PEACEW RKS

Media and Conflict in Myanmar

Theo Dolan

and Stephen Gray

[ [

OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEDIA TO ADVANCE PEACE
Cover photo: AFP

The views expressed in this report are those of 

the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 92. First published 2014.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-208-9

© 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace

About the Report

This report is based on a methodology, created by 

USIP, that can help donors, NGOs, policymakers, and 

local stakeholders in Myanmar determine which media 

initiatives can effectively be used to assist in mitigating 

conflict and building peace. The research offers a 

systematic process for integrating conflict and media 

assessments by considering media and nonmedia factors 

in the design of locally led initiatives to bring about social 

change. The authors would like to thank Than Lwin Htun 

for his key role on the assessment team, Lyndal Barry and 

Alison Campbell for their advice and editorial assistance, 

and more than one hundred interviewees in Myanmar 

for making the recommended media initiatives both 

purposeful and possible.

About the Authors

Theo Dolan is a senior program officer at USIP. He has 

worked with media stakeholders in Iraq, South Sudan, 

Pakistan, and Myanmar to find innovative ways to use 

media in resolving conflict. Stephen Gray is a consultant 

and researcher specializing in international assistance in 

peacemaking and peacebuilding. Previously he worked 

for the New Zealand government and the United 

Nations at home and abroad in Cambodia, Liberia, the 

United States, and South Sudan. He has been working 

on Myanmar since 2009 and based there since 2012. 
Peaceworks • JANUARY 2014 • no. 92

CONTENTS

Introduction ... 5

IONA Methodology ... 6

Conflict Landscape in Myanmar ... 7

State-Society Conflict ... 7

Ethno-Political Conflict ... 9

Intercommunal Violence ... 11

Media Landscape ... 15

Print ... 16

Broadcast ... 16

Internet ... 17

Mobile ... 18

Media Training ... 19

Business Environment ... 20

Regulation ... 21

Ethnic Voices ... 21

Media Interventions ... 23

Media as Tool ... 23

Media as Target ... 28

Conclusion ... 34

[Despite deeply entrenched beliefs regarding ethnicity, many 

interviewees acknowledged the need to bridge the divide 

between Burmese and other ethnic communities through media.]

media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 3

Summary

■ Myanmar’s democratic reform, economic development, and peacemaking progress have 

been rapid since 2010, though significant hurdles threaten to derail the advances. 

■ This study is based on the Intended Outcomes Needs Assessment (IONA) methodology 

and assesses the changing relationships between media and conflict in Myanmar.

■ Findings reveal a deeply rooted, intractable, and dynamic conflict landscape. Analysis 

focuses on three key conflicts: citizen-state, ethnic, and intercommunal.

■ The developing media environment has been a central feature of the transition. The range 

of outlets for information sharing and the diversity and reach of content are expanding 

rapidly.

■ Radio has a significant influence in ethnic and conflict-affected areas. Television does as 

well, especially in urban areas.

■ New media freedoms are supporting peaceful transition but are also causing harm. 

■ Certain initiatives are needed to monitor and counter hate speech online and leverage 

social media and online mechanisms to advance social norms that support peaceful coexistence and tolerance.

■ A Peace Technology Innovation Workshop to shape information and communications 

technology (ICT) initiatives that address issues such as land-grabbing, rumor, and corruption would be productive. 

■ Training for journalists, particularly in conflict-sensitive reporting, is a priority. 

■ Public relations for government officials and ethnic nationality leaders is recommended to 

increase awareness and foster accountability between citizens and state and to raise awareness on ethnic identity and peacemaking issues. 

■ Across all formats, training for ethnic nationality and Bamar journalists is encouraged to 

tackle ethnic identity and language issues in reporting.

■ Additionally, the regulatory environment must be further reformed to support a progressive press law, new legislation for access to information and telecommunications, and 

education among local stakeholders on how to implement such laws. 

■ These initiatives, among others recommended by the study, would support, not replace, 

nonmedia statebuilding efforts.

media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 5

Introduction

Myanmar’s transition has been remarkable in pace and scope. Government and civil society 

actors have taken extraordinary steps to foster democratic change, institutional reform, economic growth, and peaceful transition. The process, however, is far from complete. The 2008 

constitution reserves 25 percent of seats in parliament for the military and blocks those with a 

foreign national in their immediate family from running for president (a clear attempt to bar 

opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from office). Following the 2010 elections, considered 

flawed by many in the international community, a new government was sworn in. Although 

technically civilian, it includes many senior military officers who resigned their military posts 

to take up public office. In addition, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development 

Party (USDP) holds more than half of the seats in parliament. Perhaps not surprisingly, as a 

result of these quotas and dynamics, the reform process was viewed with skepticism when it 

began to emerge in 2010.

Advances in the reform process since 2010, however, have led many to temper their skepticism. Various barometers attest to the astonishing pace and scope of Myanmar’s transition. 

Laws that denied freedoms of speech, association, and movement have been repealed en masse. 

The vast majority of political prisoners have been released and political exiles welcomed home, 

swelling the ranks of an already vibrant civil society. As of August 2013, fourteen cease-fire 

agreements have been signed with armed groups representing non-Bamar nationalities since 

the government launched its peace initiative in 2011. An agreement to halt hostilities in the 

last active civil war between the government and the Kachin Independence Organization and 

Army was achieved in late 2013. This agreement raises the possibility that a nationwide ceasefire might soon be in place for the first time since independence. The international community 

has responded to the country’s efforts by lifting sanctions, reestablishing diplomatic ties, welcoming the country’s leaders to their capitals, wiping out most of the country’s debt and pledging billions in aid, and gearing up for large-scale private investment. Flanked by 40 percent of 

the world’s population and two rising powers in China and India, Myanmar’s political, social, 

and economic transformation is no longer a boutique issue in international politics.

Hosting the 2013 South East Asian games, implementing its 2014 census, and chairing 

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2014 provide politically important milestones 

for Myanmar’s leaders. The eyes of the world will be watching. These will be important benchmarks on the path to the 2015 elections, which will be a critical point in determining how 

genuine and comprehensive the reform process is. If 2015 is the goalpost, then constitutional 

change, free and fair elections, and some form of political guarantee for armed groups for a 

post-2015 political process are the goals. This ideal scenario is possible but far from guaranteed.

Although the transition has been rapid, it has not been smooth on all fronts. The international community has largely applauded Myanmar’s progress, but several ugly episodes of 

communal violence and the continued military offensive in Kachin State have tarnished the 

country’s improving image. Business commentators have talked up the potential of Myanmar 

as the last frontier or the next Asian tiger, but increasing investment flows have been accompanied by reports of land grabbing, corrupt business practices, and public protest. Myanmar’s 

leaders have stayed the course, but the inevitable frictions among leaders vying for top positions in the run-up to 2015 are emerging. International partners have had difficulty calibrating 

engagement. As one interviewee noted, “The international community went from complete 

sanctions to full engagement, both of which are too extreme. You can engage and be critical at 

the same time. There needs to be accountability for the negative and positive changes.”

The international community 

has largely applauded 

Myanmar’s progress, but 

several ugly episodes of 

communal violence and 

the continued military 

offensive in Kachin State 

have tarnished the country’s 

improving image.
PEACEWORKS 92

6 USIP.ORG

One area of positive change is the lifted media restrictions, which has led to an explosion 

in the availability of information across multiple media formats. People have new access to 

information that can, for example, hold wrongdoers accountable, promote transparent governance, and increase understanding and exchange between previously competing ethnic and 

religious groups. This opening should be supported. However, increasing access to information 

also carries conflict risks. Fed for decades on a restricted diet of state-sponsored half-truths, 

the population at large has little media literacy and a tendency to attach as much validity 

to rumor as to reported fact. Most notably in relation to the communal violence between 

Buddhist and Muslim communities across the country that has marred the transition period, media (particularly social media) have been used as vehicles for hate speech and tools to 

mobilize antigroup (particularly anti-Muslim) sentiment and action. Antigroup attitudes, 

suppressed under the military regime, are surfacing in the new climate of openness and, according to some interviewees, are being mobilized by certain elites—particularly those resisting the reform efforts—for political gain.

Media opening in Myanmar creates both benefits and risks. This study recommends initiatives to capitalize on opportunities for media to support peacebuilding and guard against the 

potential for the newly opened media environment to cause harm.

IONA Methodology

Building on the work of the United States Institute of Peace’s (USIP) Center for Media, 

Conflict, and Peacebuilding in multiple conflict-affected countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and Pakistan, this study uses an IONA methodology that blends conflict analysis with an assessment of Myanmar’s rapidly evolving media landscape.1

 The project team comprised senior 

Myanmar media experts, in-country conflict advisers, and key staff from USIP. The project was 

guided by an advisory group of Myanmar media professionals and conflict experts who offered 

their input at two stages in the process. Before the interviews in Myanmar, the advisers helped 

revise the preliminary conflict assessment and afterwards assisted in refining the proposed media interventions. Data collection included extensive desk research; field research included two 

workshops, individual and group interviews, and follow-up meetings with more than one hundred participants. The participants included local peace and conflict experts, legislators, technologists, state and nonstate representatives, creative professionals, non-Bamar ethnic leaders, 

civil society representatives, and media professionals.

The analytical framework can be distinguished from traditional conflict assessments by its 

focus on knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (KAB) change. This framework is designed specifically to examine how access to and consumption of information influences peace and conflict:

■ Knowledge is what people know to be true based on their experience and access to 

information.

■ Attitudes are what a people in the target society believe. These attitudes are formed on the 

basis of what people know and influence why people engage in certain behaviors.

■ Behaviors are what people do. Behavior is knowledge and attitudes made manifest in 

context, though not always deliberately.

The framework relies heavily on substantial local input to characterize the culturally unique 

knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of the target populations. The investigation necessarily conAntigroup attitudes, 

suppressed under the 

military regime, are 

surfacing in the new climate 

of openness.
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 7

siders the diversity in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior among groups within the population, 

realizing that these differences themselves are often associated with conflict behaviors.

The intended outcomes or goals of media initiatives are similarly defined as specific 

knowledge, attitudes, and behavior outcomes that respondents argued will best support conflict 

management and peacebuilding. These outcomes are defined as a desired state with respect to 

the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of target communities in relation to specific conflicts. 

For example, Myanmar’s Bamar ethnic majority is often not aware of or misunderstands the 

aspirations of the country’s non-Bamar ethnic groups, which can drive attitudes and behaviors that sustain conflict or make collaboration for peacebuilding difficult. Thus, an intended 

outcome of media interventions is for Bamar populations to gain widespread awareness of 

non-Bamar ethnic history, language, and culture and perceive these communities’ aspirations 

as legitimate.

Of course, media initiatives are far from the only activities that support positive knowledge, attitude, and behavior change in societies. Much work is being done in education, for 

example, to promote understanding of other ethnic groups, tolerance, and respect for diversity. 

