### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00741- CV

St e phe n M c Elr oy , A ppe lla nt

v. City of Tem ple, Texas, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BELL CO UNTY, 169TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 19620 4-C, HO NORAB LE GORDO N G. ADAMS, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N
I n th is c a se , w e de te rm ine wh e the r a po lic e of fi cer w ho is r e c a lle d into a c tiv e duty in a bra nch of the United States mili t ary is entitled to a mili tary

leave of abse nce f

rom the police de pa rtme nt u nd e r s e c tio n 1 43 .0 72 of

the loc a l g ov e rnme nt c od e and wh e the r h is a

bs e nc e c re a te s a “vac ancy” that m u s t b e filled with the perma nent promotion of another elig ible office r. The tr ial court de nied appe llant Stephen McElroy ’s re quest for a decla ration that he sh o u l d have be en promoted to a Senior Police Of fice r posit i o n wi th the Temple Police De partment. SeeTex. L oc. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 1 43 .0 72 (We st 1 99 9) ; Tex. Civ. Pr a c . & Re m. Cod e Ann. §§ 37 .0 01 -. 01 1 ( Wes t 20 05 ). F or

the re a so ns e xpla ine d b e low , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.Acc ording to a S eptember 9, 2002 letter fr om Col. P aul Capstick, B rown wa s an “a ctive 1 mem b e r o f th e 4 2 5 th M il it a r y Po li c e D e tachment ( Criminal I nvestig ative Division)” who w as “c alled to mili tary

service by

the President of the United States to assi s t i n t h e U.S. missi on supporting Oper ation J oint Guardian, K osovo.” Th e me mor and

um a pp ointin g Mc El ro y

to B ro wn ’s po sit ion state s that he wa s te mpo ra ri ly 2 appointed for

ninety day s, at which time the situation would be re- evaluated. At trial, Temple police c hie f R a lph

Ev ang e lou s te sti fi e d th a t he int e nd e d to ro tate ano the r of fi c e r i nto B ro wn ’s po sit ion in J anuar y . Howeve r, afte r Evang elous rec eived a letter from McElroy ’s attorney on J anuar

y 6, he lef t McElroy in the temporar

y position because E vang elous was c oncer n e d th a t r e mo v in g

M c E lr o y might be vie we d a s r e ta liatio n f or fi lin g a c omp la int
. 2 BACK GR OUND McElroy beg an his e mploy ment with the City

in 1998 at the entry

level ra nk of Police O f f i c e r an d w a s e l i g i b l e t o b e p r o m o t e d t o S e n i o r P o l i c e O f

f i c e r a s o f S e p t e mb e r

2 0 0 2
. In September, Clay

Br own, a Senior Police O ffice r and member of the United States Army Reserve , wa s r e c a lle d to act iv e duty and wa s g ra nte d a “ mil ita ry le ave of a bs e nc e .” Th e City

of Te mpl e 1 Pe rs onne l Po lic ie s and Pr oc e dure s Man ua l pro vid e s, un de r the he a din g “ Mil ita ry L e ave ,” tha

t “ [a]ll employ ees who are members of the military service s, active se rvice s, rese rve units, National Gua rd
o r o t h e r s p e c i a l u n i t s c ant ak e c o mp e n s a t e d m i l i t ar y l e av e n o t t o e x c e e d

f i f t e e n( 1 5 ) w o r

k i n g d ays in any one ca lendar

y ea r; h o we ver, the day s need not be consec utive. Time requir ed over the maxi mum a llowed compensated milit ary leave must be taken as annual leave o r l ea v e o f absence without pay , upon the appr oval of the de partment he ad.” A dditionally , the Gene ral Orde rs Manua l of the Te mpl e Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt pe rm its “ mil ita

ry le ave ” fo r a

n “ e mpl oy e e wh o is re sp on din g to order s of the military

service as a me mber of suc h service .” On September

27, the City

appoi nte d

M c E lr o y to f il l B rown’s position on a tempora ry ba sis
. SeeTex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 143.038 (West 19 9 9 ). Al t h o u g h the City compensated 2McElroy reque sted a decla ratory judgme nt a

nd other relief

, “including , without lim itation, 3 wr its of mand amus and

inj un c tio n. ” Th e fi na l jud g me nt do e s no t sp e c if ic a lly me nti on the re qu e st for wr it o f ma n d amu s o r

in ju n c ti o n , b u t o r d e r s th a t M c E lr o y ’ s r e qu e s t f o r d e c la r a to r y r e li e f and attorney s’ fe es is denied a nd that McElroy

