PEACEW RKS

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Fiona Mangan with Erica Gaston

[ [
Cover photo: Covered Yard Area, Hodeida 

Central. Photo by Fiona Mangan.

The views expressed in this report are those of 

the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 106. First published 2015.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-282-9

© 2015 by the United States Institute of Peace

About the Report

This report examines the prison system in Yemen from 

a systems perspective. Part of a three-year United 

States Institute of Peace (USIP) rule of law project on the 

post-Arab Spring transition period in Yemen, the study 

was supported by the International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Bureau of the U.S. State Department. With 

permission from the Yemeni Ministry of Interior and the 

Yemeni Prison Authority, the research team—authors 

Fiona Mangan and Erica Gaston for USIP, Aiman al-Eryani 

and Taha Yaseen of the Yemen Polling Center, and 

consultant Lamis Alhamedy—visited thirty-seven detention facilities in six governorates to assess organizational 

function, infrastructure, prisoner well-being, and security.

About the Authors

Fiona Mangan is a senior program officer with the USIP 

Governance Law and Society Center. Her work focuses 

on prison reform, organized crime, justice, and security 

issues. She holds degrees from Columbia University, 

King’s College London, and University College Dublin. 

Erica Gaston is a human rights lawyer with seven 

years of experience in programming and research in 

Afghanistan on human rights and justice promotion. Her 

publications include books on the legal, ethical, and 

practical dilemmas emerging in modern conflict and crisis 

zones; studies mapping justice systems and outcomes 

in Afghanistan and Yemen; and thematic research and 

opinion pieces on rule of law issues in transitioning 

countries. She holds degrees from Stanford University 

and Harvard Law School.
PEACEWORKS • MARCH 2015 • NO. 106

CONTENTS

Introduction ... 5

e Prison System ... 9

Prisoner Well-Being ... 25

Conclusion ... 41

Recommendations ... 43

Notes ... 47

Appendix A. Data Overview ... 51

Appendix B. Facility Visit Data ... 52

Appendix C. Detention Centers ... 70

Appendix D. Prison Act and Regulations ... 76

Appendix E. Online Only Decisions and Regulations ... 83

[In its political transition and reform, Yemen faces 

complex and challenging security threats....Addressing 

the weaknesses and deficiencies in the prison system will 

be key to promoting rule of law and improving security.]

USIP.ORG 3

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Summary

■ Since the 2011 crisis sparked by the Arab Spring, Yemen has been in a critical political 

transition. Improving government institutions and rule of law are key goals. Reforming the 

prison system must be at the core of any strategy for improving rule of law institutions.

■ Security is universally weak across central prisons. Facilities lack both the physical infrastructure and technical expertise to counter the serious security and terrorist threats they 

face. Prison breaks are frequent, resulting in serious consequences for broader rule of law 

and citizen security.

■ Most facilities have no proper classication and segregation systems in place, and thus 

detainees held for lesser crimes often mix with serious oenders, and pre-trial detainees 

with sentenced prisoners. is practice not only violates detainee rights but also enables 

criminalization, radicalization, and recruitment throughout the detention system.

■ Overcrowding and substandard prisoner care both result in physical and psychological 

damage and contribute to frequent rioting and security incidents.

■ Most guards have no training before taking on their positions. is lack has a negative 

eect on treatment of detainees, security, and prison guards themselves. Prison guards 

showed signs of psychological strain, fear, and stress, in part due to managing roles they 

have not been adequately prepared for.

■ Within the scope of challenges facing Yemen is a risk that reform of detention and prison 

facilities might not be prioritized. However, given the centrality of a safe and strong detention system for law enforcement and antiterrorism, a failure to do so would be a mistake.

■ A number of simple, often not costly, reforms—such as establishing basic training for 

prison leaders, reinforcing a prison order and routine, establishing secure key control and 

prisoner classication, and baseline security protections—would address many of the most 

serious rights violations and security concerns.

USIP.ORG 5

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Introduction

Specic attention to detention systems is critical during transitional periods, not only to improve rights and governance but also to improve security and rule of law. e ability of the state 

to securely hold and properly manage large numbers of people in detention has signicant 

ramications. On the one hand, insecure prisons, or violations of rights in prisons, can lead to 

both short and long-term societal discontent and either spark or reignite conict. Conversely, 

when a state safely cares for and respects the rights of its criminals and detainees,1 the eect 

on rule of law is positive.

Perhaps nowhere are these concerns more evident than Yemen, where regular terror-related 

prison breaks have rocked the country. Overcrowding and substandard prisoner care lead to 

serious physical and psychological damage among inmates.2 ese conditions in turn lead to 

frequent rioting as well as radicalization and recruitment within detention facilities.

Since the 2011 Arab Spring crisis, Yemen has been in a critical political transition and 

considered signicant proposals for security sector reform, including its detention system. In 

November 2011, after nearly eleven months of protests and rapidly escalating civil conict, 

the country’s main political parties signed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement, 

which established a two-year period for political transition and related UN-backed implementation mechanisms.3

 Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to step down from power 

in exchange for immunity. Former vice president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi was conrmed 

as interim president in a February 2012 referendum and by a government of national unity 

between the General People’s Congress (GPC) and the opposition parties under the coalition, 

the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).

In addition to halting the immediate political crisis, the GCC agreement set out a number 

of benchmarks for the transition period to include both taking “necessary measures to achieve 

peace and security and extend State control” and improving governance and rule of law.4 In 

2012, several powerful relatives and cronies of the former president were ousted from top security, political, and even business positions as a result of a series of presidential decrees and public 

pressure. With signicant international technical and nancial support, the new transitional 

government engaged in planning for reform and restructuring of Yemeni institutions, notably 

in the security sector. ese included the Ministries of Defense and Interior as a whole, and 

those branches of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) related to the Prison Authority.5

More potential reforms were anticipated following the close of the National Dialogue 

Conference (NDC), the agship process in the GCC agreement.6 Among the more than 

eighteen hundred recommendations, the nal NDC document called for reorganization of the 

Prison Authority and provision of sucient funding for prison facilities. e document recommended recruiting more highly qualied sta and providing appropriate nancial incentives 

for guards and sta at all facilities. It also emphasized the need for improvements in classication of inmates, greater engagement in education and rehabilitation services, and better care for 

female prisoners and their children.7

In addition, because one of the key decisions of the NDC was to adopt a federalist system, 

many powers currently centralized at a national ministerial level may be devolved to regional or 

governorate level ocials. At the time of writing, it is not clear whether the primary authorities 

currently granted to the Prison Authority (to be discussed in detail later in this report) will be 

decentralized to governors, but such a move seems unlikely in light of current planning discussions among MOI ocials.8

Overcrowding and 

substandard prisoner 

care lead to serious 

physical and psychological 

damage among inmates.

These conditions in turn 

lead to frequent rioting 

as well as radicalization 

and recruitment within 

detention facilities.
6 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

However, although the GCC agreement and the NDC created an élan for reform, true 

political transition has often been frustrated by frequently problematic government actors and 

the weakness of the transitional government. e agreement and subsequent reforms removed 

Saleh and some of his most prominent supporters from power, but the deep patronage systems 

and political capture that have for years abetted institutional weakness and frustrated institutional reform remain. e power-sharing agreement, which has been treated as a de facto quota 

system by the GPC and the opposition JMP, has exacerbated intragovernmental squabbling 

for positions and control. Rather than leading toward reform, this squabbling has limited the 

ability of the government to maintain even basic competencies.

e government has, for example, been unable to cope with the heightened security pressures coming out of the 2011 crisis. Security, rule of law, and government control as a whole 

remain far weaker than in 2010. ere is in fact no meaningful state-backed rule of law or even 

state control in most of the country. Criminality has increased and armed groups are more 

prevalent and pose a more serious threat to government authority. Already fragile and underperforming government institutions are under ever greater strain in the face of deteriorating 

security and prolonged political uncertainty.

e Prison Authority has been directly aected by these situational and environmental 

factors. e lack of government presence or rule of law across vast parts of Yemen creates an 

enabling environment for transnational terrorist networks and criminal actors. Terrorist and 

criminal groups have directly targeted law enforcement ocials and detention facilities in order to free detained associates or prevent arrest.

ese immediate challenges have compounded many of the long-standing structural systems and prisoner care challenges outlined in this report. As the transition progresses, it will be 

key to include prisons as a core aspect of security and justice reform, both as a contribution to 

building a more enlightened rights-based approach to detention and as a key factor in ensuring 

state security.

e weakness of the transitional government and the existential nature of security threats 

came to a dramatic climax in September 2014, when the Houthis—a political faction with a 

strong military arm that has frequently clashed with government forces—seized control of the 

capital Sana’a.9

 In addition to seizing major strategic assets, Houthi ghters took over many 

basic government functions, from patrolling streets in Sana’a to reportedly guarding some of 

the prison facilities in Yemen. e takeover also forced a new political arrangement, called the 

Peace and National Partnership Agreement, that will signicantly aect how the remainder of 

the transition period and any reform agendas advance. Although the Houthi takeover and the 

new political arrangement were not in place when this research ended, they are important to 

implementing the recommendations in the future.

Methodology and Approach

An extensive 2013–14 mapping of justice institutions in half of Yemen’s governorates suggests 

that a more in-depth assessment of detention facilities and their role within larger rule of law 

challenges would be valuable.

With a focus on understanding detention from a systems perspective, looking at organizational and legal function, prisoner well-being, infrastructure, and security, this study centers 

primarily on facilities under the jurisdiction of the Yemeni Prison Authority, the central prisons 

Terrorist and criminal groups 

have directly targeted law 

enforcement officials and 

detention facilities in order 

to free detained associates 

or prevent arrest.
USIP.ORG 7

PRISONS IN YEMEN

in particular. An eort was also made to visit juvenile care centers and detention facilities at 

police stations, courts, and other MOI facilities to better understand a broader spectrum of 

detention issues and the interplay between detaining authorities in Yemen. It was not possible, however, for the team to cover detention by the national security agencies and detention 

by tribes in facilities beyond state control. Yemen’s primary internal security and intelligence 

agencies—the Political Security Organization (PSO) and National Security Bureau (NSB)—

report directly to the president and operate their own detention centers, often holding highprole, high-risk detainees for long periods without bringing any formal charges against them. 

Concerns have been raised both by local and international human rights organizations and the 

international community about reports of prisoner abuse, torture, and extrajudicial detention 

at PSO and NSB facilities.10 Also of great concern, nonstate private prisons are operated by 

Yemeni tribal leaders, often based within the compound or home of a tribal leader or sheikh 

and used during conicts with other tribes or as a means of controlling or punishing their own 

tribesmen. Reports of abuses at these centers are widespread, but tackling the issue has proved 

problematic because many such tribal leaders are represented in parliament.11

From mid-February to the end of April 2014, a team of mixed international and Yemeni 

researchers visited detention facilities in six governorates: Sana’a, Taiz, Aden, Hodeida, Ibb, 

and Hadramawt. ese facilities included central prison facilities and a range of temporary 

detention locations, thirty-seven facilities in total (see table 1).

Table 1. Facilities Visited

Aden

Aden Central Prison

Basateen Police Station

Aden CIDa

Aden Juvenile Care Center

Kormakser Police Station

Quloo’a Police Station

Soloban Police Station

Tawahi Police Station

Aden Court of Appeals HC

Ibb

Ibb Central Prison

Ibb CID

Remand Prison

Juvenile Care Center

Western Area Police Station

Sana’a

Sana’a Central Prison

Juvenile Care Center for Boys

Al-Habrah Remand Prison

Al-Mu’allim Remand Prison

Al-Thawrah Remand Prison

Alaya Remand Prison

West Sana’a Court HCb

Hadramawt

Mukalla Central Prisona

Fwah Police Station

Mukalla Police HQ

Traffic Police

Hadramawt CID

Sayun Central Prison

Sayun Police HQ

Tareem District Police Station

Socotra

Socotra Police Station

Hodeida

Hodeida Central Prison

7th July Police Station

Ad Dari Police Station

Hodeida Remand Prison

North and South Circuit Court and PGO

Taiz

Taiz Central Prison

Taiz CID

Taiz Police HQ

Judicial Complex HCb

Sabr al-Mwadem Court HCb

a

 access limited

b access denied

CID = Criminal Investigation Department; HC = holding cells; HQ = headquarters
8 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

At each facility visited, the team carried out an initial interview with the prison director or 

ocer-in-charge and then performed a walk around, observing as many areas of the prison as 

possible. Information intake sheets were used to collect data at each location and to record observations. Because opportunities to speak with inmates condentially were limited, discussion 

with them was limited to questions geared toward ensuring that inmates understood why they 

were being held, their next court date, their sentence, release date, and so on:

Map 1. Prison Facilities in Yemen

Rada
USIP.ORG 9

PRISONS IN YEMEN

§	 How long have you been at this detention center?

§	 Do you understand the charge against you/your sentence?

§	 Have you been to court?

§	 When is your next court date?

§	 Do you know when you will finish your sentence/be released?

§	 What is your age?

§	 What is your nationality?

In general, research teams were granted good access to detention facilities, but overcrowding and security concerns necessitated the withdrawal of the teams from many of the facilities 

before they were able to fully observe all areas. All facilities were observed with permission 

from the Yemeni Ministry of Interior and the Yemeni Prison Authority. Authorities were generally cooperative and supportive of the research, and most observations were made in the 

company of those in charge of the facilities. However, full access was prevented at facilities in 

Hadramawt, at nearly all court facility holding cells, and at the Central Investigations Department Holding Cells in Aden.

The Prison System

Legal and Regulatory Framework

In Yemen, the Prison Authority Organization Act, Republican decree no. 48 (1981), and Prison Act regulations provide the legal framework for management of the prison system. Despite 

its origin in Saleh’s often closed and oppressive regime, the prison law contains many positives. 

At its core is a progressive nonpunitive approach to imprisonment and a central aim of reform 

and rehabilitation. e rst paragraph of the act identies this intent and goal clearly:

The Prison authorities shall take into account the importance of the psychological factor 

in reforming and rehabilitating the prisoners. They shall continuously endeavor to 

develop and improve the service they provide to prisoners because they are in need of 

human treatment and a caring environment. Furthermore, the prisoners shall be free 

from hunger, diseases and abuses. They shall maintain their family links, preserve their 

dignity and observe their human rights.12

e law and regulations provide a strong basis for management of Yemen’s prisons, spelling out detailed provisions on inmate admissions, training and labor, health care, classication, 

discipline, internal management and regulation, and appropriate restraint of inmates. ey 

include a few weaknesses, however. e law lacks a robust section detailing prisoner rights—

core protections that merit detailed description and inclusion as a binding part of prison law. 

Additionally, provisions requiring segregation of foreign and homosexual inmates legitimize 

discriminatory practices.13 Regulations lack uniform coverage of practical aspects of prison 

management, very detailed in certain areas but entirely absent on others. ey dedicate, for 

example, an entire chapter to duties of social and psychological workers, setting out four categories of work, but fail to establish any guidance on the role of prison guards.

At least one copy of the law was available for use by the prison director and senior sta 

at almost all facilities. Constructively, pocket-sized laminated handbooks setting out prisoner 

rights and sta duties were recently designed by the Prison Authority for distribution to each 

detainee and sta member. Although handbooks were shown to the research team at most 

facilities, they were not observed in cells or among inmates’ possessions. is is a very positive 

initiative, and handbooks ought to be broadly distributed and used in interaction with detainees 
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PEACEWORKS 106

and sta for maximum eect. In addition, consideration should be given to other means of 

communicating rights and duties given low literacy rates in Yemen.

e prison law’s fundamental weakness is lack of implementation and enforcement—a 

fact not lost on the Prison Authority, prison directors, or guards. Prison leadership and sta 

expressed frustration with the resource-strained prison system, which undermines organizational ability to implement what is at its core a good law and constrains uniform application 

of its provisions in day-to-day facility management. Although the law is infused with notions 

of reform and rehabilitation through meaningful labor and vocational training, budgets have 

reduced prisoner activity to accessing small prison yards for a few hours each day, and only 

basic educational classes at only a few facilities. e law provides for classication of prisoners 

and specialist guards and sta to ensure appropriate security and accommodation for dierent 

groups of prisoners. However, infrastructure deciencies and overcrowding inhibit the ability 

to implement proper classication and segregation, and inadequate sta numbers and training 

impede the ability to meet basic, much less specialized, needs.

Despite practical challenges, a rst step toward encouraging application of the law would 

be to deepen awareness and understanding of its substance. is process has already begun with 

the creation of the laminated booklets on prisoner’s rights and sta duties, which should be 

distributed to all inmates and sta and knowledge enhanced through regular training.

Deeper reform of the legal and regulatory framework will require a multistakeholder review 

of the prison law and regulations. e Prison Authority Organization Act is an excellent basis 

for discussion of reform and has potential for improved implementation. Review should include 

understanding resource and management requirements for compliance, developing realistic expectations for prison directors now, setting progressive goals for improvement, and identifying 

ways to support eorts to apply the law into the future. Reform should also include expansion 

of the Prison Act regulations to comprehensively cover all core aspects of prison management.

Organizational Structure

e Prison Authority is an executive agency under the purview of the MOI. Debate is ongoing in Yemen over whether to reorder ministry oversight to place the Prison Authority under 

the Ministry of Justice. An international trend is to shift prisons under Ministry of Justice control to ensure fairness of the civilian criminal justice process by creating an institutional barrier 

between policing and internal security, and trial processes and detainee care. No decision as yet 

has been taken in Yemen.

Prison Authority Headquarters

e Prison Authority headquarters are located in Sana’a directly adjacent to Sana’a Central 

Prison and structured much like many other parts of the MOI. With the exception of the rst 

two categories, which are unique to the Prison Authority, departments are consistent with 

other ministry departments:

• Internal Affairs—registration, intake policies, security/protection, prisoner complaints, staff misconduct, and so on

• Rehabilitation and Social Care—training, education, workshops, job skills, juvenile 

detention, prison health, and prison social workers

• Planning—job descriptions, general and administrative planning, data-driven planning, and infrastructure and renovation of facilities

The prison law’s 

fundamental weakness is 

lack of implementation 

and enforcement.
USIP.ORG 11

PRISONS IN YEMEN

• Human Resources

• Financial Affairs

• Legal and Monitoring—legal cases, drafting of regulations and procedures, prison 

monitoring, and so on

In addition to the main thematic departments, the oce of the director—a chief-of-sta 

style position—and a director for general aairs—covering responsibilities such as departmental spokesman—also sit within the Prison Authority organizational frame. Finally, four 

prisons—Sana’a Central, Taiz, Aden, and Hodeida—are so large that each one is additionally 

considered a department within the Prison Authority.

Figure 1. Yemeni Prison System Organogram

e Department of Public Prosecutions also plays an important oversight and coordination role regarding detention. A deputy prosecutor-general is assigned to each central prison to

• ensure that all individuals held in custody are lawfully detained,

• follow up on prisoner release orders,

• monitor conditions,

• receive prisoner complaints, and

• investigate any potential infractions.

eir role includes addressing coordination issues arising in transport of detainees to and from 

court for hearings. In addition to assigned representatives at each central prison and some criminal 

investigation departments (CIDs), the Department of Public Prosecutions is also tasked with 

performing rotational visits to all other places of detention, including police and CID facilities.
12 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

Levels of Detention and Prisoner Classification

Article 55 of the Prison Act regulations sets out three levels of detention and the categories of 

prisoner falling under the care of each.

Central prisons

• homosexuals with prior convictions or different prisoner classifications

• sentenced to incarceration for more than three years

• held in preventive/precautionary detention and immigrants

• transferred from branch prisons for bad behavior

• others, outside these categories, as designated by the Minister of Interior

Branch (remand) prisons

• sentenced to more than one but fewer than three years in prison

• prior convictions

• transferred from the central prison as part of staged release

• transferred from local prisons for bad behavior

• held in pre-trial detention for petty crimes

Local prisons

• sentenced to less than one year in prison

• transferred from central or branch prisons as part of staged release

• held in pre-trial detention for petty crimes

• imprisoned for civil debts

In reality, these distinctions are articial and the three-tiered, strictly segregated prison 

system envisioned in the regulations has not been implemented. Local prisons were never constructed, though in some locations, police stations and CIDs serve a somewhat similar function. Branch prisons were constructed in some, but not all, cities. ey are generally referred to 

and used as remand prisons—in theory holding only pre-sentence remand prisoners. Central 

prisons are the only category more rmly established and exist in all major cities. However, 

prisoner categories in their care are far more uid than the regulations would suggest. In practice, central prisons hold a mixture of remand and sentenced prisoners and individuals serving sentences of mixed duration. Additionally classications and segregation are not practiced 

within central prison facilities. Terminology used to categorize prisoners also requires modernization and clarication, for example removing reference to “homosexuals with prior convictions” as a category.

Central prisons are divided into between three and four sections: men’s, women’s, psychiatric, and juvenile. e separation of juveniles age fteen to eighteen is a recent development and 

has not been implemented at all central prisons. It marks a shift in thinking and forms part of 

an ongoing debate on the age of majority in Yemen. Juvenile oenders age fteen and younger 

are held in Juvenile Care Centers under the Ministry of Social Welfare.

Lack of separation of distinct categories of prisoners is a problem not only between dierent facilities but also within each facility. Prisoner classication and segregation is considered 

an important part of reception of new inmates and safe management of prisoners; it can also 

be an important dimension of prison security. Generally, classications are assigned based on 

assessment of security risk, personal history, criminal record, mental health, sex, age, and so 

on.14 In Yemen, the Prison Act sets out classication of prisoners to isolate

Generally, classifications 

are assigned based on 

assessment of security risk, 

personal history, criminal 

record, mental health, 

sex, age, and so on.
USIP.ORG 13

PRISONS IN YEMEN

• new offenders from repeat offenders,

• prisoners serving sentences for severe social crimes,

• foreign prisoners from Yemeni prisoners,

• minors from adult prisoners, and

• female prisoners from male prisoners.15

Although many prisons have attempted to classify and segregate prisoners by cell, infrastructure design, prison management and overcrowding limit capacity for true implementation of the 

law because prisoners mix freely during the day within cell blocks and yard areas. For example, at 

Hodeida Central, juveniles have been segregated into one cell within the main block for sleeping; 

however it is adjacent to the cell holding adult oenders convicted of moral crimes—a term used 

to denote sex oences. Considering that prisoners also generally hold cell keys, segregation can 

hardly be considered eective. Although the stipulation to isolate foreign prisoners from Yemeni 

prisoners runs contrary to international standards and should be amended, it was only observed 

as implemented in a very limited number of facilities and dierential treatment was not observed. 

Sta, prison directors, and prison authority leadership expressed signicant concerns over the 

criminalization and radicalization of prisoners within the prison system, one director wryly observing that his prison had become “a school for teaching people how to become criminals.”

Criminalization and radicalization in prison are not new concerns but take on a disquieting 

dimension in the Yemeni context where al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) recruitment and orchestrated prison escapes have become a major dimension of prison security and 

present a threat to both local and international security. Given the extent of the threat within 

the Yemeni system, the Yemeni government, with the support of the international community, 

needs to urgently confront the security threat posed by radicalization and recruitment within 

the prison population. Prison leadership and guards should be trained and sensitized to observe 

spectrums of radicalization activity in prisons, reporting signs of group formation, incidents of 

nonviolent or violent resistance, escape attempts, internal attacks on guards or prisoners, and 

signs of communication with criminal, radical, or extremist groups on the exterior.

Prisoner classication policies should be detailed and secure containment of extremist prisoners implemented immediately. is may necessitate reassigning or segregating prison yard 

space or temporarily implementing regulated shifts for outdoor and recreation spaces in order 

to gain greater control over prison populations and reduce criminalization, radicalization, and 

victimization occurring in mixed recreation spaces. Programming aimed at countering radicalization must be more widespread throughout the system.16

Staffing Roles

e structure, role, and qualications for Prison Authority sta are not well elaborated within 

the prison law and regulations. e regulations provide details on the duties of prison directors 

and social and psychological workers but fail to set out a departmental sta structure for Prison 

Authority headquarters or prison guards of dierent ranks.

Prison Directors

e duties of the prison director are one of the few sta roles elaborated in the Prison Act 

regulations.17 e regulations place legal responsibility for prisoner care and stang decisions—including elaboration of sta functions and terms of reference, establishing prison 
14 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

routine, safety and security, prison budget, oversight, and reporting—in the hands of the prison director. Prison directors noted the weight of such responsibility and that they often do 

not feel fully supported.

Despite detailing prison director’s duties, no career path, qualications, or requirements 

are outlined for assuming a prison director or senior position within the Prison Authority. e 

de facto method has involved cross-pollination of senior MOI security sta, many of them 

switching between dierent ministry security postings, ascending to greater responsibility as 

security generalists rather than specialist prison wardens. Personal insecurity and the challenging nature in the post, however, have meant that prison director positions are often hard to ll. 

e post is regarded as undesirable, generally assumed by those who lack the personal connections to secure a better position. Senior sta noted the need for the development of regulations 

and procedures to govern stang at all levels.

In spite of their breadth of decision-making power and responsibility, only a handful of 

prison directors displayed strong control over their institutions. Many could not provide a clear 

breakdown of sta, and few seemed to understand that elaboration of sta roles was within 

their power. At a number of facilities, prison directors and senior ocers were both unfamiliar 

with the facilities and related issues and unaware of detainee concerns and conditions. In several of the central prisons, directors and sta were fearful to enter sections of the prison. One 

noted that the joint visit with USIP was the rst time he had stepped foot in the main ward of 

the prison and repeatedly requested withdrawal out of fear.

Eective prison management requires detailed understanding of the internal dynamics of 

the prison, attention to prisoner and sta concerns, and regular contact with all aspects of the 

prison to ensure interaction with and anticipation of emerging issues.

Prison Guards

Aside from a limited set of dos and don’ts for prison workers generally, scant guidance on the 

role of prison guards exists within the prison system. e prison law and regulations make 

little explicit reference to prison guards and provide no elaboration of their role and duties. 

Regulations outline that “terms of reference, work and duties [are] to be claried” by the prison 

director, an important function most prison directors were not aware of.18 is lack of clarity 

translates into unclear, ill-dened, and at times inappropriate roles played by prison guards 

within the prisons.

At the outset, an important distinction must be made between prison guards falling under 

the Prison Authority and external security guards. Perimeter security are assigned to guard the 

exterior perimeter of prisons on a rotational basis by the MOI. ey receive security training, 

carry rearms, and were broadly observed as uniformed and present. Prison guards, by comparison, are directly employed by the Prison Authority, perform their duties within the prison 

compound, interact directly with prisoners, and do not carry rearms. Guards do not consistently wear uniforms, making it dicult to distinguish them from ununiformed detainees (see 

photo 1).

It was universally reported that prison guards received either little or no training whatsoever. No specialized prison guard training course is in place. Some guards receive basic security 

training from the MOI, and a handful in each prison reported that they participated in ad hoc 

short specialized training courses.

Prison director positions are 

often hard to fill. The post 

is regarded as undesirable, 

generally assumed by those 

who lack the personal 

connections to secure a 

better position.
USIP.ORG 15

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Guards have a poor understanding of their role, severely inhibiting their ability to control 

and care for detainees. In most prisons, for example, many guards had delegated to varying 

degrees much of their power and functions to detainees. Core functions, such as key control, 

were observed as mainly in the hands of nominated detainees. In some instances, sta showed 

inappropriate and at times excessive use of force, from shouting matches with detainees and 

shoving to wielding batons, sticks, belts, and lengths of chain to control populations. In other 

centers, guards were observed in overfamiliar relationships with detainees, such as chewing qat 

outside secure areas.

e research team nonetheless reserved sympathy for prison guards, who in general did not 

seem to intentionally inict negative treatment but rather had simply been placed in high-risk, 

high-stress positions without clear delineation of their function, boundaries for their behavior, or 

the requisite skills and knowledge to appropriately handle care, security, and prisoner management. 

ese systemic failures have a negative eect on both detainee treatment and the guards themselves. Guards showed signs of psychological strain, fear, and stress—such as anxiety and unwillingness to enter sections of prisons, lethargy, fear, or anger responses in dealing with inmates—and 

a number of prison directors expressed concern over mental well-being of sta.

Specialist Staff

e United Nations standard minimum rules (SMRs) for the treatment of prisoners outline 

that, so far as possible, “a sucient number of specialists such as psychiatrists, psychologists, 

social workers, teachers and trade instructors” should be “secured on a permanent basis.”19 e 

Prison Act regulations adhere to the spirit of these standards, setting out lengthy and detailed 

duties for social and psychological workers within prisons and outlining details for labor and 

vocational training.20 In reality, however, the regulations remain aspirational. Few permanent 

Photo 1. Guards at Gate, Taiz Central

Guards showed signs of 

psychological strain, fear, 

and stress—such as anxiety 

and unwillingness to enter 

sections of prisons, lethargy, 

fear, or anger responses in 

dealing with inmates—and 

a number of prison directors 

expressed concern over 

mental well-being of staff.
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PEACEWORKS 106

Although the numbers provided suggest an adequate sta-to-detainee ratio, a lack of clarity over precise number of guards interacting with prisoners and high rates of guard absenteeism especially at night likely means a far lower ratio in practice (see table 3).

specialist sta were observed carrying out the functions outlined during prison visits. Most 

social and psychological prison workers are not full-time employees, and prison directors almost universally stressed the need for greater frequency and quantity of visits and specialists. 