Various local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been working 

for decades in areas such as human rights documentation, advocacy, and capacity-building 

initiatives to increase awareness and foster attitudinal change on peace-related issues. The proposed initiatives in this report are intended to complement these activities, taking advantage 

of new media freedoms within the country. In a similar vein, media initiatives are intended 

to support rather than replace structural changes necessary for a peaceful transition. Media 

initiatives can promote transparency and accountability of government, for example, but must 

be accompanied by comprehensive structural reforms, more effective service provisioning, and 

relationship-building between citizens and the state that combined will create the foundation 

for sustainable peace.

This study considers three primary conflicts—or sets of issues that generate violent conflict—in Myanmar and details the knowledge, attitudinal, and behavioral elements that compose them. These three conflicts are characterized for the purpose of this report as state-society, 

ethno-political, and intercommunal. The proposed media initiatives detailed later are designed 

to transform peoples’ knowledge, attitudes, and behavior in order to build peace.

Conflict Landscape in Myanmar

State-Society Conflict

Conflict between the regime and the people came to symbolize Myanmar’s struggle, particularly for international audiences. Arising out of decades of authoritarian rule, Myanmar is 

marked by low levels of trust and moments of open and violent conflict between the government and its people. Many civilians have sought more equal distribution of power, which those 

in power have sometimes feared would bring disunity or disintegration of the Union. This 

counterpoint has led to several cycles of civilian protest and violent backlash since independence. Perhaps the most notorious was the pro-democracy uprising of 1988 and the military 

regime’s violent crackdown, which brought the state to the brink of collapse and forced much 

of Myanmar’s civil society and democratic opposition underground. In 2007, this conflict was 

again made visible when Buddhist monks and nuns led a movement known as the Saffron 

Revolution, demanding economic and political changes from the government. In these various 

moments of citizen mobilization, the demands have been for democracy, fairer distribution of 

resources and services, economic opportunity, accountability under the law, and freedom to exMyanmar’s Bamar ethnic 

majority is often not aware 

of or misunderstands the 

aspirations of the country’s 

non-Bamar ethnic groups, 

which can drive attitudes 

and behaviors that sustain 

conflict.
PEACEWORKS 92

8 USIP.ORG

press their identities. The post-2008 reform processes are making impressive progress on these 

fronts, but there remains much to do.

In the transition period, citizen protest has manifested in demonstrations for peace in 

Kachin State in September 2012; reactions to unpopular development projects, such as the 

Myitsone Dam; and demonstrations at the Leptadaung copper mine in 2013 (which sparked 

an aggressive response from police). Although the security forces are working hard to professionalize and recalibrate their responses to meet the requirements of a modern, civilian 

police service, the potential for public discontent to turn violent remains high.

In many cases, Myanmar’s citizens still lack any institutionalized means of holding political or business leaders accountable. Although the legislature has made impressive progress in 

the transition period,2

 the judiciary is not entirely independent, and the capacity of the legal 

system is limited. As a result, many people do not have reliable access to justice, and the value 

of any new legislation remains limited by the capacity of the institutions required to implement 

and uphold it. Corruption in government, military, and business activities remains problematic, 

although the new press freedoms are already appearing to limit some corrupt behavior. The 

promise of the governance and institution-building work conducted thus far by the government of Myanmar is laudable, but it will be some time before Myanmar’s citizens trust institutions and believe they can rely on them for justice, accountability, or a fair deal.

The Myanmar Police Force and the military (Tatmadaw) are tasked with ensuring national 

security and unity but are also not trusted by sections of the population. For citizens living in 

non-Bamar ethnic or conflict-affected areas, as well as for those who have experienced crackdowns firsthand, the Tatmadaw is associated with repression and abuses. At times, nonstate 

armed groups (NSAGs) have also preyed on the communities they claim to protect, extracting 

taxes and punishing those deemed disloyal to their causes. Rather than feeling safe in the presence of security forces and NSAGs, many still fear them. Several interviewees suggested that 

fear also exists among those who control Myanmar’s security forces, in terms of the potential 

loss of power, resources, sovereignty, and national unity.

Interviewees in urban areas expressed renewed confidence in democratic institutions and 

rule of law to protect them, though this perspective was usually not shared by rural and nonBamar participants. Many citizens remain unconvinced that the peace process or the ballot box 

will deliver on their aspirations. Exacerbating this outlook is that few mechanisms for meaningful engagement between civil society and government have developed since 2010. Because 

of the lack of means to relay concerns and engage with government authorities to help resolve 

community needs, citizens resort to agitator activities—including mass protests—against the 

government.

Referring back to the KAB framework that formed the methodological basis of this study, 

it is encouraging that Myanmar’s leaders have already taken important steps to transform what 

people know, the attitudes they hold, and the way they behave in relation to state-society conflict. Indeed, the resolution of state-society tensions in Myanmar is perhaps the most advanced 

among the three conflicts explored. Flaws in governance are understood by leaders, the democratization and governance reform process is advancing, and nascent efforts to improve rule of 

law are under way. New freedoms are already enabling the media to play its part in holding the 

government and security forces accountable. As one media group owner noted, “We all feel 

that we have a responsibility to the society to be the fourth estate.” Unpopular development 

projects and policies, such as the Printers and Publishers Regulation Bill or the flawed Vacant 

Land and Fallow Land Act, have been widely criticized. Human rights abuses by state security 

Corruption in government, 

military, and business 

activities remains 

problematic, although the 

new press freedoms are 

already appearing to limit 

some corrupt behavior.
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 9

forces have been publicized, as have controversial reports such as the land commission’s findings that primarily blame the military for historical cases of land-grabbing.

The media initiatives set forth in relation to state-society conflict should thus be seen 

as bolstering these efforts. The proposed media initiatives intend to promote transparency, 

accountability, and equitable resource sharing in business and politics and build trust and confidence in (and the use of) the political process as a means of sharing power and resources and 

advancing mutual interests. As one local NGO director put it, “Political elites don’t always 

represent their constituents. Media links two sides. Media makes the process transparent.” 

Outcomes are detailed further in the media initiatives section in relation to specific activities. 

The knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors associated with state-society conflict are summarized 

in table 1, along with the intended outcomes that the proposed media initiatives will target.

Ethno-Political Conflict

Identity differences mark Myanmar’s ethno-political conflicts. The country officially recognizes 135 ethnic groups in eight major clusters, each with distinct languages and cultures and 

a history of governing separately administered kingdoms before colonization. Under the 1947 

Panglong Agreement, several (but not all) of Myanmar’s ethnic nationalities were guaranteed 

protections of rights, equality, and some degree of financial and administrative autonomy. From 

Table 1. State-Society Conflict: Problems and Outcomes

Existing Problem Desired Outcome

Knowledge Elite awareness that democracy has been destabilizing in 

the past 

Elite perception that empowering citizens may threaten 

elite interests

Elite understanding that their interests are not necessarily 

threatened by democracy, power sharing, and 

transparent practices

Public awareness that previous state, military, and 

business abuses have not been held accountable

Public confidence that there will be justice for past 

abuses 

Elite stance that civil and human rights norms do not 

need to be respected

Elite knowledge that they are more accountable to 

human rights norms

Attitude Military and state belief that power and resource sharing 

threatens national stability

Belief in divide and rule policy (for democratic and ethnic 

opposition)

Leader confidence in inclusive governance

Lack of public confidence in state institutions

State and business belief that they will not be held 

accountable for wrongdoing 

Citizen trust in state and business structures

Behavior Conflict over usurped natural resources, particularly in 

non-Bamar ethnic areas

Equitable natural resources development in 

non-Bamar ethnic areas

State limitations on civil rights and political space for civil 

society

Cycles of citizen protest and violent government 

response

Violent insurgency to achieve political goals

Human and political rights through political process and 

state institutions

Human rights abuses against citizens by state and military

Corruption by central and local state institutions, 

businesses, and the military

Perpetrators of corruption or rights abuses held 

accountable by state institutions or nonstate processes
PEACEWORKS 92

10 USIP.ORG

the perspective of ethnic nationalities interviewed for this study, these guarantees were never 

fulfilled, invoking a series of armed independence movements that are some of the longest running insurgencies in modern history. Wary of disintegration of the Union, Myanmar’s leadership has at times sought to galvanize national solidarity by a policy of Burmanization, whereby 

Bamar language and culture and Buddhist religion have been promoted to the exclusion of 

other ethnic identities. For ethnic nationality interviewees, this policy has been part of a Bamar 

tendency toward paternalism over the country’s ethnic nationalities. For their part, non-Bamar 

ethnic groups and their associated armed groups have found unity in ethno-nationalist identities with distinct languages, cultures, and versions of history. Both sets of identities are highly 

militarized. Ethnic nationalities reject the notion of a Bamar-Buddhist national identity and 

have a tendency to see the peace overtures of the present government as a continuation of the 

Bamar imperialism of the past. A remark from a member of a nonstate armed group was typical of this sentiment: “Bamar people don’t try to understand ethnic people. They know there are 

ethnic people and they don’t want separation, but they don’t want solutions.”

Political exclusion is a second pillar of ethno-political conflict, according to interviewees. 

Although some ethnic political parties have been established and hold seats in parliament, 

many ethnic representatives (including members of NSAGs) have been unable to represent 

their communities in politics. Ethnic nationalities have long desired a political dialogue process in which their historical grievances can be aired and root causes of conflict with the state 

resolved. The cease-fires of the 1990s ended violence in parts of the country but did not create 

peace precisely because the political dialogue in relation to fundamental autonomy and identity 

issues never materialized. The same risk is true of the current cease-fire process initiated by the 

Thein Sein government in 2011. Without a political process to address root causes, cease-fires 

will address symptoms but never the causes of ethno-political conflict. Signs in late 2013 that 

a roadmap for political dialogue might soon be agreed on as part of a nationwide cease-fire 

agreement are encouraging.

Control of resources is a third pillar and increasingly significant. One interviewee described 

this problem as the “orientation of access to resources around ethnic identity.” The parts of the 

country populated by Myanmar’s non-Bamar ethnic groups are rich in natural resources but 

relatively poor in terms of average income and quality of life. This reality is a source of grievance 

for the non-Bamar ethnic representatives interviewed. For some NSAGs natural resources 

have historically also provided a source of income to maintain the insurgency against the military government. Some groups, particularly in Shan State, have weak political objectives at best 

and can be more accurately described as armed criminal networks that profit from legal or 

illegal trade. In the current cease-fire process, as in the 1990s, natural resources are fueling conflict by opening opportunity for military and business investors to profit from land and natural 

resource projects, causing land grabbing, displacement, environmental degradation, and erosion of confidence in the peace process. Development projects such as Shwe gas pipeline and 

the Myitsone Dam have become rallying points for affected communities. Resource sharing 

and land reform will be another important element of safeguarding Myanmar’s peace process.

