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IRAN’S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY

AGENCY OBLIGATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 24, 2015

Serial No. 114–23

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. William H. Tobey, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University ......................................................................................................................... 7

Ms. Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, fellow, George C. Marshall Institute ....................... 13

Mr. David Albright, founder and president, Institute for Science and International Security .................................................................................................. 20

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. William H. Tobey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 8

Ms. Rebeccah L. Heinrichs: Prepared statement .................................................. 15

Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement ............................................................... 22

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa: Statement from Michael Rubin, Ph.D. ........................................ 54

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 60

(1)

IRAN’S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGENCY OBLIGATIONS 

TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and Ranking Member Ted Deutch for 5 minutes 

each for our opening statements, I will be glad to recognize other 

members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from 

our witnesses. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for being here 

today. Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will 

be made a part of the record and members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

Before we begin, I would like to see unanimous consent to enter 

the testimony of AEI’s Dr. Mike Rubin for the record. Dr. Rubin 

was originally slated to testify at this hearing before it had to be 

postponed due to inclement weather earlier this month and is not 

unable to join us today and we thank him for his contributions to 

this hearing. And hearing no objections, his statement will be made 

a part of the record. 

The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. This week marks 

the end of the second extension of the Joint Plan of Action and 

though no final deal has been made as the negotiations continue, 

it is important to take stock of where we stand today versus where 

we stood on November 24, 2013 when the JPOA was formally announced. While Iran may have complied with some cosmetic aspects of the JPOA, reducing enrichment stockpiles, turning off 

some centrifuges, the fact remains that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure remains entirely intact. 

Let us pretend for a moment that Iran hasn’t already violated 

the terms of the JPOA, a notion that is as preposterous as Iran’s 

claim to its right of enrichment. The role of monitoring Iran’s nuclear program and verifying its adherence to the agreement falls on 

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sidering we failed to detect Iran’s covert activity before and we 

failed to detect nuclear activity in Syria and North Korea in the 

past. 

History has shown us that our intelligence assessments are not 

always perfect, so we cannot allow Iran to even possess the capability to get a bomb because we very likely would miss it if Iran 

makes that mad dash. 

Just last year, the Defense Department put out its own assessment that we do, in fact, lack the capability to detect covert nuclear 

sites in Iran and wouldn’t be able to detect a move toward breakout. And it was before this subcommittee that General Hayden, 

former Director of the NSA and the CIA, echoed that sentiment 

saying that as long as Iran continues to block access to its facilities 

we wouldn’t be able to detect its development of a bomb. He then 

stated that if he were advising the President, unless Iran came 

clean about its past weaponization and PMD activities, he would 

be compelled to say that the deal could not be adequately verified. 

So then that leaves the lion’s share to the IAEA. 

The IAEA has a long history in Iran, but not nearly as long as 

Iran’s history of subterfuge and covert work on a nuclear weapons 

program. As a signatory to the NPT and the Safeguard Agreement 

with the IAEA since 1974, Iran was required to make accurate and 

complete declarations of all of its nuclear material and nuclear-related activities to the IAEA. We know that Iran was in violation 

of this for decades and being in violation had forfeited any claim 

it had to enriching uranium. 

Since 2003, we know that Iran has done everything it can to deceive, block, and prevent the IAEA from gaining the access it needs 

to verify its nuclear program. Iran has taken advantage of several 

rounds of negotiations to stall for time and has exploited loopholes 

and ambiguities to make advances in its nuclear program. And this 

latest attempt by the P5+1 is no different. Since November 24, 

2013, as part of the JPOA, the IAEA has been working to get unresolved issues regarding Iran’s past, its work on nuclear weapons 

development, and other possible military dimensions (PMD) of 

Tehran’s nuclear program. 

Yet, even as the negotiations continue, the IAEA reports that 

Iran has been unwilling to cooperate and is hindering its inquiries. 

There are still a dozen outstanding questions that the IAEA has 

about Iran’s PMD, possible military dimension, that Iran refuses to 

provide answers for, giving us more reason to suspect that Iran is 

pursuing a nuclear program for other than peaceful purposes. 

The JPOA sets a bar lower than had previously been established 

through a series of six U.N. Security Council resolutions. For a nation that has operated a covert nuclear program for decades and 

which continues to stonewall the most serious inquiries from the 

IAEA, we should have every reason to suspect that its activities extend further than what has been declared to date. 

Just a few weeks ago, it was reported that there may indeed be 

other covert sites that Iran has not previously declared and this is 

why this nuclear deal is setting up to be a bad and dangerous deal 

because it relies on something we cannot guarantee. The only way 

that we can ensure that Iran is in compliance with the IAEA obligations and is not paving the way toward a nuclear weapon is to 

3

fully dismantle its infrastructure because as long as that infrastructure is intact, Iran will always be able to make the decision 

to go for the bomb and the IAEA or our Intelligence Community 

does not have the ability, despite what President Obama guarantees, to detect it in time. Shame on us. 

And with that, I am glad to yield for his opening statement to 

my good friend from Florida, the ranking member, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We are now a week 

away from the deadline to reach a political framework agreement 

in the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 over Iran’s illicit 

nuclear program. For all the talk about various elements of a potential deal, including future verification and monitoring, it has 

been easy to lose sight of a very clear and very current indicator 

of Iran’s willingness to comply with international obligations. That 

is, its repeated stonewalling and noncompliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

The IAEA first found Iran to be in noncompliance with its obligations as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2005. 

Between 2005 and 2010, the IAEA issued 30 reports detailing concerns about Iran’s activities, ultimately leading to referral to the 

Security Council and successive rounds of sanctions, including U.N. 

Security Council resolutions demanding that Iran stop enrichment. 

Running parallel to the current P5+1 negotiations, the IAEA, arguably the agency that will be charged with carrying out future 

monitoring and verification of a nuclear deal, has been engaged in 

a new round of discussions with Iran. On November 11, 2013, the 

IAEA and Iran signed a joint statement on a framework for cooperation. In the framework for cooperation, the IAEA and Iran 

agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to 

resolve all present and past issues. 

In its latest report, on February 19, 2015, the IAEA confirmed 

that it has only been able to make progress on 1 out of 12 key 

issues. The report states and I quote,

‘‘Iran has not provided any explanations that enable the Agency to clarify the two outstanding practical measures nor has it 

proposed any new practical measures in the next step of the 

framework for cooperation.’’

As it has for years, Iran has been slow walking investigations and 

inspections, refusing to cooperate on providing past activities and 

refusing access to various suspect sites. And this is simply to carry 

out its obligations as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty. There are many of us who fear that this is an unfortunate 

foreshadowing of the way in which Iran will respond to its obligations should there be a permanent nuclear deal that is reached. 