Specialist educational sta employed under the Ministry of Education and medical sta under 

the Ministry of Health are also in theory assigned to work at prisons, but instead most visit 

periodically rather than take on full-time roles. Additionally, aside from general comments that 

numbers of specialist sta were inadequate to address needs, a full picture of hours and regularity of visits was either unclear or unavailable at most facilities.

Staff Ratios

Precise numbers of prison guards at many detention facilities were dicult to ascertain. Many 

facilities could not produce gures, indicating that management did not keep accurate records, 

but also that the distinction between prison guards and perimeter security was not clear. When 

numbers were provided it was hard to disaggregate sta to determine in detail the number 

of prison guards in direct contact with detainees, of perimeter guards, and of specialist and 

administrative sta at facilities (see table 2).

Table 2. Estimated Inmate-Sta Numbers at Prisons 

Inmates Staff

Sana’a Central 2,326 550

Aden Central 723 100

Taiz Central 1,577 300

Hodeida Central 951 141

Ibb Central 1,235 130

Mukalla Central 483 191

Sayun Central 87 105

Al-Mu’allim Remand 315 43

Al-Habrah Remand 250 35

Alaya Remand 330 47

Al-Thawrah Remand 170 36

Hodeida Remand 201 51

Ibb Remand 300 20
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PRISONS IN YEMEN

Table 3. Estimated Inmate-Sta Ratios at Prisons 

Total Inmates Total Staff Ratio

Sana’a Central 2,326 550 1:4

Aden Central 723 100 1:7

Taiz Central 1,577 30 1:53

Hodeida Central 951 141 1:7

Ibb Central 1,235 130 1:10

Mukalla Central 483 191 1:3

Sayun Central 87 105 1:1

Al-Mu’allim Remand 315 43 1:7

Al-Habrah Remand 250 35 1:7

Alaya Remand 330 47 1:7

Al-Thawrah Remand 170 36 1:5

Hodeida Remand 201 51 1:4

Ibb Remand 300 20 1:15

Inadequate sta skills and training are one of the clearest weaknesses inhibiting the proper 

function of the Yemeni prison system. SMRs set out three stipulations:

• The personnel shall possess an adequate standard of education and intelligence.

• Before entering on duty, the personnel shall be given a course of training in their 

general and specific duties and be required to pass theoretical and practical tests.

• After entering on duty and during their career, the personnel shall maintain and 

improve their knowledge and professional capacity by attending courses of in-service 

training to be organized at suitable intervals.21

Attention should be given to a review of sta numbers, roles, protocols, and training. Specialized prison guard training would have a transformative eect on the prison system, instilling 

guards with the condence and skills to perform their challenging role and demanding higher 

levels of professionalism in return. It was evident that guards who had received even ad hoc shortcourse training were more competent and showed more pride in their work. Over time, a professional cadre of specialized prison guards could be developed. All prison guards should receive 

specialist prison guard training from a tailored curriculum involving both theoretical and practical 

components along with regular in-service refresher training, sensitivity training, and psychological 

evaluation and support. As a cornerstone of this practice, prison leadership roles, responsibilities, 

career path, and training should be reviewed. Basic and specialist training curricula should be 

developed in line with the Prison Act and Regulations and Sta and Prisoner Rights handbooks, 

bearing low literacy rates in mind in development of training programs.22

In addition, given that a substantial number of prison facility services are the responsibility of 

institutional actors outside the Prison Authority but are currently being under-provided, crossministry discussion regarding provision, posting, and nancing of specialist support should be 

launched. is should engage all relevant ministries including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry 

of Justice, Ministry of Social Welfare, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Health.
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Prison Security

Security in the Yemeni prison system is universally weak. Although a detailed technical assessment of security requirements and issues at all prisons was not possible in this research, 

basic security concerns were clearly observable, and prison directors expressed anxiety over 

the security challenges and threats they face. Facilities lack both the physical infrastructure 

and technical expertise to counter the serious security and terrorist threats faced in Yemen, 

and numerous other factors detailed in the following further compound insecure conditions.

Prison escapes are becoming the norm in Yemen. All central prisons visited have experienced 

one or more escapes in recent history, four in seven central prisons reporting external incursions 

involving coordination with inmates. All prisons reported regular threats and ongoing risk of 

external incursions, Aden Central noting that grenades are regularly thrown over their insecure 

perimeter wall. e majority of escapes are ordinary small-scale escapes—frustrated inmates 

taking advantage of poor security and sta incompetence. Another common form of escape for 

detainees is suicide. ough authorities do not record numbers, media have attempted to document cases, highlighting the poor conditions and desperation at their root.23

e system is also experiencing a growing number of sophisticated and coordinated operations involving use of external force, evidence of sta collusion, and involvement of terrorist groups, most signicantly AQAP. Prison directors near uniformly expressed vulnerability 

to external attack as a top concern, as well as feelings of helplessness in the face of far greater 

resourced terrorist and criminal groups.

Sana’a Central Coordinated Prison Break—February 2014

Photo 2. Guard at perimeter wall near site of attack

All central prisons visited 

have experienced one or 

more escapes in recent 

history, four in seven 

central prisons reporting 

external incursions involving 

coordination with inmates.

On February 13, 2014, AQAP carried out a major targeted prison break at Sana’a Central 

Prison. While MOI perimeter security guards were engaged in a firefight at the main facility 

entrance, a suicide car bomb penetrated the side perimeter wall adjacent to Prison Authority headquarters, injuring a number of staff inside. AQAP operatives then entered the facility, 

overpowering guards and releasing twenty-nine detainees, including nineteen al-Qaeda suspects. Coordination with both staff and detainees is suspected because AQAP detainees had 

been transferred to a lower security block adjacent to the perimeter wall targeted, allegedly 

in an effort to segregate them from the main prison population. Investigations are ongoing to 

determine whether staff were involved.
USIP.ORG 19

PRISONS IN YEMEN

e 2014 Sana’a Central attack is one in a series of AQAP prison attacks or escapes. A 

number of signicant incidents with suspected AQAP involvement and often involving the 

release of members are captured in table 4.

Table 4. AQAP Prison Escapes

Year Location Number 

2014 Sana’a Central Prison 19 AQAP, 29 overall

Mukalla Central 6

Sayun Central 6

2013 Sana’a Central <300 attempted 

Dhale Central 1

Aden Central 2

Aden CID 7

Abyan Central 4, 3 AQAP

2012 Sana’a Central 3

Taiz Central 4, 13 attempted 

Al-Bayda Central 365

Hodeida Central 5

Aden PSO Detention Center 15 AQAP

Lawdar Central 3 AQAP

2011 Sabir Prison 20 (backed by 

Southern Movement

separatists)

Amran Central 10

Mukalla Central 63 suspected AQAP

2007 Taiz Central 3

2006 Sana’a PSO Detention Center 23

2003 Aden PSO Detention Center 10

Note: Figures are derived from multiple media sources on file with the authors and therefore approximate.

Ongoing conict in some governorates since 2011 also contributed to a spike in escapes. 

In 2011, open ghting and aerial bombardment led to damage of the central prison facility in 

Abyan, enabling all prisoners to escape. e facility has not yet been repaired, and Abyan detainees are held in nearby Aden’s central prison. More recently, ongoing ghting in Amran has led 

to repeat partial or wholesale escapes of the prison population, a total of 470 detainees freed.24

Escapes and external incursion have been less frequent at remand prisons. Although facilities were observed and assessed as vulnerable to attack, high-risk detainees are generally not 

held at such facilities during pre-trial phase but instead are transported either to central prisons 

or to PSO detention facilities, both of which have had escapes and external incursions.

e primary concern of this report is from a domestic criminal justice perspective, but 

greater international attention has focused on Yemen’s corrections system recently because the 

majority of detainees in Guantanamo Bay are Yemeni. Although the vast majority of those in 

custody have been cleared for transfer (fty-seven), they have not been repatriated because of 

security weaknesses in Yemen. e recent spate of prison breaks only seem to conrm con-
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cerns about the security of Yemen’s prison system, and the fragility of state law enforcement 

institutions casts doubts on the ability to monitor or prevent recidivism among any returned 

Guantanamo Bay prisoners.

Six of seven central prison facilities reported regular internal security problems, such as 

strikes, riots, prisoner self-harm, and ghting—all heightened by overcrowding. Prisoners at 

Hodeida Central, for example, have staged numerous hunger strikes, seeking to highlight delays in their cases, perceived injustices perpetrated by the courts, and poor conditions. Following a 2012 prison escape and riots at Taiz Central, internal security slipped so far beyond 

control that guards could not enter the premises. Authorities turned o water and electricity 

for several days before reentering, presumably to punish and sedate inmates. In Ibb, prisoners 

regularly strike over delays in their cases. In one incident, a number of inmates sentenced to 

death set a re in protest; eight died.

At the level of basic security—and more readily corrected by prison leadership—is key control. is is primarily in the hands of designated representatives in each cell. At almost all facilities visited, sta had to call on inmates responsible for carrying the keys to cell areas to open 

locked cell doors and to provide the numbers of detainees per cell—a practice that appears to 

have become the norm in the prison system. In a number of instances, guards found themselves 

either locked out or locked in cell areas for lengthy periods while inmates or sta sought to 

locate the designated key holders within the chaotic prison population, demonstrating some of 

the associated security and safety risks. Furthermore, at Mukalla Central, an inmate claims to 

act as deputy director, greeting the research team with his cell phone in hand, issuing orders to 

guards, confronting and overriding decisions of the ocer-in-charge.

Core security functions being carried out by inmates relinquishes control of internal cell 

areas to them, giving specic detainees preferred positions of power over others, and is a serious 

threat to security and inmate safety. Policies and corresponding disciplinary measures should 

be promptly reviewed and altered to ensure that total command of all keys, locking devices, 

recreational areas, and storage is maintained by sta only and is under the strict guidance and 

command of prison leadership. Safety and contingency planning should be put in place to ensure that all cell and exit keys are readily accessible to designated correctional sta and available 

to on-duty sta at all hours. Strict procedures and control systems should be kept, detailing 

responsibility for and location of all available keys and locks at all times.

Cell phones and other contraband were observed in detainees’ possession in most facilities. 

Authorities and prison directors noted the challenge of keeping prisons contraband free; the 

Six of seven central prison 

facilities reported regular 

internal security problems, 

such as strikes, riots, 

prisoner self-harm, and 

fighting—all heightened 

by overcrowding.

■ riot gear and specialized training

■ jamming devices for cell phones

■ sirens for emergency situations

■ prisoner uniforms

■ two-way radios for staff

■ paved yards

■ secure division of yard areas

■ reinforced perimeter walls

■ high guard towers plus observation walkways

■ concrete barriers on adjacent roads

■ electronic doors

■ security wands

■ surveillance cameras

■ armored trucks for transport

■ stun guns for riots

Security infrastructure noted by prison directors as required but currently absent:
USIP.ORG 21

PRISONS IN YEMEN

governor of Taiz recounted that when their 2012 prison break occurred, “For years the police 

had not had full access. No one had gone in [the wards]. When they went in they found weapons, booze, hashish...you name it.” At Mukalla Central, prisoners complained about the role 

guards play in smuggling in contraband. In an interesting role reversal, inmates reported that 

they search the guards as they enter the facility because they believe that the guards smuggle in 

drugs for sale and distribution within the prison. Sale and consumption of qat was also visible at 

all facilities, often involving guards and nominated detainees.

e observation team witnessed sta at a number of facilities entering prison compounds 

and cell areas openly carrying and with concealed rearms. Firearms should be strictly prohibited from entry within prison compounds and used for external perimeter security only. e 

Prison Authority should conduct a review of rearms policy and implementation in tandem 

with broader security reviews. Prison leadership and sta may consider rearms as protection 

against uncontrolled prison populations, but the risk of prisoners gaining possession of rearms is serious and has potentially dire consequences.

On a positive note, the use of instruments of restraint, such as shackles and handcus, were 

observed in minimal use only for transport of detainees and during court appearances in line with international standards.25 Prisoners were not observed shackled within facilities or as any kind of punishment. A shortage of handcus for prisoner transfer was highlighted as an issue in a few facilities.

Improving security and safety of central prisons is one of the most immediate needs. A full 

security review of all prisons is imperative, further funding ideally applied to security infrastructure repair and reinforcement. Clarifying and instilling in prison sta basic security procedures and protocols—such as the need to maintain key control and to refrain from carrying 

rearms within prison cells—should be at the core of any new training initiatives. Such simple, 

basic security and order provisions should be expanded upon and claried in the Prison Act 

regulations, which currently provide scant detail on the subject.

Physical Infrastructure

e design and construction of central prison facilities varies greatly—from a British colonial 

structure at Aden Central and 1970s builds at Sana’a and Hodeida Central. Mainly located 

within urban or peri-urban areas, many are now in close proximity to communities as city populations have expanded and developed around them. Although the majority of those visited, 

with the exception of Taiz and Hodeida Central, were built as prisons, the expanding prison 

populations have far outstripped the capacity of the original designs. Infrastructure limitations 

reduce the ability to hold detainees safely and humanely, a reality acknowledged and listed as a 

core concern by all prison directors as aecting prison security and prisoner well-being. Prison 

designs across the board presented water, sewage, wiring, electricity, and security issues in need 

of urgent attention and repair.

Although no set of standards for prison infrastructure has been agreed upon, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued guidance in 2012 on physical organization 

and basic infrastructure in Water, Sanitation, Hygiene and Habitat in Prisons: Supplementary 

Guidance.

26 Prisons should all have certain facilities:

• buildings for detainees to sleep

• sanitary installations including toilets and showers

• outdoor areas

• yards for outdoor exercise and sports grounds
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PEACEWORKS 106

• kitchens

• health care facilities

• visiting rooms to meet families and legal representatives

• offices for prison administration

• prayer rooms

• storerooms

• workshops

• classrooms

• multipurpose rooms

• library

• water and sewerage systems

• staff accommodation and services

• isolation areas

Although Yemeni central prisons do have many of the basic physical components set out 

in the ICRC guidelines, their material standards and functionality are poor or inadequate. 

For example, cells and internal cellblock corridors were generally found to lack adequate light, 

ventilation, space, or a combination of these. Sanitation systems were generally overloaded and 

in need of repair. A number of prison kitchens were unhygienic and in need of an upgrade. 

Medical clinics were generally insucient for prisoners health needs.

Perhaps one of the most concerning design aws almost universal in central prisons designs 

is inadequate outdoor and recreation spaces that can be securely controlled. Because of overcrowding, prison populations are generally found mixing freely in prison yards during the day, 

reducing the ability to segregate inmates based on classication—in part a management issue 

but compounded by too little yard space. is situation was particularly concerning at Hodeida 

Central, where the main male block has a central covered yard with no access to sunlight. At a 

number of facilities, open space is available within prison compounds but use is poorly allocated 

or no funds are designated to developing outdoor areas. Little allocation is made for physical 

exercise and few of the limited sports elds or courts observed are in use. Similarly, education, 

labor, and vocational training workshops at many facilities are either shuttered or not fully in use 

because of funding cuts.

Photo 2. Covered Yard Area, Hodeida Central
USIP.ORG 23

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Remand facilities visited are housed within more recently constructed buildings that date 

from 2000 onward. ey follow the same or similar standardized design, with no provision for 

recreation or prison activities, and are characterized by narrow passageways, narrow staircases, 

and limited egress options, all posing internal control and security problems for sta. A number 

of remand facilities are located on sites too small to allow adequate perimeter security or outdoor 

space and too close to neighboring businesses and residential spaces to ensure security for both 

urban populations and detainees. Remand facilities do not have adequate provision for exercise 

or recreation for prisoners and uniformly lack classrooms, libraries, and other work facilities. e 

excuse is that these are temporary detention centers, but given the uidity of detainee categories 

and lengthy pre-trial and pre-sentence periods, greater attention needs to be given to the standard of care at these facilities.

Four of ve remand facilities visited were undergoing expansion and renovation projects, 

including construction of additional oors to increase capacity, repair of existing cells, and conversion of at roofs into recreation areas for access to fresh air and sunlight. ese repairs and 

attention to problematic facilities are commendable, but the repairs underway do not resolve the 

broader core design aws at the facilities. Increased capacity will cause greater strain on sewage systems, electricity, water, food, and medical needs and will increase security strain on sta. 

Conversion of roof spaces will at minimum provide greater access to fresh air and sunlight but 

will not adequately address the facilities’ need for proper recreation and exercise space.

In the short to medium term, a review of outdoor space and potential remedies is in order. 

In a number of facilities, immediate steps are possible and should be initiated. For example, lack 

of access to sunlight for prisoners at Hodeida Central is easily avoidable given the ample internal yard space. Greater attention needs to be given to improving exercise, recreation, and other 

provisions for remand facilities.

In the medium to long term, many existing detention facilities should be rehabilitated or redesigned and careful contemplation given to needs, planning, and consultation on prison design 

standards. Prison design, when undertaken correctly, can vastly improve prisoner well-being as 

well as the functional needs for sta and state security. Consultation with organizations who 

have developed prison design standards, such as the ICRC, should be part of the process.27

Prison Registry and Data Overview

Prison les and record-keeping methods were relatively uniform across the system. Prisons 

maintain paper les with inmate paperwork, including any orders from the prosecutor’s oce, 

courts, etc. In addition, an electronic database of prisoners, which includes photo and biometric data, is operational at most facilities and links to a central prisoner database maintained at 

Prison Authority headquarters. Some facilities noted that lack of power and Internet connectivity present barriers to proper upkeep of ling. Prison directors also noted that processing delays, 

diculties in obtaining correct paperwork, and communication with the prosecutor general’s 

oces and courts contribute to administrative delays.

At a few facilities, prisoners handle ling and administrative work. Although limited involvement in some administrative work is an acceptable form of the prison labor in return for 

remuneration, prisoner work that permits access to personal data, records, or case-related material involving other inmates should be strictly prohibited. Similarly, work on administrative 

areas involving deliveries, outside service providers, infrastructure, and the like can present a 

security risk and access to avenues for escape.
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PEACEWORKS 106

Despite theoretically positive ling and data processes, obtaining an accurate breakdown of 

inmate numbers in detention was dicult at each facility. Inmate numbers provided by prison 

leadership did not add up in numerous instances or were contradicted by subsequent observations during prison visits. Further analysis of data inaccuracies at the prison level should be 

considered to better understand whether they involve false reporting, incorrect or inconsistent 

prisoner count, fraud, or ling issues linked to courts or prosecution service.

Monitoring prisoner volumes and trends in prison in- and out-ow is a vital part of the 

work of headquarters-level prison management. Headquarters sta have produced some impressive statistical analyses and reviews of the prison system that should be continued, deepened, and strengthened with more accurate reporting and maintenance of data at local level 

and adequate time and resources provided to headquarters sta engaged in research on system 

management and reform. Strengthening internal data management, processing, and monitoring 

will greatly assist senior leadership in planning and reform of the Prison Authority, decisions 

on infrastructure needs, prisoner classication, and the like.

Use of Isolation Cells

Isolation cells were present at nearly all central and remand prisons facilities visited. e SMRs 

set out two related stipulations:

• Discipline and order shall be maintained with firmness, but with no more restriction 

than is necessary for safe custody and well-ordered community life.

• Punishment by close confinement or reduction of diet shall never be inflicted unless 

the medical officer has examined the prisoner and certified in writing that is fit to 

sustain it.28

Isolation cells are generally considered a necessary element of prison infrastructure. e core 

issue is how they are used. Access to properly observe isolation cells was not granted at all locations. Of those observed, the nature of use ranged greatly, from oces or storage to brief isolation 

in quelling ghts or misconduct and closely monitored by prison sta and the director to “black 

hole” style punishment. At Sana’a Central, a large number of inmates were held in two dark cells, 

deprived of natural light, held in extremely cramped quarters, and given no access to outdoor 

space or adequate sanitary facilities—conditions amounting to punishment prohibited under the 

SMRs and potentially reaching the level of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.29 Within the 

two isolation cells, one set of inmates were categorized as troublemakers undergoing isolation as 

punishment, and the second held homosexual detainees “in part for their own protection” because 

they were considered either vulnerable to attack or sexual predators.

Insucient access and inconsistent use of isolation cells make broad observations about their 

compliance with the SMRs dicult. Medical observation of connement is clearly not implemented. Although use was inappropriate and excessive in a small number of facilities, as highlighted, in others relatively enlightened low or no use policies were in place. Overcrowding in 

prisons also aects use of isolation cells, serious overcrowding in prisons mirroring overcrowding 

in isolation cells, thus properly isolating detainees when necessary is not always possible.

Policies and procedures for use of and presence of isolation cells at prison facilities should be 

reviewed and standardized in Prison Act regulations for implementation, including processes of 

appeal, review, medical observation, and oversight.
USIP.ORG 25

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Communication with Inmates

Maintenance of communication lines and constructive relations between inmates and guards, inmates and prison leadership, and guards and prison leadership can promote information ows 

that facilitate smooth management, the ability to handle security and prisoner concerns before 

they reach crisis point, and advancement of positive, calm prison environments. Understanding 

prisoner needs will also be key to the success of any reform program the Prison Authority and 

Yemeni government might pursue.

In a number of prisons, the strain of overcrowded, underresourced facilities had undermined sta interest in dealing with prisoner concerns, complaints, and requests. Sta seemed 

unfamiliar with prisoners and their needs, and no system of communication with inmates was 

in place. Complaints boxes had once been operational at all facilities but no longer were.

Deputy prosecutor generals, who are assigned to each central prison, also play an important 

role in receiving complaints from and carrying out investigations on behalf of prisoners. Part of the 

role is to conduct regular inspection and walk-throughs of prisons, but the extent to which this 

is regularly carried out and ongoing was unclear.

Going forward, complaints procedures for prisoners should be reinstated and receive effective attention and follow-up. Prison leadership and guard training should involve ensuring 

that sta maintain positive relations and professional communication with prisoners. Greater 

observation and discussion with prosecutor generals assigned to prisons is needed to assess 

how they might more actively contribute to monitoring conditions and enabling positive communication patterns. Based on this preliminary assessment, these prosecutors appeared overwhelmed and underresourced.

Prisoner Well-Being

Overcrowding, serious deciencies in bedding and accommodation, lack of hygienic bathroom 

and washing facilities, and availability of water were issues across the central prison system. 

Some of these issues are also persistent challenges for the poor in Yemen, but when the state has 

deprived an individual of liberty, it has a heightened duty to ensure basic health and well-being. 

In addition, poor conditions can contribute to poor security within prisons. For example, at 

Taiz Central, conditions had become so cramped in Ward A that regular ghts and riots broke 

out over bathrooms privileges available. Local authorities believed this was a factor in the 2012 

prison break—one of the major reforms after which was to construct more bathroom facilities.30

Overcrowding and the resulting inadequacy in bedding, bathroom facilities, food, and 

other basic provisions are serious issues in all central prisons, but the conditions and provisions 

for prisoner well-being are considerably better than in other detention facilities visited, such as 

police stations and MOI CID facilities.

Overcrowding and Accommodation

Prison overcrowding and access to adequate personal space is a major challenge in many prison 

systems, and Yemen is no dierent. Space requirements and type of accommodation varies widely from nation to nation and depends on resources, space, and culture. For example, although 

individual or double cells are the standard for many Western countries, group or dormitory style 

accommodation is considered more humane in many cultures because it can reduce loneliness 

and anxiety. e SMRs are quite clear on the quality of accommodation ideally provided:

Taiz Central, conditions 

had become so cramped 

in Ward A that regular 

fights and riots broke out 

over bathrooms privileges 

available. Local authorities 

believed this was a factor 

in the 2012 prison break.
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PEACEWORKS 106

All accommodation provided for the use of prisoners and in particular all sleeping 

accommodation meet all requirements of health, due regard being paid to climatic 

conditions and particularly to cubic content of air, minimum floor space, lighting heating and ventilation.31

Signs of overcrowding are generally clear regardless of cultural variations:

• irregular sleeping arrangements—including sleeping in shifts; sleeping two per bed or 

on the floor; sleeping in corridors, communal spaces, or bathrooms; too few mattresses 

for the number of inmates; visibly cramped conditions

• disorderly, packed spaces—persons and personal items crowding cell areas; items 

hanging from walls, roof, and bunks, blocking ventilation, light, or cell sight lines

• stale or airless environs with little or too little ventilation

• unhygienic sanitary systems—whether blocked or overflowing

• virulent illness common and difficult to eradicate

• guards incapable of controlling inmate populations

• insufficient food and water sources

Overcrowding aects safe management of prisons and often triggers poor management 

practices. It also places a heavy burden on the basic infrastructure and sanitation systems and 

has a negative impact on the physical and mental health of detainees.

Photo 3. Obscured Sightlines in Overcrowded Room

Photo 4. Prisoners Sleeping in Corridor
USIP.ORG 27

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Figure 2 presents a sample of overcrowding issues in the Yemeni system, as dened by 

reported numbers for prison capacity versus actual prison population.

In general, overcrowding is less severe in women’s sections of prisons and more so in mentally ill and juvenile sections, which were observed as at or beyond capacity.

Overcrowding, which senior leadership and almost all prison directors say seriously affects their ability to run prisons, places enormous strain on the Prison Authority as well. It is a 

signicant contributor to the lack of appropriate classication and segregation within central 

prisons and between central prisons and other temporary detention facilities. Given the severe 

shortage of detainee facilities, assignment is primarily driven by the availability of space rather 

than any security risk the detainee poses, length of sentence, or due process concerns.

Overcrowding also has a negative ripple eect on almost all aspects of prisoner care and 

therefore needs urgent attention and consideration. Facilities at 150 percent overcrowded 

should stop receiving inmates. Some immediate relief from overcrowding would be facilitated 

by issuing release orders for those who have overstayed their sentence or where pre-trial limitations have been surpassed. Transferring some detainees to other less crowded facilities may be 

possible in some circumstances, though given the pervasiveness of overcrowding, the system 

has little spare capacity. In developing medium- to long-term solutions, the Prison Authority 

should review the root causes of overcrowding. Often it is the result of systemic features of the 

criminal justice system and may relate to slow progress in criminal trials and problems in immediately enabling release where authorized.

Due Process, Unsentenced Prisoners, and Release Issues

Overcrowding of the prison system in Yemen is closely tied to problems of due process, backlogged courts producing a glut of unsentenced prisoners and aecting prisoner release. ese issues 

were raised repeatedly, by prisoners and sta alike, as aecting prisoner well-being in various ways.

0

50%

100%

150%

200%

250%

300%

350%

Al-Thawra Remand

Sayun Central

Al-Habrah Remand

Hodeida Remand

Ibb RemandIbb Central

Mukalla Central

Al-Mu’allim Remand

Aden Central

Sana’a Central

Taiz Central

Hodeida Central

Alaya Remand

150% over Capacity

At Capacity

Under Capacity

Figure 2. Prison Overcrowding 
28 USIP.ORG

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In terms of positive practices, basic levels of due process are in place. In general, almost 

all detainees know the nature of the charge laid against them or their sentence, though fewer 

know their next court date, in part because of scheduling failures and backlogs in the system. 

Nonetheless, poor communication with oces of the prosecutor general and slow court processes commonly led to elongated pre-trial periods in poorly resourced remand facilities or in 

other non-Prison Authority facilities32 not designed for lengthy detention.33

Inmates who have served their sentences but have not yet been released is widespread and 

recognized by all concerned as a major problem within the detention system. In Yemen, as in 

other systems, nes or compensation to victims are imposed as part of sentencing. However, 

given widespread poverty, sentenced prisoners are often unable to pay their debts—and the 

Yemeni system extends custodial sentences until such time as nancial obligations are satised. 

In numerous prisons, some detainees had signicantly overstayed their sentence for as many as 

ve or ten years. Accumulation of such detainees exacerbates overcrowding and service provision and is a nancial drain on the state. Charitable organizations, communities, and sheikhs 

have in some cases assisted with satisfaction of debt. Serious consideration should be given to 

process reform, further analysis of the problem in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, 

and alternatives to incarceration for such cases, given that prolonged periods of detention also 

reduce earning potential and thus are scarcely a remedy to inmates’ failure to pay.

A number of ocials noted that failure to carry out death sentences is an additional contributor to prisoner surfeits. e Criminal Procedure Code prescribes that executions must be 

witnessed by the heirs or family of the victim.34 Witness fear or preference for life imprisonment often thus delays execution. Clarity or reform of this process is needed.

Although in reality prisoner release delays are extremely problematic and a major contributor 

to overcrowding, prison regulations outline a positive detailed process and recommend that those 

Figure 3. Prisoner Status

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500 Total Inmates

Sentenced

Pre-Trial Inmates

Sana'a Central

Al-Mu’allim Remand

Al-Habrah Remand

Alaya Remand

Al-Thawra RemandAden CentralTaiz Central

Hodeida Central

Hodeida Remand

Ibb Central

Ibb Remand

Mukalla Central

Sayun Central
USIP.ORG 29

PRISONS IN YEMEN

who have served more than ve years serve an additional semicustodial stage before release, during which they are transferred to the prison closest to their home and granted periods of gradual 

extended leave to normalize their reintroduction into society. In tandem, social workers are tasked 

with follow-up care for prisoners that includes case monitoring. Prison systems are overstretched, 

however, and incapable of implementing these provisions. e system should strive to live up to 

the targets set out or amend regulations to include provisions in line with current prison structure 

and stang but retain the aspirational provisions as part of a strategic vision for improved system 

delivery. Another possibility would be to link with other ministries or local governments to develop community corrections functions to oversee semicustodial prisoners.