“take nothing by

this suit .” Se nio ri ty

in r ank de te rm ine s sh if

t a ssi g nme nt a

nd c ho ic e of va c a tio n d a te s. 4 3 McElro y as a S en i or Police Off icer during his temporary

appointment, se e id ., he wa s unsatisfied wi th the te mpo ra

ry natur e of the a pp ointme nt a

nd de mand e d to be pe rm ane ntl y pr omo te d. Th e City ref used, and in F ebrua

ry 2003, McElroy filed sui t, complaining that he had not been either promoted or by passed within six ty

day s of the vac ancy . See id . § 143.036 (West 1999). I n May , thre e Se nio r P oli c e Of fi c e rs we re pr omo te d, le avin g the ir po sit ion s v a c ant. Another police office r wa s promoted t o the first vac ancy , and a pr omotional ex amination was g iven to fill the remainingtwo positions. See id . §§ 1 4 3
. 0 3 1 , .032 (West 1999). McElroy rec eived the second hig hest g rade on the exam; he and anothe r off icer wer e b o t h p romoted to Senior Police Offic er on June 6. Br own re turned to his orig inal position on J une 13.

McElroy ’s orig inal petition requests a de clar at i o n t hat he should have been perma nently promoted instead of temporar ily appointed to Senior Police Offic er. See id . § 143.036. 3 The c rux of his complaint befor e the tria l court wa s that beca use he w as not promoted until J une 2003, he was improperly denied se niority over othe r off

icer s who wer e promoted in May and June. 4 Fur thermore , beca

use an of fice r must serve two y ear s in a rank be fore taking another promotional exam, se e id . § 143.028(b), Mc Elroy was not elig i ble to take a nother e x am, and ther eby rec eive another promotion, until J une 2005. The trial c ourt denied Mc Elroy ’s re quest for r elief a nd fi led finding s of fa ct and
c on c lus ion s o f l aw. Mc El ro y re tir e d f ro m th e De pa

rtme nt a ft e r t ime ly

fi lin g thi s a

pp e a l.4 DI SCU SSIO N I n his sole issue, McElroy complains that the City ref used to promote him to S enior Police Offic er pur suant to local g overnme nt code se ctions 143.072 and 143.036. The Cit y has filed a motion to di s miss the appeal, ur g ing that the issue is moot because Mc Elroy has re tired and seniority could no long er be nefit him. Alternatively , the Ci t y as s erts that McElroy ’s claims ar e without merit based on the plain languag e of the statute.
M ot ion to dism iss

Th e moo tne ss d oc tr ine lim its c ourt s to de c idi ngc a se s w here an ac tua l c on tr ov e rs y exis ts. Ca ma r en a v. Texas Em ployment Comm’n , 75 4 S. W.2 d 1 49 , 1 51 (T e x. 19 98 ). A c a se become s moot if a controve rsy cea ses to exis t b et we en t h e parties at any stag e of the leg al proce eding s, including the appe al. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. , 1 6 6 S. W. 3 d 7 3 2 , 7 3 7 ( T e x. 20 05 ); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hal l man , 1 59 S.W. 3d 64 0, 64 2 ( Te x. 20 05 ). A d isp ute ov e r a tto rn e y s’ fee s is a live controve rsy . Hallman , 159 S.W .3d at 642.