Now if Iran wants to show the world that it can act in good faith 

or that we should have any belief at all that this regime could be 

trusted in the future, it would start by cooperating with IAEA. If 

Iran at the end of any nuclear deal wants to be treated like any 

other NPT country, it could start by acting like one now. 

Extremely concerning throughout this whole process is the refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to certain suspect sites, notably 

Parchin. With respect to Parchin, as previously reported by the 

IAEA, the activities that have taken place at this location since 

4

February 2012 are likely to have undermined the Agency’s ability 

to conduct effective verification. It remains important for Iran to 

provide answers to the Agency’s questions and access to the particular location at this site. 

But most concerning is Iran’s refusal to cooperate on the possible 

military dimensions of its program. How can we construct a viable 

verification regime going forward if we don’t know fully what the 

Iranians have done in the past with respect to weaponization? Just 

this week, speaking at a conference, IAEA Director General Amano 

stated and I quote,

‘‘We are also implementing the Joint Plan of Action and we can 

also say the implementation is good. But with respect to the 

clarification of issues with possible military dimensions, the 

progress is limited and this is the area where more cooperation 

from Iran is needed.’’

Amano said the Agency still was not able to conclude whether all 

nuclear material in Iran was being used for peaceful purposes, saying,

‘‘We continue to verify the nondivergence of nuclear material 

declared by Iran, but we are still not in a position to conclude 

that all nuclear material in Iran is peaceful in purpose.’’

Given Iran’s intransigence, the international community is left 

with little choice but to believe that it has something to hide. And 

I for one would not be comfortable with any nuclear agreement 

that doesn’t force Iran to come clean on its past activities. 

As former IAEA official Olli Heinonen wrote earlier this month,

‘‘The IAEA can only return to routine inspections when the 

IAEA is certain that all nuclear material and activities are 

being used exclusively for peaceful purposes.’’

And I frankly don’t know how we can ever be certain of this when 

we don’t know everything that Iran has done. 

Furthermore, as I mentioned at the outset, it will be the IAEA 

who will be charged with carrying out verification and monitoring 

should a deal be reached. It is the IAEA that wants to first observe 

a violation and then what happens? Do the Iranians stonewall as 

the international community tries to get additional information? Do 

they have the opportunity to dispute the IAEA’s findings? How 

long will it take for the IAEA to confirm its finding and report to 

the P5+1? Who is responsible for determining the penalties if a violation occurs? These are all outstanding questions that will need to 

be answered before any reasonable country should enter into any 

agreement with Iran. 

Lastly, let me just say I frankly am unclear as to how we can 

reasonably conclude any permanent agreement with Iran on its nuclear activities if the IAEA is unable to finish its parallel investigation. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today and I appreciate their 

insight and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, for that 

opening statement. 

Mr. Issa of California is recognized. 

5

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair. This is an important hearing. I want to hear some of the specifics about the breakout time, 

the technical problems, and to the greatest extent possible, some of 

the areas in which the proposed agreement falls short from an inspection standpoint. I also look forward to hearing Mr. Tobey who 

has vast background and knowledge and history of where we failed 

before. We failed with India. We failed with Pakistan. We failed 

with North Korea. The difference in all of those is expansive view 

of the world and terrorism that clearly is coming from Iran. If they 

get a nuke, we will never hear or see the last of it in the region. 

Having said that, I want to echo the statements of both the 

chairman and ranking member. When they talk about a country 

that cannot be trusted, Iran comes to the top of the list. Since 

1979, consistently, year after year, decade after decade, what Iran 

says and Iran does are different. And therefore, until or unless 

there is an inspection regime that is verifiable and has been consistently verified before a deal, any expectation that once sanctions 

are lifted that Iran will suddenly be a new and different Iran are, 

in fact, sillier than the many turnarounds we saw in Groundhog 

Day those many years ago. The fact is history does repeat itself. 

Iran will not keep its promises. And Madam Chair, I want to thank 

you for this important hearing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Issa. Mr. Boyle 

of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you and I am reminded of the saying that the 

best way to predict future behavior is to look at past behavior. So 

I am especially interested in this subject matter. I have already 

read the three witnesses’ testimonies and I think that judging 

Iran’s experience with respect to the IAEA is a great way to project 

future behavior. 

I also just want to add following on the last comments that were 

made by Mr. Issa, it is actually remarkable when you look at humankind over the last 65 years that nuclear weaponization has 

been contained to the extent that it has. The challenge of Iran 

reaching a nuclear capability is would that be the catalyst to touch 

off Saudi Arabia and every other regional player also deciding that 

they would suddenly be interested in this capability. 

So with only a minute, I will save the rest of my comments for 

question time. I would just say I thank the chair and the ranking 

member for having this incredibly important hearing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think a lot of 

Americans are wondering what is going on with these negotiations. 

Iran does cheat. Can we trust them? And then lo and behold, a couple of days ago, you have the Supreme Leader, the only decision 

maker that really matters chanting ‘‘Death to America.’’ So is he 

saying ‘‘Death to America’’ because he means it? If so, why would 

we be negotiating? If he doesn’t mean it, how do we trust what he 

says? It is interesting how that was dismissed by the White House 

as oh, just mere domestic political rhetoric. Don’t worry about that. 

But when the Prime Minister of Israel says something in the heat 

of the campaign and then explains, no, you have got to hold him 

to that. You are going to take him to the United Nations now. We 

are going to turn our back on Israel. 

6

The national intelligence estimate has removed Iran and 

Hezbollah as terrorist threats in their recent worldwide threat assessment. Gulf States are responding to the potential for this deal 

in a way that they clearly don’t have confidence in. The Socialist 

President of France is stronger on Iran than the U.S. administration is right now. 

I look forward to the testimony, but I think I speak for a lot of 

my constituents that we are concerned about this deal. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis. From 

Florida also, Mr. Clawson. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Thank you for coming. Years ago, there was a 

movie called Animal House and the characters went on a road trip. 

You all probably remember the movie. And the character that 

needed to supply the vehicle was named Flounder. And it was his 

older brother’s shiny black Lincoln Mercury. And so his crazy fraternity brothers wanted to use that car for their road trip. Now he 

knew he shouldn’t have given him the keys. Everybody watching 

the movie knew he shouldn’t give him the keys, that it was going 

to be a bad outcome. We all knew it. And yet, he gave the keys to 

his brother’s car and of course, they took the car and trashed the 

car. And at some point afterwards they said ‘‘Flounder, you messed 

up’’ or something to that effect. ‘‘You trusted us.’’

We all know if we give the keys, the nuclear keys to Iran, that 

we are going to look back and say we really messed this up. We 

trusted them. And so I echo what has already been said here today. 