Recreation, Exercise, Education, and Labor

Prison facilities and routine should provide and plan for prisoner engagement in positive recreation outside prisoner accommodation areas. Recreation, exercise, movement, and meaningful 

activity, such as education and work, counteract negatives of connement both mentally and 

physically and provide positive outlets for stress, pent up energy, and aggression. e SMRs 

specify that prisoners “shall have at least one hour of suitable exercise in the open air daily if 

weather permits.” 35

At a basic level, no facility locked prisoners in their cells twenty-four hours a day, as is often the 

case in security-challenged prison systems. Although outdoor spaces are inadequate, prisoners are 

generally free to move around the cellblocks from early morning until late evening lock up.

What is of concern is the lack of adequate outdoor space, time, and opportunities for positive activity. As highlighted earlier, access to sunlight and fresh air was poorly addressed in 

prison design. is problem was particularly acute at remand facilities and at Hodeida Central, 

where a covered yard is the only recreation space provided.

Prison directors lament that prison labor opportunities have been reduced and many workshop facilities have been closed in recent years due to lack of funding. Prison labor and vocational training are outlined as core to rehabilitation in the prison law, which sets out enlightened provisions that adhere to international standards for allowable work hours, remuneration, 

and the like.36 Some women’s facilities oer a slightly better outlook with limited but functional sewing and crafts workshops.

Inmate education is oered at some facilities in partnership with the Ministry of Education. 

e only facility in which daily educational classes are fully operational is Sana’a Central, which 

has a small but impressive prison school, where teachers and students were keen to point out the 

positives of the educational opportunities they receive but noted scope for further improvement. 

e prison also has an impressive library accessible from one of the large prison yards.

Religious observance generally took place in open prison yard spaces. Muslims make up the 

vast majority of the inmate population, and access to imams is provided. Although no provision is made for other faiths, no resistance to other forms of religious observance is evident.

Immediate attention to ensuring basic access to sunlight and free movement in facilities 

where it is now most limited, notably Hodeida Central, is critical. A relatively modest allocation of funds to restore recreation, labor, and educational activities would signicantly improve 

prisoner well-being and the overall management and security of facilities. Extension of schooling and vocational education across the Prison authority facilities should be a core goal in 

developing the prison system for the future. Reaching out to rearm the partnership between 

Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Education and clarify obligations on education provision 

is an important step in extending the positive example set by Sana’a Central.

Extension of schooling and 

vocational education across 

the Prison authority facilities 

should be a core goal in 

developing the prison 

system for the future.
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Sanitation

Maintenance of basic sanitation is a major challenge for prisons, especially with factors such 

as overcrowding, infrastructure, and problematic sewage systems compounding the situation. 

SMRs set out basic requirements for sanitation as follows:

• The sanitary installation shall be adequate to enable every prisoner to comply with the 

needs of nature when necessary and in a clean and decent manner.

• All parts of an institution regularly used by prisoners shall be properly maintained and 

kept scrupulously clean at all times.37

ICRC has recently developed guidelines noting the importance of sanitation in controlling 

the spread of disease within prisons.38 Guidelines note that the World Health Organization 

(WHO) recommends provision of one toilet per twenty-ve persons, but that one per fty is 

an absolute minimum, though this ratio is very low. Toilets should be disinfected once a week 

or, in the case of epidemic, twice a week. One shower per fty inmates is considered the minimum to meet basic standards.39

Sanitation facilities and bathrooms vary in quality and upkeep but are universally subpar. 

ey require urgent attention in a number of facilities where conditions present serious prison 

and public health concerns. All toilets must be accessible during the day and at night, which is 

noted as a challenge in facilities where toilets are outside cellblocks. Authorities were keen to 

point out sanitation concerns and, in many cases, doing their best to be responsive in dealing 

with sewer and drainage system problems.

Photo 5. Women’s Bathroom, Taiz Central

Many of the sanitation concerns in Yemen can be linked to poor infrastructure, design, and 

overcrowding. Sanitation systems were not well designed and cannot manage waste for numbers far beyond those intended. Most facilities have both too few and broken taps and showers, 

and the design of showers atop toilets, though the norm in many Yemeni bathrooms, further 

compounds drainage issues. Remand facilities in Sana’a have serious design aws, leading to 

frequent overows of the toilet system. Sewage leaks are common at Taiz and Hodeida Central 

Prisons and Hodeida Remand Prison.
USIP.ORG 31

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Photo 6. Sewage Leak Along Perimeter Wall, Taiz Central

Practical and detailed guidance on calculation of estimated per capita waste generation; water requirements; latrine varieties, including environmental and cultural considerations; dimension and slope of drainage pipe installation; and latrine maintenance and inspection are available. Any new infrastructure projects should consider such factors in design and construction.40

Basic refuse removal and prison cleaning vary greatly depending on prison leadership. Systematized refuse removal and daily cleaning and prisoner hygiene routines are important to 

maintaining a clean and hygienic prison environment. A number of prisons, including al-awrah and Hodeida Remand/Branch and Sayun Central, should be commended for their cleaning 

routines and have orderly clean cells and common areas and prisoners included in prison cleaning routines, provided with any necessary cleaning supplies. Other institutions are strewn with 

trash and disorderly, an aspect of sanitation that could easily be improved by a stronger prison 

hygiene routine and having sta and prisoners involved in maintaining clean facilities.

Basic prison cleaning routines do not require large resources but rather often are an issue of 

prison management and prisoner discipline. In the short term, prison directors should involve 

prisoners in cleaning and hygiene as part of prison routine. Review of sanitation infrastructure, 

design, and compounding factors (such as the impact of overcrowding) should form part of the 

recommended overall review of rehabilitation and redesign of prison facilities.

Food and Water

Access to food and water is a basic of human care. Provision of regular meals and potable water, 

free of charge, is vital for prisoners, who depend on institutions to survive.

• Every prisoner shall be provided by the administration at the usual hours with food of 

nutritional value adequate for health and strength, of wholesome quality and wellprepared and served.

• Drinking water shall be available to every prisoner whenever he needs it.41
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Prison Act regulations stipulate that prison directors are responsible for inspecting kitchens to 

ensure that food is prepared well and distributed fairly and on time and for checking on the quality 

of groceries, foodstus, and monitoring their prices.42 e regulations also set out food allowances 

for detainees in precautionary detention and for prisoners sentenced to death but provide little 

general guidance on the types of food to be served, regularity of meals, or nutrition.

Food supply and nutritional value of meals was generally good, directors reporting that the previous head of the Prison Authority—dismissed following the AQAP breakout from Sana’a in February 2014—had signicantly improved both the quantity and the quality of food sent to facilities. A 

number of exceptions persist at Taiz and Mukalla Central Prisons. Detainees at Taiz Central were 

insistent that they did not receive enough food daily, or of sucient nutritional quality.

Overall, however, the Prison Authority and prisons should be credited for their generally 

eective management of food supplies and distribution. Few cases of malnutrition or hunger were observed, unlike in many transitional, postconict, and developing countries, where 

food supply chains may have broken down or prisoner care is not prioritized. Conditions also 

strongly contrast with detention centers not under the Prison Authority—for example, police 

stations, where no budgetary assignment is made for detainee meals and they are generally only 

provided by family members.

Food and bread were cooked at the central prison facilities, in kitchens and bakeries, staed 

by a mixture of civilian sta employed by the prison and prisoners assigned to assist. A number 

of central prisons also provide bread from in-house bakeries to supplement food prepared at 

remand facilities. Some prison directors, sta, prosecutors, and charitable organizations noted 

that supplemental food and water is provided by prisoners’ families, local benefactors, other 

local municipal resources, or charitable organizations. A number of interviewees noted that 

budgetary allocations for food have not necessarily kept up with the greater numbers of prisoners and that without these outside supplements food shortfalls would be serious.

Kitchen location and hygiene are important aspects of prison design and management; 

ideally, kitchens are situated within or near prison compounds but not within cell blocks, and 

due consideration is given to waste water and smoke removal, re safety, and ventilation.43

Kitchen hygiene and wastewater is a concern at a number of facilities though cleanliness varied 

widely. Some kitchens were remarkably clean, sta and prisoners alike clearly taking pride in 

their food preparation role, others displaying little concern for cleanliness, insect infestations, 

and housing detainees sleeping near food preparation areas or foodstus. At Hodeida Central, 

a number of prisoners operate a makeshift restaurant with gas burners within the covered 

prison yard, presenting a serious re hazard and health and security concern.

Access to sucient clean, ltered water for drinking and water for washing is a challenge 

at a number of facilities. ree prisons have a sucient supply, nine do not, and in one the 

situation is uncertain. Although water is an issue for all Yemenis, lack of water is particularly 

problematic for detained populations who are vulnerable to deciencies. ICRC sets out the 

following requirements for water:

• one to two taps per hundred detainees

• ten to fifteen liters of water per day per inmates for all needs

• three to five liters of water per day as minimum for survival

• one liter per person per day for washing 44

Urgent attention is needed on water deciency and provision in Yemen’s prison facilities, as is 

development of clear guidelines at the prison level to include contingency options for dealing 

At Hodeida Central, a 

number of prisoners operate 

a makeshift restaurant with

 gas burners within the 

covered prison yard, 

presenting a serious fire 

hazard and health and 

security concern.
USIP.ORG 33

PRISONS IN YEMEN

with scarcity and maintaining water reserves for emergencies and full consideration in any expansion or renovation of existing facilities.

Solidifying gains and addressing outstanding insuciencies in facilities like Taiz and Mukalla Central need to be a continuing priority. To continue to build on existing improvement, 

greater attention should be given to kitchen hygiene standards and protocol. Water concerns 

system wide should be a priority, in consultation with other relevant state authorities. Gas 

burners should be removed from crowded cell areas and operated exclusively in kitchen areas 

by kitchen workers.

Access to Medical Services

Provision of medical care is vital to ensuring prisoner well-being, particularly given the physical and mental stresses of incarceration. Numerous international standards and principles 

emphasize the importance of access to medical services without prejudice to a person’s legal 

situation.45 e SMRs contain detailed provisions stressing the need for prison medical care 

to be closely linked with state health services and setting out that prison health care should 

include health checks as part of admissions procedures, transfer of prisoners to hospitals when 

specialized care is required, pre- and postnatal, dental, and psychiatric. ey also highlight the 

advisory role that medical professionals ought to play in prison inspections, particularly regarding nutrition and food preparation, hygiene, sanitation, heating, lights and ventilation of cells, 

clothing, bedding, physical exercise, and detainee condition.46

e Yemeni Prison Act provides strong guidance for care that are closely aligned with the 

principles set out in the SMRs.47 Additionally, in Yemen, as is recommended by numerous 

international standards, prison health services are delivered through the coordinated eorts 

of the Ministry of Health and the Prison Authority. Integration of prison health into public 

health services is considered inuential in improving access and standard of care.48 In 2003, 

the WHO further stressed the importance of closely linked health services and prison departments to ensure high standards of treatment for detainees, independence of personnel, application of modern standards of disease control, and continuous treatment for all members of 

society whether in or outside prison.49

Where possible, the research team reviewed prison and detention center medical facilities and 

discussed health care with sta. Most central and remand prisons visited—ten of thirteen—have 

a basic medical clinic, the exceptions being Mukalla and Sayun Central Prisons in Hadramawt 

and the remand prison in Ibb. Although clinics are present in most centers, many are not staed 

or operational, and almost all are inadequately resourced, staed, and equipped.

Standard of care varies greatly but is universally subpar. At some prisons, clinics are available 

and staed with regularly scheduled, permanent medical personnel, including doctors, nurses, 

and medical assistants. In others, prison directors complain that doctors rarely show up. In some 

prisons, directors have loose arrangements with local doctors to attend on occasion or in emergencies. At three facilities, inmates were observed as involved in providing medical care, which is 

acceptable only when medical sta provide adequate supervision, which was not observed as the 

case. Ambulances or means to transport detainees requiring specialist care are also in short supply, a number of prisons using personal vehicles or taxis instead. Permission for prisoner transfer 

also requires approval from the deputy prosecutor general. Delays with this process and refusals 

are a concern to clinic sta and prison leadership, one interviewee exclaiming, “Even when you 

request for a detainee to go to the hospital, they act oended. It’s like this is a forgotten person 

and why should they get medical treatment.”

Although clinics are 

present in most centers, 

many are not staffed or 

operational, and almost all 

are inadequately resourced, 

staffed, and equipped.
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PEACEWORKS 106

At a number of larger facilities, such as the central prisons in Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden, small 

medical center blocks are present within the prison compound and feature a number of examination rooms and basic inrmary, but in most cases, clinics are very basic rooms with scant 

medical instruments, no modern equipment, and in some cases unclean and unhygienic. Medical cases range from serious injuries sustained either before or after entry into the system, such 

as gunshots, broken limbs and necrosis, cuts and abrasions. A number of patients receive treatment for conditions such as heart disease, epilepsy, and hemorrhoids.

e most common ailments—which each appeared at between ve and seven prisons—

were infections of the chest, stomach, eyes, and skin. Scabies were rampant at just over half 

(54 percent) of Yemen’s prison facilities, unknown at 38 percent, and rare at 8 percent. Scabies mites are microscopic insects transferred through personal contact, causing skin irritation. 

Such infections and vector-borne conditions are common in almost all prisons but particularly 

virulent in conned, crowded spaces. High rates of such infections and conditions often indicate overcrowding. Damp conditions or poor bedding can exacerbate colds and chest infections. Stomach and gastric illness is also often linked to poor sanitation and hygiene.

Diagnosed tuberculosis was reported at three facilities. Tuberculosis is highly contagious, 

and medical sta noted that ensuring infected patients are isolated to prevent the spread is a 

challenge given space limitations. HIV was reported at one facility. Although the research did 

not focus on policies toward HIV/AIDS infected patients, it was clear from instances when it 

was raised by prison sta that education on HIV positive prisoners, their rights, and treatment 

is needed. Medical authorities also indicated that numbers are not properly recorded and thus 

are likely inaccurate.

Psychiatric care, psychological, and social support for inmates is not oered at most of Yemen’s prison facilities. Imprisonment, detention, and processing throughout the criminal justice 

system generally translate to detainee anxiety, hypertension, depression, and a sense of isolation 

from family and community, all of which were observed in the Yemeni system. Broader access 

to psychiatric care as part of prison medical services should be given consideration. Additionally, 

little to no provision is made for psychiatric care at remand facilities and a few highly disturbed 

and distressed inmates were observed, handled with diculty by prisoners and sta.

Access to dental care is almost universally absent save for limited treatment at Sana’a Central and a trained dentist prisoner at Hodeida Central, who provides some basic care but lacks 

the necessary tools and instruments to properly attend to patients. As in prisons worldwide, 

dental care should be a priority health care area, because oral hygiene can indicate other health 

issues and does aect overall immunity.

A shortage of medications and supplies is an issue at almost all facilities, approximately 

92 percent, the situation at the remaining 8 percent being unclear. At a number of facilities, 

prison directors noted that donations from local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or 

the community are necessary to supplement medical needs or that prisoners and their families 

must pay for medication to receive treatment. Medical authorities noted that inmates with 

chronic conditions are expected to provide their own funding for care and that those without 

the means or family support are often left untreated. Additionally, expired medication was 

observed at one central prison and four remand prisons. Medical specialist sta appeared 

unaware of the issue and expressed serious concern on observation, marking expired medication for immediate removal and educating prison sta that delivery of such medication 

should not be accepted and that medication should be regularly checked to ensure that it has 

not expired. Small batches of the same types of expired medication were observed in a few 

Tuberculosis is highly 

contagious, and medical 

staff noted that ensuring 

infected patients are 

isolated to prevent the 

spread is a challenge 

given space limitations.
USIP.ORG 35

PRISONS IN YEMEN

remand prisons rather than being an issue for all medication, possibly indicating mistaken 

delivery of a problematic batch. Nonetheless, expired medication at prison clinics must not 

be allowed, and both the Prison Authority and Ministry of Health must be vigilant to ensure 

that it is eliminated.

Medical professionals involved in prisoner care expressed frustration with the prison health 

system, observing that quality care is often aected by prison bureaucracy and any limits on 

their movement within prisons. Nontransparent hiring practices and systematic impediments 

for dedicated professionals has further reduced the pool of doctors willing to serve prisoners, 

resulting in a reported 95 percent of prisons operating without medical doctors, care being 

instead provided by nurses or fellow prisoners. Furthermore, authorities project that approximately six to seven hundred medical workers are required to provide basic care, yet the current 

gure is just seventy-four.

In spite of excellent provisions for prisoner health care in the Yemeni Prison Act, the area requires urgent attention and improved standard of care. Doctors, nurses, medical assistants, prison 

directors, and indeed inmates struggle to provide the best care possible within a dicult set of 

circumstances in many locations. Few, however, appeared to be aware or have time to attend to 

broader aspects of their role, such as inspections and nutrition. Additionally, prison doctors and 

health workers—when correctly educated about their role—can serve an important function in 

reporting instances of physical or mental maltreatment, patterns of abuse, and so on.

Renewed commitment and partnership is required on the part of the Ministry of Health, 

Ministry of Interior, and Prison Authority to raise prison medical services to an acceptable 

level. Clear policies and protocols for care should be developed jointly and assessment of current resource commitment should be reviewed. ICRC has led in this area, providing some 

corrective assistance particularly to upgrade remand prison clinics, on the assumption that the 

Ministry of Health will sta the clinics with appropriate medical sta. e new clinics were 

in place, but prison directors noted that stang remains a problem. One interviewee criticized 

the Ministry of Health for viewing prison health “as a charity rather than as part of their job 

and institutional duty.”

Contact with the Outside World and Visits

International standards set out in the SMRs guarantee contact with the outside world through 

visits and correspondence with family and access to legal counsel.50 Accordingly, the Yemeni 

prison law outlines that all prisoners have a right to

• meet with family, relatives, and friends;

• receive and reply to correspondence; and

• receive and transfer money.51

Additionally, the law and regulations provide further detail on a number of special prisoner categories. Remand prisoners are permitted to receive visits from relatives and legal 

counsel once written permission is provided as part of the remand order.52 Prisoners pending 

release can be visited for a minimum of one hour, the prison director having the discretion to 

increase the time allowed.53 Inmates sentenced to death are entitled to a visit from family and 

relatives one day prior to execution, and the prison director is responsible for communicating 

this information to family.54 Deprivation of visit privileges “for a period of one or two times” 

is set out as a low level disciplinary measure, which can be authorized—by the prison director—in response to prisoner misconduct.55

Authorities project that 

approximately six to seven 

hundred medical workers 

are required to provide basic 

care, yet the current figure 

is just seventy-four.
36 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

Although the law and regulations do not set out a statutory minimum time allowance 

for visits, approaches to visit time were in practice observed to be generous at most facilities, 

prison leadership generally having standard visit hours, allowing visits to occur over a number 

of hours, several days each week. Most visits were observed as noncontact visits through a 

designated visit area in which visitor and detainee were separated by a metal grill. International good practice trends now indicate that contact visits—with no barrier between prisoners 

and visitors—should be the norm.56 Contact visits, particularly face-to-face family visits, were 

observed at a few prisons but were often chaotic and insecurely managed. Nonetheless, most 

directors appear to place no limit on the number of visits or visitors detainees may receive—an 

enlightened approach that should be encouraged with appropriate consideration to security.

Two areas of concern were highlighted. First, prison sta noted that female detainees often 

receive fewer visitors, in part because of societal attitudes toward female oenders. Second, foreign detainees at a number of facilities were concerned about lack of access to their embassies 

and telephone calls to family.

Photo 7. Visiting Area, Sana’a Central

Conjugal visits—private visits between an inmate and spouse—are permitted at several 

central prison facilities. ese visits, recognized as important for preserving familial bonds, occur in rooms set aside for such use. Family visitation rooms were under construction at some 

facilities at the time of study. Although not stipulated in prison regulations, prison ocials 

described a relatively uniform approach wherein couples must petition the prison for a time 

slot and present both identication and a valid marriage certicate to be eligible. e program 

is restricted to the adult male prison population—prison authorities noting that the prison 

system could not cope with pregnancies that might emerge from female inmate conjugal visits, 

given that women’s health and childcare services are already strained. Inequality between male 

and female inmates aside, Yemen’s approach to conjugal visits is progressive compared with 

numerous developed countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and parts of the 

United States and Australia, which do not permit conjugal visits. Yemen ts with a global shift 

toward increased private visits for inmates backed by research indicating that it assists with 

rehabilitation and ability to reintegrate into family life on release.57
USIP.ORG 37

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Consideration should be given to ways to increase visits for female detainees to ensure 

maintenance of familial bonds. Foreign detainees must, as required in the SMRs, be provided 

“reasonable facilities to communicate with diplomatic and consular representatives.” A further 

step to improving visitation rights would be to enable secure no-barrier contact visits, particularly for prisoners and families.

Special Category Prisoners

Women

As in many countries worldwide, women in Yemen are a tiny percentage of the overall prison 

population (see table 5). Nonetheless, design of care for female detainees is particularly important because women are vulnerable in prisons and their requirements—given gender, social dynamics, culture, and childcare responsibilities—dier from men’s. e 2010 adoption 

of the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures 

for Women Oenders is an important advance in recognition of the gender-specic needs and 

necessary safeguards for women in the criminal justice process.58

Female oenders in Yemen are generally transferred to women’s sections of central prisons 

almost immediately following arrest because neither police stations nor remand facilities are 

equipped with separate sections or cell areas for women, nor do they generally have female 

sta. Pre-trial and sentenced detainees in the female wards of central prisons are therefore held 

together. Additionally, no female juvenile centers are currently operational, so female juveniles 

are mixed with the adult population.59

As with male facilities, women’s prisons do not segregate detainees, and prisoner classication is mainly by age. At Hodeida Central, a juvenile female with a mental disability was being 

held with the female inmate population despite not having been charged with or accused of 

any crime, as she had been found in the company of men and no family could be located.

Female oenders often need heightened psychosocial support to counter the strong impact 

of disrupted family life, social stigma, and isolation. Additionally, many women in prison are 

former victims of abuse or are imprisoned for crimes with an abuse component, such as adultery or prostitution. Distress, shame, and depression were evident among female detainees. As 

noted, prison sta pointed out that female detainees tend to receive signicantly fewer or no 

visitors, many having been abandoned and rejected by family and community.

Table 5. Women to Total Population in Central Prisons

Women Total Inmates Ratio

Sana’a 77 2,326 1:30

Taiz 48 1,577 1:33

Ibb 25 1,235 1:49

Hodeida 30 951 1:32

Aden 17 723 1:42

Mukalla 7 483 1:69

Sayun — 87 —
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Female health and childcare were challenging at all facilities visited. Infants and children 

imprisoned with their mothers were present in all female prisons, but facilities are not well 

designed for children’s needs. Bathrooms were often narrow, and washing facilities made bathing infants and children dicult. Lack of formula, clean water, sterilization equipment, diapers, 

and female sanitary products were listed as a concern, and there was little evidence of nursery or 

play facilities at most centers. Maternal and specialist female health workers are in short supply, 

and sta noted great need for specialist medical care. At Aden Central, a large uncovered sewer 

in the courtyard is a serious health risk and danger for small children and inmates alike.

Pregnant, nursing, new mothers, and babies delivered in prison are covered under health care 

provisions of the Prison Act. e law outlines that pregnant prisoners are entitled to appropriate 

health care before, during, and after delivery; that birth inside a prison shall not be mentioned in 

the ocial records of the country; and that babies may stay with mothers until the age of two and 

after if no competent guardians can be found, with some discretion allowed depending on medical 

advice and the discretion of the respective governor or based on the minister of interior’s order.60

ese provisions comply with international standards set out in the SMRs, and the spirit of the 

law was generally observed, but adequate provision of health care remains a key challenge.

Sta to prisoner ratios in female prisons were very low, one to two female guards for the 

entire section working long shifts without rotation. Few female prison guards and carers are 

available within the Yemeni system, and almost no females observed in prison leadership roles. 

Overall gures of women working in the country’s security sector generally are extremely low 

due to cultural and societal pressures, but female ocers noted that additional shame and 

negatives are associated with work as a female prison guard.61

Male sta sensitivity to entering female sections unannounced varied, some facilities careful to minimize entrance of male sta or large delegations to female areas, and others refusing 

requests from the research team to wait outside. Male sta also entered female sections sometimes carrying weapons, a practice also reected in male sections.

On the positive side, women’s facilities are less crowded than male facilities, are regularly visited 

by local or international NGOs, and had workshop facilities, sewing rooms, crafts, and classrooms 

(though some were not functional). In addition, civil society, local benefactors, and charitable organizations appeared to actively support female detainees, meaning that more resources were available for and more attention given to women on some issues. Nonetheless, facilities overall are 

inadequate for the needs of detainees, in many places requiring repair and greater funding.

Improving conditions for female detainees would rst require increasing the number of 

female prison guards and of social workers and psychologists working with female detainees. 

ese social workers might facilitate greater engagement with families of female detainees and 

connections to society. Restarting education and work opportunities, such as workshops and 

sewing rooms, would, as noted earlier, help relieve stress and depression among female inmates 

and potentially ease later reintroduction into society. A longer-term project is to address the 

lack of pre-trial and juvenile detention options for female detainees and to increase provision 

for children of detainees (to include nurseries, education, and play).

Mentally Ill

Care for prisoners with mental health needs is a challenge in all countries. Dierent countries have adopted incarceration models ranging from secure hospitalization or outpatient care 

outside the prison system to mixing with the general prison population. Incarceration places 

mental strain on all prisoners but can be particularly damaging and dangerous for those who are 

Overall figures of women 

working in the country’s 

security sector generally 

are extremely low due 

to cultural and societal 

pressures, but female 

officers noted that additional 

shame and negatives are 

associated with work as a 

female prison guard.
USIP.ORG 39

PRISONS IN YEMEN

mentally ill and presents an array of management issues for sta. e Prison Act stipulates that 

if “the prisoner suers from a psychological or mental disease, he shall be transferred to the psychological and mental hospital based on the report of the competent doctor and in accordance 

with related regulations.” 62

In the past, detainees with mental health needs were often removed from the prison system and placed in psychiatric hospitals. At present, incarceration and treatment are within the 

system in assigned separate psychiatric wards within the compounds. In theory, this allows for 

specialist care and separation of detainees who both are vulnerable and can have violent or disruptive behaviors. In practice, however, wards for the mentally ill were observed as inadequate 

in providing care, and implementation of segregation varied. Sana’a Central, Taiz, Ibb, and Hodeida had fully separate walled units within the central compound, Aden a very limited freestanding cellblock, and Mukalla and Sayun an open space within the compound. Mental health 

wards are available for adult male detainees only. Mentally ill female and juvenile detainees are 

dealt with within their cell areas.

Wards for the mentally ill were beyond sta control and observed—in Aden, Sana’a, and 

Taiz Central—as dangerous. Due to lack of funding, wards are insuciently staed—also not 

adequately provided with specialist psychiatric and medical sta, psychologists, social workers, and guards capable of sensitively and safely handling the detainees. Guards expressed fear 

and were concerned about allowing access to these areas. Discussion with mental health sta 

reected great need and low availability of care. Few doctors, psychologists, and nurses can be 

convinced to take on positions within the prisons because the jobs oer comparatively low 

salaries and are considered undesirable.

Availability of specialist medication varied. Where available, it was often not tailored to 

patient’s needs, given that many do not receive detailed or proper diagnoses. Treatment is 

conned to medication and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), and sta are typically unable to 

provide psychosocial treatment, behavioral therapies, and the like.

Such care may be limited within central prisons but is nearly nonexistent after arrest and 

during remand phases. Treatment at remand facilities was a concern during observation. At one 

facility, for example, prisoners were observed using force and beating a mentally ill prisoner to 

restrain him while guards looked on.

In a number of facilities, isolation cells are used to hold violent or problematic mentally ill 

inmates, and the threat or use of overnight stays in the mentally ill ward was reported as a disciplinary measure for the general prison population. Such practices are harmful and should be stopped.

Given the weakness of mental health treatment within the detention system, the criminal 

justice system and prison authorities should consider greater use of outpatient services and 

alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent mentally ill oenders. e Prison Authority should 

work with the Ministry of Health to overhaul mental health protocols for prisons, including 

increasing both availability of mental health professionals and treatment options and medication. A cadre of specialist prison guards should be trained to work in conjunction with trained 

psychiatric nurses in psychiatric wards.

Juveniles

Denition of a juvenile in the Yemeni criminal justice system is in ux. Yemen ratied the 

Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1991, dening a child as anyone under eighteen 

years, but culturally the age of majority is generally considered to be fteen.63 A bifurcated 

system currently operates wherein fteen- to eighteen-year-old oenders are considered adult 

At one facility, prisoners 

were observed using force 

and beating a mentally ill 

prisoner to restrain him 

while guards looked on.
40 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

and fall under Prison Authority jurisdiction. Oenders under fteen fall under the Ministry 

of Social Welfare and are housed in juvenile care centers, staed primarily by teachers, social 

workers, and psychologists, the Ministry of Interior providing perimeter security only.