According to interviewees, peoples’ knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors in relation to 

ethno-political conflict are an outcome of lived experience and government control of the 

information system. Promotion of Bamar majority, language and culture was formerly a state 

policy, as reflected in the education system and state institutions, including the state-run 

media. On the other hand, and according to some participants, the military government was 

conditioned to fear and protect against ethnic secession from the Union. In the words of a local 

Ethnic nationalities have 

long desired a political 

dialogue process in which 

their historical grievances 

can be aired and root causes 

of conflict with the state 

resolved.
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 11

NGO worker, “Burmans got brainwashed that federalism equals disunity [and that] we should 

crush Kachins as a result.” According to interviewees, widespread misunderstanding remains 

among the Bamar majority regarding the aspirations of non-Bamar groups. One interviewee 

joked, “On the day the media can spell my name correctly, that’s when we have ethnic equality.” Non-Bamar ethnic groups, on the other hand, especially in rebel-held areas, often harbor 

negative stereotypes of Bamar people and may not distinguish between the people who have 

occupied their lands militarily (who may or may not be Bamar), those who govern the country, 

and the Bamar ethnic group as a whole. One interviewee mentioned that the only Bamar he 

had ever met were carrying guns. In short, negative stereotypes abound on both sides and are 

often reinforced by media.

After decades of fighting and broken promises, mistrust is high, especially from ethnic nationalities toward the government and, in some instances, the Bamar majority. Human rights 

abuses, displacement, and trauma associated with long cycles of war have deepened the sense of 

injustice felt by some non-Bamar communities. Confidence in the cease-fire process has been 

further weakened by ongoing clashes in parts of the country technically under cease-fire, particularly in Kachin and northern Shan states. Meanwhile, Tatmadaw units have yet to withdraw 

from outlying states and in some cases have increased their presence during the cease-fire process. Many interviewees on all sides of the ethnic divide suggested that the government is saying one thing about the reforms and the military is doing another. The political process has not 

delivered a viable solution to this problem in six decades, so despite the strong desire for peace 

on both sides, violence remains for some a more viable means of fulfilling aspirations. “We have 

a culture of arms,” said one government interviewee. “It’s easier because you can put all of your 

feelings and emotions into violence, but politics is much more difficult.” It will be a long time 

before Myanmar’s ethnic communities on all sides have the trust and confidence to truly reconcile and address past injustices and resolve the fundamental causes of ethno-political conflict.

Cease-fires are only the first step in an extended process to resolve the country’s ethnopolitical disputes. To achieve peace, the country will have to go even further. Comprehensive 

political agreements will need to be reached that fundamentally alter the country’s political and 

governance structures and redistribute political and economic power more equitably among 

ethno-political groups. In addition to structural alterations, deep-rooted attitudinal changes 

will be needed. Comprehensive transformation will take generations, not years.

The proposed media initiatives seek to raise awareness and change attitudes in support of 

peacebuilding and reconciliation between ethnic groups by promoting better understanding 

of the language, history, and aspirations of other ethnic groups; a national identity based on 

unity in diversity rather than unity via assimilation; and trust in the political process to deliver 

the rights, resources, and political aspirations of all people. As one youth activist said, “We can 

promote our unique cultures, but we live in the same house.” The knowledge, attitudes, and 

behaviors associated with ethno-political conflict are summarized in table 2 along with the 

intended outcomes that the proposed media initiatives will target. Outcomes are discussed 

further in the media initiatives section.

Intercommunal Violence

The opening of the information space has had important implications for conflict, notably in 

the contribution of information as a driver of communal violence in 2012 and 2013 that broke 

out between Buddhist and Muslim groups across the country, particularly affecting Muslim 

communities who were the overwhelming victims. This phenomenon is not new—tensions be-
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12 USIP.ORG

Table 2. Ethno-Political Conflict: Problems and Outcomes

Existing Problem Desired Outcome

Knowledge Non-Bamar ethnic cultures, histories, and grievances 

misunderstood

Contrasting understandings of history between ethnic 

groups (particularly as related to conflict)

Genuine understanding of other ethnic cultures, 

histories, and grievances

Better appreciation of the unique histories of different 

ethnic groups

Non-Bamar collective memory of abuse and broken 

promises

Non-Bamar trust in both government and Bamar majority 

and awareness that means to rectify injustices are 

available

Attitude Bamar paternalism

Bamar and military belief in unity via assimilation

Conflicting aspirations (national unity versus ethnic 

autonomy)

Bamar respect for other ethnic groups’ right to 

self-determination

Other groups seen as equal partners in Myanmar 

transition

Myanmar belief in unity in diversity

Unified vision for Myanmar’s future based on federalism 

and both resource and power sharing

Bamar negative stereotypes of other ethnic groups

Non-Bamar ethnic group negative Bamar stereotypes

Positive stereotypes of all ethnic groups

Non-Bamar victim mentality

Mistrust

Non-Bamar trust in government and Bamar majority and 

means to rectify injustices

Culture of violence Trust in political process

Behavior State discrimination against non-Bamar ethnicities Discrimination not tolerated

Violent suppression of non-Bamar ethnicities

Ethnic-based separatist insurgency

Peaceful political participation to achieve goals

tween Buddhist and Muslim communities have surfaced before—but its modern incarnation 

appears more virulent. Before the current transition process, reporting on communal violence 

occurred only through the state media, which did not allow the same scope and spread of information as the current online and legacy media space. Beginning in Rakhine State in July 2012, 

after a picture of a Buddhist woman who had allegedly been raped was circulated by local media, incidents of physical violence between Buddhist and Muslim communities have occurred 

in Okkan, Meiktila, Lashio, Thaton, and elsewhere.3 Hundreds have been killed and more 

than 150,000 displaced in this violence.4

International commentary often presents the violence as the result of interreligious tensions between an aggressive Buddhist majority and a persecuted Muslim minority. Religion 

is a convenient oversimplification to discuss the conflict but tends to obscure the separate and 

interconnected social, economic, and political causes—each with discernible knowledge, attitudinal, and behavioral elements.

According to multiple expert interviewees, an important root cause of the conflict is the 

perceived threat to Buddhist identity and power posed by the gradual permeation of Muslim 

people, culture, and religious practices in both Myanmar and Asia as a whole. The Buddhist 

faith has historically been a central pillar of nationalist policy. According to Buddhist and 

Muslim interviewees, modern-day Buddhists sometimes perceive Islamic values as antithetical 

to their own and fear that the proliferation of this identity will distort the culture and values of 

Myanmar society. In the words of one interviewee, “Buddhism needs protection from outside 

influence. Other countries are losing Buddhist influence, and we don’t want that here.”
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 13

One strand of the perceived threat relates to concerns about population takeover. The 

belief that Buddhist women who marry Muslim men will be unwittingly converted to Islam is 

widespread. This feeling is fed in part by Islamic disapproval of interfaith marriages and practices that deny non-Muslim wives the right to marital property in the event of death or divorce. 

Concerns over this issue led to a call in mid-2013 for a law to prevent Buddhist women from 

marrying Muslim men. Combined with the perception (real or otherwise) that Muslim families have more children (in Rakhine State at least), there is a fear that followers of the Islamic 

faith will come to outnumber Buddhists. This fear is also evident in official recommendations 

made in April 2013 in response to the Rakhine conflict that called for “reproductive education,” which in the Myanmar context is a euphemism for limitation of Muslim population 

growth.

Culturally and religiously, Myanmar’s citizens often perceive Muslims as less willing to 

integrate into Myanmar society than previously. According to interviewees, citizens sense an 

increase in symbols of Islam, such as mosques, women in hijabs and burqas, and men with 

kurtis (long shirts), beards, and prayer caps. The fear of Islamification is not helped by the fact 

that Islamic communities, including mosques and madrasas, remain relatively closed to outsiders, rousing suspicion about the attitudes and practices of Muslim communities. “The Muslim 

population has been isolated within Yangon for so long, so we need to get them involved, to 

practice citizenship and take part,” one youth activist said.

Fear of Islamification in Myanmar also manifests in economic competition. Since colonial 

times, South Asian migrants, sometimes Muslim and sometimes not, have grown in influence 

in Myanmar’s merchant economy. In modern times, Islamic mercantilism is often numerically symbolized in signs displaying 786, which refers to halal produce in accordance with the 

Quran. Numerology being influential in Myanmar Buddhist consciousness, many Buddhists 

are quick to assume that 786 has hidden meanings. They have also come to believe that it is 

a marker that leads Muslims to buy exclusively from Islamic businesses. The reaction to this 

phenomenon is evident in the 969 movement, which invokes the Buddhist principles (the 

three precious gems) of the Buddha, the Dhamma (teachings), and the Sangha (monkhood) 

and calls on the faithful to boycott Muslim businesses in favor of “buying Buddhist.” The 

economic dimension of these anti-Islamic attitudes have manifested in the looting of Islamic 

businesses during communal violence.

Polarized reporting by domestic and international media has often reinforced the divisions between these communities. According to interviewed experts, domestic journalists and 

opinion leaders are more likely to report negatively on Muslims than on Buddhists. Western 

journalists, on the other hand, have tended to report Buddhist-Muslim violence through a normative, rights-based framework that victimizes Muslims and blames Buddhists. This reporting 

circulates back into Myanmar, reinforcing anxiety about threats to Buddhist identity that gave 

rise to the conflict in the first place. One expert commentator argued that for Buddhists, this 

anxiety leads to calls to “defend the Sasana,” invoking a deeply rooted duty to protect the Buddhist tradition, considered the moral spine of Myanmar nationhood. This dynamic was evident 

for example in Time magazine’s reporting on Buddhist nationalist monk U Wirathu as “the 

face of Buddhist terror”—perceived as highly disrespectful and inflammatory for Myanmar 

Buddhists. Censorship of this publication may have stifled debate on a highly important topic, 

but it was done so by authorities to prevent violence.

International Islamic commentary has had a similar effect on root causes. Here communal 

violence is framed as part of an international tendency to persecute Muslims as part of the 

global war on terror. These accounts link to powerful global advocacy networks, Islamic institu-
PEACEWORKS 92

14 USIP.ORG

tions, and financiers that have taken interest in the cause, conducting visits, establishing offices 

and programs, and offering political and financial support to Myanmar’s embattled Muslim 

communities. Similarly, the perceived persecution and abject situation of Rohingya Muslims in 

Rakhine State has for some time pulled disproportionate international support in their direction, 

fueling Buddhist Rakhine grievance and threat perception. These responses to the BuddhistMuslim conflict, though justifiable, add to Buddhist fears of Islamification and so-called jihadist agendas. In this way, what started as a largely ungrounded fear has the potential to become 

a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby the defensive actions of Buddhist nationalists against perceived Islamification generates the threats that motivated their actions in the first place.

The knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors associated with communal violence are summarized in table 3, as are the intended outcomes that the proposed media initiatives will target. 

Myanmar’s Buddhists are aware that other countries in the region, most notably Indonesia 

and Malaysia, have transitioned from majority Buddhist or Hindu to majority Muslim in the 

last century. The war on terror or clash of civilizations narrative has permeated the community, 

arousing fears of terrorism and the spread of values inconsistent with Buddhism. Islamic beliefs 

can encourage behaviors that close off Muslim communities from other citizens, sometimes 

inviting suspicion. Experience of scripture has taught both Buddhists and Muslims to defend 

the faith as a religious imperative. Furthermore, many citizens have long been conditioned to 

associate Buddhism with national solidarity and fear of disintegration. Negative stereotypes 

about Muslims are prevalent, and there is a high degree of misunderstanding of Islamic values 

and practices. Buddhist sermons, which are distributed en masse, feed attitudes about other 

groups, even if the recordings have been distorted postproduction to confer Buddhist nationalist or anti-Islamic sentiment. It is widely seen as blasphemous to criticize publically these 

sermons or the monks who offer them.