I don’t know what reason we would have to trust and we all know 

if we give the nuclear keys to these folks that we are going to regret it. Thank you for coming today. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Clawson. Ms. 

Frankel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I may be a little 

repetitive, but there are three points that I am interested in. First 

of all, thank you all for being here. 

Number one is how confident are you that we would be able to 

verify a complete Iranian compliance with an interim agreement? 

Number two, what lessons should we learn from our history with 

North Korea? And finally, do you have an opinion as to whether 

a comprehensive agreement should require Iran to come clean on 

its entire nuclear program including weaponization? And I waive 

the rest of my time, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Those were excellent questions. Thank you 

so much, Ms. Frankel. 

And now we will turn to our witnesses. Thank you very much for 

being here with us. We are pleased to welcome Mr. William Tobey. 

He is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Previously, he was Deputy Administrator for the Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the 

National Nuclear Security Administration and has served in the 

National Security Council staff. Welcome, Mr. Tobey. 

Second, we welcome Ms. Rebeccah Heinrichs. She is a fellow at 

the George C. Marshall Institute where she has concentrated her 

research in the areas of nuclear deterrence and missile defense. 

She has also held fellowships from The Heritage Foundation, the 

7

Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and has previous work as 

a congressional staffer. Do we pronounce the S in the last name? 

Ms. HEINRICHS. Yes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And last, but certainly not least, 

we welcome back Mr. David Albright, founder and president of the 

Institute for Science and International Security. He has authored 

numerous assessments on covert nuclear weapons programs 

throughout the world, as well as regular publications on scientific 

research. 

We welcome all of you. Your prepared remarks will be made a 

part of the record. And Mr. Tobey, you will be recognized after that 

great intro from Mr. Issa, Mr. Historian. 

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM H. TOBEY, SENIOR FELLOW, 

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. TOBEY. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be 

here to speak about a matter of surpassing importance. 

Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is vital to U.S. 

national security interest. The committee has asked to focus today 

on Iran’s non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and from 

the opening statements, it is already clear that the committee has 

a profound understanding of those issues. So I will confine my remarks to just three points. 

First, in 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board 

of Governors found that Iran had violated its safeguards obligations by failing in a number of instances over an extended period 

of time to make necessary declarations. 

Second, since 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 

Secretariat has expressed serious concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program which Tehran refuses to 

clarify despite being required to do so under the Joint Plan of Action agreement. And here I would note that many of the members 

referred to the so-called possible military dimensions and I think 

that gets to the heart of the important issues on the Iran agreement. 

Third, in August 2014, less than 6 months ago, the United States 

Department of State sanctioned an Iranian Government organization for ongoing nuclear weapons development work. 

In sum, Iran has violated its safeguards obligations in the past. 

It is charged by the United States Government with doing so in the 

present. And evinces little reason to believe that it will not continue to do so in the future. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tobey follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Tobey. Ms. 

Heinrichs. 

STATEMENT OF MS. REBECCAH L. HEINRICHS, FELLOW, 

GEORGE C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE 

Ms. HEINRICHS. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, 

members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to participate in this hearing. 

I have spent the last 10 years in various capacities from working 

for the Congress to working as a researcher in think tanks studying specifically how the U.S. can deter the most catastrophic kinds 

of attack with an emphasis in ballistic missile defense which is 

critical should deterrence fail. 

Arms control is just one tool for deterring the spread of strategic 

weapons, but for it to be effective as President Obama said in his 

2009 Prague speech, ‘‘Rules must be binding. Violations must be 

punished. Words must mean something.’’ Administration officials 

have said that Iran cannot be permitted to achieve a nuclear weapons capability which if it did, would be in violation of the NPT as 

well as several Security Council resolutions, but to allow Iran to 

maintain its ability to produce a nuclear weapon while also relieving sanctions would signal to foes that violations, if persistent 

enough, could end in reward. 

It is important to keep at the front of our mind the context of 

which the P5+1 has attempted to secure a diplomatic solution. Iran 

views the U.S. and Israel as its principal enemies and over the past 

three decades Iran has very intentionally created a network of terrorist surrogates, able to target U.S. interests and Israel. The regime does not view the P5+1 talks as an opportunity to reconcile 

with the West. To the contrary, Iran has failed to instill confidence 

in the most optimistic of U.S. diplomats that it is sincere about 

maintaining a peaceful nuclear program. 

At the recent APEC conference, Ambassador Rice said ‘‘The administration holds a distrust and verify policy toward Iran’’ an important twist on President Reagan’s policy toward the former Soviet Union, ‘‘Trust, but verify.’’

But Iran to this day stonewalls the IAEA’s efforts to verify the 

Iranians’ claim that the nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful 

purposes, making verification nearly impossible. 

In 2011, in November, the IAEA laid out possible military dimensions of the program. The Agency concluded that Iran had been undergoing a structured program that included possible 

weaponization activities until the end of 2003, but then went on to 

cite activities related to the development of a nuclear explosive device that continued after 2003 and noted that these particular activities could remain ongoing. 

And just last month, the IAEA report confirmed again that Iran 

still has not provided any explanation that enable the Agency to 

clarify the outstanding practical measures. 

But even if the Agency were permitted unfettered access to Iran’s 

scientists, documents, and facilities, and able to get to the bottom 

of Iran’s weaponization activities, by all accounts the negotiations 

do not include Iran’s missile program. Iran wants more than a nuclear weapon. Iran wants to be able to credibly threaten its adverVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:17 May 21, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\032415\93913 SHIRL
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saries with a nuclear armed missile and also with a variety of conventionally armed missiles. The DNI assessed that Iran would likely choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering a 

nuclear weapon, if one is ever fielded. 

Missiles are a cost effective way for a country like Iran to pose 

an asymmetric threat to much more militarily sophisticated countries like the U.S., therefore, Iran is motivated to keep and improve 

his arsenal and has defied U.N. Resolution 1929 in order to do it. 

For example, it is improving its accuracy of missiles to threaten 

ships in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and is on a determined course to achieve an intercontinental ballistic missile capable to threaten the U.S. homeland. 

Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, seeming to back away 

from her previous commitments to include Iran’s missile program 

before this committee, said that a comprehensive agreement, although it is important to address that Resolution 1929 is ‘‘not 

about ballistic missiles per se’’ but about nuclear arms missiles. 

But a ballistic missile can carry conventional or a non-conventional 

warhead including those that are chemical, biological, and nuclear. 

In closing, Iran continues to support terrorism and there is no 

evidence that it has made the political decision to move away from 

achieving a nuclear weapons capability. Getting to the bottom of 

what the IAEA identified as the possible military dimensions of 

Iran’s nuclear program ought to be a necessary condition to moving 

forward with any kind of real negotiations. But even if this is accomplished, any deal focused on Iran’s nuclear program must include its missile program. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Heinrichs follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Albright. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Deutch and other members. Thank you for inviting me to testify 

today. 