Since 2001, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Social Welfare, along with the 

United Nations Children’s Fund, the European Union, donor countries, Penal Reform International, Save the Children, and numerous local NGOs, have been engaged in a cooperative 

strategic reform project that has gradually developed and shaped the notion of juvenile protections within the criminal justice system. ere are now eleven juvenile care centers in Yemen 

to divert young oenders away from the punitive adult system toward a more rehabilitative, 

caring approach. Specialist police stations and juvenile courts are being developed to complete 

the program. One sticking point is the issue of age of majority, some arguing for the full segregation of fteen- to eighteen-year-old juveniles in detention units within the central prison 

system with an array of rehabilitation programs attached, as has been implemented in Sana’a 

Central. Others argue for the full removal of oenders younger than eighteen from Prison 

Authority jurisdiction and into juvenile care facilities.

e research team visited Juvenile Care Centers in Sana’a, Aden, and Hodeida. A pilot juvenile police station in the Crater area in Aden is preparing to open but not yet fully operational 

or receiving juveniles. e benets of specialist juvenile care are clear. Facilities are styled more 

like boarding schools than detention facilities, characterized by brightly painted and decorated, 

clean, orderly dormitories separated by age and supervised twenty-four hours a day by child 

protection sta. Although bathroom cleanliness at juvenile care centers is not ideal, wear-andtear from high occupancy by often dicult youth is a challenge, and funds to conduct repairs 

are lacking. Children are encouraged and instructed to maintain cleanliness and good hygiene 

in their physical appearance and surroundings. Routine includes daily school lessons, group 

and individual psychological counseling, play, sport, theater, art, and vocational skills. Maintenance of family connection is strongly encouraged, with exible visit times and occasional 

home visits where possible. Security is a concern. e low-wall, low-security approach, though 

positive in terms of rehabilitation and fostering a caring environment, allows for more frequent 

escapes. Overall, although a comprehensive review of the facilities was not possible, it is clear 

that juvenile care in Yemen represents a more enlightened, rehabilitative approach, lessening 

the exposure of juveniles to criminalization, radicalization, and victimization typical within the 

adult system. Female juvenile care is a particular challenge. Because of funding cuts to numerous centers, female juvenile sections have been closed and oenders are currently housed within 

women’s facilities at central prisons.

Within Prison Authority prisons, juveniles are a small but signicantly at-risk population. 

At central prisons and remand facilities, juveniles are generally at minimum segregated by cell 

but mix freely with the prison population during the day in most facilities. Given that key 

control is generally within inmate rather than sta control and that no supervision is provided 

at night, major concerns for juvenile safety and vulnerability to abuse require urgent review. 

Additionally, despite the age brackets provided at interview, juveniles are housed within the 

adult prison population and at remand centers (see table 6).

Sana’a Central operates as a pilot model for a fully segregated juvenile detention facility 

within the central prison system. Unlike at most central prison facilities, Sana’a Central holds 

juveniles age fteen to eighteen in a separate block dedicated for their care. e area houses a 

library, small workshop, game room, TV room, and prayer area but lacks a dedicated outdoor 

area despite occasional access to a soccer pitch and volleyball court. Positive strides have been 
USIP.ORG 41

PRISONS IN YEMEN

made in terms of education and recreation provision, and the prison is clearly proud of its 

investment in juvenile education, the director and sta noting that many have nished high 

school as prisoners and a number are studying at university level courses, such as commerce, 

literature, humanities, and law. e juveniles have a very enthusiastic and active supervisor—a 

Jordanian with a master’s degree in education—in charge of the area, who sleeps in a room 

within the facility and is available 24/7. He demonstrated deep care and pride in the boys’ 

achievements and interest in ensuring talent development and aftercare programs for juveniles. 

at said, the supervisor is a serving prisoner. Consideration should be given to the appropriateness of involving inmates in juvenile care, and sta and prisoners alike in caretaking roles 

responsible for juveniles should be carefully vetted and supervised.

Although serious concerns about juvenile care in Yemen prisons remain, recent reforms 

indicate what can be achieved in the system as a whole. e constructive, sustained dialogue 

across the Yemeni government, civil society, and the international community has led to substantial improvements to juvenile detention and care and should be continued.

e United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice64

and United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of eir Liberty 65 provide 

a framework for treatment of juvenile oenders and highlight limiting institutionalization of 

minors wherever possible and only exceptional use of pre-trial detention for juveniles. Where 

possible, removal of minors from prison facilities to suitable juvenile care facilities or, if possible, to the custody of their families is preferable.

At a minimum, all currently detained juveniles under eighteen must be segregated from 

incarceration and socialization with adult oenders. As part of an overall rework of stang and 

training, specialist sta should be trained for juvenile care at prison facilities.

Conclusion

In its political transition and reform, Yemen faces complex and challenging security threats. 

is turbulent period, however, also presents rare windows of opportunity for change, shedding 

the structures of the past and embracing a new vision for security and justice. Central to this, 

addressing the weaknesses and deciencies in the prison system will be key to promoting rule 

of law and improving security. Woven throughout this report and set out here, analysis and 

recommendations seek to address both core thematic areas of concern and how and when to 

address them.

e Yemeni prison law and regulations provide an excellent basis for reform. Although in 

need of development, particularly to add greater specicity, they are a solid legislative base from 

Juveniles Inmates Ratio

Sana’a 77 2,326 1:30

Taiz 32 1,577 1:49

Ibb 27 1,235 1:46

Hodeida 31 951 1:30

Aden 14 723 1:52

Mukalla 2 483 1:242

Sayun 1 87 1:87

Table 6. Juveniles to Total Population in Central Prisons
42 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

which to build a progressive, rights-based approach to imprisonment. Many of the recommendations in this report are aimed at ensuring better conditions for both prisoners and sta 

because well-being has an important bearing on the strength and stability of the prison system 

as a whole. Improvements in organizational structure and prisoner well-being, for example, 

can act as a lever for improved security. Decreasing overcrowding not only improves quality of 

life for prisoners but vastly improves security strain placed on guards and prison infrastructure. 

Ensuring that prisons provide recreation, sport, labor, and training not only allows prisoners 

to engage in meaningful activity but also improves physical and mental health, lessens the 

strain on medical services, reduces conict by providing an outlet to counteract connement, 

promotes rehabilitation, and provides skills for reintegration of prisoners into society. Similarly, 

emphasis on a strong prison routine not only improves prison sanitation and prisoner hygiene 

but also provides order and promotes calm.

At a national level, reform should be led by the Prison Authority and Ministry of Interior, bringing together all relevant ministries working on prisons—including the ministries of 

Health, Education, Social Welfare, and Justice—in dialogue. e process should also embrace 

involvement of local civil society engaged in prisoner care, international organizations, and 

donor representatives, which allows for cooperative input, technical expertise, and potential 

nancial assistance. In parallel, strategic working groups and consultation at prison leadership level should feed ground realities and needs into the national level process. Furthermore, 

momentum and inspiration can be drawn from juvenile detention reform processes already 

under way. e cooperative multistakeholder approach adopted to focus on juvenile justice has 

yielded results for juvenile care that could be built upon in the prison system more broadly.

Although nancial and strategic capabilities investment will be required to comprehensively advance reforms in prison conditions, security and care, dialogue, prisoner care, and 

security has the potential to galvanize more straightforward changes as well. Two examples 

are rearming commitments to medical care and education for prisoners as part of the state 

health and education sector and agreeing to partnerships with civil society or donors to provide 

bridging assistance on key areas of need.

Prison leadership should not lose sight of areas currently within their control that could 

be improved. Immediate priority should be given to urgent security and welfare concerns, 

such as ceasing prisoner key control and regaining authority over cell areas. e very core 

life-sustaining needs of vulnerable prison populations must be ensured—weaknesses in water 

and provision of sucient food of good nutritional value need attention. Facilities reaching 

dangerous 150 percent and higher levels of overcrowding—such as Ibb, Mukalla, Aden, Sana’a, 

Taiz, and Hodeida Central Prisons, along with al-Mu’allim and Alaya Remand Prisons in 

Sana’a—should stop receiving inmates. Early investment in simple, often low-cost changes can 

inuence prisoner well-being, such as instilling a basic sense of routine and providing sucient 

access to fresh air and sunlight each day. Health and safety measures, such as not allowing open 

burner ames unsupervised in public yards and cells, checking stocks for expired medication, 

covering and attending to sewers, and instilling rules for proper use of isolation cells, could be 

implemented immediately at little to no cost, but with great impact.

A further set of recommendations require signicant time and nancial investment and 

entail more invasive reforms to address system needs either urgently or in the medium to long 

term. For example, the Yemeni government, with support from the international community, 

needs to urgently confront the security threat posed by radicalization and recruitment within 

Decreasing overcrowding 

not only improves quality of 

life for prisoners but vastly 

improves security strain 

placed on guards and prison 

infrastructure. 
USIP.ORG 43

PRISONS IN YEMEN

the prison population—a risk to both local and international peace and security. Relatedly, 

though likely to occur through phased development over the medium to long term, prison infrastructure needs to be rehabilitated and redesigned to meet security and prisoner care needs. 

Guard training and personnel development must be undertaken as a priority but will require 

sustained investment up front and consistently going forward to run secure, well-managed 

prison facilities. Processes for change must be commenced immediately, laying foundations for 

development through reform dialogue.

Despite the many challenges, small windows of opportunity for prison reform are emerging. Many, in fact, are well within reach. e chance to embrace change in this crucial period of 

security and justice reform should not be missed.

Recommendations

Four prison-specic recommendations are urgent.

• Stop assigning inmates to Ibb, Mukalla, Aden, Sana’a, Taiz, and Hodeida Central 

Prisons and to al-Mu’allim and Alaya Remand Prisons in Sana’a.

• Address food and nutritional concerns at Taiz and Mukalla Central.

• Give immediate attention to ensuring basic access to sunlight and free movement in 

facilities where it is now most limited, notably Hodeida Central and Sana’a remand/

branch facilities.

• Address and immediately correct conditions and use of isolation cells at Sana’a Central.

System-wide recommendations for the longer term fall into sixteen categories.

Legal and regulatory framework

• Encourage immediate full implementation of project to provide laminated booklets on 

prisoner’s rights and staff duties to inmates and staff. Consider other programming 

dedicated to communicating rights and duties given the low literacy rates in Yemen.

• Undertake multistakeholder review of the prison law and regulations, including 

assessing resource and management requirements for compliance, developing realistic 

expectations for prison directors now, setting progressive goals for improvement, 

identifying ways to support efforts to apply the law into the future, and expanding the 

regulations to comprehensively cover all core aspects of prison management.

Levels of detention and prisoner classification

• Confront, with the aid of the international community, the security threat posed by 

radicalization and recruitment within the prison population.

• Train and sensitize prison leadership and guards to observe spectrums of radicalization 

activity in prisons, reporting signs of group formation, incidents of nonviolent or violent 

resistance, escape attempts, internal attacks on guards or prisoners, and signs of communication with criminal, radical, or extremist groups outside the prison compound.

• Detail prisoner classification policies and contain extremist prisoners immediately and 

securely. May necessitate reassigning or segregating prison yard space or temporarily 

implementing regulated shifts for outdoor and recreation spaces.
44 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

Staffing roles

• Review staff numbers, roles, protocols, and training.

• Review and clarify prison leadership roles, responsibilities, career path, and training.

• Provide specialist prison guard training with a tailored curriculum involving both 

theoretical and practical components as well as regular in-service refresher training, 

sensitivity training, psychological evaluation, and support.

• Develop both basic and specialist training curricula in line with the Prison Act and 

regulations and staff and prisoner rights handbooks, with sensitivity to literacy rates.

• Launch a cross-ministry discussion on providing, posting, and financing specialist 

support to include the ministries of Interior, Justice, Social Welfare, Education, and 

Health.

Prison security

• Undertake a full security review with the goal of improving security and safety of 

central prisons and supplementing funding for infrastructure repair and 

reinforcement.

• Immediately clarify and instill basic security procedures and protocols, such as the 

need to maintain key control or to refrain from carrying firearms within prison cells.

• Expand and clarify security and order provisions in the regulations.

Physical infrastructure

• Undertake a review, for the short to medium term, of outdoor space and potential 

remedies. Give greater attention to improving exercise, recreation, and other provisions for remand facilities.

• Consider, for the medium to long term, rehabilitation and construction of prisons, 

carefully contemplating needs, planning, and consultation in prison design standards.

Prison registry and data overview

• Institute basic monitoring procedures for administrative staff and leadership to 

improve accuracy of prison numbers and reporting.

• Improve monitoring and data-driven strategic management and planning for the 

medium and long term.

Use of isolation cells

• Review and standardize policies and procedures for use and presence of isolation cells 

in the regulations for implementation, including processes of appeal to isolation cells 

use, review, medical observation, and careful oversight by prison directors.

Communication with inmates

• Reinstate complaints procedures for prisoners.

• Incorporate in prison leadership and guard training the importance of maintaining 

positive relations and professional communication with prisoners.
USIP.ORG 45

PRISONS IN YEMEN

• Assess—by observation and discussion—ways to strengthen the role of prosecutor 

generals in processing prisoner complaints and monitoring care.

Overcrowding and accommodation

• Consider immediate relief measures—to include transfers—in cases of gross overcrowding, such as issuing release orders for those who have overstayed their sentence 

or when pre-trial limitations have been surpassed.

• Review root causes of overcrowding with an eye to developing medium- and longterm solutions.

Due process, unsentenced prisoners, and release issues

• Work with the Ministry of Justice on the overcrowding review to study root causes of 

delayed release, fines, and the debts system.

Recreation, exercise, education, and labor

• Give immediate attention to ensuring basic access to sunlight and free movement in 

facilities where it is now most limited (notably Hodeida Central).

• Reallocate funds to restore recreation, labor, and educational activities.

• Include dialogue and reaffirmation of partnerships between the Ministry of Interior 

and Ministry of Education to clarify and renew obligations on education provisions.

Sanitation

• Involve prisoners in cleaning and hygiene as part of prison routine.

• Review sanitation infrastructure, design, and compounding factors.

Food and water

• Address food and nutritional concerns in facilities characterized by deficiency.

• Make water concerns system-wide a priority in consultation with other relevant state 

authorities.

• Remove gas burners from crowded cell areas.

• Review kitchen hygiene standards and protocol.

Access to medical services

• Include dialogue and reaffirmation of partnerships between the Ministry of Interior and 

Ministry of Health to clarify and renew obligations on medical service provision.

Contact with the outside world and visits

• Ensure the rights of foreign detainees to good communication with embassy representatives and family.

• Consider ways to increase visits for female detainees.
46 USIP.ORG

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• Consider permitting secure no-barrier contact visits for prisoners and families.

• Set out clear policies and procedures around conjugal visits.

Special category prisoners

• Increase number of female prison guards. Direct recruitment campaigns to reduce 

stigma for female prison guards.

• Train female guards alongside male counterparts and include training on interaction 

with victims of abuse.

• Increase number of social workers and psychologists working with female detainees 

and seek to engage families of female detainees and connections to society.

• Address the lack of pre-trial and juvenile detention options for female detainees and 

provision for children of detainees (to include nurseries, education, and play).

• Instruct prison leadership that isolation cells must not be used to house mentally ill 

prisoners.

• Eliminate confinement overnight in the mentally ill ward as a punishment for 

prisoners.

• Work with Ministry of Health to overhaul mental health protocols for prisons, including urgent discussion of provision for mental health professionals, treatment options, 

and medication.

• Consider greater use of outpatient services and alternatives to incarceration for non

violent mentally ill offenders.

• Train a cadre of special guards to work in conjunction with trained psychiatric nurses 

in psychiatric wards.

• Segregate offenders under eighteen from incarceration and socialization with adult 

offenders.

• Consider removing minors from prison facilities to suitable juvenile care facilities or, 

if possible, to family custody.

• Train specialist staff for juvenile care and prison facilities.
USIP.ORG 47

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Notes

1. For ease of reading, and due to the fluid nature of detention, pre-sentence, and post-sentence in Yemen, the 

terms prisoner and detainee are used interchangeably throughout the report. When detainees were clearly 

pre-trial, the term detainee has been used.

2. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Growing Inmate Crowding Negatively Affects Inmates, Staff, and 

Infrastructure,” September 12, 2012, www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-743; Hans-Joerg Albrecht, “Prison 

Overcrowding–Finding Effective Solutions,” Max-Planck-Institut für Ausländisches und Internationales 

Strafrecht, 2012; UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Handbook on Strategies to Reduce Overcrowding in 

Prisons,” 2013, www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Overcrowding_in_prisons_Ebook.pdf.

3. The exact duration of the agreement was twenty-seven months, which included the three months before the 

February 2012 presidential elections.

4. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement, Article 13 (c), www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/yemen/yemen_

transition_agreement.htm.

5. See April Alley, “Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?” International Crisis Group 

Middle East Report no. 139, April 2013, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20

North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Yemen/139-yemens-military-security-reform-seeds-of-new-conflict.

6. The NDC was initially supposed to close in August 2013 and to move immediately toward a new constitution drafting process, followed by regular elections instituting a new government. However, political 

standoff has frustrated the benchmarks of the GCC agreement at each step in the process. The NDC ultimately closed on January 25, 2014, and NDC representatives agreed to delay the next stages of the transition 

process accordingly. In its final closing session, NDC delegates agreed to extend the transition process for at 

least one more year, until roughly February 2015, to ensure implementation of the NDC recommendations 

and appropriate preparations for elections. The NDC closing document left President Hadi in office until a 

new president is elected. Also the drafting of the new constitution, referendum, and election deadlines originally envisioned in the GCC extended were to take place through 2014 and 2015. See Erica Gaston, 

“Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue,” USIP Special Report no. 342, February 2014, 

www.usip.org/publications/process-lessons-learned-in-yemen-s-national-dialogue; Tobias Thiel, “Yemen’s 

Negotiated Transition between the Elite and the Street,” London School of Economics and Political 

Science, Middle East Centre blog, March 3, 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2014/03/03/yemens-negotiated-transition-between-the-elite-and-the-street/; and Chatham House, “Prospects and Challenges for 

Yemen After the National Dialogue: Meeting Summary,” April 4, 2014, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/

chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140404ProspectsChallengesYemenFinal.pdf.

7. See final National Dialogue Conference Final Document, www.ndc.ye/default.aspx, 141.

8. MOI and Prison Authority officials interviewed suggested that relatively few structural changes as a result 

of the NDC conclusions were likely because many of the changes that would be required had already been 

put in place in the security sector reform efforts in 2013.

9. See Mohammed Ghobari, “Houthis Tighten Gip on Yemen Capital After Swift Capture, Power-Sharing 

Deal,” Reuters, September 22, 2014; International Crisis Group, “Conflict Alert: Unrest in Sana’a,” press 

release, September 8, 2014, www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/alerts/2014/conflict-alert-unrest-insanaa.aspx. For background on the conflict between the Yemeni government and the Houthis, see April 

Longley Alley, “The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa,” International Crisis Group Middle East Report no. 

156, June 10, 2014, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20

Gulf/Yemen/154-the-huthis-from-saada-to-sanaa.pdf.

10. Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: Detained, Tortured, and Disappeared,” May 7, 2012, www.hrw.org/ru/

node/106995; U.S. Department of State, “Yemen 2013 Human Rights Report,” www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/

hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220385; Library of Congress–Federal Research 

Division, “Country Profile: Yemen,” August 2008, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf.

11. U.S. Department of State, “Yemen 2013 Human Rights Report”; IRIN News, “YEMEN: Growing Calls 

for Closure of Private Prisons,” May 2, 2007, www.irinnews.org/report/71905/yemen-growing-calls-forClosure-Of-Private-Prisons; International Committee of The Red Cross (ICRC), “Yemen: Alleviating the 

Suffering of Detainees,” July 31, 2013, www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2013/07-31-yemen-detainees-macsweeney.htm.

12. Introductory paragraph, Prison Authority Organization Act, Republican decree No.48 (1981). Translated 

copy received from international NGO.

13. Article 32(3), Prison Authority Organization Act, Republican decree No.48 (1981) and Article 58, Prison 

Act Regulations.

14. Article 8, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

15. Chapter 7, Article 32, Prison Act.

16. Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, “Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding 

the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners,” RAND Europe, 2008.

17. Chapter 2, Article 4, Prison Act Regulations.
48 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

18. Chapter 2, Article 4(6), Prison Act Regulations.

19. Article 49, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

20. Chapter 3 and Chapter 6, Prison Act Regulations.

21. Article 47, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

22. It is understood that some work may be under way with Penal Reform International engaging with the 

Yemeni Ministry of Interior on training, opening a training center in Sana’a in March 2013, and beginning 

support for courses on human rights and basic prison management with the aim of rolling out to all prison 

officers over the next five years. See Penal Reform International, “Working Towards Fair and Effective 

Criminal Justice: The PRI Way,” Annual Report 2013, www.penalreform.org/resource/

pri-annual-report-2013.

23. Nasser Al-Sakkaf, “Ibb Prison Suicide Highlights Poor Prison Conditions,” Yemen Times, April 8, 2014, 

www.yementimes.com/en/1770/news/3696/Ibb-prison-suicide-highlights-poor-prison-conditions.htm.

24. Recent escapes in Amran include reports of a full escape in early July 2014 and a partial escape in June 2014. 

See Nasser Al-Sakkaf, “Air Force Bombs Targets in Amran,” Yemen Times, June 5, 2014, www.yementimes.

com/en/1787/news/3934/Air-force-bombs-targets-in-Amran.htm.

25. Articles 33–34, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

26. ICRC, Water, Sanitation, Hygiene and Habitat in Prisons: Supplementary Guidance, July 2012, www.icrc.org/

eng/resources/documents/publication/p4083.htm.

27. ICRC, “Water Sanitation Hygiene and Habitat in Prisons,” February 2013; “Supplementary Guidance.”

28. Articles 27 and 32(1), Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

29. Article 32(1), Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

30. Additional bathrooms have now been added but are still inadequate given sustained overcrowding.

31. Article 10, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

32. These facilities include police stations, CID holding cells, and court holding cells, among others.

33. Erica Gaston with Nadwa al-Dawsari, “Justice in Transition in Yemen,” USIP Peaceworks no. 99, 

September 2014. 

34. Article 483, Yemeni Criminal Procedure Code.

35. Article 21, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

36. Chapter 4, Articles 12–22, Prison Act.

37. Articles 12–14, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

38. ICRC, “Supplementary Guidance.”

39. See ICRC, Water, Sanitation, Hygiene and Habitat in Prisons, chapter 3.

40. Ibid.

41. Article 21, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

42. Articles 4(13) and 4(14), Prison Act Regulations.

43. ICRC, Water, Sanitation, Hygiene and Habitat in Prisons, 24–25.

44. ICRC, “Supplementary Guidance,” 45.

45. Principle 9, United Nations Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners; and Principle 1, United Nations 

Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the 

Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 

Treatment or Punishment.

46. Article 22–26, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

47. Ibid.

48. International Centre for Prison Studies, “Prison Health and Public Health: The Integration of Prison 

Health Services,” April 2004, www.prisonstudies.org/sites/prisonstudies.org/files/resources/downloads/

health_service_integration.pdf.

49. World Health Organization Europe, “Declaration on Prison Health as Part of Public Health,” adopted in 

Moscow on 24 October 2003.

50. Articles 37 and 93, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

51. Article 30, Prison Act.

52. Article 31, Prison Act.

53. Article 63, Prison Act Regulations.

54. Article 73, Prison Act Regulations.

55. Article 31, Prison Act; Article 81, Prison Act Regulations.

56. ICRC, “Supplementary Guidance,” 17.

57. See “Conjugal Visits: No Laughing Matter,” The Economist, November 2, 2013, www.economist.com/news/

international/21588887-prisons-increasingly-allow-conjugal-visits-not-britain-and-america-no-laughing.
USIP.ORG 49

PRISONS IN YEMEN

58. Also known as the Bangkok Rules, see United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and NonCustodial Measures for Women Offenders, www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2010/res%202010-16.pdf.

59. See Marie-Christine Heinze and Sarah Ahmed, “Integrating Women’s Security Interests into Police 

Reform in Yemen: Some Suggestions for Structural Reform,” Yemen Polling Center, June 2013.

60. Articles 27–29, Prison Act.

61. See “New Video From Yemen Explores Women’s Role in The Security Sector,” Saferworld, June 23, 2014, 

www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/news-article/656-new-video-from-yemen-explores-womenas-role-in-thesecurity-sector-.

62. Article 26, Prison Act.

63. For Yemen’s UNHR ratification status, see http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/

Treaty.aspx?CountryID=193&Lang=EN.

64. Also known as the Beijing Rules, see “United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 

Juvenile Justice,” Document no. A/RES/40/33, November 29, 1985, www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/

a40r033.htm.

65. See “United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty,” Document no. A/

RES/45/113, December 14, 1990, www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r113.htm.

USIP.ORG 51

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Appendix A. Data Overview

Prison Total Capacity Sentenced Pre-Trial Women Infants Juveniles Foreign Staff

Sana’a

Sana’a Central 2,326b 1200 1,235 545 76 12 69+8F 33 550

Al-Mu’allim Remand 315 176 24 291 - - 10 13 43

Al-Habrah Remand 250 300 0 250 - - 15 - 35

Alaya Remand 330 100 —c 330 - - 7c 47 47

Al-Thawrah Remand 170 300 3 167 - - 7 8 36

Aden Central 723b 400 214 436 17 4 13+1Fc 60 100

Taiz Central 1,577b 750 492 901a 48 3 32 12a 300a

Hodeida Central 951b 350 418 374 30 10 31a 22 141

Hodeida Remand 201 200 15 186 - - 9 3 51

Ibb Central 1,235 800 746 489 25 16 27 1 130

Ibb Remand 300 250 60a 240a - - 40 - 20

Mukalla Central 483 300 160a 280a 7 - 2 61 191

Sayun Central 87 120 60 27 - - 1 4 105

Table A1. Penitentiary Authority Prison Data Summary

a

 Estimate—precise numbers not provided.

b Numbers provided from records but do not add up.

c

 Reported figures differ from observed.

F=Females
52 USIP.ORG

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Appendix B. Facility Visit Data

Sana’a Central

Built in 1970s as a prison. Large perimeter wall. Separate areas for male, female, juvenile, and 

mentally ill detainees. Numerous gated perimeter areas. Structure lacks modernization and 

security resources. Little natural light in corridor areas. Electricity access inconsistent. Outdoor 

space poorly utilized. Considered one of the most secure facilities. Numerous security vulnerabilities. No capacity to hold and segregate detainees.

Prison data

• Total population—2,326

• Capacity—1,200

• Men—2,181

• Women—76 (8 juveniles)

• Juveniles—69

• Mentally ill—95

• Sentenced—1,235

• Not sentenced—545

• Foreign total—33

• Foreign nationalities—Somali, Ethiopian, Jordanian, Pakistani, Iranian, Egyptian

• Composition—Mixed, criminal, terror suspects, pre-trial, and sentenced

• Classification—By cell within blocks. Overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure. 

No capacity to properly classify and segregate.

Medical care

• Clinic in a building adjacent to women’s prison. Not open on either visit. Not fully 

observed. Smaller clinic areas within male and female blocks for minor complaints.

• Common female health issues include gynecological problems and infections, chest 

infections, allergies.

• Medical needs greatly surpass care. Supplies lacking.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Numerous major breakouts and escapes. Director aware of vulnerabilities, has sent Prison Authority and MOI a detailed list of requests: electronic doors, 

security arcs and wands, surveillance cameras, reinforced perimeter wall, concrete 

blockades, observation towers, sealed flooring for yard areas, riot gear; stun guns, 

jamming equipment for cell phones, security siren/alarms, water canons, prisoner 

uniforms.

• Escapes. 2001, 7; 2002, 1 (U.S. citizen); 2009, 2; 2013, 29 (al-Qaeda).

• External incursions. 2013 escape involved blast and firefight on perimeter wall.

• Internal issues. 2011 riot, registry office burned, troops deployed. Members of terrorist 

organizations within prisons provoke conflict, recruit, pass information in and out, use 

prisoner informants.

• Isolation cell and policy. Officially, staff raise issues and director gives orders; in practice, 

decisions made by officer in charge. Most held two to three days.
USIP.ORG 53

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Large area within a secondary perimeter and gate. Two recreation yards, one 

with a comprehensive library. Cells large, approximately 8 by 20 meters. Many overcrowded, as many as forty inmates, cement bunk beds, floor mattresses. Most have 

internal bathrooms with two toilets and two taps, many broken. Hygiene subpar. 

Ventilation poor. Cleaning routine not uniform. All areas could not be observed. 

Guards beyond prison control, reluctant to allow access. Team forced to withdraw 

after seeing only a few cells.

• Female. Separate area with internal walled perimeter. Construction rubble at perimeter 

gate a security and egress hazard. Two yard areas, one with old playground equipment, 

only one in use. Includes classrooms, sewing, workshop areas. No remand prison. Two 

female security staff on 24-hour shifts, four educational staff, two social workers. 

Routine involves rising at 9 am, cleaning, attending class, receiving visitors (more than 

twenty never have), spending time in open areas, cells closing about 10 pm. No 

bathrooms in cells. Small kitchen available. Cell areas near capacity and insufficiently 

resourced. Bathrooms narrow and quite small. Doctor visits twice weekly. Detainees 

and staff complain of insufficient diapers, formula, water filters and heaters, clothes 

and shoes for infants. Local NGO assistance does not cover needs.