Table 3. Intercommunal Violence: Problems and Outcomes

Existing Problem Desired Outcome

Knowledge Conflation of economic, population, and religious 

conflict drivers (religionification of the conflict)

Better understanding of each other’s religions and 

appreciation of peaceful elements

Improved understanding of different conflict drivers

False information about Islamic values, traditions, history, 

culture, and intentions

Credibility of information sources valued

Global war on terror narrative permeated into public 

consciousness

Belief that jihadists operate in Myanmar exposed as false

False belief that received information is credible Awareness that some information cannot be trusted

Attitude Buddhist belief in anti-Islamic stereotypes Greater mutual Buddhist and Muslim tolerance 

Belief in superiority and centrality of Buddhism in 

Myanmar identity

Broad acceptance of Myanmar as a multifaith country

Fear of Islamification

Culture of violence Greater mutual Buddhist and Muslim tolerance 

Behavior Buddhist boycotting of Muslim businesses Boycotting ceases

Viral spreading of anti-Islamic information Hate speech monitored, not tolerated, and shut down

Attacking and looting of Muslim businesses, places of 

worship, people, and Muslim retaliatory attacks

Stronger police enforcement

Buddhist nationalist sermonizing and rumormongering Stronger monitoring

The war on terror or clash 

of civilizations narrative has 

permeated the community, 

arousing fears of terrorism 

and the spread of values 

inconsistent with Buddhism.
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 15

Myanmar faces significant challenges in responding to intercommunal violence. Unlike 

governance reform and the peace processes, no large-scale mechanism or widespread popular 

or political support addresses the root causes of this conflict. Politicians, clergy, opinion leaders, and international actors alike risk losing credibility and support by going against the tide 

of public opinion, creating an environment in which radical rather than moderate voices can 

flourish. The media initiatives recommended by this study thus urgently seek to raise awareness and shift attitudes while guarding against the potential for media to fan violence in the 

short to medium term. Such initiatives aim to generate better interreligious understanding 

in Myanmar, promote tolerant and nondiscriminatory interreligious attitudes and practices, 

counter misinformed or anti-Islamic messaging, enable hate speech to be monitored and shut 

down, promote media literacy, and support the vision of Myanmar as a diverse, multifaith 

country. International support should be low key because overtly international efforts are likely 

to lack credibility and risk tarnishing the reputation (and effectiveness) of local actors. In the 

short term, initiatives should support the creation of an environment in which more moderate voices have the confidence (and cover) to speak out. Outcomes are detailed further in the 

media initiatives section.

Media Landscape

How can media be harnessed to bring about desired outcomes related to the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of citizens in Myanmar? Proposed media initiatives are intended to be 

both purposeful and possible. ‘Purposeful’ means that the initiatives address specific problems 

that people in Myanmar have prioritized and seek to change. ‘Possible’ indicates that interviewees believe that media can be an effective tool for resolving problems and achieving societal change. Recognizing that media initiatives alone cannot address all of the broad outcomes 

outlined in the previous section on conflict, only transformations specifically related to media 

activities are examined here.

Understanding the current media landscape in Myanmar is critical in determining how 

realistic a media intervention might be. We therefore first describe, by no means completely, 

the capacity and potential of the media sector in Myanmar. Although the media landscape 

continues to shift according to the pace of transition, this information is intended to provide a 

contextual lens through which the proposed media interventions are viewed.

The recommended media initiatives, initially developed at the end of the interview process with a panel of local advisers, are divided into two types. In some, media are the tools of 

the intervention, whereas in others they are the target. More specifically, when outcomes are 

achieved using existing media capacity, media is the tool, and when outcomes require transforming the media or media environment, media is the target.

Additional factors about the proposed media initiatives need to be considered:

■ Initiatives are designed to be carried out by local stakeholders, often but not always in 

collaboration with international actors.

■ Initiatives are national in scope but can be customized for local needs with input from local 

communities and implemented by local media.

■ Depending on the capacity of the media, proposed initiatives will be conducted according 

to varying time frames, and the effects of social change may also be apparent on different 

timelines.
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Print

The real turning point for media in Myanmar arrived in June 2011, when the government of 

Thein Sein announced the gradual withdrawal of prepress censorship. Although this withdrawal began with entertainment media, the process came full circle in August 2012, when 

censorship of all news media officially ended.5 This step forward needs to be qualified, however. 

Even as journalists were allowed to write about Aung San Suu Kyi, to avoid potential repercussions, they continued to practice self-censorship when it came to political news. Additionally, 

a de facto post-press censorship still exists in that the Ministry of Information (MoI) continues to control registration and therefore can levy penalties or revoke registration in response 

to printed material it might take issue with. In another promising step, daily publications 

were approved, and four gained initial licenses to begin operations on April 1, 2013. A total of 

sixteen were expected to enter the market, and many weekly journals are planning to transition to the daily format.

Currently, Myanmar features a vibrant print media landscape with more than three hundred newspapers; roughly one-third of these newspapers are based in Yangon.6

 The literacy 

rate in Myanmar, though subject to debate, is estimated to be as high as 89.9 percent.7

 It is unquestionably lower in rural areas. Nevertheless, levels of readership across the country are high, 

and rent-a-book shops are popular fixtures in many areas. At such venues, several newspapers 

are combined into one take-home volume. Many local communities have their own tea shop 

culture that includes sharing newspapers and discussing the news of the day.

One general problem is the lack of local-language print media that truly represent the 

communities. In fact, community media are scant, though this is beginning to change.

The availability of print media is widespread for monthlies and weeklies but will be more 

difficult for dailies as they begin to enter the market. The infrastructure simply does not support easy transport of papers, and only a few newspapers have their own printing facilities. 

As a result, the largest printing houses have significant influence.

Overall, trust in the government-run newspapers is scant, especially after decades of topdown control of the entire media environment. In comparison, some trust lies with the private 

media, but according to interviewees, the level depends largely on who is running the particular 

outlet. Most weeklies run the same content, so readers are especially appreciative of special 

reports—these distinguish one weekly from the next. There is a certain level of distrust in international media coverage of ethnic and religious issues. Some Bamar think that such coverage 

unfairly weights the concerns of non-Bamar ethnicities and also demonstrates a superficial 

level of knowledge about conflict issues in Myanmar.

Broadcast

Before 2011, broadcast media were completely controlled by the state, and the transition 

since 2011 has brought far less freedom to it than to the print sector. Whereas five dailies 

continue to be operated by the state—either the MoI or the military—two state television channels—MRTV (Myanmar Radio and Television) and Myawaddy—remain under 

government control. Meanwhile, several new privately owned FM channels and a handful of private television stations have emerged, but most are owned by government-aligned 

cronies.8

 The founding of other broadcast outlets has likely been hampered by high start-up 

costs, particularly relative to print media.

Outside city centers, radio is still the media of choice, especially for listening to international broadcasters, such as Voice of America (VOA) and BBC. However, according to a radio 

Myanmar features a vibrant 

print media landscape with 

more than three hundred 

newspapers; roughly onethird of these newspapers 

are based in Yangon.
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 17

coverage map,9

 radio coverage by the nine main FM stations is concentrated in the central 

(and most populated) areas. Media consumers in cities and towns in ethnic areas also have 

radio coverage, such as Pyinsawaddy in Sittwe, but far less choice.10

According to interviewees, the new FM stations are mandated to carry centralized Burmese news. They are oriented toward entertainment programming and do not carry nonstate 

news. As with the print media, ethnic radios are still heavily influenced by ethnic military 

groups, and almost no community radio stations truly represent the interests of their communities. In Karen State, for example, no local media were allowed until very recently.11

International broadcasters have ethnic language radio programming, but it is somewhat 

limited. VOA features a weekly program called “News from Ethnic Frontiers.” Although it 

is in the Burmese language, the program presents stories on ethnic issues by ethnic reporters. 

Radio Free Asia (RFA) does produce weekly television and radio programs in seven ethnic 

languages—about ten minutes for each language. Of the Burmese stations, only the state-run 

radio channel—MRTV, the ethnic language service—broadcasts in ethnic languages.

Meanwhile, television is beginning to outpace radio in terms of appealing to urban audiences.12 According to Gallup data, almost half of Burmese tune in to television news at least 

weekly (44.7 percent). Television viewership is far more common in urban areas (41.6 percent 

watching news daily and 67.8 percent at least weekly). The vast majority of urban households 

(84 percent) have a working television set. Yet only 10 percent of Burmese television owners 

indicate their sets receive satellite signals.

By virtue of the concentration of television in urban areas, generally the more affluent 

members of society are television watchers. Due to the lack of local broadcasting in ethnic 

languages, television viewers are also largely Burmese speakers. However, state-run Myanmar 

International TV does air in English, and Myanmar National TV also offers some English 

programming. MRTV recently announced plans to launch an ethnic language channel that 

would include programs in eight ethnic languages. International broadcasters offer ethniclanguage programming (such as the programming by RFA) in addition to Burmese-language 

news and information, but ethnic-language television content is extremely limited overall.

Although state channels such as MRTV are still operated by the MoI, the ministry announced plans to transition it to a public broadcasting service. Additionally, since 2011, a new 

trend has begun in which channels have been forming joint ventures. For example, two channels, MRTV-4 and Channel 7, are nominally public-private partnerships between the MoI 

and the Forever Group. Meanwhile, according to interviewees, SkyNet is a privately run channel operated by a wealthy businessman aligned with the government. Television content is 

heavily balanced toward entertainment, and any television news programming largely toes the 

government line.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that according to Gallup research, few viewers trust any 

television channel “a great deal,” though a high percentage of viewers trust “somewhat.” The 

international broadcasters have marginally higher trust levels than state television does. These 

data stand somewhat in contrast to the perceptions of many interviewees, including one highly 

popular entertainer who simply said, “There is no news that ordinary Burmese can trust.”

Internet

Mainly well-off, urban people have Internet access, although with the awarding of mobile 

licenses to international companies Telenor and Ooredoo, the cost of mobile use will drop, allowing more people to purchase Internet-enabled phones. According to Gallup data, only 1.4 

Ethnic radios are still heavily 

influenced by ethnic military 

groups, and almost no 

community radio stations 

truly represent the interests 

of their communities.
PEACEWORKS 92

18 USIP.ORG

percent of the people of Myanmar have used the Internet in the last week.13 This number rises 

to just 4.1 percent for citizens in urban areas.14

Internet access is largely available in urban areas and much less available in rural (and 

ethnic) areas. However, overall penetration rates could be misleading based on the availability of Internet in urban cafes that enable multiple users at one access point. Also, people are 

increasingly able to access Internet on mobile devices. Despite the virtual lack of Web-based 

infrastructure for mobile phones, mobile access might even be faster than computer-based 

Internet (according to Gallup).

Internet costs $300 or more for installation, and subscription rates vary based on download 

and connection speed ($75 to $100 per month). Cost for mobile Internet access is estimated 

at 15 to 30 cents per minute.

Internet is the primary medium for ethnic communities based outside the country, with 

formerly exile outlets, such as Mizzima, Irrawady, and Democratic Voice of Burma, providing 

much of the online news content.