Adequate verification is critical to a long term nuclear deal with 

Iran. Robust measures are needed to ensure declared nuclear sites 

engage in only peaceful activities and more importantly to ensure 

the absence of undeclared nuclear material and facilities in Iran. 

Although the interim deal under the JPA strengthen the monitoring of declared nuclear facilities, it did little to increase the 

IAEA’s ability to detect and find covert sites and activities. The 

IAEA has regularly reported in its quarterly safeguards report on 

Iran that it is not in the position to provide credible assurance that 

all nuclear material in Iran is used for peaceful activities. 

Whether this situation changes will largely depend on the ability 

of the United States and its partners to create a long-term agreement that establishes legally binding conditions on Iran that go beyond those in the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. A critical question will be whether the agreement 

establishes a verification regime adequate to promptly catch Iran 

in cheating. 

There are many reasons why an agreement must require extraordinary verification arrangements as has been pointed out today so 

far by I guess every speaker. The most critical ones are Iran’s well 

documented violations of its safeguards agreement, its actions inconsistent with that agreement and a peaceful nuclear program 

and Iran’s long history of non-cooperation with the IAEA. 

Let me just list a few additional examples. Iran has built several 

nuclear facilities in secret. It has been pointed out that Iran has 

violated its comprehensive safeguards agreement prior to 2004 on 

multiple occasions. Iran has depended extensively on illegal overseas procurements of a range of goods for its nuclear programs in 

violation of national laws and U.N. Security Council resolutions. At 

least one illegal procurement for the Arak reactor complex was attempted after the JPOA went into effect. Although this is not a violation of the JPOA, it does violate U.N. Security Council Resolutions. 

Iran has not allowed the IAEA to visit the site at Parchin which 

has been mentioned already or other sites associated with past 

work on nuclear weapons research and development and other military nuclear activities. Iran has delayed inspectors’ access to sites 

and extensively modified buildings or the sites themselves in apparent efforts to thwart IAEA verification methods. And of course, 

Iran has stonewalled the IAEA in resolving the inspectors’ concerns 

about the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programs. 

This record demonstrates why Iran has a significant confidence 

deficit with much of the international community. As a result, 

verification conditions in a long-term deal will need to be rigorous, 

unprecedented, and long lasting. These extraordinary conditions 

need to remain in place for at least 20 years. This time frame 

21

should be sufficient for the IAEA to achieve full confidence in the 

absence of undeclared Iranian nuclear materials and facilities and 

in a peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programs. 

To that end, several measures are needed to ensure adequate 

verification and a long-term deal. I agree with others, other members, or with members and with my panel that Iran must address 

the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s past and possibly ongoing nuclear 

weapons research and development. An agreement that sidesteps 

the military nuclear issues would risk being unverifiable. Moreover, the world would not be so concerned if Iran had never conducted weaponization activities aimed at building a nuclear weapon. If no concrete progress on this issue is forthcoming by July 1st, 

a deal should not be signed. If Iran in good faith asks to delay demonstrating concrete progress until after a deal is signed, it should 

not receive any sanctions relief until it fulfills its commitment 

along with providing a road map on resolving the rest of the 

IAEA’s concerns. 

Visits to Parchin and related sites and access to key individuals 

should be part of Iran’s demonstration of concrete progress. 

United Nations Security Council sanctions on proliferation-sensitive goods such as dual use high tech goods should be maintained 

during the duration of the deal. Authorized nuclear programs could 

be exempted from these sanctions via specially monitored procurement channel. Often overlooked, these sanctions are critical to 

building an adequate verification regime. These sanctions are a 

fundamental part of ensuring that Iran is not secretly establishing 

the wherewithal to build secret nuclear sites, make secret advances 

in its advanced centrifuge or other nuclear programs or surge in capability if it left the agreement. 

And finally, a deal must include legally binding provisions that 

allow the IAEA to conduct snap inspections or anywhere anytime 

inspections. These provisions need to also require broader Iranian 

declarations about nuclear activities than those required in additional protocol. These conditions should also last for at least 20 

years. 

So thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]

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39

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Excellent panelists 

and I would like to ask unanimous consent that our subcommittee 

recognize our special guest who is with us, Mr. Trent Franks, for 

a statement he would like to make. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you kindly, Madam Chair. I appreciate your 

holding this hearing so very much and as it happens Ms. Heinrichs 

was the military legislative assistant in our office and she taught 

us essentially everything we know about missile defense. And we 

are just extremely proud of the direction that she has gone, that 

she is able to teach other Members of Congress and I think she is 

a force that is important to the world and I really appreciate you 

being able to hear her testimony today. I don’t want to embarrass 

her. She didn’t know I was doing this, but we are very impressed 

with all the great things she is doing. And with that, I am just 

grateful for the opportunity and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you so much and I think that 

that was an accurate assessment of her capabilities and she made 

a most excellent presentation. So trained by the best. I don’t know 

which way that training went. I think knowing you, Trent, it went 

toward you. But thank you so much and I am so pleased with the 

testimony today and with the members present and this is an extremely important topic. 

The administration’s argument is that this deal will allow us to 

have the mechanisms in place to monitor and verify Iran’s compliance with any final agreement, to hold Iran accountable, and to 

prevent it from getting a bomb, a wonderful desire, wonderful outcomes. But as most folks pointed out, every indication from past 

history suggests otherwise, that Iran’s continued stonewalling of 

the IAEA will continue and even during the implementation of the 

JPOA this stalling and this stonewalling was taking place. So it 

gives us further cause to be less than optimistic. 

As the ranking member pointed out earlier this week, Olli 

Heinonen, the former Deputy Director General of the IAEA who we 

have had testify before us and Ray Takeyh, and former NSA and 

CIA Director General Michael Hayden, stated in an op ed in the 

Washington Post that even if the nuclear deal manages to push 

Iran’s nuclear breakout time to 1 year, that is the stated goal, this 

might not be sufficient to detect and reverse the Iranian violations. 

So I wanted to ask the panelists what are the difficulties in 

achieving a verification regime that would be capable of detecting, 

of testing, of acting to stop Iran from possible breakout for both the 

IAEA and their standards and the U.S. Intelligence Community? 

What difficulties do we have in getting such a structure in place? 

We will begin with Mr. Tobey. 