• Juvenile. Separate block. Area includes library, small workshop, game room, TV room, 

and prayer area. No dedicated outdoor area. Occasional use of soccer pitch and volleyball court. Capacity for ninety but insufficient bedding. Cells approximately 4 by 7 

meters. Somewhat overcrowded: ten per cell in bunk beds. Some personal possessions 

allowed. Cells relatively cluttered but clean. Inability to classify and segregate juveniles. Positive strides in education and recreation: vocational training, sport, university 

coursework, culture evenings, art, Quran study.

• Mentally ill. Separate gated area: a long cell on one side and parallel outdoor space with 

grass area. Established in 1985 with assistance from ICRC. Equipped to treat only 

mild cases. Assistance provided by Ministry of Health, falls under Prisons Authority. 

Adult males only. Females housed and treated in women’s prison. One psychiatrist, 

eleven nurses, one visiting anesthetist for administering ECT. Seventeen guards, 

24-hour shifts. Medication supply ample. Detainees heavily sedated. Separate kitchen 

and dining room area unclean. Food from main kitchen. Barber shop.

• Isolation cell and policy. A black hole with no natural light, bricked-up windows, 

extremely poorly ventilation, no hygiene. Approximately 2.5 by 2.5 meters, housing at 

least six men, no bedding. One foul-smelling toilet. Used for troublemakers. Officerin-charge decides who is put in. Second barely lit, crowded isolation cell 4 by 4 meters 

holds “homosexuals.” Conditions extremely poor, bordering on inhumane. Poor key 

control, raising concerns for inmate safety.

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Each area save juvenile offers outdoor space and generous 

time outdoors. A school, library, workshops, volleyball, soccer.

• Kitchen. Not observed. Neither lack of food nor quality issues arose in discussions with 

staff and prisoners. Compound includes a bakery.

• Staff. Most guard staff in uniform. Weapons left outside blocks. Guards do not have 

full control over male prison area. Stress and psychological strain evident.
54 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

Al Mu’allim Branch/Remand Prison, Sana’a

Built in 2000 as a detention facility, under renovation. Same multioor design as other prisons 

in Sana’a. Within compound little bigger than prison building, no additional outdoor space, 

surrounded by residential and commercial buildings. Renovation intended to upgrade conditions: water coolers with lters, water heaters, showers, painting, and inmate accommodation. 

Entrance steps and internal stairways broken and strewn with rubble.

Prison data

• Total population—315

• Capacity—176 (target 276 after renovation)

• Men—305

• Women—0

• Juveniles—10

• Mentally ill—0

• Sentenced—24

• Not sentenced—291

• Foreign total—13

• Foreign nationalities—Somali, Egyptian, Sudanese

• Composition—Mixed, mostly criminal

• Classification—By cell, separating previous offenders, new offenders, and juveniles. 

Detainees move freely and mix during the day.

Medical care

• Basic first aid clinic available through assistance from ICRC. Small one-room clinic 

with dispensary. No medical staff present during visit. Full-time medical staff promised but not yet assigned. Small batches of expired medication, including calamine 

lotion. Detainee doctor currently assisting with medical care.

• Common medical conditions include chest pain, fever, colds, headache, abdominal 

pain. Records book mainly listed symptoms—not observed at other locations.

• Contract with al-Thawrah hospital, prisoners transferred for free treatment.

• Clinic new and transitional. Insufficient supplies. Expired medication observed.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Some vulnerability due to design and proximity to community.

• Escapes. NA

• External incursions. NA

• Internal issues. NA

• Isolation cell and policy. In basement area. Used primarily for storage. Director 

decision.

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Renovated cells bright and airy, good ventilation, windows and ceiling fans, 

clean bathrooms. Approximately 5 by 8 meters, some twenty to twenty-five mattresses 

on floor. Hygiene issues in unrenovated cells, conditions cramped. Narrow staircases 

under repair and hazardous. Basement area chaotic and beyond staff control. Detainees 

keen to report delays with their cases. Concerns over food, water, and telephone access. 

Key control in hands of “prisoners in charge.”
USIP.ORG 55

PRISONS IN YEMEN

• Female. NA

• Juvenile. Separate cell at night. Mix freely with other detainees during the day. 

Approximately 8 by 5 meters, ten per cell, mattresses on floor. Cell and bathroom less 

clean than others at facility. One at facility a full year, soon to be released.

• Mentally ill. NA

• Isolation cell and policy. Small area in basement. Not in use during visit.

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Small tiled basement courtyard approximately 8 by 10 

meters. Roof area under repair, extending wall height. Overcrowded. No other activities provided for.

• Kitchen. Small building within compound. Relatively clean but cramped and old. New 

refrigerator needed.

• Staff. Little consistency in uniforms. Staff mostly outside cell areas. Prison appears to 

be run by nominated prisoners.

Alaya Branch/Remand Prison, Sana’a

Built in 2004 as a prison, under renovation. Same multioor design as other prisons in Sana’a. 

Information in initial interview diered from walk-through observations.

Prison data

• Total population—330

• Capacity— 100

• Men—323

• Women—0

• Juveniles—7 reported, 30 observed

• Mentally ill—0

• Sentenced—0 reported, 6 observed

• Not sentenced—330

• Foreign total—47

• Foreign nationalities—Sudanese, Somali, Ethiopian, Palestinian

• Composition—Mixed, mostly criminal

• Classification—By cell, separating previous offenders, new offenders, and juveniles. 

Detainees can move freely and mix during the day.

Medical care

• Basic first aid clinic available through assistance from ICRC. One-room clinic with 

dispensary. Medication supply good, some expired.

• Timetable for medical staff. No attendant doctor or nurse. Detainee doctor assists.

• Common medical conditions include scabies, dysentery, UTI’s, bronchitis, chest 

infections, flu, constipation, eye infections, heart problems, diabetes, epilepsy, drug 

withdrawal, and psychological problems, including depression and hypertension.

• Can transfer to local hospital.

• More specialist medication needed. Some chronic health issues. Expired medication 

observed.
56 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

Internal and external security

• General concerns. NA

• Escapes. NA

• External incursions. NA

• Internal issues. NA

• Isolation cell and policy. NA

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Three floors. Narrow staircases. Main entrance crowded. Detainees and visitors 

communicate through grills in entrance area. Most cells approximately 5 by 8 meters. 

Severely overcrowded. Accommodate thirty-five to fifty-four detainees each. 

Mattresses on floor. Areas under repair bright and clean. Some window bars not 

properly secured. Cell toilet areas backed up. Consistent sewage issues. Key control in 

hands of “prisoners in charge.”

• Female. NA

• Juveniles. Held in a separate cell but mix freely with other detainees during the day. As 

young as fourteen. Far more observed than reported.

• Mentally ill. NA

• Isolation cell and policy. Small basement area. Primarily used for entry screening but 

occasionally as short holding areas.

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Small tiled basement courtyard approximately 8 by 10 

meters. Roof area under repair, extending wall height, for additional outdoor space.

• Kitchen. Small building adjacent within compound. Relatively clean. Food cooked for 

lunch during visit.

• Staff. Guards both uniformed (perimeter) and not uniformed.

Al-Thawrah Branch/Remand Prison, Sana’a

Built in 2000 as a prison, slated for renovation. Same multioor design as other prisons in 

Sana’a. No potential for additional outdoor space. Signicantly calmer, more under control, 

and less crowded than other facilities.

Prison data

• Total population—170

• Capacity—300

• Men—163

• Women—0

• Juveniles—7

• Mentally ill—0

• Sentenced—3

• Not sentenced—167

• Foreign total—8

• Foreign nationalities—Ethiopian, Portuguese, Somali

• Composition—Mixed, mostly criminal
USIP.ORG 57

PRISONS IN YEMEN

• Classification—By cell, separating older detainees, juveniles, repeat offenders, assault 

cases, theft, fraud, drinking, and commercial cases–debt. Detainees can move freely 

and mix during the day.

Medical care

• Health unit assigned but not yet stocked or in use.

• Common medical conditions include stomach infections. Little information 

available.

• Transfer to hospital necessary due to lack of medical staff. Reduces staff numbers 

because guards must stay with detainee. Too few vehicles.

• More specialist medication needed. Expired medication observed.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Violent or dangerous detainees transferred immediately to Sana’a 

Central.

• Escapes. NA

• External incursions. NA

• Internal issues. NA

• Isolation cell and policy. Used as storage and office

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Three floors. Narrow staircases. Most cells approximately 5 by 8 meters. 

Accommodate fifteen to twenty-two, mattresses on floor or bunks. Significantly less 

crowded, cleaner, calmer, and more orderly than other facilities. Detainees observed 

reading, playing cards, etc. Some held for commercial crimes observed as older, some 

requiring specialist medical care. Key control handled by staff.

• Female. NA

• Juvenile. Held in separate cells.

• Mentally ill. NA

• Isolation cell and policy. Small basement area. Used as office and storage.

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Small tiled basement courtyard approximately 8 by 10 

meters. Outdoor space insufficient.

• Kitchen. Small building within compound. Relatively clean.

• Staff. Guards both uniformed and not uniformed. Significantly more in control of cell 

areas, held keys, and both familiar with and respectful of prisoners.

Al-Habrah Branch/Remand Prison, Sana’a

Built in 2000, under renovation. Same multioor design as other prisons in Sana’a but slightly 

bigger.

Prison data

• Total population—250

• Capacity—300

• Men—235

• Women—NA

• Juveniles—15
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PEACEWORKS 106

• Mentally ill—NA

• Sentenced—0

• Not sentenced—250

• Total foreign prisoners—Varies

• Nationalities of foreign inmates—Sometimes Somalis

• Composition—Mixed, mostly criminal

• Classification—By cell, mostly separating previous offenders, new offenders, and 

juveniles. Detainees can move freely and mix during the day.

Medical care

• Basic first aid clinic now available through assistance from ICRC. Small one-room 

clinic with dispensary. Doctor, currently a volunteer, not present during visit. Some 

expired medication observed, including calamine lotion.

• Common medical conditions include cold, flu, headache, stomach problems. TB and 

skin and eye infections rare.

• Transfers to Al-Thawrah hospital for free treatment. One vehicle.

• Clinic new and in transition. Insufficient supplies. Expired medication observed.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Staff sensitive to 2013 al-Qaeda attack at Sana’a Central, asking for 

cement roadblocks and reinforced security.

• Escapes. NA

• External incursions. NA

• Internal issues. Few strikes but numerous fights. ICRC prevents violent restraint.

• Isolation cell and policy. Rarely used, mostly for sexual assault cases or attempted suicide. 

Director decision. Duration usually ten to fifteen minutes.

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Cells spread over three floors. Small tiled basement courtyard. Narrow staircases. 

Main entrance crowded. Detainees and visitors communicate through grills in entrance 

area. Atmosphere chaotic. Stairways and corridors crowded. Most cells approximately 5 

by 8 meters. Accommodate twenty-five to thirty detainees each. Floor mattresses. Some 

cells empty, under repair, broken bunk beds. Part of basement locked, under repair, not 

in use. Cell toilets backed up. Consistent sewage issues. Sewage observed leaking from 

external pipes. Key control in hands of “prisoners in charge.”

• Female. NA

• Juveniles. Held in separate cell. Mix freely with other detainees during the day. Cell 

clean, with TV, freshly painted.

• Mentally ill. NA

• Isolation cell and policy. Small basement area. Three held for fighting.

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Small tiled basement courtyard approximately 8 by 10 

meters. Trash piled in corner. Roof area under repair, extending wall height, for 

additional outdoor space.

• Kitchen. Small building within compound. Clean and orderly. One staff member 

assists with meals.

• Staff. Most guard staff in uniform.
USIP.ORG 59

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Taiz Central

Built as rehabilitation and vocational training center. Requires at minimum major renovation, 

ideally new facility. Serious overcrowding. Many detainees, at least three hundred, held for 

failure to pay nes.

Prison data

• Total population—1,577

• Capacity—750

• Men—1,465

• Women—48

• Juveniles—32

• Mentally ill—32

• Sentenced—492

• Not sentenced—901

• Foreign total—100

• Foreign nationalities—Mostly African, Somali and Ethiopian

• Composition—Mixed, criminal, both pre-trial and sentenced, some immigration. 

Terror suspects sent to Sana’a Central.

• Classification—Minimal system not properly implemented due to overcrowding. In 

theory, separated by crime and a separate cellblock for “dangerous criminals.” In 

practice, not implemented.

Medical care

• Small medical clinic with neither consistent resources nor necessary scope. Examination 

room, medical supply closet, bathroom, recovery room, and minor operation room. 

Relatively clean, well ventilated, well lit. Women treated within their facility. Doctor 

and nurse report twenty to forty daily requests for medical treatment and regular 

monthly or biweekly rounds.

• Common medical conditions include skin infections, including rampant scabies, chest 

infections, stomach problems, and TB.

• More serious cases transferred to hospital. Transfers sometimes difficult or substandard care.

• Supplies and medications not consistently provided. Provision of care inadequate.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Facility beyond staff control. Since 2012 escape, access and internal 

security improved and facility access more regular. Guards vigilant in removing 

weapons from staff or visitors before entry. Perimeter security weak

• Escapes. 2012—9 escaped, 8 returned.

• External incursions. 0

• Internal issues. Before 2012 escape, staff access to facility nearly impossible.

• Isolation cell and policy. Under construction. Mentally ill section sometimes used as 

punishment.
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PEACEWORKS 106

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Two wards. Cells extremely overcrowded. Bunk beds and floor mattresses. 

Bedding extended to corridors in main cell block. Corridor lighting dark. Personal 

items on display in most cells. Blankets used to create personal space. Number of 

toilets increased but still insufficient.

• Female. Free-standing, separate area with perimeter gate and bright courtyard. Cells 

clean. Good natural light and ventilation. Possibly insufficient artificial light. Bunk 

beds. Toilet areas in poor condition and unhygienic. Inadequate bathing facilities. In 

theory, classified by crime. In practice, detainees intermingle. Sewing room with 

machines, but most equipment broken for five years.

• Juvenile. Held in single-cell separate block. Ventilation and natural light good. One 

small light bulb for evening. Overcrowded. Eye and skin conditions common. Newly 

carpeted. Floor mattresses. Toilets functional but unhygienic. No washing facilities. 

Funds requested.

• Mentally ill. Separate small facility. Small staff. Area not fully under control. At least 

twenty prisoners observed banging compound gate and begging to be released. Guards 

indicated fear and stress. Visiting physician reported limited access. Medication available 

but not tailored to needs. Few inmates properly diagnosed, merely assigned. No segregation 

or classification. High incidence of assault and aggression, both physical and sexual.

• Isolation cell and policy. Under construction.

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Space within each ward save juvenile exposed to sunlight 

and fresh air. Access generally free throughout the day. School, library, workshops, 

volleyball, soccer.

• Kitchen. Not observed. Reportedly dilapidated.

• Staff. Most in uniform. Weapons left outside blocks. Sometimes overfriendly. Do not 

have full control. Stress evident.

Aden Central Prison “Mansoora”

Built in 1962, nal days of colonial rule. Built-up urban area. Security increasingly dicult. 

Large perimeter wall but numerous escapes. New facility frozen by government. Cells large. 

Barred open windows and fans help air circulate. Generally hot climate. Well-known carpentry workshop, basketball courts, and outdoor areas. Funding cuts and security concerns halted 

recreation. Inmates conned to cell blocks. Sta in cell blocks with rearms.

Prison data

• Total population—723

• Capacity—400

• Men—706

• Women—17 (1 juvenile)

• Juveniles—0 reported, 13 observed

• Mentally ill—Not known

• Sentenced—214

• Not sentenced—436

• Foreign total—60 (3 female)
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PRISONS IN YEMEN

• Foreign nationalities—Somalia, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Thailand

• Composition—Mixed, criminal, terror, pre-trial, sentenced

• Classification—By block, within blocks observed

Medical care

• Clinic block housed with small rooms for care and storage. Equipment old. Medication 

insufficient. Patients often pay for medication to be sent from outside. No regular 

doctor or nurses employed. Small, crowded ward with trolleys and floor mattresses. 

Inadequate conditions. Expired medication observed.

• Common medical conditions include scabies, mental illness, psychological stress, 

hypertension, bone fractures from fights, gunshots, hemorrhoids, hernias. Respiratory 

issues, stomach problems, infections due to sewage problems.

• Hospital transfers limited. Two nearly unusable vehicles.

• Medication and supply budget quite small, approximately $400 per month.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Numerous. Guards reluctant to enter cellblocks. Perimeter walls 

dilapidated. No proper watch towers. Threats from al-Qaeda and others. Poor lighting. Fortification for walls, watchtowers, cement barriers requested, not received.

• Escapes. Numerous.

• External incursions. Grenades thrown in.

• Internal issues. Fights common.

• Isolation cell and policy. Policy unclear. Visit not allowed.

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Four long large cells around small central open air yard. Cells approximately 7 

by 20 meters. Forty-plus per cell. Floor mattresses. Cells, courtyards, bathrooms 

unclean and untidy. Toilets overflowing. Staff fearful in cellblocks. Some carried 

firearms. Research team allowed to enter only two blocks.

• Female. Separated by small perimeter wall and narrow tunnel entrance from male area. 

Considerably cleaner and brighter. Beds, bedding, activity rooms, sewing workshop, 

computer room, classrooms. Red Crescent social workers visit twice weekly. NGOs 

assist with resources. Male staff enter section without warning and carrying weapons. 

International support for educational programs and workshops in decline. Pregnant 

and nursing women lack specialist medical care and supplies. Large uncovered sewer 

in courtyard.

• Juvenile. No perimeter wall or gate. Floor mattresses provided by family. Mosquito nets 

provided by a wealthy sheikh and foosball table by a human rights organization. Cell 

untidy. Toilets overflowing and dirty. Small outdoor space but unclear whether use 

is permitted.

• Mentally ill. Small block with no perimeter wall. Team not allowed to enter. 

Conditions chaotic and beyond staff control. Facility dilapidated. Formerly attended 

regularly by psychiatrists. No longer transferred to psychiatric hospital/clinic. Some 

outdoor access. No designated outdoor area observed. Unclear whether detainees were 

allowed to wander freely in main prison compound.

• Isolation cell and policy. Violent criminals reportedly kept there. Team visit not 

permitted.
62 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Large compound but few recreation opportunities since 

carpentry workshop closure. Access to sunlight in courtyard. Basketball courts not 

in use.

• Kitchen. Appeared clean. No modern equipment. Inmates involved in cooking meals.

• Staff. Many out of uniform. Some unfamiliar with facility and fearful of inmates.

Hodeida Central Prison

Built circa 1975–80 as a school. Large walled compound with guard towers. Half-built new 

prison within the compound. No exercise area or outdoor space. Electrical problems, exposed 

wiring, electrical shorts and res commonplace. Electrical problems. Heavily littered and disorderly. Sewage issues.

Prison data

• Total population—951

• Capacity—350

• Men—889

• Women—30, plus 10 children

• Juveniles—31 (counted as men)

• Mentally ill—32

• Sentenced—418

• Not sentenced—374

• Foreign total—20 male, 2 female

• Foreign nationalities—Ethiopian, Sudanese, Eritrean, Nigerian, Turkish

• Composition—Criminal and illegal entry

• Classification—By cell, prisoners mix in central covered yard

Medical care

• Medical clinic minimally stocked and understaffed.

• Common medical conditions include scabies, hemorrhoids, diabetes, hypertension, 

kidney issues.

• Ill detainees transferred. Insufficient funds.

• Small pharmacy with limited Ministry of Health supplies supplemented by local 

donors.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Perimeter security insufficient. Fights and injuries common inside 

prison.

• Escapes. One from nearby temporary detention center.

• External incursions. None. Orders for high alert.

• Internal issues. A few riots. Frequent organized protests, including hunger strikes, for 

lack of response on cases, sentencing, family failure to visit.

• Isolation cell and policy. Even isolation cells overcrowded. Placement for simple misbehavior. Director decision. Duration at most two weeks, normally less than a day. Visit 

not permitted.
USIP.ORG 63

PRISONS IN YEMEN

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Large warehouse-style building. Cells on external walls, range from 4 by 25 

meters to 4 by 15, most with toilet, taps, shower. Large central communal area beyond 

staff control. No access to sunlight. Numerous private markets. Kitchen with gas 

burners. Numerous personal ovens and burners in cells. Block chaotic, messy, infrequently cleaned. Approximately fifty-two per cell. Metal bunk beds and floor mattresses. Sightlines broken by fabric privacy walls. Structural damage to cell walls and 

roof. Exposed electrical wires. No clean filtered water. Some loose classification in 

cells for sleeping but mixing in communal area.

• Female. Secure separate unit within the main compound. Cells around exterior wall. 

Central open-air tiled patio. Communal cells, range from approximately 5 by 10 

meters to 4 by 8. Floor mattresses and beds. Bathrooms communal and outside cells. 

Some hygiene concerns.

• Juvenile. No separate facility. One 5 by 8 meter cell in a corner of men’s facility, adjacent 

to moral crimes section. Floor mattresses only. No access to sunlight or recreation.

• Mentally ill. Separate walled facility at rear of compound. Large communal cells 

around a small bright garden area. Classified by seriousness of condition and level of 

aggression. Staffed with specialist psychiatrist and medical technician. No ECT 

administered. Limited specialist drug supply. Separate kitchen and eating area. 

Conditions unhygienic. Relatively clean communal bathroom.

• Isolation cell and policy. Not visited.

• Outdoor and recreation areas. No outdoor area. Schooling in improvised spaces. One 

outdoor cement workshop. A sewing area.

• Kitchen. Disorderly and unclean. Cooking pots old, refrigerator not functional. 

Cockroaches and other insects. Open blocked sewers. Bedding stored beside vegetable 

preparation area.

• Staff. Most in uniform. Insufficient in numbers and skills. Reluctant to permit visit. 

Some rough handling of detainees.

Hodeida Branch/Remand Prison, Hodeida

Built as school. Adjacent to central prison. Separate perimeter wall and entrance. Little recreation or outdoor space save for small tiled internal courtyard. Nonetheless, better control and 

familiarity with prison and prisoner concerns than at many facilities.

Prison data

• Total population—201

• Capacity—200

• Men—192

• Women—0

• Juveniles—9

• Mentally ill —0

• Sentenced—15

• Not sentenced—186

• Foreign total—3
64 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

• Foreign nationalities—Egyptian

• Composition —Mixed, mostly criminal, three immigration

• Classification—By cell, but detainees mix freely during the day.

Medical care

• Basic clinic. Almost no equipment. Extremely low supplies of medication.

• Common medical conditions include skin infections, malaria, fever, stomach 

infections.

• No ambulance available for hospital transfers.

• Medications and supplies limited to painkillers and basic drugs.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Building needs serious upgrade to address security concerns. Major 

sewage leak. One perimeter wall weakened and may collapse.

• Escapes. 1

• External incursions. 0

• Internal issues. Detainee strikes in 2013 that spread from central prison.

• Isolation cell and policy. None.

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Four cells around a square, a small tiled central courtyard open to the sun. 

Approximately 5 by 10 meters each. Accommodate approximately fifty per cell. Three 

tiered bunks, many without mattresses. Overcrowded. Toilets filthy, many without 

doors. Many taps broken. Limited washing water. Small prison shop. Ventilation from 

ceiling fans adequate.

• Female. NA

• Juveniles. No dedicated area. Housed in courtyard to avoid sexual assault.

• Mentally ill. NA

• Isolation cell and policy. None

• Outdoor and recreation areas. One small tiled courtyard with grilled roof. Some books 

and copies of Quran.

• Kitchen. Old but reasonably well ventilated and clean. Refrigerator working poorly. 

Cool, dry, dark pantry and food storage area.

• Staff. Most in uniform. Better inmate and key control than at other facilities.

Ibb Central Prison

Built in 1980s as a prison. Large walled compound, ve guard towers. Walls crumbling, in need 

of repair. Sewage leaking under them.

Prison data

• Total population—1,235

• Capacity—800

• Women—25, plus 16 children

• Juveniles—27

• Sentenced—745

• Not sentenced—489
USIP.ORG 65

PRISONS IN YEMEN

• Foreign total—1

• Foreign nationalities—Ethiopian

• Composition—Criminal except terrorism (transferred to Sana’a Central)

• Classification—None

Medical care

• Clinic present.

• Drugs generally not expired but some near expiry.

• Rusted, unclean, surgery tools. Insufficient medicine supply. Appliances and equipment needed.

• Common medical conditions include diabetes, hypertension, fever, flues, headaches, 

and heart disease. Some scabies and TB.

• Hospital transfers frequent, at least seven daily, to al-Thawrah Public Hospital. Some 

to Sana’a on PO approval.

• Extremely low medication and supplies.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Prison insecure. Old stone walls in danger of falling. Window fences 

easily cut. No security staff to guard prisoners during hospital transfers.

• Escapes. One in 2005 within compound.

• External incursions. None

• Internal issues. Strikes by those with outstanding fees. Fire set by prisoner to be executed.

• Isolation cell and policy. Prisoners responsible for 2013 fire put in isolation.

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Block One divided into ground floor and basement. First floor cells approximately 5 by 5 meters. Small sunbathing area where leftover bread is dried and sold as 

food for livestock. Common area generally unclean. Four communal bathrooms each 

with six toilets and four taps. No shower taps. Bathrooms generally dirty. Signs of 

blockages in toilets. Taps often broken or leaking. One cell in basement, houses 320 

prisoners. Large but crowded. Insufficient ventilation and light. No usable bathrooms. 

Block Two a large room rented by prisoners as kitchen.

• Female. Separate block of three cells, bathroom, small prayer room, classroom, and sewing workshop surrounding central outdoor area. Eight prisoners per approximately 6 by 

6 meter cell. Exposed electric wires in cells. Good ventilation through windows in cells. 

Two gas burners in hallway outside cells. One bathroom with five toilets, four sinks, and 

four taps, one broken. Bathroom somewhat clean but needs repair. Workshop with nine 

not fully functional sewing machines. Bunk beds and clothes cupboard in cells.

• Juvenile. No separate block.

• Mentally ill. Small enclosed outdoor area surrounded by cells and another outdoor 

area. Two dark communal bathrooms without doors. Each cell about 4 by 10 meters, 

housing about eight prisoners. Mattresses torn, bed frames in poor condition. Food 

served in unhygienic pans and exposed to air and flies. Twelve iron bed frames, most 

without mattresses, in one cell. No blankets observed.

• Isolation cell and policy. Prisoners who set 2013 fire in isolation cells. Visit not permitted.
66 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Enclosed outdoor area in each block too small for number 

of prisoners.

• Kitchen. Unclean, possibly because food just served. Several medium-sized ovens and 

one large baking oven. Large walk-in refrigerator. Staffed by prisoners.

• Staff. In uniform. Weapons left outside blocks. Guards barely in control, did not hesitate to hit prisoners with sticks.

Ibb Remand/Branch Prison

Built in 2005 as a temporary prison. Exterior walls without guard towers. New building within 

compound under construction. No exercise area or outdoor space. No power generator. Public 

power intermittent. Sewage problems. Compound disordered and unclean.

Prison data

• Total population—300

• Capacity—250

• Men—294

• Women—0

• Juveniles—6

• Mentally ill—0

• Sentenced—60 to 65 (no records)

• Not sentenced—240

• Foreign total—0

• Foreign nationalities—NA

• Composition—Criminal except terrorism

• Classification—By cell, loose. Mixed in central uncovered yard area.

Medical care

• No medical clinic. Medication is provided by families.

• Common medical conditions include scabies, diabetes, fever, and kidney issues.

• Hospital transfer the treatment. Shortage of funds and vehicles.

• No medical supplies provided. Some brought by families. Guards dispense 

medication.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Wall short. No guard towers. Insecure. Perimeter security insufficient. Armed specialist units needed. Four exterior guards.

• Escapes. 0

• External incursions. 0

• Internal issues. None. Atmosphere agitated and loud.

• Isolation cell and policy. Two cells used as ordinary cells because of overcrowding. 

Dangerous prisoners reportedly isolated, but not observed.

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Two-floor building. Cells on external walls. Small communal area in center 

includes stairs to second floor and access to natural light. Crowded. Eight cells house 

approximately thirty-eight prisoners each. Central area and cells chaotic, messy, and 
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not frequently cleaned. Cells communal, approximately 4 by 25 meters to 4 by 15, each 

with three toilets, two taps, and one shower (often broken). Communal bathrooms 

with four toilets and several taps, relatively clean. Floor mattresses. Privacy fabrics do 

not break sightlines. Electrical wiring dangerous and exposed. No clean filtered water. 

Kitchen with two gas burners operational within cell area.

• Female. NA

• Juvenile. No separate block. Mixed with forty others in cell approximately 4 by 12 meters

• Mentally ill. NA

• Isolation cell and policy. Visit not permitted. Area not under control.

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Small courtyard. Schooling in improvised spaces around 

compound. One outdoor cement workshop. Sewing area.

• Kitchen. Disorderly and unclean. Cooking pots old. Refrigerator not functional. 

Cockroaches and other insects. Open blocked sewers immediately outside kitchen. 

Bedding stored beside vegetable preparation area.

• Staff. Most in uniform. Team not escorted by staff.

Mukalla Central Prison

Not built as a prison, uncertain date. Four main buildings: administrative, women’s (not secured and small); large remand block not well secured; large sentenced section not well secured.