Despite the low Internet penetration rates and relative dearth of users, social media such as 

Facebook have become extremely popular. It is estimated that there are roughly eight hundred 

thousand Facebook accounts in Myanmar,15 though half of them could be using fake identities.16 Interviewees point to many positive instances in which social media have been used to 

rally for peacebuilding and other social causes,17 but social media have also exacerbated ethnic 

and religious tensions and helped spread misinformation and rumor. Hate speech has proliferated online, including reinforcing negative stereotypes about both Muslims and Buddhists. 

Much of the inflammatory content has been directed at the Muslim population in Rakhine 

State in particular, which has sparked violence and reprisal attacks. One interviewee, himself 

a Buddhist monk in Yangon, indicated that he was so well connected by social media that 

he saw no reason to verify the information he was receiving and disseminating in support of 

Rakhine Buddhists. One media executive stated simply that “social media is not accountable.” 

In fact, the ability of activists in Myanmar to act instantaneously on the Internet has trumped 

discussion of controversial issues in the mainstream media, a potentially dangerous trend that 

has many worried about how to rein in inflammatory online content yet maintain some level 

of free expression.

Mobile

According to 2011 data, 1.244 million people in Myanmar have mobile phones.18 According 

to Gallup, 16.6 percent of Burmese have a working mobile phone in the household. Mobile 

phone ownership has risen sharply in urban areas, from 13 percent in 2010–11 to 35.2 percent 

in 2012. In Yangon and Mandalay, almost half of the residents (45.7 percent) have mobiles. 

Short message service (SMS) usage is quite low, however: Only 4.3 percent of urban mobile 

users text at least once per week.

This overall use of mobiles is expected to surge when new licenses are issued to international mobile companies. At the end of June 2013, Norway’s Telenor and Qatar’s Ooredoo won a highly competitive tender process from among eleven other short-listed carriers. 

However, the awarding of the licenses will be delayed until the parliament has passed a new 

telecommunications law that governs the industry. Once the licenses are issued and network 

build-out can begin, service will expand rapidly. The government goal is 80 percent coverage 

by 2016. Other factors are contributing to attaining this ambitious target. First, mobile devices 

are available everywhere, especially cheap Chinese models, and most are Internet enabled.19

One interviewee, himself a 

Buddhist monk in Yangon, 

indicated that he was so 

well connected by social 

media that he saw no reason 

to verify the information 

he was receiving and 

disseminating in support of 

Rakhine Buddhists.
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 19

Also, the basic costs for mobile SIM cards could drop from roughly $2,000 several years ago 

to well below April 2013 rates of $200 to $250 per card. These costs are still fairly prohibitive, 

and Gallup data indicate that the vast majority of Burmese (79.4 percent) cannot afford to buy 

more than the basic necessities. Among those who are better off, 44.7 percent say they have 

mobile phones.

Interviewees from the technology sector indicated that though they see the potential 

for eleven million new mobile users in the next six months, obstacles to further expansion 

remain. For example, rural connectivity is a potential problem as not much information is 

available about how networks will be built out in areas with little infrastructure. Also unclear 

is the role of the state operator Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and how it 

will function alongside international competitors. Currently, interviewees noted that MPT 

cares little about service, international roaming is not available, and SMS messaging is not 

reliable.

Not surprisingly, rural and ethnic areas have far less mobile access from the MPT network. 

However, ethnic communities are accessing Chinese and Thai networks, depending on their 

location. Interviewees indicate that mobile information is trusted but is mainly used by youth 

for sports news.

Media Training

One dubious legacy of the former military regime and its complete control of the flow of 

information is the lack of media professionals trained to conduct high quality, ethical news 

reporting. Across interviews with government officials, civil society, and media of all types, 

training is almost always the first area of need identified, especially because training of media was not allowed by the former regime.20 Consequently, most journalists in Myanmar are 

relatively young and inexperienced (an informal poll by the Press Council indicated that the 

average age of an editor is twenty-seven), and turnover within media outlets is high. The capacity gap is further exacerbated by the top-down mentality left over from the era of statecontrolled media. When interviewees noted the need for training, it appeared they did so with 

different motivating factors in mind. Journalists and media managers largely understood they 

were thrown into an increasingly fluid and competitive news environment that would seriously 

challenge their skills. Government officials expressed concern about the pace of media reform 

and the capacity of news media to report accurately to better protect public order. Meanwhile, 

citizens were suddenly exposed to new information sources that they craved but still harbored 

a deep distrust of news. So journalism training for them meant reestablishing the credibility 

of news media in the eyes of the public.

Another area of need identified by interviewees is the professional reporting on conflict. Although part of this problem stems from the lack of access to conflict-affected areas 

controlled by either the Tatmadaw or NSAG, part of the issue lies in a high degree of selfcensorship that has effectively replaced the previous censorship regime. One media executive 

interviewed noted, “Even the big outlets like Weekly 11 don’t go against public opinion. Their 

reporting on conflict is not really professional. Reporters seek to avoid conflict, and they don’t 

criticize. Buddhist monk Wirathu led the 969 movement, but local Burmese journalists are 

scared to criticize him.”

Local and international organizations are actively taking steps to address these gaps in 

capacity. Although only one university—National Management College in Yangon—has a 

journalism program, UNESCO is working with the school to develop and institute a new 
PEACEWORKS 92

20 USIP.ORG

curriculum. The three main media associations—the Myanmar Journalist Association, Myanmar Journalists Union, and Myanmar Journalists Network—offer ad hoc instruction, and the 

Press Council developed a resource center for media and an ethical code of conduct. In terms 

of broadcast training, Deutsche Welle has partnered with the Myanmar Media Development 

Center, which is associated with MRTV-4, to train broadcast journalists. One of the longestrunning training programs has been conducted by Internews, which has instructed ethnic media along the border with Thailand since 2001 and journalists in Yangon since 2003. Internews 

has also done significant conflict-sensitive reporting training, including developing a manual 

in the Burmese language. Recently returned from exile, Mizzima is offering conflict-sensitive journalism training using a curriculum developed by Danish NGO International Media 

Support.

One consistent theme that has emerged in discussions about journalism training is that 

the many local-international partnerships to advance media professionalism are relatively ad 

hoc and uncoordinated. Despite a great deal goodwill on the part of the media community 

in Myanmar to receive assistance, international organizations are practically tripping over 

themselves to get involved, which risks fragmenting efforts. A coordinating body such as the 

Media Development Thematic Working Group—organized by UNESCO in February 2013 

and representing the MoI—national and ethnic media, and international development partners should help mitigate this scenario, if competing agendas can be put aside.

Business Environment

As with many other industries experiencing transition in Myanmar, the economic underpinnings of the media sector are characterized by serious challenges and significant opportunities. 

Although the economic infrastructure is still limited and corruption and crony capitalism are 

major problems, the lifting of economic sanctions, the passage of new legislation on foreign direct investment, and the corresponding entry of major international firms to the Burmese market all signal a monumental shift in the media ad space. Estimated by interviewees to generate 

$200 million in 2011—two-thirds going to television and the rest to print media—Internews 

presents a figure of $525 million for the total ad market in 2013.21 A boom in tourism and 

investment from the World Bank should further open the space for ad growth. Myanmar has 

172 ad agencies, but only five are of international quality.22 The ad market, however, is largely 

free from crony control due to the volatility of the marketplace so far. Overall, the opportunity 

for media in print and broadcast should be trending upward due to dailies coming on the market in April 2013, new television joint ventures, and more FM radio stations. The previously 

mentioned award of mobile licenses to Telenor and Ooredoo also infuses the market with new 

revenue streams.

In terms of the sustainability of local media outlets, it would be difficult for all sixteen 

newspapers that received or are receiving daily licenses to survive in the current marketplace. 

In the broadcast arena, cronies still maintain control over public-private joint ventures, such as 

MRTV-4 and private satellite channel SkyNet. Private media in both print and broadcast will 

also be challenged by competition from the MoI, which has plans to turn state-run MRTV 

into public service media and has similar plans for the state-run dailies. Meanwhile, exile media outlets such as Mizzima and Irrawaddy that have returned to the country will have to 

compete in a very different marketplace where aid from international donors might not be as 

forthcoming.

Overall, the opportunity for 

media in print and broadcast 

should be trending upward 

due to dailies coming on the 

market in April 2013, new 

television joint ventures, and 

more FM radio stations.
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 21

Regulation

In addition to the broad consensus on the need for professional training for journalists and 

managers in Myanmar, there is similar motivation to revise the fairly restrictive media laws left 

on the books from the previous regime. Such legislation includes the 1962 Printers and Publishers Act and the 2004 Electronic Transaction Act. The former law reinforces the registration 

of all media outlets as well as prepress censorship practices. The latter includes vaguely worded 

statements prohibiting journalists from “distributing any information relating to secrets of 

the security of the state.”23 Both laws have been heavily criticized by media in Myanmar as 

tools to imprison journalists and restrict freedom of speech.

In the broadcast arena, still largely under state control, the MoI has taken a leading role in 

drafting new pieces of legislation, including a new broadcast law, a public service media law, 

and bills governing the film industry and libraries. Separately, and much more controversially, 

a presidential order in 2012 created the interim Press Council, an industry body formed with 

a yearlong mandate to draft the new press law. All three existing media associations—the 

Myanmar Journalists Association, Myanmar Journalists Union, and Myanmar Journalists 

Network—are represented on the Press Council.

However, the Press Council began inauspiciously. Problems were related to oversight of the 

body—the government initially wanted the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division to manage the council—and the composition of the membership—ultimately only ten of the thirty 

members were approved as government appointments. These issues were finally resolved in 

September 2012, and the drafting process began. Yet even as the Press Council was consulting 

with local and international partners on the content of the press law, the MoI was preparing 

its own competing bill, ironically called the Printers and Publishers Regulation Bill. The Press 

Council quickly condemned the MoI’s draft, noting that it ignored recommendations made 

by the Press Council and included restrictions in the form of licensing and registration for all 

print media (essentially amounting to post-press censorship). The MoI interviewee, however, 

indicated that the ministry was limiting its oversight to printing and publishing and leaving 

the professional aspects of the law to the industry leaders. In early July 2013, the lower house of 

parliament passed the MoI’s version of the bill, leading to calls by the Press Council to disband. 

More recently, both bills were under consideration by parliament, and the MoI draft was approved by both houses. Meanwhile, the upper house signed off on the Press Council’s version, 

paving the way for a final legislative showdown over the status of the press law. How the law 

balances the interests of the MoI and the media industry remains to be seen.

Additionally, interviewees noted the importance of a Freedom of Information (FOI) Law. 

One observed, “Access to data will lead to good governance.” Others question both the current 

capacity of national and local officials to implement an FOI law and the perceived threat such 

legislation would have on the power base of certain politicians.