Mr. TOBEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. The difficulties are considerable and they are made worse by what at least has been reported 

about the shape of the deal. You referenced creating a 1-year 

breakout time. That, of course, deals only with declared sites. So 

that would ensure or would aim to ensure that the declared sites 

were not used to make nuclear weapons. But the problem is that 

I think most analysts believe that were Iran to move in the direction of nuclear weapons, they would use undeclared sites, covert 

sites. And the burdens that are placed on any verification program 

for detecting covert sites are made much more difficult by the alVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:17 May 21, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\032415\93913 SHIRL
40

lowance of some enrichment work. I know that that has been bitterly disputed as to whether or not Iran should or should not be 

allowed to have any enrichment capability. But I think it is indisputable that if they have some capability it would be more difficult 

to verify that that capability isn’t being diverted to covert sites. 

So that is why it is so centrally important to get to the bottom 

of the so-called possible military dimensions that all of you have 

referenced, all of us have referenced. All of us in this room understand the importance of that issue. And I think it has to be gotten 

to the bottom of in order to ensure that future activity——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. TOBEY. It is not about the past. It is about the future. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. Ms. Heinrichs? 

Ms. HEINRICHS. I agree with what my colleague just said. I will 

also just like to point out that because the nuclear program is so 

inextricably tied to their missile program, the missile component is 

something that hasn’t been discussed as what it should be. But 

missile detection is much easier to do than to detect the 

weaponization elements of the nuclear program. 

And so we can already see what they are doing with their missile 

program. So Mr. Tobey is correct. It is almost impossible to get to 

the bottom of the verification if they don’t even disclose what they 

have done in the past. And we need to do that first. But I would 

suggest that an easier, possibly an easier way to actually see what 

they are doing is just look to see their massive missile program. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very good point. Mr. Albright? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. The administration’s goal of having a 1-year 

breakout criteria makes sense. I mean you need something to drive 

in negotiations. 

As Mr. Tobey pointed out and it is easier to apply to declared facilities and where the difficulty is, of course, is if Iran is going to 

try to do covertly. And I would say may do a hybrid or using declared and undeclared facilities. So there are many paths to the 

bomb. 

But I think the verification, if done rigorously, can actually lead 

to a situation where you could do this in a year. But it certainly 

would, from my point of view would need to include coming clean 

on PMD. You would have to be able to make sure Iran isn’t smuggling goods in for a covert site, so you would need the U.N. Security Council sanctions to remain in place for the duration of the 

deal. If it has to empower or give more tools to the inspectors, they 

are going to have to be able to go, in a sense, very quick notice to 

sites where there are suspicions. They are going to have to have 

access. And so you are going to have to wire all this in an agreement. And if it isn’t wired in an agreement, then I think it will be 

very hard to satisfy the 1-year criteria for undeclared sites. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. True. Now as we know, Iran impedes any 

and all IAEA inspections that it can that may be related in any 

way to its suspect activities including the PMD. And we were talking about the snap inspections, the any time, anywhere inspections. 

Many people believe that we need that in order for this deal to be 

credible. 

How likely is it that the Iran deal will include these inspection 

parameters that they will have this snap, any time, anywhere inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:17 May 21, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\032415\93913 SHIRL
41

spections? Will we insist on it? Will the IAEA insist on it? The Intelligence Community, will they be satisfied with what is in the 

deal to detect Iran’s noncompliance if these snap inspections were 

not guaranteed in any final agreement? 

Mr. TOBEY. With respect to the any time, anywhere inspections, 

I don’t know whether or not those will be a part of the agreement. 

But I would point out that there are other elements that may be 

as or more important. It is an important deterrent to have the ability for inspectors to go any place any time. But it is not how you 

generally detect a covert operation or a covert nuclear capability. 

That is done by talking to people, by examining records, by much 

broader declarations as Mr. Albright already referenced, by the sort 

of patient and careful work that would lead inspectors to understand that covert activity is underway. And it is only at the last 

moment that one would actually take the final step to go and visit 

a site. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. They have to do their homework before to be 

able to have that snap inspection. 

Mr. TOBEY. Absolutely. So all of that work is at least as important as the ability to go any time any where. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I believe the only real way to 

prevent Iran’s breakout is to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. 

As long as we are only getting access to what Iran wants us to see, 

there is no way to know, as you pointed out, the real extent of 

Iran’s nuclear program. And the current JPOA is limited to only 

declared sites, as you pointed out. It is the undeclared sites that 

should really worry us. 

Mr. Tobey, you stated that by doing this it actually facilitates 

Iran’s ability to cheat. If you could explain that. 

Mr. TOBEY. I am sorry, by doing——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The current JPOA is limited to only declared 

nuclear facilities and by doing this, we are actually perpetuating 

that 

Mr. TOBEY. Exactly. The focus of the talks has been creating this 

1 year breakout time. So we have gone from a situation where the 

President’s originally-stated goal was preventing Iran from getting 

a nuclear weapon. In other words, changing their strategic calculus. Now our goal is putting a 1-year speed bump between Iran 

and a nuclear weapon. Unfortunately, that applies only to declared 

sites. And the only way to get at undeclared sites is a two-fold operation which Mr. Albright has already referenced. One is to get to 

the bottom of these so-called possible military dimensions and the 

second is to be able to understand and monitor all of the equipment 

and materials that Iran is either importing or creating itself that 

would be applicable to making nuclear weapons. So without those 

two elements any agreement would not be verifiable. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And Mr. Albright, getting back to the snap 

inspections that you were talking about, how can the IAEA monitor 

and verify any Iranian activity at sites that are actually 

undeclared? If you could push that button. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. You asked would this be an agreement. I mean 

I think there is worry that it won’t be. There is certainly indications that the administration is making compromises and the Iranians have been very tough on this. This was told to me by one of 

42

the negotiators well over a year ago that the Revolutionary Guard 

had sent a signal through the Iranian negotiators that there was 

no way the IAEA would be allowed to visit military or Revolutionary Guard sites. And so that was stated as one of the essentially two major redlines. And of course, that is unacceptable, but 

will the U.S. push hard enough to overcome this redline and get 

to an ability to have anywhere any time inspections. 

Now of course, we will see, but I do worry about it and I think 

that without those I would expect they wouldn’t get the broader 

declarations too, that there is a real risk that you won’t have the 

package of measures needed to do adequate verification. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It would be interesting to see. And one last 

question and I thank the members for allowing me all this time 

and you will have that time as well. 

Ms. Heinrichs, you have done extensive work on Iran’s ballistic 

missile program and as you pointed out in your testimony, written 

and verbal, several U.N. Security Council resolutions explicitly 

seek to curb Iran’s missile program. But how closely related are 

Iran’s progress on its ballistic missile program and its nuclear program? And do you think that the negotiations will include or 

should have included other aspects of Iran’s dangerous activities 

including its support for terror, its ballistic missile program? 

We had a full committee hearing last week and I think Mr. 

Blinken, we asked him is Iran the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and he said it is among the top. I can’t even imagine except 

for North Korea who is in that league. But if you could tell us 

about the ballistic missile program and other aspects of Iran’s dangerous behavior? 

