did apply the Confidentiality Act in 

Novak v. Rathnam, 106 Ill. 2d 478 (1985), a case also cited by 

defendants. There, the plaintiff sued a psychiatrist and a 

psychologist for the wrongful death of his daughter, who was 

shot and killed by a man who had been treated at a mentalhealth center by the defendants and released. The man 

received treatment in 1978, prior to the effective date of the 

Confidentiality Act. This court ultimately determined that the 

nondisclosure privilege had been waived when the man 

asserted an insanity defense at his earlier criminal trial and 

introduced his mental-health records. Novak, 106 Ill. 2d at 484. 

Because the issue we are faced with here was not raised and 

discussed in Maxwell, Novak, or Laurent, we find these cases 

to be of limited applicability. 

Plaintiff argues that applying the nondisclosure provisions of 

the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency Act to Kownacki=s 

preenactment treatment records would have a retroactive 

impact because it would impose new duties with respect to 

documents and transactions completed years before the 

statutes= enactment. We reject this argument and conclude that 

the applicability of the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency 

Act to Kownacki's treatment records does not hinge upon a 

retroactivity analysis. Disclosure, which is the act regulated by 

both statutes, takes place only in the present or the future. 

Thus, any new duties regarding disclosure or nondisclosure 

would likewise be imposed only in the present or the future, not 

in the past. In other words, applying the nondisclosure 

provisions of the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency Act to 

preenactment treatment records and communications would 

not impair anyone=s rights with respect to past transactions. 

Neither statute impacts any actions that may have taken place 

in the past with regard to Kownacki=s records. For these 

reasons, we conclude that the Confidentiality Act and the 

Dependency Act are applicable to treatment records and 

communications that were created pursuant to treatment given 

prior to the effective dates of those statutes. 

We caution that we are not deciding the issue of whether 

Kownacki is in fact entitled to invoke the rights of confidentiality 
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conferred by the statutes as to the specific mental-health and 

alcohol-abuse treatment records at issue here. We note 

parenthetically that any such rights belong to Kownacki 

personally, not to the Diocese. Whether they apply to the 

particular records in dispute is a matter for the trial court to 

determine, as is the question of whether any statutory 

exceptions may apply. We express no opinion on these 

matters. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the rights to confidentiality 

granted by the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency Act 

may be applied to mental-health records and communications 

and to alcohol-treatment records created prior to the effective 

dates of the statutes. In light of our decision on this issue, we 

need not address defendants= argument that the Confidentiality 

Act protects from disclosure Kownacki=s alcohol-treatment 

records that predate the Dependency Act. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, we conclude that the nondisclosure 

rights created by the Confidentiality Act and the Dependency 

Act apply to records covered by those Acts, regardless of when 

the records were created. We reverse those portions of the 

appellate court=s and the circuit court=s judgments holding 

otherwise. We affirm that portion of the judgment that vacated 

the trial court=s contempt order. The cause is remanded to the 

circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Appellate court judgment affirmed 

in part and reversed in part;

circuit court judgment reversed; 

cause remanded.