Ethnic Voices

As noted, the challenges for producing balanced and accurate news in non-Bamar ethnic 

areas are formidable. Although some Yangon-based newspapers have stringers in several 

ethnic states, reliable coverage is still limited, particularly in conflict-affected areas. In these 

areas, the military tends to control information about actions conducted against NSAGs, and 

the NSAGs can pressure their local media to support their own cause. The interviewee from 

the Kachin News Group (KNG) stated that the media outlet does attempt to be independent 
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22 USIP.ORG

but has more access to the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) than other media, so 

it is perceived to be pro-KIO. In a separate interview, however, a representative from the KIO 

noted that the KNG was not truly representative of the Kachin people. Nevertheless, the KNG 

interviewee acknowledged that many people in Kachin have a negative view of the government and an independent journal in the state would go a long way to changing the mindset of 

the local communities.

Some interviewees considered many non-Bamar ethnic states to be simply “media dark,” in 

that no local media exist to represent their community’s interests. Yet this situation has recently 

begun to change. A handful of ethnic media are now emerging, including in Mon State, where 

the Independent Mon News Agency (based on the Thai-Burma border) started printing The 

Guiding Star in the Mon language in April 2013. Despite its political affiliations, this outlet 

could be viewed as an example for other ethnic media as they seek to establish their voices. 

Similarly, Karen News recently received a license to print a local newspaper, and discussions 

are under way to begin a local radio station. Licenses are also being sought in Chin and Shan 

states for additional radio stations.

According to interviewees, state governments are now responsible for making decisions 

on registering local media, and the Ministry of Communications, rather than the military, 

currently controls frequency allocation. Both steps offer hope that community media, ultimately including community radio, can be established to inform local people and share credible 

information with mainstream Yangon-based outlets. Community radio is deemed especially 

critical by interviewees, and recent signs point to an accelerated timetable for the emergence 

of these radios. One interviewee suggested another way that community radio could emerge 

relatively quickly. The KIO, for example, has its own FM station that might, under the right 

conditions, be transitioned to a community outlet. Such a model could be followed in other 

ethnic states.

Meanwhile, non-Bamar ethnic media are attempting to find their collective voice as well. 

Burma News International (BNI) is a group of small ethnic media outlets, many of which are 

based in Thailand. With the support of international donors, BNI brought together one hundred media outlets in April 2013 in Mawlamyaing for one of the first ethnic media conferences 

in the country. Although symbolic, the event underscored the difficulties such outlets are facing 

in returning to Myanmar. Even though a handful of outlets, such as Mizzima, have returned, 

others—such as the Kaladan Press, KNG, and the Shan Herald Agency for News—remain 

on the outside looking in. The reason is an environment they still deem to be unsupportive of 

ethnic media, which includes hacking of media websites and charges of false reporting by the 

military.24

Despite deeply entrenched beliefs regarding ethnicity, many interviewees acknowledged 

the need to bridge the divide between Burmese and other ethnic communities through media. 

Such efforts include mainstreaming non-Bamar ethnic voices in the (Yangon-based) Burmese 

media and strengthening non-Bamar ethnic media as credible voices of their communities. 

Both could be accomplished by creating a forum for joint reporting projects between ethnic and Burmese journalists, offering ethnic journalists internships at Yangon-based outlets, 

and producing broadcast content that raises awareness about both Bamar and non-Bamar 

communities.

State governments are 

now responsible for making 

decisions on registering local 

media, and the Ministry of 

Communications, rather 

than the military, currently 

controls frequency allocation.
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 23

Media Interventions

Media as Tool

1. Peacebuilding Television Drama 

Interviewees indicated that the existing stereotypes and misunderstandings between Bamar 

and the varied ethnic communities could be broken down through a compelling serialized television drama based on an educational curriculum.25 It would feature a diverse group of characters from across the ethnic spectrum interacting in ways that would foster mutual respect and 

trust-building. Similarly, the television production team would be composed of cast and crew 

from different ethnic groups to ensure that the program resonates with a wide range of viewers.

Technical elements

Target audience General public audience but especially a cross-section of Bamar and other ethnic communities

Format Serialized television drama, likely at first via international broadcasters

Broadcast component Weekly thirty-minute episodes in Burmese and ethnic languages

Outreach components Customizable for radio production

Used as a learning tool for civil society organizations (CSOs) to promote interethnic dialogue; integrated 

into the education system by providing DVDs and the curriculum to schoolteachers

Local celebrities (such as Zaganar) who have expressed strong interest in peacebuilding efforts in guest 

appearances on the program

Moderated online forum on Facebook to facilitate further dialogue based on the curriculum as well as 

enabling interaction with the actors on the show

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Better understanding among ethnic groups of the experiences and day-to-day lives of each other

Awareness among ethnic groups about the consequences of negative stereotypes of “the other”

Knowledge of both similarities and differences among groups, including different histories, cultures, and 

grievances

Attitude Expansion among individuals, groups, and communities within Myanmar of interethnic trust

Sense among non-Bamar ethnic communities of less marginalization and among Bamar majority of other 

ethnic groups as equal partners

Heightened respect among ethnic groups for other groups and surrender of the us-versus-them mentality 

toward the Bamar majority

Belief among citizens that unity and diversity will carry the nation forward

Behavior Acceptance among citizens of ideas from other ethnic groups

Citizens demonstrating new ways of showing tolerance and respect for other ethnic groups

All citizens practicing new forms of problem solving in relation to other ethnic groups
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24 USIP.ORG

2. Investigative Reporting Radio/Television Program

“Heroes of Myanmar.” Interviewees emphasized the heightened level of tension among religious groups in Myanmar in addition to the existing ethnic divisions. Bridging these divides 

and mitigating negative stereotypes among diverse groups can be addressed through a series of investigative reports highlighting heroes of Myanmar. Short reports would reveal how 

common people from different religious and ethnic backgrounds have done small acts of heroism to help others solve problems, assist in their communities, or prevent violence. For example, 

the Buddhist monk who provided a safe haven for four hundred Muslims in his community 

after a spate of religious violence broke out in Meikhtila. 

Technical elements

Target audience General population of Myanmar

Format Short investigative reports for radio or television

Broadcast component TV: weekly thirty-minute program with several short reports; radio: twice weekly fifteen-minute programs

Outreach components A program tip line to accept new stories of heroes across the country; information also collected through 

social media and letter writing in rural areas

Audience feedback built into each program (via call-ins) to facilitate discussion about solutions to ethnicreligious issues

Documentaries on the most popular and compelling issues produced for public service broadcasting

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Better understanding among citizens of the peaceful aspects of each other’s religion

Awareness of shared problems and possible problem-solving options with people from different ethnicities 

and religious orientations

Understanding that some sources of information about other faiths and ethnicities are more trustworthy 

than others

Attitude Acceptance of Myanmar as a multifaith, multiethnic country

Tolerance for people from other ethnic and religious groups, and less willingness to fall back on negative 

stereotypes

Confidence in the capacity to solve problems

Behavior Applying lessons learned from heroes to solve problems in communities

Interethnic and interreligious dialogue opened; hate speech and discrimination not tolerated
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 25

3. Participatory Radio-Television Talk Show

“Local Issues, National Debate.” Interviewees emphasized the deep mistrust between citizens 

and the government, which still manifests itself in an us-versus-them mentality at the local and 

national levels. With state administrations run by officials appointed by the national government, Bamar and other ethnic communities struggle to have their voices heard. A political talk 

show radio program that highlights local issues, based on audience input, that are also relevant 

at the national level, such as natural resource allocation and corruption, and would involve 

moderated audience participation and interaction with a varied slate of guests from differing 

ethnic backgrounds and government branches. The radio program could also be adapted for 

television production and broadcast.

Technical elements

Target audience General population, local and national decision makers

Format Weekly radio talk show with moderated listener call-in and live interviews

Broadcast component Brief news report on issues of local and national importance

Interview of guest or guests by program host

Call-in questions to guest or guests from listening audience

Discussion of responses to listener comments

Outreach components Assistance from listening public in determining program topic and guests 

Audience call-ins posing questions to the guest 

Guests from state and national government determining action to respond to identified issue

Citizens given a call in number or SMS short code to chart progress of officials in dealing with the problem

Successes and failures digitally mapped to enable follow-up activities as well as provide accountability

Problem revisited in subsequent episodes to explore lessons learned and share solutions

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Citizen understanding that they can communicate their needs and demand accountability from officials

Citizen confidence that they can express themselves on issues of local and national importance using 

media

Knowledge that the same problems (and potential solutions) affect everyone in the country

Government official and elite understanding that their interests are not necessarily threatened by power 

sharing and transparent governance

Attitude Trust among citizens that government can solve problems and deliver services

Increased citizen belief that involvement and action can help ensure accountability

Trust in the political process as a means of sharing power and resources

Behavior Increased citizen demand—often through the media—for accountability from government officials

More information sought about how other communities solve problems and resolve conflict

New ways pursued to include citizens in governance and in resource allocation
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4. Countering Rumor Radio Satire Program 

“Around the Well.” Many interviewees indicated the prevalence of rumor in shaping opinions 

and potentially fomenting violence, especially in rural and ethnic communities. Rumors are 

particularly dangerous when people have the tendency to accept information about interethnic 

and interreligious conflict without verifying the information. This radio satire program will 

feature characters considering the latest rumors while talking around a well, a popular venue 

for sharing information in rural communities. 

Technical elements

Target audience Rural population, leaders, and decision makers

Format Radio drama and live call-in program

Broadcast component Weekly fifteen-minute episodes in Burmese and ethnic languages; brief follow-up discussion program to 

present counternarratives

Outreach components Humorous storylines generated by actual rumors found on social media websites and in local communities; 

storylines focus on more trivial rumors to avoid sparking misunderstanding among listeners

Moderated discussion program includes an invited guest, such as a community elder; more dangerous 

rumors also discussed

Cartoons in print media and online to illustrate the danger of certain rumors

Counternarratives presented during the radio discussion to dispel rumors also posted online

Social media monitoring to track how dangerous rumors are spread and the effect the radio program and 

online forum has on presenting an effective counternarrative

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Citizen understanding of the power of rumors and the negative consequences of believing them

Citizen understanding of the importance of verifying information and considering different sources

Citizen understanding that by dispelling rumors, they can gain a better understanding of people with 

different ethnic and religious backgrounds

Attitude Belief in capacity to filter information to solve problems

Trust built in other individuals and groups with separate and unique histories, cultures, and grievances.

Behavior Information verified before being acted on.

Reliable sources of information sought out, and false information countered

Information that denigrates others rejected, and new lexicon of tolerance and mutual respect built
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 27

5. Multimedia Conflict-Sensitive Reporting

Although training of journalists is the most commonly identified area of need, improving the 

quantity and quality of reporting related to ongoing conflict in Myanmar is also important. 

Identifying and training reporting teams (one Bamar journalist and one non-Bamar journalist) to collaborate on conflict-sensitive coverage of issues such as human rights violations, 

land disputes, and patronage systems could help inform the public on the root causes and 

potential solutions related to key conflict issues. This initiative would begin by using print and 

online media but could later be customized for radio and television.