Ms. HEINRICHS. Thank you for the question. I think it is possibly 

one of the most important questions. Iran’s nuclear program is inextricably tied to its ballistic missile program. They go hand in 

glove. So if we simply pause their enrichment capability, for instance, they have already mastered the ability to enrich, and they 

are very patient, so they can go ahead and take a pause on that. 

And then continue the more difficult aspects of their program 

which is their delivery system, their ballistic missile system. 

So ballistic missiles, they are relatively cheap, if you are going 

to try to pose an asymmetric threat to a country that is much more 

militarily sophisticated than Iran, like the United States. And that 

is exactly what the Iranians have been working on doing. They 

have just successfully orbited their fourth satellite which is that 

technology is directly transferrable to an ICBM capability and the 

Intelligence Community still assesses that Iran will be able to test 

an ICBM capability which would give them an ability to coerce the 

United States’ homeland by this year. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Deutch is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Mr. Albright, during 

these negotiations we have been told that the goal ultimately is to 

cut off the four pathways to a nuclear bomb for Iran: Fordow, 

Natanz, Arak, and covert program. Are those the only four? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That covers it. I think there is always more, but 

that is the main pathways that the administration needs to worry 

about. 

43

Mr. DEUTCH. And the access, the unprecedented access that we 

are told we received during this JPOA, during the interim deal, 

does not include any where, any time inspections? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No. 

Mr. DEUTCH. What do we have now? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, there is better monitoring at declared sites 

and there is some more openness at parts of the centrifuge manufacturing complex. But in general, no. The measures that were put 

forth as part of the JPOA were never intended to be able to increase the IAEA’s ability to detect covert sites. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So what is it going forward? You said we need any 

where any time inspections and that those need to be in place for 

at least 20 years. Is that, given the reports in the news, would that 

be 10 years beyond the deal or would that be—would that require 

a deal that is 20 years long? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. It could be done independently of the limits on 

the nuclear program. I mean one would assume that when it is on 

the Arak reactor are indefinite. They won’t be reversible, so once 

they are put in place there will just be limits on the ability to make 

weapon-grade plutonium. 

On the centrifuge number, those could be lifted after some period 

of time. These inspection arrangements, these broader verification 

requirements must continue past that, I would argue. You are 

going to need them for a long time. In a sense, Iran has been in 

noncompliance for 20 years. I mean it has severe lack of credibility 

and 10 years is just not enough. 

Mr. DEUTCH. What does that mean, they have been in noncompliance? Take a step back. We are all steeped in this. We have 

been focused on this for a long time. For people who are tuning in 

to these talks because it is the very end and there is a lot of talk 

to understand about striking a deal with Iran and stopping it from 

acquiring nuclear weapons. Why are we concerned? What have 

they done wrong all this period? And weaponization and creation 

of a bomb, but they tell us they want to have a peaceful nuclear 

program. For people who haven’t paid attention, explain to them 

why this matters so much. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. It is a little bit like someone who breaks the law. 

Iran has been deceiving the IAEA, the international community, 

for 20 years or so. And its intention was to put together in secret 

nuclear capabilities and part of that capability appears to have 

been oriented to getting nuclear weapons. So in a sense you have 

a situation where they have been caught and convicted. That is in 

the sense what the U.N. Security Council resolutions signify and 

that they are on probation. And we need time in order to verify 

that they are reformed. And in that period you need to limit their 

ability, in a sense their freedoms to move on nuclear programs. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And they have not verified anything to date. A lot 

of believe we shouldn’t, we can’t make a deal, shouldn’t consider 

making a deal if they are not willing to come clean on the past 

military dimensions of the program. Would it make sense for us to 

do that? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Obviously, the administration is thinking about 

not doing that. I think that is pretty clear. Or doing it in a much 

more limited way than maybe we have discussed today. 

44

Now I think one of the problems of doing that is if I can go back 

to the days of the agreed framework, people were really scared of 

war with North Korea in ’94. And a decision was made to call off 

the inspectors and a deal was made that essentially hobbled the inspectors. They were brought forth to do monitoring and I at the 

time supported the agreed framework, but I understood its weakness. 

In this case, there is a risk that if you don’t get the IAEA’s 

strengthened, it doesn’t go into this deal knowing what Iran has 

done in the past, you are hobbling them and undermining their 

ability to verify. But in this case, unlike the North Korean case, the 

IAEA is going to be called upon to be the lead investigator in a 

sense to determine whether Iran is complying. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right, so that is what I want to understand. So the 

IAEA—Iran has completely stonewalled. They have not been forthcoming. They have not granted the access to the IAEA. They have 

not answered the questions posed by the IAEA which stem from 

the fact that we know that as you point out, we know what Iran 

was trying to do to develop nuclear weapons. They were caught. 

They were convicted, but we are now at the point where they are 

not complying with what the world has expected them to comply 

with, right? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is right. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So the question is going into a deal, if there is one, 

regardless of what the deal looks like, if it is the IAEA that is ultimately the entity that is going to monitor and verify whether the 

terms of a deal are being lived up to by the Iranians, how, number 

one, how can that happen? How do we trust that that can work 

given 20 years of experience that we have had with Iran’s interaction with the IAEA? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I would agree that it can’t work. I mean it is really—I mean no one is looking for Iran to have a mea culpa. It would 

be nice and it would be very helpful, but there are ways to do this 

sort of thing. But Iran can’t continue to—it essentially almost 

abused the IAEA. They issue reports. One came out a couple of 

weeks ago which just belittles the IAEA. And also in that report, 

they argue strongly that the IAEA’s verification as it exists today 

should be weakened. So you have a situation that is unacceptable 

and Iran does need to face up and make changes in how it views 

verification and how it treats the IAEA and how it satisfies the 

IAEA’s condition. 

And I would say that it may be that in the way the administration is negotiating this is that you can’t force Iran to do this before 

the deal is signed, but you certainly can say no sanctions relief 

until they at least make concrete progress on addressing the 

IAEA’s concerns. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. So the question is if you—if there is a deal 

that is reached, the moment that a deal is struck if there is sanctions relief of any kind and according to the reports in the press 

which is what we have to go by on the current negotiations, according to the reports in the press, Iran’s sticking point is that they 

want massive sanctions relief or total sanctions relief at the outset. 