The trial c ourt denied Mc Elroy ’s reque st f or decla ratory relief

, attorney s’ fee s, and costs. Although Mc Elroy has re tired and se niority

would no longe r benefit him, the case rema ins
a liv e and jus tic ia ble be c a us e a de c isi on tha t Mc El ro y wa s imp ro pe rl y de nie d the pr omo tio n w ou ld
ne c ess it ate a

re mand to t he tr ia l c ourt

to c on sid e r whe the r a

n a wa rd of a tto rn e y s’ fe e s a

nd c os ts would be appropriate. See H allman , 159 S.W .3d at 642 (controve rsy was live be cause aff irmative
ans we r on lia

bil ity wo uld ne c e ssi tate re mand to tr ia l c ourt to c on sid e r wh e the r a wa rd of a tto rn e y s’Mc El ro y a sse rt s th a t th e re is a

liv e c on tr ov e rs y

be c a us e he is ent it led to h ave his c ivi l 5 se rv ic e re c or d r e fl e c t a

pr omo tio n in

No ve mbe r i ns te a d o f Jun e , a nd a lte rn a tiv e ly , th a t hi s c a se fa lls within the “public intere st” exception to the mootnes s doctrine. Se e Un iv e rsi ty In te rsc ho las tic League v. B uchanan , 8 48 S.W. 2d 29 8, 30 4 ( Te x. Ap p. 19 93 ) ( re vie wi ngc a se purs ua nt t o “ pu bli c interest exception” to mootness doctrine ). B eca use we overr

ule th e C i t y ’s motion to dis miss on other g rounds, we ne ed not re ach this issue. 5 fee s was appr opriate in lig ht of cha ng ed status of pre vaili n g p ar t i es). Theref ore, w e over

rule the City ’s mot ion

to d ism iss and

wi ll c on sid e r t

he me ri ts o f M c El ro y ’s c la im. 5
Does sec tion 143.072 app ly to off icer s w ho are re called to act ive m ilitary duty? Mc El ro y argue s th a t B ro wn

wa s g ra nte d a mi li tary

le ave of a bs e nc e purs ua

nt t o
se c tio n 1 43 .0 72 of

the loc a l g ov e rnme nt c od e , tr ig g e ri nga pr ovis io n that r e qu ir e d th e City to promote McElroy , the next eligible off icer , into Brown’ s “vac ant” position. The C ity responds that the plain languag e of se ction 143.072(a) only applies t o office rs who are originall y ente ring milit ary service , not to those who are recalled to active mil itary duty

such as B rown. The City explains t hat Br own was g rante d a “military leave of abse nce” under City and depa rtment personne l po li c ie s r ather than “military

leave ” pursua

nt to section 143.072. Statutory construction is a que stion of law that we revie w de novo. Texas De p’t of Transp. v. Needham , 82 S. W.3 d 3 14 , 3 18 (T e x. 20 02 ); Ma y he w v . To wn o

f Su nn y v ale , 964 S.W .2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). In construinga statute, our pr imary objective is to deter

mine the intent of the leg islature from the l anguag e of the s tatute. See Powell v. Stover , 165 S.W .3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2005); Helena Che m. Co. v. W

ilkins , 47 S.W .3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001)
. To discer n that intent, we conside r the objective the law see ks to obtain and the conseque nces of a particular construction. Tex. Gov’t Cod e Ann. § 3 11 .0 23 (1 ), (5 ); Sultan v. Mathew , 178 S.W .3d 747, 749 (Tex. 2005). We presume that6

ever y word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that eac h word, phra se, cla use and se ntence should be g iven ef

fec t. T ex a s Dep’t of Parks & W ildlif e v. Sc humake , 3 1 S. W. 3 d 6 6 , 7 5 ( T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