Technical elements

Target audience General population of Myanmar, including ethnic communities

Format Weekly investigative reports in print and online media

Broadcast components Brief news report on issues of local and national importance

Interview of guest or guests by program host

Call-in questions to guest or guests from listening audience

Discussion of responses to listener comments

Outreach components Jointly reported stories produced weekly in Burmese and other ethnic languages; online versions to ensure 

broader distribution to ethnic communities in border areas

Bamar and non-Bamar ethnic journalists interviewed on radio and television as part of coverage to share 

experiences of joint reporting

Top stories developed as documentaries by local peacebuilding organizations to encourage conflict 

resolution

Conflict-sensitive reporting prizes awarded to the top reporting team

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Increased practical conflict-sensitive reporting skills among journalists and increased awareness about 

problems and solutions relevant to other ethnic groups

Greater citizen understanding about conflict and ethnic violence in Myanmar

Citizen awareness of the unique histories and common problems that all ethnic communities in Myanmar 

face

Attitude Citizen trust that the information they receive about conflict is credible

Belief among all ethnic groups that they are equal partners in Myanmar’s transition, including conflict 

resolution

Confidence among journalists that they can present accurate information about conflict that will resonate 

in Myanmar

Decreased sense of threat among government officials for quality conflict-sensitive reporting

Behavior More balanced reporting on conflict issues media-wide

Less citizen tolerance of discrimination and increased consideration of interethnic solutions to problems

Government peacebuilding groups use conflict-sensitive reporting to further conflict resolution goals
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28 USIP.ORG

Media as Target

1. Develop Ethnic Language Community Media and Increase 

Ethnic Language Content

Because most of the violent armed conflict is taking place in the ethnic states of Myanmar, 

many non-Bamar ethnic communities need a voice of their own, both in community media 

(print and radio) and in access to more ethnic language media content. The Guiding Star and 

Karen News are some of the few community media outlets and could serve as models for 

encouraging the proliferation of ethnic language content trusted by local communities. Such 

content could also be translated and shared with Burmese-language outlets to foster intercultural understanding.

Requirements

Non-Bamar ethnic media receive licenses from state governments

Ministry of Communications allocates frequencies for community radio

Training of non-Bamar ethnic language journalists is continued and expanded

Commitments from the military put in place to protect journalists working in conflict-affected ethnic states

International donors, NGOs, and media continue to fund, produce, and support development of local 

language content

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Understanding among non-Bamar ethnic communities that they have access to credible news and 

information produced by journalists from their own ethnic groups

Awareness among non-Bamar ethnic communities that they have a broader choice of information than 

what armed groups provide

Awareness among Yangon-based mainstream media that non-Bamar ethnic media content can also be 

used to inform Bamar audiences, broadening the understanding of non-Bamar ethnic culture, history, and 

grievances

Attitude Sense among non-Bamar ethnic groups that they have a voice in a national context and are less victimized

Public trust in media slowly restored through access to more ethnic language content

Bamar audiences more open to non-Bamar views with more access to coverage of various ethnic groups 

by various ethnic groups

Behavior New local media outlets producing more higher-quality local language content

New content about and by various ethnic groups spurs debate between these groups and the Bamar 

majority about conflict resolution
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 29

2. Improving the Media Regulatory Framework 

During the interview period, much debate took place regarding the drafting of a new press 

law and the competing bills prepared by the MoI and the Press Council. Even as parliament considers both drafts, advocacy should continue to amend certain provisions that 

still limit media freedoms and promote additional legislation related to access to information and telecommunications. This process also includes repealing anachronistic laws that 

have been used to repress press freedoms such as the 1962 Printers and Publishers Act 

and the 2004 Electronic Transactions Act.

Requirements

Media voice in advocating for change to the regulatory framework

Dialogue among local media, government, and international organizations to ensure more progressive 

laws are put in place and properly implemented

Public awareness campaign to inform citizens about the benefits of new legislation

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Awareness among journalists, government, and civil society about what the new press law allows and does 

not allow

Understanding among the media that legal advocacy for free speech and press freedom are 

long-term processes

Understanding among citizens and political leaders that passing new media legislation is a step toward 

more transparent governance and power sharing

Attitude Confidence among Myanmar journalists in their freedom to report on certain issues

Citizen trust in media and belief that they can receive credible information from local media

Behavior Press law enacted and implemented that enables more freedom for journalists and editors

Journalists practice their craft without harassment

Citizens able to make decisions to participate in the political process and resolve conflict based on 

credible information from the media
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3. Multistakeholder Media Training

Interviewees overwhelmingly supported additional training for media in Myanmar, but they 

also called for parallel training for government and civil society. For government officials, this 

means understanding the role of the media as the fourth estate, how to interact with the media, 

and the protection of journalists. For civil society, media literacy training is needed to help citizens understand the danger of rumor, the information choices available to them, and how they 

can use media to interact with elected officials. Including representatives from media, government, and civil society as part of the same training program (starting with small interventions) 

could also help raise awareness and improve interactions among the three stakeholder groups. 

Such trainings could be replicated at the local and state level for the most impact.

Requirements

Continued funding for journalism training by international organizations, including practical 

in-house training at print and broadcast outlets

Commitment from the government to educate officials at the state and national level on public relations 

and media affairs

Outreach by civil society, private-sector media, and government to improve media literacy of the public

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Journalists gain knowledge in professional and ethical reporting

Government officials know how to interact with journalists without treating the media as adversaries

Public awareness about the variety of available information sources available to them, including from the 

government

Attitude Citizen trust in information provided by the media as well as media’s role as an oversight body

Citizen belief that good governance includes transparency

Belief among media outlets and their reporters and managers that they can provide coverage on a wide 

range of issues

Government officials feeling more open in dealing with the media and in providing information about 

services offered to the public

Behavior Citizens make more informed choices and improve their involvement in governance

Media continue to improve quality of their reporting and increasingly serve as public watchdog

Local and national officials provide more reliable information through the media, including that related to 

governance and conflict
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 31

4. Peace Technology Innovation Workshop

Interview respondents in the technology sector as well as civil society peace advocates were 

generally bullish about the potential for new technologies to address specific drivers of conflict 

in Myanmar. Yet they also noted that the uncertain pace of technology growth could hinder or 

outstrip nascent peacebuilding efforts if not carefully managed. A Peace Technology Innovation Workshop would connect civil society organizations working on peacebuilding issues with 

access and understanding to these technologies. Together with local and international technologists, civil society peacebuilding organizations would learn practical skills and approaches 

for applying low-cost, easy-to-use technologies to meet current challenges—such as landgrabbing, corruption and human rights abuses. The goal would be to create a set of solutions 

to implement over the following six months. The initial workshop would be the beginning of 

a longer-term engagement to develop the projects that emerge, ultimately yielding tangible 

benefits for building peace in Myanmar. Additional workshops could be undertaken to help 

cement the relationship of local technologists with local civil society and relevant government 

officials, which would build a more lasting technology for social good environment.

Requirements

Media and ICT specialists convene from across the country to meet with peacebuilding organizations, 

relevant government officials, and selected international technologists as needed

International companies and ICT specialists engaged to promote collaborative and long-term partnerships 

when investing in the technology sector in Myanmar

Follow-up sessions held to keep local and international participants engaged

Event publicized to raise public awareness about the potential of ICT for peacebuilding.

Funding sources identified to support some of the best projects that emerge from the workshop

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Understanding among ICT experts in Myanmar of how they can develop technologies for conflict 

prevention and resolution

Greater public awareness that media and technology can be used to build peace

Better understanding among government officials of their role in promoting ICT development

Attitude Citizens more empowered to seek out solutions to problems through ICT

ICT expert belief that they can contribute to peace in Myanmar while still earning money

Greater incentive among government officials to support technology innovation if they are involved in the 

process

Behavior New innovative thinking drives development of new technologies for peacebuilding

Greater citizen participation in governance and problem solving through access to ICTs
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32 USIP.ORG

5. Develop Mobile Technologies as Early Warning and Crisis Response Tool 

The vast potential for mobile telecommunications is just waiting to be tapped, pending the 

passage of a new telecommunications law to regulate the sector. When the international carriers enter the market and prices drop to levels that most citizens can afford, people will demand 

more news and information, including through their 3G-enabled devices. Interviewees also 

indicated that mobile technology can be a useful tool for crisis prevention and response. For 

example, SMS early warning systems can be developed in advance of key events with potential for conflict, such as the national census in 2014 and the national elections in 2015. Such 

systems can also be used in tandem with digital conflict mapping to facilitate effective disaster 

response.

Requirements

Citizens and CSOs mobilized to report by SMS on instances of potential or actual conflict

CSO editors trained in conflict sensitive journalism to assist in verifying information and to provide 

accurate coverage of conflict online and by SMS updates

Digital mapping technologies used to chart high risk locations and areas where emergency response is 

required

Communications with government bodies and mainstream media outlets established to ensure data 

generates broad response and increases public awareness

CSOs use a database of mobile users to conduct public surveys and prepare strategy to mitigate 

subsequent conflict scenarios

Partnerships with mobile providers established to design incentive mechanisms (such as mobile credit) and 

free short code numbers for text messaging

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Awareness among citizens that they can access credible information about conflict

Understanding among government officials they are responsible for addressing conflict

Understanding among journalists that information from the public and CSOs can enhance their coverage 

of conflict

Attitude Citizen belief that they can contribute to preventing conflict in their communities using mobile 

telecommunications

Less sense of isolation among marginalized groups in the reporting and mapping of conflict

Greater sense of accountability among government officials for preventing, managing, and resolving 

conflict

Behavior Increased citizen use of mobile technologies in mitigating conflict and responding to crisis

Journalist monitoring of social media and CSO activity to inform their coverage of conflict and to hold the 

government accountable for action

Government design of emergency response protocols based on interaction with and data provided by civil 

society
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 33

6. Preventing Online Hate Speech

Despite the relatively low levels of Internet penetration in Myanmar, respondents expressed 

concern not only with the speed at which hate speech is disseminated online but also the 

virulence of some of the inflammatory messages. Also of concern was the way in which online 

narratives of hate were threatening to trump news coverage by mainstream media, especially 

regarding intercommunal conflict. Through an initial analysis of online content, potentially 

through natural language processing, inflammatory terms appearing on Facebook and other 

online media can be identified and monitored. Content analysis methods and systems can 

then be integrated into training programs for civil society, media, and government officials in 

order for these groups to better understand, and more effectively respond to, online content 

that could incite violence.

Requirements

Consensus among a wide range of stakeholders on what constitutes inflammatory content; lexicon of 

terms that might incite violence published and widely distributed

Automated social media monitoring to analyze inflammatory content and its potential effects on 

mainstream media and the public

Training program established for bloggers, citizen journalists, mainstream media professionals, government officials, and civil society watchdogs to understand dangers of hate speech, how to monitor such 

content, and how to use self-regulatory tools to prevent the spread of such speech online

Early online warning systems developed in advance of contentious events, such as a national census and 

electoral periods

Content analysis data and self-regulatory tools related to hate speech integrated into interfaith dialogues 

and peacebuilding workshops

Interfaith Facebook campaigns initiated to promote tolerance and mutual respect

Civic-state dialogue on Internet regulation that limits inflammatory content while protecting freedom of 

speech

Social media providers engaged to develop policies for shutting down offensive user accounts and pages

Desired outcomes

Knowledge Understanding among citizens about the dangers of hate speech and the risks of obtaining information 

through social media

Heightened awareness among journalists for using social media as a credible source in reporting on 

conflict

Understanding among government officials about what constitutes hate speech and how to react to it 

appropriately

Attitude Citizen acceptance of Myanmar as a multifaith country

Tolerance and mutual respect between different faiths

Behavior Hate speech monitored, not tolerated, and ultimately shut down
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34 USIP.ORG

Conclusion

The USIP’s IONA methodology enables donors, NGOs, policymakers, and local stakeholders in conflict-affected environments to determine which media initiatives can effectively be used to help mitigate conflict and build peace. The IONA methodology offers a 

systematic process for integrating conflict and media assessments by considering media and 

nonmedia factors in the design of locally led initiatives that can help to bring about social 

change.