If you provide any sort of significant sanctions relief the day the 

agreement is signed, you will have rewarded Iran for 20 years of 

45

bad behavior, flouting international norms, and ignoring the demands of the IAEA. Isn’t that right? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes, I agree. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And finally, if the goal is a year’s breakout time 

and we have just gone through all these concerns about the IAEA, 

is a year enough time? Is that goal enough for the IAEA to detect 

a potential breakout, to verify it, and then take action to stop it, 

particularly given that there are other countries Iran may argue 

the other countries, the P5+1, the U.N. may be brought in, is a 

year breakout time realistic if the IAEA is the entity that is tasked 

with enforcing it? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. At declared sites, I think it is. And again, I think 

some of this depends on the U.S. being willing to take military action if it believes there has been a violation and it is confirmed. 

And the idea with the year is that there would be enough time to 

gather international support to avoid that. But in the end, some of 

this is going to rest on the U.S. being willing to do that. 

Now in the covert sites, if the verification is not improved from 

what would be traditional IAEA safeguards and additional protocol, 

then it is going to be tough. I mean you could easily have had a 

situation with Iran where you do spend a year arguing in the 

United States, internationally, on what has happened, is it really 

a violation? You may have trouble pulling together a coalition and 

the U.S. may be put in a position of having to decide does it take 

military action when there is deep opposition to that military action? But if the verification arrangements are done properly, then 

I think a year can be enough. But it is going to require a very intrusive verification system and it is unclear if that can be accomplished. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Madam Chairman, I appreciate the indulgence. 

Anything short of that then, anything short of unprecedented any 

where any time inspections demanded by the world of Iran which 

Iran should comply with given their history and given what else 

would be included in this deal, anything short of that makes that 

1-year breakout time which has been the goal we have been told 

of these entire negotiations significantly perhaps dramatically less 

than 1 year leaving us with a dramatically reduced period of time 

in which to respond. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Could be, but the one thing I would say any 

where any time is not unprecedented. That language is adopted 

from what South Africa said it would do after it decided to come 

clean about its past nuclear weapons program which also was a big 

fight. South Africa refused to do that initially despite the evidence, 

but under pressure decided to come clean and accepted this idea 

of anywhere any time inspection. So I think it is not unprecedented. But I do think that there is a lot of parts to verification. 

And so I wouldn’t want to say that if you don’t get one exactly as 

you need it, that the thing falls apart. You have to look at it system wide. But without any time any where inspections, the job gets 

much harder. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that, Madam Chairman, thank you 

and I thank the other witnesses for your testimony. I didn’t want 

to exclude you, but I am out of time. Thank you. 

46

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. Mr. 

DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Mr. Tobey, are you comfortable with the enrichment ability that is contemplated under this deal? It had always 

been that they were not going to be able to enrich. Now they have 

a substantial number of centrifuges. Are you comfortable with 

that? 

Mr. TOBEY. The original idea to ban all enrichment was to keep 

Iran from gaining the technical capacity to understand that, so 

they couldn’t mount a covert effort. Unfortunately, that horse is out 

of the barn. So the original rationale for that, I think, is diminished. At the same time, zero is a lot easier to verify than some 

higher number which would allow the technology and equipment 

perhaps to be diverted. 

So while I think it is not an ideal situation, the only terms under 

which I would be comfortable is if we had two additional 

verification provisions. One would be to get to the bottom of the 

possible military dimensions as we have talked about and the second would be to have firm control over the materials and equipment that Iran either produces or imports as Mr. Albright has described. So this would be an ongoing monitoring situation. 

And so by allowing some level of enrichment, I think it demands 

a much more rigorous verification system. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The 10-year sunset that is reported, is that adequate? 

Mr. TOBEY. It doesn’t strike me as adequate. This issue was reported by the IAEA Board of Governors to the U.N. Security Council 10 years ago. I am dumbfounded that we might have an agreement that would be shorter than the time it has taken to negotiate 

it. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Ms. Heinrichs, do you agree with that? Ten years 

to just simply walk away after 10 years and trust that they are 

going to behave. Does that bother you? 

Ms. HEINRICHS. No, I don’t think that we should trust them now. 

I think 10 years is not adequate because what we really want is 

for them to make the political decision to move away from a nuclear weapons capability and they have not done that. 

Mr. DESANTIS. In terms of the military sites, because it seems 

to me that if you are not having any type of inspection of those 

sites, if there are secret sites, we have no reason to take Iran at 

its word, it seems to me that they could abide by the deal in the 

sense of allowing full inspections and yet they could still end up developing a nuclear weapon, correct? 

Mr. TOBEY. One thing that I would point out is that Secretary 

Kerry, I think reasonably, said it is unacceptable for Iran to be 2 

months away, to have a 2-month breakout. If it is unacceptable 

today, I don’t understand why it becomes any more acceptable 10 

or 15 years from now and at least what has been reported was that 

the broad restrictions in the Iranian program would fall away after 

10 or 15 years which would enable them to move right back to that 

2-month breakout period. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Even if the inspections were allowed to go to 

these sites, if the military sites are not included, then they could 

47

conceivably keep the deal with respect to those inspections, but still 

develop a capacity. Is that inaccurate? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. It is a fear. I mean if the IAEA can’t do its job 

and get to the bottom of what has happened, the PMD issues, 

namely, and then be able to continue verifying no activity at those 

sites and among those people and potentially other sites, then it 

would be an agreement where Iran could just wait it out. 

But the idea is that you try to at least have restrictions on the 

program for a generation. That was the goal. Looking back a year, 

the goal was to have restrictions, pretty strict restrictions on the 

whole program for a year, intrusive verification, and then over that 

period of time you would then develop confidence that they 

wouldn’t try to get weapons in the future. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Or give time to have a change in the regime or 

change in the nature of the regime. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is right. And so if you shorten that, and it 

is just 10 years, then of course, you have to worry more. Now I 

would say be careful. We don’t know the details. The administration is going out of its way to confuse us, I will admit, when they 

talk about using double digits or they use terms like at least 10 

years. They talk about phasing on the enrichment programs. So I 

think the situation is very confused. But I do think it is very logical 

to demand that the verification conditions either be permanent or 

last at least a generation. And I think that has be a very clear message that the administration hears. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Look, I am mindful about kind of jumping on 

some of these reports. At the same time, you do look at the behavior of the Gulf States and what they see. Their behavior is not very 

comforting in terms of this being a deal that they have confidence 

in, and obviously they fear an Iranian bomb very much. 

Look, my bottom line is we have seen different examples of this 

where North Korea, obviously, didn’t work. I think Gaddafi feared 

he was going to be removed from power. He really was worried 

about the threat of military force. And I just wonder whether Iran 

really believes that that credible threat is on the table. And if they 

don’t, then man, I think that they have every incentive to want to 

cheat this deal. I am over my time and I will yield back. I am good. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis. And 

thank you, Mr. Boyle, from Pennsylvania. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BOYLE. As you might remember from my brief opening remarks, consistent with what I think pretty much everyone who has 

spoken on both sides of the aisle here, I come to this whole issue 

as someone who is highly skeptical that we could reach an agreement that reasonable people would have full confidence in. 