Prison data

• Total population—483

• Capacity—300

• Women—7

• Juveniles—2

• Sentenced—160

• Not sentenced—280

• Foreign total—61

• Foreign nationalities—Kenyan, Somali

• Composition—Mixed, mostly criminal, one terrorism

• Classification—None

Medical care

• Medical clinic staff, one inmate who is not a physician.

• Common medical conditions include skin rashes, mental health issues, kidney issues, 

asthma, malaria, diabetes, blood pressure, and one HIV.

• No ambulance.

• Medical supplies improved under previous chief of Penitentiary Authority. Expired 

medicines observed.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Vulnerability to potential shootings at the prison and terrorism.

• Escapes. 5 recent

• External incursions. 3

• Internal issues. Frequent. Tear gas used.
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• Isolation cell and policy. Cells in place, no specific policy. Mentally ill frequently placed 

in isolation.

Cell and detention area observations

• Male. Cells approximately 6 by 7 meters, house eighteen to thirty-five prisoners each. 

Old floor mattresses. Cell walls dirty. Ropes available to hang washing. High windows. Three to four fans per cell. Some electric stoves and food (onion, potatoes, 

tomatoes, sugar, tea). Atmosphere tense. Bathroom areas filthy, infested with mosquitos, no doors. New doors provided, not yet installed. No showers. Taps leak. Yard area 

full of garbage and wastewater.

• Female. Held in one cell.

• Juvenile. Not fully observed.

• Mentally ill. Twelve living and sleeping in an open space, appeared distressed. Guards 

interacted aggressively.

• Isolation cell and policy. In use. Mentally ill man isolated for aggressive behavior. Police 

use of cell unclear, contradictory indications.

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Divided into prayer space with basin for washing. No 

recreation, education, or training workshops.

• Kitchen. Unclean. Cooking staff sleep and prepare food in same area. Hygiene exacerbated by cockroaches. Food quality complaints. Freezer not operational.

• Staff. One guard accompanied team, unarmed in cell areas. Some in uniform.

Central Prison of Sayun

Building not designed as a prison. Handed over to the Penitentiary Authority in 2001. Large 

but not well secured. Six large cells and one ward for isolation.

Prison data

• Total population—87

• Capacity—120

• Women—0

• Juveniles—1

• Sentenced—60

• Not sentenced—27

• Foreign total—4

• Foreign nationalities—Somali

• Composition—Terrorism suspects and criminal

• Classification—By type of crime, separate cell for murders, for robberies, debts, and 

alcohol consumption. Youth held with detainees for alcohol consumption.

Medical care

• No medical clinic. No medical beds. Sick treated in wards or duty officer’s room.

• Common medical conditions include mental health issues, asthma, kidney issues, 

respiratory infections, stomach problems.

• No ambulance. Transfer to hospital by private vehicles or the Army.
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• Medicine and supplies in short supply. Medicine stored at house of health assistant, 

who prescribes but not a qualified doctor.

Internal and external security

• General concerns. Terror attacks, car bombs.

• Escapes. 30 in 2013.

• External incursions. During 2013 uprising.

• Internal issues. None.

• Isolation cell and policy. Eight cells. Used by orders of PGOs or in cases of fights or 

system violations. Length of stay determined by instructions or commitments.

Cells

• Male. Cells large, housing about 18-35 inmates each on floor mattresses. Cells clean, 

good natural lighting and ventilation. Atmosphere calm. Guards cooperative, hold cell 

keys. Toilets clean, but toilets and taps damaged and need upgrade. No showers.

• Female. NA

• Juvenile. No juvenile section. Juveniles generally sent to Mukalla Prison, more than 

five hours away.

• Mentally ill. Held in open space around prison. Considered threat to themselves and 

other inmates. Guards interact infrequently.

• Isolation cell and policy. Used for mentally ill in “worsening condition.”

• Outdoor and recreation areas. Available from morning until midday Muslim prayers, again 

from 3 pm until 7 pm. No training workshops, school, library, or space for sports.

• Kitchen. Particularly clean, no insects, hygienic food storage. Pots old. Cook a contracted civilian assisted by prisoner who was a cook.

• Staff. Guards on good terms with inmates. Not in uniform. Carried arms during visit.
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Appendix C. Detention Centers

Police Stations and Criminal Investigations Departments

Aden: Basateen Police Station

Dilapidated building and compound in low-income area in Aden with large immigrant population. No budget for prisoner care or provision of food and clean water. ese sometimes 

provided by detainee families or local organizations. Few detainees, rarely stay long—three to 

four days maximum. ree 10 by 14 feet concrete cells at side of police compound. Conditions 

quite poor, little hygiene, poor ventilation. Cells covered in prisoner writing. Prisoners appeared 

distressed. New Sexual and Gender Based Violence unit and medical clinic. One cell for female detainees not yet staed.

Aden Criminal Investigation Department Holding Cells

Access restricted and dicult to obtain. Despite permissions, team permitted access to only 

two cell blocks and ordered not to interact with detainees. Cells arranged in small blocks with 

numerous cells o corridor with roof of metal bars, used as outdoor space for access to sunlight. 

Housed sixteen adult male detainees. Uncertain whether any juveniles among them. Non-Yemenis occasionally detained but none present. Female block reportedly closed, all female detainees sent directly to central prison. Cell areas observed as in very poor condition. Filthy toilet 

areas, bad ventilation, cramped cells. Bars removed from one corridor roof because of suicide. 

Sta unwilling to answer questions about conditions. Noted that pre-trial temporary detention 

center needed.

Kormakser Police Station

Visit not permitted. Capacity reportedly twenty. Eight present, no women, no juveniles. Greatest concern the lack of transport vehicles.

Soloban Police Station

Police station, clinic and holding cells within a compound on outskirts of town. One cell in 

very poor condition—lthy, insecure, littered—but empty. Detainees rare, maximum 24 hour 

stay. No food or water provided.

Tawahi Police Station

Building dates to colonial period. Few signs of renovation or investment. Holding cells wall 

collapsed more than two years prior. No detainees held at station, instead transferred. Rebuilding halted and never resumed. Plans for capacity of ten to fteen detainees per cell.

Quloo’a Police Station

Built in 1997 as a police station. Small cell block to one side. Four rooms, each with capacity 

of four to six detainees. 4 by 8 feet “outdoor area” between cells with roof of metal bars. Prison 

dilapidated, aecting conditions and security. One cell originally for women but converted. 

Women sent to CID. Nine detainees observed, including one Somali. No juveniles. Most prisoners in cells for three to four days. One complained of police abuse and had visible injuries. 

Food and water are major problems. Previously a contractor delivered cooked food but that has 
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stopped and food only comes when families provide it. Mattresses and bedding also provided 

only by family, if at all. Tap water adequate for washing but not potable. Citizen trust weak. 

Tensions related to conict aect relations with community.

Hadramawt: Fwah Police Station

Small holding cell area within prison. Two rooms with two toilets, no doors. Fan in each room, two 

windows in each cell. No electric lights. Exposed wiring. One detainee present, apparently with 

mental health issues. Sta claimed contractor service provides three daily meals. Not witnessed.

Hadramawt: Mukalla Police HQ

Holding cells in small building on right side of police HQ compound. Known as remand 

prison. ree cells and a room for guards. Building in disrepair. Security weak. Twenty-two 

detainees present at visit. Capacity, twenty-one. All adult males, one Somali. Outdoor space a 

corridor with open barred roof, narrow and littered. Kitchen in central area. Cooking by female 

ocer. Drinking water an issue. No medical care on site. Ambulance available for transfers. 

ree recent escapes associated with external incursions. Detainees held between fteen days 

and seven months. Many uncertain about progress of cases.

Hadramawt: Mukalla Traffic Police

Building not designed for detention. Detainee charged with accidental vehicular homicide 

soon to be released on bail. Held for days. Nine trac police ocers detained for 48 hours 

after refusing to patrol because of fears for assigned areas. Say they are “in fear for their lives.”

Hadramawt: Mukalla Criminal Investigation Department Holding Cells

Building old, not designed as detention facility. “e place is not t for holding people and 

respecting their freedoms and legal rights, but that is what we have.” Not well secured. Lacks all 

basics. Fifteen detainees present, held for two to twenty days. No women, one juvenile. Capacity, thirty. Detainees kept in cells all day. Food allegedly provided three times a day. Water an 

issue. Water tanks old and damaged. Prisoners threatened sta with revenge on release.

Hodeida: 7th July Police Station

Dilapidated and disorganized police station. Lacking basic furniture and equipment. Holding 

cells to one side of main building. One large cell in use, lthy inside, poor hygiene. One extremely agitated detainee complained of police abuse. Sta shouted aggressively. Sense of total 

lack of control. No budget. Mattress and food provided by sta personally.

Hodeida: Ad Dari Police Station

Police station dilapidated. Sta reluctant to show cell area at the back. One old concrete cell, 

bars worn away from window area. Hygiene poor. No toilet. No capacity to feed detainees 

without family support. Detention for short periods.
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Hodeida Criminal Investigation Department Holding Cells

Cells in basement of large security directorate and central city police building. Cells medium size. Little light. Unclean, cells littered with bottles, qat, food, etc. Despite fans, ventilation poor. Foul odor. One courtyard area with access to light several oors up through grated 

ceiling. Atmosphere tense, one detainee had mental health issues. Guards extremely rough. 

Twenty-two adult males in custody at visit. Juveniles observed and reported. Capacity allegedly 

sixty, seemed at or beyond capacity. Most reportedly held between one and three days. Inmates 

reported longer stays, some over a month. Complaints of poor treatment, including sleep deprivation, beating, lack of medical care. Families provide most meals.

Ibb Criminal Investigation Department Holding Cells

Built about 2008. Designed as a government building. Minimal fortications. High perimeter 

wall, no monitoring towers. Main gate in danger of collapsing. Bars of cells not suciently 

reinforced. ree large cells, two small isolation cells, separate toilets for each. No exercise area 

or outdoor space. Cells dirty and disordered. Torn oor mattresses, no carpet. Too few toilets, 

broken taps. Light switches broken. Exposed wiring. Sewage and garbage problems. Capacity, 

thirty ve. Population, forty-eight. ree juveniles, one under age ten. Food provided when 

family can bring it. No proper drinking or washing water.

Ibb Western Area Police Station

Built in 1980s as a basic police station. In disrepair. One detention cell, approximately 3 by 5 

meters, no carpet. Poor ventilation. One communal bathroom, dirty. Capacity, ten. ree prisoners during visit. No budget for food, water, bedding. Provided by family. One prisoner held 

for three days. None knew case status.

Sayun Criminal Investigation Department Holding Cells

Built in 2001. Two small rooms with bathrooms. Poorly ventilated and secured. Capacity, 

twelve. No detainees at visit. Detainees usually in cells all day. No outdoor access. Guards 

report sharing food cooked onsite with inmates. Sta in civilian clothes.

Sayun Police HQ

Built spring 2014. Holding cells in small two-room building to one side of compound. Capacity, twelve. Two detainees during visit. Food provided by police HQ. Water frequently a 

problem. Detainees present held for one week. No women or juveniles.

Tareem Police Station

Relatively new and well-kept building. Holding cells in two small buildings in bad condition. 

Capacity, eighteen. One detainee during visit, who had been held for three days. No outdoor 

space or time. Food was provided by police station. Water reportedly adequate.

Socotra Police Station

Medium-sized walled compound. Two large holding cells in back—one male, one female (almost never in use). Cell for males dilapidated, covered in wall drawings. Basic cleanliness, 
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ventilation, and light. Adjacent good bright outdoor area. Toilets dirty and in disrepair. Inmates 

allowed to roam within compound if on good behavior. Capacity, thirty-ve male, twenty-ve 

female. Rarely full. Four detainees during visit—two sentenced, two pre-trial. One older man 

held twenty-four days, one more than a year and to serve sentence at Mukalla Central. A female detainee once held at the prison during the day and returned home each night. Juveniles 

rarely held, generally placed with guardian. Food and water an issue. No budget for prisoner 

care. Sta and prisoners receive same food. Security issues rare. Occasional escape attempts.

Taiz Criminal Investigation Department

Temporary detention facility with PGO based at the oce. Capacity, 20 to 25. Population, 

as many as 140; 89 during visit. No budget for water or food. Water donated, food mostly 

provided by family. Broad cross-section of crimes includes theft, drug oences, murder. Held 

for two to seventeen days. No foreign detainees. Women sent immediately to central prison. 

Juveniles sent to juvenile facility, if age sixteen to eighteen often sent them back. Eight juveniles during visit. No medical center. Assistance provided by Red Crescent. Transport often a 

challenge, detainees often made to pay. Four cells, open to each other and to corridor. Cells 

carpeted and well lit, some grati and supercial damage, no structural issues. Most prisoners roam freely. No access to outdoor space. Open grating in corridor provides minimal (but 

free) access to sunlight. One room functions as mosque, water provided. Bathrooms eectively 

nonfunctional. Four stalls, backed-up plumbing, usually no running water. Hygiene very poor. 

Detainees relaxed, interactions with sta positive. Complaints about food: variety, nutritional 

value, and amount. Isolation cells present and in use.

Taiz Police HQ

Holding cells within chaotic police building in serious disrepair. High overcrowding. Capacity, 

eight. Population, twenty-ve. Cells among worst in cleanliness. Poor sanitation, lthy walls, 

bad smell, poor ventilation, poor light. Meals primarily provided by prisoners. In theory detainees share sta food, in practice inconsistently. No consistent drinking water. No clean bathing 

water. Bathrooms foul and unsanitary. Good outdoor light access (open area). No potential for 

exercise. Station neglected. Little to no contact with lawyers or family. Designed as temporary 

facility, no funds. In practice, detainees held for much longer periods than allowed by law or 

envisioned for facility. Consistent violation of holding rules (beyond limits set by law) in evidence, some detainees held for more than twenty-ve days.

Courthouse Holding Cells

Aden Court of Appeals

Row of concrete holding cells, open barred sides, behind courthouse. Cells empty but clean. 

Used on limited basis, given many appeal cases on technicality. When used, only briey.

Hodeida North and South Circuit Court and PGO

Very small holding cell areas in corridors outside courthouse. Used immediately before trial. 

Quite cramped but used only for minutes or hours.
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Taiz Judicial Complex

Access not possible because key could not be found (a serious security and health and safety issue in itself). Ocials willing for detainees to be questioned briey. Building new, constructed 

along with judicial complex. Freestanding, approximately 15 feet by 20 feet. Grated window 

for access to sunlight and fresh air on three facing walls. Two rooms hold approximately fteen 

to twenty detainees. Most held approximately a week, and some for a few days. Bathroom 

inside, but no water available. Complaints of too little food, cramped quarters, poor air circulation, high temperatures. Not allowed out for fresh air or exercise, no way to secure them.

Sabr al-Mwadem Court, Taiz

Access denied. Brief interaction with detainees, questions through window, quickly halted. 

Single room, approximately 12 feet by 18 feet. Small grated windows on sides of building. 

Population, approximately 20. Two held for two weeks.

West Sana’a Court, Sana’a

Access inside denied. Small, likely single room, approximately 8 feet by 12 feet. Door open, 

only outer grate conned prisoners. Easy to see inside and communicate with prisoners. Prisoners frantic, shouting demands and requesting help. Power out at court. Cell dark and dank. 

One small, horizontal window with grating near the top of each side of building the only access for light or fresh air when door not open. Population, approximately twenty in cell. Some 

held for months, or could not remember. Bathroom and running tap water. Two guards wore 

MOI and regular local police uniforms, general security assigned to court, not detention.

Juvenile Care Centers and Model Juvenile Police Station

Aden Juvenile Care Center for Boys and Girls

Renovated in 2000s with U.S. assistance. Girl’s facility closed for nine months following an 

escape and scandals. Girls now sent directly to central prison. Under direction of Ministry of 

Social Welfare, center staed by specialized personnel with backgrounds in child psychology, 

social work, and education. Low budgets, volunteers are also involved. Calm positive atmosphere, clear routine incorporating education, play, and skills training. Bright, clean dormitories 

with overnight sta to supervise. Toilet areas not all clean. School area, library, play, workshops, 

outdoor football eld, theater. Family visits strongly encouraged and facilitated carefully. Food 

and water sucient. Kitchen equipment needs upgrade. Medical services adequate. Children 

mostly taken to local clinic if sick. Security an issue, also a balance between low intensity in 

security and frequent escapes. Compound gate opened to team by small child.

Crater Model Juvenile Police Station

Opened in February 2014 as part of combined initiative to reform juvenile care within criminal 

justice system. Still unfurnished and not operational. Juveniles to be diverted away from normal criminal justice system and ltered through this police station staed by specially trained 

police, social workers, child psychologists, etc. Sta enthusiastic, envisage more a guesthouse 

than police station. Pilot centers opened in Sana’a, Aden, Taiz, and Ibb. Building abuts large 

busy road. No outdoor or play space. Sta concern that without proper funding never more 

than a good idea.
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Hodeida Juvenile Care Center for Boys

Opened in 2003, moved in 2010. Facility clean, bright, well managed. Houses only boys, currently twenty in facility. Provides supervision and home visits for eight on remand. Center for 

girls being created. Currently home incarceration and supervision. Detention in central prison 

only in very serious cases or when suitable guardian not available. Staed by specialized social 

workers, psychologists, education, and child specialists. Carefully planned routine oers structured days, education, play, skills training, games, and counseling. Medical care good. Doctor 

visits for checkups, available on call. Only sta complaint food budget and poor water supply. 

Spotless dormitories. Children segregated by age, some perhaps crowded. Play areas, looms for 

sewing, library, school rooms, child-friendly decoration, general sense of calm.

Ibb Juvenile Care Center for Boys

Square building, garden, and volleyball eld. Designed more like school than detention facility. 

Classes and workshops one side, living quarters and administration on the other. Perimeter wall 

is not high enough, allowing escapes. Facility lacks protection. Four rooms, one for each age 

group, approximately 6 meters by 6. Population, sixteen. Staed by specialists, high turnover. 

Caring and calm environment. Medical attention good, includes visiting nurse and dentist. 

Structured day, routine includes learning, play, art, sport, vocational skills, and therapy. Facility 

houses some farm animals the children care for. Main sta concern, proximity of building to 

governorate trash dump. Respiratory ailments common. No court transport, use public.

Sana’a Juvenile Care Center for Boys

Large facility resembling boarding school, but with security on gates and perimeter. Population, forty boys age eight to sixteen. Capacity, 150. Girls in a separate facility in Sana’a. Specialist sta includes public school teachers, psychologists, social workers, child specialists, doctors, and female supervisors. Medical care provided by volunteer doctor who visits regularly. 

Routine carefully developed and adjusted to incorporate learning, psychological help, theater 

and self-expression, hygiene lessons, art, literature, and play. Dormitories clean and brightly 

decorated with paper artwork made by the children. Some issues in bathrooms, sta struggle 

to keep them as clean. Some broken taps and water heaters. Supervisor assigned to each section. Area for smaller children has female supervisor. Family visits encouraged and structured 

to incorporate family therapy.
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Appendix D. Prison Act and Regulations

Introduction

Directives of H.E. the President of the Republic

e Penitentiary authorities shall take into account the importance of the psychological factor 

in reforming and rehabilitating the prisoners. ey shall continuously endeavor to develop and 

improve the services they provide to prisoners because they are in need for humane treatment 

and caring environment. Furthermore, the prisoners shall be free from hunger, diseases, and 

abuses. ey shall maintain their family links, preserve their dignity and observe their human 

rights.

Marshal Ali Abdullah Saleh

President of the Republic

Republican decree no. 48 of 1981 concerning prison organization

After reviewing the declaration of the RoY agreement,

And the constitution of the Republic of Yemen,

And the republican decree no. 1 of 1990 concerning the formation of the Cabinet, and after 

the approval of the Presidential Council

It was decided:

Chapter 1. Definitions

Article (1): is law shall be called “the Penitentiary Authority Organization Act”.

Article (2): For the purposes of this Act, the following terms and expressions shall have the 

meanings specied hereunder unless otherwise required by the context:

e Republic: the Republic of Yemen

e Government: the Government of the Republic of Yemen

e Ministry: the Ministry of Interior and Security

e Authority: the Penitentiary Authority

e Chief: the Chief of Penitentiary Authority

e Director: the Director of the Central Prison or its branches

e Guards: the Guards of the prison from all ranks

e Prison: the place where the prisoners and remand prisoners are admitted to.

e prisoner: any person who was sentenced to imprisonment

e Remand Prisoner: any person who was detained by a legally competent authority.

Chapter 2. General provisions

Article (3): e treatment of prisoners inside the prison shall aim at achieving the following:

1– Reform and rehabilitate the prisoners using all educational, medical, vocational, and social 

services as well as the entertaining, cultural, and sports activities.

2– Create the desire and pursuit to lead an honest life and a good citizenship among the 

prisoners.

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Article (4): All the employees in the prison shall help and impress the prisoners by oering a 

role model and a good example for their reformation.

Article (5): e activity of the authority shall aim at ensuring the re-education of the prisoners 

and instilling the spirit of love of work and law-abiding. It is not permissible to inict physical 

or mental harm to prisoners serving their sentence in prison.

Article (6): e authority and all its employees shall abide by the provisions of this Act and the 

other laws in force in the Republic.

Article (7): e eective judicial sentence shall be the basis for executing imprisonment punishment and practicing the reforming and educational eects on the prisoners.

Article (8): It is not permissible to imprison or admit any person in prison without the executive warrant of the judicial sentence signed by the competent judge or the imprisonment order 

written on the related template, signed by the competent Prosecution and stamped with the 

ocial stamp of the competent authority.

Chapter 3. System of admittance and release of prisoners

Article (9): 1– e person sentenced to prison shall be moved to the prison immediately after 

the issuance of the verdict.

2– e Minister shall issue the moving system for moving the sentenced person to the prison 

to execute the punishment constituent to paragraph 1 of this article.

3– Prison management shall inform the family of the prisoner of his location and notify them 

in case he is moved to another prison.

Article (10): Only sentenced persons by eective judicial sentence shall be admitted to prison, 

except those who are convicted with crimes of severe social danger, who are sentenced to 

remand prison by the prosecution during the investigation stage or by the competent court 

during the trial period.

Article (11): Taking into account the Criminal Procedures Act related to the release of prisoners, prison management shall:

1– Release the prisoner in the morning of the same day of the end of the period of imprisonment stated in the verdict.

2– Release the prisoner after the completion of the dened period for remand imprisonment 

based on a written order by the competent authority which issued the order of imprisonment.

Chapter 4. Reformation, rehabilitation, and vocational training

Article (12): Prison management shall organize labour in prison and shall resemble as closely 

as possible the labour conditions outside the prison in terms of quality, method, and type of 

tools and equipments.

Article (13): Labour shall be part of the execution of the punishment not the punishment 

itself, and shall be considered as a necessity to maintain the prisoner’s being and the interest 

of the society.

Article (14): e working hours shall be no less than 4 hours and no more than 6 hours. It is 

not permissible to require the prisoners to work on weekends and ocial holidays.

Article (15): e remand prisoner shall not be required to work.

Article (16): If it is required to put the prisoners to work in public service or in remote locations, they can be sheltered at night in temporary camps or in prisons in accordance with the 

orders of the concerned prison director and the approval of the Minister.
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Article (17): e prison labour shall aim at rehabilitating the prisoner and provide him with 

vocational training to help him to reintegrate in the society and become a good citizen.

Article (18): Industrial security means shall be provided in the work place of the prisoners 

similar to what is provided outside the prison.

Article (19): e prisoner shall be paid for the work he performs and shall be granted with 

remunerations for work injuries according to the Labor Law. e wages and remunerations 

shall be dened by a ministerial decree and in coordination with the Ministers of Civil Service 

and Vocational Training.

Article (20): A suitable means of study shall be provided for prisoners as much as possible 

inside the prison for the prisoners, especially illiterate prisoners. Capable prisoners who wish 

to complete their study may have the opportunity to do so inside the prison only.

Article (21): A breacher shall be assigned for each prison in order to attract the prisoners to 

virtue and encourage them to perform the religious duties. Also, there shall be one or more 

specialist in psychological and social sciences.

Article (22): ere shall be cultural programs to engage the prisoners during their free time and 

to give them the opportunity to practice sports and entertaining activities.

Chapter 5. Health care for prisoners

Article (23): Prison management shall take into account the public health inside the prison, assume the responsibility of the prisoners’ medication, provide prisoners with health and preventive care, and appoint specialized doctors in coordination with the Ministry of Public Health.

Article (24): e instructions and observations of doctors in health, prevention, medication, 

and nutrition shall be abiding for the prison management. If it is impossible to implement the 

doctors’ instructions due to the lack of possibilities, they shall be referred immediately to the 

Minister to take necessary action.

Article (25): e Minister, in agreement with the Ministry of Public Health, shall issue a 

detailed guidelines to regulate the health and medical aairs inside the prison, determine the 

functions of assistant doctors and the procedures for transferring the sick prisoners to public 

hospitals and dene the schedules for food, clothes, mattresses, and furniture portions for the 

prisoners.

Article (26): Prisoners who have a psychological or mental disease shall be transferred to the 

psychological and mental hospital based on the report of a competent doctor and in accordance with the related regulations.

Article (27): A pregnant prisoner shall be provided with health care before, during, and after delivery according to the recommendation of a competent doctor and based on rules and 

regulations.

Article (28): A baby delivered inside the prison shall not be mentioned in the ocial records 

of the jurisdiction. e baby shall not stay in prison with his mother after reaching 2 years of 

age and shall be delivered to his father or relative unless the competent doctor decides that his 

condition does not permit delivery to the father or relatives.

Article (29): If the baby delivered in the prison does not have a father or trustworthy relatives, he 

shall be delivered to the authority responsible of sheltering houses through the respective Governor. e baby can be kept in the prison for compelling reasons based on the Minister’s order.
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Chapter 6. Facilities for prisoners

Article (30): Prisoners shall be granted, in addition to the rights granted in this Act, the following facilities:

1– Meeting family, relatives, and friends;

2– Receiving and replying to correspondence;

3– Receiving and re-transferring many transactions.

Article (31): e remand prisoner shall meet his relatives and attorney based on a written 

permit from the authority which issued his imprisonment warrant.

Chapter 7. Prisoners’ classification

Article (32): A place in prison shall be assigned and named “the reception” which shall receive 

the prisoners upon their admittance into the prison, and shall classify and isolate them as 

follows:

1– Prisoners who enter the prison for the rst time from those with history;

2– Prisoners guilty of severe social crimes;

3– Foreign prisoners from Yemeni prisoners;

4– Minors from adult prisoners;

5– Female prisoners from male prisoners.

Article (33): Women in authority shall be entrusted to the tasks of guarding and management 

of the aairs of women prisoners.

Chapter 8. Disciplinary measures for prisoners

Article (34): Prison directors are granted the power of imposing disciplinary punishment on 

any prisoner who violates the regulations and instructions issued in accordance with this Act 

and its regulations as follows:

1– Deprivation from participating in the sports and entertainment events for a maximum 

period of one month followed by eliminating no more than 7 grades from conduct;

2– Deprivation from correspondence for a maximum period of two months followed by eliminating no more than 7 grades from conduct;

3– Deprivation from buying allowed consumer materials for a maximum period of one month 

followed by eliminating no more than 7 grades from conduct;

4– Deprivation from periodic visits twice followed by eliminating no more than 5 grades from 

conduct.

5– Solitary connement for a maximum period of two weeks followed by eliminating no more 

than 15 grades from conduct.

Chapter 9. The procedure concerning the execution of death penalty

Article (35): e following measures shall be taken by prison management towards persons 

sentenced to death penalty:

1– A person sentenced to death should be checked carefully and put in a solitary cell under 

constant watch.

2– e Prison Director shall be responsible for verifying the identity of the person sentenced 

to death penalty upon receiving him for execution and make sure that he is the same person 

whose name is mentioned in the Prosecutor General’s order.
80 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 106

3– e execution of death penalty shall be according to the provisions of the Criminal Procedures Act based on a written order from the Prosecutor General submitted to the Minister in 

the legal template in which all the required procedures by the law are detailed.

4– e Minister shall notify the Prosecutor General of the dened date, time, and location of 

execution beforehand.

5– If the religion of the person sentenced to death requires him to perform certain rituals according to his religious belief before death, he should be allowed to perform this ritual as far 

as possible.

6– e relatives of the person sentenced to death shall be allowed to visit him on the previous 

day of execution and the prison management shall notify them of the matter.

7– e execution shall be in the presence of the Prosecutor General or his representative, the 

prison director and the prison doctor. No one else shall be allowed to be present without the 

permission of the Prosecutor General.

8– Prison management shall bury the body of the executed person at the expense of the Government unless the relatives of the deceased requested to receive the body. In this case, the body 

shall be delivered to them.

Chapter 10. Internal rules and regulations of the prison

Article (36): e Minister shall issue the internal rules and regulations of the prisons as follows:

1– e entry and exit system for prisoners and visitors including inspection, guarding, visits organization, prisoners’ movement from prison to another and other security issues in the prison.

2– Determine the types of records and data of the prisoner like the judicial papers, the conduct, 

the health and mental condition, the prisoner’s belonging, etc.

3– Determine the type of uniform for the prisoners and persons sentenced to death.

4– Determine the prisoners’ condition according to their classication taking into consideration the level of dangerousness, sex, age, history, duration of penalty, and the type of crime 

according to the security requirements.

5– Determine the human labor force in prisons in all their specialties, assistant positions and 

the system of their work, transfer, mission, and appointment including the other hired guards.