In Myanmar, this hybrid approach is intended to provide a unique perspective. Although 

many conflict assessments have been conducted in Myanmar since 2011, as well as analyses 

of the media environment, few, if any, blend the two approaches. Studies focused on media or 

conflict can still be extremely useful, and the IONA approach complements such research in 

that it connects what people in Myanmar know and believe and how they act to a well-defined 

set of social change outcomes. The media initiatives that can be implemented by local stakeholders with the support of international donors and NGOs are then designed to specifically 

address these outcomes to mitigate conflict.

In the first conflict described, the government of Myanmar has taken significant steps 

in resolving tensions between citizens and the state. The democratic process has resulted in 

unprecedented opposition voices in parliament, and a raft of new laws has been enacted. Nascent efforts to establish rule of law and a stronger judiciary have also emerged. Nevertheless, 

significant mistrust remains between the government and the people after years of control by 

the military, the unequal distribution of resources, and the lack of overall accountability. The 

resulting fear that has emerged—citizens’ fear of being marginalized and fear of those in power 

losing their control—is still pervasive. To build trust and reduce fear between citizen and state, 

interview respondents tended to prioritize media interventions, such as a participatory radio 

or television talk show that features state and national officials interacting with citizens who 

call in to the program. This media-as-tool intervention can be coupled with media trainings 

for government officials, media, and civil society in which they engage with each other to gain 

awareness about each group’s role. A combination of these initiatives (and other nonmedia 

projects) could continue to erode the negative attitudes and aggressive actions between citizens 

and the government.

In the last two years, substantial progress has been made in addressing interethnic conflict 

in Myanmar. Steps have been made toward formal reconciliation and more than a dozen ceasefire agreements have been signed. However, the roots of conflict among ethnic groups are deep. 

State policies of Burmanization, unequal natural resource allocation, and political exclusion of 

non-Bamar ethnic groups have sowed negative stereotypes on all sides and significant mistrust 

among Bamar and other ethnic communities alike. To counter these stereotypes and reestablish trust, interviewees emphasized a peacebuilding television drama that could entertain and 

educate about “The Other.” Paired with support for community radio in non-Bamar ethnic 

areas and additional non-Bamar ethnic media content featured in mainstream Burmese-language media, real social change could be fostered.

The conflict between Buddhists and Muslims that has taken place in Myanmar also has 

historical roots, but recent manifestations of intercommunal violence are especially worrying. Furthermore, the government seems poorly equipped to deal with these tensions, given 

that deeply entrenched beliefs about Buddhist nationalism and fears of the Islamification of 

Myanmar are powerful forces that bring potentially disastrous political consequences. To assist 

in alleviating these fears, respondents prioritized initiatives, such as the Heroes of Myanmar 

To build trust and reduce 

fear between citizen 

and state, respondents 

tended to prioritize media 

interventions, such as a 

participatory radio 

or television talk show 

that features state and 

national officials interacting 

with citizens.
media and conflict in myanmar: opportunities for media to advance peace

USIP.ORG 35

program and the countering rumor radio satire, that could promote tolerance, sensitize citizens 

to the notion of a multifaith country, and provide counternarratives to dangerous misinformation propagated by social media and local rumor mills.

When USIP interviewed various stakeholders in Myanmar about media and conflict, 

most had sophisticated analyses of the underlying problems and their desires for social change. 

Although many had just begun to think about specific ways in which media could be used as 

a peacebuilding tool, they were able to connect the dots between other ongoing interventions 

that could resolve conflict (such as formal peace negotiations and rule of law reforms) and 

media-based solutions. Given the pace of transition in Myanmar, it is possible to overlook 

certain avenues for building peace, but to effect real change requires careful consideration of 

what can ultimately shape the attitudes and behaviors of those leading reform efforts. Clearly 

media can play a vital part.
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36 USIP.ORG

Notes

1. Andrew Robertson, Eran Fraenkel, Emrys Schoemaker, and Sheldon Himelfarb, “Media in Fragile 

Environments,” U.S. Institute of Peace, www.usip.org/publications/media-in-fragile-environments.

2. Fifty-eight laws were passed in the thirty months ending in August 2013 (Soe Than Lynn, “Thura U Shwe 

Mann takes Hluttaw Reins,” Myanmar Times, August 4, 2013).

3. Communal Buddhist-Islamic violence in Rakhine differs from Islamic-Buddhist violence in the rest of 

Myanmar in that as Rakhine state has distinct immigration, citizenship, ethnic identity, and political and 

economic exclusion factors, which are not detailed in this report. 

4. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Rakhine Response Plan (Myanmar) July 2013–

December 2013,” ReliefWeb, August 12, 2013, http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/rakhine-response-planmyanmar-july-2012-%E2%80%93-december-2013. 

5. At this time, the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division was also disbanded.

6. Reporters Without Borders, “Burmese Media Spring,” December 2012, http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rsf_

rapport_birmanie-gb-bd_2_.pdf.

7. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Fact Book: Burma, November 2013, https://www.cia.gov/

library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html.

8. Cronies are generally described as part of the economic elite who have deep ties to military officials.

9. Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), “Coverage of Myanmar Local Radio Media,” February 

2013, www.themimu.info/docs/SectorMap_Govern_Radio_MediaCoverage_MIMU965v01_1February20_

A3.pdf; MIMU, “Coverage of Myanmar Free-to-air Television Media,” February 2013, http://www.

themimu.info/download.php?file=docs/SectorMap_Govern_Television_MediaCoverage_MIMU965v01_1

February20_A3.pdf

10. According to Gallup polling, 62.2 percent say they use radio as a news source at least once per week. In small 

towns and rural areas, people are twice as likely to use radio (67.4 percent) for news on a weekly basis than 

television (34.8 percent). International Audience Research Project (IARP), “Analytical Report for Burma 

Media Use Survey,” Gallup Broadcasting Board of Governors, September 2012, p. 6.

11. Karen News very recently obtained a license for print media, and discussions have begun regarding a local 

radio license.

12. In urban areas, television has outpaced radio (67.8 percent to 50.2 percent for radio).

13. Gallup’s national survey was conducted between December 2010 and January 2011 (IARP, “Analytical 

Report,” p. 29).

14. According to the CIA’s World Factbook, there are 1,055 Internet hosts (2012) worldwide, which puts Myanmar 

at 172 in a global ranking. Data from 2009 suggest that of the country’s fifty-five million people, 110,000 are 

Internet users.

15. https://twitter.com/AmaraDigital/status/329872633699110912.

16. Deputy Minister of Information U Ye Htut, speaking at the event “Preventing Hate Speech in Myanmar: 

Divergent Voices in a New Democracy,” Rangoon (June 28, 2013), http://www.dvb.no/dvb-video/

freedom-from-hate/29074.

17. One civil society organization used Facebook to arrange a peace march on International Day of Peace in 2012. 

Although not sanctioned by the police, they marched through ten townships in Yangon in what could have 

been the largest march since the Saffron Revolution.

18. CIA, World Factbook.

19. Interviewees estimate costs of $12 for an Internet connection, plus 5 cents per minute for data.

20. Such training either had to be held covertly within Myanmar or outside the country.

21. Michelle Foster, “The Business of Media in Myanmar, 2013,” Internews, February 2013, https://www.

internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/Internews_Business_of_Media_in_Myanmar_2013.pdf.

22. Ibid.

23. Reporters Without Borders, “Burmese Media Spring.”

24. Radio Free Asia, “Exile Ethnic Myanmar Media Groups Wary of Returning,” July 13, 2013, www.rfa.org/

english/news/myanmar/media-07122013190654.html.

25. This format is an entertaining drama that seeks to change the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of the 

target audience through a carefully designed curriculum.
 5

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Chairman of the Board: J. Robinson West

Vice Chairman: George E. Moose

President: Jim Marshall

Executive Vice President: Kristin Lord

Chief Financial Officer: Michael Graham

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • 

George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George 

Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant 

to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. 

Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and 

Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, 

American University • Stephen J. Hadley, Principal, RiceHadleyGates, 

LLC, Washington, D.C. • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy 

Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. Khan, 

President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, Nev. • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, N.Y. • 

Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, Va. 

• Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference 

on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Kathleen Hicks, Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. 

Army; President, National Defense University • Jim Marshall, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
2 Looking for Justice United States Institute of Peace • 2301 Constitution ave., nw • Washington, DC 20037 • usip.org 

Since its 2010 elections, Myanmar’s political transition from 

military junta to democratic rule has been remarkable. The 

process, though, is far from complete. In the context of a 

deeply rooted, intractable, and dynamic conflict landscape, 

this report addresses the role of Myanmar’s national media 

in the country’s political, social, and economic transition. 

Analysis focuses on three key conflicts: citizen-state, ethnic, 

and intercommunal. The report is based on a methodology 

developed by the United States Institute of Peace that is 

designed to help donors, local stakeholders, NGOs, and 

policymakers determine effective media initiatives to help 

mitigate conflict, build peace, and support nonmedia statebuilding efforts in Myanmar. 

Related Links 

■ Evaluating Media Interventions in Conflict Countries by Amelia Arsenault, 

Sheldon Himelfarb, and Susan Abbott (Peaceworks, October 2011)

■ Afghanistan Media Assessment: Opportunities and Challenges for Peacebuilding 

by Eran Fraenkel, Emrys Schoemaker, and Sheldon Himelfarb (Peaceworks, 

December 2010)

■ Media in Fragile Environments by Andrew Robertson, Eran Fraenkel, 

Emrys Schoemaker, and Sheldon Himelfarb (USIP Press, 2011)

■ Social Media Reporting and the Syrian Civil War by Anand Varghese (Peace 

Brief, June 2013)

■ Mitigating Media Incitement to Violence in Iraq: A Locally Driven Approach

by Maureen Taylor and Theo Dolan (Special Report, March 2013)

■ Blogs and Bullets II: New Media and Conflict after the Arab Spring by Sean 

Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, and Deen Freelon 

(Peaceworks, July 2012)

■ Salam Shabab: Views and Voices of Iraqi Youth by Theo Dolan and Alexis 

Toriello (Peace Brief, January 2011)

■ Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics by Sean Aday, Henry 

Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, John Kelly, and Ethan Zuckerman 

(Peaceworks, September 2010)

■ Preventing Media Incitement to Violence in Iraq by Theo Dolan (Peace Brief, 

April 2010)

■ Media and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan by Sheldon Himelfarb (Peace Brief, 

March 2010)

Peaceworks • JANUARY 2014 • no. 92