20 04 , n o p e t.) ; see O ld Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez , 149 S.W .3d 111, 11 5 ( Te x. 20 04 ). Th e st atu te is co ns ide re d in its e nti re ty

rathe r t ha n v ie wi ngits pr ov isi on s in isolation. See Conti nental Cas. Co. v. Downs , 81 S.W. 3d 80 3, 80 5 ( Te x. 20 02 ); W

ilkins , 47 S.W .3d at 493. We beg in, however , with the plain and common mea ning of the words ch o sen by

the leg islature. See Stov er , 165 S.W. 3d a t 32 6; Meritor Auto., Inc. v. Ruan Leasing Co. , 44 S.W .3d 86, 8 9 (T ex . 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Albe rts on ’s , I nc . v . S inc lai r , 984 S.W .2d 958, 960 (Tex. 1999)). I f the meaningof the statutory

lang uag e is una

mbiguous, we adopt, with f ew exceptions, the interpre tation supported by the plain meaning of the provision’s words and terms. Meritor Auto., Inc. , 44 S.W .3d at 8 9 (c i t i n g Fitzgerald v. Advanc ed Spine Fix ation Sys., Inc. , 996 S.W .2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999)).

Se c tio n 1 43 .0 72 pr ov ide s th a t: (a ) On wr itt e n a pp lic a tio n o f a

fi re fi g hte r o r p oli c e of

ficer, th e c omm iss ion

sh a ll g ra nt t he pe rs on a mil ita

ry le ave of

a bs e nc e wi tho ut p ay

to e na ble the pe rs on

to enter a branch of the Unit ed S tates m ilitary service
. The leave of absencemay not exc eed theperiod of compulsory military servic e o r t h e b a sic minimum enlistment period for the br anch of service the fir e fi g hter or police office r e nte rs . (b) The commiss ion shall g rant to a fire fig hter or police office r a le ave of absenc e for initial training or annual duty in the milit ary rese rves or

the national guard. (c) Whil e a f

ire fig hter or police office r who re ceive d a military leave of abse nce serve s in the mili t ar y , t h e commission sh all fil l the per son’s position in t he depar tment in accor dance with this chapter. The fire f ighte r o r police off

icer wh o f ill s th e po sit ion

is subject t o replace ment by theperson who rece ived the military leave a t th e tim e the pe rs on re tur ns to a c tiv e duty

in t he de pa rtme nt.Section 143.072 was am ended effe ctive June 18, 2003 to add subsections (g ) and ( h) 6 reg ardingemploy ee be nefits and voluntar y substitut ion by

other off icer s or fire fig hters. SeeT e x. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 143.072 (West Supp. 2005). Also eff ective June 18, 2003, the leg islature added section 143.075, “military leave time acc ounts.” Se e id
. § 1 4 3
. 0 7 5 ( We s t S u p p . 2 0 0 5 )
. We will analy ze the statute as it exis ted duringthe re levant time per iod. 7 (d) On terminat ion of active military servic e , a fire fig hter or police office r who re c e ive d a milit ary le ave of a bs e nc e un de r thi s sec tio n is entitled to be reinstated to the position t hat the per son hel d i n t h e department at the time the le ave of a b s e n c e w a s g r an te d

if th e p e r s o n[m e e ts s p e c if

ie d c o n d it io n s ].

. . . . (f) I f the re in s t at em en t of a f ire fig hter or police office r who re ceive d a military leave of abse nce c auses tha t p er s o n’s re place ment to be re turned to a lowe r position i n g rade or compensation, the replace d person ha s a pre fer ential rig ht to a subsequent appointment or promotion to the same or a simil ar position

from which t he person was demote d . This prefe rential rig ht has priority over a n elig ibilit y list and is subj ect to the repla ced pe rson re maining phy sically and mentally fit to discharg e the duties of that positi on.
Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 143.072 (empha sis added). 6

I t is un dis pute d th a t B ro wn ’s a bs e nc e wa s n ot d

ue to “ ini tia l tra ini ng or

annua l duty in th e milit ary

rese rves or

the national guard.” See id . § 14 3. 07 2( b) . Rathe r, the pa rt ie s d isp ute wh e the r s ub se c tio n ( a ) a

pp lie s w he n a

n o ff ic e r i s recalled

to active duty , or if it applies only when an off icer e nte rs int o the military
. Id . § 143.072(a)
. The plain m ea n i n g of “e nter” can be “to make a beg inning.” SeeWebster’s Third New I nternational Dictionary 756 (1986). In construinga similar provision, the San Antonio court of appe als rec og nized that there is a
definite distinction betwe en a pe rson beingrec alled on ac tive duty and one who is on active duty