Chapter 11. Cases of using restraint means and firearms against prisoners

Article (37): e police ocers working in prison shall have the right to use restraint in the 

following cases:

1– Prisoner escape or attempt to escape;

2– Riots, unrest, or gathering by prisoners that could cause storming and breaking down or 

climbing the gates or fences of the prison;

3– Resisting prison police.

Article (38): 1– Prison police may use rearms in the cases mentioned in article (37) if other 

restraint means proven un-useful provided to be preceded by a call to stop and ring gunshots 

in the air as an alarm.

2– When using rearms, the life of prisoners must be preserved as much as possible. e prisoners shall be provided with rst aid treatment while taking into consideration the required 

security measures.

3– It is prohibited to use rearms in cases where the lives of other people who are not related 

to the events can be put in danger.
USIP.ORG 81

PRISONS IN YEMEN

4– e prison management shall inform the Prosecution of any act mentioned in this article 

and article (37) of this Act.

Chapter 12. Final provisions

Article (39): Any person who commits the following acts shall be punished by imprisonment of 

3 months and a ne of no more than YER 5000 or one of these two punishments:

a) Any person who brings in or tries to bring in, in any given way, any item to prison that violates 

the rules and regulations of the prison.

b) Any person who brings in or takes out correspondence or documents in contravention of the 

laws and regulations of the prison.

c) Any person who gives a prohibited item to a prisoner or a remand prisoner shall be punished 

by imprisonment for a maximum period of 6 months or a ne of no more than YER 5000 or 

both if the person who committed this act is an employee or worker at the prison or one of the 

guards assigned to guard the prison.

Article (40): Any person who helps or facilitates the escape of a prisoner or a remand prisoner 

shall be punished by imprisonment for a maximum period of 5 years or shall be ned by a maximum amount of YER 10000. is punishment shall be doubled if this act is committed by one 

of the employees of the prison.

Article (41): Anyone who admits a person to the prison without a written order from the competent court or the Prosecution shall be punished by imprisonment for a maximum period of 5 

years or shall be ned by a maximum amount of YER 10000 or both.

Article (42): a– e prosecution and the jurisdiction shall oversee the veracity of execution of the 

judicial verdicts in prison and shall take the necessary actions to remove or prevent any violations by the prisons’ managements, the prisoners or any other party.

b– Prison management shall implement the decisions and directives of the Prosecution and the 

jurisdiction related to the execution of the punishment of imprisonment.

Article (43): e executive regulations of this Act shall be issued with a republican decree after 

the approval of the Cabinet.

Article (44): e republican decree shall be nullied by Act no. 31 of 1979 regarding prison 

organization issued in Sana’a as well as Act no. 7 of 1987 issued in Aden. It shall nullify any 

provision or text that contradicts with its provisions.

Article (45): is republican decree shall be put into force with an act starting of the date of its 

issuance and shall be published in the ocial newspaper.

Issued by the Presidency of the Republic- Sana’a

28 Ramadan 1411 hejra

Corresponding to 13 April 1991

Lt. General Ali Abdullah Saleh

Chairman of the Presidency Council

Republic	Decision	No.	221	of	the	year	1999

Executive	Prison	Regulations of	Law	No.	48	of	the	year	1991

The	President	of	the	Republic:

Pursuant	to	a	review	of	the	constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Yemen;

And	republican	decree	of	law	No.	(20)	of	the	year	1991	concerning	the	Cabinet.

And	law	No.	(48)	of	the	year	1991 regarding prison	regulations;

And	republican	decree	No.	(169)	of	the	year	1995	regulation	of	the	Ministry	of	Interior.

And	republican	decree	No.	(72)	of	the	year	1998	government	formation	and	the	naming	of	members;

And	a	proposition	by	the	Minister	of	Interior;

And	pursuant	to	the approval	of	the	Cabinet

It	was	decided:

Part	1

Terms	and	Definitions

Article	(1)

This	regulation	is	known	as	{the executive regulation	of	prison	laws).

Article	(2)

For	the	purposes	of	this regulation,	the	following	terms	are defined	as	follows:

- Republic:	Republic	of	Yemen	

- Ministry:	Ministry of Interior

- Minister:	Minister	of	Interior

- Authority: The Prison	Authority

- Chief of	the	Institution:	Chief	of	The	Prison Authority

- Director: The	Director	of	a Central Prison or	its	branches

- Guards:	Prison	guards	of	various	ranks

- Prison:	Facility	in	which	prisoners	and	remand prisoners	are	held

- Prisoner:	Every	person	sentenced	through	a	judicial	decision to	be	held	as	a	prisoner

- Remand	Prisoner:	Any	person sentenced	through	a	judicial	decision	or	through	a	decision	by	a relevant

legal	authority	to	be	held	in	detention	awaiting	trial

- Act:	Prison Regulation Act	No.	48	of	1991

Part	2

Duties	of	Prison	Staff

Chapter	1	

General	duties

Article	(3):

All	prison	staff	must	perform	the	following	duties:

1- Adhere to	provisions	of	the	prison act,	laws	in	force,	and	this	regulation.

2- Not	enter	or	exit	the	prison,	nor	try	to	take	anyone	or	anything or	anyone’s	belongings inside	or	outside	

the	prison	unless	permitted	by	the rules	and	regulations

3- Not to disclose or	reveal	any	information	related	to	the prison or prisoners, not	to disclose	any	

information	related	to	the	prison,	prisoners,	or	his/her	work	except to	authorized personnel	as	stated	in	

the	regulations.	

4- Prohibit	all	unauthorized	communication	of	prisoners.

5- Be	in	strict	compliance	with	the	law	authorizing the use	of	firearms.		

6- Not exploit	any	prisoner	for	any	personal purpose.

7- Deal	firmly	with	prisoners while	taking into	consideration	humanitarian	concerns.
8- Immediately	inform	the	Prison	Director	if	they	observe	any	disorder,	irregularity, or signs	of	disturbances	

of	prison order	that	may	violate	security	or	safety	of prisoners.

9- All external	communications	must	be	done	through the	Prison	Director,	with	the	consent	of	the	Prison	

Authority	Chief	when	necessary.

Chapter	2

Duties	of	Prison	Director

Article	(4)

The	Prison	Director	must	perform	the	following	tasks:-

1- Carry	out	responsibilities	and	duties	prescribed	by	the	two	acts	of	prison	regulation,	penal	procedures,

laws	and	rules	relating	to	prison	work,	decisions	issued	by	the	Minister	or	other	directives	issued	by	the	

Prison	Authority Chief.

2- Ensure	the	well	being	of	prisoners	in prison,	and	to	classify	them according	to what	the laws	and	

regulations specify.

3- Verify	that	any	judgment,	directive,	or	decision for	imprisonment or	release	is	issued	by	a	relevant legal	

authority	in	accordance	with	the	law from	a	facial	standpoint.

4- Ensure	that	every	prisoner	or	detainee	once	admitted	to	prison, are met	by	the	Prison	Director	within a	

maximum	of 12	hours,	and	are	informed	of their	duties,	rights, and	the	circumstances	in	which	they may	

be	subject	to	shooting.

5- File	all	directions	and	instructions	regarding	prison	employment	and	its	facilities	in the	prison	system	and	

its	appendix	which	must	be	adhered	to	by	security	forces,	employees	and	prison	users.

6- Clarify	specialties	and	delegate	work	and	duties	to	security	forces, employees	and	prison	users to	ensure	

that	every	person	performs	their assigned duties. In	case	of absence	for	any	reason,	another	staff	

member must	perform	their	task,	which	must	be then filed	in prison records.	Accordingly, legal	measures	

must	be	taken	against	the	absent	individual.

7- Task	prisoners	with specific	work	and	monitor	them	throughout,	ensuring	that	the	work	is	properly	

carried	out	in	addition	to	verifying a	head	-count.	Daily	searches	of	prison cells,	working	stations,	and	all	

parts	of the	prison	are	to	be	carried	out	to	ensure	cleanliness	and	orderliness,	and	to	pass	by	prisoners	

while	they	are	carrying	out	any	activity	within	the	prison.

8- Pass	by	on	a	regular	basis,	prison	facilities and all	buildings belonging	to	the	facility,	checking	doors	and	

windows	ensuring	their	compliance	with	safety	standards,	taking	the	required	measures accordingly to	

address	any	faults,	and	if	need	be, to	notify the	Prison	Authority Chief, and to	be	thorough	in	checking	the	

areas	where	the	more dangerous	prisoners,	and	the	ones	that	pose	a	threat	of	escaping	the	prison are	

held.

9- Ensure the	sufficiency	and	competency	of	guards	and	precautionary	security	measures, their	correct	

distribution	and	organization	in	the	prison	guaranteeing the	 maintenance of prison	security	both day	and	

night.	Surprise	inspections	must	be	carried	out	from	time	to	time	suggesting	amendments	or	changes	

where	necessary.

10- Ensure the	sufficiency	and	adequacy of	precautions	preventing	and	combating	fires,	and	to	ensure	that	

the	equipment	is in	good	condition	and valid	for	use,	and that	they	are placed in	their	designated	areas.

11- Take appropriate measures	to	prevent	entry	of	contraband into	the	prison and	to	continuously	carry	out	

surprise	inspections of the	prison	and	prisoners,	seizing any	prohibited	items	and to take	legal	measures

accordingly.

12- Not to allow	anyone to	enter the prison	or	speak with	prisoners without	a	written	permit	from	the	

relevant	authority, and	not	to	allow	the	opening	of	the	prison	at night	unless	pressing	circumstances	exist,	

which	is	to	be	carried	out	by	authorized	personnel	that	subsequently	log	it	in	the	prison	incident	records

13- Inspect	the	prison	kitchen	and	ovens ensuring that	food	is	adequately prepared	and	safely	distributed,	

that	it	complies	with	the specific	standards	set	out	and	to	ensure that	rations	are	given out to	prisoners	in	

a	timely	manner.

14- Check prison groceries	ensuring that they	are	fit for	consumption	and	that	their	prices	are	compatible	

with	the	selling	prices	of	other	grocery	shops.

15- Check	prison	stock	ensuring	adequate	storage	and	to	carry	out	ad hoc	inventory	inspections	to	ensure	

that	it	meets	the	standards	specified	in	the	records.

16- Check	safes	and	cupboards	that	are	designated	for	the	safe	keeping	of	money,	possessions	and	other	

valuables	and	to	carry	out	a	surprise	inventory	check	at	a	minimum	of	twice	every	month	and	to	log	the	

findings in	the	specified	records.
17- Receive	all	judicial	documents	relating	to	prisoners	and	to	hand it over	to	them	the	moment	they	are	

received,	and	to	receive	their	appeals	and	any other requests designated	to courts, prosecutors,	or	the	

authority	issuing	the	imprisonment	order	and	to	log	it	in the	specified	records	and	to immediately deliver	

it	to	the	designated	authorities.

18- Hear	out	 all	prisoner	complaints	and	take the necessary and proper	measures accordingly

19- Ensure	that	no	one	is allowed	to	enter	the	female	prison,	their	housing or	places	of	work	except for	those	

who	are	legally	authorized	in	the	name	of	carrying	out	their	formal	duties,	in	the	presence	of the	female	

prison	supervisor	or	her	delegate.

20- Have the	power	of	executive	oversight	of the	prison,	prisoners	and	all	persons,	militants	or	civilians	

employed	in	the	prison.

21- Supervise	all vocational,	educational,	social	work	and	social	awareness	activities	and	other	programs that	

are assigned	by	the	Prison Authority Chief.

22- Report to	the	Prison Authority Chief	through	the	managerial	hierarchy,	regular	and	annual	statistics,	data	

and	information	that	are	requested according	to the	specific designs,	models	and	forms,	in	which	the	

Minister	issues	a	decision	thereof.

23- Immediately notify	the	public	prosecution,	the	authority	issuing	the	detention	order and	the	Prison	

Authority	Chief	in	the	event	of	the	prisoner	or	detainee	being	subject	to	the	following:

a. Death	or	serious	illness.	

b. Escape	or	riots.

Chapter	3

Duties	of	Social	and	Psychological	Specialists

Article	(5):

The	social worker must	perform	following	tasks:	

First:	In	the	area	of	admission and	examination	of	cases:

1. Meet prisoners	at	the	earliest	opportunity	following	their	admission	to	the	prison	to	get	to	know	them,	

instill	confidence,	examine	their	situation	and	study	it,	diagnose	them,	identify	the	reasons	behind

committing the crime and planning	to outline	a	therapy	and	treatment	path whilst	serving	their	sentence	

and	to	propose	appropriate	work	and	activity.

2. Register all	data	and	information	about	prisoner	in the specified registers.

3. Help	the	prisoner	in	tackling	his personal problems,	and	to	improve his	family and	community	relations in	

the	prison.

4. Limit	and	register cases	of	prisoners'	families	that	require	help,	and to notify	the	Ministry	of	Social	Affairs	

through the	Prison	Director.

5. Introduce	the	prisoner	to	the	prison	community,	its	aims,	goals and	prisoner	treatment	regulations,	and

to stress	the	importance	of	compliance	with	the	regulations	and	activities	of	the	prison	

6. Participate	in	committees	that	work	in	the	fields	of	education,	housing,	vocational	training,	conditional	

and special	release and	incremental	treatment,	and	to	supply	these	committees	with	information	and	

data	that	aid in	achieving	its	goals	

7. Create	a	log	for	prisoners’	complaints	and those	of	their	families forwarded	by the	prison	administration

for	follow	up	and	potential	resolution	with	procedural	evidence and	notify	the	complainant	with	the	

result.

8. Follow	up	on	prisoner's	cases	throughout	their imprisonment	term,	and	create	a	public file	for	each

prisoner	that includes	all	information, data	and	research carried	out	about	their	cases.

Second:	In	the	realm of	working	with	prisoners	and	occupying	their	free	time:

1. Create	a	homogeneous	organized	culture of	prisoners	in	the	fields	of education,	sports,	entertainment

allowed	within	the	prison, exercised	during	non-working	hours and	to	supervise	and	encourage	prisoners	

to	join	for	the	purpose	of	creating a	conduct	of good	cooperation	and	competitiveness	amongst	the	

prisoners.

2. Set programs	for	the	exercise	of these	activities,	arrange	competitions	and	report these activities	to	the	

prison	administration.

3. Oversee	the	prison's	library,	its	activities	and to encourage prisoners	to	read

4. Oversee	the	prison's	local	radio station,	issue magazines	and	organize meetings	and	seminars, and	to	

revive national	and	religious	occasions	determined	by	the	prison's	administration.
Third:	With	regards	to	follow-up	care:

1. Meet	with	the prisoners	who	are	to	be	released	two	months	before	their	release in	the	form	of	weekly	

seminars	to	rehabilitate	them	socially	to	face	society	post	release.

2. Review the	social	files	of	released	prisoners	to assess	their	situation and	work on to	solving their	external	

problems.

3. Contact	Social	Services and	other	institutions	and	committees	that work	in	the	field	of	caring	for	released	

prisoners	and	to	cooperate	with	them	to	set	a	pre-release	plan	and	provide the required	assistance.

4. Follow	up on cases	of	released	prisoners,	assess their	conditions and	problems	they	are	facing, help	in	

resolving	their problems	and log	the	procedures	taken	to	follow	up	in	the	specified	record.

5. Submit	to	the	prison	administration	and	the	Prison	Authority	Chief based	on	cases	reports	of	their	work.	

Fourth:	General	duties:

1. Organize	records,	documents	and	social	files as	required	by	the	job,	prepare periodic	reports	and	statistics	

and	inform	the	prison's	administration, and Prison	Authority	Chief	with	the	data	and	information,	and	

accordingly	their recommendations.

2. Cooperate	with	the	prison's	doctor	and	other	specialists	in	following	up on cases	of	prisoners.

Article	(6)

The	Psychologist	must	perform	the	following	tasks:

1. Meet	the	prisoner	at	the	earliest	opportunity	following	admission	into	prison, and	to	review	all	medical	

reports	and	social	researches	that	were	carried	out	regarding the	prisoner's	life	and	family	relations and	

troubles, to	diagnose	their	psychology	and	the	factors	and	reasons	that	led	to committing	the crime, to

draw	up	a	treatment	plan	for	the	duration	of	the	sentence	and prepare	a	report	thereof.

2. Carry	out	psychological	tests and	analyses according	to	the	prisoner's	needs	and to	provide the	required	

psychotherapy to	any	prisoner	with	such	a	need

3. Cooperate	with	the	different	specialists	in	diagnosing	and	assessing	the	prisoner’s condition,	and to	

provide help	to	any	prisoner	that	requests	it	or	that	is	referred	to	them by	the	prison	manager	for	

diagnosis	and	treatment.

4. Oversee	prisoners'	behaviors through	periodical reports	provided	by the	different	social	specialists,	

doctors and	supervisors	of	various	activities.

5. Prepare	and	organize	records, forms	and	files	required	by	the	job	and	fulfill	the	required	data	thereof,	and	

to	work	on	preparing	and	submitting	periodical	reports	with	regards	to	their	work	backed	by	statistics,	

data,	and	information.

Chapter	4

System	and	Administration

Section	1

Prison	Administration

Article	(7)

Establish	a	fixed	force	that	executes	the	prison’s	rehabilitation	and	penal	policy	according	to	laws	and	regulations,	

which	receive	special	training	in	order	to	aid	in	wholly	carrying	out	their	duties.

Article	(8)

The	Prison	Director	is responsible	for	reform,	punitive	measures,	and	detention	implementation	according	to	the	

law	and	these regulations,	and	has	the	responsibility	of	guarding	prisoners,	and	of	decisions	issued	within	the	

prison,	and	has	to	abide	by	the	orders	and	instruction	issued	by	the	Prison Authority Chief.	All officers,	guards,	

employees,	and	prison	users must	enforce	and abide	by	the ordinances issued	by	the	Prison	Director.

Article	(9)

The	Prison	Director	must	implement	all	written	orders received	from	prosecution	or relevant	courts, by	requesting	

the	bringing	of	remand	prisoners	and	convicts	and	to	verify	that	they	are	sent	according	to	the	schedule	set	by	that	

authority.
Article	(10)

Taking	into	consideration the provisions	of	article	(36),	the	Interior	Minister	is	in	charge	of	issuing	the	following	

regulations	and	organizational decisions:

1. The	system	of	entering	and	exiting	of	prisoners	and	visitors	to	the	prison	that	includes inspection,	

guarding	and	scheduling	of	visits.

2. Transfer	of	prisoners	from	one	prison	to	another.

3. The	types	of records	and	data	related	to	facilitating the	running	of	the	prison.

4. List	of	medical	services	in	the	prison	in	coordination	with	the	Minister	of	Public	Health.

5. Determining	the	uniforms	of prisoners	and of those	who	face the death	penalty.

6. The	tasks,	transfer,	assignments	and	appointments	of	the	work	force	in	prison.

7. Prisoner placement	according	to their classifications,	taking	into	consideration	the	threat	and	danger	they	

pose,	sex,	age,	prior	convictions,	length	of	sentence	and	type	of	crime, according	to	security	needs.

8. The	work	force in	the	prison	of	different specialties,	their	work	systems, their transfers,	their	

classifications	and	appointments,	including	guards	and	other	users.

Section	2

Formation	of	the	Supreme	Prison	Committee and	Specialty	Identification

Article	(11)

Formation	of	the	Supreme	Prison	Committee	is	as	follows:

1- Interior	Minister: Head	of	committee

2- Representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Justice: Member

3- Representative	of	the	Public	Prosecution: Member

4- Representative	of the	Ministry	of	Education: Member

5- Representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Insurance	and	Social	Affairs: Member

6- Representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Work	and	Vocational	Training: Member

7- Representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Youth	and	Sports: Member

8- Representative	of	the Ministry	of	Public	Health: Member

9- Representative	of	the Ministry	of	Endowment and	Guidance:	Member

10- Representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance: Member

11- Chief	of	the	Authority: Decision	Maker

Article	(12)

The	Interior	Minister	has	the	discretion	of	member	admittance to the	Supreme	Prison	Committee as	he	sees

beneficial	and	useful	to the	activities	and functions of	the	prison.

Article	(13)

Each	authority	is	in	charge	of	naming	its	representative	in	this Committee of	which	their	rank must not	be	below	

deputy	minister.

Article	(14)

The	Supreme	Prison	Committee	is	responsible	for	the	following:

1- Developing	and	improving prisons	and	their	performance.

2- Reviewing	proposals	related to the improvement	of	the	prisoners’ conditions,	setting foundations	and

suggestions	relating	to their	treatment, accommodation	and	therapy.

3- Setting	a	program	of	training	and	rehabilitation	for	prisoners.

Article	(15)

The	committee	must	hold	regular	meetings every	two	months,	and	the	head	of	the	committee	reserves	the	right	

to	call	the	committee	to	hold	exceptional	meetings when	necessary.
Chapter	5

Reform	and	Rehabilitation

Section	1

Teaching,	Education,	and	Preaching

Article	(16)

The	administration	of	each prison	must	conduct	prisoner	education	programs and	curriculums according	to	

directives	of	the	Prison Authority Chief	in	collaboration	with	the	Ministry	of	Education	and	according	to	what the	

Supreme	Prison	Committee	specifies.

Article	(17)

The	prison	administration	must	encourage	illiterate	prisoners	to	join	illiteracy resolution classes	and	the	Ministry	

of	Education	must provide	all the required	educational	tools	and	aids,	and	the	prison	administration	must,	to	the	

utmost, work	to	help	prisoners that	have	reached	a	limited	stage	of	education, to	further	pursue	it.

Article	(18)

All	examinations are to	be performed	inside	prison, accordingly,	it	is	prohibited	for	any	prisoner to	do an

examination outside	the	prison,	and	the	Prison	Authority	Chief	must	coordinate	with	the	Minister	of	Education	the

distribution	of	proctors and	examination committees,	according	to	the	system	implemented	by	the	Ministry	of	

Education.

Article	(19)

The	prison	administration	must	encourage	prisoners	to	undertake	cultural, social	and	artistic	activities	through

organizing	competitions between	prisoners in the different	areas	of	these	activities and	to	honor those	who	excel.

Article	(20)

The	religious	preacher	must,	to	the	utmost	of	his	ability,	work in	collaboration	with	the	prison	administration	on

reforming	prisoners	through	religious preaching	and guidance	according	to	programs and	curriculums

recommended	by	the	Prison Authority Chief,	and	must especially	focus	religious,	social	and	legal	guidance on	

homosexual	prisoners	and	prisoners	with	particularly	bad	behavior.

Section	2

Social	Services

Article	(21)

Each	prison,	according	to	the	capacities	and	limitations,	must have a	sufficient	number	of social	workers	to	

implement	social	programs	in	the	prison and	the	Prison Chief	must	through	consulting	with	the	director-general	of	

rehabilitation coordinate	the	work	between	them	and	issue	decisions	and	directives	relating	to	social	work	in

prisons.

Article	(22)

Prisoners	must	be,	as	much	as	possible, encouraged	to undertake sports activities in each prison, in	coordination	

with	the	Youth	and	Sports	Ministry	according	to	the	following methods:

1- Creation	of playgrounds	in	the	interior yards	of	the	prison,	taking	into	consideration	the	allocation	of	

secure	locations	and	to	provide	it	with	security	measures.

2- Providing	table	tennis	and	basketball	courts	in	addition	to	mental	exercise	games	such	as	chess	within	the	

different	sections

3- Arranging	sports	competitions	among	sections	and	departments	for	the	purpose	of	occupying	prisoners’	

free	time	and	to	contribute	to	their	bodybuilding from	a	physical	health	standpoint.
Chapter	6

Prisoner	Employment	and	Vocational	Training Regulations

Section	1

Prisoner	Employment

Article	(23)

Subject	to provisions	of	the	law:

a. Every	prisoner	sentenced	with	deprivation	of	liberty	must	work	in	occupations determined	by	prison	

administration.

b. Females	sentenced	to	imprisonment	are	to	be	assigned	positions that	coincide	with	their	nature.

Article	(24)

Injured or	patient	prisoners	are	not	to	be	employed	without	a	formal	report	from	the	prison	doctor	assuring	that	

they	are	fit	to	do	so.

Article	(25)

Prisoners	assigned	to	clean	are	not	to	be	permitted	to work	in food	and	beverage positions.

Section	2

Wages	of	Prisoners

Article	(26)

Prisoners	are	assigned	positions	according	to	their	skills	and	competencies	in	each	profession	to	three	categories	

(a,b,c)	according	to	the	articles	of	this	regulation.

Article	(27)

Prisoners	are to	be given	daily	wages	for	their	productive	and	artistic	work	according	to	the	approved	budget	for	

this	purpose.

Article	(28)

The	Minister along	with the Ministers	of	Civil	Service,	Work	and	Vocational	training and	following	a	

recommendation	from	the	Supreme	Prison	Committee	specify	daily	wages	of	each	profession	of	the	three	

categories.

Article	(29)

Prisoners	who	work	in	different professions of	vocational	training	workshops	or	those	that	join	after	the	execution	

of	these	regulations	are	to	be	placed	in	the (C)	classification.

Article	(30)

Prisoner	promotion	into	a	higher	classification	is	to	be	gradual following	a	profession	examination	by	the	

vocational	training	committee	according	to	rules	set	by	the	Prison	Committee

Article	(31)

The	general	director of	reform	and	rehabilitation	is	permitted	according	to	a	recommendation	from	the	vocational	

training	committee	to	transfer	a	prisoner	skilled	in	his	profession	from	class	(C)	to	either	of	the	higher	classes	

Article	(32)

Prisoners	are	not	to	be	given	wages	for absent days	unless	their	absence	is	excused	following	a	written	report from	

the	doctor	explaining	that	the	illness	is	work	induced,	and	in	all	other	illness	cases,	prisoners	are	to	be	given	wages	

for	absent	days	with	the	condition	that	it	does	not	exceed	three	days	each	time.

Article	(33)

Prisoners	are	permitted	to	spend	an	amount	not	exceeding	half their	wage	in	acquiring	their	needs	of	prison	

certified	goods	or	to	provide	support	for	their	families	following	a	recommendation	from	the	social	specialist,	and	

the	remaining	balance	is	held	on	trust	that	is	given	to	them	on	release.
Article	(34)

The	Prison	Director	has	the	discretion	of	allowing prisoners to	spend	more	than	the	allowed	rate	of	their	wages	

when	there	is	absolute	necessity,	and	to	log	it	in	the	prison	record.

Article	(35}

The	prison	administration	is not allowed	to	expend	prisoners’ wages	unless	expressly	permitted	by	the	prisoner	

and	without	breaching	prison	administration	withdrawals	vis-à-vis	the	losses	effectuated by	the	prisoner	or	

through	a	judicial	decision.

Section	3

Goals,	Means,	and	Methods	of	Vocational	Training

Article	(36)

The	goals	of	the	training	are	to focus	on	the	following:

1- Training male	and	female prisoners	who	were	penalized with a	liberty-depriving	sentence throughout	the	

duration	of their	sentence in	vocational	training	for	the	purpose	of	acquiring	a	craft,	or	industrial	or	

agricultural	profession.

2- Vocational	training	programs	are	to	be	compatible,	to	the	utmost,	with	the	capabilities,	needs,	and	

desires	of	prisoners	within	the	limits	that	coincide	with	sound	rules	for	vocational	training	selection	and	

the	capacities	and	regulations	of	the	prison.

3- Creating	opportunities	for	prisoners	post release	in	order	to	engage	in honorable/respectful work that	

prevents	them	from	the	fouls	of	unemployment and	return	to crime.	

4- Developing	the	skills	of prisoners with	expertise	and	to	advance	their	scientific	abilities.

5- Occupying	prisoners’	free	time and	advancing	their	activity.

6- Making	maximum	use	of	the	unemployed	work	force	in	prison	which	benefits	the	prisoners and	the	

community.

Article	(37)

The	methods of	training	are	as	follows:

1- Establishing	vocational	training	workshops in	every	prison	within	the	limits	of	its	capacities	according	to	

health	standards	and	requirements	of	industrial	safety	analogous	to	work	regulations	outside	prison.

2- The	number	of	workshops	and	their	specifications	must	be	proportionate	to	the	number	of	prisoners	to	

be	trained,	and	accordingly,	the	type	of	profession	that	they	will	be	trained	in.

3- Establishing	farms	to	train	prisoners	in	agriculture	and	to	supply	these	farms	with	all	the	required	facilities	

to	apply	agreed	upon	training	standards.

4- Selecting	trainers	specialized	in	crafts	and	different	professions	according	to	a	high	standard	of	

competency,	expertise,	and	conduct	.

Article	(38)

The	means	of	training	are	as	follows:

1- Setting	adequate	standards when	preparing for the	levels	of	training on	the	basis of	belonging	to	a class	

with	special	circumstances.

2- Training	standards	are	to	conform,	to	the	utmost,	with	what	is	practiced	on	production	sites.

3- Periods	of	training	must	be	proportionate	to	the	length	of	the	prisoner’s	sentence.

Section	4

Crafts	and	Artisan	Work

Article	(39)

The	Minister	must issue	a	decision	to	organize	vocations	and	crafts	based	on the	Supreme	Prison	Committee's	

recommendations whereas	it	encompasses	the	standards,	specifications,	tools	and	methods	of	the	programs	

required	exclusively	for	each	profession,	and	the Minster,	after	consulting	with	the	Prison	Committee,	can	add	any	

craft,	reorganize,	modify	and	cancel	any	of	which.
Section	5

Training	Committee

Article	(40)

Members of the	training	committee	must	satisfy	the	following conditions:

1- Possess	the	relevant qualifications.