That said, it is worth remembering, I think it was Ms. Heinrichs 

who quoted President Reagan, ‘‘Trust, but verify.’’ He quoted the 

Russian proverb, ‘‘Doverai no proveryai.’’ The reason why we remember that is because it was said at a signing ceremony with Mikhail Gorbachev. And so those agreements that after the failure at 

Reykjavik, when the agreements were signed in ’87 and ’88, they 

were criticized at the time by some as naive and going too far. And 

I would say that history proved them—proved President Reagan 

pretty well in terms of reaching those agreements. 

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So toward that end, while I am highly skeptical given Iran’s repeated history of bad faith behavior with the IAEA and with the 

international community and being with one of the largest, if not 

the largest, exporters of terror in the world, all of that having been 

said, if by some grace of God a new leadership were to come in 

Tehran, actual, real, Western-oriented, moderate, who wanted Iran 

to rejoin the international world, and give up this path that they 

have been on over the last three and a half decades, what would 

a real agreement look like that each of you would say that is something that is worth signing? That is something that we could place 

trust in and actually have real confidence that it was actually an 

agreement worth signing? 

Mr. TOBEY. In terms of a technical model, it has already been 

referenced, the South Africa example is probably a good one. I 

would also look for markers of a strategic decision just as you described, that Iran had decided to forego pursuing nuclear weapons 

in favor of a better relationship with other nations. 

Frankly, I do come back again to this possible military dimensions issue. If they are not willing to come clean on that, it not only 

makes verification more difficult, but it is a marker of Iranian intent because they clearly want to hide something in order to preserve it. 

And so I would say that an agreement that looked like it was 

going to be useful and that is what I think all of us here seek. I 

mean the reason we have criticisms about what may be taking 

place is because we want a better deal, not because we don’t want 

a deal. It would be to get to the bottom of that issue. 

Ms. HEINRICHS. I appreciate the question. I would agree that we 

have to get to the bottom of the possible military dimensions, but 

again, I think it is a bit of a litmus test to look at their missile 

program. There is no reason that the Iranians need to be as dedicated to their massive ballistic missile arsenal that they have if 

they don’t intend to use it for coercion. And who are they trying 

to coerce? It is the United States. It is the United States’ influence 

in the region. And so I think unless we see a political decision or 

a strategic decision of the Iranians to move away from this ballistic 

missile capability, which I believe is inextricably tied to their nuclear program, and then allow complete unfettered access of the 

IAEA to its nuclear program to show that they are actually coming 

clean, essentially, the South Africa example being a good one, then 

we should not trust them enough to secure a diplomatic solution 

to this problem. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think one of the worries that was alluded to earlier that they will just wait it out. They did some of that during 

the time of the suspension from ’03 to ’06 and President Rouhani 

bragged about how they were able to advance while waiting it out. 

So I think one of the concerns now is that the pattern of the Iranians appears to be to basically say that yes, we will give up the 

IR1s which are pretty decrepit machines, but we want to be able 

to advance our centrifuges and build advanced ones and keep that 

program alive. 

And I think that this deal is going to be much less worthwhile 

if Iran succeeds in being able to do centrifuge R&D on a substantial basis and I think there is a real worry that that could happen. 

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And clearly, it is where I think the Iranians are building their narrative. And the U.S. has invested a lot into capping and reducing 

the IR1 program which may be the thing that Rouhani cares least 

about at this point in time. Certainly, the nuclear people probably 

don’t care about. 

Some other things that are very important is and I think the administration has made progress is in getting rid of the stocks of 

well-enriched uranium in Iran. They can’t stay there. Whether they 

are in hexafluoride form or oxide, they should leave the country. 

So I think they have made good progress on getting that established, but whether Iran will go along or not is still an open question, but if there are very minimal stocks in Iran, then that would 

be—that would build confidence in this deal. 

Another thing is that Fordow would be shut down and not involved in any enrichment, that Iran should not have deeply buried 

sites that contain any gas centrifusion enrichment capability. That 

is critical, too. Again, I am not sure the administration is going to 

get that or is even seeking that at this point in time. 

So I think that there are many ways you could put together an 

agreement and I think the administration has thought through all 

of them and so now the question will be are they going to come up 

with an agreement with enough of those in there that one can have 

confidence in. 

Mr. BOYLE. Well, I thank you, all three of you and I see I have 

hit my time limit. But I would just ask in closing and maybe a 

quick response, South Africa has been referenced a number of 

times. I think though not on the nuclear part, but in terms of a 

country that was clearly engaging in terrorism and then actually 

decided they wanted to rejoin the international world and that was 

more important to them under the end of Muammar Gaddafi. That 

is actually an example of a country that remarkably changed its 

behavior. 

I was wondering if we know of any others that we can point to 

as a potential model to hope and work toward Iran joining? 

Mr. BOYLE. There has been other victories, less well known, but 

Taiwan had a nuclear weapons program and the U.S. intervened 

politically to end it. And it was done very quietly. So I think there 

are other victories. Same in South Korea. It was a little tougher 

there, but—so I think there is ways to do this, but again, I think 

it depends on the U.S. exerting its influence and the country 

changing its attitude toward some of these issues. 

Mr. Tobey raised this issue of——

Mr. BOYLE. And every one of the examples cited it was ultimately initiated by a decision made in that capital to completely 

change and which direction it was going and change its priorities 

and then behavior changes followed that. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. But under a lot of pressure. Those cases involved 

tremendous amounts of pressure, even South Africa. There were 

cases, I was told, meetings with nuclear officials in South Africa 

with U.S. officials where a South African official was fist pounding 

essentially on the table denying they had a nuclear weapons program just a week or two before de Klerk admitted, yes, we did have 

one. So I think that pressure matters. And in South Africa, conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:17 May 21, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\032415\93913 SHIRL
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gressional pressure mattered. If you look back in history, you will 

see that the U.S. Congress played a very important role. 

Ms. HEINRICHS. I would just add that it was under enormous political pressure, but it was also in the case of Libya and then as 

the Intelligence Community has said that they believe that some 

of the weaponization activities did cease around the 2003 time line, 

about the time that Libya then voluntarily gave up their WMD program, but it was under the fear of a credible threat of military invasion. It was when the United States went into Iraq. So I think 

that that is important to keep in mind that without the credible 

threat of force, that some of these things might not have happened. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much and unfortunately that 

credible show of force is lacking in Iran. The negotiations look to 

be we are playing a very weak hand and I don’t think that pressure is being applied to Iran and Congress has been muted and the 

sanctions are being lifted and we are in pretty bad shape. But you 

were wonderful panelists so we thank you very much for being here 

with us. And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA


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