as a result of joining the service
. The first situation involves the ge nera l8

pr inc ipl e of

an invo luntary c a ll to duty ; whe re a s, the latte r is ba sic a lly a vo luntary a c t, irre s p e c ti v e o f

th e r e a s o n s f

o r s u c hv o lu

n ta r y a c t. T h e r e c a ll o f

r e s e r v is ts to a c tive duty has bee n commonplace since just prior to World W ar I I , and ther efore, the dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n ‘ be ingre c a lle d to a c tiv e duty ’ and that of ‘j oin ing the se rv ic e ’ i s well known. City of San Antonio v. P i n ch back, 489 S.W .2d 451, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1972, no writ). This distinction was also rec og nized by the leg islature. I n section 143.02 8 , t h e l egi slature pr ov ide d th a t “ [i]if

a pe rs on is recalled on ac tive military duty for not mor e than 24 months, the twoy e ar s e rv ic e re qu ir e me nts pr e sc ri be d b y Sub se c tio ns (a ) a

nd (b ) do no t app ly and

the pe rs on

is entitled to ha

ve time spe nt on active milit ary duty considere d as duty in the respe ctive fire or police depar tment.” Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 143.028 (West 1999) (e mphas i s ad d ed). W hen the le g isl a tur e ha s u se d a

te rm in o ne se c tio n o f a

sta tut e and e xclu de d it

in a no the r, we wi ll n ot i mpl y the term wher e it has been e x cluded. Meritor Auto., Inc. , 4 4 S
. W
. 3 d at 9 0 (c i t i n g Sm ith v . B ald win , 611 S.W .2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980)). Thus, in another section in t h e chapte r, the leg islature sp e c if ic a lly a dd re sse d p e rs onne l is su e s o f o ff ic e rs wh o ar e re c a lle d on ac tiv e mil ita ry duty , y e t di d not use the same te rm in section 143.072, and we will not im ply its use. McElroy contends that the le g islature’s use of the word “demoted” in subsection (f)
c omp e ls a c on c lus ion that se c tio n 1 43 .0 72 a pp lie d a nd tha t th e City wa s r e qu ir e d to pr omo te him
. We disag ree . First, subsec tion (f) only applies t o an officer or fire fig hter who w as g rante d a military le ave of a bs e nc e . T e x. L oc . G ov ’t

Cod e Ann. § 14 3. 07 2( f)
. Vi e wi ngthe statut e a s a wh ole and

its terms in context, we believe that the word “demoted” convey s a loweringof position, but does not
nece ssarily

compel the perma

nent promotion of a lower- ranking office r into the positi on cre ated by the a bs e nc e of the se nio r o ff

ic e r o n mi lit ary

le ave . Th e pla in langua g e of the statut e , e sp e c ia lly

inF ur the rm or e , f

e de ra l st a tut e s and re g ulatio ns a pp ly to the job s o f i nd ivi du a ls who se rv e in 7 the military
. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301-4333 (2002) ( Uniformed Ser vices E m p l o y

m ent and Reemploy ment Rights Act)
. 9 light of the leg islature’s pr ovision for temporar y assig nmen t s in this chapter, doe s not compel the City to pr om otea re maining of fice r, only

to return a

n absent office r to his or her orig inal position upon return. See id . §§ 143.038 (tempora ry duties in highe r classification), .072. The Cit y has the discretion to either temporar ily assig n or permanently promote other of fice rs into positi ons that are op e n f oll ow inga

le ave of mil ita ry a bs e nc e purs ua

nt t o s e c tio n 143 .0 72 . How e ve r, the City is
r e qu i r e d , u n d e r

c e rt a i nc o n d i t i o n s , t o r e i n s t a t e e l i g i b l e o f f i c e r s u p o n t h e i r r e tu r

n f r o mm i l i t ar

y d u t y. 7 See id . § 143.072(d).