2- Mastery	of	the	profession	is	the	subject	of	training and	knowledge	how	to	use	the	required	tools

3- Mastery	of	the	training	method	specific	to	the	profession	and	a	number	of	other	closely	related	

professions.

4- Ability	to	select	and	utilize	the	means	and	methods	of	 training.

5- Be	of	good	reputation	and	behavior	and	not	to	have	been	convicted	in	cases	related	to	dishonesty.

6- Must	have	a	spark	of	innovation	and	to	produce	relevant	training	samples	.

Article	(41)

Work	force	profession	requirements	must	be	specified	in	every	prison	separately	and	in-lieu	with	the	nature	of	the	

profession	that	is	to	be	trained and	the	number	of	prisoners	to	be	trained.

Chapter	6

General	Testing	Conditions	and	Acceptance	to	the	Different	Professions

Article	(42)

Applicants	for	profession	testing	are	conditioned	by	the	following:

1. The duration	of	the	prison	sentence	must	cover	the	predetermined	duration	of	training	in	which	they	are	

to	be	tested.

2. The	prisoner	applying	for	the	test must	be	medically	fit and	approved	by	a	report	from	the	prison	doctor

3. The level	of	education	and	experience	must	conform	to the	profession admission	conditions.

4. Moreover,	acceptance	to	the	various	professions	are	conditioned	by	the	following:

a- Good	familiarity	with	reading	and	writing	with	the	preference	to	those	familiar	with	mathematics

b- Having	prior	experience	in	the	field	of	the	profession	to	be	trained	in.

c- Prisoners	to	undergo	preliminary	testing	in	the	field	of	occupation	to	establish	what	Article	43	of	

this	provision	set	forth.

d- Taking	into	consideration	the	interest of	prisoners’	in	profession	testing	that	they	are	to	be	

trained	in.

e- Not	to	exceed	45	years	of	age	and	to	be	medically	fit.

Article	(43)

A	committee	must	be	formed	in	each prison,	which is to	be called the (Vocational	Training	Committee)	chaired	by

the Prison	Director	or	his	deputy,	the prison	doctor and	social	specialist	as	members and	head	of	the	Training	

Committee	as	adjudicator	whereas	they	specialize	in	selecting	prisoners	for	the	various	professions	according	to

the rules	and	regulations of	prison	law	in	addition	to	any	other	specialties	provided	by	this	regulation	of	provided	

by	general	director of	reform	and	rehabilitation.

Article	(44)

The	committee	is	to	meet	once	every	week	and to	log	their	proceedings	in	records	and	allocated	forms	that	

contain the	name	of	prisoners	that were	presented	to	it	and	the	professions	they	are	to	take	up,	and	the	

committee	has	to	select a	proportionate	number	to the	capacities	of	each	profession	and	to	log	the	remaining

applicants	in	waiting	lists to	supplement	the	required	schedule.

Article	(45)

The	vocational	training	committee	of	the	prison	is	allowed	to	change	the	prisoner's	profession	for	medical	reasons	

based	on	the	prison	doctor’s	report	with	the	confirmation	of	necessity	by	the	committee.

Article	(46)

The	vocational	testing	system	is to	be applied	on trainees at	the	end	of	the	specified training	period	to	reaffirm	

that	they	are	capable	of	understanding	and	thus	gaining	the	required	skill	to	practice	their	profession	in	the	

practical	life.
Article (47)

The	vocation	test	must	include the	practical	and theoretical	related aspects.

Article	(48)

Prisoners	are tested	in	each	profession	with	the	knowledge	of	the	training	committee	according	to	rules	and	

foundations	set	by	the	Prison	Committee.

Article	(49)

The	prison	committee	determines the types	of	prisoner	certifications	to	be	given	at	the	end	of	the	course	in	

consultation	with	the	country’s	relevant	authority.

Article	(50)

The	prisoner	who has successfully	completed	the training	period	is	given	a	certificate	for	the	specific	curriculum	

that	states	the	successful	completion	of	the	training	course,	and	clarifying	the	areas	in	which	they	were	trained,	

the	duration	and	level	of	skill	that	has	been	attained

Article	(51)

The	prisoner who	has	not	been	successful	in	passing	the	vocational	test	at	the	end	of	the	course,	the	training	will	

be	recommenced	in	the	same	profession	if	the	remainder	of	the	sentence	is	of	durational	sufficiency	for	the	

course.

Article	(52)

All	instructions	and	directives	of	industrial	safety (profession	health	and	safety) issued	by	the	Work	and	Vocational	

Training	Ministry for	the	protection	of	prisoners	at	every	workshop are	to	be	enforced	and	followed.

Article	(53)

All	health	standards must	be	taken	into	consideration, and	natural	and	industrial	lighting	must	be	sufficient	in	the	

operation	of	workshops.

Section	7

Compensation

Article	(54)

Rules,	regulations,	and	worker	injury	compensation	are	to	be	applied,	including	illnesses	contracted	on	the	job	by	

prisoners	and	workers	that	work	in	vocational	training	in	prisons.

Chapter	7

Categorization	and	Housing

Article	(55)

Prisoner	categories	are	distributed	to	central,	branch,	and	local	prisons	taking	into	consideration	the	contents of	

article	(32) of	the	regulation according	to	the	following	details:

A) Central	prisons	comprise	of the	following	categories:

1- Homosexuals	with	prior	convictions	and	homosexuals	of	different	prisoner	classifications	

2- Convicts	sentenced	to	incarceration	for	more	than	three	years

3- Detainees held	in	preventative/precautionary	detention	and	immigrants

4- Convicts transferred	from	branch	prisons	for	bad	behavior

5- Convicts,	not	in	the above	categories,	as	designated	by	the	Minister	to the	central	prison.

B) Branch	prisons	comprise	of	the following	categories:

1- Convicts sentenced to one	year	in	prison

2- Those with	prior	convictions	and	those	of	ordinary	behavior

3- Convicts transferred	from	the	Central	prison	as	part	of	a	staged release

4- Convicts	and	transferees	from	local	prisons	due	to	bad	behavior

5- Detainees held	in	precautionary detention for	petty	crimes.

C) Local	prisons	comprise	of the	following	categories:

1- Convicts	sentenced	to less	than	one	year

2- Convicts transferred	from	central	or	branch	prisons as	part	of	staged	release

3- Detainees	held	in	precautionary detention for	petty	crimes.	

4- Convicts	imprisoned	for	civil	debts.
Article	(56)

Exceptions	to previous	regulations,	in	necessary	cases,	the	Prison Authority Chief	can	issue	a	transfer	to	another	

prison.

Article	(57)

No	prisoner shall	be	transferred	from	one	prison	to	another	unless	authorized	by	the	Prison Authority Chief	

according	to	rules	and	regulations	issued	by	the	Minister	or	a	judicial	order.

Article	(58)

Within	the	prison’s	capacities,	housing	of	prisoners	in	rooms	and	cells	in	prison,	whenever	warranted	by	the	

prison’s	capacities	according	to	the	following	rules,	unless	the	chief	orders	otherwise:

1- Taking	into	consideration	not	to	generalize	between	convicts	with	prior	convictions	and	other	prisoners,	

applied	in	the	same	manner	to	remand	prisoners	.

2- Taking	into	consideration	to	the	utmost	the	placing	of	dangerous	and	homosexual	prisoners	with	regard	

to	security	of	the	prison	according	to	individual	case,	and	must	isolate	those	notorious	for	homosexuality	

in	solitary	confinement	with	constant	supervision.

3- Prisoners	convicted	of	similar	crimes	are	to	be	grouped	together	while	isolating	addicts	from	others	

4- Placing	convicts	of	civil	debt	and	those	convicted	of	physical	violence	together.

5- Isolation	of	convicts	and	precautionary	detainees	of	immigrants	from	other	prisoners.

6- Taking	into	consideration	cases	mentioned	above,	a	separated	place	is	allocated	to	prisoners	housing	

during	the	specified period	or	for	placing	them	under	medical	testing.

7- It	should	be	taken	into	consideration the placement	prisoners	of	all	categories	and	those	with	proximate	

ages	together.

8- Considering	not	disrupting	what	follows,	grouping	of	prisoner	categories	according	to	homogenous	

groups	socially	and	culturally	.

9- If	necessity	calls	for	it,	the	imprisonment	of	armed	and	security	forces	in	detention	that	does	not	result	in	

dismissing	them	from	service must	be	isolated	in	a	separate	location	according	to	the	above	rules.

10- The	Prison	Manager	must	ensure	from	time	to	time	that	classification	and	housing	is	done	according	the	

law	and	these	regulations.

Chapter	8

Treatment	of	Prisoners

Section	1

Precautionary	Detainees

Article	(59)

In	a	manner	that	does	not	conflict	with	the	regulations	of	penal	procedure,	and	following	the	regulations	of	Article	

(31)	of	Prison	Regulation	No	(48)	for	the	year 1991,	precautionary	detainees are	allowed	to	meet	their	spouses	and	

lawyers	whenever	need	be,	with	a	written	authorization	from	the	authority	responsible	for	issuing	the	detention	

order.

Article	(60)

Precautionary	detainees	are	allowed	to	receive	food	from	outside	the	prison	according	to	the	following	

regulations:	

1- They	must	vow to	the	Prison	Director	that they will	take	the	responsibility	of	bringing	food from	outside	

the	prison	at	their	own	expense.

2- The	food must	be brought at	the	appropriate time	set	by	the	prison	administration	

3- The	food	must	undergo	restraints	and	conditions	set	by	the	prison	administrator	for	the	purpose	of	

preventing	contraband	and	luxury	items	from	getting	into	the	prison	and	to	ensure	their	conformity with	

health	regulations

4- Prison	food	is	not	to	be	dispensed	for	the	prisoner	nor	can	they	receive	its	value,	an	exception to	this	rule	

is	in	the	situation	where	they	do	not	receive	sufficient	food	following	a	report	from	the	prison	doctor	in	

which	case	the Prison	Administrator	can	issue	the	cancellation	of	receiving	food.
5- If	the	prisoner	fails	to	bring	his	own	food	or	it	was	not	available	to	him	in	a	repetitive	manner	and	in	a	way	

that	affect	the	prisoner’s	health,	the	Prison	Director	is	allowed	to	cancel	permission	of	receiving	outside	

food,	is	given	the	decided	prison food	that	is	given	to	all	other	prisoners .

Article	(61)

The	Prison Authority Chief	is	allowed	to	grant	any	prisoners	convicted	of	civil	debt	or	physical	violence	all	or	some	

benefits	conferred	upon	precautionary	detainees.

Section	2

Gradual Treatment

Article	(62)

Every	prisoner	sentenced	to	imprisonment	that	has served	five	consecutive	years	must,	before	release,	go	through	

a	transition	period that	is	calculated	on	the	basis	of	one	month	for	a	full	year	from	their	penalty	with	the	condition	

that	the	transition	period	is	not	less	than	six	months	and	does	not	exceed	two	years.

Article	(63)

Prisoners	enjoy the	following	benefits	during	the	transfer stage:

a- Transfer	to	the	closest	prison	from	his	residential	address.

b- The	prisoner	is	dealt with in	the	same manner as	prisoners	held	in	precautionary	detention	with	regards

to	visits	and	correspondence and	is	permitted	a	weekly visit	for	one	hour,	where	the prison	director	can	

increase	it	when	necessary.

c- In	urgent	situations	the	prisoner	is	to	be	given	a	leave	that	does	not	exceed	48	hours	notwithstanding	

travel	duration,	and	a	permit	of	this	leave	is	to	be	issued	by	the	Prison Authority Chief	following	an	

approval	from	the	public	prosecution,	in	which	the	time	they	spend	outside	prison	is	to	be	deducted	from	

the	duration	of	their	sentence.

Section	3

Prisoners	Sentenced	to	Death

Article	(64)

Prisoners sentenced	to	death	receive	the	same	rations of	clothes,	blankets, and	food	as other	prisoners.

Article	(65)

When	the	prisoner	sentenced	to	death	leaves	his	solitary	cell	for	any	purpose,	he	must	be	handcuffed prior	to	

leaving	and	it	is	not	permitted	to	handcuff	him	whilst	returning	him	into	the	cell	unless	he	was	reaching	a	level	of	

desperation	or	dangerousness.

Article	(66)

Four	samples are	to	be	taken	from	the	prisoner	after	being	sentenced	to	death,	which is	to	be	sent	to	a	forensic	

laboratory	for	identity	verification.	The	samples	are	to	be	returned	to	the	prison	for	safekeeping and	are referred	

to	by	the	Prison	Director	or	officer	when	ordering	the	execution,	where	these	samples	convey	the	execution,	its	

date,	and	the	prison	that	they	are	executed	in.	One	of	the	samples	is	to	be	sent	to	the	authority	that	issued	the	

sentence.	The	remaining	samples	are	to	be	sent	to	the	Crime	Investigation	Department	to	complete	its	records,	

and	the	prison	director	is	responsible	verifying	the	identity	of	the	prisoner	sentenced	to	death	when	brought	forth	

for	the	execution.

Article	(67)

The	guard	of	the	prisoner	sentenced	to	death	must	immediately	notify	the Prison	Director or	officer	of	any	

abnormal	incident	that	occurs	to	the	prisoner	sentenced	to	death.

Article	(68)

If	the	execution	is	to	take	place	in	prison,	all	internal	functions	of	the	prison	must	be	seized	and	all	other	prisoners	

must	be	kept	in	their	cells	and	must	are	not	permitted	to	leave	or	to	commence	any	work	until	the	corpse	is	taken	

out	of	the	prison.
Article	(69)

Sufficient	and	adequate	security	must	be	assigned	under	the	supervision	of	prison	management	to	guard	and	

watch	the	prisoner	sentenced	to	death.

Article	(70)

The	following	precautionary	measures	must	be	implemented	when	dealing	with	prisoners	sentenced	to	death:

1- Not	to	permit the	possession	of	flammable materials.

2- Not	to	permit	the	possession	of	any	sharp	object.

3- Provide food	in	plastic	containers,	and prohibit	the	use	of	metal and	glassware.

4- Continuous	verification	of	the	safety	of	electrical	wiring	in	the	cells	and	its	inaccessibility.

Article	(71)

It	is	permitted	to	allow	prisoners	sentenced	to	death	to	access	the	interior	yard	of	the	prison	for	the	purpose	of	

taming	them,	and	it	is	not	to	exceed	an	hour	a	day	at	times	specified	by	the	prison	administration.

Article	(72)

When	the	execution	order	is	issued,	the	Minister	along	with	the	Prison Authority Chief	must	perform	the	following	

procedures before	the	execution:

1- Notify	the	public	prosecution of	the	date,	place	and	time	of	execution,	that	is (48	hours)	prior	to	

execution	and	to	notify	the	relevant	authorities	to	directly	monitor	and	supervise the	execution.

2- Arrange	the	required	security	measures	to	prevent	general	security	disruption	and	carrying	out	the	

execution.

Article	(73)

Considering	the	provisions	of	the	article	(35) of	Prison Regulation	No.	(48) of	the	year 1991,	the	prisoners	

sentenced	to	death	are	allowed	to:

1. If	the	religion	of	the	prisoner	sentenced	to	death	imposes	a	specific ritual	prior	to	execution,	they are	

allowed,	to	the	utmost,	to	perform	it.

2. Facilitating	the	required	measures	to	write	a	will	if	requested.

3. Allowing	his	relatives	to	visit	one	day	prior	to	the	execution date	and	the	Prison	Director	is	responsible	for	

informing	the	family	of	the	date	of	this	visit.

Chapter	9

Violations	and	Punishment

Section	1

Violations

Article	(73)

The	prisoner	is	considered	the	perpetrator	of a	penalizing offence	if	he	commits,	tries,	embarks	on, or	incites	

another	to	commit any	of the	following:

1- Disobeying	orders.

2- Refusing	to	work,	neglecting or	derelictions	in	performance.

3- Presence	without	permission	in	a	location	other	than	the	one	allocated	for	his	residence	or	work.

4- Possession	of	contraband.

5- Self-infliction	of	harm.

6- Pretention	of	insanity	or	illness.

7- Refusing	medical check	up	or treatment.

8- Falsely	proclaiming or	accusing any prisoners	

9- Abstaining	or	deliberately	stating	misleading	answers	to	any	question	asked by	prison	staff	or	any	other	

official	visitors.

10- Escaping.

11- Stealing	keys	or	copying	them.
12- Destroying	prison	records	or	documents	deliberately or	making	any	alteration.

13- Possession	of	any	weapon,	dangerous	article,	flammable	materials or	toxic	substances.

14- Deliberately	setting	fire	in	the	prison.

15- Assaulting	any	prisoner	through	words,	signs or	threats,	whether	it	causes harm or	not.

16- Assaulting	prison	staff,	official	visitor	or	any	others	entering	prison	to	perform	job	related	duties	through	

words,	signs,	threats	or	physical	assault	whether	it	causes	harm	or	not	

17- Obscenity	of	actions	or	language.

18- Vandalizing	 or	destroying	foods or	drinks.

19- Unauthorized	communication	with	any	prisoner	or	a	person	unrelated	to	the	prison.

20- Disobedience,	collective	anarchy,	or	incitement	of	such.

21- Purposely	vandalizing	prison	property.

22- Receiving	or	sending	letters	in	an	unauthorized	manner.

23- Abstaining	from	notifying	an	escape	of	a	prisoner or	attempt	to	escape,	aiding	an	escape or	aiding	their	

attempt	to	escape	or	the	agitation	of	any	other.

24- Causing	chaos,	disturbance,	or	disruption of	prison	regulations	and	security.

25- Committing	any	crime	in	prison.

Section	2

Punishment

Article	(74)

The	specialized	court's	issuance/approval of	punishments	for	crimes	committed	in	prison	are	not	to	be	precluded	

from	issuing/approving administrative	punishment	outlined	in	this	regulation.

Article	(75)

Punishment	of	a	prisoner	is to	be approved	only	after	hearing	his	defense	and	verifying	that	he	committed	the	

violation, and	accordingly the	punishment	issued	is	to	be logged	in	the	designated	punishment	record	and	the	

prison	files	in	the	allocated	forms.

Article	(76)

The	issuance/approval	of	a	punishment	according	to	this	regulation	does	not	preclude	the	release	of	the prisoner	

on	time whereby	the	order	is	issued	automatically	or	the	relevant	authorities.

Article	(77)

If	a	prisoner	committed	multiple	violations	simultaneously,	they	are	to	face	maximum	punishment.

Article	(78)

Acts	committed	by	a	prisoner	that	amount	to	a	crime	according	to	the	laws	and	punishment	regulations	are	to	be	

immediately	reported	to	the	relevant	authorities.

Article	(79)

The	prison	director	must	immediately	notify	the	Prison	Chief,	the	attorney	general and	the	security	director of	

prisoners	held	in	outposts	of	any	rebellion	or	disobediences.
Article	(80)

Every	prisoner that commits	any violation stipulated	in	this	regulation is	to	be punished	on	conviction	of	any	of	the	

following	with the	knowledge	of	the	following	authorities:

Type	of	Punishment Authority	Authorized	to	Issue	Punishment

- Warning

- Visitation	deprivation	for	a	period	not	exceeding	

twice	a	month

- Deprivation	of all	or	some	privileges	for	a	period	

not	exceeding	one	month

- Overtime	work	for	a	period	not exceeding half	a	

month

- Solitary	confinement	for	a	period	not	exceeding

half	a	month

- Correspondence	deprivation	for	a	period	not	

exceeding	one	month

- Approval	of	any two	of	the	above-mentioned	

penalties.

- Approval	of	any	three	of	the	above	mentioned	

penalties	simultaneously

The	Prison	Director

The	Prison	Director

The	Prison	Director

The	Prison	Director

The	Prison	Director

The	Prison	Director

Prison Authority Chief

Prison Authority Chief

Section	3

Escape

Article	(81)

All	tools,	machines	and	equipment	which	may	be	used	as	dangerous	weapons or	to	facilitate	an escape	such	as	

portable	ladders,	construction	materials, whitening	substances	and	others	are	to	be	meticulously	monitored	when	

in	use,	and	must	be	returned	and	kept	after	use	in	a	permanently	sealed	location that	is	under	constant	thorough	

monitoring	inaccessible	to	prisoners

Article	(82)

When	prisoners	are	assigned work	outside	prison,	they	must	work	in	groups,	and	must	be	assigned	adequate	

security

Article	(83)

Sufficient	and	adequate	security	meticulously	chosen	must	be	appointed	when	transferring	prisoners	to	and	from	

courts,	prosecutions,	hospitals	and	others	according	to	the	need,	taking	into	consideration	the	number	of	

prisoners	and	the	threat	they	pose,	in	addition,	extra	precautions	are	to	be	taken	when	transferring	prisoners	from	

one	prison	to	another

Article	(84)

Prisoners	are	not	to	be	taken	out	of	prison	in	severe	storms,	foggy	conditions	that	obstruct	visibility,	heavy	rain,	

and	so	on	until	weather	conditions	improve	
Article	(85)

If	a	prisoner	escapes,	the	nearest	outpost	or	police	station	must	be	immediately	notified	and	updated	of	all	the	

information and	details related	to	their	sentence,	residency	record,	and	description	in	addition	to	any	other	

information	that	aid	in	their	capture.	Moreover,	the	respective	prosecution	and	authority	issuing	their	sentence	

must	be	notified	and	a	sample	must	be	sent	to	the	Forensic	Investigation	Department as	well	as	notifying	the	

prison	chief.

Article	(86)

The	Prison	Director	or	Warden	must	regularly	ensure	the	integrity	of	the	prisoner	housing structure,	places	of	

work,	doors	and	windows, with	specific	regard	to	locations	containing	dangerous	prisoners or	those	that	pose	a	

threat	of	escape.

Article	(87)

The	name	of	the	escaping	prisoner	must	be	logged	in	the	allocated record,	and	the	Prison	Director	or	Warden	must	

follow	up with	the relevant	security	forces	every	three	months	until	the	fugitive	is	arrested	and	to	log	the	numbers	

and	correspondence	leading	up	to	the	arrest	in	the	same	record.

Article	(88)

The	duration	of	escape	is	added	to	the	imprisonment	term	from	the	day	of	escape.	The	imprisonment	orders,	

implementation	and	all	orders	related	to	the	prisoner	are	to	be	kept	in	their	file	that	must	be	kept	in	a	specific	

location.

Article	(89)

The	Prison Authority Chief	is	permitted	to	order	prisoners	susceptible	to	escape	to	wear	specific	uniforms	or	

distinctive	marks.

Chapter	10

Special	Release	and	Final	Release

Section1

Special	Release

Article	(90)

The	Minister,	based	on	the	prison	chief's	report,	reports to	President	of	Republic a	list	of	names of	prisoners	

sentenced	to	liberty	deprivation and	whom are	subject	to	the	application	of	Article	(104),		that	outlines	their	

release	in	religious	and	national	occasions	in	order	to	issue	a	release	as	he	sees fit.

Article	(91)

The	Prison	Directors	of the	different	provinces	must	send	to	the	Prison Authority Chief	a	list,	which	is	to	be	

received	two	months	ahead	the	above-mentioned	occasions for	prisoners	sentenced	to	liberty	deprivation	in	

provincial	prisons	and	those	whom	are	subject	to	the	following	conditions:	

1- Prisoner	sentenced	to	liberty	deprivation	for	15	years	or	more whose	date	of	release	is	8	months	apart	

from	the	relevant	occasion.

2- Prisoner	sentenced	liberty	deprivation to	10	years	or	less,	whose	date	of	release	is	6	months	apart	from	

the	relevant	occasion.

3- Prisoner	sentenced	to	liberty	deprivation for	4	years	and	less	than	10	years,	whose	date	of	release	is four	

months apart from the	relevant	occasion.

4- Prisoner	sentenced	to	liberty	deprivation	for	1 year	and	less	than	4	years,	whose	date	of	release	is	2	

months	apart	from	the	relevant	occasion.

Article	(92)

A	committee	is	to	be	formed	in	every	prison	and	is	to	be	chaired	by	the	Prison	Director,	with	the membership	of	

the social	specialist	and	the Chief	of	the	Vocational Training	Committee.	The committee	is	to	review	the	prisoners'	

files	that	are	eligible	according	to	the	conditions	prescribed	in	the	previous	article	and	to	recommend	the release

or its	deprivation whilst	clarifying	the	reasons	for	refusing	to	recommend	a	release	stating	the	name	of	every	

prisoner,	accordingly,	the	committee	must	notify	the	relevant	provincial	security	of	every	prisoner	recommended	

for	a	release.
Article	(93)

The	committee	must make or	withhold its	recommendations	according	to	the	following	rules:

1. The	prisoner	must	be	of	good reputation	and conduct	during	the	prison	term.

2. The	prisoner	must	have	benefited	from	the social	and	vocational	rehabilitation	programs

3. The	period	spent	by	the	prisoner	in	prison must	have	been	sufficient to	reform	and	rehabilitate	them

4. The	prisoner	must have fulfilled all	financial	obligations	of	the	sentence

5. No	threat	to	public	security	and	possibility	of	crime	pursuant	to	their	release

Article	(94)

Three	copies	of	the	recommendations	of	release must	be	sent, that	include	the	names	of	the	prisoners	that	are	

subject	to	the	conditions	outline	in	Article	(106)	of	this	regulation stating	their	name,	their	restraint	number,	crime	

committed,	length	of	sentence,	its	start	and	end,	source	of	judgment,	the	date	in	which	three	quarters	of	the	

imprisonment	term	have	lapsed	and	number	of	prior	convictions	followed	by	any	notes	of	the	committee,	if	any.

Article	(95)

A	committee is	to	be	formed comprising of	the	prison	chief,	representatives	of	the	Minister	of	Justice,	the	

Attorney-General	and	relevant	security	forces	to	screen	the	case	of	each	prisoner	that	is	subject	to	the	above	

mentioned	rules	and	regulations.	The	committee	must	then	notify	the	Minister in	a	uniform	consensus	of	the	

prisoner	recommended	for	special	release	whilst	clarifying	the	reasons	from	withholding	their	recommendation	of	

others,	stating	the	name	of	each	respectively.

Article	(96)

Prisoners	are to	be released	only	after	the	prison	director	receives	an	official notice	from	the	Minister	or	the	Prison

Authority	Chief	based	on	the	President	of	the	Republic’s	decision.

Article	(97)

The	prisoner	whom	the President	of the Republic	grants	special	release	is	to	be	released	in	the	morning	of	the	

occasion.

Article	(98)

In	compliance	with	the	punitive	measure	regulations	No.	(13)	of	the	year	1994,	the	Prison Authority	Chief	may	

notify	the	Attorney	General	of	those	eligible	for	conditional	release	and	those	whom	the	conditions	apply	to	

according	to	the	law.

Section	2

Final	Release

Article	(99)

The prisoner	held	in	precautionary	detention	must	be immediately released	at	the	end	of	their	imprisonment	

term, or	by	a	written	order	from	the	relevant	prosecutor	or	authority	issuing	the	detention	order.

Article	(100)

The	prisoner	must be	released	the	morning	that	follows	the	completion	of	their	respective	sentence unless	

punitive	regulation	measures	state	otherwise.

Article	(101)

This decree	shall	be	effective	from	the	date	it	is issued and	shall	be	published	in	an	official	gazette.

Issued	by	the	Republican	Presidency- Sana’a

13/July/1999

Minister	of	Interior Prime	Minister President	of	the	Republic

Major	General/	 Dr.	Abdul	Kareem	Ali	 Ali	Abdullah	Saleh

Hussein	Mohammed	Arab Al-Iryani
 5

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Chairman of the Board: Steven J. Hadley

Vice Chairman: George E. Moose

President: Nancy Lindborg

Chief Financial Officer: Michael Graham

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, 

D.C.• George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The 

George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former 

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under 

George W. Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph Eldridge, University 

Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. 

Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram 

U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, Nev. • 

Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International 

Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John A. Lancaster, 

Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, 

Potsdam, N.Y. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, Va. • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense 

• Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National 

Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
2 Looking for Justice

Still in the midst of its post–Arab Spring political transition, Yemen faces serious security sector reform challenges, not least in its detention system. As this report 

documents, security is universally weak across central prisons, facilities are overcrowded, care is substandard, and 

guards are barely trained. Reforming the prison system 

needs to be at the core of any overall strategy for improving Yemen’s rule of law institutions. Despite the many 

challenges, however, small windows of opportunity for 

prison reform are emerging. Many, in fact, are well within 

reach. The chance to embrace change in this crucial 

period should not be missed.

Of Related Interest

■ Justice in Transition in Yemen: A Mapping of Local Justice Functioning in Ten 

Governorates in Yemen by Erica Gaston with Nadwa al-Dawsari 

(Peaceworks, September 2014)

■ Dispute Resolution and Justice Provision in Yemen’s Transition by Erica 

Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsari (Special Report, April 2014)

■ Yemen in Transition: Between Fragmentation and Transformation by Philip 

Barrett Holzapfel (Peaceworks, March 2014)

■ Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue by Erica Gaston 

(Special Report, February 2014)

■ Waiting for Change: The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in 

Yemen by Erica Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsari (Peaceworks, April 2013)

PEACEWORKS • MARCH 2015 • NO. 106

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