The plain a

nd common meaningof the wor ds in subsection (a ) o f sec tion 143.072 compel us to hold that a military leave of absenc e without pay “to ena ble [a] person to enter

a bra nch of the United States milit ary service ,” does not a pply to those who are recalled into mil itary

service in situations ot her tha

n initial training or a

nnual duty
. Se e id . § 143.072(a) , (b) ( emphasis adde d). Our holding , howeve r, must be consider ed in light of fede ral lawand loca l personnel policies. See , e.g. , 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333 (2002). Was McElroy e ntitled to prom otion pu rsuant to sect ion 143.036?

Next, McElroy

argues t h a t i f s e c ti o n 1 4 3
. 0 7 2 d o e s n ot apply , section 143.036 re quired the City to promote him. Specifically , McElroy urg es us to hold tha t Br own’s abse nce c reated a

“ va c anc y” wh ic h r e qu ir e d th e City to p e rm ane ntl y

pr omo te McElr oy in No ve mbe r 2 00 2— wi thi nI f an e ligibility list does not ex ist on the date a v ac an cy o cc u rs, other pr ocedur es and 8 timelines apply
. SeeTex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 143.036 (West 1999). 10 six ty day s of the tempora

ry appointment—rathe r than his subsequent pr omotion in J une 2003. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 143.036(a) , (e)
.

Section 143.036 provides that “[i]f an elig ibilit y list ex ists on the d at e a va canc y
oc c ur s, the de pa

rtme nt he a d sha ll fil l the va c anc y by pe rm ane nt ap po intme nt f ro m th e e lig ibi lity

lis t fu rn ish e d b y

the c omm iss ion

wi thi n 6 0 day s aft er the date the va c anc y oc c ur s. ” Thus , w e mus t

8 deter mine whether

Br own’s abse nce c onstitut es a “ vaca ncy” of his position. See id
. A vac ancy

occur s when a

n ex i s t i n g position i s vacated or a newly cre ated position is established by

ordinanc e. Se e City

of F or t W or th v . Ny bo rg , 9 9 9 S. W.2d 451, 4 5 5 ( T e x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 1 99 9, pe t. d e nie d) ; see also City of San Antonio v. Edwards , 974 S.W .2d 148, 151 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 19 98 , n o p e t.) ; International Ass’n of Firefighters Local 624 v. C ity of San An ton io , 822 S.W .2d 122, 131 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied)
. A vac ancy also occ urs when the e mploy ee is pe rmane ntly disqualif i ed fr om further

service
. See G ibson v. Barbe , 907 S.W .2d 646, 648 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no pet.).

The doc umentation verify ing B row n ’s re call into active military service states that he wo uld be on duty fo r 2 69 da

y s, and the re c or d s ho ws tha

t B ro wn int e nd e d to re tur

n to his position. Thus, under the fa cts in this case, Br own was only temporar ily absent from his positi on. His position was not vacate d, and he w as n o t permane ntly disqualified from f

urther se rvice
. See Ny bo rg , 9 99 S.W. 2d

a t 45 5; Gibson , 907 S.W .2d at 648.11 Fur thermore , under Mc Elroy ’s interpre tation, anytemporar y ab s ence could be a

“ va c ancy ” requ irin g pr omo tio n und e r s e c tio n 1 43 .0 36 , r e nd e ri ngse c tio n 1 43 .0 38 , w hic h p e rm its temporar y assig nments, superfluous. The re is a pr esumption that the entire statute is intended to be
e ff e c tiv e , a jus t and re a so na ble re su lt i s in te nd e d, and publi c int e re st i s f avo re d o ve r a

ny pr ivate interest. Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021 ( West 2005).

Thus, we hold that under the fac ts in this case , Br own’s posi tion was not vacated, and the City was not re quired to pe rmane ntly promote an elig ible office r into Br own’s position pursuant to sections 143.036 or 143.108. See Te x. L oc . Go v’ t Cod e Ann. § 14 3. 036(a) . W e ov erru le McElroy ’s sole issue.
CO NC LU SION

Havingoverr

uled McElroy ’s sole issue, we aff irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

__________________________________________ W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med F ile d: Marc h 16, 2006